Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 618 - Yemen War Mosaic 618

Yemen Press Reader 618: 24. Jan. 2020: Ein Besuch auf Sokotra – Das Stockholmer Abkommen, ein Jahr später – Politische Spaltungen im Südjemen – Munition von Rheinmetall Denel: Mord u. Zerstörung
Bei diesem Beitrag handelt es sich um ein Blog aus der Freitag-Community

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

... Munition von Rheinmetall Denel: Mord und Zerstörung im Jemen – Die Lizensierung von Waffenexporten und internationale Verantwortung für illegalen Waffenhandel – und mehr

Jan. 24, 2020: A visit at Socotra – The Stockholm agreement, one year later – Political divides in southern Yemen – Rheinmetall Denel Munition: Murder and mayhem in Yemen – Arms export licensing and international responsibility for unlawful arms transfers – and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2:

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Seuchen / Most important: Epidemics

cp1b Am wichtigsten: Kampf um Hodeidah / Most important: Hodeidah battle

cp1c Angriff auf Marib tötet 116 Soldaten und andere / Attack at Marib kills 116 soldiers and others

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp8a Jamal Khashoggi

cp9 USA

cp9a1 USA-Iran Krise: Wachsende Spannungen am Golf: Deutsch / US-Iran crisis: Mounting tensions at the Gulf: German

cp9a2 USA-Iran Krise: Wachsende Spannungen am Golf: Englisch / US-Iran crisis: Mounting tensions at the Gulf: English

cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain

cp11 Deutschland / Germany

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp12a Katar-Krise / Qatar crisis

cp12b Sudan

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms Trade

cp13b Mercenaries / Söldner

cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp18 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification




(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

(** B P)

Photo Essay: Socotra, Out of One Cyclone and Into Another

During a trip to Yemen in mid-2019, I visited the Socotra archipelago, where another chapter of the Yemeni conflict is being written today. I spent several days there, interviewing locals and visiting important places. Developments in Socotra illustrate how the island has become a regional football, much as have other parts of Yemen, while the internationally-recognized government of President ‘Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi has struggled to maintain its authority.

Socotra, in the northwest Indian Ocean near the Gulf of Aden, is the largest of Yemen’s islands and is a part of an archipelago consisting of four islands and two rocky islets. Two of the islands, ‘Abd al-Kuri and Samha, are inhabited, while a third, Darsa, is uninhabited. Socotra, which was declared a natural reserve in 2000, has an area of 3,650 square kilometers. The archipelago was a part of Hadhramawt Governorate, before becoming its own governorate in 2013.

Socotra has a population of some 90,000 people, but in the last five years the number has increased dramatically because of the arrival of people fleeing the war in mainland Yemen, with some statistics estimating the population at 150,000. Most live in Hadibo, the capital.

Traveling to Socotra is no longer easy for Yemenis. The only way to access the island is by flying Yemenia, the national carrier of Yemen, which flies there only once a week, a frequency requiring passengers to book long in advance. One can also go to the island by sea, from Hadhramawt and Mahra, but this is only allowed for the island’s inhabitants. Since the United Arab Emirates (UAE) began operating the airport in 2016 and Saudi troops deployed to the island in 2018, the security authorities have imposed a heavy fine on boat owners bringing passengers who are not from Socotra. However, there are two flights a week, sometimes more, to the island from Abu Dhabi airport. The fact that it is easier to visit Socotra from the UAE than it is from Yemen itself offers a glimpse of the current situation there.

From the arrival hall at Socotra airport one immediately senses the changes in the island. The first thing I received was a text message welcoming me to “Saudi Arabia.” I soon understood the reason why when noticing the camps of Saudi Arabian military forces nearby.

In February 2016, the then-Yemeni prime minster, Khalid Bahah, signed several agreements with Emirati aid organizations to implement developmental projects in Socotra.

Since that time, the UAE has expanded its involvement in Socotra through several means. It began by buying the loyalty of the local authorities by paying extra salaries to public servants as well as giving new cars to key officials. It has also paid salaries to tribal leaders, including the heads of smaller tribal groups. In addition, the UAE has unified Yemeni security institutions present in Socotra under one authority, centralizing security matters in the island.

In terms of soft power, the UAE has built or renovated dozens of schools across the island, as well as building or expanding mosques, including family mosques. Given that the island community is religious, this has enhanced the Emiratis’ credibility. The UAE has provided school buses and has distributed scholarships to study in Emirati universities. It has also sponsored social activities such as group marriages. Its most significant project is the establishment of the Sheikh Khalifa Hospital to provide medical treatment for islanders, while those requiring surgery are sent to the UAE.

The Emirati presence in Socotra pushed the Saudis to also think about expanding their influence in the strategic island – by Ahmed Nagi (with photos)

(** B K P)

Yemen’s hopes and expectations - Part 1: the Stockholm agreement

What has been the outcome of the Stockholm agreement, a year after it was reached?

As the new year starts, and the fifth year of internationalised war in Yemen nears its end, what are the prospects for Yemenis in 2020? Are they likely to see any real improvements in their living conditions? An end to the war? An end to being talked about as ‘the world’s worst humanitarian crisis’? An end to being described as ‘a proxy war’? The beginning of an era of peace and reconstruction? Millions of Yemenis must hope that this year will bring a positive answer to these and plenty other questions. Most of them are also probably more realistically aware of the great gap between hope and expectation. While their expectations are certainly far more modest, they must at least hope that there will be some improvement to the situation. So what happened in 2019? Did any of the Yemeni or coalition leaders do anything to reach a solution or peace for the Yemeni people? Did any of them give any consideration to the suffering of the population?

What is in the Stockholm Agreement?

2019 started with great hopes in the international community thanks to the UN-sponsored Stockholm Agreement reached on 13 December 2018 after a week of negotiations in Sweden

The entire document is only 3 pages, and it would be very difficult to produce something vaguer

Fourteen months later, what has happened? Nothing more has been heard of the Taiz element and no progress made to de-escalate fighting in the city and governorate of Taiz. Both have mostly been liberated from Huthi control, but the Huthis retain certain pockets from which they occasionally attack the forces opposing them. However they don’t have to do much, as the anti-Huthi forces are busy fighting each other as different factions vie for dominance.

Taiz city is one of the strongholds of the Islah party, and much of the fighting is between the Islah-related government forces and those of Abu Abbas, a warlord close to the Salafis and al Qaeda but, being anti-Islah, has access to UAE assistance.

The exchange of prisoners remains an issue of deep concern to thousands of prisoners and their families. Most observers were surprised at the numbers included in the agreement, as the expectation was of a few thousand at most. Regardless, the current situation is that only a few hundred have been returned to their families.

The Hodeida agreement

The agreement on Hodeida is the main element of the Stockholm Agreement and certainly the one which has received the most attention from the UN Special Envoy [UNSE] and his team. Hodeida is the main port through which basic commodities arrive and reach the majority of the Yemeni population. Yemenis depend on imports for more than 90% of their wheat and 100% of other basics [rice, tea, sugar, etc.] as well as most fuel.

The main positive achievement of the Stockholm agreement has been on the Hodeida front. Fighting in Hodeida effectively ceased for almost a year, and the cease fire has more or less held for 13 months now. This has been thanks to the presence on the ground of the UN Mission to support the Hodeida Agreement [UNMHA] established in January 2019and whose mandate was renewed for a further six months on 13 January 2020. Although it faced considerable difficulties and is on its third leader, it is now fully staffed and has set up 4 ‘observation posts’ in Hodeida city, which are contributing to keeping the area free of fighting and facilitating transit of goods between the port and the roads to the interior. Less successful has been the ‘redeployment of forces’ which called for the redeployment of forces from both sides and the handover of the three ports to local security forces agreed by both parties and endorsed by the UN. This formulation of course allowed each side to interpret the situation as they wished, which is precisely what they did.


Later in the year, continuing lack of progress was notable despite the resumption of meetings by the Joint Redeployment Committee: an indicator of the lack of trust is that all its meetings since early 2019 have taken place on board a UN ship in the high seas, due to the inability to agree on a meeting place in Hodeida itself. By the end of the year, they had agreed a mechanism for the payment of port revenues to the Hodeida Branch of the Central Bank of Yemen, whose funds are to be used to pay salaries of civil servants. To date this has not been implemented.

Overall the outcome of the Stockholm agreement, a year after it was reached, is very limited. In particular it has not prevented the Huthis from increasing their influence in the part of Yemen they control nor has it reduced their control in Hodeida governorate.

