Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 645 - Yemen War Mosaic 645

Yemen Press Reader 645: 24. April 2020: Anfang vom Ende des Jemenkriegs? – Schwierigkeiten für Frieden im Jemen – USA muss Unterstützung der Saudis beenden – Huthis, Separatisten & Islah Partei
Bei diesem Beitrag handelt es sich um ein Blog aus der Freitag-Community

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

... Der Fall eines Kindersoldaten – Englands Krieg im Jemen – Coronavirus im Jemen – Überschwemmungen: 10 Tote und Zerstörung – Saudis verlängern „Waffenstillstand“ – und mehr

April 24, 2020: The beginning of the end of the Yemen War? – Difficulties for a Yemen peace – The US must stop supporting the Saudis – Houthis, separatists and Islah Party – The case of a child soldier – Britain’s war in Yemen – Coronavirus in Yemen – Heavy floods: 10 killed and destruction – Saudis extend “ceasefire” – and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2:

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp1b Am wichtigsten: Kampf um Hodeidah / Most important: Hodeidah battle

cp1c Am wichtigsten: Regenfälle und Überschwemmungen / Most important: Rainfalls and floods

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain

cp11 Deutschland / Germany

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp12a Katar-Krise / Qatar crisis

cp13a Mercenaries / Söldner

cp13b Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp18 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification




(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

(** B K P)

Hot Issue – Is This the Beginning of the End of the War in Yemen?

Executive Summary: Defeats, plummeting oil prices, and a global pandemic are forcing Saudi Arabia to rethink its involvement in Yemen. Ironically, the end of overt Saudi involvement in Yemen may help it achieve some of its aims as new alliances dilute Houthi control and minimize Iranian influence. While Yemen faces years of low-intensity conflict, the beginning of the end of its interlocking wars maybe in sight.

After five years, billions of dollars, and little success, the government of Saudi Arabia seems to understand what was clear from the beginning of the Saudi and Emirati-led intervention—defeating the Houthis is not going to happen. The Houthis and their allies, which include a broad and growing base of old and emergent northern elites, have excelled on both the martial and political battlefields. Little doubt exists that the Houthis are the predominant political and military force in northwest Yemen. This will be the case for years to come.

While a negotiated peace with the Houthis is not the outcome Saudi Arabia—or much of the international community—wanted, it may mark the beginning of the end of Yemen’s interlocking wars. This is not to say that conflict will not continue in Yemen. It will persist at a low level for years. However, an end to overt Saudi involvement in Yemen and some kind of negotiated settlement between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis may pave the way for a return to relative stability. Such a settlement may also bring about an opportunity for reconciliation between the Houthis, their allies, and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which controls much of southern Yemen. Additionally, by ending its direct involvement in the war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia may finally achieve two of its primary objectives: minimize Iranian influence and weaken the core Houthi leadership’s hold on power.

Parallels Between 1967 and 2020

Saudi Arabia could have avoided its disastrous war in Yemen if its leaders had looked to the history of Egypt’s invasion of northern Yemen in 1962.

Diminishing Houthi Control and Iranian Influence

Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s intervention in Yemen has been just as counter-productive as the Egyptian intervention. Rather than defeating or even substantially weakening the Houthis, the war has made them militarily and politically stronger. Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s often indiscriminate aerial campaign in Yemen has bought the Houthis a great deal of support from those who live under the threat of bombardment. The aerial campaign, which has targeted farms, schools, hospitals, and critical infrastructure, has had little impact on the Houthis’ ability to fight (Middle East Monitor, March 26).

The UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s territorial ambitions in Yemen also generate support for the Houthis and their allies. The UAE, which has largely ended its overt involvement in Yemen, still maintains bases on the Yemeni island of Socotra and outside the Yemeni port city of al-Mukallah. Saudi Arabia is trying to establish a permanent presence in the Yemeni governorate of al-Mahra. There, Saudi Arabia has plans to build an oil pipeline that will allow it to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Many Yemenis view Saudi and Emirati ambitions in Yemen as a threat to the territorial integrity of the country.

The Saudi and Emirati-led intervention in Yemen has helped achieve exactly what it wanted to stop—empowerment of the Houthis and the growth of Iranian influence. By ending their intervention in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE will actually begin the process by which the control of the Houthis—especially that of the core leadership—is slowly diminished. The wars in Yemen are the glue that hold the Houthis and their allies together. Without these wars and their accompanying threats to national sovereignty, the cohesiveness of the alliances that the Houthis have stitched together will deteriorate. [3] Tensions between members of the Houthi leadership will likely surface.

These recalibrations will further minimize what was already limited Iranian influence. Despite the prevailing narrative that the Houthis are the proxies of Iran, this is not the case.

A significant percentage of the Houthis allies are, as expected, Zaidi tribal and political elites who are determined to preserve Zaidism. They do not want Zaidism contaminated with Iranian-introduced beliefs and jurisprudence. Many already resent attempts by some Houthi elites to introduce Iranian religious practices. This resentment will build in the coming months and years.

Shifting Loyalties

As counterintuitive as it sounds, a victory by the Houthis and their allies over the Saudi-backed forces of Yemeni president Abd Raboo Mansur Hadi may dilute Houthi influence in northwestern Yemen. The Houthis and those who support them know that capturing the governorate of Marib, the last real stronghold for Hadi-aligned forces, will be the coup de grâce for Yemen’s government-in-exile. Taking Marib will give the Houthis and their allies control of Yemen’s most important oil and gas production facilities.

While the Houthis and their allies are fighting to retake the governorate, all sides, including some among the Saudi-supported Hadi government, want to avoid a costly battle that will destroy important and lucrative infrastructure. This coincides with Saudi Arabia’s decision to reduce funding and support for the Hadi-allied forces. Despite spending billions of dollars paying, equipping, and training these forces, Saudi Arabia has seen little return on its investment. What Hadi and Saudi Arabia call the Yemeni Army is not a cohesive force. Rather, it is riddled with factions who often have little interest in fighting the Houthis. A significant percentage—as high as 40 percent—of the soldiers on the payroll are “ghost soldiers” who only exist to extract money from Saudi Arabia.

Without Saudi support, the Hadi-allied forces will melt away. Tribal elites who allied themselves with the Hadi government know this. Most will make deals with the Houthis before they will risk a damaging and protracted fight.

Détente Between North and South?

A combination of defeat, a global pandemic, and plummeting oil prices have pushed Saudi Arabia to begin to alter course in Yemen. However, now that it is reducing support for the Hadi-aligned forces, it is only a matter of time before these forces are either defeated or subsumed by the Houthis and their allies.

The Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is the preeminent political and military force in southern Yemen, understands this . The STC, which the United Arab Emirates supports, is preventing forces allied with the Hadi government from transiting territory that it controls.

The reasons for these actions by the STC are threefold. First, the STC is not opposed to the Houthis consolidating their control of northern Yemen as this will weaken, if not eliminate, the STC’s primary rival, the Hadi-led government.

Détente between a Houthi-led coalition in the north and an STC-controlled southern Yemen is not out of the question.


There will be an uptick in fighting over the short-term as the Houthis and their allies push forward with their offensive against Hadi government forces in Marib. In the south, the STC will also engage Hadi government forces as it attempts to consolidate its control over the southern governorates. In the coming months, those forces aligned with Hadi and Yemen’s government in exile may withdraw to parts of the eastern Yemeni governorate of the Hadramawt. The Houthis will build alliances and dole out government positions to new allies before launching new offensives.

In the medium-term, Yemen will remain divided along historical lines between north and south. The Houthis and their allies will control most of the northwest, and the STC will control what was historically South Yemen. Barring negotiations, the Tihama, the region that abuts Yemen’s Red Sea coast, is at high risk for intense conflict. This area is loosely controlled by forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s nephew, Brigadier Tariq Saleh. Tariq Saleh’s forces are capable, cohesive, and backed by the UAE. These forces alone are a match for the Houthis and their allies. However, with the increasing irrelevancy of the Hadi government, Tariq Saleh may be cut off and forced to choose a side—either join the STC or make a deal with the Houthis.

Over the long-term, Yemen faces years of low-intensity fighting as old alliances crumble and new ones form. However, the beginning of the end of Yemen’s interlocking wars may be in sight. The drawdown of overt Saudi and Emirati support for competing factions will allow Yemen’s formal and informal political processes to begin to function just as they did following the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from northern Yemen in 1967 – by Michael Horton

(** B K P)

Could pandemic pave a path to peace? Why Yemen war is resistant.

By focusing minds on what is most important, the dark cloud of the coronavirus pandemic has at times displayed a silver lining. That raised hopes for Yemen, but peace there is proving elusive.

But with the cease-fire expiring today, the lack of results – with Houthi rebels continuing to press their military advantage, and Saudi planes launching scores of airstrikes in reply – is a stark reminder of the challenges to peace that remain.

In return for a Saudi withdrawal, the Houthis would sign a peace deal, analysts say, and the Iran-backed Houthi movement, known as Ansar Allah, produced an eight-page proposal two weeks ago. But with battlefield momentum now in their favor, the analysts say, the Houthis expect to dictate the terms of any Saudi drawdown – which is unacceptable to Riyadh.

“As far as the Saudis are concerned, they don’t know what to do,” says Abdulghani al-Iryani, a senior researcher at the Yemen-based Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies. “They’ve given one gesture after another, but these gestures are viewed by the Houthis as empty, given the fact that there is no overall understanding of how the relationship between the two sides will be in the future. The guarantees are not there.”

The fulcrum of any deal needs to be agreement by the Saudis to stop undermining the Houthis, and agreement by the Houthis to protect Saudi borders and limit smuggling and human trafficking, says Mr. Iryani, who was a consultant to the U.N. Development Program in Yemen until the end of 2019.

“What stands in the way is this huge gap of confidence between the two sides,” he says. The Houthis need guarantees that any deal will be implemented, in order to “be willing to give up some power” to the Saudi-backed, internationally recognized government – currently in exile – of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.

