Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 640 - Yemen War Mosaic 640

Yemen Press Reader 640: 9. April 2020: Saudi-Arabien erklärt Waffenstillstand – Huthi-Friedensplan – Jemen: Teilung und Ende des Staates – Versagen der Hadi-Regierung – Saudi-Arabiens Blitzkrieg
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Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

... Saudi-Arabiens Blitzkrieg-Fiasko – Humanitäre Hilfe von WFP im Nordjemen um 50 % gekürzt – Jemens Gesundheitswesen und Corona – Strife between Houthis and WFP – US und britisches Militär im Jemen – Jemens Schicksal hängt an der Wirtschaft – Angst vor Corona-Ausbruch im Yemen – und mehr

April 9, 2020: Saudi Arabia declares ceasefire – Houthi peace plan – Yemen: Division and end of state – The failure of Hadi government – Saudi Arabia’s “Blitzkrieg” fiasco – WFP humanitarian help for Northern Yemen is cut by 50 % – Yemen’s health system and Corona – Houthi and WFP in strife – US- und britisches Militär im Jemen – Yemen’s fate hinges on economy – Fear of Corona outbreak in Yemen – and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2:

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Seuchen / Most important: Epidemics

cp1b Am wichtigsten: Kampf um Hodeidah / Most important: Hodeidah battle

cp1c Am wichtigsten: Saudi-Arabien erklärt Waffenstillstand / Most important: Saudi Arabia announces ceasefire

cp1d Am wichtigsten: Huthi-Friedensplan / Most important: Houthi peace plan

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp8a Jamal Khashoggi

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain

cp11 Deutschland / Germany

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp12a Katar-Krise / Qatar crisis

cp12b Sudan

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms Trade

cp13b Mercenaries / Söldner

cp13c Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage

cp13d Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp18 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification




(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

Neue Artikel / New articles

(* B H K)

Film: In_five_years, no one suffered as the Yemenis suffered. Their stories are similar, and the pain remains the same.

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

(** B P)

Yemen: Will a Divided Nation End the State?

The nation, meaning the people of Yemen, will endure against all odds, as they have done throughout history, but the state has for all practical purposes ceased to exist. The Hadi government, long considered the legitimate and internationally recognized authority in Yemen has, after five years in exile, become incapable of serving any purpose for the people it purportedly represents. Many now consider it an arm of the Saudi monarchy that has hosted and sponsored its actions. The oft-expressed prophesy of the late president, Ali Abdallah Saleh, has become a fact: The state of Yemen, unified under Saleh for at least the last decade of his rule, has disintegrated into roughly four entities, alternately at war with one another and vying for international support to keep them afloat. The Riyadh Agreement, the latest regional and international attempt to bring peace to the country has fallen by the wayside, as has the Stockholm Agreement before it, sponsored by the United Nations Special Envoy, Martin Griffiths. Despite verbal agreement by both the Houthi/Ansar Allah movement and the Saudi government to an appeal for a ceasefire, made most recently by the Secretary General of the United Nations, the prospects for ending the war and reunifying the country appear dim at best.

Ever since the Houthis/Ansar Allah took over Sanaa, the government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi have spent minimal time on the ground in Yemen, fleeing to Riyadh after a short stay in Aden. Critics note how governing remotely has by all accounts been profitable for the president and ministers alike, sparing them the rough experience of being on the ground in their devastated country while enjoying the benefits of widespread corruption.[1] In addition to traveling around the world in style for meetings in Europe and New York, the derisively-labeled “hotel cabinet,” resides and works from luxury hotels in Riyadh. Combined with inefficiency, this set-up has made it impossible for them to fulfill the sole purpose of government – to champion and meet the basic needs of their people.

Putting aside the lack of infrastructure, healthcare, and even clean water across the country, Hadi’s government has for the most part failed to pay salaries and benefits to public service employees and the military. Protests in the streets, appeals from international organizations, and funds from Saudi Arabia, eventually led to partial disbursements. Last year, the International Monetary Fund praised the government for payments made, but urged them to reimburse employees in the Houthi-controlled north as well.[2]

Security is understandably difficult to ensure in a war zone. Bombardment and shelling aside, however, there are still city streets, intercity roads, and government facilities that citizens need to frequent. Hadi’s official armed forces and police have not been able, or by some accounts often evenwilling, to provide this security to the general public. Part of the problem has been the hybrid nature of security forces.[3] The main problem however has been the continued perception of government corruption and the officials in its employ. Inflated numbers mean that officers collect funds for more troops than they actually have and political interests translate into the government providing security and payoffs to individuals, business, and tribes it considers allies to the exclusion of the public at large.[4]

A new map of Yemen may see an expanded Houthi north to include Ma’rib, Shabwa and alJawf, Saudi control of the Hadramawt and Mahra corridors, and UAE control of Soctora and Aden – the latter through proxy forces. Lahj, Dalea’, and the city of Taiz may be left as contested areas between Islah forces and the Houthis – unless of course Islah agrees to become part of the deal being worked out. In this interpretation, it is speculated that Hadi’s government would remain in exile, a puppet legitimizing Saudi control in at least parts of Yemen of interest to them – by Nabeel Khoury

(** B P)

Five Years of Failure: The Dismal Performance of the Hadi Government

The most appropriate way to chronicle the performance of the internationally recognized Yemeni government since the outbreak of war in the country is by listing its failures. The five years since the Saudi-led coalition intervened in Yemen on behalf of the government of President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi has seen misstep after misstep. These failings have occurred on multiple fronts – militarily, politically and economically. Owing to these failures, the government – still operating largely in exile in Saudi Arabia – is no closer to returning to power in Sana’a than it was in 2015. Meanwhile, its vital claim of possessing domestic legitimacy is more tenuous than ever as the Houthi movement has entrenched its rule in the north and the government’s ostensible allies challenge its authority in nominally government-held areas.

As a student of Yemeni politics, I am not surprised by this: failure has been a persistent feature of government performance over the past four decades.

When Hadi assumed the presidency in 2012, his only frame of reference for leadership was Saleh, but the new president lacked his predecessor’s tenacity and skills of political maneuvering. Yet Hadi attempted to copy the centralized one-man rule model, with the result that the key weakness of the Yemeni government, lack of accountability, got even worse. During the transitional period (2012-2014) this state of affairs was further exacerbated by elites affiliated with the Islah party – most notably prominent sheikh and businessman Hameed al-Ahmar – who used the government as an instrument to further their own commercial and political interests.

In the lead up to the Houthi movement’s takeover of Sana’a in 2014, the Yemeni government was paralyzed, and it failed to develop a strategy to deal with the group at a cost acceptable to the nation.

The failure to come to some form of accommodation led the government to unleash a war that it could not control – particularly through the dubious authorization in 2015 to the Saudi-led coalition to wage a destructive military campaign against the Houthis.

Five years on, the Yemeni government’s weakness vis-à-vis its coalition partners is especially noteworthy. When the coalition began its intervention by conducting a massive air campaign targeting vital infrastructure, hospitals, food processing plants and sites of cultural heritage, the Hadi government said nothing. Indeed, this silence would prove to be an enduring feature the conflict, with the government seemingly content to allow Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the two main partners in the coalition, to pursue their own agenda in the country, even if that agenda went against the government’s interests and those of the Yemeni population.

Following the collapse of the Kuwait peace talks in August 2016, Riyadh changed tack and began preventing government forces from advancing, preferring instead to rely on airstrikes and keep the level of fighting at an endurable level. Rather than trying to win the war, Saudi Arabia began using the Yemen conflict to agitate against Iran while waiting for the opportunity to execute its own strategic plans.

Domestically, the government dramatically failed in building a unified political front against the Houthi movement, resulting in the fracture of government-held territory into rival spheres of influence. In the early stages of the war, the Yemeni government alienated the General People’s Congress (GPC) and turned away military and political defectors from Sana’a. It acquiesced to the Islah party’s fierce attempt at monopolizing power in Marib and Taiz. The UAE-supported faction of the GPC, led by Saleh’s son Ahmed, having formed a significant military force on the Red Sea Coast led by Ahmed’s cousin Tariq, refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Yemeni government. Meanwhile, President Hadi spurred the creation of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which would become the government’s chief rival in the south, through a combination of state neglect and personally targeting of southern leaders. The government’s refusal to recognize the STC’s legitimate right to represent its popular base in Al-Dhalea and Lahj eventually led it to insist on monopolizing representation for all of southern Yemen to the exclusion of Bedouin pro-Hadi factions in Abyan and Shabwa.

Perhaps the Yemeni government’s biggest failure has been in terms of governance, with its decision to weaponize the economy during the war having devastating consequences for the country as a whole. The reckless decision in September 2016 to transfer the headquarters of the Central Bank of Yemen from Sana’a to Aden is a case in point. As part of the move, the government pledged to pay salaries for all government employees (a promise it has not kept) despite the fact that most state revenues remained under Houthi control.

The government did its utmost to weaken other Yemeni state institutions, thereby decreasing the resilience of the Yemeni state. In effect, because many of these bodies were based in Houthi-held Sana’a, the government was willing to kill them in order to “save” them from the Houthis. Its poor attempts at cloning institutions in Aden also failed to consider the fact that Aden was under the control of Hadi’s opponents in the STC. Even if that were not the case, most government ministries comprise a minister, a briefcase and a handful of assistants. This is reflected in the disheartening level of service delivery to communities under government control. Consequently, a government that derives its legitimacy from UN Security Council resolutions has lost it in the eyes of most Yemenis and is now beholden to its coalition backers.

Government failures on nearly every front have been a boon to the Houthis.

All the while, various factions within the government appear content with its poor performance as long as they are profiting off the war. One notable example of graft during the conflict is the practice of inflating the government payroll with hundreds of thousands of ‘ghost’ soldiers and civil servants, allowing officials to pocket the salaries.

When the government does act, its action is often driven by the divisions that have crippled it from the start.

While the Yemeni government continues to lose its relevance among the majority of the country’s population, it will nevertheless remain the legitimate representative of the people of Yemen in the eyes of the international community. Therefore, it will also remain the main negotiator across the table from the Houthi movement in reaching a final settlement of the conflict. However, for such negotiations to be successful, the government will have to be restructured to include representation from all Yemeni parties currently fighting under the umbrella of the anti-Houthi coalition. Failure to do so will unnecessarily prolong the conflict and cost more lives – by Abdulghani Al-Iryani =

(** B K P)

Saudi Arabia’s “Blitzkrieg”-fiasco in Yemen

However, from the onset, this “Blitzkrieg” was stopped in its tracks by the firm opposition from the Houthis, supported by Iran behind the scenes. The war quickly became a drawn-out conflict with numerous casualties and, most importantly, a high price tag for Riyadh as more of its servicemen were killed, equipment destroyed and costs of replacements rising substantially. Aside from the initial miscalculations, more issues arose as Saudi Arabia’s key allies in the Yemeni Civil War, the Emirs, from 2016 to 2017 lost their zeal. And at the end of 2019, Sudan, a country that provided many troops, withdrew from the coalition. In addition, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), believed to have been established using Emirs’ funds, effectively opened up a second front against the pro-Saudi government in Yemen.

Saudi Arabia’s key partner within the anti-Houthi alliance, the UAE, also pulled out from the coalition this year, under the pretext that it needed to defend its own territories as tensions in the Middle East between the United States and Iran continued to rise.

Hence, over the past 5 years, the Saudi-led coalition has not had much success in their battle against Houthi rebels, who continue to receive military support from Iran.

It should seem obvious to everyone now that assisting President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who had fled Sana’a in January 2015, was not the actual reason behind Saudi Arabia’s armed intervention in Yemen – instead the nation’s strategic position and its fossil fuel resources were. While the United Arab Emirates prioritized their commercial and economic ambitions to extend their influence along the entire coast of Horn of Africa and to Yemen, Saudi Arabia was primarily interested in controlling Yemen’s crude oil riches. Further evidence to this hypothesis is added by the fact that, since the UAE announced the withdrawal of its troops from Yemen, Saudi forces have focused on territories with fossil fuel deposits, such as Shabwah and Ma’rib, in addition to Hadhramaut. One of Saudi Arabia’s aims is to gain control over Al Mahrah Governorate in order to then lay oil pipelines in this region, which will pass through Yemeni territories to the Arabian Sea, thus providing an alternative route for exporting oil from the Persian Gulf and mitigating constant threats made by Tehran to close the Strait of Hormuz.

Starting in autumn of last year, the Houthis started to make visible progress against forces loyal to President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. The rebels began its military push at the end of February.

Yet another loss for the Saudi-led coalition has demonstrated that the conflict in Yemen has truly bogged Riyadh down. Saudi Arabia has spent a lot of money on this intervention but it is still on the losing side, as it continues to lose not only its troops and military equipment but also its face. According to various sources, since 2015, the Royal Saudi Air Forces alone have lost from 1,000 to 3,000 soldiers and officers not only in Yemen but also in the kingdom itself, as a result of missile strikes and cross-border ground operations carried out by Houthi rebels.