Despite the hopes of the UN, it has demonstrated one of its most surprising statements, that it ‘shall not be considered a precedent to be referred to in any subsequent consultations or negotiations.’ The presence of the UNMHA has forced the coalition to abandon its plan to conquer Hodeida, leaving it without a military strategy to defeat the Huthis. This was one factor which encouraged the Saudis to start direct negotiations with the Huthis, and was probably the main reason for the UAE to announce its military withdrawal from Yemen in mid-2019, which has only been partially implemented. This probably played a role in inducing its southern separatist ally to expel the Hadi government from Aden in August 2019, the subject of part 2 of this series – by Helen Lackner

My remark: Another report on this subject in cp7.

(** B K P)

War and pieces: Political divides in southern Yemen


Since the 2010s, a wide range of separatist movements have represented the main political demands in southern Yemen.

These groups are motivated by their geographical and historical origins, backed by various foreign powers, and divided by their demands for independence or autonomy.

The Southern Transitional Council, the most prominent separatist group, claims to represent the south as a whole but it has limited control over parts of western governorates.

The 2019 clash between the council and the internationally recognised government poses the most serious threat to the anti-Houthi coalition since the start of the Yemen conflict.

The implementation of the Riyadh Agreement is far behind schedule and it is unclear whether Saudi Arabia will be able to enforce the deal, given the UAE’s withdrawal from Yemen.

The European Union should continue to support development and state-building in Yemen, increase its efforts to mediate between Yemenis, and develop institutional and democratic platforms on which southerners can achieve self-determination.

From the Introduction

Foreign powers involved in the broader war in Yemen have paid limited attention to southern separatism, partly because they all want the country to remain unified. Yet their approach is unsustainable: the war puts the country at risk of disintegration. Only by addressing the diverse, complex challenges that have arisen in southern Yemen can the European Union succeed in its efforts to create neutral, constructive avenues for mediation and development across the country.

This paper focuses on the origins, development, and prospects of political challenges in southern Yemen. It begins with an analysis of historical divisions in the south, outlining key issues within specific governorates – including the political fragmentation that has occurred since 2015, when the war in Yemen first gained an international dimension. The paper concludes by examining the significance of the Riyadh Agreement, as well as the implications for the south of current attempts to end the war. It argues that EU policymakers need to address the diverse, complex problems facing southern Yemen if they are to create a sustainable solution to the conflict – and makes several recommendations for how they could achieve this. The EU should continue to support development and state-building in Yemen, and should increase its efforts to mediate between southerners, as well as between southerners and northerners. This would promote cooperation and coexistence, encouraging the development of institutional and democratic platforms upon which southerners can achieve self-determination.


Within the south, there are numerous groups separated both by perceived identities and by competition over the region’s sparse natural resources. These groups are not defined by residence in the current governorates but by different factors: their allegiance is first to the memory of the “national” entities of Aden and the Protectorates and second to new political institutions and movements that emerged in the decades since unification. For example, in wadi Hadhramaut, there is now a political entity covering areas that were once part of both the Kathiri and Qu’ayti states but are unified thanks to a broad allegiance of low-status supporters of Islah. As a result, they form a significant part of the IRG’s military forces under the leadership of Vice-President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar. Further west, the alignments of the 1986 conflict largely overlap with the current rivalry between the IRG and the STC.

Strategically important, sparsely populated Al Mahrah is forced to deal with many external claims on its territory. Although Shabwa has some hydrocarbon resources and the Marib-Balhaf gas pipeline, these assets do not provide significant employment for its population. Further west, Abyan, Lahij, and Dhali’ – formerly part of the PDRY – have few natural resources and a largely poor population that has for centuries sustained itself through migration and raiding. The conflicts between the historical micro-states contained within these governorates are likely to re-emerge in a new form. Indeed, these governorates now provide most of the troops and leaders of Salafist forces the UAE has trained and deployed.

Meanwhile, the internationalisation of the Yemen conflict and the interests of the two main leaders of the coalition add another dimension to these rivalries. For instance, the situation in Al Mahrah has been shaped by Saudi Arabia’s determination to achieve one of its long-term strategic objectives: bypassing the constraints imposed by its reliance on the Strait of Hormuz, which threaten its access to the high seas for energy trade. Similarly, the UAE’s support for the STC in Aden and other ports is designed to develop Emirati maritime supremacy along the coasts of the Arabian Peninsula, as well as to exert influence over a rival to the IRG and thus to oppose Islah. Foreign military interventions in the past decade have deepened Yemen’s devastating humanitarian crisis and accelerated the administrative failures of both de facto and internationally recognised local authorities. These exogenous initiatives increase Yemeni dependency on external agencies while undermining the capacity of local actors and institutions to develop their own mechanisms for dealing with the situation.

The war has exacerbated the political fragmentation of the south and southern separatists have proven unable to overcome their factional rivalries or develop strategies that address the population’s social, economic, and political development problems. They offer no programme that generates support outside the region they represent and, therefore, are susceptible to foreign influence. While the south is torn between a multiplicity of diverging movements and separatist claims, the Houthis are running a tight ship in the areas they control, hoping to extend their governance model across the whole country. Although their ideology is widely abhorred, the Houthis offer the kind of strong, centralised control that some people long for. Just as many Yemenis opposed the socialist regime but respected it for imposing law and order – and for its broader organisational capabilities – they may see the benefits of Houthi rule, particularly given the chaos within the IRG. Fragmentation can be tempting: as the Tihami and other groups demonstrated in the National Dialogue Conference, allowing one political entity to claim special rights to a specific region only encourages others to follow suit.

In this complex and risky environment, European policymakers should be careful to avoid actions likely to further fragment Yemen and its south in particular. The country needs a strong but sensitive new government that the citizenry – who have come to see the force of arms as the authorities’ main form of control – view as just and legitimate. In designing and implementing interventions, foreign powers must take into consideration the historical, geopolitical, economic, and social nuances of southern Yemen. In the search of a settlement to end the war, the EU and other members of the international community should work to restore a sense of nationhood within Yemen. To this end, they should launch projects and other activities designed to reduce social tension between southerners and northerners. The EU should assist Yemeni parties in engaging in internal discussions on the future of the south within a united Yemen, providing them with a stronger and more durable opportunity for autonomy through a democratic process – by Helen Lackner and Raiman al-Hamdani

Comment by Elisabeth Kendall: New 30-page @ecfr brief casts much-needed light on complex power dynamics inside south #Yemen. In some areas, the interpretation of who really holds sway on the ground is controversial (certainly debatable). But it's a useful exposée of the main divides

#Yemen fragmentation: Significantly, the @ecfr brief refers to the Hadi government as IRG (internationally recognized government) as opposed to the more usual GOY (government of Yemen); and it refers to the STC as the most prominent southern separatist "group" among many

(** B K P)

Rheinmetall Denel Munition: Murder and mayhem in Yemen

Companies with South African links have been allowed to supply Saudi Arabia and its allies with weapons — despite the humanitarian destruction the war in Yemen has wrought.

A South African-based defence firm has been involved in selling weaponry suspected of fuelling the crisis linked to human rights violations in Yemen. This practice was halted only in 2019 when export controls tightened by the South African government came into effect.

While some seem worried about potential loss of jobs and financial hurt to the arms industry, there is also real tragedy in the backdrop of extreme violence and loss of life that these arms sales have caused.

While the geopolitics of this story are important, we should not lose sight of the powerful private arms companies that have continued to profit from this war by supplying the weapons that have fuelled it. Some of these are apparently close to home and include South African-based Rheinmetall Denel Munition Pty Ltd. (RDM). RDM is a joint venture between state-owned arms company Denel (which holds a 49% stake) and German arms company Rheinmetall AG (51%).

RDM specialises in the design, development and manufacturing of medium- and large-size ammunition and is the global frontrunner in ammunition primers and detonators; the company also specialises in the production of 120mm mortars. In addition, RDM exports this mortar ammunition to both the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

There is increasing evidence that the Saudi-UAE coalition forces have targeted civilians and that the weapons produced in RDM’s four facilities on South African soil can be linked to the death of civilians in Yemen.

In 2016, the Al-Kharj military facility in Riyadh, reportedly built in collaboration with RDM, was officially opened by former president Jacob Zuma. This facility produces heavyweight aircraft bombs and 600 mortar missiles a day. With regard to complicity in war crimes, this is hugely dangerous as South African arms companies, such as RDM, run the risk of aiding countries such Saudi Arabia to build and establish factories that have the capability of creating internationally banned cluster munitions.