Houthis “need” the war

“The Saudis want out; the solution for the Saudis is, ‘COVID-19 is a wonderful way for us to get out respectably, and start focusing on the rest of our problems, which are not insignificant,’” says Helen Lackner, a Yemen expert and visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

“But the Houthis won’t let them go. The Houthis want this war to go on, they don’t want this war to stop. They need it,” says Ms. Lackner, noting current rebel advances, and how the conflict and flow of humanitarian aid have boosted Houthi resources.

“You have a fundamental, objective problem: The Saudis want out, the Houthis don’t. How do you deal with this?” asks Ms. Lackner, author of the 2019 book “Yemen in Crisis: The Road to War.”

Yet instead of a demonstration of Saudi military prowess ordered by the new and assertive crown prince, the Yemen initiative has turned into a venture that is failing, even after the application of more than 20,000 air raids

“Why [the Saudis] don’t declare victory and go home is a question I asked about three years ago, and it would have been a lot easier for them to declare victory [then] than it is today,” says Ms. Lackner. “Can they announce the extension of a cease-fire that hasn’t actually happened?”

“The big change could be if we see COVID-19 taking hold in Yemen and spreading quite quickly, as it is likely to do,” says Peter Salisbury, the senior Yemen analyst for the International Crisis Group

“We’re really in a place where it depends on the willingness of one or several of the key parties to take a leap of faith ... to make gestures that build confidence from the other side,” he says. “The question right now is: How willing are the parties to really compromise, in any way?”– by Scott Peterson

(** B K P)

Withdraw US Support From Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should end its invasion and withdraw its forces. To encourage the KSA to halt a cruel campaign which has killed hundreds of thousands, created millions of refugees, and left most of the population hungry and impoverished, Washington should terminate its support for the needless Saudi war, including sale of weapons and munitions, as well as intelligence sharing.

Saudi Arabia’s ruthless and reckless Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman believed he could reinstall Hadi in a brief campaign, leaving a compliant regime in Sanaa. This policy was just one of many which turned the once quiescent KSA into the most dangerous and destabilizing regime in the Middle East.

Riyadh expected its impoverished neighbor to be an easy target. However, unlike the effete Saudi military the Yemeni people were used to hardship and combat. Under attack by the Saudis backed by Washington, the Houthis turned to Tehran for support, which was eager to bleed the Kingdom.

Unfortunately, President Barack Obama continued decades of truckling to the Saudis. Having dismissed their opposition to negotiations with Iran over the nuclear accord with Iran, the president decided to reassure the Saudi royals by supporting the crown prince’s murderous misadventure.

Unfortunately, the result was to make Americans accomplices to murder.

As a result, Yemen scarcely exists anymore.

The Houthi movement is no friend of the West and rules brutally over the territories it controls. But the harm caused by the continuation of internal strife going back years was a lesser magnitude than that which resulted from the Saudi invasion, which internationalized the fighting, made Yemen into a sectarian battleground, and turned the conflict into a Saudi-Iranian proxy war.

The only constructive role that Washington can play is to end military assistance

The Saudi ceasefire is the Kingdom’s first public acknowledgment that its aggression has failed. The crown prince finally had to recognize brutal reality. Some analysts write of the complex issues that now must be negotiated. The only talks necessary are over the amount of reconstruction aid from Saudi Arabia necessary to rebuild the nation that it callously destroyed.

Riyadh should end its invasion. Washington should stop aiding and abetting the KSA’s criminal war – by Doug Bandow

(** B P)

The Houthis and the STC: Enemies with common enemies

Several Houthi leaders, including Hussein Al-Ezzi, have stated their support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in confronting “terrorism,” a broad term that has been stretched at times to include forces belonging to the internationally recognized government. It is no secret that in every military confrontation between the government and the STC, which is backed by the UAE, we have repeatedly witnessed Houthi media align with the STC against the Yemeni government. This is not surprising, as the Houthis resort to rapprochement and sometimes temporarily alliances to get rid of their opponents, and this is the case with the STC.

The Houthis and the STC share a common enemy: both parties share hostility toward the Yemeni government and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah). This is because the internationally recognized government represents a constitutional and political framework that hinders the aspirations of both to build a different state on the basis of military power and political quotas.

In this context, both of them have drawn on old vendettas: the Houthis invoke the Sa’ada wars of 2004-2010, which they fought against the Yemeni army led by commander Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, who has supported Islah and is now vice president.

For its part, the STC has focused on the active participation of the Islah party in the 1994 war against the Socialist Party in the South

Islah represents an ideological and political orientation that presents an obstacle to both the Houthis and STC. Although it is a party with a religious core, it has nationalist ideological features and a political character that it has acquired from decades of political experience, having been one of Yemen’s political pillars prior to the ongoing war.

The ideology of the Islah Party seems more complex to the STC, which comprises a significant number of Salafis, creating an overlap with Islah. This may cause it to be problematic, as the Salafis backing the STC do not have an organizational framework or political experience like Islah, and the STC Salafis have a regional outlook in contrast to that of Islah, which extends nationwide.

Islah also represents Yemenis from different regions, which is contrary to the aspirations of both the STC and the Houthis to divide Yemen’s regions

What is remarkable here is that both deliberately mix Islah with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (Daesh). This strategy is simple and possible to succeed in the case of Houthis, because of the group’s sectarian nature, but the issue is more complicated in the case of the STC because of the sectarian entanglement and the religious nature of many of its Salafi elements

Both sides see that the problem of the internationally recognized government is the dominance of Islah. Islahi leaders deny this accusation by saying that since the beginning of Yemen’s post-2011 transitional period Islah did not take more than four ministries, ignoring the fact that its military leaders and thousands of its recruits fill the ranks of the state military – not to mention its close relationship with Ali Mohsen. Moreover, Islahi party members fill highly influential positions, including director of the president’s office.

On the other hand, the STC and the Houthis frequently exaggerate the presence of the Islah party in order to cover its real problems with the government

When it comes to dividing the country, the difference between them comes down to timing: it is a temporary goal for the Houthis while a permanent goal for the STC

It is in this context that the Houthis – still at odds with the STC on the battlefield – are seeking rapprochement with the STC. This may amount to nothing more than coordination if needed – and if accepted by the STC. Regardless, every rapprochement or alliance in Yemen is a temporary one, and with the Houthis in particular it rarely lasts more than a short period. – by Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen

(** B H K)

Ali… The Onion Picker

From the Tragedy of Displacement to the Catastrophe of Recruitment

A lot of the children who were recruited as fighters in the areas of the conflict have suffered from both physical and psychological disabilities that deprived them from leading normal lives and the possibility for a future. Many of them do not have this option because they already lost their lives, and their families found themselves in the middle of an intricate tragedy.

Ali is a 16-year-old child of Sabaryah village, Mawza’a province, Taiz. A tiny child who lives a simple childhood, yet beautiful when being compared to that of his peers who were deprived of the opportunity of going to schools. Then the war came!

After the Ansar Allah (Houthi) armed group seized control of the village, the Saudi/UAE-led collation jet fighters intervened. After their house was destroyed by the air strikes, Ali’s 12-member family had to relocate to Abyan governorate in August 2017.

Due to their financial dire conditions, Ali had to return alone to Mawza’a and to work in a farm as an onion picker for 500 rials a day (less than $1) a day. It is not enough for a big family, especially that Ali has a 20-year-old- sister who has a spleen deficiency condition.

One day, Ali saw some of his friends who were enlisted in the 4th Infantry Brigade led by Tarq Mohammed Abdullah Saleh. They suggested to him to be enlisted in the brigade for 1000 Saudi rials a month. On Sunday, May 12, 2019, at 8:00 a.m., Ali headed to Hodaydah to start fighting against Ansar Allah (Huthis) in Al-Jah frontline, Bayt al-Faqih district.

Ali remained in that war zone until the noon of Sunday, September 1, 2019 when fierce clashes took place and Ali received a bullet in the forehead and another in his left shoulder. He was immediately rushed to the intensive care unit in Al-Naqeeb Hospital in Al-Mansourah district, Aden. His family was contacted and the news hit them like a lightening bolt.

The family immediately traveled from Al-Wadi village, where they were staying in Abyan, to Aden. They arrived in Sunday evening, and they were allowed into the hospital in order to see Ali. As soon as they saw their son, Ali’s parents were devastated because he was in a coma. His mother was screaming while his father who was petrified with tears rolling down his face, wept in silence.

The conflicting parties are exploiting the deteriorating economic and humanitarian conditions of the country and children dropping out of schools to recruit and mobilize those children.

The child was lying in bed motionless and speechless. He could hear them, but he was not able to speak to them. His mother hugged him despite him being hooked up to medical equipment and being covered with bandages. Ali’s countenance had changed as a result of explosion of the bullet on his face, and he looked fatigued.

A voice came from outside the room announcing the end of visitation hours. The family left their son’s room and waited outside, at the gate of the hospital until the sunrise of the next day, Monday, September 2, 2019. They tried to enter the hospital to see their son again, yet they were not permitted to. At 10:00 a.m. a doctor came out and asked for Ali’s father and brothers. Judging by the doctor’s countenance, the family realized they would not hear good news. The doctor said to them: ” May Allah reward you for the loss of your son.”

Ali’s body was released after a series of proceedings and paperwork, and his family took the body to Al-wadi village in Abyan and he was buried there. Two months later, Ali’s sister passed away, due to the lack of means of treatment. The family now lives in destitution in a hut built of palm tree and banana tree leaves, just because there is war whose victims are forgotten.

In 2018, Mwatana for Human Rights conducted 689 interviews and observations of child recruitment for the purpose of using them in military operations by all parties to the conflict.

Those parties continue to recruit children under the age of 18 and continues to use them for fighting, security, or checkpoint-duty purposes or in other military logistic support. The conflicting parties are exploiting the deteriorating economic and humanitarian conditions of the country and children dropping out of schools to recruit and mobilize those children.

(** B K P)

Coronavirus cannot stop Britain’s war in Yemen

Despite claiming to help tackle the coronavirus pandemic, Britain’s military and arms industry continue to facilitate bombing one of the world’s poorest countries, which is most at risk from Covid-19.

