Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 692 - Yemen War Mosaic 692

Yemen Press Reader 692: 10. Nov. 2020: Joe Biden und Jemen – Jemen im Oktober 2020 – Teilung des Jemen und Scheitern des Riad-Abkommens – „Eingefrorener“ Föderalismus im Jemen ...
Bei diesem Beitrag handelt es sich um ein Blog aus der Freitag-Community

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

... Jemens Gefangenenaustausch muss entpolitisiert werden – Krieg der Identitäten – Das Riad-Abkommen nach einem Jahr – Die Huthis und die Stämme im Nordjemen – Unterdrückung der Frauen im Jemen: Unbezahlte Arbeit – Oman und die Provinz Mahrah – Covid-19 trifft auf humanitäre Krise – und mehr

Nov. 10, 2020: Joe Biden and Yemen – Yemen in October 2020 – Partition of Yemen and failure of the Riyadh agreement – “Frozen” federalism in Yemen – Yemen’s prisoner exchange must be depoliticized – The war of identities – The Riyadh agreement, one year on – The Houthis and the tribes of Northern Yemen – Subjugation of women: Unpaid labour – Oman and Mahrah province – COVID-19 hits humanitarian crisis – and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-692b-yemen-war-mosaic-692b

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavitrus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp1b Am wichtigsten: Großer Gefangenenaustausch / Most important: Great prisoner swap

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp12b Sudan

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade

cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage

cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle

cp19 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification

***

**

*

(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-einfuehrende-artikel-u-ueberblicke

(* B H K P)

Kein Ende in Sicht

Humanitäre Lage im Jemen weiterhin katastrophal. Angriffe Saudi-Arabiens auf zivile Infrastruktur halten an

Das derzeitige Ausmaß des Hungers Im Jemen ist nach Angaben der Vereinten Nationen beispiellos. Fast zehn Millionen Menschen sind akut von Hunger bedroht, allein zwei Millionen Kinder sind auf entsprechende besondere Hilfe angewiesen. In einigen Regionen sei fast jedes dritte Kind unterernährt, teilte das UN-Welternährungsprogramm (WFP) in seinem jüngsten Bericht vom 20. Oktober mit.

Auf der Liste der Hilfsorganisation International Rescue Committee, die größten Krisen betreffend, belegte das Land 2020 den ersten Platz – vor der DR Kongo und Syrien. Im seit März 2015 andauernden Krieg Saudi-Arabiens gegen die Ansarollah (»Huthis«) waren bereits bis Oktober 2019 über 100.000 Menschen getötet worden, meldete die Nichtregierungsorganisation »Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project«.

Werden die Todesopfer der sogenannten Sekundärphänomene hinzugezählt, steigt die Zahl gar auf eine Viertelmillion: Denn neben dem Hunger wüten Malaria, Dengue, Polio, Masern und Cholera im Land. Nach Angaben der WHO gab es zwischen Oktober 2016 und Januar 2020 mutmaßlich 2.316.197 Cholerafälle im Jemen. Die Organisation hat aufgrund der Coronapandemie aufgehört, ihre Updates für die Folgemonate zu veröffentlichen.

Angriffe der saudi-arabischen Kriegskoalition auf Krankenhäuser und Einrichtungen der Nahrungsmittel- und Trinkwasserversorgung haben dazu geführt, dass 80 Prozent der Bevölkerung auf humanitäre Hilfe angewiesen sind, doch diese kommt nur selten bei der Bevölkerung an: Vergangene Woche Mittwoch veröffentlichte »Yemeni Archive«, ein Portal zur Dokumentation von Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Land, Daten, wonach die Kriegskoalition zwischen 2015 und 2019 insgesamt 131 Brücken, die für den Transport von solchen Gütern notwendig sind, systematisch zerstört hat.

Hinzu kommt eine nahezu komplette Seeblockade des Landes: Diese ist eine der Hauptgründe für die Hungersnot, da sie Nahrungsmittellieferungen erschwert. Die Abschottung ist verantwortlich für ein anderes enormes Problem: Die meisten verbliebenen Hospitale sind auf dieselbetriebene Generatoren angewiesen, die von Treibstoffimporten abhängig sind. Allein im August hinderte Riad 21 Öltanker daran, den wichtigsten jemenitischen Hafen in Hodeida anzufahren, wodurch sich die katastrophale Lage des Gesundheitssystems weiter verschlechterte, wie aus einem Bericht des Außenministeriums in Sanaa hervorgeht, der jW vorliegt.