As a South African-based company, RDM is of course still subject to South African and international law. Formally, South Africa has one of the most advanced and progressive arms export laws and processes in Africa, the bedrock of which, on paper at least, are human rights considerations and transparency.

This is where the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) fits in.

The NCACC, created to break with apartheid’s history of secretive arms deals, supervises all arms exports from South Africa. It also enforces the Conventional Arms Control Act of 2002 which prohibits South Africa from supplying arms to countries where human rights are being abused or where they might destabilise a region.

In theory, this transparent system should have prevented the supply of South African-manufactured weapons to the conflict in Yemen. Yet, as described above, the artillery shells found at the scene of civilian attacks in Yemen presents the clearest possible evidence that local arms exports to the Saudi coalition are being used to commit the most serious human rights abuses and violations of international law.

RDM has been an important element of this booming business. Established only in 2008, it has enjoyed impressive revenues. RDM’s profits are largely generated from exports, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been particularly important markets. In 2014, when the war in Yemen began, RDM saw a 20% spike in its export revenue, and it has enjoyed these high returns since.

It is clear that South African companies have been allowed to supply Saudi Arabia and its allies with weapons — despite the humanitarian destruction the war in Yemen has wrought. As increasing evidence suggests, this trade is complicit in war crimes and the murder of civilians.

While the conflict in Yemen causes widespread human suffering, arms companies such as RDM — with an important shareholding by the South African public — have until recently seen the world through the lens of dollar bills. This is largely blind to a civilian crisis and instead sees a profitable market for its bombs and munitions.

Arms companies should no longer be left unaccountable — the South African government, as co-owner of RDM, on behalf of the South African people, must put a permanent stop to the dirty profits from a war that is a violation of human rights – by Open Secrets

(** B K P)

A Hard Sell? Arms Export Licensing and International Responsibility for Unlawful Arms Transfers – Part I

Domestic licensing procedures implementing the international legal obligation to ban weapons transfers that are likely to provide assistance to serious violations of international law have failed to do so. States continue to sell weapons where there is a voluminous record attesting to the buyer’s structural inability to comply with key international legal principles, to their past record of serious violations of international law and thus to the eventuality that the arms sold will be used for the perpetuation of serious violations. What does it take, then, to bring about the revocation of such arms licenses, or hold to account the licensing authority or company benefiting therefrom? Thousands of arms are sold every day, but regrettably only spectacular conflicts, such as the one in Yemen, have helped bring some of the human consequences of such well-oiled supply chains to light.

In both its 2018 and 2019 reports, the UN Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen called for a cession of all transfers of arms that could be used by the parties to the conflict, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, due to apparent patterns of serious violations, including war crimes. Yet arms-supplying states, including the UK, Italy, Spain and France, continue to authorize arms transfers by their corporate nationals destined to be used by perpetrators of international law violations in Yemen. For years now, leading human rights organizations have scrutinized the complicity of States engaged in such sales and called for their embargo. A legal opinion released on 10 December 2019 by the International Peace Information Service (IPIS), to which I contributed, sets out the international responsibility of arms-supplying states that provide military support to parties in the Yemen conflict. A communication to the ICC submitted on 11 December 2019 by Mwatana for Human Rights, the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), Amnesty International, and CAAT, argues that government and corporate officials involved in such transfers should be investigated and prosecuted for aiding and abetting international crimes.

These recent interventions are part of a years-long effort by practitioners and NGOs to challenge ongoing arms transfers linked with the Yemen conflict. The scale and diversity of the proceedings brought before domestic judges to question the legality of Yemen-linked arms licenses presents an occasion to investigate the accountability gaps for arms-supplying states and corporate actors in domestic and international law. This two-part post is an initial reflection on the limits of international arms control law, as highlighted by Yemen, and on how practitioners might chart a way forward. The Global Legal Action Network (GLAN) and its partners are engaged in a project to study the revelations of the ongoing challenges to arms transfers in the context of the Yemen conflict as regards to international responsibility and international arms-export control law.

Without access to the evidence available to the supplying states, or to their criteria for assessing buying states’ conduct and the kind of circumstances that would mandate the suspension of a license, the supplying state can plausibly claim that it appropriately relies on assurances from the buying state that certain procedures or attacks will not recur. In the CAAT case, for instance, the High Court held that the UK government knew more than NGOs about Saudi Arabia’s (and other coalition members’) targeting processes and practices without needing to explain the information available to the government or what assessments the government had made of Saudi Arabia’s attitude towards international law. Notwithstanding the opacity that supplying states effectively maintain while purporting to implement the ATT, an even more demanding burden is that the person or organization attempting to challenge these sales typically must show the transfer was made in ‘actual knowledge’ of the likely use of the arms in serious violations. These hurdles of the licensing process significantly alleviate the need that governments feel to adopt preventive measures to end arms sales that risk complicity, and provide supplying states with counter-arguments to deflect questions of international responsibility. They blunt the prohibition on transfers of arms likely to be used in violative ways by allowing supplying states’ authorities to engage in a process that is largely devoid of a review of substantive questions of international responsibility or, more significantly, the factual analysis of the human consequences of such dealings.– by Valentina Azarova

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Seuchen / Most important: Epidemics

(* A H P)

Rights activist: Prisoners infected with dengue fever at Aden’s Bir Ahmed prison need outside treatment

Huda Al-Sarari warned that the mosquito-borne illness would likely spread throughout the prison if the inmates aren't treated

Huda Al-Sarari, a prominent Aden-based lawyer and human rights activist, told Almasdar Online on Wednesday that seven of the detainees at the UAE-run Bir Ahmed prison in the southern port city of Aden have confirmed infections with dengue fever.

One detainee is in severe condition, she said, but prison officials have denied treatment for the infected prisoners outside the detention facility, which is located in Yemen's interim capital.

Al-Sarari said she was concerned about the plight of the detainees due to the rapid spread of the mosquito-borne disease in the prison.

Several prisoners started an open hunger strike to protest the lack of medical care for their colleagues

(B H)

The danger of malnutrition and fevers threatens civilians in al-Maqaterah in Lahj governorate. The health office in the district documented 144 cases of malnutrition and 92 cases of dengue fever

(B H)

World Health Organization: Update on the Expanded Programme on Immunization, December 2019

Yemen’s Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) uses routine and specialized vaccination campaigns to protect children under one year of age from life-threatening diseases, including diphtheria, cholera and polio. More than 82% of targeted children under 1 year old were reached with various EPI vaccines. In total over 50 million doses of different vaccine, including oral cholera vaccine administered in 2019 through the EPI, with an average coverage of 80%, during the different campaigns conducted.

Yemen has been polio free since 2006. In December 2019, WHO and UNICEF conducted a 3-day nationwide polio campaign to protect over 4 million children under the age of 5. The recent campaign covered 317 out of 333 districts and all 22 governorates across the country.

During the campaign, around 4 538 861 (85%) children under-5 years of age received polio vaccine with the help of 18 133 house-to-house vaccination teams.

(B H)

World Health Organization: Yemen: Preliminary results for National Polio Campaign December 2019

cp1b Am wichtigsten: Kampf um Hodeidah / Most important: Hodeidah battle

(A K pS)

Houthis continue to shell al-Duraihimi in south Hodeidah

(A K P)

[Sanaa gov.] Local, Health and Hodeidah’s Port Authorities Expose Impact of US-Saudi Siege on Yemen to EU Ambassadors

(A K pH)

US-Saudi Aggression’s Daily Update for Wednesday, January 22nd, 2020

(A K)

Roadside bomb kills 2 civilians in Yemen's Hodeidah

At least two civilians from the same family were killed as a roadside bomb struck a vehicle in Yemen's Red Sea port city of Hodeidah on Wednesday, a local security official told Xinhua.

"The two civilians were going to the public market to sell their vegetables ... when their vehicle ran over a mine planted by the Houthi rebels," the security source said on condition of anonymity.

only reporting one killed:

(A K pS)

A citizen's martyrdom due to the explosion of an explosive device planted by the Houthi militia in Al-Qataba, Hodeidah

Film: A displaced person was killed in an explosion of an improvised explosive device that was laid by #Houthi militia in Al Tuhaita, south the port city of #Hodeidah.