In the current global economic climate, as oil prices are falling, continuing with the military intervention may result in economic hardship in Saudi Arabia itself. And, of course, more attacks by Houthi rebels against Saudi facilities for extracting, processing and transporting its “black gold” are possible.

There is seemingly growing fatigue as a result of the conflict among the members of the Saudi-led coalition as they use up more and more of their resources. Many allies within the coalition have already understood the pointlessness of this war, and by minimizing their involvement in it, in this tough economic climate, they are demonstrating their unwillingness to continue with the military intervention in Yemen and their desire to withdraw their troops from this nation – by Valery Kulikov

(** B H P)

Humanitarian food assistance to be cut by 50 percent in Houthi-controlled areas in April 2020

Beginning in April, an estimated 8.5 million beneficiaries in northern Houthi-controlled areas (Figure 1), who have been receiving nearly full rations of food assistance monthly, will face a 50 percent reduction in assistance as a result of the restrictive operating environment faced by the World Food Program (WFP). This will significantly reduce access to food among already food insecure populations and increase the magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity. While Famine (IPC Phase 5) is not the most likely scenario, the risk of Famine is expected to increase due to the compounded negative effects of the partial loss of assistance, rising food prices, and a recent escalation in conflict. An outbreak of COVID-19 in Yemen would likely further increase acute food insecurity and mortality. Action to end the conflict is ultimately needed to decrease the size and scope of emergency assistance needs.

Since 2015, WFP has provided humanitarian food assistance to an increasing number of beneficiaries, reaching nearly 13 million people per month as of late 2019. Most humanitarian assistance in Yemen is provided in the form of monthly in-kind food or commodity vouchers equivalent to approximately 80 percent of total energy needs. Throughout 2019, however, WFP and other humanitarian actors have reported increasing operational constraints in northern Houthi-controlled areas. As a result of mounting impediments, beginning in April 2020, WFP will shift from monthly to bimonthly food assistance distributions for the approximate 8.5 million beneficiaries in Houthi-controlled areas, with the result being an effective 50 percent reduction in assistance.

Cuts to humanitarian food assistance will significantly reduce access to food for households across much of northern Yemen. Reduced assistance levels are expected to increase beneficiaries’ market dependence, though most will be unable to further expand income-earning opportunities to compensate for the loss of food assistance. Due to this limited ability of beneficiaries to expand their purchasing power, food prices are not expected to rise significantly as a direct result of the assistance cuts. However, food prices are expected to continue increasing due to the ongoing currency depreciation and declines in food imports. Most households will likely rely increasingly on the cheapest available staple grains, further reducing dietary diversity; they are also likely to engage in increasingly high cost coping strategies in an attempt to compensate for the partial loss of assistance.

In many Houthi-controlled areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes already exist at the governorate-level. Following distribution cuts, this classification [Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse] will expand to an increasing number of households, though a deterioration in area-level outcomes is not expected in the next 1-3 months. Beneficiaries who face assistance cuts are likely to engage in consumption-smoothing strategies; however, because the amount distributed will not be sufficient to cover needs for two months, many households will experience increasing consumption gaps and/or engage in more severe coping during the time leading up to the next distribution. As these more severe consumption gaps will be experienced intermittently, excess mortality indicative of area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes is unlikely to be observed in the near term. Furthermore, given that distributions are being cut in response to the restrictive operating environment, it is anticipated that WFP faced difficulty reaching all worst-affected households. Therefore, among those who were reached, some beneficiaries may have relatively more coping strategies still available to support current levels of consumption in the near-term. The loss of assistance and repeated intermittent reliance on unsustainable coping strategies is, however, still anticipated to lead to a deterioration in food security status over time.

Given population size and current levels of assistance provision, governorates with the highest number of people who will experience reduced food access include Hajjah, Sa’dah, Ibb, and Sana’a City, and concern remains high for Hajjah and Sa’dah where area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes already exist. Across impacted governorates, an increasing number of households are likely to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes by mid to late 2020, and deterioration to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) at the governorate-level will be increasingly likely. However, given that the constrained operating space has restricted food security and nutrition data collection, it is difficult to identify all areas in which deteriorating food security would be expected.

(** B H K)

Yemen: First bombs, soon a coronavirus epidemic

Five years of war have devastated Yemen's healthcare system. A COVID-19 outbreak would be a catastrophe.

The new threats of the virus will complicate an already disastrous and entirely man-made humanitarian crisis. The multiparty war that has ravaged Yemen the past five years has not spared hospitals or health workers the violence and destruction.

Mwatana for Human Rights, the organisation I founded in in 2007, documented 120 attacks on health facilities and medical personnel by all parties to the conflict in Yemen between 2015 and 2018. They resulted in the death of 96 civilians and health workers and wounded hundreds of others.

In a report released in March by Mwatana for Human Rights and US-based organisation Physicians for Human Rights, we illustrate how these attacks were carried out and how they have contributed to the disastrous humanitarian situation in Yemen. This is just a snapshot, with the actual number of attacks on health facilities likely being much higher.

The Saudi and Emirati-led coalition, the Houthi armed group, and the internationally recognised government of Yemen have all contributed to the collapse of the healthcare system. They have launched aerial or ground attacks on known, occupied medical facilities, looted medical supplies, and assaulted medical personnel, among other violations.

By the end of 2016, just one year into the war, more than half of Yemen's health facilities closed and those that remained operational lacked specialists, essential equipment, and medicines.

The few remaining and barely functional medical centres were often occupied and militarised by parties to the conflict, thereby weaponising and co-opting access to healthcare.

Today, Yemen is facing a tremendous shortage of medical professionals, with only 10 health workers per 10,000 people - less than half of the minimum ratio recommended by the World Health Organization to provide the most basic health coverage to a population of this size.

The destruction of health facilities and the shortage of medical professionals have all contributed to a catastrophic situation for civilians in Yemen. This explains why Yemenis suffered an outbreak of an easily preventable disease, cholera.

Parties to the conflict in Yemen must cease attacking and weaponising healthcare across the country and should immediately conduct investigations into attacks to ensure accountability for crimes committed, and offer redress to victims.

In Yemen, our worst fears will likely become a reality: another epidemic. While novel to the entire world, the disease may be particularly deadly to countries in conflict like Yemen. A friend of mine who lives in Sanaatold me: "If Coronavirus arrives in Yemen, we should just dig our graves and wait quietly for death."

The spread of coronavirus anywhere is a threat to everyone. While countries shore up their own health systems to battle coronavirus, they must not ignore the plight of Yemenis who are already under attack – by Radhya Almutawakel

(** B H P)

Houthis, WFP ... fiery statements threatening to cut off humanitarian aid

Ansar Allah group (Houthis) is fighting a battle no less fierce than its military battles, but this time with the World Food Program (WFP) in Yemen, with whom it exchanges accusations about spoiling the path of humanitarian aid and exploiting it with opportunism.

Since the beginning of last year, the Houthi group began attacking the World Food Program (WFP), opening files of "corruption", reinforced by the documents ... a sudden attack, which the WFP replaced by waving a paper stopping its relief activities in the areas under Houthi control.

The series of accusations and threats, which lasted for nearly a year and 3 months, was interrupted by intermittent lulls during which intermittent proposals were made between the Houthis and the World Food Program(WFP), but they did not see the light.

The dispute renewed recently, following reports confirming that the food program had stopped its activities in the Houthi regions, which caused the latter to issue fiery statements against the program.

Head of the Planning Department of the Houthi High Coordination Council for Humanitarian Affairs, Mutahar Zaid, said Tuesday evening that the decision of the international organizations to reduce aid by more than 75% at a sensitive stage "reflects the reality of the role of these organizations."

The Houthi-run Al-Masirah, quoted Zayd as saying: “Most of the projects of the international organizations’ projects go as operating expenses.

Zaid stressed that, under the umbrella of aid, international organizations benefit and offer crumbs to the Yemeni people.

Debriefer has learned from private sources in the World Food Program (WFP) in Yemen that the program will not continue to disburse aid in the Houthi-controlled areas, starting in April.

The group's prominent leader, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, had threatened, late on Monday, the World Food Program, to reveal the proceedings of the meetings held with his officials and broadcast their videos, in the event that the delivery of aid was not started in cash.

Al-Houthi tweeted: "If the food program does not start the implementation of the experimental stage for the delivery of the cash (approved) and justified with flawed excuses, then the videos for these excuses may be downloaded and we show their agreement to the terms and the fact that the problems they hinder the implementation of the experimental stage of the cash It out. "

He added, "The program officials in Yemen were briefed on the videos."

(** B K P)

American, British Forces Landed on Coasts of Yemen Provinces

Intelligence sources revealed the landing of US and British forces on the western and southern coasts of Yemen.

The sources pointed out that the American forces carried out a landing operation for their forces at the marine pier in Ras Al-Ara in Al-Sabiha area of Lahj province.

The sources confirmed that British forces also carried out a landing operation for its forces in a number of locations, including the headquarters of the Oxen Company, located between the two districts of Al-Arish and Al-Alam in Aden province.

The sources added that there was another landing of British forces at the company’s headquarters in Arama area, located in Shabwa province, in addition to the landing of other forces in the port of Shahr in Hadramawt province, according to Yemeni news portal sources.

The sources indicated that there is a US-British plan to control the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, in addition to the southern coasts of Yemen.

This comes after the arrival of a US force of 110 soldiers, in mid-March, from Afghanistan, to Balhaf Port in Shabwa, reinforced by 10 Black Hawk planes and 30 Harvey armored vehicles, in addition to four Patriot air defense systems, and an integrated field operations room.

Whereas, in a tweet at the end of March, the Vice President of the pro-Emirati Southern Transitional, Hani bin Brik, welcomed the entry of the Fifth Fleet of American Forces into the Arabian Sea.

“The American forces, an ally of the transitional, are coming to combat the Brotherhood ISIS terrorism,” Hani bin Brik said.

(** B E K P)

Yemen’s Fate Hinges on the Economy

While the focus on immediate crises is understandable, this approach can, however, distract from the disturbing long-term trends that in many cases predate the war. The most important of these overlooked issues, given its profound impact on the daily lives of Yemenis, is the economy.

The slow-motion atrophy of Yemen’s economy has been occurring for years and has deepened the impoverishment of the country, with some 24 million Yemenis now requiring some form of humanitarian assistance. Despite persistent efforts by various Yemenis in the public and private sectors to make economic issues more of a priority, there remains little concerted effort to address the principal factors behind the country’s general economic collapse, and a lack of awareness regarding the financial interests that various parties to the conflict have in continuing the war. There is also a lack of acknowledgment of the nature and extent of the Yemeni economy’s fragility. Spoiler alert: the situation is pretty bleak and likely to get worse, no matter how resilient Yemeni society and people’s social support networks are in the face of the crisis.

Yemen’s economic decline continues to shape the extreme humanitarian suffering felt nationwide. This is manifested in reduced purchasing power tied to the decline in value of the Yemeni rial, rising unemployment and poverty levels, the major collapse in the public service delivery system and infrequent public sector employee salary payments, among other symptoms. Fleeting international attention on Yemen’s economic decline often focuses on the public sector and tends to overlook the huge challenges that Yemen’s private sector has also faced, even though the latter provides more jobs to Yemenis. While even basic data collection to quantify trends with statistics is scant, the indicators that do exist still fail to give the full perspective on the humanitarian cost.

A political settlement is urgently needed. The problem though is that any agreement will remain elusive as long as battles over access and control of key economic facilities and sources of revenue continue to drive the conflict. Actors dotted all over the country are personally and collectively profiting from the conflict, whether from extracting rents from fuel imports, liquified petroleum gas (LPG), humanitarian aid, taxation or the plentiful options of foreign patronage on offer. There are a lot of potential spoilers who have a vested interest in a continuation of the status quo.

And no matter what the main warring parties may present publicly – trading accusations over who is to blame for Yemen’s humanitarian crisis – underlying economic objectives ultimately override concerns they might have over the suffering of the Yemeni people.

More serious discussions need to be held in regard to the economy, and fast. If for nothing else, these talks should heed the warning signs and prepare for the worst case scenario – the total collapse of the Yemen economy — with the goal of protecting the public at large and the most vulnerable members of society in particular.

Looking ahead, the scope of international policy discussions related to the Yemen economy must go much deeper than the usual topics of conversation – which are often limited to the current status of imports, commodity prices and public sector salary payments, or briefly highlighting the daunting task of reconstruction that awaits, rather than exploring potential avenues for development and investment in Yemen’s human capital that could begin in earnest. A good place to start when broadening discussions on the Yemeni economy would be examining different ways to balance pressing economic concerns versus longer-term planning on crucial matters such as the eventual need for economic diversification to reduce the reliance on hydrocarbon revenues and external financial aid.

