Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 663 - Yemen War Mosaic 663

Yemen Press Reader 663: 2. Juli 2020: Drahtzieher im Jemen – Taiz: Durch den Krieg verwüstet – Folter und Tod in Jemens Gefängnissen – Kriegführung der Huthis – Huthi-Sicherheitsregime in Ibb ..
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Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

(Air raid July 1: Saada province, Maqash area)

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

(Air raid July 1: Sanaa, Dhahban area, tire storage warehouse)

... Rivalität Saudi-Arabien gegen Emirate im Südjemen – Die Außenpolitik der Emirate Israels Ambitionen im Jemen – und mehr

July 2, 2020:

Puppet masters in Yemen – Taiz: defaced by war – Torture and deaths in Yemen’s prisons – The Houthi art of war – Houthi security arrangement at Ibb – Saudi Arabia versus Emirates in Southern Yemen – Israel’s ambitions in Yemen – Foreign policy of the Emirates - and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2:

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavitrus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain

cp11 Deutschland / Germany

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp12a Katar-Krise / Qatar crisis

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms Trade

cp13b Mercenaries / Söldner

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle

cp19 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification




(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

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The Puppet Masters of Yemen’s Humanitarian Crisis

“The question worth asking is: Who stands to benefit from the continual fueling, participation, and organization of a war that threatens to destabilize Yemen irreversibly?”

The Puppet Masters

Many commentators have sought to characterize the proxy conflict between the Saudi-coalition and the Iran-back Houthi insurgency as a sectarian one. The ideological struggle across the region between Saudi Arabia’s Salafi Wahhabism and Iran’s Shia Islam is partly based on the Wahabbi interpretation of the Shia sect as heretical. However, it does not fully explain the pattern of allegiances in the Yemen civil war. A more in-depth examination of religious identities within the Houthi movement disproves the superficial observation of the conflict as sectarian in nature.

First, the majority of Houthis practice Zaydism, an ideologically distinct sect from the Twelver Shiism that serves as the official doctrine of Islam in Iran. The Zaydis view themselves as a wholly separate sect within Islam and one that more closely resembles Sunni doctrine than Shia.

According to an April 2015 article in The Wall Street Journal, Yemen’s various factions driving the civil war at the time were on the verge of signing a deal before unprovoked Saudi-airstrikes derailed the negotiations. The question, then, is not why the civil war originally broke out. Nor is there a question as to what the effects of the civil war in Yemen will be. The question worth asking is: Who stands to benefit from the continual fueling, participation, and organization of a war that threatens to destabilize Yemen irreversibly?

The answer is one that exposes a myriad of foreign interests such as the U.K., U.S., and their perennial bedfellow, Saudi Arabia. This coalition stands in opposition to Iranian interests in the region as well. Only if one views Yemen as an untapped geopolitical weapon do the seemingly sporadic actions in the civil war begin to make any sense. Yemen has become a battleground for regional dominance by international actors split broadly into three categories: the Saudi-backed Hadi coalition, the Iranian-backed Houthi coalition, and independent competitors for territory such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). An assessment of each role-player uncovers the incentive for a destabilized and, therefore, an easily-manipulated Yemen.

Saudi Arabia is the most visible foreign interest at play in the war. Before the events of the 2011 Arab Spring, Saudi fears over Yemen’s stability climaxed when the Ansar Allah movement mounted several challenges to the central authority in Yemen. The active rebellion emerged primarily as a result of socio-economic grievances in northern Yemen. The rise of the Houthi-led movement prompted military intervention by Saudi Arabia for the first time in decades. However, the operation backfired on the Saudi Kingdom as the military failed to make meaningful advances in the region.

Former rivals such as the Houthi insurgency and the Hiraak southern separatist movement joined forces to unseat President Saleh. Sensing an opportunity to gain control of the region, the Saudi Kingdom formulated a transitional plan that would replace Saleh with a government unopposed to Saudi interests. Nowhere was this more evident than in the uncontested election which now-President Hadi won. But what interests would be furthered by increased Saudi presence in Yemen? Aerial bombardment by the Saudis has destroyed much of Yemen, but it is worth noting that the eastern Hadramawt region has remained relatively unscathed. The strategic bombing is a telling clue as to the motives behind Saudi intervention.

The magnetic pull of Hadramawt on the Saudis lies in their ambition to construct an oil pipeline through the region. Saudi Arabia’s pipe dream was laid bare in a leaked cable which revealed that “A British diplomat based in Yemen told PolOff that Saudi Arabia had an interest to build a pipeline, wholly owned, operated and protected by Saudi Arabia, through Hadramaut to a port on the Gulf of Aden, thereby bypassing the Arabian Gulf/Persian Gulf and the straits of Hormuz. Saleh has always opposed this. The diplomat contended that Saudi Arabia, through supporting Yemeni military leadership, paying for the loyalty of shaykhs and other means, was positioning itself to ensure it would, for the right price, obtain the rights for this pipeline from Saleh’s successor.”

Herein lies the overarching aim behind Saudi Arabia’s involvement in perpetuating the civil war. Some skeptics may excuse this action as long as Yemen recovers, but the Saudi’s indifference to the interests of the Yemeni people is evident in their relations with AQAP. The Saudi-coalition has typically avoided any confrontation with the AQAP, using the terror group as an ally against the Houthi’s, as well as a potential check on ISIS forces. This method is a familiar ploy of the Saudi regime and mirrors its support of Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria as a proxy ally in fighting the Shia government of Bashar al-Assad and ISIS. Saudi support of AQAP has emboldened the organization, which had been largely eradicated by the Houthi insurgency.

The U.S. has been complicit in indirectly funding Saudi operations in Yemen.

The reasons for continued intervention in Yemen were outlined by U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo in a letter to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 2019. Pompeo stated: “Iranian malign activity poses a fundamental threat to the stability of the Middle East and to American security at home and abroad.” He added that Iran had “directed repeated attacks on civilian and military infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE by Iranian-designed explosives-laden drones and ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, who receive financial, technical, and materiel support from Iran.”

With American and British military personnel working in the command center with the Saudi-coalition, it is clear that the American and British governments’ respective involvement is anything but passive. The rapid mobilization of resources in support of the Saudi-coalition comes as a response to increased Iranian influence, which threatens U.S. and U.K political interests in the region.

The UAE has also entered the fray. The reasons for UAE involvement in the Yemen civil war is multifaceted. The UAE’s co-operation with the Saudi coalition opens the path for further collaboration with the U.S. in combating terrorist groups such as AQAP in southern Yemen.

The UAE also wishes to check the rise of Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Yemen’s brand of the Sunni Islamist movement, Al-Islah, has become a key player in Yemen, and its alignment with the Saudi coalition has sparked fear in the UAE.

Saudi Arabia, sensing a dangerous threat to its broader aim of overthrowing the Houthis, intervened to ensure that the STC would commit to fighting the Houthi’s. After the fight for control of Aden subsided, the STC decided to align with the Saudi-coalition and handed back some power to the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces. Control of the Aden government remains firmly under STC control with the Hadi-government ruling only as a proxy to the UAE-Saudi coalition. Involvement in southern Yemen has allowed the Gulf nation to exercise control over several of Yemen’s port cities, which benefits UAE commercial and energy interests. Herein, lies the Gulf country’s predominant reason for entering the conflict.

Some have seen Iran’s direct and indirect involvement in Yemen as an attempt to create an armed, stateless, non-Sunni actor that could be advantageous to Iran as a means of reaching its preferred political and military ends. Iran’s interference is only likely to have emerged once the war broke out in light of the fact that Iran had few direct institutional links to the Houthi insurgency before the civil war.

As such, Iran’s intervention in the war appears to be an opportunistic attempt to destabilize Yemen with the hopes of installing a leader who will be on favorable terms with Iran’s regime.

Who will speak for Yemen now?

Unfortunately, the situation in Yemen is an all too familiar one. The promise of the Arab Spring never came to fruition for the Yemeni people. The fragility of post-revolution states provides fertile ground for foreign interference. A power grab from factions within the country ensued backed by nations jostling for control over the region. Aid organizations such as the U.N. attempt to maintain non-partisan support of Yemen, but when the powerful interests fueling the civil war also fund the U.N., the situation reaches the impasse we see today.

As the war drags on, the likelihood of a peace agreement in the interest of Yemenis becomes an increasingly improbable event – by Cameron Joseph


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Yemen: Third-largest Yemeni city defaced after five years of war

The city of Taiz, the third-largest in Yemen, was seen defaced after enduring more than five years of war, as seen on Monday. Drone footage captured buildings and houses destroyed by the strikes while ground footage unveils the condition local residents are living in. A man could be seen taking care of kids on the last floor of a shattered building, as people were walking among debris and getting potable water from a public water tank. "Due to the war, I left the house, I was afraid for my children. I had to leave the house, a shell fell onto my house and destroyed it all, now we don't have anything. Then, I fled to al-Hoban, I lived in a house, but I cannot pay the rent so I had to go back to al-Jahmaliya to my destroyed house to live there. I use some wood and plastic to cover the broken windows and doors," Shihab Abdullah, a local resident, said. Human rights activist Awad Almariry mentioned that on the eastern side of Taiz the destruction "makes you think it was a hurricane, not war." The activist added that the damage "spreads to public institutions such as hospitals and service institutions in general." Once known as the "cultural capital of Yemen," now Taiz is reportedly the longest-running battleground in the Yemeni war since Houthi forces took the city on March 22, 2015. According to reports, Taiz became the most heavily bombed city by the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes. =

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Menschenrechtler: Hunderte in Geheimgefängnissen im Jemen gefoltert

Eine jemenitische Menschenrechtsgruppe hat beiden Konfliktparteien in dem Bürgerkriegsland auf der arabischen Halbinsel hundertfache Folter in Geheimgefängnissen und andere Übergriffe vorgeworfen.

Seit April 2016 seien 1.600 Fälle von willkürlichen Verhaftungen, 770 Fälle von Entführungen, 344 Fälle von Folter sowie 66 Todesfälle dokumentiert worden, heißt es in einem Report der Mwatana-Organisation für Menschenrechte, der heute veröffentlicht wurde. Darin deckt die Gruppe mindestens elf inoffizielle Haftzentren im ganzen Jemen auf, wo „Folter und andere Formen von grausamer, inhumaner und entwürdigender Behandlung besonders weit verbreitet“ seien. Betroffenen wurden demnach zum Beispiel die Nägel herausgerissen. Zudem seien Opfer mit Elektroschocks traktiert worden. Umfang und Schwere der Übergriffe hätten erhebliche gesellschaftliche Auswirkungen.

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Mwatana: Warring Parties Disappear, Torture and Arbitrarily Detain Hundreds at Unofficial Detention Centers Across Yemen

Arbitrary Detention, Enforced Disappearance and Torture Committed by All Warring Parties in Yemen between May 2016 and April 2020

All parties to the conflict in Yemen must release all those arbitrarily detained and disappeared, and should do so with the utmost urgency given the risks from the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic in Yemen, Mwatana for Human Rights said today. In a statement today announcing the release of its new report, “In the Darkness,” Mwatana confirmed that all parties to the conflict have detained hundreds of Yemenis at unofficial detention centers. Detainees have been disappeared, have been tortured, and have died in detention. Some of these acts may amount to war crimes. Mwatana reiterated its calls for the Ansar Allah group (Houthis), the government of Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, authorities loyal to the Islah Party in Marib and Taiz, and UAE forces and UAE-aligned armed groups, including the Southern Transitional Council, to immediately release all those arbitrary detained, to end the use of torture and to reveal the fate of those forcibly disappeared.

Today, Mwatana published a report entitled, “In the Darkness: Abusive Detention, Disappearance and Torture in Yemen’s Unofficial Prisons.” The report documents cases of arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and torture between May 2016 and April 2020 by all parties to the conflict in Yemen. The report consists of two parts: The first part examines 11 unofficial detention centers where people were arbitrarily detained, tortured and, in some cases, died in detention. The second part highlights cases of enforced disappearance in areas under the control of the following three parties: The Ansar Allah group (Houthis), the government of Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, authorities loyal to the Islah Party in Marib and Taiz, and UAE forces and UAE-aligned armed groups, including the Southern Transitional Council.