(A K pH)

US-Saudi Aggression’s Daily Update for Tuesday, January 21st, 2020

(A K pH)

Two Children Injured by Bomb, Remnants of US-Saudi Aggression, in Hodeidah

(A H P)

Örtliche Behörde[der Sanaa-Regierung] in Hodeidah verurteilt Entscheidung des Ernährungsprogramms, Hilfsgüternslieferung an Al-Duraihimi zu verhindern

cp1c Angriff auf Marib tötet 116 Soldaten und andere / Attack at Marib kills 116 soldiers and others

(* A K P)

Hadi minister accuses UAE of targeting mercenary camps

Pro-Hadi mercenaries hit by Emirati bombings, Ahmed al-Maisari claims

The so-called Minister of the Interior of the Saudi-owned puppet government of Hadi, Ahmed al-Misari, has accused Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates of attacking a Yemeni mercenary camp in Ma’rib.

The accusation were made during during an interview with Al Jazeera TV on Wednesday.

Al-Maisari said that the attack on the camp in Ma’rib “is not the first and will not be the last,” adding that “condolences are not enough.”

He called on the Saudi-UAE coalition to respond positively with a clear answer about what happened, since they are the ones who control the airspace across occupied Yemen.

“This incident should not go unnoticed, as the UAE air force has targeted our forces in al-Alam,” he said.

Al-Misari continued: ” We will deal with our Saudi brothers based on what we see on the ground.”

(* A K P)

Ansarullah rejects Saudi claim of its role in Yemen’s Ma’rib attack

A senior official with Yemen’s Houthi Ansarullah movement dismissed a claim by Riyadh and Dubai that it was behind a recent deadly attack against a military camp belonging to pro-Saudi militants in the northern city of Ma’rib.
“If we had carried out the attack, we would have announced it publicly,” said Mohammad al-Bakhiti, a member of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council, in an interview with the Al Jazeera on Monday.
The missile attack on Saturday targeted a military camp occupied by Saudi-backed militiamen loyal to the ex-Yemeni government in Ma’rib. Reports say there were also forces from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other countries at the site.

(* A K P)

Yemen dismisses Saudi, UAE claim of Houthi role in deadly missile attack in Ma’rib

Yemen’s ruling Houthi Ansarullah movement has rejected a claim by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that it was behind a deadly missile attack against the positions of pro-Riyadh militants in the northern city of Ma’rib.

Saturday's missile attack targeted a military camp in Ma’rib, where Saudi-backed militiamen loyal to the government of ex-president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi are based.

The Saudi regime and the UAE — two key parties to a Riyadh-led coalition waging war on Yemen — blamed the raid on the Houthi movement, which has been defending the country against the massive military invasion.

However, Mohammad al-Bakhiti, a member of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council, denied any role in the missile strike in an interview with the Al Jazeera television network late on Monday.

“If we [Houthi fighters] had carried out the attack, we would have announced it publicly,” said the official.'rib-missile-attack-Saudi-arabia

(A K P)

Yemeni Calls to End the Coup Militarily

A Houthi attack on a mosque in a Yemeni army camp in Marib Governorate sparked popular rage of Yemeni politicians, activists, and military leaders who vowed to respond appropriately to the attack, which they described as “treacherous.”
Yemeni activists and politicians demanded the internationally-recognized government and army leaders quickly mobilize to defeat Houthi coup militias militarily.
Yemeni author and activist Hamdan al-Aleai considered that the proper response to the attack would be liberating Houthi-held Sanaa.
“This will protect Marib, Mocha, and other liberated areas from Houthi resurgence,” Aleai said, pointing out that freeing Sanaa is a matter of time only.

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Yemen: death toll rises to 116 from suspected Houthi missile attack

Military camp strike is one of bloodiest incidents in civil war, putting peace process in doubt

The death toll from a suspected Houthi rebel missile attack on Yemeni government forces has risen to at least 116, making it one of the bloodiest incidents in the country’s civil war, and threatening to derail the country’s fragile peace process.

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Film: The death toll of martyrs in the bombardment of al-Nusrafi camp Marib increased to 114

cp2 Allgemein / General

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Interactive Map of Yemen War

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North: Sanhan tribes continue to support fronts

Tribes of Sanhan area of Sanaa province held a tribal rally on Thursday to send food convoy and back the Yemen army in the battle fronts.

South: The tribes of AlJawf and Marib mobilise tribesmen to stop the Houthis attacks on the two provinces (film)

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Yemen in Focus: Nationwide violence shakes period of peace

This week we focus on a deadly attack on government forces, a newly-launched anti-Houthi offensive, and violence against children.

[Resuming last week]

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Jemen, Syrien und Somalia sind am korruptesten

Globale Schlusslichter waren der Jemen, Syrien, der Südsudan und Somalia.

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How The Missile Strike On A Yemen Base Affects The Ongoing Peace Process

NPR's Alisa Chang speaks with Peter Salisbury of the International Crisis Group about last Saturday's missile attack in Yemen, which killed at least 100 people.

SALISBURY: Well, this strike has been part of a series of escalations between the government of Yemen and the Houthis that we've seen, really, over the last two, three weeks that could threaten to disrupt a planned peace process this year. So they're really quite concerning.

So we'd already seen an increase in ground fighting along certain front lines to the east of Sana'a. And, really, that fighting has intensified. It's also led the Saudis, who are backing the internationally recognized government's forces, to launch air strikes against the Houthis. And if this is allowed to escalate, even if violence on the border is reducing, is falling, there is the risk that this could translate to an escalation across all the front lines in Yemen - there are many, many front lines; it's a very complex conflict - and really push us back into maybe the most intense fighting we've seen since the beginning of the war. It would cause a loss of faith among the Houthi political class who've been really pushing these talks with the Saudis and pushing the idea of a political settlement.

Certainly, we've seen a reduction in the number of Saudi strikes in northern Yemen, in areas that the Houthis control but not a complete halt. And it seems sort of inevitable consequence at this point that wherever there are sort of a large volume of Saudi strikes, they do seem to hit civilian targets, whether on purpose or not.

I'm not sure if the killing of Soleimani and, in fact, a U.S. attack on an Iranian commander inside Yemen are necessarily what caused this air strike. It seems to be much more connected to the fighting on the ground in Yemen and the strategic calculus of the Houthis and others. But at the same time, of course, that's going to play into the narrative, the story that both sides tell about why things are happening right now. = =

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Do not fight a man who lost everything and has nothing to lose. Lost, broken peoples in the Arab region, which were fostered by internal and interstate wars and conflicts. An entire generation did not know stability and the matter is getting worse day after day. What is the fullness of this falsehood that crises makers and war merchants bring to us?

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New Numbers for US-Saudi Crimes in Yemen during 1550 Days

Eye of Humanity Center for Human Rights and Development revealed a statistic of the US-Saudi aggression crimes in Yemen during 1550 days. The statistic confirmed that 41517 of the civilians were killed and injured, most of them children, elders and women

My comment: These figures are not precise (“killed and injured”). And Saudi interference lasts 1750 days now.

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

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Sana’a Airport Director Calls on United Nations to Abide by Its Obligations, Open The Airport

The Director General of Sana'a International Airport, Khaled Al-Shayef, expressed his hope that the visit of the UN envoy Martin Griffith to Sana'a Thursday will solve the issue of lifting the siege on Sana'a airport and launching the humanitarian air medical bridge.

Al-Shayef told Almasirah that the United Nations had not fulfilled its obligations regarding the lifting of the siege on Sana'a airport and the launch of the medical bridge to transport patients, which was expected to be launched at the beginning of January.

Al-Shayef pointed out that the UN envoy, after his arrival this afternoon at Sanaa airport, did not make any statement about lifting the siege on the airport, and went directly to meet officials in Sana'a, which indicates his indifference to the suffering of thousands of patients.


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During Arrival in Sana’a, Griffith Refuses Explaining Reasons for Obstructing Medical Bridge, Opening Sana’a Airport

During his reception at Sana’a International Airport, Griffith refused to explain the reasons for obstructing the medical bridge and the opening of Sana’a airport despite the repeated international promises to facilitate this issue.

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US-Saudi Aggression Continues its Arbitrary Measures, Detains 8 Oil Tankers

The Yemeni Petroleum Company announced that the US-Saudi aggression added another ship to the list of detained oil ships, bringing the number of detained oil tankers to eight. These ships are loaded with more than 200 thousand tons of diesel and kerosene.