Auch die Kämpfe in dem Land halten an, wie etwa im Gouvernement Marib

Die Leidtragenden sind unterdessen einmal mehr die unschuldigen Kinder, Frauen und Männer aus Marib sowie die Millionen Binnenvertriebenen vor Ort – von Jakob Reimann

https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/389819.jemen-kein-ende-in-sicht.html

(B H)

Film: Yemen conflict, hunger and now COVID-19

Yemen is a country already battered by conflict, hunger and flooding. Suha Basharen describes how CARE is responding to the intersecting of needs of a complex emergency.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bs7LzP5xEdY

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

(** B K P)

Real Journalists Would Grill Biden On Yemen At Every Opportunity

During this whole stupid US presidential race I heard very few arguments in favor of a Biden vote that struck me as anything more than the product of ignorance, propaganda distortion and partisan hackery. He’ll probably be worse than Trump on war. His climate proposals are as much a band-aid on a sucking chest wound as his plans for economic justice. There’ll still be racism in America. The fact that Trump ended up deporting far fewer undocumented immigrants than Obama means Biden’s presidency probably won’t even help things on that front.

As far as real changes that affect normal people, the coming Biden presidency doesn’t offer many things to be especially hopeful about.

But there was one item on the Democratic Party’s platform this election season that especially conscious people sometimes point to which I absolutely could respect as a good reason to vote for Biden. It reads as follows:

“Democrats will end support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen and help bring the war to an end. This war is responsible for the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, and it amplifies threats to the region and to our interests. Democrats believe that the United States should support diplomatic efforts — not block them.”

“Vice President Biden believes it is past time to end U.S. support for the war in Yemen and cancel the blank check the Trump administration has given Saudi Arabia for its conduct of that war,” Biden campaign spokesperson Andrew Bates told the Washington Post last year.

Now, you can believe them or not; it doesn’t matter. The important point is that, while Trump vetoed congressional attempts to save Yemen (arguably the single most evil act of his entire administration), Biden campaigned on ending the war. He should therefore be pushed on that issue constantly, every time the opportunity presents itself.

“Biden has committed to end U.S. participation in the war on Yemen as president,” Sperling told In These Times. “But he must make clear that it will include any kind of assistance — as Obama officials Rice, Power, Rhodes and others have urged — including intelligence sharing, logistics support and spare parts for warplanes.”

“He should publicly and privately tell the Saudis that he will do this on day one,” Sperling added. “This will pressure them into negotiations and may end the war before he even enters the White House.”

“President Biden doesn’t need a Senate majority to end the genocide in Yemen,” tweeted journalist Walker Bragman, who has reported on the conflict extensively. “He could end U.S. military involvement in Yemen and support for the Saudi-led coalition on day one. He pledged he would end arms sales during the campaign, but given who Biden is, gotta start making noise now. Yemen needs medical supplies, food, clean water, and humanitarian aid.”

If the United States had a real free press, this subject would come up every single interview and every single press conference that Biden does. If journalism actually existed in mainstream media, he would be grilled on this issue any time he’s near a camera. What’s the plan for ending the war? What steps has he taken to enact that plan? Has he called the Saudis yet? How about the other US allies who are backing the slaughter? What specifically is happening, and when?

There is no legitimate reason this should not happen. Yemen is the single most pressing issue in the world, Biden bears responsibility for it, and he said that he would end it. If there were an actual free press in America holding power to account and asking the important questions of their leaders, Biden would be interrogated on this subject with unrelenting urgency every time an opportunity presented itself.

And of course we know this will not happen. We know the United States of America does not actually have a free press holding power to account and asking the important questions of their leaders; it has plutocrat-owned royal court stenographers who cultivate warm relationships with power and regurgitate back to their gullible audiences whatever lines they’ve been fed. We know they’ll give the nice old man who they aggressively protected from scrutiny during the election as much comfortable space as he needs and let him say whatever he wants to say on his own terms when he feels ready.