Since 2016, Mwatana has documented 1605 incidents of arbitrary detention, 770 incidents of enforced disappearance and 344 incidents of torture, including 66 deaths in detention centers, across Yemen.

The warring parties continue to insult Yemenis’ dignity by committing such violations, including arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and torture, Victims have been subjected to appalling patterns of torture. Urgent action is needed to release all those arbitrarily detained as one of the most crucial steps given the looming spread of Covid-19 in detention centers, and the danger the disease poses to detainees

The Ansar Allah group (Houthis) bears responsibility for 904 incidents of arbitrary or abusive detention, 353 incidents of enforced disappearance, and 138 incidents of torture, including 27 deaths in detention centers. The internationally recognized Yemeni government bears responsibility for 282 incidents of arbitrary or abusive detention, 90 incidents of enforced disappearance and 65 incidents of torture, including 14 deaths in detention centers. UAE forces and UAE-aligned armed groups, including the Southern Transitional Council, bear responsibility for 419 incidents of arbitrary or abusive detention, 327 incidents of enforced disappearance and 141 incidents of torture, including 25 deaths in detention centers.

All parties to the conflict in Yemen have used arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and torture against perceived opponents, and those they believe to be followers or supporters of their opponents. The warring parties have also used such violations against civilians in order to impose their authority in the areas under their control.

“The warring parties continue to insult Yemenis’ dignity by committing such violations, including arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and torture,” Radhya Al-Mutawakel, Mwatana for Human Rights Chairperson said. “Victims have been subjected to appalling patterns of torture. Urgent action is needed to release all those arbitrarily detained as one of the most crucial steps given the looming spread of Covid-19 in detention centers, and the danger the disease poses to detainees.”

The report includes recommendations for the parties to the conflict and authorities in Yemen, as well as a number of countries and relevant actors such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, the United States and the Security Council. Among the most critical recommendations addressed to all parties to the conflict and authorities in Yemen is the urgent release of all those arbitrarily detained in light of the risks arising from the spread of Covid-19.

The report documents cases of arbitrary and abusive detention, including torture and cruel treatment during interrogation, in 11 unofficial detention centers run by various parties to the conflict across Yemen. These detention centers are located in the capital city of Sana’a, Aden, Taiz, Marib, Al-Hudaydah, Dhamar, Hadramout, Abyan and Ibb.

While conditions of detention across Yemen, including in official detention sites, are often appalling, access to unofficial detention sites for independent observers and family members of detainees is often limited to non-existent. Torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment are particularly prevalent in these centers, and many of these sites are used to disappear people for lengthy periods.

The warring parties used different forms of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, including withholding food and water, sleep deprivation, electrocution, kicking, whipping, hitting with the butts of weapons, hitting with hammers, severe beatings, burning with cigarette butts, pulling out nails, forced drinking of urine and prolonged hanging from the ceiling. Some detainees were subjected to the burning of their genitals, sexual humiliation and threats of rape or rape of their relatives. Others said they were subjected to degrading treatment, such as being denied from performing religious services and forced nudity.

In addition to the appalling and degrading conditions of detention, and the detention of dozens in cramped facilities and narrow cells, coalition airstrikes have struck detention centers, at least four times, at detention centers in Dhamar, Al-Hudaydah and Sana’a.

The most recent attack occurred on the evening of Saturday, 31 August 2019, when the Saudi/UAE-led coalition bombed four buildings belonging to the Dhamar community college, where the Houthis had used at least one building as a detention site. The attack killed and injured about 170 civilians and prisoners protected under international humanitarian law. In a statement following the attack, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Yemen said it was aware of the site and had periodically visited it before the attack.

On 10 April 2020, authorities in Hadramout announced the first confirmed case of Covid-19 in Yemen. While it is impossible to measure the true extent of the virus’s spread in Yemen, given the country’s extremely limited testing capacity, and warring parties’ refusal to provide transparent information about the disease, particularly Ansar Allah, social media pages have filled with condolences, and graveyards with bodies, as humanitarian organizations have noted the Covid-19 virus is spreading at the community level with grave consequence.

These steps are even more important given the generally poor conditions in detention centers across Yemen. In December 2019, Mwatana released a study on the situation of detention centers, finding that detention centers are overcrowded, unsanitary, lacking adequate ventilation, toilets and shower facilities. Detainees are often unable to access materials such as soap. Routine health care is non-existent, and in some cases, detainees are denied access to healthcare all together.

In February, the ICRC and Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen announced that a plan had been agreed on to complete the first large-scale formal exchange of prisoners and detainees since the beginning of the conflict. However, since the announcement, the plan has not been implemented. Still, several areas in Yemen have recently seen the release of arbitrarily detained persons by various warring parties. While these steps seem positive, they are not sufficient given the number of people arbitrarily detained and forcibly disappeared since the beginning of the conflict in Yemen when Ansar Allah and forces loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh seized the capital city of Sana’a in September 2014, and after the conflict escalated with the Saudi/UAE-led coalition’s launch of military operations in March 2015 .

“The international community must support efforts to achieve accountability for these horrific violations. The mandate of the Group of Eminent Experts in Yemen must be renewed and strengthened to include collecting and preserving evidence of violations and related crimes,” Al-Mutawakel added. “The international community must be aware that accountability is one of the key factors needed to achieve sustainable peace in Yemen.”

Executive summary:

Full report:

Media reports:

Most important points.

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Hot Issue – The Houthi Art of War: Why They Keep Winning in Yemen


The Houthis and their allies have withstood five years of aerial bombardment, blockades, and attacks on multiple fronts by forces backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Throughout the last five years, the Houthis have been outgunned, outspent, and subject to persistent aerial and satellite surveillance. Yet the intervention has not materially weakened them, and now, the Houthis are once again on the offensive across multiple fronts (al-Monitor, March 12).

The resiliency of the Houthis stems from their leadership’s understanding and consistent application of the algebra of insurgency. T.E. Lawrence used the term, or a version of it, in an article he wrote for Army Quarterly in 1920. The article, “Evolution of a Revolt,” argues that insurgents would be victorious if they applied certain “algebraical factors.” [2] These include force mobility and security as well as time and respect for the populace. [3] The Houthis broadly apply these and multiply them with superior human intelligence and an intimate knowledge of northwest Yemen’s daunting mountainous terrain. The Houthis, partly due to technical support from Iran, have also added drone and missile technology to the equation. These factors combine to make the Houthis a formidable force.

Move or Die

Force mobility has been—and remains—fundamental to the Houthis’ success in battling elements of the Saudi and Emirati militaries as well as those forces they support. These forces include Yemen’s internationally recognized government-in-exile, led by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, which is allied with Saudi Arabia, and a panoply of militias and armed groups supported by the UAE. The Houthis understand and readily apply what Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley explained in 2016, “on the future battlefield, if you stay in one place longer than two or three hours, you will be dead.” [4] General Milley made his comments in light of the widespread use of drones and other rapidly developing battlefield technologies.

The UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s ability to field unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has increased over the last three years. Both countries use Chinese manufactured UAVs in Yemen, most of which are operated by Chinese contractors as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi suffer from a lack of well-trained personnel. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also enjoy drone and satellite surveillance provided by the United States, which flies its own UAVs over Yemen on a daily basis.

In response to what, at times, has been persistent aerial surveillance, the Houthis make extensive use of highly mobile small combat units. These units are critical to the Houthis’ ability to defend territory, harass enemy forces, and plan and launch offensives. The combat units most often consist of no more than 20 men—roughly equivalent to a squad or specialized platoon—who rely on two or three light trucks and/or technicals. These trucks and/or technicals are easy to disguise and traverse Yemen’s worst roads and tracks.

Security and Intelligence

To a large degree, the mobility of Houthi forces ensures their security. The combat units that rove around their assigned sectors are indistinguishable from civilians since a significant percentage of Yemeni men in northwest Yemen carry weapons. Long before the start of the current war, bearing arms was a part of the culture. Additionally, the Toyota trucks used by the Houthis are as ubiquitous as the Kalashnikovs and G3 rifles carried by many across large swaths of Yemen.


The defeat of the Houthis has, according to many analysts and think tanks, been imminent for much of the past five years. The better equipped militaries of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and their various proxy forces were supposed to rapidly defeat the Houthis and their allies. Great emphasis was placed on the technical superiority of the Western-equipped militaries of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Yet despite the expenditure of vast sums on weapons and materiel by Riyadh and the Abu Dhabi, the Houthis have consolidated their control of northwest Yemen and are poised to capture the governorate of Marib.

The Houthis’ ability to defy and defeat technologically superior forces is a reminder that, as the military strategist and fighter pilot Colonel John Boyd argued, “machines don’t fight wars, terrain doesn’t fight wars. Humans fight wars. You must get into the minds of humans. That’s where the battles are won.” [9] The Houthis excel on the battlefield and this is unlikely to change, no matter how much Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their backers spend on the war in Yemen. However, despite their military success, the Houthis may lose the core battle for the hearts and minds of Yemenis. Ironically, it is the end or reduction of hostilities that will most weaken the Houthis’ hold on power.

The war and their martial abilities are the Houthis’ greatest sources of legitimacy and support. Many of those who back the Houthis do so only for pragmatic reasons.

While the Houthis will remain a martial and political force in northwest Yemen for the foreseeable future, resistance to the Houthi family itself will grow if the war winds down. Without the threat posed by the coalition and coalition-backed forces, the dominance of the Houthi family in the political arena of northwest Yemen will be more difficult to justify and sustain. Tensions within the core leadership will also threaten this dominance. The immediacy of war provides most of the cohesiveness that the Houthi leadership has enjoyed. Without the war, tensions within the core leadership will become more pronounced. As rival leaders attempt to broaden and reinforce power bases, there will be more space for old and emergent elites to reassert their authority. Over time this will lead to the dilution of the power held by the Houthis’ core leadership – by Michael Horton

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Seizing the State: Ibb’s Security Arrangement after Ansarallah’s Takeover

Main Findings

Ansarallah’s takeover of Ibb governorate in 2014 usurped power from the local elite. While state institutions became stronger through Ansarallah’s focus on controlling formal structures and personnel, the members of the elite who had previously held the reins of power in Ibb became increasingly marginalized, a process that has been repeated in other governorates that have fallen under Ansarallah’s control.

Ibb’s social structure differs markedly from the northern regions where Ansarallah originated and remains firmly rooted, but Ibb has also hosted political networks connecting it to power centers in the north. These connections helped facilitate Ansarallah’s seizure of the governorate and the group’s consolidation of control over it. Prior to Ansarallah’s arrival, the elite in Ibb derived its power from a socioeconomic structure best characterized as feudalistic, with so-called sheikhs operating as landowners and with the farmers working the fields being paid in kind.

While in a tacit alliance of convenience with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who continued to hold sway over most state institutions even after resigning in 2012, Ansarallah installed its members in key positions within state institutions and appointed allies as supervisors, who were ordered to learn state administration from incumbent officials. These supervisors would eventually come to wield control, but they did not immediately displace their predecessors.

State institutions in Yemen, with their hierarchical nature and informal social extension in the form of aqils, community liaisons, are easier to control than sheikhs. To decrease the risk of sheikhs uniting against Ansarallah in Ibb, the group marginalized them while focusing on capturing state institutions, a fundamental element in the group’s larger political goal of being taken seriously as a state actor.

By 2017 in Ansarallah-controlled Ibb, the police had emerged as the first security provider approached by residents to deal with problems, followed by Ansarallah itself. Residents viewed the police positively, with 60 percent considering them “well respected” in the city of Ibb.

Ansarallah’s ongoing control of Ibb has stretched the police force beyond its capacity, with crucial work being ignored so its energies can be redirected toward the suppression of Ansarallah’s opponents.

Policemen and activists interviewed believe that aqils in Ibb no longer act independently in representing the interest of their communities, but instead implement whatever orders Ansarallah issues or risk detention. Meanwhile, the aqils view their relationship with Ansarallah as one of merely coordinating with the state.