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

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Obstruction of Medical Air Bridge, by US-Saudi Aggression, Continues, Stranding 32,000 Patients

The head of the Medical Committee and Humanitarian Medical Air Bridge, Dr. Mutahar Darwish, explained that "the US-Saudi aggression continues to obstruct the start of UN approved flights, of the air bridge. Each flight can help rescue more than 32 patients with severe diseases. These people are in need travel for treatment outside Yemen and are at risk of death. Amid repeated postponement of their departure, ambiguity of the United Nations position can't be explained” regarding this.

Dr. Darwish attributed the obstruction of the humanitarian medical bridge for two years to "political motives" rather than technical reasons. He said that "the World Health Organization blames the countries that will receive patients for the failure of the medical bridge, and that is not the truth." He added that "the World Health Organization did not provide any positive indication about the date of the first flight of the medical bridge or the programming of the rest of the trips."

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[Sana gov.] Minister of Health: Health Sector in Yemen Under Aggressive, Organized Attack

Minister of Health, Dr. Taha Al-Mutawakkil stressed that the health sector in Yemen is under an aggressive and organized attack aimed at attracting Yemeni medical personnel who are able to work outside the country.

Al-Mutawakkil remarks came on Thursday during the second extended practical meeting, which lasts for three consecutive days, in preparation for launching the stage of advancing the health situation in Hodeidah governorate, up to the rest of the governorates.

Al-Mutawakkil indicated that the Ministry works to achieve access to a comprehensive application of hospital standards and exit from dependence on organizations to self-reliance.

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Film: The mobile clinics of the UAE Red Crescent continue to provide medical services to the West Coast areas

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United Nations Population Fund: UNFPA Response in Yemen: Monthly Situation Report #12 December 2019

The UNFPA-led, Rapid Response Mechanism has provided lifesaving emergency relief items to 1.24 million displaced persons in 2019 alone.

The Yemen humanitarian aid operation continues to be the largest in the world reaching an average of 11.4 million people each month, an increase of 49 percent from 2018. This is despite a myriad of operational challenges such as delayed disbursement of pledges by donors in the first nine months of the year, ongoing conflict and other access restrictions.

By end December, the Yemen humanitarian operation had mobilized $3.88 billion, of which $3.48 billion was for activities within the 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP). This represents 83 per cent of the YHRP requirement for 2019 and the most funded in the world. With donor support, aid agencies were able to roll back catastrophic food insecurity in 29 of 45 districts facing Integrated Phase Classification 5 conditions, help millions of Yemenis overcome hunger, reduce the disease caseload and preserve the capacity of public sector institutions to deliver life-saving basic services.

UNFPA was able to mobilize 80 percent of its US$ 110.5 million appeal for 2019, by the end December, rolling back services that were closed or at the risk of closure during mid-year.

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Relief and Development Peer Foundation: Saving lives from falling even deeper into hunger

Mumbling to herself with a prayer mixed with a pale voice and eyes filled with tears of life’s suffering and cruelty. Reminiscing about the nights she spent thinking of the huge amount of pain and agony her children had to endure. For the first time in a while, experiencing a moment of great joy and happiness after a long battle with hunger, lacking the most basic needs of daily sustenance.

Qabul is a mother of 7 children who has struggled enough to make a living for four daughters and three sons.

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USAID Yemen: Activities

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Audio: Vergessene Krise: Wie überleben Menschen im Jemen?

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Hunger and disease is the fate of children in Yemen

Hunger and disease is the fate of millions of children in Yemen due to the war and the unjust blockade, a child dies every 10 minutes in Yemen from malnutrition, while 2.8 million children facing death as a result malnutrition like girl Amirah 15 month-old and weight 4 kg, suffers from severe malnutrition that we met her during our visit to provide aid for Aslam health center,

We appeal every human in the world to help our children and stop this unjust wAR now, stop suffering of our children.

Stop this tragedy. (photos)

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

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UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Protection Cluster: Protection Cluster: Yemen Response and Gap Analysis - Activities of Protection Cluster Including Child Protection and Women Protection Sub-Clusters, January - December 2019

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UN High Commissioner for Refugees: Somalia: Refugee returnees to Somalia (as of 31 December 2019)

From Yemen: 13,285; returnees to Yemen: 5,087.

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International Organization for Migration: IOM Yemen: Monthly Migration Overview, November 2019

Migratory flows from the Horn of Africa are mixed in nature, comprised mostly of migrant workers but also of refugees and asylum-seekers2 . Although the conflict in Yemen has not had a deterrent effect on flows, it has had an impact on the routes through the country that migrants use to get to KSA. Before 2015, migrants often arrived at the western coast around Al Hudaydah but due to the increased level of active conflict in that area, the route was pushed to Yemen’s southern coastline .

Prior to reaching Yemen, migrants are exposed to many challenges including exploitation and abuse, extreme thirst and hunger, as well as lack of shelter and medical assistance. In most cases, migrants also have to seek out smugglers and criminal groups to facilitate their journey and very few people travelling on this route are in possession of valid travel documents . Throughout their journey to Yemen, migrants find themselves in dangerous situations, including during the crossing from Djibouti or Somalia to Yemen in inadequate boats. Upon arrival and during their travel within Yemen, migrants pass through and often get trapped in areas of active conflict where they are at severe risk of being seriously injured or killed. Over 50 people were reported to have lost their lives during two incidents in Sa’ada governorate on 20 and 27 November respectively . Ethiopian nationals were reported to be among the causalities and those injured, as the location hit in both incidents was a market close the KSA border which is frequented by migrants waiting to cross. These were the first such incidents near a border crossing point where migrants were reportedly killed since July 2019.

Apart from the dangers linked to active fighting, while making their way towards KSA, many migrants are subject to violence and torture, sexual abuse, abductions for ransom, arrest and detention in inhumane conditions. To be able to continue their journey, migrants often resort to working in farming and other sectors where they may also be at risk of exploitation and forced labour.

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International Organization for Migration: IOM Yemen: Migrant and refugee movements overview, December 2019

Migrants expressing a desire to return home are counselled by IOM and supported to make an informed decision in line with their specic needs.
While the vast majority of migrants travel to Ethiopia, via IOM chartered ights, IOM also organizes commercial ight bookings for other nationalities home.

Available to less than 1 per cent of refugees globally, refugee resettlement is a durable solution for the most vulnerable. Currently, only Sweden accepts refugees from Yemen.

Voluntary Repatriation is a durable solution for refugees wishing to return to their country of origin. UNHCR gives access to the programme to qualifying refugees and IOM prepares refugees for travel through medical screenings, assisting with departure formalities, and arranging air travel and arrival assistance

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

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Houthi "supervisor" kills two brothers and maims a third for refusing to rent land in Sana'a

Houthi supervisors have faced ongoing accusations of corruption and abuse of power given the relative impunity with which they are allowed to operate

Nabeel Alawzari, a Sana’a-based photojournalist, said in a Facebook page on Wednesday that Houthi “supervisor” Ibrahim Al-Zubairi killed two of his brothers and injured a third after they refused to rent the rebel official their land on Nasr Street in the Sawan area of Yemen’s capital Sana’a.

Supervisors are senior Houthi officials assigned to oversee a particular district, neighborhood, state department or institution. Supervisors generally lack the skills necessary to perform their jobs and are selected based mostly on loyalty to the rebel government.

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Film. Taiz journalists: Houthis are concerned about suppressing freedom of opinion and expression

Yemeni activists and journalists stood in a vigil in Taiz province to denounce the continued detention of journalist Hamza al-Jubehi and other journalists in Houthi prisons.

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Houthis return the bodies of six abducted children-turned-soldiers to families in Dhamar

Local authorities say nearly 2,000 children from Dhamar have died fighting for the Houthis, the majority of whom come from impoverished families

Houthi authorities returned the bodies of six children to their families in the northwest city of Dhamar on Tuesday, 45 days after they were abducted from the Al-Jamarek neighborhood and taken to battlefields along the Saudi-Yemen border to fight for the rebels.

An official working for Dhamar City’s local authority said the names of the six dead children, aged 14 and 15, were

The families of the dead children were outraged by the abduction and killing of their children without their knowledge.

While speaking to Almasdar Online, a relative of one of the deceased children appealed to local, regional and international human rights organizations to stop the abduction and recruitment of young children who are being used as pawns to fight on the frontlines without the consent of their families.