Although a number of crude oil production blocks have come back online and crude oil exports have increased in recent years, the fact remains that economic dependency on hydrocarbons offers short-term relief as opposed to long-term stability.

Discussions and planning on Yemen must acknowledge realities on the ground, including the political, regional and economic fragmentation of the country.

Yemen’s economy was teetering years prior to the escalation and regionalization of the conflict in March 2015 due to elite capture of resources, weak state legitimacy and capacity, structural economic imbalances, social inequalities and political exclusion. Five years on, despite a patchwork of bailouts and internal measures to stay afloat, the Yemeni economy is in a worse state than ever before.

Yemen’s economy is only being held together by money from abroad. The primary source of foreign currency during the conflict comes from remittances sent home by Yemeni workers. The second biggest source is humanitarian aid that has been either channeled through the UN humanitarian response plan or delivered independently.

All three sources of external financial aid are under threat and will probably be reduced in 2020.

In the short term, neither the government nor the Houthis are likely to countenance abandoning the economic warfare that both are engaged in, and the stark reality is that neither is in a position to avert Yemen’s economic decline on their own. Still, deescalation remains essential. Moving forward, Yemen certainly cannot afford to hang all its hopes of economic recovery on hydrocarbon revenues or the potentially misplaced assumption that Saudi Arabia will continue to bail it out in perpetuity. International policymakers, for their part, need to read the macroeconomic warning signs that have been present for years and take note of the origins of what was and arguably still is a conflict driven by local dynamics – at the heart of which is a battle over access and control over different sources of revenue – by Anthony Biswell

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Seuchen / Most important: Epidemics

Siehe / Look at cp1

(** B H)

Risks and Challenges of a Coronavirus Outbreak in Yemen

As Yemen already endures a vast man-made humanitarian crisis, its crippled healthcare infrastructure renders it helpless in combatting the coronavirus pandemic should it hit the country.

With Yemen’s five-year-long war generating what the United Nations called the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis,” the new global coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic risks wreaking further devastation to civilian lives should it spread to the country.

Yemen’s healthcare system is already on the brink with over a million cases of cholera – the worst recorded epidemic of the disease in history, along with other flourishing ailments. Millions are severely malnourished, and most Yemenis depend on humanitarian aid to survive.

Health experts and Yemeni medical workers therefore fear the country would struggle to deal with an emergence of COVID-19 should the virus breakout.

“In Yemen, we cannot overwhelm the already fragile health system. The health system is functioning at 50 percent of its capacity,” Muneera al Mahdli, Communication and Media Relations Officer for WHO in Yemen, told Inside Arabia. “If the public does not understand what COVID-19 is and how to protect themselves, an introduction of the disease will overrun Yemen’s hospitals and healthcare facilities and pull health workers away from people who are severely ill and need treatment.”

“We need to remain vigilant by taking urgent and essential measures and scaling up our preparedness and response efforts. We need to respond together in order to stop community transmission of the disease once that first case hits.”

Aylan Abdulhaq, a medic at Al Thawrah Hospital in Taiz, told Inside Arabia that a lack of awareness about COVID-19 in society, as well as the country’s fragile conditions from the war, heightens the risk of the virus spreading.

“Hospitals will not be able, with their current capabilities, to treat critical cases if the virus spreads,” added Abdulhaq.

Mohammad Hojily, a Yemen affairs commentator based in Sanaa, told Inside Arabia: “Despite a small number of changes, there is no real widespread preparation to deal with the virus and the health system has no real capabilities to discover it, let alone treat it.”

“I have only seen a tiny number of people wearing masks and taking other visible precautions,” he added.

WHO recommends regularly washing one’s hands as a key measure to prevent spreading COVID-19. However Afrah Nasser, Yemen researcher at Human Rights Watch tweeted: “Already a scarce commodity, the war is depleting the water supply in Yemen. In the Coronavirus era, how [are] civilians . . . supposed to frequently wash their hands? How can they do that when the contamination of water has already led to the spread of a crippling cholera epidemic?”

Enduring a severe economic crisis, where the Yemeni riyal’s value has plummeted in value and even basic goods are unaffordable, millions of civilians would struggle to afford tests and other essential preventative measures like sanitation. An inability to mass test civilians makes it difficult to track and treat any spread of the coronavirus.

Meanwhile the Saudi-UAE-led blockade on Yemen has restricted the flow of aid and commercial goods, meaning substantial aid supplies cannot currently reach Yemeni civilians.

Though the UAE still wields significant influence in southern Yemen through its proxy forces, and has likewise delivered humanitarian assistance to Yemen’s south, there has been no Emirati support to fight against a potential COVID-19 outbreak. Furthermore, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE will likely prioritize containing the coronavirus within their own borders, meaning Yemen would face more humanitarian neglect.

The increasing violence on the ground creates additional difficulties

“Because Yemen is at war, I think coronavirus will arrive. There are Yemeni people who work in Saudi Arabia who cross the border, maybe some will be infected by the virus and this could spread it quickly if it arrives,” Ahmad Algohbary, a Sanaa-based activist, told Inside Arabia.

Though the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) has established quarantined areas in the northern province of Sadaa, Algohbary fears this could not be enough.

“Millions could be affected,” Algohbary said. “Many Yemenis are desperate to make an income, and due to the severe economic problems, people will not want to stop their already low-paying jobs. Already being the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, it will add more suffering to the Yemeni people.”

“Yemen could become a ghost country,” he added.

Indeed, should an outbreak occur, Yemen will not only face further losses of life and economic paralysis—as other countries have experienced, it would also be powerless to alleviate any damages.

Yemenis have faced a harsh blockade and years of war, which the United States and United Kingdom’s vast military support to the Saudi-UAE-led coalition has created. Even if Yemen is somehow spared from a coronavirus outbreak, the pandemic’s impact on global powers means there could be even less incentive to address Yemenis’ enduring suffering – by Jonathan Fenton-Harvey

(* B H)

Under shadow of pandemic

Yemen has so far been spared from the COVID-19 pandemic, according to official statistics. There are no known cases of the virus in the country. Yet health experts, and the general public, are fearful that the disease could soon strike.

An outbreak would be disastrous for the country and its health system. Eighty percent of the country relies on humanitarian assistance for survival. Nearly a quarter of the entire population is malnourished, including an estimated one million pregnant and breastfeeding women.

The most basic preventative measure – hand washing – is not an option for many Yemenis. More than 17 million people need support to meet their basic water, sanitation and hygiene needs. Soaring prices and reduced purchasing power are also putting clean water and personal hygiene items out of reach for the most vulnerable.

On top of that, the health system is on the verge of collapse.

UNFPA is working closely with the Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization to prepare for the potential arrival of COVID-19.

UNFPA has provided 40 ventilators for emergency obstetric care; these are now being made available for the response to the pandemic, and another 40 ventilators are being shipped to the country. Assorted infection control and personal protective equipment for approximately 1,500 health personnel has been pre-positioned in the country. This week, these supplies were distributed to 22 health facilities in southern parts of Yemen. Additional supplies are being procured for health workers in the northern parts of the country.

UNFPA is also working to support maternal and reproductive health services, which are already in short supply. One critical measure has been reinforcing infection prevention and control measures in 235 UNFPA-supported maternal and emergency obstetric care facilities country-wide.

Assistance is also required for people who are being quarantined after entering the country. As of 5 April, UNFPA, together with UNICEF and the World Food Programme, had provided food, hygiene kits and dignity kits to more than 5,200 people under quarantine.

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Save the Children: Child Protection COVID-19 Guidance: Yemen

The outbreak of infectious diseases like COVID-19 can disrupt the environments in which children grow and develop. In Yemen, children already face protection risks due to conflict and violence. In this context, response measures to the spread of COVID-19 can expose children to severe protection risks and have negative consequences for their well-being and development.

This document aims to support protection actors in Yemen to conduct their work without causing harm to children.

COVID-19 can quickly change the context in which children live. Quarantine measures such as school closures and restrictions on movements disrupt children's routine and social support while also placing new stressors on parents and caregivers who may have to find new childcare options or forgo work. Stigma and discrimination related to COVID-19 may make children more vulnerable to violence and psychosocial distress, especially among those groups which are already very vulnerable such migrants and Muhamasheen. Disease control measures that do not consider the gender-specific needs and vulnerabilities of women and girls may also increase their protection risks and lead to negative coping mechanisms. Children and families who are already vulnerable due to socio-economic exclusion or those who live in overcrowded settings are particularly at risk. In working with government, CP actors should advocate to ensure measures implemented to address COVID-19 accord with international standards, in line with the WHO advisory, and are human rights-based, non-discriminatory and proportionate.

and full document:

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Noch keine Fälle verzeichnet

Bislang wurde im Jemen noch keine Infektion mit dem Coronavirus registriert. In dem Land ist die medizinische Grundversorgung bereits wegen jahrelanger Kampfhandlungen eingebrochen. Experten fürchten eine Katastrophe, sollte die Pandemie auf das Land übergreifen. Das UN-Entwicklungshilfeprogramm UNDP sprach von einem "unsichtbaren Tsunami", der den Jemen jederzeit erreichen könne. Covid-19 sei ein "neuer, gnadenloser Gegner, der bei einer Fortsetzung des bewaffneten Konflikts unbesiegbar sein wird", teilte UNDP vergangene Woche mit.

(A H P)

Qatar Red Crescent : QRCS, UN raise awareness against Coronavirus in Yemen

The representation mission of Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS) held an introductory workshop on the risks and prevention of Coronavirus (COVID-19), amid public uncertainty and lack of information about the disease.

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Yemen [Hadi gov.] seals border with Saudi Arabia over virus fears

Yemen has not reported any COVID-19 case yet, Saudi Arabia's tally rose to nearly 2,800

Yemen has decided to seal its only remaining border crossing with Saudi Arabia to prevent a coronavirus outbreak in the war-ravaged country, local sources said on Wednesday.

Yemeni authorities have decided to close the al-Wadia border crossing with Saudi Arabia from Wednesday until further notice, sources at the border told Anadolu Agency on condition of anonymity as they were not authorized to speak to the media.

Al-Wadia remains the only transition point between the two countries after other border crossings were closed due to the conflict continuing in Yemen since September 2014.

(A H P)

Arrest of 6 infiltrators suspected of being Coronavirus- infected with while trying to enter Sana'a

The security authorities in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, said, on Wednesday evening, that they have referred 6 infiltrators who were caught at the Al-Mokair port in the Khawlan district, evading their quarantine until they are sure they are not infected with the Coronavirus.

(* B H)

Aid Groups Say They've Never Faced A Challenge Like The Novel Coronavirus

Humanitarian groups say they've never had to face a challenge like the novel coronavirus.

"We've never had to respond to a crisis that has simultaneously impacted every single office that we run in the world at the same time," says Elinor Raikes, head of program delivery at the International Rescue Committee, a humanitarian organization that operates in 40 countries.

It comes at a time when they're dealing with many crises already.

We spoke to international aid groups about how the pandemic has affected their ability to provide care in emergency settings. Here's what their top concerns are.

Billions of dollars are needed but who will give?

Meanwhile, some in the humanitarian sector fear that donors will be less likely to give. Rich countries that typically donate millions are now affected by COVID-19 and will need to devote money to their own needs. And the pandemic has wreaked havoc on the world's economies, further constraining resources, says Manuel Fontaine, director of emergency response at UNICEF, the U.N.'s agency for children.

For now, governments and private donors are still contributing funds to non-COVID-19 emergencies, but Fontaine says he's not sure how long that will last. "There's always a risk that the part that is going to get cut off from budgets is going to be [development] assistance."

Staff can't go where they're needed

It's never easy to get an aid worker to a trouble spot. Perhaps the area is in the middle of a conflict zone or roads were damaged by a natural disaster.

Now it's even harder. Airlines have canceled hundreds of thousands of flights — and some are suspending international flights. Countries are shutting borders to international visitors.

"It's a lot more difficult to bring colleagues and staff and personnel on the ground to actually respond simply because the flights are not there," says Fontaine.

If an aid workers do manage to reach a country in need, they may have to be quarantined for two weeks in case they harbor the virus, he adds. "That means they're not able to hit the ground running and do their work immediately."

Rich countries may hold onto medical equipment for their own fight against the coronavirus

Even the wealthiest country in the world — the United States — reports shortages of PPEs and ventilators. Aid groups say countries that already have a fragile health-care system will be even worse off.

The lack of supplies has also given aid groups a wake-up call: If health workers don't have the equipment they need to treat severe COVID-19 patients when a country hits peak COVID-19 infection, they will have to resort to triage, choosing who they try to save and who they let die — a situation that even the U.S. is preparing for.

In spite of everything, all hope is not lost

Epidemics can bring out the best of people, even in the toughest scenarios.