The Royal Air Force (RAF) and Britain’s largest arms company, BAE Systems, are continuing to support Saudi Arabia’s assault on Yemen, despite calls from the United Nations for a ceasefire over fears of “untold human suffering”, Declassified UK has found.

Declassified UK has found that while the recent sorties were underway, British arms industry giant BAE Systems flew a cargo plane (tail number G-JMCM) from its Typhoon fighter jet factory at Warton Aerodrome, England, to the RAF’s Akrotiri air base in Cyprus on 15 April 2020 where it refuelled and stayed overnight.

The cargo plane then proceeded to Ta’if, near Mecca in Saudi Arabia, the following day. BAE staff at King Fahad Air Base in Ta’if service a fleet of Typhoon fighter jets used by the Saudi air force to bomb Yemen.

A few hours after landing in Ta’if, the BAE freighter returned along the same route to Warton, arriving on 17 April. A plane spotter logged the flight on an internet message board and a fellow enthusiast remarked: “The weekly Saudi aircraft spares supply flight (what else?) continues unabated by any Covid-19 pandemic that grips the world.”

When asked by Declassified UK about the purpose of last week’s flight from Britain to Ta’if, a BAE spokesperson would only say: “We provide defence equipment, training and support under government to government agreements between the UK and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”

Flight data appears to confirm that the Warton-Akrotiri-Ta’if flight is a weekly event. The model of aircraft used by BAE, a Boeing 737-300 freighter, can hold eight large cargo containers on its main deck.

Declassified UK has also found that in April alone BAE has advertised at least five vacancies for expatriates to help support the Saudi air force. BAE employs about 6,500 people across Saudi Arabia, of which approximately 30% are expatriates.

The job adverts include one for an instructor to train Saudi Arabian military pilots how to fly Hawk jets at King Faisal air base in Tabuk, close to Jordan. Pilots must learn to fly the Hawk before they can master the more advanced Typhoon jet, which is active over Yemen.

The other four vacancies are in Ta’if where Saudi Arabia’s Typhoon fleet currently requires a new “simulator instructor pilot”, an “armament technician supervisor”, a “logistics control engineer” and a “capability insertion engineer”.

When asked about such job adverts, a BAE spokesperson told Declassified UK: “We comply with all relevant export control laws and regulations in the countries in which we operate. Our activities are subject to UK Government approval and oversight.”

Flying the flag

The British military and the UK’s largest arms company work closely together at all levels of Saudi operations. BAE is assisted in Saudi Arabia by about 100 serving UK military personnel, mostly drawn from the RAF, under a scheme known as the Ministry of Defence Saudi Armed Forces Projects (MODSAP) which earns the UK government £60-million per year from the Saudi regime.

Without Britain’s technical expertise, the Saudi air force would be out of service in less than a fortnight, according to a former BAE employee who spoke to Channel 4 Dispatches. In addition to Ta’if and Tabuk, other MODSAP sites include the Saudi capital of Riyadh, Khamis Mushayt near the border with Yemen, Jubail and Dhahran on the Gulf coast, and Jeddah on the Red Sea coast.

The MOD told Declassified UK it would not specify how many of its personnel are at each site “for reasons of operational security” and did not answer our questions about whether it was appropriate for the RAF to continue its support for Saudi Arabia’s air force during a pandemic.

In March 2020, Britain’s defence minister Mark Lancaster told Parliament that RAF personnel “provided routine engineering support” for Saudi military planes “including aircraft engaged in military operations in Yemen”.

He added that they have also “provided generic training support” to Saudi pilots, but the RAF did not monitor how their students went on to use the skills they learned.

The MOD claims its role does not amount to “direct support” for Saudi sorties in Yemen because RAF personnel “do not prepare” Saudi aircraft for operations, either by “loading” weapons or planning attacks.

However, the government has admitted that UK personnel store and issue weapons for use by the Saudi air force, load weapons for its training missions and participate in training exercises with the Saudi air force. Three RAF personnel are also embedded in the Saudi Air Operations Centre.

Hours after the BAE cargo plane landed in Ta’if on 16 April 2020, Sir John Lorimer, a British Army general who deals with the Middle East, had a “warm, productive discussion” with the chief of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces. Sir John described his Saudi counterpart as a “friend” and criticised Yemen’s Houthi rebels on Twitter for not engaging in a ceasefire during the pandemic.

The UK also has a close relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), another key member of the coalition that is bombing Yemen. Last week, an RAF transport plane flew from Cyprus to Al Minhad air field in Dubai — UAE’s biggest city — where the RAF has a permanent presence. The UAE has also hired British mercenaries to assist its Presidential Guard unit which has fought in Yemen.

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

(A H)

Recovery of Yemen's only Covid-19 patient puts country in the clear – for now

Yemen is officially clear of coronavirus cases following the recovery of its first – and so far only – Covid-19 patient.

A Yemeni man working in the port of ash-Shihr, on the Indian Ocean coast of Hadramaut province, was diagnosed with the virus on April 10. The town was immediately placed under curfew and preventive measures were imposed in neighbouring areas. Since, then, no further cases have been reported.

For now, the war-torn country appears to have been spared a major outbreak which, in view of its crumbling health system and widespread malnourishment, could easily prove catastrophic.

(A H P)

Russian ambassador points to Yemen’s steps to prevent coronavirus spread

Yemen’s authorities have asked the international community, including Russia, for assistance in preventing the spread of the coronavirus, Russian Ambassador to Yemen Vladimir Dedushkin told TASS on Thursday.

"Yemen is making serious preparations to combat a possible outbreak," he said, commenting on the country’s request for assistance. "The authorities are taking preventing measures so that they have the necessary resources to combat the pandemic in the future," the envoy added.

According to Dedushkin, the country currently lacks "testing systems, which is why the number is incorrect."

(* B H)

Humanitarians are racing against time to help Yemen address COVID-19; the odds are stacked against them

Humanitarian agencies are rushing to help authorities suppress the spread of COVID19 in Yemen and to prepare and equip facilities in case people become ill.

“It’s a race against time,” said Ms. Lise Grande, Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen. “The threat of COVID19 is so terrifying we have to do everything we can to stop the spread of the virus and help the people who may become infected.”

“We have to be frank, the odds are stacked against us. Already we are supporting the largest humanitarian operation in the world, reaching more than 13 million people each month,” said Ms. Grande.

“Operating conditions are restrictive, in some places paralyzing so, and we don’t have enough resources. Until donors see that we are allowed by authorities to do our jobs the right way, in accordance with the same principles respected everywhere in the world, funding is going to remain limited.”

Using existing resources, even as they try to mobilize additional funds, humanitarian agencies are taking decisive steps.

The World Health Organization (WHO) is funding the work of 333 Rapid Response Teams. These five-person teams are present in every single district across the country, responsible for detecting, assessing, alerting and responding to suspected COVID-19 cases. People can reach out to these teams through multiple channels including newly established hotline numbers.

“The aim is to increase the number of teams to 999, a tripling of existing detection capacity,” said Mr. Altaf Musani, the WHO Country Director.

(* A H P)

Yemen produces ventilators despite of Saudi blockade

Mohammed al-Houthi praised Yemenis for massive strides in industrial development

Leading figure of the Supreme Political Council Mohammed al-Houthi, has revealed that artificial respirators have successfully been produced in Yemen as part of precautionary measures and preparations to counter the new corona virus (Covid-19) pandemic.

“Thanks to God, some ventilators have been put on the test in a Yemeni industry,” Mohammed al-Houthi said at midnight on Tuesday.

“We hope that the Ministry of Health will soon announce the success of the tests for locally-made devices.”

The announcement of the manufacture of artificial respirators reinforces the announcement of the Minister of Health in the National Salvation Government, Dr. Taha al-Mutawakkil, that he made during his briefing to the House of Representatives regarding Yemeni efforts to fight the pandemic.

(* B H)

Sara Beysolow Nyanti (UNICEF): I spoke earlier this morning to @AJEnglish on how vulnerable #Yemen is amid a potential spread of coronavirus. With the pandemic, almost 5 million children are unable to go to school and don't have the privilege of continuing to learn online. Health systems are also under threat. (film)

(A H)

UNHAS Yemen: COVID19 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)

The present SOP aims to establish a WFP Aviation/UNHAS procedures to be followed when operating in areas affected by the current outbreak of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19).

(* B H P)

In Yemen: Death by bullets or coronavirus

Although one case of the coronavirus was officially confirmed in Yemen, sources say there are four infected people in isolation.

But the virus apparently has reached Sanaa, the capital. Four suspected coronavirus cases were identified in the first week of April and the patients have been in isolation at the Movenpick Hotel in the city, according to a medical professional who has been working with the teams handling the cases. This information was shared reluctantly and anonymously, cautioning against exposing their identity.

“The cases must remain a secret. If the Houthis find out the news has leaked, there will be severe consequences. They don’t want the people — especially potential fighters — to be scared and distracted from the main cause, which is winning the war against the Saudis and their Yemeni allies,” he said.

On April 2, Mohammed Abdulqudoos, deputy director of Yemen's official Saba News Agency, tweeted that a case of the virus that causes COVID-19 had been discovered in Sanaa as a woman coming from Saudi Arabia tested positive and was placed in isolation. He quickly retracted his tweet and said it was only a suspected case and the woman did not have the virus after all.

However, the medical professional and other sources told Al-Monitor about the existence of positive cases, and with every informant a new piece of Yemen's COVID-19 puzzle falls into place.

As a preemptive measure, the Movenpick Hotel was designated for such cases, supervised by the endemic combating authority, because of its isolated location. The hotel has been disinfected, medical staff have been trained and shifts have been scheduled.

In Sanaa, around 350 people have been tested; they were Yemenis who returned to the country prior to the lockdown. Most of them were coming back from Mecca pilgrimages. Two of the four people are sisters, and according to the medical professional, all four patients are recovering well and have not needed ventilators.

A directive dated April 18 by the endemic combating authority to the capital secretariat and other provinces under Houthi control stated that people who are currently in quarantine must complete their 14-day isolation and then be allowed to return home.

Yemenis joke that the COVID-19 virus has been traveling around the world and decided to skip Yemen because the other diseases have it covered.