But it should happen. And the most powerful government on earth should have a free press holding power to account. And the butchery in Yemen should be ended. Immediately – by Caitlin Johnstone

https://caityjohnstone.medium.com/real-journalists-would-grill-biden-on-yemen-at-every-opportunity-93ce0a75c2cc = https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL2011/S00053/real-journalists-would-grill-biden-on-yemen-at-every-opportunity.htm

(** B K P)

The Yemen Review, October 2020

Contents

October at a Glance

State of the War

Feature

What Happens When COVID-19 Hits the World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis? – by Shuaib Almosawa

Commentaries

Yemen’s Prisoner Exchange Must be Depoliticized – by Nadwa Al-Dawsari

Yemenis Must Face the Truth About Our War of Identities – by Abdulghani Al-Iryani

The Riyadh Agreement One Year On – by Hussam Radman

The Conversation

Q&A with Anna Karin Eneström, Swedish Ambassador to the UN

Arts & Culture

Salma: The Misery of Tin – Excerpt by Rim Mugahed

Endnotes

Developments in Yemen

Prisoner Exchange

Iranian Ambassador Appears in Sana’a

Houthi Minister Assassinated in Sana’a

Hadi-STC Cabinet Rumors

Disruption at Aden Port

Economic Developments

Easing of the Fuel Crisis

Battle of the Central Banks

Humanitarian and Human Rights Developments

Death Penalty Ruling in Al-Aghbary Case

Decrease in Cholera Cases in 2020

International Developments

State of the War

Marib

Hudaydah

Al-Dhalea

Taiz

Abyan

https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/11814

(** B P)

De Facto Partition of Yemen Looms with Riyadh Agreement’s Continued Failure

The Riyadh Agreement, signed one year ago, has failed in almost every aspect of its implementation. As its promise to act as a unifying force in Yemen continues to fade into the past, the de facto partition of the country is coming evermore into focus on the horizon.

As the name suggests, the agreement was of Saudi design. Through it, the kingdom had sought to assume ultimate authority over the Yemeni forces confronting the armed Houthi movement – which had seized Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, and much of the country’s north five years earlier – and to mend the oft-violent confrontations among those parties that were undercutting the fight against their common Houthi foe.

The agreement envisioned Saudi Arabia becoming patron to the Southern Transitional Council (STC), taking over from the United Arab Emirates as Abu Dhabi drew down its military involvement in Yemen, and absorbing the STC into the internationally recognized Yemeni government.

Various factors have helped stall the agreement’s implementation, including intense animosity among the implementing parties, a lack of technical details regarding implementation, the sluggishness of Saudi decision-making in responding to changing circumstances on the ground, among others. A factor underlying many others, however, is a fundamental disagreement regarding the sequencing of the deal’s political and military aspects.

A similar impasse in 2016 was a primary factor responsible for scuttling UN-backed peace talks between Hadi’s government and the armed Houthi movement as well as a peace initiative then-US Secretary of State John Kerry had pursued. Hadi insisted that the political dimensions of a post-conflict government would not be decided before Houthi forces handed over their heavy weapons and withdrew from areas they had seized, while the Houthis refused to give up their military leverage until their place in a post-conflict government was assured.

The Riyadh Agreement’s failed implementation has, similarly, created space for the STC to leverage its military control over Aden and surrounding governorates to attempt to create the conditions to fulfill its ambitions for southern Yemen’s secession. These efforts saw the group declare self-rule in southern Yemen in April, following which, and in direct contravention to the Riyadh Agreement, it took meaningful steps toward establishing a financial basis for independence by redirecting state revenues in areas it controls – such as from the Aden port – to its own newly created quasi-state financial institution.

Historic intra-southern animosities and regional identities almost certainly prevent the STC from extending its control in southern Yemen to the governorates east of Aden, and Riyadh was ultimately able to pressure the STC into rolling back assertion of self-rule. Still, the STC remains the de facto authority in south Yemen’s largest city and the nearby governorates of Lahj and Al-Dhalea and, on current trajectories, its continued political entrenchment in these areas seems likely.