"We've seen time and time again that people are extraordinarily resilient," says Raikes of the International Rescue Committee. "And local communities are able to deal with crises when they hit."

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Houthi Ministry of Health: COVID-19 could infect 28 million Yemenis

The spread of COVID-19 in Yemen could leave 28 million Yemenis infected, said Taha Al-Mutawakel, the minister of health in the Houthi-controlled government in Sana’a.

"Yemen's hospitals have only 1,500 beds," he said in a speech to Parliament in the capital. “If the epidemic enters Yemen, we will need one million beds in just two months."

“If one patient transmits the infection to three more people, in just weeks the number of infected people in Yemen would reach 28 million," amounting to 90 percent of the population, he said, which would overwhelm Yemen’s health and economic capacities.

“The World Health Organization (WHO) has estimated at least 70,000 deaths, and we estimate that half a million of Yemenis will die,” Al-Mutawakel added, calling for cooperation with the Saudi coalition-backed government to develop a plan to confront a potential outbreak in Yemen.

The minister called on the UN and other international organizations to provide at least 1,000 urgently needed ventilators and to properly equip hospitals.

In the northern governorate of Al-Jawf, Houthis have transformed residential units – built by the government of Kuwait for displaced people in the Manfoha neighborhood of Al-Jawf's capital Al-Hazm city – into quarantine sites. The units would house those coming from outside the governorate as well, he said.

(A H P)

Yemen launches hackathon in face of coronavirus

Yemen Hackathon has called for creative thoughts to enrich the initiative in fight against the novel coronavirus.
The initiative aims at brining specialists in technology together to share creative ideas in a competitive environment so as to accelerate a solution for a potential spread of COVID-19.

(* B H)

WHO and the UN equip Yemen’s health-care workforce to respond to COVID-19

To ensure that Yemen is not left behind, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN are working to tailor their efforts in support of the country’s response should COVID-19 be confirmed.

Though there are currently no confirmed cases of the disease in Yemen, WHO and the UN continue their support to the country’s fragile health system. They are helping to train health-care workers across the country, building their awareness of COVID-19 and strengthening their response capacity in the event cases emerge within Yemen’s borders.

Thanks in large part to the support of the King Salman Centre for Relief and Humanitarian Aid (KSrelief), a total of 95 health-care workers across Yemen have been trained. These “super trainers” will in turn build the capacity of almost 1,000 Health Rapid Response Teams and disease surveillance officers across the country who are responsible for tracking and investigating alerts related to COVID-19. These teams are deployed each time an alert is raised through the hotlines established for the disease in Yemen.

Currently, there are more than 31,000 health-care workers operating in Yemen, comprising specialists, physicians, medical assistants, nurses and midwives. The hope is that these frequent trainings will strengthen the country’s existing health-care workforce in terms of how to clinically manage any COVID-19 cases that may arise.

The men and women who make up Yemen’s health-care system are the heroes of this conflict, working tirelessly to meet the needs of millions of Yemenis in hospitals and health facilities across the country.

They have battled cholera, diphtheria, dengue and chronic diseases such as cancer and renal failure, and are now getting ready to fight a disease that is attacking the entire world.

My comment: Saudi blood money should not be praised.

(* B H P)

Statement by the Development Champions Forum and Recommendations to Deal with the COVID-19 Pandemic and its Economic Implications

the Development Champions Forum calls for an immediate halt of all military operations across Yemen, and for a positive and swift response to the call from the UN Secretary-General for a ceasefire to focus on dealing with this pandemic and its effects.

The pandemic’s implications will place additional and unprecedented burdens on Yemenis, in addition to the suffering they are going through now. Therefore, we call upon all political forces in Yemen to deal with the recent developments with a sense of responsibility and humanitarian duty and to consider it an opportunity to start a comprehensive peace process.

The weakness of state institutions in these difficult times necessitates a comprehensive review of the condition of these state institutions and the implementation of fundamental solutions, including reforming the cabinet into a smaller and more effective technocratic one that is able to:

Deal with the current and potential challenges,

Carry out wide-reaching economic reforms,

Implement a strategy to curb poverty and improve governance,

Streamline spending and combat corruption.

The Development Champions Forum also reiterates the importance of urgent coordination and integration among the operation command centers that have been created in all governorates to face this pandemic, whose impact could last more than a year. The Development Champions Forum also stresses the importance of activating the role of local authorities and providing incentives to various sectors, like the private sector, the media, and community and youth initiatives in the governorates, to participate in dealing with the pandemic.

We would also like to draw attention during these harsh times to the fact that this suffering affects all segments of society, especially women, children, internally displaced persons and the poor, who live in crowded and unhealthy settings. Therefore we recommend these groups be taken into account when creating and implementing any interventions.

As the expected economic implications of these measures could be more than Yemenis can cope with, we present the following recommendations and proposals:

Calling upon the Yemeni parties to form a joint crisis unit at the national level to manage this crisis and reach an agreement on several measures to alleviate the health and economic impact of the pandemic, in partnership with international organizations, the private sector and civil society.

Securing the in-country food and medicine stock and taking all necessary steps to do so through several proposed measures

(* B H)

COVID-19 Aftershocks: Secondary impacts threaten more children's lives than disease itself

World Vision’s Aftershocks report considers what would happen if the devastating secondary impacts of the 2015-2016 Ebola outbreak on children were replicated in the 24 most fragile countries covered by the UN’s COVID-19 humanitarian appeal.

“We are wrong if we think this is not a children’s disease. Experience tells us that when epidemics overwhelm health systems, the impact on children is deadly. They are the most vulnerable as other diseases and malnutrition go untreated,” says Andrew Morley, World Vision International President and CEO. “COVID-19 has become a devastating pandemic, but the secondary impacts will likely be a lot worse for children in fragile contexts.”


Secondary impacts will threaten many more children’s lives than COVID-19 itself. As many as 30-million children’s lives are in danger from secondary health impacts such as deadly disease or lack of immunization, increased malnutrition as well as increased number of children dying from Malaria (as heath capacity is focused on COVID-19 patients).

(A H P)

[Anti-Houthi] Military forces prevent boat from entering Yemen's West Coast

The forces of Bab-el-Mandeb brigade prevented on Monday, a boat from entering a fishing port on Yemen's West Coast.
The chief of operations of Bab-el-Mandeb brigade, Colonel Adel Ghanem told the press that the boat came from the African Horn carrying five Yemenis and an African had been prevented from docking in al-Souqiya area and forced them to return to their port of origin.

(* A H P)

Human smuggling, trade tiring Houthis in fight against COVID-19

Despite preparations and precautionary measures taken by Yemen to counter coronavirus, in particular Houthis in areas under their control, smuggling of people coming back from abroad to the capital and other Yemeni governorates – without undergoing a health quarantine – could lead to a real disaster.

The Houthi group does not hide fears of coronavirus spread because of the humans' smuggling trade, and is aware that a COVID-19 spread would have catastrophic consequences.

The group has already accused the Saudi-led coalition and the Yemeni internationally-recognized government of seeking to bring the pandemic into Yemen by allowing for many flights into Aden and Seyoun airports and keeping land ports at Saudi borders open.

The Houthis say the suspected cases are Yemenis coming from Saudi Arabia, who were smuggled from land ports to the capital of Sana'a.

The Houthi minister of health hailed "checking the pandemic" as good, with "the health situation being observed around the clock despite limited resources and logistic challenges currently facing the health sector, in addition to the spread of other diseases like malaria and cholera.

"All these factors altogether have negatively affected the health condition in general across Yemen," Taha al-Mutawakil added in press remarks.

Another challenge is the newcomers arriving from abroad, who were quarantined at border cross points and have mounted to 24,000 people so far, Dr. Mutawakil said.

Sana'a government has instructed security authorities to intensify efforts in "combating the smuggling of travelers from ports by some malicious people lacking the sense of national or moral responsibility."

Security authorities have been urged to strictly deal with and severely punish smugglers, the government said.

Houthi interior ministry has called on citizens to report the where of any person that came from abroad or from other Yemeni areas under the official government and Arab coalition, so that they would be obligatorily quarantined to insure they are free from COVID-19.

The ministry will never tolerate the entry of any arrivals, from abroad or government-held provinces, "to protect citizens from the epidemic."

It vowed to impose deterrent penalties against everyone found guilty of smuggling any arrival from ports or providing them with access.

(A H P)

[Sanaa gov.] Health Minister: Situation in Yemen Requires Everyone to Unite to Confront Coronavirus

(* A H)

Film: Taiz Central Laboratory free of coronavirus screening solutions

The province of Taiz in southern Yemen ranks first in terms of population, accounting for 12.16 percent of the country, the new coronavirus outbreak has cast a shadow over it, with the deputy director of the National Center for Public Health Laboratories in the province revealing that the solutions for coronavirus tests have not reached the central laboratory in Taiz until today, despite the government's continued assurance that it is available in the central laboratories of the provinces.

(B H)

Film: Sorry for yourself stuck at home? Here's a bit of perspective: #Quarantine facility in #Yemen [Info: Video is from Yemeni WhatsApp groups. Claims to be in Houthi-controlled Sa'dah. 2 locals verified it but I obv can't. A version of it was also shared by @MJumeh 3/21]

My comment: Oh my goodness.

(B H P)

Yemen: Caught between war hammer and coronavirus anvil

This ceasefire may have failed because the Saudis cannot break the stalemate in a war they launched in the belief they would win within weeks while the Houthis, encouraged by Iran, have seized strategic territory from pro-Saudi forces since January and believe they are winning.

Neither side is prepared to yield.

The rejection of the ceasefire is certain to deepen the misery of the already miserable Yemeni people, 80 per cent of whom survive on external humanitarian aid.

Since Yemen remains a country at war, UNDP makes the point that the battle against the far greater danger of the pandemic cannot be won if Yemen cannot strengthen its health system as the “first line of defence” against the virus. Yemen must also carry out social distancing and quarantining once the virus appears, and provide for Yemenis until their economy can be rebuilt and jobs can be created. UNDP calls for urgent action on a ceasefire to ensure the virus does not plunge Yemen into another crisis.

cp1b Am wichtigsten: Kampf um Hodeidah / Most important: Hodeidah battle

(A K pH)

Verstöße in Hodeidah durch die Aggressionskräfte

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Film: the killing and wounding of 5 civilians, including women and children, by bombing the Houthi militia on the city of Hays

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Film: A citizen was wounded by a sniper from the Houthi militia in Tahita

(A K pH)

87 Verstöße der Aggressionstruppen in Hodeidah am Mittwoch

(A K pH)

In Hodeidah, US-Saudi forces committed more than 87 violations, including developing two fortifications in 50th St., 29 violations with missiles and artillery targeting and 56 violations with bullets.

(A K pS)

Film: The combined forces responded to two Houthi attacks and thwart the planting of an explosive device

(A K)

Yemen's Houthis target areas in Yemen's port city of Hodeidah: Saudi state TV

(A K pH)

Aggression continues to violate Stockholm Agreement in Hodeidah

(A K pH)

In Hodeidah, US-Saudi aggression committed 78 violations, among the violations attacking Kilo-16 watch post, 101 artillery shells and missiles attacking and 51 bullets in several areas.

and also

(A K pH)

The continuous violations of the aggression forces in the governorate of Al-Hodeidah 06/04-2020

(A K pH)

78 Verstöße der Aggressionstruppen in Hodeidah in den letzten 24 Stunde

(A K pH)

Ein Zivilist wurde bei neuen Aggressionsverbrechen in Al-Hodeidah und Hadschah martyred und sechs verletzt

Die Quelle bestätigte den Tod eines Bürgers und die Verletzung von zwei weiteren Personen bei der Bombardierung der Aggressionstruppen ihrer Häuser in der Nachbarschaft vom 7. Juli im aktuellen Distrikt. Drei Frauen wurden ebenfalls schwer verletzt, weil ihre Häuser im östlichen Salkhana-Distrikt des 50. Distrikts derselben Artillerie-Direktion beschossen wurden.


(A K pS)

Houthis target civilians in south Hodeidah

(A K pH)

US-Saudi Aggression’s Daily Update for Monday, April 6th, 2020

In Hodeidah, a citizen was killed and two others were wounded when the mercenaries of the aggression targeted their homes in the 7th-July neighborhood in Al-Hali district. Three women were seriously injured due to artillery shelling that targeted their homes in the eastern Slakhana district of the same district.


and also

(A K pS)

Joint forces foil two Houthi attacks in Hodeidah

(A K pS)

Films: Houthi militias are developing new military sites in the homes and farms of citizens in Hais

(A K pH)

90 Verstöße der Aggressionstruppen in Hodeidah in den letzten 24 Stunden

(A K pH)

Aggressionskräfte setzen ihre Verbrechen gegen Zivilsten in mehreren Provinzen fort

(A K pH)

Three Civilians Killed, Injured by US-Saudi Shelling in Hodeidah

A citizen was killed and two others were injured, Monday, by the US-Saudi mercenaries shelling in Al-Hodeidah, in a new violation to the Stockholm Agreement.