From the Introduction:

As the conflict in Yemen drags on, developments in the governorate of Ibb have not received as much attention as those in the more politically important and strategically vital cities of Aden, alHodeida, Sanaa and Taiz. Ibb fell under the control of Ansarallah in October 2014, after the local ruling elite struck a deal with the armed group instead of organizing resistance to it. Since 2015 the Saudi-led coalition opposing Ansarallah’s power grab in the country has launched thousands of airstrikes against civilian and military infrastructure in Ibb, in central Yemen, as Ansarallah and local tribes opposing it engaged in intermittent armed conflict on the ground.4 Despite these and other security challenges, the governorate has remained a safe enough haven to attract internally displaced persons (IDPs), especially from neighboring Taiz and al-Hodeida.

The security arrangement in the governorate, however, changed as a consequence of Ansarallah taking control of Ibb. The local leaders who facilitated Ansarallah’s relatively peaceful takeover may have done so with the hope of preserving their positions of authority through a deal, but the arrangement shifted power such that the traditional informal security actors lost their standing as Ansarallah-captured state institutions gained influence. Today, the governor of Ibb, Abdulwahid Salah—affiliated with the General People’s Congress (GPC), the party of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and Saleh’s successor, President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi—has been reduced to a cutout, an empty symbol of state authority who lacks control over the state institutions he supposedly oversees. To understand this outcome, it is important to consider Ansarallah’s alliances, strategies and interests.

– by Mareike Transfeld, Maysaa Shuja al-Deen, Raiman al-Hamdani

full report:

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The UAE is gradually eclipsing Saudi Arabia in Yemen

The STC's takeover of Socotra indicates that the United Arab Emirates has marginalised Saudi Arabia into a weaker position, at least for now

After much jostling with Saudi and local authorities, the United Arab Emirates-backed separatist takeover of Yemen's remote island of Socotra effectively secured one of Abu Dhabi's primary objectives in the country, as it seeks influence elsewhere in south Yemen.

Following a previous takeover attempt in May 2018, UAE-backed forces partially withdrew after a Saudi-brokered deal.

This development symbolises the UAE's gradual eclipsing of Saudi Arabia as a dominant external actor in Yemen - previously a limited player in the country - while Riyadh slowly loses influence through its ideal candidate, the UN recognised government of Abedrabbo Mansour Hadi.

The UAE has long coveted the island as a platform to extend its maritime trade across the Indian Ocean and beyond, along with other ports in south Yemen including Aden and Mukalla. It built up the separatist STC with its founding in 2017, and supported its military wing the Security Belt and aligned militias across the south, as a friendly independent southe

The takeover of Socotra inspired further STC activity elsewhere in south Yemen.

It also staged anti-Hadi government protests across the south, including in the Hadramawt and Mahrah governorates.

This violence comes after last November's Riyadh Agreement broke down, when the STC declared 'self-rule' from Aden in April. The Riyadh Agreement saw Saudi Arabia regain temporary control, and it eased fighting between the STC and Hadi government, which erupted last August following the STC's coup in Aden and subsequent Emirati airstrikes on Hadi forces.

Despite this apparent setback, the UAE still sought to undermine the deal and chip away at the government's control, as revealed by its ongoing support for separatist militias on Socotra and elsewhere in the south. Though it vocally opposed the declaration, it is not inconceivable that Abu Dhabi encouraged the STC's move, in order to legitimise its presence and undermine Hadi.

While both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have now clearly diverged in Yemen, their relationship should rather be considered as a "rivalry within a solid alliance". They have always communicated extensively, including when their strategies have split, and have largely managed to contain their differences.

However, there are quiet tensions, particularly as Saudi Arabia likely secretly resents the UAE's adventurism. Riyadh is now otherwise helpless to act, yet would still not want to fall out with Abu Dhabi.

After all, Saudi Arabia needed the UAE's help in south Yemen to support its intervention against the Houthis. This has left Riyadh in a dependent and vulnerable position, while enabling the UAE to secure its presence in the south, having entered the war in March 2015, then as a less influential actor.

While Saudi Arabia pursued its destructive and fruitless bombing campaign against the Houthis, the UAE, trained and equipped these separatist militias, establishing a more tangible on-the-ground presence, independent of Hadi's authority.

Continued Saudi and Emirati cooperation will prevent a huge outbreak of violence between Hadi and the STC. Yet the changing dynamics show that the UAE is gaining the upper hand, while Saudi Arabia's influence is slipping away.

The UAE, still valuing its ties with Saudi Arabia, will take more calculated than forceful measures to empower the STC. Yet even if the STC struggles to secure full control over the south, and if its independence bid does not receive international recognition, the UAE only really seeks to secure a handful of various southern ports, including Socotra and Aden.

For now, it has marginalised Saudi Arabia into a weaker position. In a wider regional context, the relationship between current leaders Mohammad bin Salman and Mohammad bin Zayed is crucial for understanding this. It has been considered by many as a 'student-teacher' relationship. The craftier and more experienced MbZ uses the younger and brash MbS' overt foreign policy as a smokescreen for expanding the UAE's own influence.

Given the tide of the battle in Yemen, the UAE will likely continue to outmuscle Saudi Arabia, unless there is global pressure on the coalition for a genuine political solution – by Jonathan Fenton-Harvey

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Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy

The UAE has emerged as an influential player in regional power politics over the past decade. This paper sheds light on Abu Dhabi’s ambitions to play a key role in shaping political and governance structures across the region, and in securing trade routes in its wider neighbourhood as an economic hub linking East Africa and South Asia.


The UAE has emerged as an influential player in regional power politics over the past decade, in a shift from a previously conservative foreign policy focused on self-preservation.

Often, UAE foreign and national security policy is analysed in the West on the basis of certain initiatives – its support for Khalifa Haftar in Libya, for example, or for secessionists and other groups in Yemen; or its role in the 2017 Qatar crisis – that seemingly point to an overall strategy or set of intentions. Rarely are its policies studied through a more comprehensive survey of its activities in multiple countries in the ‘neighbourhood’ where it is most visibly engaged.

This paper, researched and written as part of a Chatham House project to address this gap in analysis of the UAE’s foreign and national security policy, sheds light on Abu Dhabi’s ambitions to play a key role in shaping political and governance structures across the region in line with its own model, and in securing trade routes in its wider neighbourhood as an economic hub linking East Africa and South Asia.

The ‘UAE model’ integrates economic openness, strong governance and service delivery, and a relatively secular and liberal (for the region) social environment, combined with a closed political system that polices speech and is built around an entrenched security state. Just as important is a rejection of any political or religious ideology that might challenge the supremacy of the state and its leaders.

UAE officials perceive that transnational, political Islamist ideologies promoted by Iran and the Sunni Islamist Muslim Brotherhood and its boosters – including but not limited to Qatar and Turkey – pose an existential threat to its broadly secular approach to government as well as to the stability of the so-called ‘status quo’ powers in the region, and act as a driver of regional radicalism. However, Abu Dhabi has been far more assertive against the Brotherhood and its purported backers, and much more cautious in its approach to Iran.

Abu Dhabi, the biggest and wealthiest of the seven emirates, increasingly sets the direction of travel for the UAE at home and abroad. The evolution of the ‘UAE model’ is chiefly associated with Abu Dhabi’s crown prince and de facto leader, Mohammed bin Zayed – or MbZ.

While MbZ and his trusted inner circle share a worldview, they are not necessarily operating from a strategic masterplan. A very small group often makes policy choices that are tactical and reactive, and such ad hoc decision-making can lead to overcorrection and missed opportunities.

Western policymakers tend to be dazzled by the UAE’s perceived liberalism, and by its officials’ ability to literally and figuratively speak their language. They need to better acquaint themselves with the ‘UAE model’ in all its aspects, and get to grips with the reality that Abu Dhabi expects to be treated as an equal. Dealing with the UAE as a robust and mature partner will also mean demonstrating a greater willingness to push back.

From Introduction

For much of its first few decades as a nation state, the UAE operated a conservative foreign and national security policy that was largely predicated on ensuring survival in the face of internal and external threats to the fragile unity and territorial integrity of the federation. While internal threats have faded, perceived existential vulnerability to regional currents continues to drive policy. Perhaps the most important difference between the federation’s approach to external affairs in its early years and its current posture is a clear sense of self-assurance and ambition among a new generation of leaders – and a growing perception among this group that the UAE is being left to fend for itself in a deeply turbulent region. The crown prince and de facto ruler of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan – or MbZ – and a trusted inner circle of advisers, many of them his full brothers, have consolidated power internally, and built a strong security and military apparatus capable of warding off most (although not all) internal and external threats, and have since 2011 operated an increasingly activist foreign and national security policy abroad. Whereas his father, Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, aspired to build a model of Arab statehood in the UAE, many observers believe MbZ wants to export his own model.

In 2017 researchers at Chatham House undertook a project to examine the UAE’s foreign and national security policy, including through interviews with UAE officials, regional and Western policymakers, and others. The research, which was completed in late 2019, sheds light on Emirati ambitions to play a key role in shaping regional political and governance structures, under the umbrella of regional Saudi–Emirati (and, to an extent, Egyptian) leadership, with the UAE at times fashioning itself as the ‘intellectual architect’, as one interviewee put it, of a new model for country-level and regional security built around the federation’s own internal structures. This ‘UAE model’ integrates economic openness, strong governance and service delivery, and a relatively secular and liberal (for the region) social environment, combined with a closed political system that polices speech and is built around an entrenched security state; and, just as important, a rejection of any political or religious ideology that might challenge the supremacy of the state and its leaders.

The UAE has been much more visibly activist in its foreign policy across a MENA region embroiled in deepening turmoil since the Arab uprisings of 2011, during which period the US has been perceived by the UAE and Saudi Arabia to be retrenching from its past role as regional security guarantor. In this context, Emirati officials say they can no longer assume that the federation will be able to sustain its past trajectory towards becoming a rare locus of stability while operating a non-interventionist foreign policy. After years of mounting regional disorder and failed Western intervention in the Middle East, epitomized by the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the model offered by the modernizing leadership in Abu Dhabi is an attractive one to Western policymakers who have long hoped for regional powers to play a more assertive role in stabilization and securitization in their neighbourhood. Diplomats, policymakers and politicians are also encouraged by time spent with Emirati counterparts who – literally and figuratively – speak their language, and in the safe, orderly and cosmopolitan metropolises of Dubai and Abu Dhabi.

A principal driving force in the UAE leadership’s approach to the region is as much what it stands against as what it stands for. MbZ and his inner circle perceive that transnational, political Islamist ideologies promoted by Iran and the Sunni Islamist Muslim Brotherhood and its boosters, including but not limited to Qatar and Turkey, pose an existential threat to the stability of so-called ‘status quo’ powers in the region, and act as a driver of regional radicalism. As one interviewee for this paper described it, the UAE’s overriding threat perception can be summarized as ‘Iran and the Ikhwan

Yet as this paper demonstrates, Abu Dhabi is aggressive in its attempts to uproot the Brotherhood but more cautious in its efforts to counter Iranian influence and expansionism, largely through support for coercive sanctions of the kind pursued by the Trump administration – by Peter Salisbury

and full paper.

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Israel’s ambitions in south Yemen increase risk of conflict with Houthis

Israel’s involvement in the Yemen war throughout its five year duration is an open secret. In 2015, when the Saudi Arabian Embassy in the capital Sanaa was seized by the Houthi forces in retaliation for the Saudi-led coalition’s aggression, a large cache of Israeli-made weapons and ammunition was discovered, in addition to documents detailing intentions by the US to establish a military base on Perim Island near the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, “to protect [America’s] interests and ensure the security of Israel”. The island has been under the coalition’s control since it was wrested from the Houthis in the same year. Foreign mercenaries fighting on behalf of coalition-partner the UAE were also said to have been trained by the Israeli military at camps in the Negev Desert.