The Yemeni government’s continued retreat from relevance in Yemen in the months and years to come would likely further spur a de facto, patchwork partition of the country, while maintaining a single Yemeni state in legal identity only, a situation similar to Somalia. The Riyadh Agreement, while heavily flawed, likely represents the best, and perhaps even the last, viable option to reverse this course.

https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/11864 = https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/11814

(** B P)

“Frozen” Federalism: Territorial Remake and Civil War in Yemen

Abstract: The Republic of Yemen, the current borders of which were carved in 1990, was the embodiment of the aspiration of two formerly existing Yemeni states, the Northern and the Southern, for political unity with the preservation of regional specificity. Nevertheless, the Civil War in 1994, won by the North, did not allow the country to introduce federal approaches. After the overthrow of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime provoked by the “Arab Spring,” the transition to a “fair” territorial and administrative state model came to the foreground. The General Peoples Dialogue which was concluded in 2014, envisaged the transformation of Yemen from a unitary state into a federal one. Moreover, the discussion on this issue revealed a fairly large variety of federal projects that were brought up for discussion by various political actors and also demonstrated the demand of many groups in Yemeni society for various decentralization models.

Introduction

Having agreed at the end of 2014 to the need to move to a federal model for Yemen, participants in the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), however, failed to develop its full design. As expected, the most heated debate was over the territorial borders of future federal regions. This situation was predictable, since in the process of Yemeni federalization, each of its many parties pursued their own goals. For instance, President Mansour Hadi saw federalism as the only tool to take away power from former President Ali Saleh and destroy the patronage system he had built (replacing it with his own patronage system). He also wanted to at least minimally meet the demands of the opposition to the dictatorship which were expressed in 2011. The new political elite around him had a very clear idea of what they wanted to achieve when they decided to introduce federalism, but their aspirations often did not match with the aspirations of the other bidders and sometimes directly contradicted them. This is not surprising; the new central power sought not only to elevate itself through federalization but also to weaken its competitors, both in the South and in the North. Because of this, it was decided to impose new regional borders from above without bringing the plans to the popular discussion and avoiding local disputes. Consequently, the only contribution of the NDC to the solution of the territorial issue was that the delegates, understanding the fragility and instability of any proposed division, declared the need to adopt legislation that would allow both the outer and inner borders of the newly formed federal units to be revised after at least one electoral cycle. This provision was included in the final report of the Constitutional Committee, which was gathered in early 2015, after the NDC ceased its activities.

Extrernal supporters

Obviously, the “six units” scheme best serves the interests of the Central government, allowing it to play on the contradictions between the newly formed regions that become dependent on the federal authorities. Federalism here is not an aim designed to harmonize national development but a means to tame political competitors. However, now at the end of 2020, the future of this project in the conditions of a disintegrating state seems more than vague. Moreover, it is not just because the Houthis, who strongly rejected it, hold a third of the country’s territory and half of its population under their control. Equally important, in addition to the internal contradictions described above, the support provided by Saudi Arabia has become a serious compromise for Hadi’s project. The Saudis consider the federalization of Yemen as equivalent to Yemen’s incapacitation, and this fits into the policy of “containing” the neighbor being conducted by Riyadh for decades. The collapse of the monarchy and the establishment of the republic in 1962 was where the Saudi regime saw a fundamental threat to itself; it was even less enthusiastic about the 1990 Yemeni unification. Not being able to directly interfere with the unification, the Saudis sought various ways to destabilize a unified Yemen.

https://research.sharqforum.org/2020/11/05/frozen-federalism-territorial-remake-and-civil-war-in-yemen/

(** B K P)

Yemen’s Prisoner Exchange Must be Depoliticized

While the prisoner exchange is a positive development, it should not be interpreted as a sign that either the Houthis or Hadi’s government are interested in ending the war. Nor should it be hailed as a “breakthrough” that can improve Yemen’s chances at peace.

There is a reason it took nearly two years to complete this exchange. One of the Stockholm Agreement’s many flaws is that it linked the prisoner exchange issue to broader peace negotiations. This politicized the prisoner exchange process and jeopardized local mediation efforts that had already proven effective.