Al-Masirah Net correspondent confirmed that the shelling by the mercenaries targeted homes in the neighborhood of 7 Yolio in Al-Hali district.

cp1c Am wichtigsten: Saudi-Arabien erklärt Waffenstillstand / Most important: Saudi Arabia announces ceasefire

(** A K P)

Saudi-led ceasefire in Yemen begins, raising hopes for peace

A nationwide ceasefire in response to the global coronavirus outbreak went into effect in Yemen on Thursday, stirring hope for an end to the five-year-old war that has pushed millions to the brink of famine.

A Saudi-led coalition fighting against Yemen’s Houthi movement announced overnight it would halt military operations from 0900 GMT for two weeks in support of United Nations efforts to end the conflict that has killed more than 100,000 people.

The Houthi leadership has yet to announce whether the Iran-aligned movement, which controls the capital Sanaa and most major urban centres in Yemen, would follow suit in what would be the first major breakthrough in peace efforts since late 2018.

The coalition said its move aims to facilitate talks sponsored by U.N. envoy Martin Griffiths for a permanent truce, motivated in part to avoid a potential outbreak of the new coronavirus, though no cases have been reported so far in Yemen.

“We are tired of the war... We want it to stop for good,” said 49-year-old Abd al-Basset Muhammad, who owns a juice shop in the southern port of Aden, interim headquarters of the Saudi-backed government.

“If the war hasn’t already killed you, you are dying of hunger or disease,” he told Reuters.

and also

(** A K P)

Zweiwöchige Feuerpause für den Jemen ausgerufen

Auch in Zeiten der Corona-Pandemie tobt der Krieg im Jemen. Die gegen die dortigen Huthi-Rebellen kämpfende arabische Militärallianz will nun die Waffen schweigen lassen, als Schritt gegen eine Verbreitung von COVID-19.

Die Waffenruhe im Jemen soll nach dem Willen Saudi-Arabiens, das die Militärkoalition anführt, an diesem Donnerstag um 11 Uhr (MESZ) beginnen. "Wir erwarten, dass die Huthi-Rebellen dies akzeptieren", sagte ein hochrangiger Beamter in Riad. Ziel der landesweiten zweiwöchigen Feuerpause sei es, eine drohende Ausbreitung des Coronavirus zu verhindern. Für den Fall, dass die Militärallianz angegriffen werde, behalte sie sich das Recht auf Verteidigung vor, erläuterte er weiter.

Der UN-Sonderbeauftragte für den Jemen, Martin Griffiths, begrüßte die Ankündigung. "Ich bin dankbar, dass das Königreich Saudi-Arabien und die arabischen Verbündeten diesen für den Jemen kritischen Moment erkannt und darauf reagiert haben", sagte Griffiths.

(** A K P)

Militärallianz ruft Waffenruhe im Jemen aus

Die von Saudi-Arabien angeführte Militärkoalition hat wegen der Corona-Pandemie eine zweiwöchige Waffenruhe im Jemen ausgerufen. "Wir erwarten, dass die Huthi-Rebellen dies akzeptieren", sagte ein hochrangiger saudiarabischer Beamter am Mittwoch. Die Waffenruhe solle am Donnerstag um 11.00 Uhr mitteleuropäischer Sommerzeit beginnen. "Wir bereiten den Boden für den Kampf gegen Covid-19", erklärte der Vertreter der Militärkoalition. Die Huthi-Rebellen äußerten sich zunächst nicht zu dem Vorstoß.

Die Militärkoalition verpflichte sich zu der Waffenruhe, behalte sich aber im Falle eines Angriffs das Recht auf Verteidigung vor, erklärte der saudiarabische Beamte. Sollten die Huthi "positiv" auf den Schritt reagieren, könnte die Waffenruhe verlängert werden, sagte der Sprecher der Militärkoalition, Turki al-Malki. Damit könnten Bedingungen für ein Treffen zwischen Vertretern der jemenitischen Regierung und den Huthis geschaffen werden, um über Schritte zu einem dauerhaften Waffenstillstand zu sprechen, teilte Al-Malki weiter mit.

und auch

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The Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen declares a comprehensive ceasefire in Yemen for a period of two weeks, starting on Thursday, April 9, 2020. at 12:00 KSA time. The two-week period is subject to extension.

Statement by the Official Spokesman of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen COL Turki Al-Malki
“Based on its previous announcement on March 25, 2020, the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition supported the Yemeni government’s decision to accept the United Nations Secretary General's call to a ceasefire in Yemen in order to counter the spread of the COVID-19 Pandemic. As well as welcoming the call by the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Yemen Mr. Martin Griffiths to deescalate tensions, take practical confidence building measures between different parties, and focus on humanitarian and economic development.
The Coalition is determined to create a conducive environment for the UN Envoy’s efforts, and to alleviate the suffering of the brotherly people of Yemen and support the efforts towards combatting the spread of COVID-19 pandemic. To that end, the Coalition announces a comprehensive ceasefire in Yemen for a period of two weeks, starting on Thursday, April 9, 2020. at 12:00 KSA time.
The two week period is subject to extension to allow for appropriate conditions to implement the UN Envoy’s call for a UN sponsored meeting between the legitimate government of Yemen, the Houthis, and military representatives from the Coalition to discuss his proposals on steps and mechanisms to implement a permanent ceasefire in Yemen, confidence building measures on humanitarian and economic sides, and to resume the political process between Yemeni parties in order to reach a comprehensive political solution in Yemen.
The Coalition will seize this opportunity to unite all efforts to reach a comprehensive and lasting cease-fire in Yemen, and agree on serious, concrete and direct steps to alleviate the suffering of the brotherly Yemeni people and maintain their health and safety. The Coalition will support all efforts to reach a fair and comprehensive political solution agreed upon by all Yemenis.”

and by UAE’s WAM agency:

(** A K P)

Saudi-led coalition announces ceasefire in five-year Yemen war

The Saudi-led coalition fighting Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis said on Wednesday it was halting military operations nationwide in support of U.N. efforts to end a five-year war that has killed over 100,000 people and spread hunger and disease.

The move aims to facilitate talks sponsored by U.N. special envoy Martin Griffiths for a permanent ceasefire, and was decided in part to avoid a potential outbreak of the new coronavirus, though no cases have been reported so far, military coalition spokesman Colonel Turki al-Malki said.

The ceasefire will go into effect at midday on Thursday for two weeks and is open to extension, he said in a statement.

But it is unclear if the armed Houthi movement will follow suit. Spokesman Mohammed Abdulsalam said they had sent the United Nations a comprehensive vision that includes an end to the war and to “the blockade” imposed on Yemen.

Hours after the coalition announcement, Yemen’s information minister said the Houthis had targeted Hodeidah and the central city of Marib with missiles, while Houthi media said coalition strikes hit Hajja and Saada provinces. Last week, U.N. envoy Griffiths sent a proposal to the internationally-recognised government, the Saudi-led coalition that supports it, and the Houthis - who control the capital Sanaa and most of northern Yemen.

Griffiths welcomed the ceasefire and called on warring parties to “utilize this opportunity and cease immediately all hostilities with the utmost urgency, and make progress towards comprehensive and sustainable peace.”

Saudi vice defence minister Prince Khalid bin Salman tweeted that the kingdom would contribute $500 million to the U.N. humanitarian response plan for Yemen in 2020 and another $25 million to help combat the spread of the coronavirus.

and also (A P) (AFP)

and by Saudi coalition media:

and by Houthi media:

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Saudi-led coalition to begin Yemen ceasefire on Thursday: Saudi officials

The ceasefire will start at noon Saudi Arabia time on Thursday, they said.

The officials, briefing reporters by telephone, said the ceasefire was aimed at giving the Iran-backed Houthi movement an opportunity to join U.N.-sponsored talks with the Yemeni government on a settlement to the five-year-old conflict and preventing a coronavirus outbreak.

“We will remain committed for the ceasefire for two weeks,” said one Saudi official.

The official said that Riyadh hoped that during that period the U.N. Security Council would help pressure the Houthis “to stop the hostilities” and join the ceasefire “and also to be serious in such engagement with the Yemeni government”.

He warned that Saudi Arabia would “defend our people” if the Houthis launched any cross-border ballistic missile attacks during the ceasefire.


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COVID-19: Devastated Saudi Royal Family Seeks to End Yemen War

UPDATED: At least 150 members of the Saudi royal family have been infected and as a result Riyadh is seeking to end its five-year disastrous assault on Yemen.

Joining in the ceasefire would be the nations of the Saudi-led coalition as well as the Yemeni government in exile in the Saudi capital, the Times reported. The coalition said in a statement:

“On the occasion of holding and succeeding the efforts of the UN envoy to Yemen and to alleviate the suffering of the brotherly Yemeni people and work to confront the corona pandemic and prevent it from spreading, the coalition announces a comprehensive ceasefire for a period of two weeks, starting on Thursday.”

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Saudi Arabia to give $525 million for Yemen humanitarian, coronavirus response: minister

Saudi Arabia will contribute $500 million to the United Nations humanitarian response plan for Yemen in 2020 and $25 million to help combat the spread of the new coronavirus, the kingdom’s vice defense minister, Prince Khalid bin Salman, said on Thursday.

and also

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Statement by the Special Envoy for Yemen on the Unilateral Ceasefire by the Joint Forces Command

The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, welcomes the announcement by the Joint Forces Command of a two-week unilateral ceasefire covering all ground, maritime and air operations in Yemen starting 9 April. The announcement comes in support of the UN’s peace process and the UN Secretary-General’s call for a nationwide ceasefire in order to avert the grave risks of a COVID-19 outbreak.

“I am grateful to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Arab Coalition for recognizing and acting on this critical moment for Yemen. The parties must now utilize this opportunity and cease immediately all hostilities with the utmost urgency, and make progress towards comprehensive and sustainable peace”

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A significant move

This is Saudi Arabia's most significant move to try to find a way out of its costly military campaign in Yemen.

The coalition statement suggests its unilateral ceasefire was sparked by the very real threat posed by the coronavirus in a country whose health system is barely functioning.

But another wake-up call dates back to last September when the Kingdom's vital oil facilities came under fire in a spectacular attack blamed on Iran.

Saudi Arabia shifted gear, embarking on secret talks with senior Houthi officials to secure their border, end Houthi missile strikes on its territory, and try to pull them away from Iran.

But in recent months, Houthi forces have kept advancing militarily, encouraging more hawkish Houthi elements.

Sources say senior Houthi leaders support a negotiated end to this war. But they're also digging in.

Even if UN talks begin, it will be a long time before they end with the political solution Yemen desperately needs – by Lyse Doucet

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The #Saudi Monarchy finally drank the poison cup & realized that they cannot beat the #Yemeni people even with the backing of #Christian #English dominated Church led #UK regime & #US government. The Saudis have done themselves a service by capitulating

The #Saudis have not only given up but as a measure of selfishness, struck a backdoor deal with #Yemen’s leading power, love them or hate them, #Ansarrullah. So idiots in media calling them “Houthis” should stop now. Use their official name. The Saudi proxies have been abandoned

The best thing the #Saudis now is to end all their regional conflicts, #Qatar #Iran #Iraq #Syria #Turkey #Oman. Most importantly they need to free all political prisoners at once & start a national reconciliation or face a military mutiny that will end them violently

Most importantly, stop listening to foreign charlatans & fake “strategic” studies centers & “institutes” who will fool you into failed adventures that will cost you. Be good to all the people of the country & all regional countries. Stop your current idiocy – by Ali AlAhmed

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Iona Craig: To see a two week unilaterally decided pause as a beginning of the end of the war is a nice idea but completely ignores precedent and how belligerents have previously used ceasefires for politicking and as a PR exercises. That leaves only hope that this time might be different.

The last unilaterally declared ceasefire was in September, by the Houthis. This did lead to a significant de-escalation that lasted for three months. Good progress. But gains in any political talks were destroyed as the conflict escalated again in January.

The last month has seen levels of violence not seen in Yemen since 2018. One step forward, two back. Just to ge back to where things were at the end of 2019, never mind anything beyond that, would take a significant amount of commitment and concession by all sides - in two weeks.

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Yemen ceasefire supports Griffiths efforts to end conflict: Saudi FM

“The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has always been a leader in supporting the brotherly Yemeni people during the last 40 years, and we will continue to stand by Yemen’s side during these circumstances,” he said in a tweet.

“We hope that the Houthis will seize this opportunity and respond in a productive and serious way to this initiative and prioritize the interests of the Yemeni people.”

My comment: „has always been a leader in supporting the brotherly Yemeni people during the last 40 years”: LOL.