Amid the ever-growing normalisation of relations between Israel and Gulf states, it should come as no surprise that it was reported last week that Israel and the Emirati-backed separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) are “secret friends” with meetings facilitated by the UAE.

The STC’s vice-chairman, Hani Bin Briek, confirmed that relations with Israel are “very good” while Tel Aviv reacted positively to the prospects of a “new autonomous state in Yemen”. The fragmentation of Arab states is, of course, consistent with Zionist strategies in the region; support for separatism in the south of Yemen echoes Israel’s decades-old policy of backing Kurdish statehood.

Covert Israeli interventions in Yemen are not without precedent.

As with every other party involved in the current conflict in Yemen, access to all seaways leading to the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean play a significant part in the underlying agendas. It is certainly one of the charges levied against the UAE over its involvement in the recent STC “coup” of Socotra Island.

However, the revelation of Israeli support for the STC is a worrying development for the prospects of maintaining a unified Yemen, however elusive that appears to be. Any attempts by Tel Aviv to back the emergence of a break-away “independent” state in the region should be treated with suspicion.

Moreover, the Houthis, who are supported by most of the Yemeni armed forces, have threatened Israel once before with “revenge” over its known involvement in the Yemen war of aggression.

These are security challenges that Israel takes seriously, especially with the long-range ballistic missiles and armed drones in the Yemeni army’s arsenal, which cross-border offensives against Saudi have shown to be very accurate. Israel has also expressed a willingness to attack Houthi targets near Bab Al-Mandab.

The Houthis also have a consistent stance on supporting the Palestinian cause

Direct military confrontation between Israel and the Houthis is unlikely and unrealistic for the time being, although both sides have voiced a willingness to take action if necessary. However, Israel is playing a dangerous game; should it become more embedded in the war in Yemen it runs the risk of conflict with the Houthis. Just as Israel has securitised its access to the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, it should not be surprised if the Houthi authorities decide to react to Israeli attempts to sow further discord and break up the already fragile Yemeni state – by Omar Ahmed

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Seuchen / Most important: Epidemics

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Yemen’s Coronavirus Catastrophe Is A Global Embarrassment

From the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to their nemesis Iran, foreign powers made Yemen especially vulnerable to COVID-19 — and aren’t helping enough.

Meanwhile, almost everyone who is in a position to prevent a catastrophe is instead making the situation worse.

The Houthis, the armed group under whom most Yemenis live, are refusing to acknowledge the extent of the outbreak and threatening people who do, fueling panic and conspiracy theories among the public while they seek to protect their own power. The Houthis’ opponents ― Yemen’s internationally recognized government, along with Saudi Arabia and the U.S. ― are failing to provide the level of needed aid or to halt bombings and a blockade of Houthi-controlled areas, causing inflation and mass hunger that makes many Yemenis especially vulnerable to COVID-19.

Both sides of the conflict are ignoring pleas for a ceasefire

The WHO predicts a coronavirus death toll of at least 65,000 in Yemen unless officials change course.

Just as powerful Yemenis and international players previously decided to turn Yemen into a battleground, they now seem committed to letting thousands of Yemeni families suffer ― showing that even a shared global challenge like a pandemic can’t end the country’s treatment as a global punching bag.

The Houthis are scrambling to ensure the coronavirus outbreak does not threaten their rule or weaken their ability to withstand the U.S.’s partners in Yemen. As deaths mount in the crowded areas under their control, grave-diggers and guards at cemeteries have been instructed to say the dead are “unidentified bodies from the war,” The Associated Press revealed, and authorities rarely tell families whether it was the virus that claimed their loved ones.

Burials are being spread throughout graveyardsto avoid drawing attention to how many are taking place, residents told the AP, and health workers are being harassed and facing delays in getting permits, The Lancet reported. “The authorities are trying to hide but every day there are more dead bodies and it is out of control,” a worker told the medical journal.

By making it hard to speak openly about the virus ― to the extent of refusing to release statistics on COVID-19 cases ― the Houthis have created an environment in which paranoia and disinformation can thrive. Many living under Houthi rule now believe they have told health workers to give patients lethal “mercy” injections.

“Whoever spreads this rumor is a criminal with every meaning of this term,” Jumaan said. The conspiracy theory both endangers medical professionals and makes sick people less likely to seek treatment, she noted.

A deadly and far-reaching initial wave of COVID-19 is now indisputable in Yemen, aid groups and experts say.

Measures to limit infection like lockdowns are only partially enforced, and most Yemenis cannot afford to stay home because of their dependence on meager daily earnings, Oxfam’s Mohammed said.

The systems that are supposed to inhibit the crisis are breaking down. Some of the 59 isolation units established by the WHO are admitting more people than they can safely handle and running low on personal protective equipment, Mohammed told HuffPost.

Authorities turned the first quarantine facilities for people entering Yemen from abroad into a “breeding ground” for the virus with policies like putting more than six people in each room, Jumaan of the Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation said. Those detainees, many of them infected, were not stopped from leaving for activities like shopping, which is how some began to buy medicine from a relative of Jumaan’s who is a pharmacist in the area. He soon infected his entire household, including his elderly parents.

Medical “facilities are already overwhelmed,” Tamuna Sabadze of the International Rescue Committee, which operates an isolation facility and a network of clinics in southern Yemen, wrote in an email.

“Suspected COVID-19 patients are being turned away … while people with other illnesses are being turned away from clinics which have been designated COVID-19 only,” Sabadze continued. “Doctors and nurses do not have sufficient PPE to continue treating the increase in patients with COVID-19 symptoms, and the severe lack of testing means COVID-19 is spreading undetected.”

Even when infected Yemenis do receive clinical attention, their chances of survival are often low after years of living in increasingly desperate conditions. In the southern port of Aden, mortality rates among people infected with COVID-19 are among the highest in the world.

Dwindling international aid will make the health care system weaker. It also threatens more basic programs that could help with the outbreak – by Akbar Shahid Ahmed

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Film: Coronavirus Update | Yemen

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Yemen records 32 COVID-19 infections, 1,190 in total

The Yemeni internationally-recognized government on Wednesday registered 32 more infections of COVID-19 in provinces under its control.
"The new cases occurred in the governorates of Hadhramout (13), Shabwa (11), Taiz (5), Mahara (2) and Lahj (1 case),"

and also

My remark: No figures from Houthi-held aereas.

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Recording 8 new cases of Corona virus infection and two cases of healing and death in Hadramout

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30 new cases of coronavirus reported, 1,158 in total

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Film by MSF, Arabic: Hello, I am Dr. Zahi, and I work in the intensive care department of the isolation and treatment center # Covid 19 of MSF at Al-Amal Hospital in # Aden. #To whom Come with me on this introductory tour, to learn more about how we can provide medical care for our patients at the center

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Yemen’s botched pandemic response and fragile conflict dynamics allow COVID-19 to spread undetected

The overall situation in the country, torn apart by conflict, is very fragile. Health infrastructure in particular is largely inadequate.

The coronavirus crisis, alongside a 44 percent shortfall in humanitarian funding this year and a sharp decline in foreign remittances due to the economic fallout of COVID-19 and its impact on Yemeni expats, only increases the humanitarian needs and economic woes.

In liberated areas of the country, there has been a variety of responses to the pandemic. In more stable governorates like Hadramawt and al-Mahra, local authorities have fared better.

In Houthi-held areas, the rebels’ concealment of COVID-19 figures has only allowed the pandemic to spread undetected.

Meanwhile, the bodies of suspected COVID-19 victims are quietly being buried under the cover of darkness, according to Maggie Michael of the Associated Press. In order to conceal the true figures, the Houthis have declined to coordinate and share information with international health organizations, instead surveilling the phones of those infected with COVID-19 and intimidating health workers, patients, and their families

In mid-June, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, a senior Houthi figure, publicly acknowledged the suppression of COVID-19 information in an interview with the BBC, admitting that “announcing or concealing COVID-19 cases doesn’t slow down the pandemic’s spread.” The Houthis’ reckless behavior has hastened the spread of the virus and caused unnecessary suffering.

What drives the Houthis’ COVID-19 approach?

There are four primary drivers of the Houthis’ approach to the pandemic. First, the Houthis fear that acknowledging its scale would have consequences on the battlefield. From a military standpoint, revealing COVID-19 figures or adopting a curfew and lockdown measures would not only lead to personnel defections from the frontlines but also to a significant decline in public mobilization and recruitment, at a time when the Houthis were preparing to take control of Radman al-Awad in Bayda, and seeking to reinforce their positions in al-Jawf, Marib, and Nihm in east Sanaa.

Second, the official acknowledgement of the crisis in Houthi-held areas took place during the holy month of Ramadan, the time when annual zakat payments are collected. In a bid to boost their financial resources, the Houthis did not want to risk impeding this; their zakat authority reportedly collected an estimated 43 billion Yemeni riyals in May 2020.

A third reason is to resist increasing international pressure, given broader discontent with the insurgency’s diversion and weaponization of incoming relief aid and its use of the Safer oil tanker, an abandoned vessel off the coast of Yemen that could sink or explode, as a bargaining chip to gain further leverage.

Fourth, there has been a clear desire on the Houthis’ part to avoid additional local and external political pressure for their mismanagement of affairs, and their repeated efforts to improve their international reputation by whitewashing their policies have so far failed – by Ibrahim Jalal

My comment: By an anti-Houthi propagandist from an anti-Iranian neocon thinktank, using COVID-19 for an anti-Houthi blame game. Well, the Houthi performance related to COVID-19 actually is perfectly bad.

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Yemen: 35% rise in food prices due to COVID-19

Food prices have increased by 35 per cent in some areas of Yemen since the start of the coronavirus crisis on 10 April, the UN warned yesterday.

In a statement, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Yemen, explained that “the cost of the minimum food basket has risen by as much as 35 per cent in some areas since the outbreak of COVID-19 while the Yemeni rial devalues.”

The demand for food and fuel to operate generators in hospitals and other facilities has also significantly increased.

All data indicates that the virus is spreading rapidly throughout the country with many people who have symptoms not seeking medical help until their condition worsens because treatment centres are not accessible, it explained.

“All indicators point to the continued rapid transmission of COVID-19 across the country and that too often, people who are symptomatic are delaying seeking treatment until their condition is serious because treatment centres are inaccessible, fear of stigma, and the perceived risks of seeking care. “

“The recent fuel crisis is already threatening access to food, hospital operations and water supplies which are fuel-dependent and crucial to preventing virus transmission and response, and presents a further obstacle to people seeking treatment. “

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"I will kill you."

That's what a family member of a COVID-19 patient told a general practitioner at a private hospital in Aden, Yemen, amid the country's coronavirus outbreak in April.

Pointing a gun at the doctor, the family member pushed him to put the patient on oxygen and mechanical ventilation, two types of treatments for severe cases of COVID-19.

The doctor explained that he wouldn't be able to provide those options for the patient.

Death threats, intimidation and violence are a part of the Yemeni doctor's daily reality as a health worker on the front lines of COVID-19 in Yemen, where there have been at least 992 confirmed coronavirus cases as of June 22. The danger he faces is part of a larger trend of attacks on health workers worldwide.

According to Insecurity Insight, a research group that documents violence against aid workers, there have been more than 400 reported global incidents of COVID-19-related violence affecting health care workers and facilities since January [worldwide]

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Film: Humanitäre Krise im Jemen

Wegen fehlender Hilfsgelder sind im Bürgerkriegsland Jemen nach Angaben der Hilfsorganisation UNICEF mehr und mehr Kinder vom Hungertod bedroht. Das Gesundheitssystem ist zerstört, Millionen Menschen hungern.

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Yemen COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Snapshot - As of 27 June 2020

As of 27 June, the number of reported confirmed COVID-19 cases in Yemen had reached 1,107 with 297 associated deaths and 419 recoveries. The highest number of cases were reported in Hadramaut (310 cases), followed by Aden (259 cases). Men constitute 75 per cent of all reported cases, and the highest number of deaths are among people aged between 45 and 59 (40 per cent of all deaths). All indicators point to the continued rapid transmission of COVID-19 across the country and that too often, people who are symptomatic are delaying seeking treatment until their condition is serious because treatment centres are inaccessible, fear of stigma, and the perceived risks of seeking care. The recent fuel crisis is already threatening access to food, hospital operations and water supplies which are fuel-dependent and crucial to preventing virus transmission and response, and presents a further obstacle to people seeking treatment.