Since the beginning of the Saudi-led military coalition’s involvement in the war in 2015, thousands of prisoners have been exchanged as a result of local mediation conducted by tribal leaders, community leaders, lawyers, military leaders, ordinary tribesmen and even local NGOs.

“The job of prisoner exchange is a humanitarian one. The UN envoy’s work is focused on political and military matters. Linking the prisoner exchange to the envoy’s negotiations made prisoner exchange subject to negotiations on political and military issues,” Rajeh Balleim, a local tribal mediator in Marib, told me.

The “all prisoners for all prisoners” rule outlined in the Stockholm Agreement was both highly ambitious and highly impractical. The implementation mechanism stipulated that both parties present lists of names and information for all of the 16,000 prisoners, detainees, missing persons, arbitrarily detained, and forcibly disappeared persons within one week, and for the exchange of all the prisoners to take place within 40 days of signing the agreement.[31] This proved extremely challenging, not only from a technical perspective, but also in terms of parties’ willingness to follow through on their commitment to implement the swap.

Negotiations frequently stalled over individual names with, for example, one party wanting a name included on the list but the other party denying that person existed. This became an excuse for parties to refuse releasing any prisoners.[32]

Sheikh Naji Murait, a tribal leader in Al-Hayma district, Sana’a governorate, shares this frustration. Murait has led negotiations that resulted in the release of more than 2,500 prisoners since the beginning of the war, and said that his and other mediators’ efforts came to a screeching halt as a result of the Stockholm Agreement.[34]

Indeed, the drawn-out negotiations over the prisoner exchange may have actually served to incentivize the abduction of civilians in order to exchange them for fighters.

The UN Envoy should absolutely call for the release of civilian captives and pressure parties to release them unconditionally. He should then remove the prisoner exchange file from the humanitarian measures proposed in the Joint Declaration as well as from cease-fire negotiations so that the fates of these individuals are not at the mercy of progress in peace talks – by Nadwa Dawsari

https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11881 = https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/11814#YemenPrisonerExchange

(** B K P)

Yemenis Must Face the Truth About Our War of Identities

The war in Yemen, while still described as a political conflict between political factions, from the start had an underlying clash between two key identities: northern Zaidi tribes of the high plateau, historically referred to as Upper Yemen, who have dominated most of Yemen for centuries; and the Shafi’i farming communities from what was described as Lower Yemen, which served as the tax base of Zaidi rule. The time for well-meaning denials of the nature of the Yemen war as a conflict of identities has passed and we Yemenis have to face the facts to be able to deal with them.

The armed Houthi movement, Ansar Allah, despite its modern structure, ideology and regional Shia dimension, is nothing more than the most recent iteration of Northern-Tribal-Zaidi (NTZ) power. The lightning speed of its takeover of Sana’a and, indeed, of most of Yemen, was a clear indication that it was a natural heir to its predecessor, the old NTZ elites led by former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. When the Houthis pushed beyond the safe space of the north, into Marib and southern Yemen, they were quickly repelled. The traditional NTZ elites’ complicity with Houthis reveals that they thought, much in the same way as President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi did — that they could use Houthis to weaken their opponents, then absorb the group into the much larger Sana’a-based faction of that elite. By choosing to support the Houthi takeover, these elites revealed their inability to coexist with the rest of the people of Yemen on an equal basis. In a sense, they were saying to others: “Either we rule, or we destroy the unity of this country.”

In so many ways, the Islah party is the flip side of the Houthi movement. This may be a surprising statement, given the Houthis’ impressive military prowess and battlefield successes and the dismal performance of forces generally considered as part of the military arm of Islah. However, Islah is the most expressive political representation of the other large Yemeni demographic, the Shafi’i farmers of Middle Yemen, although the group’s stand against the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) in 1994 weakened its representativeness of the governorates of Aden, Lahj and Al-Dhalea.[38]

The Houthi movement openly expresses the sectarian nature of their political system. Slogans of welayah[39] and other Zaidi doctrines are splashed all over public buildings and in the streets of majority-Shafi’i cities such as Hudaydah. They couldn’t say any more clearly that they view the Shafi’i population as their subjects. In this climate of sectarian polarization, Islah became the main adversary of the Houthi movement.