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Al-Houthi oversees tribal reconciliation in Amran

The Supreme Political Council member Mohammad Ali al-Houthi oversaw on Wednesday a tribal reconciliation in Amran province. Al-Houthi affirmed, during sponsoring on the reconciliation in districts of Qaflat Adhar and Habour Dholimah, on enhancing the intern front between the Yemeni tribes for confronting the Saudi-led aggression coalition and its crimes committed against the Yemeni people

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Houthis raiding local vegetables/fruits market to implement their new rules of banning the new currency issued by legitimate government. Shooting & chasing sellers ,thus they can’t work! Militia continues harassing civilians & imposing rules makes affect economy badly.

referring to film

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Yemen’s Houthis Set Preconditions for Peace to Consolidate their Coup

Yemen’s Houthi militias have placed several conditions to agree on a comprehensive political deal amid efforts by UN Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths and European ambassadors to revive talks on ending the country's war.
Houthi official sources asserted on Tuesday that militia leaders in the capital Sanaa placed a number of conditions during their meetings with European ambassadors.

The sources quoted Houthi foreign minister in the coup government Hisham Sharaf as saying that a political settlement in Yemen requires a comprehensive ceasefire at all battlefronts, an end to the blockade, and a set of measures on confidence-building, which include the payment of salaries for civil servants, reopening of Sanaa airport and allowing access for oil tankers and ships carrying foodstuff at Hodeidah port without any hindrance.

My comment. By a Saudi news site. This sounds quite serious alltogether. The next sentence is resuming the Saudi comment: „According to Yemeni observers, the Houthi pre-conditions aim to consolidate their coup and open a maritime and air corridor with Iran,“ is absurd propaganda bullshit.

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President Mahdi al-Mashat meets with EU, French and Dutch ambassadors

First ever summit between president of Yemen and European delegates

President al-Mashat has on Monday met with the European Union ambassador to Yemen Hans Grundberg, French Ambassador Christian Testot, and Dutch ambassador Irma van Dueren, who are currently visiting Sana’a.

At the meeting, the president briefed the ambassadors on the deteriorating humanitarian situation as a result of the war and blockade imposed by the Saudi-led aggression coalition on Yemen.

The President welcomed the ambassadors, praising the UN and European Union’s efforts to stop the aggression and achieving a comprehensive political solution.


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European Union Ambassadors Visit Means No Security Risks in Sanaa

In a rare scene in our Arab countries, Member of the Supreme Political Council and Chairman of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee, Mohammad Ali Al-Houthi, met on Tuesday, January 21, 2020, a European delegation, including the EU Ambassador to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, with the Ambassador of France, Christian Testo, and the Ambassador of the Netherlands, Irma van Dueren, riding a bicycle, confirming that Sanaa is in the position of strength.
The head of the Revolutionary Committee went to meet the European ambassadors on his bicycle, was not to show off, in fact, it is the result of a fierce security war, where the spokesman of the Ministry of Interior, Brigadier Abdel-Khaleq Al-Ajri, confirmed that the achievements of the security services since the beginning of the aggression have reached 46 thousand achievements Until December 2019.
The Ministry of the Interior also clarified that 296 hostile security plans were detected, while dozens of "terrorist" groups were arrested, including 13 groups during the past year, and 1458 explosive devices were discovered and dismantled.


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Video: Bicycle diplomacy in Yemen!

Mohammed Ali al-Houthi , head of high council of Yemen’s revolution, met with ambassadors of EU, France and Netherlands on bicycle!

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

Siehe / Look at cp1

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In response to military escalation which led Houthi to capture Nehm, the Yemeni government in exile officially announce "the failure of Stockholm agreement." Not sure what that means but it might be a way to save face! Yemenis r angry at Hadi for failing them over & over again!

My remark: For these fights look at cp17.

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[Separatist leader] Al Zubaidi to RT: Our Duty is to Defend Our Land

President of the Southern Transitional Council Aidros Al Zubaidi clarified a couple of pressing issues on the reasons for the delaying implementing the terms of the Riyadh Agreement.
In a televised interview which was aired on ‘Russia Today’ television on Tuesday, Al Zubaidi was clear in his response that the main reason for delaying the terms of the agreement goes back to the legitimacy and the Brotherhood agents who are in the government cabinet.
Al Zubaidi explained that the duty of the STC is to defend the land and to provide military protection. “We are not responsible for the governmental institutions or the public services departments or ministries, the government is responsible to provide those services to the public. Our duty is to protect those institutions and our land from the Houthi expansion and from terrorism”.
On the terms of the Riyadh Agreement, Al Zubaidi said, “ It is a new experience for us in the south with the friends in the Kingdom and we trust them but the Yemeni government.


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Yemen: Southern strongman warns of peace agreement "collapse"

Separatist leader in southern Yemen, Aidarous al-Zoubeïdi, warns of "collapse" of power-sharing agreement with government, dead letter since signing more than two months ago in Riyadh .

In an interview with AFP in Aden, the strong man from southern Yemen, head of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), says that the agreement is threatened by the action of the Islamists and the economic crisis .

"The delay (in the application of the agreement) is the fact of those who in the government do not want it: the Muslim Brotherhood of the al-Islah party", accuses Mr. Zoubeïdi.

The STC is fiercely hostile to the Muslim Brotherhood of the al-Islah party, associated with the government of President Abd Rabo Mansour Hadi, who lives in exile in Ryad and who is supported by Saudi Arabia.

"The threats (weighing on the agreement) are numerous and the most important is the activity of terrorist organizations, in particular those of the Muslim Brotherhood," he accuses.

"We are committed to the Ryad agreement and we are making great efforts, under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, to guarantee its success and establish peace in the region," said Zoubeïdi.

The separatist leader federated those who in the south refused to stay the claim for independence because of the war against the Houthi rebels.

"We do not aspire to independence at the moment but we want to have the right to be associated, as southerners, with the delegation which must negotiate (peace in Yemen) under the aegis of the United Nations", underlines Mr. Zoubeïdi.

In the long term, however, "we aspire to obtain a state and self-determination with democratic means", he recalls.

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Accusations between military leaders of Muslim Brotherhood on the theft of weapons of martyrs of the Houthi massacre in Marib

Military leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood exchanged accusations about the theft of personal weapons of martyrs and wounded in the last Houthi massacre at the reception military camp in Marib

My remark: As claimed by a separatist news site.

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After the mosque massacre … Brotherhood’s military prevented southern soldiers from leaving Marib

Southern soldiers appealed to President Hadi to intervene and lift the siege imposed on them inside the Brotherhood’s camps in MarIb, by “Ali Mohsen”.
The southern soldiers said in their request that the northern Brotherhood leaders refused to allow them to leave the camps and return to their provinces in the south.

My remark: As claimed by a separatist news site. – For this maasacre, look at cp1c.

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” Ben Adiyu ” is dancing on corpses of more than 111 martyrs of forces loyal to legitimacy government

Under the patronage of Shabwa governor, Mohammad Salih Ben Adiyu, Ataq city is hosting a dancing art festival under the name of the second heritage festival.
This festival comes hours after a massacre committed by the Houthi militia against soldiers loyal to legitimacy government in Marib, where more than 111 soldiers were killed and more than 30 others were wounded, all of them from the Arab south.
Activists on social media mocked the governor of Shabwa, and said that what he was doing added to his poor acts of assaulting his family, as he did not respect and value the families of the victims, who to this day have not received the bodies of their sons.

My remark: Separatists blaming the Hadi gov. governor.

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Aden International Airport Rehabilitation Project

The Aden International Airport rehabilitation and upgrade project is being undertaken by the Saudi Development and Reconstruction Program for Yemen (SDRPY).

A groundbreaking ceremony was held in January 2020, marking the launch of phase one of the project.

The modernisation and expansion project aims to improve services to travellers and transform the airport into a world-class non-stop hub for domestic and international flights.

My comment: This is no humanitarian act. Probably, mainly the Saudis themselves will use the airport for military purposes.

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Al-Zamki: A cheap and bastard figure was one of the tools for the failure of the Riyadh Agreement

Southern politician Dr.. Ali Al-Zamki, revealed reasons for the failure to implement the Riyadh Agreement
he said the reason is the appointment of a personality, which he described as cheap and bastard – without naming – by Yemeni President Abdo Rabboh Mansour Hadi within the delegation of Yemeni government

My comment: A really strange blame by the separatists. While separatists claim they would follow the Riyadh agreement (LOL):

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In implementation of the Riyadh agreement, two battalions withdrew from the southern forces in Abyan

The southern forces continue their withdrawal from their positions in Abyan governorate, in implementation of the Riyadh Agreement, according to the sc

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Security source clarifies the truth about the arrival of military vehicles in the capital Aden

Field sources indicated the arrival of military vehicles in the capital Aden on Sunday, from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The sources denied entering any force from any party with these military vehicles, as they were accompanied by support forces and the security belt from the city of Zanzibar to the capital, Aden, without any human or military forces with it.