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Outbreak update – Cholera in Yemen, 14 June 2020

The Ministry of Public Health and Population of Yemen reported 3091 suspected cases and four associated death during epidemiological week 24 (8 – 14 June) of 2020 with 17% of the cases reported as severe. The cumulative total number of suspected cholera cases from 1 January 2018 to 14 June 2020 is 1 378 052 with 1572 associated deaths (CFR 0.11%). Children under five represent 24% of the total suspected cases during 2020. The outbreak has affected 22 of the 23 governorates and 295 of the 333 districts of Yemen.

Suspected cholera cases at the country level started to be increasingly reported from week eight of 2019 and the trend continued until week 14 when the number of cases reached more than 29 500, the highest number of cases reported so far. The number of suspected cases fluctuated over the following period with the trend now considered as stable during th

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Outbreak update – Cholera in Yemen, 7 June 2020

The Ministry of Public Health and Population of Yemen reported 3113 suspected cases and two associated death during epidemiological week 23 (1 – 7 June) of 2020 with 15% of the cases reported as severe. The cumulative total number of suspected cholera cases from 1 January 2018 to 7 June 2020 is 1 374 961 with 1568 associated deaths (CFR 0.11%). Children under five represent 23% of the total suspected cases during 2020. The outbreak has affected 22 of the 23 governorates and 293 of the 333 districts of Yemen.

Suspected cholera cases at the country level started to be increasingly reported from week eight of 2019 and the trend continued until week 14 when the number of cases reached more than 29 500, the highest number of cases reported so far. The number of suspected cases fluctuated over the following period with the trend now considered as stable during the past three weeks based on the average number of cases calculated between weeks 21 and 23.

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Yemen: Dengue Fever - Outbreak Operation Update n° 2 Report (DREF n° MDRYE008)

Summary of major revisions made to emergency plan of action:

The DREF operation was exceptionally extended by two months until 30 August 2020. The extension was to ensure the completion of the activities in this operation which have been delayed or suspended following COVID-19 pandemic restriction measures imposed by the authorities in Yemen since March 2020. The current movement restrictions have been affecting field implementation of community activities in the targeted governorates which are essential for the completion of the operation; especially related to community awareness and hygiene promotion. In addition to the COVID-19 situation in country, the delivery of items faced important delays related to the availability in the market and transportation.

This extension will facilitate the final distribution stage of hygiene kits and remaining fogging machines and materials for Yemen Red Crescent Society (YRCS) branches and complete the remained activities in the operation.

Description of the disaster

A significant increase in dengue cases was observed from 18 November – 8 December 2019 (epidemiological reporting Weeks 47,48,49) in the country, and this was further confirmed on by the Health Cluster on 18 December 2019, with 22,003 cases and 60 deaths reported. Dengue outbreaks affected 174 of 333 total districts (54%) in 22 of 23 governorates of the country. The governorates with highest number of suspected dengue cases are from Hudaidah, Operation Update Report no. 2 Yemen: Dengue Fever Outbreak Taiz, Aden, Hajjah and Lahj and deaths reported from Hudaidah, Aden, Hajjah, Lahj, Shabwa, Marib and Rayma. Most reported cases are concentrated in urban areas. The number of affected governorates increased due to the collapse of the health system in Yemen resulting from ongoing complex and protracted conflict, the poor water and hygiene condition in the most affected areas, with limited access to humanitarian support to the most vulnerable and affected populations.

cp2 Allgemein / General

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Interactive Map of Yemen War

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An analysis posted at one of the Carnegie institutes notes that Yemen has experienced “Gulf Arab solidarity only in the form of an economic blockade and aerial bombardment [against it] from states that have kept the country at arms’ length in times of both war and peace.” LINK It must be noted at the outset however that GCC-member State Oman declined to participate in the onslaught launched against the Yemeni people from the outset, and Qatar was barred from all Gulf Cooperation Council activities after the falling out with the Saudis in 2017.

The publicly declared motivations and justifications of this astoundingly brutal and destructive act of unity and solidarity shift between vanquishing the ‘Houthi rebels’ (officially known as the Ansar Allah movement) and restoring the ‘internationally recognized government’, confronting the threat of terrorism posed by the expansion of Al Qaeda on the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, and preventing Iran from gaining influence in Yemen.

Although the hostility of most of the GCC members to Iran is beyond doubt, the real reason behind the massive aerial bombardments, foreign invasion and total physical and economic blockade is being revealed with more clarity as time has passed, namely the Saudis’ and the UAE’s ambitions to annex parts of Yemen through compliant puppet presidents and proxy groups willing to grant them control over ports, future oil and gas pipelines, military bases and any other natural resources and markets that Yemen might be found to possess.

The ‘international community’ continues to support this act of wanton savagery and genocide through the travel bans, financial sanctions and weapons and economic embargo imposed by the Security Council almost exclusively on ‘the Houthis’, who are universally blamed by the foreign aggressors and a handful of Yemenis living in self-imposed exile in Riyadh as bearing full responsibility for the armed conflict.

The Russian Federation was the only member of the Security Council not to vote in favour of the resolution in 2015 shortly after the external intervention commenced, noting that it was one-sided and did not therefore facilitate a political solution. The Venezuelan representative observed that the non-permanent members of the Council were sidelined from all substantive discussions, but nonetheless voted in favour of the resolution.

In effect, the sanctions and embargo have imposed a total blockade against at least a third of the people of Yemen, a brutal and hypocritical collective punishment for rejecting the dictates of the GCC and ‘the international community’. The rest of Yemen, occupied and under the control of either Saudi or UAE military forces and their ‘local partners’.

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Yemen’s Catastrophe and Saudi’s Fiasco

Weak from five years of invasion and siege, the Yemeni people are struggling against the corona pandemic. Despite the UN call for a ceasefire, and despite the Saudi regime announcing a ceasefire, there has been no peace for Yemen. A country acknowledged to have the worst humanitarian crisis in the world today is facing further catastrophes.

The invading powers, led by Saudi Arabia, and supported by the US, British and French governments, are cutting up the country to their own ends. Different plans are being fought out within a single coalition, using heavy weapons and coups. It is hard to distinguish that which is more complete – Yemen’s tragedy or Saudi Arabia’s fiasco.

Blocking and Skimping Aid

Despite the extensive suffering of the Yemeni people, the Saudi regime is currently preventing ships from unloading in Hodeida port. Yahyah Sharafaddin, vice chair Red Sea Ports Corporation, reports that the last ship to unload in the port was on May 20th. The Saudis are holding up 22 ships wanting to dock. This is despite the fact that these ships have received permission to do so from the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM). UNVIM was set up in 2015, it is based in Djibouti, and is responsible for preventing arms smuggling.

These ships contain no arms. They do contain gasoline, diesel, food and medical supplies. The impact of their denial of entry is substantial.

In an effort to offset, or justify, their blockade the Saudi regime say they are arranging for 800,000 litres of fuel to be trucked from Aden daily. But this is compared to a daily requirement in the affected areas of 10.2 million litres.

Yet the Saudi regime boasts of its aid to Yemen. In this it is not alone. The “international community” aid to Yemen is bound up with political manipulation and miserly commitment.

Covid 19 in the Arabian Peninsula

Despite being under siege Yemen did not benefit from isolation. Corona found its way through Yemen’s interconnectedness with neighbours.

There is no doubt that migrant workers in the GCC countries are disproportionately suffering from the outbreak. Many have been trapped in crowded hostels. Others will have taken the disease to their home country. It is estimated that 3.5 million migrants in the GCC countries will lose employment (and residence) as a result of Covid 19.

For Yemen this will be a further blow. Remittances home from Yemenis abroad have been an important part of Yemen’s economy, assisting in family welfare and wider social development. Yemeni migrants, working mostly in Saudi Arabia and UAE, contribute around $3.7 billion annually to the Yemeni economy. That represents 12% of Yemen’s GDP

The First Saudi Fiasco – Fake Cease Fire

At the start of April the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, called for a cessation of military conflicts in the time of the pandemic. With much international boosting, the Saudi regime announced a two week ceasefire on April 8th, followed by a month ceasefire at the end of that fortnight. Yet it continued to wage war throughout that period. According to figures from “Yemen Data Project”, in the months from February, through May this year, the Saudis launched more air strikes each month than in any month in the whole of 2019. They called a ceasefire and increased their bombing.

Violations are persistent still. According to the Saba News Agency, there were 45 air raids across five provinces in the 24 hours on June 26th.

The Second Saudi Fiasco – Coalition at War with Itself

A Piece of the Pie

The whole war was commenced in March 2015 by the coalition with the express aim of restoring the “internationally recognised government” of Hadi. Five years later, this leader is still unable to live in Yemen. Despite the useless slaughter, the Saudis and the UAE are neither of one accord, nor remotely concerned about the supposed war aim. They are, of one accord on seeking benefit in the war.

Time Running out for the Saudi Adventure

The Saudi regime appears to want an end to the war but is unwilling to concede its failure. Any popular movement in the Kingdom to achieve accountability from the regime faces terrifying obstacles. Its international allies, especially the US and British governments, continue to enable the war to be waged. So there is little pressure for an abrupt end. But the Saudi regime has neither limitless, time nor resources - by Steve Bell, Stop the War Coalition = =

(A P)

Mhmd AlHouthi: "Brian Hook announced support&assistance2 #Saudi What is happenin now is a result of #US decision rejectin peace,participatory&supportive of continuation of aggression Were USA pilots,experts&soldiers sent2 #KSA?We hold US&Coalition responsible4disturbing serenity"

(? B K P)

„Mein erster Gedanke: Sie sind tot“

Seit fünf Jahren tobt der Bürgerkrieg im Jemen, es ist die schlimmste humanitäre Katastrophe unserer Zeit. Ein Frieden sei weit entfernt, sagen viele Jemeniten im Exil – das Land habe sich an den „Schockzustand“ gewöhnt (nur im Abo)

(* A K P)

Yemeni gov't seizes other arms heading for Houthis

A boat loaded with arms has been intercepted en route to Houthis, spokesman for the Yemeni joint forces fighting in the western coast said Wednesday.
The Yemeni Red Sea coastguard force on Tuesday seized a smuggling boat carrying a variety of weapons, including munitions, revolvers and other pieces heading for the Houthi group, Wadhah al-Dobaish added in remarks carried by Xinhua.
While at a routine mission near a Yemeni island, a coastguard patrol was suspicious of the boat that was held along with its crew, he said.
The boat is Yemeni, the spokesman, noting that all the sailors are Yemeni nationals and are now being questioned for further information that will be publicized later, as "sea smuggling is abnormally in the rise."


(* A K P)

Spokesperson of the West Coast Forces, Waddah Aldubish, said the Coast Guards have intercepted a boat loaded with different kinds of weapons. The boat, according to the spokesman, was on it way to #Houthis. (photo)

(A P)

Yemen rebels say UAE-backed commander defects

Al-Abyadh is a commander in the National Resistance Forces, a UAE-backed faction in Yemen

Abdel-Malik Khammash al-Abyadh has returned to Sanaa and joined the Houthi group, Al-Masirah television reported.

The NRF is led by Tareq Saleh, a nephew of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

and also

referring to


(A P)

Film: Abdul-Malik al-Abyadh, commander of military operations in the UAE-backed forces led by Tareq Saleh has returned to Sanaa, joined the Ansarullah group along with other troopers. He called upon "deluded persons" to return to the home side, unite efforts to expel the occupiers.

(* A P)

Iranian ships conducted 'world's largest illegal fishing operations' in Somali and Yemeni waters

Nearly 200 fishing vessels were found to be unlawfully operating in Somali and Yemeni territorial waters, report says

At least 192 Iranian boats illegally fished in Somalia and Yemen's territorial waters last year, depleting food supplies in countries where millions are facing acute shortages of food, a new report has said.