Islah is also in the crosshairs of a dangerous regional power, the United Arab Emirates. The core of Islah is the Yemeni chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood, which the UAE has classified as a terrorist organization and sworn to eradicate.

Still, the UAE’s position is only the tip of the iceberg of regional and global antagonism against Islamist parties, and thus, the dilemma for Islah is that it is in a lose-lose situation. Whether the Houthis or the internationally recognized government, supported by the Saudi-led Coalition, win the war, Islah’s very survival is at risk. To exit that doomed situation, it cannot just react. It needs to be proactive.

The obvious representative of the Shafi’i subjects is a subdued Islah party. Negotiations are ongoing between Islah and the Houthis. The release of the Islah-affiliated Minister of Education Abdulrazzaq al-Ashwal by the Houthis in 2018 was the sign of the first attempt at such negotiations.

Grim as the situation appears to be, there is still one possible way out. The lines of confrontation could still be rearranged to lead to a more inclusive, participatory and progressive settlement. In 1991, Islah was formed out of a number of core General People’s Congress (GPC) leaders. Though wounded and divided, the GPC remains the party with the largest popular base in Yemen, including a sizable portion of the country’s technocratic elites. Despite its sorry state, the international community, the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the UN Security Council resolutions and common sense dictate that the GPC must play a leading role in any settlement. Notwithstanding its corrupt past, the GPC’s history of moderation is a reassurance to the region and to the world that Yemen can cease to be a regional security concern.

Islah has the choice: Either make a deal with the Houthis and hope they do not double-cross it in the future, or go back to its roots and merge with the GPC, where it can hibernate and wait out this formidable wave of antagonism. A merger of Islah with the GPC would hopefully provide enough assurance to the UAE that Islah would not act against its interests, and so the Emiratis would let it be. The GPC is a loosely organized bureaucratic party,[40] and many of its leaders were previously in Islah or the YSP, or are former Baathists or Nasserites. Islah leaders will not be alone.

This option is one possible way to end the war and give Yemenis a chance for an inclusive political settlement upon which to build a civil state – By Abdulghani Al-Iryani

https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11978 = https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/11814#WarofIdentities

(** B K P)

The Riyadh Agreement One Year On

One year on, none of these steps has been achieved. President Hadi has taken a few small steps, such as appointing Ahmed Lamlas, the STC secretary general, as governor of Aden. But Aden’s new security chief, Ahmed al-Hamidi, has not yet been able to assume his position. Hadi’s government and the STC have also agreed, in principle, to divide ministerial posts, but only a few of these have been named.

In attempting to midwife the process, Saudi Arabia has been faced with the predictable problem of which issue to deal with first: security or politics. The STC insists that a cabinet has to precede any redeployment of forces, while Hadi’s government is equally adamant that the STC must withdraw its forces from Aden and other flashpoint areas before a cabinet is formed. Neither trusts the other — or Saudi Arabia — enough to take the first step, and Saudi appeals that withdrawal and cabinet formation take place in concert have so far fallen on deaf ears.

But much like the Riyadh Agreement itself, the “mechanism to expedite” has not achieved its aims.

There are three reasons for this. First, neither Hadi’s government nor the STC has been willing to commit to a timeframe. Both sides distrust the other. Second, the formation of a new “unity” cabinet may solve little. Decision making will continue to be monopolized by Hadi, Vice President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and their inner circle regardless of how many STC officials gain seats. Third, the redeployment of STC forces does not mean that these forces will hand over their weapons or renounce their goal of complete secession. Particularly as STC leaders have consistently stated that they view the Riyadh Agreement as an interim step and not a final deal.

Still, Saudi Arabia retains the power and influence, through its economic and military power on the ground, to at least push the two sides to implement a token deal.

One year ago, the Riyadh Agreement represented the best of a series of bad options. In a very narrow sense, it succeeded in halting the military confrontation that began in August 2019. But Saudi Arabia has not been able to transform that cease-fire into lasting peace between Hadi and the STC – By Hussam Radman

https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11905 = https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/11814#TheRiyadhAgreement

(** B P)

Coercing Compliance: The Houthis and the Tribes of Northern Yemen

Yemen’s northern tribes and the Houthi movement have shared a long and tumultuous political history. The Houthis recognize the political utility of the northern tribes’ support, and Houthi leadership has engaged in significant efforts to control the tribes and manipulate their traditional frameworks for political influence. As a result, a block of Yemen’s northern tribes currently fights under Houthi control. But the loyalty of the tribes is not a given, and Houthi methods of tribal control may ultimately backfire, leaving the Houthi movement friendless in a hostile environment. In any case, this interruption in the tribally defined social fabric of northern Yemen will certainly have profound and violent consequences, and stakeholders should be aware of these changing social dynamics.