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[Separatist] STC forces setup new security checkpoints in Aden’s Al-Mualla district

Troops from the 1st Infantry Brigade, loyal to STC President Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, blocked roads leading into Al-Mualla from neighboring districts

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Blind protesters urge Islah militias to leave their schools in Taiz

The visually impaired students held an open sit-in in front of the interim governorate building in the heart of Taiz city, south-west of Yemen.
Well-informed sources told the local press that the blind students demand the return of their schools that had been turned into military barracks by Islah Party-linked armed groups.

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Yemen’s army dismantles two cells working for Houthis in Marib

The two cells were monitoring the movements of the Yemeni national army, according to a security source who added that military maps and communication devices linked to the Houthi militia in Sarwah in north Yemen were confiscated.

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Displaced employees demand from gov’t urgent payment of their salaries from the past few mnths. In a statement,they demanded forming a unit to receive IDPs&provide housing allowances 4 their families.They accused gov’t of stopping their salaries under false pretenses

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Al-Jadi: The Islamists Brotherhood get killed by #Houthi in #Marib and they plan to invade #Aden

The member of the Presidency of the Southern Transitional Council, Fadl Al-Jadi, criticized the Brotherhood [Islah Party; supporting President Hadi] and their plans to attack the south, while the Houthi who kill them.

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STC complains to UN over Yemen government’s failure to implement Riyadh Agreement

The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) have reportedly complained to the UN envoy over the internationally-recognised Yemeni government’s failure to adhere to the so-called Riyadh Agreement.

According to the Yemen Press Agency, Nasser Al-Khabji, head of the STC’s joint committee for monitoring the power-sharing agreement, has denied accusations by the government of exiled Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi that they have fallen short in fulfilling their own obligations to the Saudi-backed accord.

“The council has carried out its withdrawals, the delivery of heavy weapons, the release of prisoners and the security of the government in Aden,” Al-Khabji said during a meeting with UN envoy Martin Griffiths.

Al-Khabji has accused the Hadi government of stalling in implementing STC demands, including withdrawal from Abyan and Shabwah provinces and agreeing on the appointment of the governor and director of Aden security.

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Yemeni Foreign Minister Accuses Southern Separatists of Sabotaging Peace Agreement

The foreign minister of Yemen's internationally recognized government, Mohammed Al-Hadhrami, accused on Tuesday the secessionist Southern Transitional Council of sabotaging the peace agreement, signed in November and envisioning separatists' withdrawal of forces from the seized areas.

"We hold the Transitional Council accountable for the consequences of its refusal to abide by the Riyadh agreement under the agreed time schedule. We believe that the refusal to give up weapons; and the moves aimed at preventing committees, dealing with deal implementation, from fulfilling their goals; as well as the refusal to withdraw forces in compliance with the agreement — all this makes the disruption of the Riyadh agreement possible, and shows the intention to do so", Al-Hadhrami said, as quoted by the Foreign Ministry on Twitter.

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Yemen’s war an opportunity to steal

Employees in the vital health and education sectors, from Aden to Sanaa, are facing starvation and non-payment of their salaries since the end of 2019. An unnamed source told the Al-Ahram Weekly that there are approximately four million Yemeni riyals stolen from the legitimate government, comprising the salaries of education and health personnel in Taiz, while the Houthis stole $165 million from the Internet sector.
The source added that the government had taken a loan from Alkuraimi Bank to pay the salaries of September 2019. When the government didn’t pay its dues, the bank took the money sent for December to settle the government’s debt, leaving health and education sector employees without salaries.
Taiz employees in the city demonstrated in demand of their salaries after it became clear to them that their salaries were stolen from the bank of Taiz governorate. An official in Taiz’s education sector explained that the salaries were not paid due to the inability to bring liquidity from Aden to Taiz as a result of sit-ins at the Central Bank in Aden, which caused its closure. He added that the government was waiting for the bank to open and liquidity to be sent to pay the salaries of the employees.
The Yemeni Tahdeeth Net website reported that Alkuraimi Bank in Taiz refused the resumption of paying the salaries of employees of the Ministry of Interior in the governorate under the control of the Brotherhood’s militia.

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Film: Inauguration of training year for 35 armored brigade in Taiz In the presence of military leaders from Yemeni army, the 35 armored brigade in Taiz Governorate, in the south of the country, inaugurated yesterday the first training and combat phase for the year 2020, with a speech ceremony and a military parade for the brigade's employees, indicating that the message they want to deliver is their ability to liberate Taiz, defend its capabilities and confront any attack from their only enemy, which is the Houthis.

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Saudis move to replace Governor of Shabwah with puppet

Riyadh claims Saleh Bin Adio is too close to Islah Party

Media sources have revealed new Saudi intentions to isolate the Governor of Shabway Mohammed Saleh Bin Adio, following al-Islah militants besieging al-Alam camp, where UAE occupation forces are stationed.

The sources confirmed that Saudi Arabia decided to arrest Bin Adio and began procedures for appointing a new person in the post of puppet governor of Shabwah, at the request of the Emiratis.

Saudi media accused Bin Adio of colluding with Islah leaders to abort the kingdom’s moves through the Riyadh Agreement and to obstruct the success of the agreement in the interests of Qatar and Turkey,” Saudi media said.

The pro-Islah Governor of Shabwah Ben Adio for his part, has accused the UAE of turning the camps into shelters for rebels who have carried out several assassinations and bombings in Shabwah province.

The conflict of interest between the Islah Party and the Saudi invaders comes amidst increased mutual distrust between the two, despite Islah being an ally of the invaders originally

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Head of Taiz hospital attacked by Islah Party thugs

Islah members beat and insult high-ranking doctor in Taiz

A medical source in Taiz city revealed that Eilan Abdul Haq, the acting deputy of Taiz province for health affairs and acting head of the General Revolutionary Hospital, which is under the control of al-Islah militias, was attacked and beaten by militia members.

The source confirmed that gunmen under the command of Abdulsalam Al-Sharihi and Sameh Al-Yousfi, both leaders of the Islah Party, attacked Dr. Eilan Abdul Haq during the opening of the women’s health and emergency obstetric center in the hospital.

(A E P)

Yemen’s dual economic war

Taiz employees in the city demonstrated in demand of their salaries after it became clear to them that their salaries were stolen from the bank of Taiz governorate. An official in Taiz’s education sector explained that the salaries were not paid due to the inability to bring liquidity from Aden to Taiz as a result of sit-ins at the Central Bank in Aden, which caused its closure. He added that the government was waiting for the bank to open and liquidity to be sent to pay the salaries of the employees.

The Yemeni Tahdeeth Net website reported that Alkuraimi Bank in Taiz refused the resumption of paying the salaries of employees of the Ministry of Interior in the governorate under the control of the Brotherhood’s militia. The website said that local sources reported that the bank’s administration in Taiz was attacked Sunday by gunmen affiliated with Muslim Brotherhood leaders, as a result of the bank’s refusal to pay salaries to non-residents of Taiz.

The website reported that the reason the bank was attacked is the presence of statements containing hundreds of fake names listed by Brotherhood leaders in the city of Taiz.

My comment: The greatest part of this article is used to blame the Houthis.

(A K P)

Armed attack leaves 2 soldiers dead in Yemen

A security official said that an armed attack that was launched on a military convoy in Hadramout province of Yemen on Monday has resulted in the death of two Yemeni soldiers.
The official said that that "a convoy of the pro-government forces was ambushed by unknown gunmen while it was passing through Shibam district of Hadramout, leaving two soldiers killed".

(A E P)

Yemen Central Bank Branch re-opens soon In Abyan governorate

The Yemeni Central Bank is preparing to reactivate its branch in Abyan governorate the coming days. The total cost to refurbish the bank reached to approximately 220 million Yemeni Rials.

(A P)

Southerners protest to release Abu Bassam from Brotherhood prisons in Maareb

Scores of southerners held a protest stand on Tuesday morning in front of the Arab coalition premises in Aden.
The stand was to protest against the capture of a southerner who is captured illegally in a prison that belongs to the Brotherhood militias [linked to Islah Party, supporting Hadi government] in Maareb.