Global Fishing Watch (GFW) and Trygg Mat Tracking (TMT) said in a report published on Monday that the "activity taking place is likely one of the largest illegal fishing operations occurring in the world".

The organisations said that Iranian vessels had been illegally operating in the countries' territorial waters between January 2019 and April 2020, with the scale of the operation only uncovered after the ships began using a collision-avoidance system that allowed their locations to be susceptible to tracking.

GFW and TMT both noted that the illegal operations were made possible due to insufficient maritime security, making patrolling the vast maritime territory difficult.

and also

(* B H K P)

Film: Is the world abandoning Yemen?

Under-funded aid agencies battle to help civilians affected by spread of coronavirus as fighting rages north and south.

Millions of people across Yemen need aid and protection as the country’s half-decade civil war continues unabated, prompting the hashtag #YemenCantBreathe on social media. But splintering alliances and new fights for territory are deepening the chaos.

With battle lines being redrawn across the country, aid agencies say it is getting ever more difficult to help people. Thousands of civilians have been killed or injured since 2015, including from Saudi-led air raids on Houthi-held territory. Millions of children face starvation. The UN says the country’s healthcare system has “collapsed” from the weight of coronavirus and cholera outbreaks, and warns that three-quarters of UN-backed aid programmes may close in weeks due to a shortage in funding. International pledges at a recent aid conference fell far short of what is immediately needed.

Is the world's worst humanitarian disaster sliding out of public consciousness? Join the conversation.
On this episode of The Stream, we are joined by: Ahmed Baider, @ahmedbaider1, Freelance journalist; Afrah Nasser, @Afrahnasser, Researcher, Human Rights Watch; Muhsin Siddiquey,@OxfamYemen, Yemen Country Director, Oxfam =

(* B K P)

A supertanker full of crude oil decaying amid Yemen's civil war could blow up

Yemen's raging civil war has created a ticking time bomb just off the country's Red Sea coast. The FSO Safer, a 45-year-old supertanker loaded with more than 1 million barrels of crude oil has been caught between the warring sides and left to decay.

Activists and officials warn that the Safer could hemorrhage its cargo into the sea at any time, with devastating consequences for nature and the already-beleaguered people of Yemen.

Yemen's government says the Safer is in "bad and deteriorating" condition. The single-hulled vessel was part of Yemen's national oil infrastructure before the war started.

An "imminent" catastrophe

Last week, The Associated Press quoted an official with Yemen's state-run oil company as saying seawater had entered the engine room, forcing the shutdown of engines used, among other things, to keep inert gas pumping through the empty space in the oil storage tanks. That gas maintains pressure in the tanks to prevent the build-up of oxygen or other potentially flammable gases. The fact that inert gas is no longer being pumped into the tanks creates a serious risk of explosion.

Photos posted online by the Yemeni environmental campaign group Holm Akhdar (Green Dream) show various parts of the vessel severely corroded, which could lead to significant leaks even without an explosion.

"The hull of the vessel has been deteriorating and one of its pipes has been punctured," the group's founder Mohammed al-Hokaimi told CBS News. He warned of an "increased risk of crude oil spilling from storage tanks while parties to the conflict continue to show indifference to this serious issue."

The Yemeni government has said that if the tanker ruptures, it could create an oil spill four times larger than the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster. In a letter to the United Nations, the government said the vessel posed an "imminent environmental and humanitarian catastrophe in the Red Sea."

Along with the Rea Sea environment, the tanker's valuable cargo is also at stake. The U.N. and the Yemeni government want access to the vessel, while the cash-strapped Houthi rebels want guarantees they'll be able to control the revenue from the sale of the oil, estimated at $45 million.

Just like in the wider war, the two sides accuse each other of refusing to make any concessions to avert disaster.

and another, US-centered and propaganda-biased thread on SAFER:

(* A K P)

Arab Coalition, US Envoy Brian Hook reveal Iranian weapons used against Saudi Arabia

New Iranian missiles and weapons found in Yemen were revealed by the Arab Coalition in a press conference on Monday.

US Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook and Saudi Arabia's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir hosted a joint press conference after examining the weapons.

Saudi Arabia is consulting with all the countries on the UN Security Council on the dangers of not extending the arms embargo on Iran, says the Kingdom's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubair.

“The weapons that we see here today … are all the evidence we need, that the arms embargo on Iran must not be lifted. If the embargo expires, Iran will be able to purchase and sell these weapons, as well as many other kinds of weapons without any restrictions at all,” Hook said.

If the arms embargo expires, Iran will acquire new sensitive technologies and re-export to its proxies in the region, Hook added (with film)

My comment: Such a propaganda press conference reveals just again how deep US-Saudi complicity really is.


(* A K P)

Arab Coalition seizes 2 Iranian weapon shipments heading to Houthis in Yemen

The Arab Coalition has released details of two seizures of Iranian weapons heading to Houthi militants in Yemen.
It shared pictures on Tuesday of the operations that were carried on April 17 and June 24.
The operation on April 17 foiled an attempt to smuggle Iranian weapons off the coast of Al-Mahra Governorate in eastern Yemen.
The second operation foiled another weapon smuggling attempt to Houthis on June 24.

The photos showed large quantities of weapons, such as night and day binoculars, drone-guiding systems, remote detonation electrical parts and dozens of sniper rifles.


(* A K P)

Intel: Saudi-led coalition says it intercepted Iranian weapons bound for Yemen

Why it Matters: The United States and Saudi Arabia are ramping up the pressure on Iran ahead of a UN Security Council decision on whether to renew an arms embargo on Tehran, which is set to expire in October.

If what Hook and Jubeir announced is accurate, the seizure would be the latest reported example of Iran violating an arms embargo on Yemen, which has been torn apart by civil war since 2015. The United States has announced two prior seizures of shipments of Iranian-made weapons bound for Yemen, including small arms, rocket launchers and drone parts.

The United States has distributed a draft resolution to the Security Council to renew the embargo on Iran. Russia and China have voiced opposition to the move.

Hook said Monday the weapons displayed in Riyadh “are all the evidence we need that the arms embargo on Iran must not be lifted.”



(* A K P)

Photos and explanations: A [THREAD] on the latest capture from smuggling to the #Houthis, from a Dhow off Mocha, #Yemen, by the Saudis. There is a lot of interesting kit.

Possible Saudis combined multiple captures into 1 press event, but still really informational.

My comment: Earlier reporting with photos: Yemen War Mosaic 662, cp2. The right thing for the US propaganda narrative ahead of the UN SC decision on Iran. Look at the photos published by Saudi Arabia to realize what a small flyspeck these arms shipments really are.


(A K P)

Yemeni President: Iran always smuggles arms to proxies

Iran always smuggles arms to the Houthi group in order to prolong war in Yemen and threaten neighboring countries, the Yemeni President said Tuesday.
At his meeting with the US ambassador to Yemen, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi highlighted the partnership and cooperation strategy with the US in the face of interferences carried out by Iran via the Houthis to destabilize security in Yemen, the region and international shipping routes, according to the Riyadh-based Saba.
"Iran works always and by every means on smuggling the arms to its proxies and tools in order to prolong war and threaten neighboring countries," Hadi told Ambassador Christopher Henzel.

My comment: And Hadi’s contribution to the US propaganda crusade for the US move at UNSC against Iran.

(* B H K P)

Save the Malnourished Children in Yemen

At a June 2 virtual donor conference, mainly Arab and Western countries pledged $1.35bn for aid operations in Yemen, far less than the $2.4bn the UN had asked for, and the $3.6bn the UN received last year.

This is while no funds have reached the Ansarullah-held regions, which is why in those areas the situation is even worse.

UNESCO should launch a global campaign to challenge the perception of normality. Put together, these facts should make the world community question their ideas about what is “normal”. They have accepted the unacceptable for far too long.

The reality cannot be considered normal any longer, now is the time to make a change. It all starts at the UN where a resolution is needed to end the conflict to allow international aid such as food and medicine to reach the affected regions.

The United States is a party to this monstrous misconduct by providing direct support to the Saudi coalition, including refueling planes during bombing raids, intelligence, airborne fuel tankers and thousands of advanced munitions.

International legal scholars and US lawmakers have warned that this continued US support - including through weapons sales - may not only make the US government complicit in coalition violations of the laws of war, but also expose US officials to legal liability for war crimes.

US officials providing assistance to be guilty of aiding and abetting coalition war crimes are aware of the fact that their aid is used to assist unlawful attacks against civilians, and that the Saudi forces they are assisting commit war crimes.

Many of these violations have been reported by the United Nations, as well as human rights organizations, and White House officials cannot debate that with some half-hearted comments.

They know that US support to the Saudis makes US personnel criminally liable. The State Department’s top human rights officers have already conceded a “possibility of legal jeopardy for US officials if arms sales continue despite continuing evidence of violations of the laws of war.”

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

(A H P)

Dozens of bakeries closed in the capital Sana'a as a result of the ongoing oil derivatives crisis which has entered its third week. The bakery owners accused the oil company controlled by the #Houthi group of refusing to provide them with the usual share of diesel.

(A K P)

[Sanaa gov.] Red Sea Ports Corporation condemns Griffith's remarks on derivatives

Yemen's Red Sea Ports Corporation on Tuesday strongly condemned the statements made by the UN envoy to Yemen, in which he called on local parties to allow oil derivatives ships access to the port of Hodeidah.

The foundation explained that Martin Griffith's statements are fully in line with the statements of the spokesman of aggression, and he seeks to cover up the crimes of the states of aggression ongoing, and tries to hold the local authority and the management of the institution and the port responsible for the blockade while they are the ones who control the sea and detain ships and pressure the Yemeni people by economic war.

In a statement received by Saba, the Foundation expressed its astonishment and regret for such misleading statements, especially since it comes from someone like the size of the UN envoy, who knows very well that those who prevent the entry of ships are free and the ports of aggression and that the port of Hodeidah complies with the International Port Security System (ISPS).

The statement explained that the institution offers all facilities and the port is open to any incoming ships and is ready to receive shipments and goods of any kind and size around the clock despite all the challenges imposed by the forces of aggression and their tails.

He stressed that the misleading statements of the UN envoy that Yemen is on the verge of a major humanitarian disaster and the complete collapse of the service sectors, especially the health sector, if the countries of aggression continue to be intransigent and intransigent by preventing the entry of oil derivatives ships.

The statement blamed the forces of aggression and the United Nations for the crime of detaining ships in the Waters of the Red Sea and preventing their access to the ports of Hodeidah.

and also

(* A K P)

Aggression coalition continues to hold 22 oil derivative ships: YPC

The Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) said on Monday that Saudi-led aggression coalition is still holding 22 ships loaded with oil derivatives and preventing their access to the port of Hodeidah.

The company confirmed, in a statement, that the held ships include 15 ships loaded with 419,789 tons of gasoline and diesel, four ships carrying mazut (fuel oil) and three ships loaded with domestic gas.

and also

(B E K P)

Film (Arabic): Almost stopped ... life in Al Mahwit due to the blockade and the prevention of the passage of oil derivative ships

(A E P)

[Sanaa gov.] Oil minister directs to file lawsuit against aggression coalition in Int'l courts

Minister of Oil and Minerals, Ahmed Abdullah Darras, directed on Monday quickly to file a lawsuit against the Saudi-led aggression coalition in front of the local and international courts due to detaining oil tankers.

and also

(A K P)

[Sanaa gov.] Interior Ministry Spokesman: US-Saudi Aggression Navy Forces Oil Tanker to Go to Djibouti

Interior Ministry spokesman, Brigadier Abdulkhaleq Al-Ajri said that the US-Saudi aggression navy has forced the DYNASTY ship, which has been detained for 98 days, to go to Djibouti, preventing its mooring at Hodeidah port.

The spokesman explained that The Red Sea sector operations and the crew of the tanker that carried over 29 thousand tons of diesel made calls. When the tanker approached the port's diver, the ship's crew replied that it would change its direction because of the naval aggression orders.