First, it is critical to understand the differences between the Houthi movement and the northern tribal groups. The Houthi movement is an armed religious movement whose ideology supports narrow rule by a particular class called the “Bani Hashim”—a group that calls itself Ahl al-Bayt, or “descendants of the Prophet’s family”. Many in the north believe the Houthi movement seeks to revive the imamate that the Yemeni revolutionaries overthrew in 1962, employing a sectarian religious mindset and often violence to achieve its goals. By contrast, the Yemeni agricultural tribes, tied together by kinship and economic interests, are seldom inclined to violence except in self-defense.

Currently, the Houthi movement controls the leadership of several tribes, the product of a long history of political manipulation. Those tribes include, Hashid, Bakil, Lahnum, Khawlan, Raymah, and other tribes where the Houthis appointed new leaders for many of these tribes and imposed them on the tribe. Therefore, the Houthis became the ones in control of the tribal scene since they have long been aware of the importance of the tribes for securing political influence in Yemen, serving as a crucial element in the failure of the Yemen’s 1948 revolution and the success of the revolutions in 1962 and 2011.

Understanding the importance of tribal support, the Houthis have pushed to disrupt the traditional tribal political system by appointing overseers from the Bani Hashim class to tribe-related positions of authority inside and outside the government. The Hashemite Houthi supervisors became the primary officials for tribal affairs, and their authority became greater than that of the tribes’ traditional leadership or that of institutional government authorities. Initial tribal support for the Houthi movement was partially a product of their alliance with former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose patronage networks allowed him to gain influence in northern Yemen.

Moreover, the Houthis chose to weaken the tribal structure’s political clout after largely failing to convincing the tribes of the Houthi ideological cause. In 2014, the Houthis appointed Daifallah Rassam of the Haydan District, a cultural and military stronghold of the Houthi movement, as head of the Houthi movement’s Tribal Cohesion Council. His appointment did not adhere to recognized tribal rules and regulations, and he was installed by force and without tribal approval.

All the while, the Houthis have adopted a policy of pitting tribes against each other and intentionally avoiding the creation and/or implementation of solutions to tribal issues, since resolving tribal disputes does not serve their interests. To implement this strategy, the Houthis entrusted tribal issues to unimportant tribal figures affiliated with them. In effect, the Houthis have ensured that there is no charismatic tribal leadership with the intelligence, statesmanship, and understanding of tribal customs necessary to solve such tribal problems through the classic methods of dialogue and arbitration. As a result, the fragmented tribes have been unable to join forces to form a united front against the Houthis.

In more direct acts of suppression, the Houthis have used excessive force to terrorize prominent tribes such as the Hashid, Bakil, Khawlan, Hamdan, and Arhab, singlehandedly fighting them one by one. This made the defeat of the tribes easy for the Houthis, who offended certain tribal leaders and blew up their homes. In addition, Houthi fighters blew up political party headquarters and local places of worship. These attacks terrorized the tribes while ultimately ensuring their passive reception of the Houthis. The Houthis were often able to co-opt pacified relations with the tribes through non-aggression pacts that allowed peace between the two parties without creating an official alliance.

In this way, the Houthis were able to divide and anger the tribes until they could be successfully militarized and exploited. – by Adel Dachila

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/coercing-compliance-houthis-tribes-northern-yemen

My comment: Interesting, but with a straight anti-Houthi bias (as generally with all publications by this US neocon think tank).