My comment: The article sems to be influenced by the author’s anti-Houthi viewpoint. The 3 cases mentioned at Sanaa obviously were 3 members of UN staff. The Houthi authorities had claimed they could have been infected, what was rejected by the UN and later we had been told that they not had been infected.

(* B H)

Coronavirus: World risks 'biblical' famines due to pandemic - UN

David Beasley, head of the World Food Programme (WFP), said urgent action was needed to avoid a catastrophe.

A report estimates that the number suffering from hunger could go from 135 million to more than 250 million.

Those most at risk are in 10 countries affected by conflict, economic crisis and climate change, the WFP says.

The fourth annual Global Report on Food Crises highlights Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, Venezuela, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Nigeria and Haiti.

Addressing the UN Security Council during a video conference, Mr Beasley said the world had to "act wisely and act fast".

"We could be facing multiple famines of biblical proportions within a short few months," he said. "The truth is we do not have time on our side."

In a call to action, he added: "I do believe that with our expertise and our partnerships, we can bring together the teams and the programmes necessary to make certain the Covid-19 pandemic does not become a human and food crisis catastrophe."

In an interview, he also expressed fear that 30 million people, and possibly more, could die in a matter of months if the UN does not secure more funding and food. But this is also a world where donors are reeling from the steep financial cost of their own Covid-19 crises.

Mr Beasley says no-one told him they would turn their back on the most vulnerable. But he admitted they would need to take stock at home first. He warned that chaos elsewhere could circle back around the world.

His blunt warning: "One way or another, the world will pay for this." Better to work together, he says, on the basis of facts, not fear.

The WFP's senior economist, Arif Husain, said the economic impact of the pandemic was potentially catastrophic for millions "who are already hanging by a thread".

"It is a hammer blow for millions more who can only eat if they earn a wage," he said in a statement.

"Lockdowns and global economic recession have already decimated their nest eggs. It only takes one more shock - like Covid-19 - to push them over the edge. We must collectively act now to mitigate the impact of this global catastrophe."

and also

(* B H)

In Jemen herrscht Krieg – wie soll das Land jetzt auch noch Corona bekämpfen?

Seit Jahren bekriegen sich verfeindete Milizen im Jemen, der Staat funktioniert kaum noch. Nun wurde der erste Covid-19-Fall entdeckt. Wir fragten die Expertin von "Ärzte ohne Grenzen": Wie soll es jetzt weitergehen?

Wie ist zu erklären, dass der Jemen so lange von Corona verschont geblieben ist?

Das Positive im Negativen ist, dass der Jemen durch den Krieg sehr abgeschottet ist. Es gibt sehr wenig Luftverkehr. Das könnte das Land zunächst geschützt haben. Auf der anderen Seite liegt das Gesundheitssystem nach fünf Jahren Krieg am Boden. Viele Einrichtungen sind geschlossen, es gibt nicht genügend Mitarbeiter, nicht genügend Medikamente. Schon mit normalen Krankheiten ist das System überfordert.

Was würde eine Corona-Epidemie also für den Jemen bedeuten?

Es wäre eine Katastrophe. Denn schon jetzt leidet der Jemen unter anderen Epidemien (nur im Abo)

(B H)

Film: 'This virus makes it a double burden' for children in Libya, Yemen and Syria

The UN children's agency has called for an extra €85 million to help fight the COVID-19 pandemic in the Middle East and North Africa. Euronews spoke to Juliette Touma, the Regional Chief of Communication for UNICEF, in the Middle East and North Africa.…

(* A H)

Unternehmen und UN liefern Tausende Coronavirus-Tests für den Jemen

Eine Gruppe von Unternehmen will in Zusammenarbeit mit den Vereinten Nationen Zehntausende Coronavirus-Tests sowie Schutzbekleidung und Beatmungsgeräte in den Jemen liefern. Das teilte die Initiative zum Kampf gegen Covid-19 im Jemen (IICY) am Mittwoch mit. Angeführt wird das Vorhaben von der Stiftung des verstorbenen jemenitischen Unternehmers Hajil Said. Beteiligt sind unter anderem der Verpackungshersteller Tetra Pak mit Sitz in der Schweiz und der niederländisch-britische Konsumgüterkonzern Unilever.

Mit Hilfe des UN-Welternährungsprogramms (WFP) soll die etwa 30 Tonnen schwere Lieferung Anfang kommender Woche von China in den Jemen gebracht werden. Teil davon sind 49 000 Sets zur Entnahme von Virus-Proben, 20 000 Coronavirus-Schnelltests und 24 000 Nukleinsäure-Tests, außerdem fünf Zentrifugen zur Auswertung von insgesamt 85 000 Tests. Auch 225 Beatmungsgeräte, mehr als eine halbe Million Gesichtsmasken sowie Schutzbekleidung und 20 000 Liter Desinfektionsmittel sollen geliefert werden.

und auch

(* A H)

Companies give Yemen tens of thousands of coronavirus test kits to ease shortage

A group of multinational companies said on Wednesday it was donating tens of thousands of coronavirus testing kits and medical equipment to Yemen, where a five-year war has destroyed the health system and left millions vulnerable to disease.

The International Initiative on COVID-19 (IICY) said in a statement that its first 34-tonne shipment would reach Yemen next week and contained 49,000 virus collection kits, 20,000 rapid test kits, five centrifuges and equipment that would enable 85,000 tests, and 24,000 COVID-19 nucleic acid test kits.

IICY was founded by the charity arm of multinational Yemeni family conglomerate Hayel Saeed Anam (HSA), Tetra Pak, Unilever, the World Bank-backed Yemen Private Sector Cluster, and the Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

It is working with the United Nations which will distribute the donated equipment, including 225 ventilators and more than half a million masks. HSA is providing the first shipment, the statement said.

and also

(B H)

SMEPS: We’re stepping in & realize #health workers in #Yemen is facing many challenges! SMEPS is training 500+ health workers more than 100+ hospitals in #Hadramout #Aden #Sanaa to increase their capabilities of case management for #COVID19. This is crucial to confront this pandemic! (photos)

cp1b Am wichtigsten: Kampf um Hodeidah / Most important: Hodeidah battle

(A K pS)

Houthi militias heavily shell residential areas in Tahita

(A K pH)

US-Saudi Aggression Intensifies Violations In Hodeidah Governorate During Past 24 Hours


(A K pH)

Aggression coalition implements 105 breaches in Hodeidah

(A K pH)

Aggressionskräfte verstärken Verstöße in Hodeidah in den letzten Stunden

(A K pH)

Verstöße der Aggressionstruppen gingen in Hodeidah weiter

(A K pH)

35 violations committed by aggression forces in Hodeidah

(A K pH)

US-Saudi Aggression’s Daily Update for Wednesday, April 22nd, 2020

(A K pH)

89 Verstöße der Aggressionstruppen im Gouvernement Hodeidah

(A K pH)

89 violations committed by aggression forces in Hodeidah

(A K pS)

[Hadi gov.] Foreign Minster cautions against collapse of Stockholm agreement

The Foreign Minister, Mohammed Al-Hadhrami, cautioned on Tuesday against failure of the Stockholm agreement on Hodeida because of mounting Houthis’ military activities in other fronts.

Al-Hadhrami said that the government will not accept that the Houthis’ use of the Hodeida agreement for expansion in other areas.

He said that the government suspended participation of its representatives to the UN Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) following death of one government’s member due to injuries he sustained in shooting by a Houthis sniper while on duty.

My comment: Read this as a threat.

(A K pH)

In Hodeidah, A source in the Liaison Officers Operations Room to monitor violations said that US-Saudi aggression committed 54 violations in the last 24 hours, including 11 violations with artillery shells and 43 violations with several bullets.

(A K pS)

Hodeidah: Joint forces foil drone attack in al-Duraihimi

and also

(A K pH)

54 Verstöße der Aggressionstruppen in Hodeidah in den letzten 24 Stunden

(A K pH)

54 violations of aggression forces in Hodeidah over 24 past hours

(A K pS)

Al Houthi militants shelled residential areas in al Durayhimi district in al Hudaydah governorate in western Yemen on April 22, according to local media sources.[2]

(A K pH)

Aggressionskräfte setzen Verstöße und Bombardierungen von Zivilisten in mehreren Provinzen fort

(A K pS)

A fisherman named Waheeb Mohammed Hassan was killed while peacefully fishing on his boat by a naval mine laid by Iran-allied #Houthi militia. His family said his body was found at al-Toor beach in the port city of #Hodeidah, west #Yemen.

cp1c Am wichtigsten: Regenfälle und Überschwemmungen / Most important: Rainfalls and floods

(** A H)

Film: Flooding in Aden, Yemen - Torrential floods, April 21-22 2020

(* A H)

Verheerende Sturzfluten

Jemen: Zu Krieg, Cholera und Hungersnot kommen ungekannte Regenmassen hinzu. Verschärfung durch von saudischer Kriegsallianz zerbombten Staudamm

Seit Wochen sind im Jemen wiederholt schwere Regenfälle niedergegangen, die zu Sturzfluten und heftigen Überschwemmungen geführt haben. Aktuell sind vor allem die Provinz Marib und die Region um die Hauptstadt Sanaa im Nordwesten des Landes betroffen. Bereits sieben Menschen sind in den Fluten in Marib gestorben, fünf Frauen und zwei Kinder, 85 weitere wurden verletzt, wie ein Bericht des UN-Nothilfebüros vom Dienstag darlegt. Besonders die Camps mit Binnenvertriebenen sind den Wassermassen schutzlos ausgeliefert: »Tausende Zelte wurden zerstört, Vorräte und Notfallgebrauchsgüter wurden von den Fluten weggespült«, heißt es im UN-Bericht. 6.290 geflüchtete Familien sind direkt betroffen. Der Sprecher des von Ansarollah geführten Gesundheitsministeriums in Sanaa, Yousef Alhadri, bestätigte am Sonnabend gegenüber jW, dass auch in der Hauptstadt zwei Menschen durch die Fluten getötet wurden.