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Arab League welcomes announcement of ceasefire in Yemen

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GCC Secretary General welcomes announcement of ceasefire in Yemen

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Speaker of Arab Parliament Welcomes Announcement by Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen on Comprehensive Ceasefire in Yemen

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UAE minister Anwar Gargash welcomes Saudi ceasefire decision in Yemen

UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr Anwar Gargash welcomed on Thursday the Saudi-led coalition announcment of a two-week ceasefire in military operations in Yemen.

In a tweet, Gargash said: "The coalition’s decision, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to cease fire in Yemen for a period of two weeks is a wise and responsible decision. With repeated calls for a political solution, fears of the spread of the coronavirus complicate the ongoing humanitarian crisis. An important decision that must be built on humanly and politically."

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"A ceasefire would be a huge step towards finally bringing safety to millions of children and families in Yemen after five years of brutal conflict. But attempts to de-escalate two weeks ago failed when violence escalated almost immediately, killing and injuring scores of civilians – including children.

“With the threat of coronavirus growing every day, it is now more crucial than ever for all sides to implement a ceasefire so health workers and the humanitarian community can prepare for what would be a devastating outbreak in a country where only half of health facilities are still functioning.

“We also call on parties to the conflict to go back to the negotiating table to achieve lasting peace and finally put an end to the suffering of Yemeni children.”

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They are not stopping the war. The blockade that is killing millions of Yemen due to famine, prevents medicine, fuel and essential goods is an act of war and a war crime and need to be lifted to consider this announcement “stopping war”

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Bukhaiti: Continuation of Siege on Yemen Means Continuation of Military Aggression

Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a senior member of the Political Bureau of the Ansarullah movement, affirmed Sana’a's commitment to “a complete cessation of the war and the lifting of the siege once and for all."

Bukhaiti said in an interview with Al-Mayadeen TV on Wednesday that with the siege of Yemen in place, the war will not end.

“If any ceasefire does not include the removal of the siege on Yemen, that would be the continuation of the Saudi war,” he noted.

“The aggression’s move to announce a ceasefire was just another ploy by the aggressors,” he said. “Saudis have repeatedly declared a ceasefire in Yemen but have violated it every time.”

Bukhaiti said Riyadh is using the outbreak of COVID-19 as an opportunity for a ceasefire and a face-saving exit from the Yemen war. “The Saudi siege of Yemen has led to the spread of many epidemics, diseases and starvation," he added.

My comment: This would not be an obstacle to accept the Saudi announcement as a first positive step.

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Hussain albukhaiti on @AJArabic about #Saudi #UAE CO declaration of2weeks unilateral ceasefire n #Yemen "This announcement is another declaration of war Saudi want2use the2weeks as #coronavirus quarantines 2stop attack frm #Sanaa&they ignored the blockade"

Referring to

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Film: (Arabic).

My comment: This does not make sense. Any war ends by a ceasefire.

And, of course, by supporters / partisans of the anti-Houthi side(s) also post a lot of propaganda BS playing the melody of bad, bad Houthis:

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For Houthis, ceasefire or peace for that matter does not include them stopping their military expansion to swallow the rest of #Yemen or halting their attacks against civilians.

Houthis definition of "ceasefire" does not mean deescalation locally. For them, it only means end of Saudi military intervention. Everything else (shelling cities, expanding militarily, sniping children & women, displacing civilians, etc) is fair game!

They have too much power to accept peace !

It is much easier for many journalists & experts to rejoice about #Saudi-ceasefire plans than to comprehend #Houthi's threat and continuous abuses. As if Yemenis killing other Yemenis is somewhat justified.

Their thinking would be akin to that of #Assad: why give up in negotiations what we gained fighting. They will double down with the fight

and also this:

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Houthis ‘Fuel War Not Peace’ Despite Coalition’s Ceasefire Announcement

A Houthi missile targeted a government building in the city center of Yemen’s Marib province, only minutes after the announcement of a ceasefire by the Arab Coalition.

The missile fell in a residential area, Yemeni security sources said early Thursday.

A Yemeni presidential adviser, Abdel-Malek al-Mekhlafi, blamed the Houthis, saying on Twitter that the attack shows the militias "are fueling war not peace.”

My comment: „only minutes after”: it’s simply too early for such a statement, this is a propaganda BS blame game.


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Yemen [Hadi government] accuses Houthis of breaching cease-fire

Yemen accused Houthi rebels on Thursday of breaching a newly announced cease-fire.

"The Houthi militia is responding to the calls for cease-fire made by the Arab Coalition with shelling residential areas in Marib and Al-Hodaydah provinces," said Moammar al-Eryani, Yemeni's Minister of Information.

He added that the "escalation which comes after hours of the Arab Coalition announcement of a cease-fire initiative for two weeks," reflected the Houthis' "lack of seriousness."

Al-Eryani also held UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths responsible for the Houthis' escalation.

But the Saudis did not stop air raids, if the dates are correct:

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Saudi Declares Ceasefire in Yemen, Then Promptly Breaches It with Airstrikes

The Saudi-led coalition, which had declared what it called a “ceasefire” in its devastating war against Yemen a few hours ago, targeted several Yemeni positions shortly after the announcement.

On Wednesday night, the coalition claimed it was halting military operations in Yemen in support of UN efforts to end its five-year war, which has killed tens of thousands and spread hunger and disease.

However, shortly after the announcement, the coalition’s warplanes struck positions at several Yemeni regions, including Sa’adah, Amran, and al-Baidha, according to Yemen’s al-Masirah TV.

Before the airstrikes, Yemen’s Ansarullah had downplayed the Saudi ceasefire announcement, describing it as a chance for Riyadh to get out of the quagmire with minimum disgrace.

The fresh air raids came hours after the coalition fighter jets launched at least nine airstrikes against the Hazm district in Yemen’s northern province of al-Jawf.

The warplanes also struck Qaniya area in the central Yemeni province of al-Baidha on four occasions, with no reports of casualties and damage immediately available.


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April 9: Aggression air forces hit Amran

cp1d Am wichtigsten: Huthi-Friedensplan / Most important: Houthi peace plan

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Das vorgeschlagene Dokument für umfassende Lösung, um Krieg zu stoppen und Belagerung zu beenden

Die Republik Jemen [Regierung in Sanaa] unterbreitete den Vereinten Nationen einen Vorschlag für ein umfassendes Lösungsdokument, um den Krieg zu beenden und die Belagerung zu beenden.

Das Dokument besagt, dass die Führung der Republik Jemen in Sanaa und die Führung der alliierten Länder umfassenden Bestimmungen und Grundsätzen zustimmen

Die nationale Vision sieht vor, eine umfassende und endgültige Beendigung des Krieges im Jemen zu erklären und alle Militär-, Land-, See- und Luftaktionen zu stoppen

Es fordert, dass der Waffenstillstand mit sofortiger Wirkung in Kraft tritt, sobald er in allen Bereichen der Kämpfe unterzeichnet ist.

Und dass der Sicherheitsrat eine Resolution zu dem Dokument verabschiedet, nachdem er es unter der Aufsicht der Vereinten Nationen unterzeichnet hat.

Das Dokument sieht das Ende der ausländischen Präsenz in allen Ländern der Republik Jemen und das Ende jeglicher jemenitischer Militärpräsenz auf saudischem Gebiet vor

Die in dem Dokument enthaltene nationale Vision besagt, dass sich die Vereinten Nationen dazu verpflichten, einen Waffenstillstand zu unterstützen und zu erklären und diejenigen zu verurteilen, die ihn infiltrieren, und das Luftembargo zu beenden, indem alle Flughäfen im Jemen für internationale Flüge geöffnet und wie vor 2015 neu gestartet werden.

Das Dokument fordert ein Ende der Landblockade, indem alle Landhäfen der Republik Jemen für alle Zivilisten und den Handelsverkehr geöffnet werden.

Beenden Sie die Seeblockade, heben Sie die Beschränkungen für alle jemenitischen Häfen auf und blockieren sie keine Schiffe.

Das Dokument bestätigt die dringende Stärkung des Mechanismus der Vereinten Nationen und den Einsatz von Monitoren im Hafen von Hodeidah, der nach sechs Monaten ausläuft.

Das Dokument sieht auch die Zahlung von Gehältern aller Beschäftigten staatlicher Sektoren in der Republik Jemen gemäß den Listen für das Jahr 2014 mit beiden Parteien vor.

Und dass die Führung der Koalitionsländer für die nächsten 10 Jahre eine dokumentarische Kreditzahlung eröffnet, bis sich die jemenitische Wirtschaft erholt.

Die in dem Dokument enthaltene nationale Vision betont, die notwendigen Maßnahmen zu ergreifen, um den Prozess der Koordinierung der Geldpolitik auf nationaler Ebene zu stärken und nicht genehmigte Währungen zu zerstören.

Das Dokument besagt auch, dass die Vereinten Nationen die Gläubigerstaaten der Republik Jemen auffordern, alle Schulden und Zinsen zu stornieren

Die nationale Vision besagt, dass die Koalitionsländer den Wiederaufbau durchführen, die Betroffenen entschädigen, Wiedergutmachungen leisten, die Wirtschaft unterstützen und ein Komitee zur Umsetzung des Wiederaufbaus bilden sollten.

Die nationale Vision der Republik Jemen sieht auch die Freilassung aller Inhaftierten und Gefangenen, die Offenlegung vermisster Personen und den Austausch von Leichen gemäß den unter internationaler Schirmherrschaft unterzeichneten Vereinbarungen vor.

Die nationale Vision sah vor, den elektrischen Strom von der Tankstelle in Marib zum Sekretariat und zu den Provinzen, die vor dem Krieg Zugang zu Energie hatten, wiederherzustellen.

Es betonte die Umsetzung gemeinsamer Anstrengungen zur Bekämpfung des Corona-Virus durch eine gemeinsame Zelle, um die Maßnahmen auf nationaler Ebene umzusetzen.

Die Vereinten Nationen und die Koalition haben sich verpflichtet, alle Anforderungen an medizinische Geräte, Medikamente und Impfstoffe zur Bekämpfung von Corona zu erfüllen.

Die nationale Vision sieht vor, dass nach der Umsetzung der Bestimmungen des Dokuments ein jemenitisch-jemenitischer politischer Prozess eingeleitet wird, der eine Übergangsphase einleitet, und dass der politische Prozess auf der Gewährleistung der Einheit des Jemen, der Unabhängigkeit seines Landes, der Verfassung der Republik Jemen und der Ergebnisse des nationalen Dialogs beruht.

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Houthis issue a document for proposed comprehensive ceasefire, end of war in Yemen

The Yemeni authorities in Sana’a including Ansar Allah (Houthis) have been indulging in peace talks with the Saudi-led coalition and the internationally recognized Yemeni government through the United Nations envoy to Yemen Martin Griffiths for the past 2 weeks or so.
So far Griffiths had 3 video conferences with the member of the supreme political council Mohammed Ali al-Houthi and same conferences with the other parties.

Ansar Allah today published a document for the proposed ceasefire and ending the war agreement. New Yemen newspaper obtained a copy of which and is pleased to provide its readers a full translation for the document below

In the name of Allah the Merciful

A proposal for a comprehensive solution document to end the war on the Republic of Yemen

After the passage of five years of war on the Republic of Yemen and the military option proved unsuccessful, believing from all sides on the need to end the war and the sincere orientation towards peace, and an end to the largest humanitarian crisis in the world that the Yemeni people suffer as a result of the war and the blockade, and a serious desire to harness all energies and capabilities To face the risks of the Coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic

The two parties (the leadership of the coalition countries, and the leadership of the Republic of Yemen in Sanaa), and those affiliated with them, agree to the following provisions and principles:

First: End the war and stop the fire:

1- To declare a comprehensive, complete and final cessation of the war and to stop all military, land, sea, and air military actions

2- The cease-fire shall enter into force with immediate effect upon the signing of this document, in all combat hubs, throughout the territory of the Republic of Yemen, and in the common borders.

In particular, the two parties shall suspend all of the following actions:

(A) Redeployment of military forces, heavy and medium weapons and ammunition.

(B) All operations directed against the lands, waters, ships and marine units of the Republic of Yemen, whether by using warplanes or drones, or by using warships, frigates, military boats, guided missiles or other means.

(C) All operations directed to the lands, waters, airports, ships, and marine units of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, whether by using drones, boats, or other means.

(D) Negative discourse in public statements and media against the other side, and contempt for the cultural, political, and social peculiarities of each party.

(E) All hostile strategies and all physical and moral targeting methods.

(F) Any other actions that might lead into undermining this document.

3- Working to limit any other issues or problems with both parties to this document, and to put in place the required programs or practical tracks , in a manner that ensures the resumption of strong and solid fraternal relations, based on the principle of good neighborliness, non-interference, mutual respect, cooperation, and the priority of common interests between the two parties in particular , And not to enter any party in any military or security lineups against the other directly.