(A K P)

STC commander killed in dispute over vehicle

Walid Saif Sukra killed by fellow commander following argument over armoured vehicle

(A P)

The Ministry of Education ceased work completely after the cabinet was stormed by a mob of people in al-Sha'ab city in the interim capital of Aden.The Ministry said in a statement that the Union of Southern Teachers pushed the mob to storm the building and attack employees

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

(A P)

Al Houthi Calls on Saudi Arabia to Release Remaining Prisoners of "Goodwill" Initiative

Supreme Political Council member Mohammad Ali Al-Houthi Thursday called on Saudi Arabia to release the remaining prisoners of “Goodwill” initiative, in which was announced the release of 200 prisoners from the Army and Popular Committees.

Al-Houthi said: "Saudi Arabia has announced that it would release 200 prisoners on “Goodwill” initiative, but so far it has not released the full number."

(* B K P)

Will bloodshed in Marib undermine political progress in Yemen?

Although Houthi representatives did not immediately take responsibility for this attack, they received blame from a number of actors. The administration of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, along with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Turkey, and the United Nations quickly condemned the Houthis for their purported strikes.

The attack, which was one of the bloodiest Yemen has experienced throughout the war, has raised concerns about setbacks to some diplomatic progress that Yemen’s parties achieved since September 2019.

In fact, two days after the January 18 strikes in Marib, fighting broke out between Houthi insurgents and Hadi’s forces just east of Marib, and the Saudi-led coalition struck Houthi-controlled Sanaa and Saada province. Then, the following day, Jaber al Muwaed, a high-ranking Houthi commander, was killed.

This renewed fighting erupted two days after the UN special representative for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, cheered the fact that Yemen’s crisis had seen a dip in violence.

In response to the attack on al Estiqbal military training camp, Griffiths warned of how quickly such violence can undo recently achieved diplomatic successes. “I have said before that the hard-earned progress that Yemen has made on de-escalation is very fragile. Such actions can derail this progress…I urge all parties to stop the escalation now and to direct their energy away from the military front and into politics.”

What Griffiths is referring to is the past several months of back-channel negotiations between representatives of the Saudi government and Houthi rebellion which have taken place in the Sultanate of Oman.

In Yemen, local tribal mediation has played an important role.

Ideally, the Marib attack will not bring an end to these channels of Saudi-Houthi communication that Oman has helped facilitate. As some experts have pointed out, because this attack took place on Yemeni (as opposed to Saudi) soil, there is perhaps not much need to worry about the strikes on Marib threatening the continuation of dialogue between Riyadh and representatives of the Houthi rebellion.

Influential powers must put pressure on the various sides in Yemen’s war to show restraint and prioritise diplomacy above revenge to give renewed negotiations a chance at success – by Giorgio Cafiero

(A P)

UN Yemen envoy condemns missile attack on MP's home

Two children were killed in the attack by rebels in Marib province

(A P)

Griffiths: Der Jemen hat genug gelitten und der Friedensprozess muss vorangetrieben werden

Der Sonderbeauftragter der Vereinten Nationen für den Jemen, Martin Griffiths, sagte am Mittwoch, dass der Jemen habe genug gelitten und der Friedensprozess müsse vorangetrieben werden.

In einer Erklärung der UN- Sonderbeauftragter von der jemenitischen Nachrichtenagentur (Saba) gelesen, brachte er seine Besorgnis über die jüngste Eskalation der Gewalt im Jemen zum Ausdruck, die zur Ermordung vieler Zivilisten führte.

(A P)

Jemen-Sondergesandte Martin Griffiths kommt in Sanaa an

(A P)

UN envoy arrives in Yemen's capital to push for de-escalation

The UN envoy to Yemen Martin Griffiths arrived in Yemen's rebel-held capital Sanaa on Thursday in an attempt to calm down tension as fighting near the capital threatens to fail the peace process.

Griffiths will hold discussions with officials from the Houthi rebel group in Sanaa over the recent military escalation and push for resuming the peace process that has been stalled since the Yemeni warring parties reached a cease-fire agreement in Stockholm in December 2018.

(* B K P)

Yemen’s Stockholm Agreement one year on: Imaginary progress?

Just over a year ago, the international community rejoiced in the revival of the UN-led Yemen peace process with the conclusion of the Stockholm Agreement between the Yemeni government and the Houthi insurgency (Ansar Allah), brokered by UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths. Although the deal marked the first political breakthrough in the peace process since the collapse of Geneva and Kuwait talks under Griffith’s predecessor, the ensuing hurdles in implementation meant that hopes for its success were short-lived. In evaluating the progress on the agreement’s three key components — covering prisoner exchange, Hodeida, and Taiz — it quickly becomes clear that the truism that implementing peace agreements is far more important, and difficult, than concluding them still rings true.

Prisoner exchange

In Sweden on Dec. 11, 2018, the Yemeni government and Houthi delegations agreed to swap more than 15,000 prisoners by the 20th of the following month, after having already exchanged lists. The parties not only missed the deadline but failed to realize the overall agreement, although they have each unilaterally released hundreds of prisoners since then, according to the UN.

Another hurdle is discriminating between the detainees themselves. Thus far, the line between the martial and civil mechanisms has largely been blurred, a matter that stakeholders — civil society, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and humanitarian organizations — must settle in coordination with the UN special envoy.

Hodeida deal

Progress in Hodeida has been minimal and proved to be a stringent test for the UN throughout 2019. Firstly, Griffiths has not managed to deliver the “significant progress” he reported monthly to the UN Security Council over the first half of the year, nor has the so-called cease-fire in the city endured. Last month, a spokesperson for the Joint Forces in Mocha accused the Houthis of committing at least 13,000 violations since the cease-fire went into effect on Dec. 18, 2018, claiming the coalition carried out only limited retaliatory attacks. According to the spokesperson, some 1,567 of the breaches constituted acts of war.

Secondly, the UN aimed at normalizing the status quo by facilitating the redeployment of government and Houthi forces in two phases within 21 days, rather than pressuring the Houthis to withdraw from Hodeida and its three ports as per UN Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015).

Taiz understanding

The expected output of the Taiz understanding was the submission of a report on the joint committee’s “work to the upcoming consultations.” This vague mission has not laid the groundwork for de-escalation efforts compared to that of Hodeida, nor has the UN applied sufficient pressure to lift the siege on Taiz to improve the humanitarian situation and the harsh conditions there – by Ibrahim Jalal

My remark: Another report on this subject in cp1.

(* A P)

Exclusive interview: UN envoy Martin Griffiths discusses prospects and plans to end Yemen's war

With hope as a weapon, Griffiths said his goal in 2020 is to launch political negotiations between the parties

In an exclusive interview with Almasdar Online’s Moath Rajeh, UN special envoy to Yemen Martin Griffiths condemns the recent missile attack that killed more than 110 in Marib, discusses the challenges in implementing the Riyadh Agreement and describes his hope and vision for Yemen’s peace process in 2020.

Griffiths believes that the Stockholm agreement has accomplished its main task of protecting the coastal city of Hodeidah and its port from the devastation that would have awaited if the war engulfed it. Unlike many stakeholders and observers, Griffiths believes the opportunity is suitable for a comprehensive agreement to end the war.

With hope as his weapon, Griffiths said his goal in 2020 is to launch political negotiations between the parties to the war without pre-conditions.

"A day of violence like we have witnessed last Saturday could threaten to shut this window (of opportunity for peace negotitations)," he said. "I am determined to make every effort to protect this opportunity, so this moment of hope materializes into a peaceful future for all Yemenis."

Full text of the interview:

(A K P)

Statement by the UN Special Envoy for Yemen calling for de-escalation of violence

The UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, is deeply alarmed by the latest round of violence in Yemen which resulted in the death of many innocent civilians.

Mr. Griffiths has been in contact with the parties reiterating his call for de-escalation.

Mr. Griffiths calls on all the parties involved to take all necessary measures to cease all military activities including movement of troops, airstrikes, missile and drone attacks.

(A P)

UN, Yemeni Legitimacy Hold Talks to Move Forward With Peace Process

Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths resumed in Saudi Arabia on Monday his efforts with the legitimate government to push forward Yemen’s peace process with Houthis. He also tackled the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement signed last December between the legitimacy and the Southern Transitional Council.
Yemeni political sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Griffiths held talks with advisors of Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi in Riyadh.

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp8 – cp18

Vorige / Previous:

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-617 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-617: oder / or

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

07:42 24.01.2020
Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
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Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
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Dietrich Klose