Andererseits sind Starkregentage, auch mit Fluten, in den Frühjahrsmonaten im Jemen keine Seltenheit, allein die Heftigkeit dieser Saison ist einzigartig: »Solche Regenfälle und Sturzfluten wie in diesem Jahr haben wir noch nie erlebt«, so Ansarollah-Sprecher Alhadri am Sonnabend gegenüber jW. Vor über 2.500 Jahren wurde das größte technische Bauwerk der Antike gebaut, der weltberühmte Staudamm von Marib, das »Wunder Arabiens« und Wahrzeichen des Jemen, mit dem Ziel, das Gebiet um die Provinzhauptstadt vor den jährlichen Überflutungen zu schützen. Ende Mai 2015 bombardierte die von Saudi-Arabien und den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten geführte Koalition den historischen Damm mehrfach und zerstörte ihn zu großen Teilen. Heute ist Marib die am heftigsten von den Fluten betroffene Region im Land.

Auch Aden blieb nicht verschont. Am 24. März »überflutete Starkregen Häuser und Straßen« in der südlichen Küstenstadt, wie ein Bericht des UN-Nothilfebüros am 31. März festhielt. Dabei wurden Brücken, Wassernetze und Ernten zerstört, Vieh ertrank. »Am schlimmsten betroffen waren Lager für Binnenvertriebene«, so der UN-Bericht, diese beherbergen in 60 Camps 4.625 Familien.


(* A H)

Zehn Tote bei Überschwemmungen nach schweren Regenfällen in Jemen

Bei Überschwemmungen nach schweren Regenfällen in Jemen sind in der Hafenstadt Aden mindestens zehn Menschen ums Leben gekommen. Das genaue Ausmass der Schäden sei noch unklar, hiess es am Mittwoch aus Sicherheitskreisen. Am Dienstag hatte die jemenitische Regierung für Aden bereits den Notstand ausgerufen



(* A H)

Mindestens sieben Tote bei Sturzfluten im Jemen

Bei Sturzfluten im Jemen sind seit Monatsbeginn mindestens sieben Menschen getötet und 85 weitere verletzt worden.

Heftige Regenfälle und Überflutungen in den nördlichen Regionen des Landes hätten zu Todesopfern und zu erheblichen Schäden an Wohnhäusern sowie an Unterkünften für Binnenvertriebene geführt, teilte das UN-Büro für die Koordinierung humanitärer Angelegenheiten (Ocha) am Dienstag mit. Ministerpräsident Moeen Abdulmalik Saeed erklärte die südliche Hafenstadt Aden zum Katastrophengebiet.

Bei den Sturzfluten Mitte April seien mindestens fünf Frauen und zwei Kinder ums Leben gekommen, teilte Ocha mit. Sieben Menschen seien schwer verletzt worden und würden im Krankenhaus behandelt. Schlimm betroffen sei die von Rebellen kontrollierte Hauptstadt Sanaa sowie deren Umgebung.

Regierungschef Saeed rief verbündete Staaten und Hilfsorganisationen dazu auf, seinem Land «im Kampf gegen diese Krise» zu helfen. Ein AFP-Korrespondent berichtete von Fahrzeugen, die durch die Fluten in Aden auf den Strassen trieben. In der südlichen Hafenstadt hat die Regierung derzeit ihren Sitz. =

(* A H)

ACAPS Briefing Note: Yemen - Heavy rainfall and flash floods (23 April 2020)

Heavy rains since April 13 led to flooding, displacement, severe infrastructure damage and casualties across Yemen. 14 governorates were affected. Sana’a city, Sana’a, Ma’rib, Aden, and Lahj governorates reported the most significant impact.

The floods have damaged civilian infrastructure: roads, bridges, electricity, and water networks. Preliminary information indicates at least 100,000 people were affected across the country between 13 and 21 April, with at least 15 deaths and 89 injuries reported. At least 7,000 people have been displaced. These numbers are likely to increase as humanitarian actors assess the impact.


(**A H)

'Fourteen dead' in Yemen's flood-hit Aden

The deaths take the national toll to at least 21

Fourteen people, including at least five children, have been killed and dozens injured in flash floods in Yemen's second city Aden, authorities said Wednesday, amid submerged streets and destroyed homes.

The deaths take the national toll to at least 21 after the United Nations said that seven other people were killed by flooding in the north, where the country's long conflict between the government and the Iran-backed Huthi rebels continues.

Deputy Prime Minister Salem Al Khanbashi told AFP that "men, women and children" were among the 14 dead in Aden, where "flooding also caused streets to shut down in most neighbourhoods".

He added that sanitation infrastructure had been severely damaged and called for urgent aid to combat the spread of diseases, "especially cholera and other deadly viral infections".

A government official told AFP at least 10 homes were destroyed and 90 others severely damaged.


(* A H)

Aden floods kill 8, injure 4, damage 76 houses

Aden floods have killed 8 people, injured 4 others and damaged 76 houses, security department in the Yemeni southern port city said Tuesday.
"Eight people including five children died and 4 others were wounded due to the heavy rainfalls seen by all districts of Aden," the department run by the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) said in a statement.
The floods killed 5 people in Saira district and 2 in al-Tawahi, while the eighth was killed by electrical fault in al-Areesh. Sheikh Othman saw 4 of its people injured, according to the statement.
"75 houses were partially damaged in the districts of Crater, Khour Makser and Sheikh Othman, and a house was completely damaged in al-Tawahi."
The Yemeni internationally-recognized prime minister on Tuesday declared Aden as an afflicted city following the rain floods and resultant losses.
"Destruction and losses suffered by Aden .. are huge," PM Maeen Abdulmalek tweeted. "Aden is an afflicted city.
"We call sister and friend countries and relief groups to lend hands and help the government in responding to this disaster and containing its devastating impacts on civilians.
"Having been paralyzed since the events of August [2019 when STC forces seized Aden], the State's institutions are now too weak to cope with such emergencies," the premier said.
Aden and most of southern provinces have been seeing heavy rainfalls, with great floods gushing into streets and roads, leaving human losses and gross damages to private properties and homes.


(* A H)

Deadly flooding strikes Yemen’s Aden killing at least 10

At least 10 civilians died and dozens were injured when heavy flooding struck the port city of Aden in southern Yemen on Tuesday.

Dr Jamal Khadabakhish director of public health in Aden, told The National that the huge floods resulted in three deaths and 27 injuries among residents of Al Mualla district.

And four people from one family died as their house in Sirah district, in southern Aden, collapsed on them.

“There are many other casualties in the northern districts of Dar Saad and Al Sheikh Othman," Dr Khadabakhish said.

"Many were taken to the healthcare centres and the public hospitals in the city, while more than three civilians still missing.

“The floods surrounded thousands of families and caused huge damage to the residences, especially those that were built randomly near the flood ducts." (with film)

and also


(* A H)

The Executive Unit for the Administration of IDP camps: 7 people died, including 5 children, 550 people were injured, including 25 who were seriously injured and 6,286 households were directly impacted by heavy rain in Marib city. (photo)


(* A H)

Floods in Aden leave three people dead, including a child

The latest round of heavy rains and torrential floods in Yemen’s interim capital of Aden left three people, including one child, dead, and caused extensive damage to property. Others are still missing.

According to residents, heavy rains flooded most of Aden's neighborhoods, leaving many people confined to their homes. Power outages, which were a chronic problem before the floods, have been widely reported throughout the city.

Photos and videos posted on social media showed the streets of Aden flooded by continuous rains that swept away people and vehicles. Aden has seen heavy rains for the past month, resulting in significant property damages.

Without proper drainage canals and pumps, the flooding could exacerbate the outbreak of waterborne diseases like cholera which thrive in areas with polluted water supplies.

In Marib governorate, recent flooding has damaged at least 17 internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, some significantly.

and also


The beautiful people of Aden. Young men in Aden rescuing an elderly woman from the flood and singing to her and making her laugh to calm her fears. =

Will we sleep today in the street? A woman of two children in #Aden is crying for help after her house is swept away in flood



(* A H)

Footage: At least 4 People Killed due to Torrential Floodwaters in Aden


(* A H)

Yemen [Hadi gov.] declares Aden a 'disaster area' after flash floods kill eight

Security forces say four children are among the dead after heavy downpours devastate Yemen's temporary capital

Yemen's government declared the southern port city of Aden a "disaster area" after flash floods caused by heavy rains killed eight people.

Videos posted on social media showed locals trying to save people swept away by the floods or youth helping the elderly trapped in their homes.

Meanwhile, local media reported that the city suffered a water and electricity power outage, with services not resumed.

and also

My remark: Earlier reporting: Yemen War Mosaic 644, cp18.


(A H)

Sam calls the international community to urgently relief Yemen in light of the floods

SAM Organization for Rights and Freedoms called on the international community, today, Tuesday, to help Yemeni cities that have been severely damaged in light of recent flood disasters in particular, the capital Sanaa, Aden and Marib in addition to other cities. "Sam" said in a press statement, that the recent flood disaster that Yemen has exacerbated, is exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, especially the camps for the displaced that were destroyed by the torrents; and increases the health risks in the already degraded countries and threatens to increase the spread of epidemics and diseases such as cholera, measles and dengue that afflicted Tens of thousands during the war years (photo)

cp2 Allgemein / General

(* A K P)

Interactive Map of Yemen War

(* A K)



(* A K P)

Waffenruhe im Jemen verlängert

Das von Saudi-Arabien angeführte Militärbündnis hat die einseitig ausgerufene Waffenruhe für das Bürgerkriegsland Jemen um einen Monat verlängert.

Die Koalition komme damit einer Bitte des UNO-Jemen-Gesandten Martin Griffiths nach, sagte ein Sprecher der Bündnisses, wie die staatliche saudische Nachrichtenagentur SPA heute meldete. Griffiths habe um mehr Zeit gebeten, unter anderem um Fortschritte bei den Verhandlungen über einen dauerhaften Waffenstillstand erzielen zu können.

Die vor zwei Wochen verkündete Waffenruhe war eigentlich gestern abgelaufen. Sie hatte die Gewalt im Jemen kaum beruhigt. =

Mein Kommentar: Sie sollten sich selbst dran halten.