4 – The Security Council issues a resolution of this document after signing it under the supervision of the United Nations, and the latter – in coordination and cooperation with representatives of the two parties – sets the executive mechanisms, specifies practical steps and procedures, in recognition of these principles, and lifting Yemen off the seventh item and its consequences, and on the basis of Clarity in commitment and concurrent implementation.

  1. All forces freeze their movements and operations in their positions with a direct impact.
  2. The two parties are committed to the following:

(A) Directly publishing the provisions of this ceasefire agreement and its terms and circulating them to all the forces and members of both parties, and all the forces affiliated with each of them are judged in full knowledge of these provisions within 3 hours of signing them.

(B) Traffic safety in international and regional shipping routes in accordance with international law for the safety of the high seas.

(C) Intensifying efforts aimed at the full implementation of the Stockholm Agreement in addition to the Hudaydah Agreement, in particular by supporting the United Nations Mission in Support of the Implementation of the Hudaydah (NMHA) Agreement and cooperating with it.

(D) Study and approve additional measures necessary to enhance respect for the ceasefire and the general implementation of the objectives of this document.

(E) Cooperate with the United Nations in implementing this document.

7- Ending the foreign presence in all the lands, islands, and ports of the Yemeni Republic, and its airspace, and ending any Yemeni military presence in Saudi lands.

۸ – The 2 parties agree within one week of signing this document on a joint mechanism to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, and the mechanism includes the following main elements:

(A) A military coordination committee composed of high-level military representatives from each party and chaired by the United Nations.

(B) A joint operations center consisting of high-level liaison officers from each party in addition to United Nations representatives, and the joint operations center to manage the flow of information.

(C) A hotline for staff of both parties, working 24 hours a day and every day, to prepare daily incident reports and send them to the United Nations.

(D) The existing ceasefire committees in all combat axes to report on the implementation of the cease-fire at the governorate level to the Joint Operations Center.

9 – The United Nations is committed to supporting and declaring a ceasefire, and to condemning those who infringe it.

  1. The United Nations may, from time to time, present proposals to the two parties to facilitate the achievement of the desired goals of this agreement, including appropriate monitoring, supervision and other appropriate mechanisms to enhance compliance with the ceasefire, in the presence and participation of representatives of the two parties, and in a manner that is not inconsistent with domestic and international laws.

Second: Ending the blockade, and economic and humanitarian measures and treatments.

In light of the spread of the Coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic, the need has become more urgent in implementing the humanitarian, economic and other measures necessary to alleviate the suffering of the Yemeni people, and to guarantee the freedom of movement of people and humanitarian and commercial goods to the country throughout all its parts, and for this reason the two parties agreed on the following:

  1. End the air embargo:

( a ). Opening all airports in Yemen, including Sanaa International Airport, to direct international flights, and restarting Yemeni airports, as was the case before the year 2015

(B). The competent Yemeni authorities adhere to international safety and security procedures and standards in accordance with the Chicago Aviation Agreement, and related agreements, and in accordance with Yemeni law.

(C) – The competent authorities in the air ports are obliged to implement the applicable safety precautions against the Novel Coronavirus COVID-19

۲. End the ground blockade:

( a ) . Reopening all land ports of the Republic of Yemen to all civilians and commercial movement, and ensuring that the military characteristic is removed from them.

( B ) . Opening of the main internal roads, by proceeding immediately with the procedures for opening the main roads:

1 – Between Sana’a and Marib – Hadramawt – Al Mahrah.

2 – Between Taiz and Al-Rahahdeh – Aden.

3- Taiz-Ibb-Sanaa highway through the Al-Huban highway.

4- Between Al-Hodeidah and Al-Duraihimi.

5- Between Al-Tuhaita Hayis and Aden.

6 – Al-Hodeidah – Sanaa Road.

7- Al-Hodeidah – Hajjah Harad -AlMalahit.

C- Forming a joint committee to implement this, and to work to open other access roads.

( D ) . Ensure that the military characteristics of roads is removed, and that traffic safety is visible to all civilians and commercial traffic. The guarantees of the parties include not directing air strikes, amassing strategic weapons, military personnel, military equipment, or firing, and it includes removing all IEDs and mines along the designated roads.

(E). The United Nations presents support for the implementation of these arrangements.

3- End the naval blockade:

( a ) . End the naval blockade and lift restrictions on all Yemeni ports, including (Al-Hodeidah – Al-Salif – Ras Issa) and all Red Sea ports, in a manner that guarantees their restart with their operational capacity that were in place before 2015.

( B ) . Not to intercept, prevent or block the following ships from entering the Hodeidah port:

– Commercial container ships.

Ships carrying food.

– Ships of fuel, gas and oil and its derivatives.

Medicines and medical supplies and equipment.

– Ships of vehicles, spare parts, heavy equipment or others.

– Other ships carrying basic commodities or others.

(C). Not objecting to the introduction of cranes or the necessary equipment to rehabilitate the ports which enable them to restore their work with their capacity.

( D). End the foreign presence in all Yemeni islands and ports.

(E). Urgent reinforcement of the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) and its activation by strengthening the presence of the monitors in the port of Hodeidah and well equipping them with equipment, provided that it expires after six months.

4-Ensure the safety of the Safer tanker:

(A) – Deployment of a technical mission led by the United Nations to the tanker to assess its conditions and make initial reforms, provide the necessary technical recommendations and perform repair and maintenance.

(B) – Agree in light of the recommendations of the technical team on a plan to extract oil from the tanker in a safe manner, including the return of pumping oil to the tanker through Safer- Ras Isa pipeline.

  1. Salary payment:

(A) – Pay the salaries of all employees of the state sectors in the Republic of Yemen, according to the lists of salaries for the year 2014 CE at both parties.

(B) Delivering all delayed unpaid salaries to all employees of the state sectors in the north, south, and all governorates of the Republic of Yemen, including those of retirees.

(C) Delivering overdue social security benefits to all who are entitled to them in the Republic of Yemen.

(D) – The leadership of the coalition countries will open a documentary credit specified for paying the salaries for the next 10 years, until the Yemeni economy recovers.

(E) – Allocating oil and gas revenues for distribution to all Yemeni families registered in the civil status records of the Republic of Yemen to meet their humanitarian needs of food, medicine and others.

6- Taking the necessary measures to enhance the process of coordinating monetary policy at the national level, destroying non-agreed upon notes, and not issuing any notes except in accordance with monetary policy through a joint committee.

7 – The United Nations invites the creditor countries of the Republic of Yemen to cancel all debts and any interest or effects thereof.

8- Reconstruction and compensation:

(A) – The coalition countries undertake the reconstruction and compensation of those affected.

(B) – The coalition countries are obligated to address the direct and indirect effects of the Yemeni citizen, redress the damage, support the economy, treat and compensate the wounded, the handicapped, the sick and the families of the martyrs who were targeted, whether by massacres or others, and those with special needs, and equip treatment and psychological rehabilitation centers.

(C) Reconstruction and compensation for all those whose homes have been bombed by coalition countries or their affiliates. (D) – Reconstruction and compensation for owners and workers of factories, companies, bodies, establishments, markets and restaurants, among others.

(E) – Forming a joint high committee under the auspices of the United Nations to implement the reconstruction and compensation for those affected, similar to what was done in the State of Kuwait and approved by the United Nations Security Council in 1991.

9 – The release of all detainees and prisoners, the disclosure of missing persons, and the exchange of coffins in accordance with the agreements signed between the two parties under the auspices of the United Nations.

10 – Restoring the electrical current from the Marib gas station to the Capital Secretariat and all the governorates that the electrical energy had access to before the war.

11 – Implementing joint efforts to counter the emerging coronavirus – COVID-19

( a ). Establish a joint operations cell from the relevant authorities in the Republic of Yemen to confront the emerging corona virus – COVID-19 to implement measures and monitor them at the national level to address the pandemic.

( B ). The United Nations and the coalition countries are committed to providing all the needs of medical devices, medicines, vaccines, solutions, sterilizers, etc., and the needs of medical quarantines, so that the concerned authorities in the republic can cope with the pandemic.

Third: The Yemeni Political Process:

( a ). A political process (Yemeni Yemeni) that establishes a new transitional stage will be launched following the implementation of the provisions of this document and on the basis of the following principles:

Ensuring the unity, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen.

Constitution and laws of the Republic of Yemen.

– What was agreed upon in the outcomes of the national dialogue.

Respecting the sovereignty of the Republic of Yemen over all its lands, airspace and waters, as guaranteed by international laws, conventions and norms.

( B ). Each party presents its proposals and visions on the political process to the envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Yemen, and upon completion of the submission of proposals and visions, the United Nations invites the specific parties to a dialogue table and specifies their location and time.

(C). The UN Security Council and the United Nations are obligated to hold the dialogue in a free and independent atmosphere, and that no country interferes in its course of affairs or influences negotiators, and does not object to its decisions.

( D ). The outputs of the political process are submitted to the popular referendum in accordance with the Yemeni constitution.

(A P)

Al-Houthi: It is not Possible to Accept Fragmented or Patchy Solutions

Member of the Supreme Political Council, Mohammad Al-Houthi, affirmed that segmented or patchwork solutions cannot be accepted.

He said in his tweets, "We presented to the UN envoy our vision for a full stop of the wa. I made it clear to him today that it is based on a comprehensive solution, as fragmented or patchy solutions - which do not put the well-being of people as priority and do not provide visions of its economic construction, independence and full sovereignty - cannot be accepted. Any solution needs - after approval - the people's referendum on it."

He added: We presented this vision as a document for a comprehensive solution to stop the war, which includes stopping the war on all fronts, lifting the air, sea and land blockade, and implementing confidence-building measures, including the disbursement of all salaries of employees in all sectors, reconstruction and reparations.


(A P)

Mohammed Abdulsalam: Comperhensive Vision to End US-Saudi Aggression and Siege Presented

The head of the [Sanaa gov.] National Delegation stated that the Delegation has presented a comprehensive National vision which includes an end to the war and to the siege imposed on Yemen.

Mohammed Abdulsalam, said in a tweet "We presented a comprehensive national vision to the United Nations; stipulating an end to the war and the blockade."

He pointed out that the comprehensive national vision presented to the United Nations guarantees the safety, unity and independence of Yemen and establishes a political dialogue in accordance with a new transitional stage.

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Rasha Jarhum: reading into #Houthis ceasefire plan, it is majorly between Houthis & the coalition and no implicit mention to the ligitimate government of Yemen. Although it says ceasefire in all fronts in #Yemen, it only specified outside attacks on Yemen [by coalition] & attacks on KSA.

it refers to a freeze of hostilities by all “forces” without specifying which forces. Is it limited to coalition and Houthis as main parties to the proposed agreement? Not clear.

it neutralize coalition by proposing lifting #Yemen from under chapter seven and calling for not siding with a military party against each other.

it refers to implementation of Stockholm and specifies Hodaida. No mention to current fronts including Taiz, Mareb, Dhaleh, and Jouf. Calling to support UNMHA’s mandate.

it proposes an implementation mechanism for ceasefire including forming a joint military committee headed by UN, operations room, hotline for monitoring, & monitoring committees. No mention how these members are going to be selected.

the plan calls for opening airports including Sana’a airport for international flights. These discussion in Stockholm failed as the gov proposed allowing Sana’a airport to operate internally rather than internationally and Houthis refused.

16) To me this plan is yet another media stunt by Houthis so the international community will clap for them while they continue to lead attacks in military fronts. I hope they prove me wrong. But it seems we will only see a ceasefire between Houthis and KSA but not inside Yemen.

17) still I appreciate the Houthis transparency in publicly sharing their vision.

cp2 Allgemein / General

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Interactive Map of Yemen War

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(* A B K P)

Saudi Arabia attempts to bribe Yemeni tribes into collaboration

Local tribes offered large sums of money to side with Saudi-led invaders

Saudi Arabia has offered billions of riyals to tribal mercenaries to retake Jawf province as well as the fronts of Qaniya and Nati’ in Bayda province, local sources told Yemen Press Agency on Tuesday.

According to the sources in Ma’rib province, Hamdan al-Shammari, commander of Saudi forces in Marib, held a meeting with tribal mercenaries in order to bribe them to retake many fronts recovered by the Yemeni forces recently.

Ali bin Mohsen Salah, one of the officers of the so-called General Staff of the Hadi puppet government, revealed last Sunday in a Facebook post that a contract worth one billion riyals was offered in order to convince the Murad tribe to attack Qaniya and Nati’ in Bayda province on behalf of Riyadh.

(* B K P)

Yemen in Focus: UN's lax approach 'emboldens Houthi violence'

Yemen's internationally-recognised government slammed the Houthi rebels this week for an uptick in violence witnessed across the country after a period of relative calm.

Prime Minister Moeen Abdulmalek condemned the rebel's "ugly massacres" and continued "terrorist crimes", which saw an attack on a prison and oil facility.