(A H K P)

Health disaster awaits Yemenis in coming days due to UN negativity: [Sanaa gov.] Health Ministry

The Ministry of Public Health and Population has confirmed on Sunday that a health disaster awaits Yemenis in the coming days due to the negative ness of the United Nations and the absence of its real role in Yemen.

The ministry said in a statement received by Saba, that the continued intransigence under the cover of the countries of US- Saudi-led coalition in the reservation of oil derivatives ships has created a major crisis in Yemen at all levels, especially the health sector.

The statement reads:

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

(* B H)

Hunger plagt Kinder im Jemen, während die UN Hilfsprogramme kürzt

Als Issa Nasser Ende letzten Jahres in einem Dorf im Norden Jemens geboren wurde, betrug sein Gewicht etwa 3 Kilogramm oder 6,6 Pfund. Jetzt wiegt das 7 Monate alte Kind fast das gleiche – weniger als die Hälfte des Durchschnittsgewichts seines Alters – und hat hauchdünne Haut und abgemagerte Gliedmaßen.

Issas Zustand spiegelt wider, was die UN-Kinderagentur letzte Woche warnte, dass Millionen von Kindern im vom Krieg heimgesuchten Jemen an den Rand des Hungers gedrängt werden könnten, wenn das Coronavirus das ärmste Land der arabischen Welt und als humanitäre Hilfsorganisationen erfasst leiden unter einem enormen Rückgang der Finanzierung.

Die Situation im Jemen wird sich voraussichtlich nur verschlechtern, da die Geberländer kürzlich die Hilfe im Rahmen der Coronavirus-Pandemie zurückgefahren haben und auch Bedenken haben, dass die Hilfe in den von den Houthis kontrollierten Gebieten möglicherweise nicht die beabsichtigten Empfänger erreicht.

Die Ernährungsprogramme werden ebenfalls gekürzt und betreffen 260.000 stark unterernährte Kinder. Mehr als 1 Million Frauen und 2 Millionen Kinder müssen wegen akuter Unterernährung behandelt werden, sagte OCHA Anfang dieses Monats.

Das Welternährungsprogramm musste die Rationen halbieren, und die von den Vereinten Nationen finanzierten Gesundheitsdienste wurden in fast 200 Krankenhäusern im ganzen Land reduziert.

Rund 24 Millionen jemenitische Menschen, das sind 80% der Gesamtbevölkerung des Landes, benötigen nach Angaben des UN-Büros für die Koordinierung humanitärer Angelegenheiten (OCHA) irgendeine Form von Hilfe oder Schutz. Und 75% der UN-Programme für das Land, die im Wesentlichen alle Bereiche abdecken, von Lebensmitteln über Gesundheitsfürsorge bis hin zu Ernährung, haben bereits ihre Türen geschlossen oder den Betrieb reduziert.

(* B H)

Yemen Situation Report, 2 July 2020

HIGHLIGHTS (1 Jul 2020)

A tragedy unfolds as funding falls short

COVID-19 rapidly spreading

COVID-19 exacerbates Yemen’s economic problems

Heavy rains and flooding hit southern and eastern governorates

Migrant arrivals plummet while anti-migrant abuse spikes leaving thousands stranded


A tragedy unfolds as funding falls short A tragedy is unfolding in Yemen as humanitarian needs continue to grow while aid agencies are running out of money to fund life-saving assistance. Millions of people who depend on aid for survival are now hanging by a thread in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Nearly 80 per cent of the population still needs some form of humanitarian aid and protection.

More than $3.2 billion is required for humanitarian response in 2020. At the High-Level Pledging Event in Riyadh held on 2 June, donors pledged only US$1.35 billion of the $2.41 billion needed to cover essential humanitarian activities between June and December, leaving a gap of more than $1 billion.

With only $558 million provided so far, the aid operation is on the brink of collapse unless donors fulfil their pledges immediately, and without additional funding. The situation compares unfavourably with this stage in 2019, when $2.6 billion had been received for the aid operation.

Aid agencies, working closely with donors, have been engaging with authorities in Yemen, resulting in concrete steps to improve the operating environment. These steps are helping to restore confidence in the operation following a sharp deterioration in the operating environment in northern Yemen in the last six months of 2019, placing the humanitarian partnership back on firm ground. The increasingly restrictive operating environment in the second half of 2019 made it difficult to assure donors that aid was being delivered in accordance with humanitarian principles leading some donors to withhold funding.

Since mid-April, 31 of 41 of critical UN programmes have reduced or closed for lack of funding

(* B H)

Nothilfe Jemen: Kinder in tödlicher Gefahr

Hunger, Krankheiten und Armut verursachen unvorstellbares Leid. Jetzt breitet sich die Corona-Pandemie unter einer Bevölkerung aus, die dem Virus nichts entgegensetzen kann.

Das zerstörte Gesundheitssystem ist mit COVID-19 völlig überfordert, es fehlt an Ausstattung, Personal, Strom und Medizin. Corona-Tests oder die Behandlung auf einer Intensivstation sind kaum möglich. Auch die sanitären und hygienischen Bedingungen sind im Land auf einem erneuten Tiefpunkt angelangt. COVID-19 und Krankheiten wie Cholera haben leichtes Spiel.

Das Land steuert auf eine Katastrophe zu, die viele Leben kosten wird. Schwer akut mangelernährte Kinder wie Saleh sind die größten Leidtragenden in dieser humanitären Krise. Schon jetzt sind über zwei Millionen Kinder im Jemen mangelernährt. Darunter sind etwa 325.000 Kinder, die unter lebensbedrohlichem Hunger leiden.

Diese Zahlen werden in den nächsten Monaten noch weiter steigen, da dringend benötigte Gelder für die humanitäre Hilfe fehlen. Gemeinsam mit UNICEF setzen wir alles daran, dass die notleidenden Kinder im Jemen auch in den kommenden Monaten versorgt werden können. Mit Ihrer Spende können wir viel bewirken:

Mit 43 Euro stellen wir einem Gesundheitshelfer ein Hygiene-Set zur Verfügung

123 Euro ermöglichen 150.000 Liter sauberes Trinkwasser

Für 60 Euro können wir 300 Stück Handseifen zum Schutz gegen COVID-19 verteilen

29 Euroversorgen ein mangelernährtes Kind einen Monat mit nahrhafter Erdnusspaste

(B H)

Film by Yemen Aid US: Four months ago, Yemen Aid started a journey towards sustainable development in #Yemen with a focus on improving the livelihoods of families. Today, we are extremely happy to share with you the SUCCESS STORY of our green-housing project in the province of #Amran!

(B H)

Film: Despite scarce possibilities... Al-Amal Center continues to provide services to cancer patients in Taiz

Al- Amal center for oncology treatment in Taiz province in southern Yemen continues to provide medical services to cancer patients despite its scarce medical potential, taking several preventive measures to protect patients from coronavirus, who are the most vulnerable and more likely to die from the virus.

(B H)

Film: Jemen: Hungersnot gefährdet Babys

Im Jemen herrscht die größte humanitäre Krise der Welt. Rund 80 Prozent der Bevölkerung benötigen Hilfe, darunter mehr als 12 Millionen Kinder. Seit dem Ausbruch des Coronavirus ist die Hungersnot im Land besorgniserregender denn je.

(* B H)

Yemen: Floods - Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) DREF n° MDRYE007 Final Report

Beginning in May 2019, Yemen experienced increasingly heavy rainfall in different parts of the country, leading to widespread floods in June that required immediate assistance. According to the need’s assessments conducted from 11 June, at least twelve of the 22 governates were affected: Aden, Marib, Taiz, Hajjah, Ibb, Al Bayda, Al Jawf, Dahmer,
Rhymah, Lahj Hadramaut and Sa’ada.

The population in the affected areas lost their livelihoods, essential assets and belongings. The areas were also impacted by subsequent floods in August, especially in Hajjah. Humanitarian actors in the country continue to have serious concerns about the possible deterioration of the health situation due to the current cholera outbreak as well as recently with other potential evolving situations like dengue fever in Hajjah.

(* B H)

Yemen Humanitarian Update Issue 6 (June 2020)

A tragedy is unfolding in Yemen as humanitarian needs continue to grow while aid agencies are running out of money to fund life-saving assistance. Millions of people who depend on aid for survival are now hanging by a thread in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Nearly 80 per cent of the population still needs some form of humanitarian aid and protection.

More than $3.2 billion is required for humanitarian response in 2020. At the High-Level Pledging Event in Riyadh held on 2 June, donors pledged only US$1.35 billion of the $2.41 billion needed to cover essential humanitarian activities between June and December, leaving a gap of more than $1 billion.

With only $558 million provided so far, the aid operation is on the brink of collapse unless donors fulfil their pledges immediately, and without additional funding. The situation compares unfavourably with this stage in 2019, when $2.6 billion had been received for the aid operation.

Aid agencies, working closely with donors, have been engaging with authorities in Yemen, resulting in concrete steps to improve the operating environment. These steps are helping to restore confidence in the operation following a sharp deterioration in the operating environment in northern Yemen in the last six months of 2019, placing the humanitarian partnership back on firm ground. The increasingly restrictive operating environment in the second half of 2019 made it difficult to assure donors that aid was being delivered in accordance with humanitarian principles leading some donors to withhold funding.

Since mid-April, 31 of 41 of critical UN programmes have reduced or closed for lack of funding, most of them critical in the fight against COVID-19. On average, aid agencies reached only 9.5 million people with life-saving aid in April, down from 13.7 million in March and 15.6 million in December 2019. Critical water and sanitation services needed to suppress the spread of the virus and other deadly diseases will come to a halt for 8.4 million people, including 3 million children, by the end of June.

Without funding, the aid operation is expected to shrink further in August when 19 million people will lose access to healthcare, including pregnant and nursing women, and children. Five million children will miss out on vaccinations against killer diseases and public health services will collapse further. Already, at this critical time, financial incentives for 10,000 health care workers who run Yemen’s health facilities have stopped and more than 2.2 million people stand to lose access to urgent surgical assistance. Life-saving nutrition services for 2.5 million malnourished children will cease by the end of August, leaving beneficiaries acutely malnourished and 23,500 children with severe acute malnutrition at immediate risk of death.

Despite limited funding, partners continue to deliver assistance to people in need while adequate funding is sought to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.

(B H P)

USAID: Yemen continuous evaluation and learning (YCLE) project

As a result of the ongoing civil war, Yemen is suffering the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. USAID is working with international and local partners to rebuild key social and economic institutions, help address the underlying causes of instability, and build the foundation for durable peace and prosperity to foster Yemen's future resilience. USAID development activities in Yemen focus on economic recovery, education; governance, peace, and stability; health; and water, sanitation, and hygiene. A robust monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) program is essential to ensure USAID effectively implements projects in Yemen's complex operating environment.


The Yemen Continuous Learning and Evaluation (YCLE) project evaluates the performance and results of USAID activities while helping USAID learn and adapt for improved effectiveness. YCLE provides effective program performance monitoring and operational context insights; evaluates the performance and results of USAID/Yemen activities; and facilitates learning and adaptation for improved effectiveness. The project also enhances USAID's MEL systems and staff capacity, including of local organizations, and provides third-party monitoring (TPM) of USAID activities in Yemen.

(* B H)

Supporting Vital Livelihoods and Increasing COVID-19 Prevention Awareness

As a response to the quickening spread of COVID-19 across Yemen, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is working to ensure Yemen’s most vulnerable populations such as women and youth are better able to protect themselves from the virus. UNDP recently launched two major initiatives that will impact Yemeni’s lives: a livelihood-support campaign and a five-governorate community awareness raising campaign around COVID-19 prevention measures.

COVID-19 is wreaking havoc on Yemen – a country that is already suffering from the world’s worst humanitarian and development crisis – by forcing thousands of micro, small and medium business to shutter, leaving many with nothing. However, through quick UNDP action and assessment of COVID-19’s potential social and economic impact in Yemen, the organization is helping thousands of Yemenis continue to operate their businesses and earn an income during this critical time. Grants provided by UNDP will help minimize the long-term social and economic impact for both business owners and communities of having businesses shutter. The funds will help the businesses stay open and, to ensure their safety during operation, UNDP is also providing emergency kits containing supplies to help fight COVID-19.