(* A K P)

The Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen: Announcing a one-month extension of a Comprehensive Ceasefire in Yemen

Statement by the Official Spokesman of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen COL Turki Al-Malki
“In reference to its previous announcement on 08 April, 2020, and in response to the ceasefire request by SESGY Martin Griffiths in order to allow progress in the negotiations between the two parties regarding a permanent ceasefire, economic and humanitarian measures agreements, relaunch of the political process, and in further continuation of the Coalition’s seriousness and will to alleviate the suffering of the brotherly people of Yemen, working to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and preventing its outbreak with the onset of the Holy month of Ramadan, the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition hereby announces a one-month extension of the ceasefire beginning Thursday, 23 April, 2020.
The Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen reiterates that the chance is still there for concerted efforts to reach a comprehensive and permanent ceasefire in Yemen, and consensus on serious, direct and tangible steps to alleviate the suffering of the Yemeni brotherly people, and that it will strongly support such fundamental steps with the UN in order to reach a just and comprehensive political solution agreed upon by all the Yemenis.

My comment: They just should keep it. But:

(A K P)

[Hadi gov.] Yemeni gov't chief of staff: Our battle against Houthis continues

The Yemeni internationally recognized government said on Thursday evening that the Ansar Allah group (Houthis) has not committed to any truce during the past period.

According to the Aden-based Yemeni news agency (Saba), the government affirmed "the commitment of the Yemeni army and the leadership of the Arab coalition to the armistice at the invitation of the United Nations."

(B H K)

Save the Children zur Lage im Jemen

Save the Children bedauert Verstöße gegen Waffenruhe im Jemen – Kämpfe erschweren Prävention gegen COVID-19

Die Kinderrechtsorganisation Save the Children bedauert die Verstöße gegen die zweiwöchige Waffenruhe im Jemen und fordert angesichts der Corona-Pandemie einen sofortigen Stopp der Kampfhandlungen.

und auch

(* A K P)

Zweiwöchige Waffenruhe im Jemen endet ohne grosse Hoffnung

Die zweiwöchige Waffenruhe im Jemen hat kaum Aussichten auf eine Entspannung des Konflikts gebracht. Die einseitige Waffenruhe des von Saudi-Arabien angeführten Militärbündnisses, das im ärmsten arabischen Land die Huthi-Rebellen bekämpft, lief am Donnerstag aus.

Seit Beginn hatten sich die Konfliktparteien mehrfach Verstösse vorgeworfen. Augenzeugen zufolge kam es jeden Tag zu Kämpfen.

und auch

(* A K P)

Saudi-led truce in Yemen expires amid fears of coronavirus disaster

A two-week ceasefire in Yemen announced by a Saudi-led military coalition expired on Thursday without leading to a permanent truce, raising fears that the country’s war will grind on and shatter its already weakened ability to combat coronavirus.

The latest Yemen peace push follows U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s call last month for a global ceasefire so the world can focus on fighting COVID-19, which aids groups worry could cause a catastrophe in Yemen after five years of war.

But the Iran-aligned Houthi group battling the coalition did not accept the coalition’s ceasefire announcement, and violence has continued in several provinces including Marib, the last stronghold of the Saudi-backed government.

Two diplomats and two other sources familiar with the matter had expected an extension of the ceasefire for at least another two weeks, if not until the end of the holy fasting month of Ramadan, expected to begin this week.

But since the Houthis continued their attacks, the coalition did not extend it, they said. The Western-backed alliance has responded to recent Houthi advances with air strikes.

“It was rather a symbolic ceasefire than an actual one, the coalition does not see the point of extending it,” one of the sources close to the discussions told Reuters.

and also

(* B K P)

The Null Effect of COVID-19 on Conflict: Why Iraq and Yemen Keep Fighting

The fact that conflicts in the Arab region are continuing despite the threat from COVID-19 is tragic, but not surprising. There is little historical evidence that epidemics put an end to wars. At best, they lead to a temporary lull as depleted armies reassemble before they resume fighting. But most often fighting continues unabated, adding another layer of deaths to those that war is already inflicting on civilians and combatants.

Furthermore, both civilian and military casualties are a normal part of war that decision-makers take for granted. Today, the language of war has become more politically correct, but the fact remains that politicians tend to dismiss deaths in the name of a higher national interest, at least as long as they do not lead to a backlash at home.

The reaction to the coronavirus pandemic seems to confirm this reality. So far it does not appear to have altered the course of ongoing conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, or Libya, nor has it led to a rapprochement between the Arab Gulf states and Iran. It does not even appear to have impacted the urgency of forming a new government in Iraq. The countries whose policies appear to be affected by the spreading pandemic are those for whom the conflicts are of secondary importance, one of their many interests rather than an existential issue. The conflict in Yemen, for example, is existential for the Houthis, but not for Saudi Arabia, whose leadership was already beginning to question the wisdom of its involvement in the conflict. This explains why Saudi Arabia was willing to declare a ceasefire unilaterally while the other side only reluctantly agreed to join and then proceeded to violate the agreement repeatedly.

All sides know that the threat posed to the peoples of Yemen by the coronavirus pandemic is enormous.

It is tempting to look at the Saudi offer and adherence to a ceasefire, compared to the Houthis’ hesitancy and violations, as examples of a rational versus an irrational reaction to the coronavirus threat. However, in a perverse way both sides acted rationally according to the logic of their goals and interests – by Marina Ottaway

(* B H K P)

US Role in Destabilizing Yemen and Somalia Could Spark “Famine of Biblical Proportions”

The World Food Program is warning that Yemen and countries in the Horn of Africa – not coincidentally states that the U.S. has been destabilizing for decades, could face mass starvation amid the coronavirus pandemic.

However, little discussed in either the World Food Program’s report or corporate media is the Western role in Yemen’s destruction. As Oxfam noted, Yemenis are not starving: they are being starved; starved by a five-year war sustained by the U.S. and its NATO allies. The U.S. and Great Britain have provided crucial support, arming, training and supporting the Saudi coalition in devastating Yemen’s economy. The country’s Ministry of Agriculture estimates that there have been at least 10,000 airstrikes against farms, 800 against local food markets, and 450 against food storage facilities between 2015 and 2019. And thanks to the fuel blockade, hospital and sanitation services are not able to function normally, leading to an enormous waste build up and outbreaks of cholera and other deadly diseases rarely seen in peacetime. COVID-19 will surely overwhelm the already struggling facilities.

The World Food Program predicts Yemen to feel the worst impact of a prolonged global pandemic and famine; 16 million people (the majority of the population) are already suffering a food crisis, the highest number in the world.

Likewise, the West has played a highly destabilizing role in the Horn of Africa, supporting militias and dictatorial regimes across the region.


(* B K P)

Trotz Pandemie kein Ende in Sicht

Seit fünf Jahren steckt Saudi-Arabien im Jemenkrieg. Jetzt sehen die vom Iran unterstützen Huthi-Rebellen eine Chance ihre militärischen Erfolge auszubauen.

Eine von Saudi-Arabien einseitig ausgerufene Feuerpause läuft an diesem Donnerstag ab – der Krieg könnte ungeachtet der Pandemie bald wieder mit voller Wucht losbrechen.

Innere Konflikte und regionalpolitische Rivalitäten haben sich im Armenhaus der arabischen Welt zu einer unheilvollen Mischung verbunden.

Für den saudischen Thronfolger Mohammed bin Salman ist der Krieg im südlichen Nachbarland längst zu einem Mühlstein geworden, den er gerne los wäre. Auch knirscht es gewaltig in der Militärallianz. Die Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten zogen im vergangenen Jahr ihre Soldaten aus dem Jemen ab und unterstützen Separatisten im Süden.

Bin Salmans am 9. April verkündete Waffenruhe war deshalb wohl ein Eingeständnis, dass der Krieg für die Golfmonarchie nicht zu gewinnen ist.

Die Huthis reagierten prompt mit einer Forderungsliste, die auf eine Demütigung des ehrgeizigen Thronfolgers in Riad hinausläuft. Sie verlangen hohe Reparationszahlungen und ein Ende der Blockade von See- und Flughäfen im Jemen. Die saudischen Herrscher lehnen dies bisher ab, weil sie befürchten, dass der Iran eine Öffnung der Häfen zu einer noch massiveren Hilfe für die Huthis nützen könnte.

Mohammed bin Salman gibt sich gerne als zuverlässiger Beschützer seines Landes. Doch die Angriffe der Huthis auf saudisches Staatsgebiet zeigen schonungslos auf, wie verwundbar die Monarchie ist. Nur weiß der Thronfolger, dass er die jemenitischen Islamisten mit Gewalt allein nicht zum Aufgeben bewegen wird. Aber zugleich wäre es ein enormer Gesichtsverlust, sollte Saudi-Arabien die Waffen strecken und sich zurückziehen müssen. Und die Macht des verhassten Iran würde wachsen.

Einerseits. Andererseits verschlingt der Krieg im Jemen viele Milliarden Dollar. Das Geld benötigt der Prinz aber dringend für seine umfassenden Wirtschaftsreformen, die das Königreich von der Ölabhängigkeit befreien soll

Beobachter nennen denn auch den Jemen das Vietnam der Golfmonarchie.

(* B K P)

Saudi-Arabiens kurze Waffenruhe: Der Anfang vom Ende?

Nach einer zweiwöchigen Feuerpause im Jemen steht Saudi-Arabien dort vor schwierigen Entscheidungen. Die Führung des Königreichs muss sich fragen: Auf unbestimmt weiter kämpfen, auch in Krisenzeiten? Oder einen – wenn auch schlechten – Deal mit dem Gegner aushandeln?

Die Ankündigung aus Riad war an Zynismus schwer zu überbieten: Das von Saudi-Arabien angeführte Militärbündnis, das seit fünf Jahren Gebiete im bettelarmen Jemen bombardiert, wolle das „Leid des jemenitischen Brudervolks mildern“. Zwei Wochen lang wollte das saudische Bündnis, das im Nachbarland gegen Huthi-Rebellen kämpft, die Waffen schweigen lassen. Beobachter fragten sich, ob es damit tatsächlich einen Ausweg geben könnte aus dem erbitterten Konflikt.