At least five women and a child were killed after Houthi rebels launched an attack on a prison in Yemen's third largest city on Sunday.

Around 28 more people were injured in the shelling which struck the women's section of Taiz's main prison, local reports confirmed.

Graphic images that surfaced online showed the dead bodies sprawled across the floor at the facility.

"Taiz citizens continue to suffer from the ongoing violence in the sixth year of the protracted conflict in Yemen," Doctors Without Borders (MSF) said.

"These attacks on civilians, whether indiscriminate or targeted, are unjustifiable breaches of international humanitarian law. [overview article]

(B K P)

Der erste NATO-Mittlerer-Osten-Krieg stürzt die regionale Ordnung um

Während Europäer und Araber von dem Coronavirus in Anspruch genommen sind, ändern die Angelsachsen die Weltordnung. Unter US-Kommando übernahm das Vereinigte Königreich die Kontrolle über den Eingang zum Roten Meer; die VAE (Emirate) wandten sich gegen Saudi-Arabien und fügten ihm im Süd-Jemen eine vernichtende Niederlage zu, während die Huthis dies im Nord-Jemen taten. Der Jemen ist nun in zwei getrennte Staaten gespalten, und die territoriale Integrität Saudi-Arabiens ist bedroht.

Das Ende von Jemen und der Anfang vom Ende von Saudi-Arabien

Die Vereinigten Staaten setzen ihre Politik des militärischen Rückzugs und der Übertragung dieser Funktion auf Stellvertreter fort und sind dabei den Krieg im Jemen zu verändern. Ursprünglich plante das Pentagon, das Land entlang der bis 1990 bestehenden Trennlinie in zwei Teile zu spalten. Es hatte Saudi-Arabien und Israel ermutigt, das Land anzugreifen, um seine Ölvorkommen in der angrenzenden Region „Empty Quarter“ auszubeuten. [3]. Die Operation war mit der israelischen Luftwaffe, unter saudischer Flagge kämpfenden kolumbianischen Söldnern und emiratischen Truppen durchgeführt worden. Sie war von einem dreigliedrigen Generalsstab (Saudi/USA/Israel) mit Sitz in Somaliland koordiniert worden.

Allerdings gelang es dem Pentagon, das sich auf Stammesrivalitäten stützte, die Situation komplizierter zu gestalten, bis das Land tatsächlich in zwei Teile gespalten war, wie allerdings auch die saudi-arabische/VAE-Koalition gleichermaßen gespalten wurde. Das Pentagon musste daher die Teilung des Jemen – ohne den Einsatz eigener Truppen – in zwei getrennte Staaten abschließen, vor dem Versuch der Teilung des ehemaligen saudischen Verbündeten in fünf separate Staaten. Der Quincy-Pakt verpflichtet die USA, den König von Saudi-Arabien zu schützen, aber weder sein Land noch seinen Erben [4].

Diese Woche entsandte das Pentagon ein Kriegsschiff vor Aden. Es richtete britische Truppen auf der Insel Socotra ein, um sie zu einer ständigen Militärbasis mit den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten zu machen und stattete sie mit Patriot-Raketen aus.

Mein Kommentar: Nun ja. Das erscheint mir doch etwas von Verschwörungstheorie zu haben.

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Red Sea coast forces seize fourth smuggling shipment in two weeks

Chemical fertilizer, banned because of its bomb-making properties, has been the target of several seizures, but farmers' crops have suffered as a consequence

Forces backed by the Saudi-led coalition on Yemen’s Red Sea coast seized two shipments of contraband on Monday, the fourth such seizure in 10 days, a military official told Almasdar Online. The latest shipment, which contained cash (6.5 million Yemeni Riyals or nearly $11,000), cigarettes and motorcycles, was seized in Tahita district on its way to Houthi-controlled Al-Jarrahi district, both in Hodeidah governorate.

On March 31, the joint west coast forces seized a truck carrying 340 bags of fertilizer in Al-Mocha district in western Taiz governorate, days after seizing two other shipments of fertilizer in the same area.

The internationally recognized government has banned chemical fertilizer, a common ingredient in explosives used by Houthi fighters. However, the ban has hurt some farmers, whose crops aren’t as abundant as they were with the use of fertilizers.

Key smuggling routes pass through the government-controlled coastal districts of Taiz and Hodeidah. Houthis use the smuggling routes to bring banned goods into areas under their control.

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Decentralization as a strategy of regime maintenance: The case of Yemen


Proponents of decentralization often argue that decentralization makes governments more accountable and responsive to the governed. This is perhaps why the decentralization literature tends to overlook Middle Eastern regimes as these are among the most authoritarian and most centralized regimes in the world. However, many of these regimes have included decentralization in their legal framework. This article shows how a weak regime can use decentralization as a regime maintenance strategy when formal decentralization reforms strengthens external and internal legitimacy.

The articles main argument builds on the literature on decentralization and elite capture to show how weak regimes can use formal decentralization reform to undermine local autonomy. The article uses the case of Yemen to make this argument. Yemen has a long tradition for local bottom‐up initiatives and there is widespread internal support for decentralization. Simultaneously, donors have seen decentralization as a way of strengthening the Yemeni state, leading to international support to the formulation of the Local Authority Law of 2000, Law 4/2000, an extensive legal decentralization framework (paywalled)

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As COVID-19 spreads, ending US support for the Saudi war in Yemen is vital

Yemen desperately needs peace and open supply lines for its fight against COVID-19. Now more than ever, Washington must end its enablement of the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen’s conflict and support a peaceful, diplomatic resolution with the immediate opening of Yemen’s airports and seaports for humanitarian aid. Riyadh has recently shown fresh interest in leaving Yemen even as it continues its air campaign. U.S. departure could tilt the scales toward peace.

It is difficult to overstate the danger of Yemen’s position here. The best preventive measure to control the spread of the novel coronavirus is hygiene, but the war has mired Yemen in filth.

Vital infrastructure isn’t all the Saudi-led intervention has destroyed: The coalition’s airstrikes have a high rate of civilian casualties.

The scarcity of food and medical supplies caused by the Saudi coalition’s ongoing air-and-sea blockade has compounded Yemeni deaths by illness and violence alike.

There is no overnight fix for Yemen’s misery. But the single most effective way to help Yemen now is for Washington to stop supporting the Saudi-led coalition intervention. Without U.S. assistance — which has included weapons provision, naval blockade, refueling planes for airstrikes, drone strikes, and intelligence sharing — the coalition could not continue its fight in Yemen, at least not anywhere near its present scale.

If Washington withdraws, it will give Riyadh a new urgency in its peace talks with the Houthi rebels

Ending Washington’s support for the coalition intervention would be a win for the United States, too. The U.S. has no vital interests at stake in Yemen — the Houthi rebels have local ambitions and do not pose a threat to America — and insofar as our involvement there affects our security, it is for the worse.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (which, unlike the Houthis, does aim to strike the U.S.) has flourished in the chaos of civil war.

Because U.S. involvement in Yemen is mostly in an auxiliary role, Washington can act quickly here. There is no large-scale withdrawal of U.S. troops to coordinate or major American military bases to shut down.

Washington can and should stop contributing to the Saudi-led intervention immediately for Yemen’s sake and our own – by Bonnie Kristian

(B K P)

Ein neuer Raketenkrieg im Jemen

Zu Beginn des sechsten Kriegsjahres Saudi-Arabiens im Jemen eskaliert erneut der Konflikt mit den Huthis

Zu Gewalt und Hunger kommen die Krankheiten: nach Cholera und Diphtherie nun auch Covid-19. Zahlen dazu gibt es aus dem Jemen keine, und es wird nie verlässliche geben: Das Gesundheitssystem ist in vielen Teilen des Landes völlig zusammengebrochen. Die Huthis haben jedoch Corona-Sicherheitsvorkehrungen erlassen.

Dass die Hoffnung auf eine diplomatische Annäherung zwischen Huthis und Saudi-Arabien – oder zumindest auf eine Waffenruhe während der Corona-Krise – begraben werden muss, wurde bereits Ende März evident. Die Huthis schossen nach einer längeren Pause wieder zwei ballistische Raketen auf die saudische Hauptstadt Riad ab – tausend Kilometer von der jemenitischen Grenze entfernt. Die Raketen wurden abgefangen, zwei Personen wurden von herunterstürzenden Teile verletzt. Eine andere Rakete wurde auf Jazan abgefeuert.

Die Saudis begannen danach, Sanaa, aber auch andere von den Huthis gehaltene Gebiete mit schweren Luftangriffen zu belegen. Die Huthis verzeichneten zuletzt entlang ihrer Frontlinie deutliche Gewinne.

Im Süden der Provinz Marib kam es zur jüngsten Eskalation, die eine weitere befürchten lässt: Die saudische Luftwaffe soll die Pumpstation einer (im Moment stillgelegten) Pipeline bombardiert haben. Die Fakten sind nicht ganz klar, die Saudis beschuldigen wiederum die Huthis der Tat

Über die Ursachen der derzeitigen Eskalation kann man nur spekulieren: Beide Seiten hatten sich zunächst vom Uno-Vorschlag einer Corona-Waffenruhe angetan gezeigt. Vielleicht wollen die Huthis einfach die momentane militärische Schwäche der Hadi-Loyalisten nutzen. Aber es scheint so, dass momentan überall Iran-Stellvertreter aggressiver werden – proportional zum US-Druck auf den Iran. Bisher ging man aber eher davon aus, dass Teheran die Huthis nicht kommandiert – anders als die schiitischen Milizen im Irak –, sondern nur unterstützt.

Mein Kommentar: Mit dem Iran hat die erneute Eskalation im Jemen sicher nichts zu tun, sondern allein mit den Konfliktparteien im Jemen. Mit den Sonnenflecken hat das auch nicht mehr oder weniger zu tun.

(B P)

Die Mutter der Revolution

Die Nobelpreisträgerin Tawakkol Karman setzt sich für Menschenrechte im Jemen ein. Selbst nach fünf Jahren Krieg gibt sie die Hoffnung nicht auf Krieg, Leid und Hunger prägen das derzeitige Bild des Jemen. Doch es gibt auch ein anderes Gesicht des Landes, jenseits von Gewalt und Terror. Kaum jemand repräsentiert das besser als Tawakkol Karman. 2011 erhielt die jemenitische Journalistin für ihren Einsatz für Frieden, Demokratie und Frauenrechte den Friedensnobelpreis. »Wir sind hier, um unsere Freiheit und Würde zurückzuholen. Wir wollen einen modernen und demokratischen Jemen«, kündigte sie damals an.

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

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Aggression Navy Continues to Detain 14 Oil and 3 Foodstuffs Ships

US-Saudi aggression navy continues piracy activities against 14 oil ships and 3 food ships despite obtaining international permits in Djibouti, an official source in Hodeidah port told Almasirah.

The source pointed out that the aggression navy continues piracy works against 14 oil derivative ships with more than 320 thousand tons on board.

The source pointed out that the piracy of aggression affected 3 food ships despite obtaining entry permits to the United Nations' port of Hodeidah in Djibouti.

The Yemen Petroleum Company announced, Wednesday, that the coalition of aggression is still holding 12 oil ships loaded with petroleum products a few miles from the port of Hodeidah, noting that the first detention period is 37 days.

(A K P)

Ein Schiff mit mehr als 24.000 Tonnen Benzin kommt im Hafen von Hodeidah an

Das Unternehmen sagte in einer Erklärung, dass die jemenitische Nachrichtenagentur (Saba) eine Kopie davon erhalten habe, dass die Aggressionskoalition immer noch 12 Schiffe beschlagnahmt, die mit Mengen von 89.000 und 696 Tonnen Benzin und 214.000 und 193 Tonnen Diesel beladen sind. Die Haftdauer beträgt zum ersten Mal mehr als 33 Tage.

In der Erklärung wurde darauf hingewiesen, dass die Koalitionskräfte die Schiffe von Ölderivaten sowie Lebensmittel-, Medizin- und Gasschiffen absichtlich verzögern und sie daran hindern, den Hafen von Hodeidah zu betreten, obwohl sie die Genehmigung der Vereinten Nationen erhalten haben

(A K P)

Ship carrying more than 24,000 tons of gasoline arrives at Hodeidah port

The Yemeni oil company announced the arrival of the ship "Bahia Damas", which carries 24 thousand and 854 tons of gasoline, to the sinking of the port of Hodeidah today, after being detained and delayed by the coalition of aggression for 146 days.

The company said in a statement received by Saba that the alliance of aggression continues to retain 12 ships loaded with quantities 89 thousand and 696 tons of gasoline, and 214 thousand and 193 tons of diesels for the duration of detention, the first of which is more than 33 days.

and also

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp3 – cp18

Vorige / Previous:

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-639 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-639: oder / or

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

15:33 09.04.2020
Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
Geschrieben von

Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
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Dietrich Klose