The continued operations of thousands of businesses will help ensure many – particularly the already vulnerable populations – will be able to care for their families. The income will allow them to purchase critical necessities like food, water, shelter, and medicines, possibly helping stave off COVID-19 and other rampant communicable diseases. For a country already facing the world’s worst humanitarian and development crisis, this support is critical.

(B H)

Film: Hassan El-Tayyab Joins BBC to Discuss the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen

Hassan El-Tayyab, FCNL's lead lobbyist on Middle East policy, joined BBC World on June 26 to discuss the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. 80 percent of the population is in need of humanitarian aid, and the pandemic will only deepen the suffering.

(B H)

Covid-19 als weitere Herausforderung für den Jemen

Der Jemen braucht dringend humanitäre Hilfe, Medikamente, neue Infrastrukturen und auch sonst alles, was zu einem Leben in Frieden gehört. Doch zu Krieg, Zerstörung und Armut kommt nun noch die Ausbreitung des COVID-19 Virus‘ dazu, und reißt das Land weiter in den Abgrund von Elend, Tod und Kindersterben.

Laut einem neuen Report der Kinderhilfsorganisation UNICEF könnte die Zahl der mangelernährten Kinder im Jemen auf 2,4 Millionen ansteigen. Der Organisation fehlen Hilfsgelder für grundlegende humanitäre Hilfen. Außerdem stellen das fehlende Gesundheitssystem und die zerstörte Infrastruktur den Jemen seit Ausbruch der Corona-Pandemie vor große Herausforderungen.

Das zugesicherte Geld der teilnehmenden Staaten der Geberkonferenz wird für die humanitäre Krise im Jemen nicht ausreichen. Den Helfer*innen muss mehr Unterstützung zugesichert werden und in Zukunft ist es wichtig sich nicht auf die Bekämpfung der Symptome zu konzentrieren, sondern für langanhaltenden Frieden zu sorgen, damit auch ein Land wie der Jemen eine Krise wie sie gerade weltweit herrscht, überstehen kann.

(B H)

Film: Jemen: CARE fördert Kleinunternehmen / Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe

(B H)

Film: Inspiring nannies who changed the behavior of their herdsmen to livestock after the agency's intervention, the video tells of some persistence and hope.

(* B H)

Hunger stalks children in Yemen as UN cuts aid programs

When Issa Nasser was born late last year in a village in northern Yemen, his weight was about 3 kilograms, or 6.6 pounds. Now, the 7-month-old infant weighs nearly the same — less than half the average weight for his age — and has wafer-thin skin and emaciated limbs.

Issa’s condition mirrors what the U.N. children’s agency warned about last week, that millions of children in war-torn Yemen could be pushed to the brink of starvation as the coronavirus sweeps across the Arab world’s poorest country and as humanitarian agencies suffer from a huge drop in funding.

The baby’s father, Ibrahim Nasser, a 51-year-old displaced fisherman now living in the village of al-Hanabiya in the district of Abs in Hajjah province, said the family has spent most of Issa’s months-long life so far in a health care center, some 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) from the village. The ill-equipped medical center services more than 50,000 displaced people in the district.

Four years ago, when fighting between Yemen’s Houthi rebels and government forces, backed by a Saudi-led coalition, escalated, Nasser left his home village near the coastal city of Midi, also in Hajjah province, on the border with Saudi Arabia.

Since then, he has been unemployed and depends on aid to feed his family, which became part of more than 3 million people displaced by the war, many pushed to the brink of famine amid stalemated fighting and a coronavirus pandemic that is ripping through the country.

“I am a poor person, and my son is in this state,” said Nasser. “And they tell me he is malnourished, you can see how his condition is.”

The health care center found out about the infant recently through a local charity which provides aid to displaced in the area, said Dr. Ali Hajar, who oversees the malnutrition clinic at the center.

“His condition is very, very tragic. He suffers from acute malnutrition. His skin is stretching tightly over his bones,” the physician said.

The situation in Yemen is only expected to get worse as donor countries recently cut back on aid amid the coronavirus pandemic and also due to concerns that the aid might not be reaching its intended recipients in territories controlled by the Houthis.

Some 24 million Yemeni people, which is 80% of the country’s entire population, require some form of assistance or protection =

(B H)

Yemen UNHCR Sub-Office Aden fact sheet

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

(B H K pS)

Film: The young Adel, victim of a Houthi bullet, lost him the ability to work

The young Adel Othman Ahmed Salem twenty years old after he strengthened his arms and extended his mustache and was hoping that his parents and his family would support him in providing the requirements of life, it became a burden on them as a result of Houthi gunshots that penetrated his body and kept him bedridden and lost his strength like his young readers. Othman says that he was shot by the Houthi militia in th

(B H)

UNHCR Kharaz Refugee Camp, Yemen - Fact Sheet May 2020

Located in Lahj Governorate, south of Yemen, Kharaz camp opened in 2001 and remains the only refugee camp in Yemen.

As of early May 2020, the camp is home to 8,935 refugees and asylum seekers, mostly from Somalia and Ethiopia.
UNHCR and partners provide protection and assistance to refugees and host communities


8,935 Number of refugees and asylum-seekers in Kharaz Camp as of 6 May 2020 .

52% Per cent of registered refugees are women and girls

2% Percent of registered refugees in Kharaz Camp are elderly (>60 years old)

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IOM: 100,000 displaced in Yemen in 2020 due to fighting, COVID-19

Some 100,000 people have been displaced in war-torn Yemen since the beginning of the year due to heavy fighting and the coronavirus pandemic, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) announced on Sunday.

In its report the organisation said: “16,601 families (99,606 people) have been displaced at least once, since the first of last January, and until 27 June.”

“The displacement of 191 additional families was recorded last week, including 80 families in Lahij governorate (south of Yemen), 65 families in Marib (east), and 46 families in Taiz (southwest).”

The IOM indicated that “the reasons for displacement have multiplied, as 112 families from Aden Governorate (South) left their homes due to the coronavirus outbreak, as well as 54 families from Al-Bayda Governorate (Central) and 49 families from Al Hudaydah Governorate (West) fled the fights.”

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

Siehe / Look at cp1

(* B P)

Survivors of death share part of misery they had in Houthis-run detention centers

Abdurrahman, a 20-year young man ended up in the Criminal Investigation Prison in the capital Sana’a upon his arrival to the city coming from his village in Haraz, on his motorbike.

The Houthis militia arrested him when he stopped nearby a group of gunmen asking for directions to Khawlan Street as it was the first time, he visits Sana'a.

Sitting on the door of her home in the village, Saood, Abdurrahman’s mother, recalls memories of her son.

Her tears stained her cheeks when she received the news of her son's arrest.

She speaks about her son with a sobbing voice.

She says: “They exercised every form of torture against him, used every tool of assault and swore at him with every bad word”.

Two months of his arrest passed, but his family knew nothing about him, and no evidence was given for his arrest.


(* B P)

Seeking job opportunity

Left his family to look for a work in Sana’a, Naji Ghaleb, 30 years old never hurt the Houthis militants nor wrote a anti-Houthis tweet at all.

Ghalib quarreled with members of the Al-Sobaha Security Checkpoint, at the Western Entrance of Sana’a following delay of the vehicle he was in for inspection.

The dispute developed then into a hand clashing.

Then, other militants ran over Ghalib and assaulted him badly.

They took him to the custody of Mutna Police Station, nearby the site.

He says: “I went to Sana’a looking for a job. I paid a goodbye to my pregnant wife and suddenly found myself in a dark cell blanketed with broken bones, blood-stained face and a bundle of charges; punishment of the least one is death.”

He went on saying: “I found out that I’m accused of being an arm smuggler and a regime opponent and attacking the Houthis checkpoint.”

“The most dangerous charge was a membership of a prostitution network. They were supposed to charge me with quarreling and that is all,” he said.

My comment: These reports seem to have been picked out oft he Mwatana report, look at cp1

(* B P)

USCIRF Releases Yemen Country Update Highlighting Houthi Religious Freedom Violations

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) today released the following new report:

Yemen County Update: This country update reviews religious freedom violations across several communities in Yemen and recommends more proactive U.S. policy to preserve these freedoms. Since capturing the Yemeni capital Sana’a in 2014, the Houthis have harassed and threatened Sunni Muslims, Christians, Jews, Hindus, and members of other faith communities. Many members of these communi

and full report:

Religious Freedom Restrictions in Houthi‑Controlled Areas of Yemen

However, the Houthis employ sectarian rhetoric and symbolism to highlight and exacerbate religious differences, even though some Sunni Muslim Yemenis support the movement. The Houthis have referred to Sunni Muslim opposition groups as takfiri (those who declare other Muslims apostates) and accuse Sunni Muslims who do not align with the movement as collaborators with or spies for the Saudi-led coalition. The Houthis have also tried to pressure Sunni Muslim imams to deliver prescribed sermons at mosques in Houthi-controlled areas.

My comment: The Houthis’ oppression of other religions is obvious. But, this report originates from the US, which is the main backer of anti-Houthi Saudi coalition. Thus, this report is biased and part of the world-wide US propaganda war. – The report itself – apart from a chapter on Bahai – contains little specially blaming the Houthis (whether for Christians, Jews, Hindus etc.), but the headline does it.

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Central Military Court holds public hearing to trial 75 soldiers of traitors

The Central Military Court in Sana'a held its public session on Tuesday to trial 75 military leaders who are traitors fleeing justice and accused of treason and facilitating the entry of the enemy into the territory of the Republic of Yemen.

The court heard the responses of the lawyers who were responsible for the traitors and approved the postponement to the next hearing to complete the hearing of the responses of the lawyers who were in office about the traitors.

My remark: Hadi gov. officers, in absentia.

(B P)

Houthis play in sport clubs their own damaging game

The Houthis militia have expanded intimidation and damaging acts to include the sport and the youth facilities in Sana’a and other Yemeni cities under their control.

Sources quoted by the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat daily Newspaper said that the Houthis apply their tampering and destructive approach in the management of the public departments on the sport facilities in areas of their control.

The intimidation against public sport facilities led to the shutdown of 32 sport federations.

The sources said that the Houthis changed headquarters of 25 sport federation into places of social gathering, stores, cafe and places of sectarian indoctrination and military recruitment centers.

(A P)

In today's Washington Post, readers will find a full-page print ad from Committee to Protect Journalists (@pressfreedom) calling for the release of Yemeni journalists Abdulkhaleq Ahmed Amran, Akram Saleh Al-Walidi, Al-Hareth Saleh Hamid and Tawfiq Mohammed Al-Mansouri (image)

(B P)

The Houthi militia has reserved a place at the premises of the National Petroleum Company for refueling their cars. Ordinary Yemenis are not allowed to refuel their cars in the same places.

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Houthis detail Radman battle with Sheikh Oadhi

The Houthi group on Monday gave details of its massive battle in Radman, a district of the Yemeni central governorate of Baydha.
"Our forces successfully won the battle in just 24 hours and reached the main stronghold of the traitorous al-Oadhi who had already fled," Houthi spokesman said at press conference.
"The offensive plan to eliminate the al-Oadhi sedition was designed on advancing from four directions," Yahiya Sarie added.
"Once Radman was secured, we started the most significant military attack, advancing in the two frontlines of Qania and al-Abdia.
"In the first hours of the operation, tens of mercenaries were killed, injured or captured, and tens others fled," the military spokesman claimed.


(A K pH)

Spokesman of [Sanaa gov.] Armed Forces: An important press briefing

and in film (Arabic):


(A K pH)

A map showing the axes of progress on the Radman district, and then the move to liberate the Qaniyah and Abidya fronts

A map showing the total area of the massive military operation on the Radman, Qaniyah, and Abdiyah fronts in Marib and Al Bayda

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp6 – cp18

Vorige / Previous:

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-662 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-662: oder / or

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

10:01 02.07.2020
Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
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Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
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Dietrich Klose