Ende der Waffenruhe am Donnerstag – und dann?

Die Ankündigung der saudischen Koalition sei nur „mit einem Körnchen Salz“ zu genießen, zeigt sich Farea Al-Muslimi, Vorsitzender des Sanaa Center und Experte für den Jemen, skeptisch. Man müsse die Nachricht entweder gleich verwerfen, oder „beten“, dass sie längerfristig doch zu etwas führen könnte, etwa einem dauerhaften Waffenstillstand. Oder vielleicht sogar zum Frieden – ein Wort, das im Zusammenhang mit dem Jemen heute fast fremd klingt. 122 000 Menschen kamen dort durch Kämpfe ums Leben, Zehntausende wurden vertrieben.

Viele zweifeln an den erklärten Motiven Saudi-Arabiens, mit der Waffenruhe auch den Weg zu politischen Gesprächen ebnen zu wollen. Stattdessen wollte das Königreich sich womöglich Zeit verschaffen, um eigene Probleme anzugehen: Saudi-Arabien ist vom Coronavirus in der Golfregion am stärksten betroffen, nach Berichten sollen auch Dutzende Mitglieder des Königshauses infiziert sein. Selbst die große Pilgerfahrt Hadsch könnte dieses Jahr wegen der Pandemie ausfallen.

Stärke der Huthis

Die vom Iran unterstützten Huthis sind im Jemen unterdessen so stark wie seit Jahren nicht.

Ausweg aus dem Krieg

Trotzdem sucht Saudi-Arabien einen Ausweg aus dem Krieg, der sich militärisch kaum noch gewinnen lässt.

Und der Krieg kostet Geld. Zugleich macht der historische Ölpreisverfall der saudischen Wirtschaft zu schaffen

Einen endlosen Krieg könnten die Saudis aber auch nicht mehr führen, vermutet Riedel. „Sie haben keine realistische Alternative, als den Huthis die meisten Teile des Jemens zu überlassen mit dem Gespenst eines iranischen Stellvertreters an ihrer südlichen Grenze.“ Auch die Analysten des Soufan Center vermuten, dass der Krieg Saudi-Arabien „überfordern“ könnte. Jetzt sei die Zeit, die eigenen Verluste zu begrenzen und einen – wenn auch schlechten – Deal auszuhandeln. =,-der-anfang-vom-ende-saudi-arabiens-kurze-waffenruhe-im-jemen-_arid,510848.html = =

(* B K P)

The future of war in Yemen amid COVID-19 and a failed ceasefire

How long can a war go on when its most powerful combatant wants to get out?

In Yemen, the answer could be, quite a while, even if Saudi Arabia succeeds in finding a face-saving way to withdraw after five futile years. Yemen is so Balkanized, so fragmented, that its well-armed tribes and factions could well continue the conflict that attracted Saudi intervention in the first place.

Regional affairs analysts were virtually unanimous in believing that the pandemic has given the Saudis the reason they were seeking to stop fighting, and that the ceasefire was a clear signal that they want to bring their involvement to an end. The kingdom has been fighting a war it cannot win in pursuit of stated — if shifting — objectives that cannot be achieved by military means.

Pressure on Saudi Arabia to get out has been mounting since last summer, when its principal coalition partner, the United Arab Emirates, sharply curtailed its military role.

Certainly, the Houthis have not been defeated, In fact, as the veteran Middle East intelligence analyst Bruce Riedel wrote, “the Houthis are winning. Since January, they have made significant advances on the ground

The Houthis have demonstrated that they are capable of making life difficult for Saudi Arabia by firing missiles not just into border cities but into Riyadh, the Saudi capital, and Jedda, the kingdom’s main port.

Also not ready to quit the field are separatist rebels, not aligned with the Houthis, who control the key southern port of Aden

However eager the Saudis may be to get out of the conflict, they are unlikely to simply walk away and leave Yemen to the warring factions. In their view, that would leave a powerful agent of Iranian ambition — the Houthis — in control of the border area, if not all of Yemen.

Saudi Arabia considers Iran a dangerous and determined rival, and opposition to Iran’s perceived role was one of the major motivators of Saudi entry into the war.

(B H K P)

Save the Children: ‘Warring parties in Yemen could not even lay down weapons for two weeks’

April 23nd marks the last day of the two-week ceasefire that was unilaterally declared by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.

Since the ceasefire was declared on April 9th, at least 38 civilians have been killed or maimed, including five children who were killed and six others were wounded in different attacks. In 29 cases, houses were hit[i].

This was the second ceasefire announcement since the start of the Covid19 global pandemic. Yemen announced its first positive case on April 10.

Xavier Joubert, Save the Children country director in Yemen, said:\ "It is hugely disappointing that the warring parties could not even lay down their weapons for two weeks to fend off the most imminent threat Yemen is facing: a possible Covid-19 outbreak. This demonstrates a complete lack of political will from all involved in this terrible conflict, for which civilians pay the highest price day in, day out.

Knowing that only half of the country's health facilities are fully functional, and only 700 ICU beds and 500 ventilators are available across the country, Covid-19 is an additional risk Yemen is undoubtedly not prepared for.

Our teams on the ground are working hard to support the communities in these dire times, but you can't fight a virus whilst coming under attack or supply a hospital when roads are routinely targeted. How can we expect families to get to a health facility, or buy hygiene products when they have to fear for their lives on the street?

We call on all parties to come to and fully implement a ceasefire as soon as possible. =

(* B H K)

Was der Krieg im Jemen mit einer Heuschreckenplage in Ostafrika zu tun hat

Angesichts der desaströsen Lage im Land stellt sich natürlich die Frage, wie viele Ansteckungen es in den letzten Wochen schon gegeben hat, denn bei einem völlig darniederliegenden Gesundheitssystem dürfte es sich wohl kaum um den wirklich ersten Fall handeln. Wer aus der von Jahren der Mangelernährung gezeichneten, teils chronisch kranken Bevölkerung nämlich hat schon die Möglichkeit, überhaupt noch einen Arzt aufzusuchen, und wenn, welche Ärzte können überhaupt Tests durchführen?

Seit Jahren wütet die Cholera im Jemen, bislang sollen sich mehr als zwei Millionen Menschen angesteckt haben, ohne dass es effektive Gegenmaßnahmen gegeben hätte.

Knapp vier Millionen, also ca. 15% der Bevölkerung sind Binnenvertriebebene, die allgemeine Lage ist inzwischen so katastrophal, dass laut Angaben der UN mehr als drei Viertel aller Jemeniten auf Nahrungsmittelhilfe angewiesen sind, die sie allerdings nicht bekommen, weshalb im Land seit längerem eine Hungersnot herrscht.

Ungewöhnliche Auswirkung des Jemenkriegs

Seit Monaten kämpfen Äthiopien, Somalia und Kenia auch noch mit einer gigantischen Heuschreckenplage, die die Lebensgrundlage von Millionen Menschen zerstört oder zu zerstören droht. Hilflos müssen sie zusehen, wie sich die gefräßigen Insekten immer weiter vermehren. Und neben dem Klimawandel ist es vor allem der Krieg im Jemen, der Schuld an der Plage hat =

(* B K P)

Audio: "The Intelligence" daily #podcast by @TheEconomist

Yesterday's (20 April) included a segment analysing warring parties' attitudes to the #Yemen #ceasefire. You can find it at 9.40 minutes in. It's free.

(B K P)

35 Yemeni journalists have been killed by snipers, ground shelling, airstrikes and landmine explosions, and 300 others detained, 16 still in prisons, since war began in Yemen in 2015, according to freedoms official at Yemeni journalists syndicate Nabil Al-Osaidi.

(* B P)

Sanjay Singh (ed.), West Asia in Transition: Volume II, New Delhi: Delhi Policy Group and IDSA, 2018.

Several chapters on Saudi Arabia, Iran, Yemen

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

(* B E K P)

Navy of US-Saudi Aggression Holding 20 Ships of Oil, Food

The navy of US-Saudi aggression is holding 20 ships of oil derivatives and food with more than half a million tons, mostly gasoline and diesel, a source in Hodeidah port assured Almasirah on Friday.

The source pointed out that among the detained ships were 7 oil derivative vessels, which had been pirated for more than a month, despite obtaining international permits to unload their cargo at the port.

The source indicated that the quantities of material seized on board the ships of oil derivatives exceed 400 thousand tons, while the ships of foodstuffs exceed 100 thousand tons.

(* B E K P)

Ölgesellschaft YPC: 60 Millionen US-Dollar Geldstrafen für die Aggressionseindämmung von Öllieferungen

Die jemenitische Ölgesellschaft YPC gab an, dass die Anzahl der von der Aggression Coalition gehaltenen Lieferungen in den letzten fünf Jahren 127 Öllieferungen überschritten hat.

Das Ölgesellschaft erklärte heute in einer Pressekonferenz in Sanaa in Anwesenheit des Ministers für Öl und Mineralien, Ahmed Abdullah Dares, dass die Volkswirtschaft aufgrund der Beschlagnahme von Fracht aufgrund der Aggression und der Blockade Geldstrafen in Höhe von etwa 60 Millionen US-Dollar erhalten habe.

Das Unternehmen wies darauf hin, dass die Aggressionsallianz weiterhin alle Mittel blockierte und einschränkte, um die Kosten für die Beschaffung von Ölderivaten durch die hohen Verzögerungsstrafen des Unternehmens zu erhöhen, was sich negativ auf den Nutzen der Bürger aus dem weltweiten Preisverfall bei Ölderivaten auswirkte.

(* B E K P)

Navy of US-Saudi Aggression Holding 19 Ships of Oil, Food

The navy of US-Saudi aggression is holding 19 ships with half a million tons of oil and food derivatives.

The Yemen Petroleum Company announced, earlier Thursday, that the number of shipments seized by the US-Saudi Aggression is more than 127 oil shipments during the years of aggression and the blockade imposed on Yemen, explaining that the penalties for delaying those shipments are about 60 million dollars.

During a press conference held in the capital, Sana’a, the company explained that the number of shipments that were seized amounted to more than 127 oil shipments that were held for varying periods of time, reaching a maximum of 145 days for the ship “BAHIA DAMAS” .

It confirmed that the detention of ships incurred the national economy late fines of about $ 60 million as a direct result of the blockade and preventing entry to the board of oil derivatives.

YPC indicated that fines could have been avoided had it not been for the continued arbitrary measures of seizing oil ships offshore by the coalition of aggression.

and also

(A E K P)

Das Schiff "Cornet" liegt am kommerziellen Dock im Hafen von Hodeidah

Mittags auf dem Handelspier im Hafen von Hodeidah wurde das Schiff (Cornet) mit 30.000 und 79 Tonnen Benzin angedockt, nachdem es von der Aggression Alliance fast vier Monate auf See vor dem Hafen von Dschisn beschlagnahmt worden war, obwohl es eine Genehmigung von erhalten hatte UN.

Nachdem das Schiff angekommen ist und die Inspektion und Messung der Sendung überwacht und sicherstellt, dass sie den Spezifikationen entspricht, um mit dem Entladen und Pumpen der Tanks des Unternehmens im Hafen zu beginnen, ist Ashara der Direktor der Import- und Schiffsabteilung des Unternehmens Dr. Tariq Al-Najjar und die Personalabteilung Abdul Sattar Zaafour wiesen darauf hin, dass die fortgesetzte willkürliche Inhaftierung von Derivaten, die in den letzten Monaten zu hohen Weltmarktpreisen verschifft wurden, durch die Aggression zu mangelnder Flexibilität des Unternehmens und zur Anpassung an niedrige Weltmarktpreise führte, insbesondere angesichts der Eskalation von Bußgeldern und anderen Belastungen Die Grundkosten, die sich aus der monatelangen Inhaftierung von Schiffen durch Schlachtschiffe der Aggression ergeben.

Und sie wiesen auf das Schiff (Cornet) hin, das am 12. Dezember 2019 zu einem Durchschnittspreis von 70,34 USD verschifft wurde. Dies ist der einzige Grund, der die Optimierung des globalen Preisverfalls bei Ölderivaten verhinderte.

(A E K P)

YPC: Aggression’s Continued Detention of Ships Made Yemen Unable to Adapt to Lower Global Prices

Coalition of aggression’s continued arbitrary detention of oil derivatives vessels shipped in recent months at high global prices has caused a lack of flexibility and inability to adapt to falling world prices, especially in light of escalating delay fines,” the Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) said in a statement on Monday.

The company explained that the ship “Cornet” which will arrive today April 21, 2020, after being held at sea in front of the port of Jizan for 103 days after obtaining the UN permit, was shipped on December 12, 2019 with an average of high exchange price of $70.34

“The company regrets to assure our fellow citizens that there is lack of moving the selling prices at this stage,” the statement read.

The YPC confirmed that it will spare no effort in reconsidering the current price if the forces of aggression lift the arbitrary restrictions imposed on oil derivatives vessels, which fall within the practices of collective punishment adopted since the beginning of the aggression.

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

Siehe / Look at cp1

(B H)

Yemen: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (2019 Yearly Overview)

(* B H)

Yemen: Millions prepare for Ramadan amid floods, conflict and coronavirus threat

People across Yemen will mark Islam's holy month this year amid ongoing conflict, seasonal diseases, floods and rising prices, in a country where the economic situation doesn't allow two thirds of the population to access or afford enough food.

The coronavirus threat is also on people's minds, with one confirmed case in the country of almost 29 million. Yemen's health system is fragile and under strain: half of all health facilities are not functioning and just this week 500 cholera cases were reported in 24 hours in one ICRC-supported hospital in the capital Sana'a.

"Yemenis cope with so much hardship every day. Ongoing fighting in parts of the country causes daily despair, seasonal infectious diseases claim thousands of lives each year and high inflation is affecting the price of food, medicine and other basic goods. Covid-19 is one more worry for people who are already so vulnerable," said Franz Rauchenstein, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross delegation in Sana'a.

The start of the rainy season has already brought misery to thousands


(A H)

Film: Yemen - War and Corona take away Ramadan joy in Taiz

The people of Taiz governorate receive the blessed month of Ramadan this year amid fears of the spread of the Corona virus

(B H)

UNFPA Yemen Response: Monthly Situation Report #03 March 2020

In March, the crisis in Yemen entered its sixth year. The scale, severity and complexity of needs in Yemen continue to stagger. Some 24 million people, 80 per cent of the entire population require some form of assistance or protection and close to half of all families are in acute need. The conflict has also compromised access to health; only 50 per cent of health facilities in Yemen are functioning, of which 20 per cent provide maternal and child healthcare; services are restricted further by intermittent electricity and power outages across the country.

Yemen’s economy has been badly fractured by half a decade of war.

(B H)

Yemen Nutrition Cluster Bulletin, Issue 9: Oct-Dec 2019

At the end of 2019, the nutrition cluster comprised of 43 partners ( 4 UN agencies , 2 government, 20 international NGOs, and 17 local NGOs ) that collectively recorded significant achievements that included:

Meanwhile, 838,798 children and 898,306 pregnant and lactating women were enrolled in blanket supplementary feeding program (BSFP) representing 122% and 126% of the annual target respectively .

Infant and Young Child Feeding counselling that include exclusive breast feeding in the first 6 months, and supplementary feedings for children under two years was provided to 2,937,139 pregnant and lactating women and care givers.

With respect to capacity building, a total of 10,945 health workers, community health volunteers and midwives were trained on basic nutrition package on CMAM, IYCF and TFCs.

Finally, SMART Surveys were conducted in 11 governorates (21 strata/livelihood surveys). Based on WHO severity classification, the nutrition situation improved in 4, deteriorated in 8 and remained in same level in 9 strata surveys.

(B H)

Yemen 2019 Overview: Logistics Cluster

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

(* B H)

IOM Yemen Quarterly Migration Overview (January - March 2020)


Yemen is a key country on the eastern corridor migration route from the Horn of Africa to the Arabian Gulf — the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is the most common intended destination on the route. In mid-March, early indications showed that the COVID-19 pandemic had begun to impact migration on the eastern corridor.
Arrival trends witnessed in 2019 continued into the first quarter of 2020, with between 9,000 to 11,000 migrants arriving in January and February. However, socio-political dynamics brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic led to restrictions on mobility, putting public health concerns at the forefront of national security and heightening the risks migrant populations are exposed to along the route. As a result, the last half of March saw an overall decrease of migrant flows into the country at specific monitoring points along the coast.

Migratory flows from the Horn of Africa are mixed in nature, comprised mostly of migrants looking for opportunities to improve their lives, but also include refugees and asylum seekers. All of the inflows into Yemen departed from Djibouti and Somalia in the first quarter of 2020, with the majority of migrants originating from Ethiopia.

(* B H)

Escaping Death: Two Teenage Girls Journey to Safety

“Before I came to Yemen, I was full of hope about the life I would have in the Gulf,” said seventeen-year-old Almaz. “But nobody told me about the war.”

Close to six years of conflict in Yemen have had little impact on the number of people travelling on the Eastern Route from the Horn of Africa to the Arabian Gulf. Many are not aware that they will enter a conflict zone by making the sea voyage across the Gulf of Aden.

Almaz left her home in Ethiopia eager to make enough money to support her family. She had seen how much her neighbours, who had travelled to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), had supposedly sent back home.

Without telling her parents her plan, she started her journey to KSA.

“I made it to Djibouti on my own. But when I arrived, I was surprised to find out that the smugglers wanted a lot of money to take me to Yemen,” said Almaz, who eventually had no choice but to turn to smugglers to reach the African coast.

The teenager eventually called her father and asked him for help. He had been worried about where she had disappeared to and was comforted to hear that she was safe. Reluctantly, he gave into her request and sent the money to fund her journey to Yemen.

Almaz was relieved when she eventually made it to a market in northern Yemen, which she knew to be close to the Saudi border. She spent the night near the market, hoping to cross the next day; that day the market was hit.

She was wounded in the strike; her leg was injured.

She was rushed immediately to Al Salam Hospital in the city of Sa’ada by other migrants, who had not been hurt. A humanitarian organization gave Almaz urgent medical treatment. She stayed in Sa’ada for ten days before she was brought to a family who offered her a safe place to stay.

Through a foster family programme run by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and funded by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), hundreds of stranded migrants like Almaz. are able to find safety, shelter, health care and food along their journeys.

When Almaz arrived at her foster family she roomed with Aziza, an 18-year-old young woman, who also ran away from her home in Ethiopia. She did not tell her family where she was until she had made it to Djibouti and had no money to pay the smugglers.

(* B H)

Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, 23 April 2020

Heavy rains and flooding hit several districts of Sana’a, Amant Al Asimah, and Marib governorates, causing extensive damage to IDP shelters and public infrastructure. In Marib in particular, sandstorms, rain and floods severely damaged 29 IDP hosting sites across four districts. UNHCR conducted rapid needs assessments in the three affected governorates and immediately assisted 500 internally displaced (IDP) families with 2,510 blankets, 1,600 mattresses, kitchen sets and 140 tents as a preliminary response. Distribution gaps still remain for shelter, mattresses, blankets and food.

During the reporting period, UNHCR continued with the distribution of mattresses and kitchen sets through partners to IDP families in Ibb and Taizz governorates who recently fled the frontlines.

The UNHCR-led Protection Cluster developed training sessions on observation techniques, targeting humanitarian actors that have access to quarantine sites established by local authorities for the response to COVID-19

As part of its regular programming and due to increased needs associated with the COVID-19 crisis, UNHCR completed the distribution of hygiene kits consisting of soap, detergent and water buckets to 28,000 refugees and host community families in Basateen neighbourhood, Aden governorate

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp5 – cp18

Vorige / Previous:

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-644 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-644: oder / or

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

14:30 24.04.2020
Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
Geschrieben von

Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
Schreiber 0 Leser 22
Dietrich Klose