(** B H)

Subjugation of Women: The Case of Unpaid Domestic Labor

Although the patriarchal society around her treats her like a machine, devoid of thought, feelings and awareness, Asma is aware that what is happening to her is injustice and an encroachment on her rights. She believes that family members, regardless of gender, should work together to complete the various daily chores. And by doing so, they would get in touch with their humanity and their sense of cooperation, and the family would become a home for them, a safe haven away from the burdens of life. But she lives in a reality where women are treated as unpaid maids born to serve men who are taught from a young age that doing housework would weaken their manhood. This is what Asma considers to be the main problem: what children are taught by their families against what they are taught by society. For, even though she tries to treat her three boys equally to her daughters in terms of rights and duties inside and outside their home, in an effort to break the cycle of unfairness she was born into, she finds that the values of equality and cooperation she instills in her sons are challenged, ridiculed and belittled by others. Asma fears her boys would become social outcasts if they were to live according to the concepts of equality she has tried to instill in them. However, if she were to let them fully integrate in society and adopt the values and practices that result in gender inequality from cradle to grave, she fears her sons would grow up to be like the many men in her family who spend their lives waited on by the same women they scorn and subjugate.

Unfair division of labor harms women and men

The mere attempt of initiating a conversation about the possibility of women receiving help with chores from their husbands or brothers or sons is not only considered a disgraceful act but it is also seen as a questioning of the social rules that must never be debated or discussed. The issue of division of labor according to Yemen’s social norms is essential to establish men’s dominance over women and girls and to control every detail of women’s lives, including the social and economic. Questioning this authority subjects women to various forms of violence, including verbal, psychological and physical violence that the Yemeni law does not protect women from, according to gender specialist Wamidh Shaker. Society does not realize that this violence results in women being stripped of any merit beyond doing household chores, which harms not only women but also men, since building a family in this unequal way leads to women experiencing severe psychological disorders. This affects their relationships with themselves as well as with those around them, including their children, who may become a means for these mothers to vent their feelings of injustice and helplessness. In other cases, feelings of helplessness may drive these women to harm themselves and others. Following years of work as a psychologist, Dr. Najla al-Afif noted that “men themselves are not spared from this cycle of violence that gives them power on the one hand, while simultaneously and unconsciously stripping them of it”.

This system of labor division that treats women as domestic workers in forced labor is the same system that reduces men to mere wallets and sources of money, whose merit and value is determined by their income. For when men exercise their dominance over women, women in turn extort men financially and lay on them heavy economic burdens. Women take on the role of dependents, only good at cooking and cleaning in response to the unfair social roles determined by gender, according to a scholar at the University of Aden, Arwa al-Shamiri.

Recent years have shown a clear rise in Yemeni women seeking freedom, independence and equality with their male counterparts with the help of human rights organizations, and such efforts may bear fruit in the future despite the silencing of these women’s voices and the societal oppression to remove their right to life as human beings and their right to lead a healthy and dignified life free of abuse and discrimination. So can the Yemeni woman prevail? Or will she forever languish under male violence and discrimination, generation after generation? – by MunirA Al-Tayyar

https://almadaniyamag.com/2020/11/05/domestic-labor-yemen-women/

(** B P)

Yemen’s War Tests Oman’s Neutrality: Focusing on the Saudi Footprint in al-Mahra

However, the ongoing war in Yemen poses a growing challenge to Oman’s neutral foreign policy. This is due to Saudi Arabia’s ambitions in the Yemeni governorate of al-Mahra, which borders Oman. Yet, Oman’s role as a mediator is critical to ending the war in Yemen. The involvement of multiple powers, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, has made the war in Yemen a stage on which regional tensions are being violently acted out. All sides in the war are emboldened, funded, and armed by outside powers, and it may be increasingly difficult for Oman to remain neutral.

Saudi Moves and Omani Counter-Moves

Before Saudi Arabia launched its March 2015 military intervention in Yemen, Sultan Qaboos and his senior advisers repeatedly warned the most senior members of the House of Saud about the dangers involved in such an intervention.

Oman comes into play because it facilitates backchannel negotiations between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. The Omani government, under the leadership of Sultan Haitham bin Tariq al-Said, the late sultan’s cousin, recently played a pivotal role in negotiating a prisoner exchange between the Houthis and Yemen’s internationally recognized government (al-Jazeera, October 17). [2]

The Importance of Al-Mahra Governorate

Oman, which shares a rugged 183-mile border with Yemen, is keenly aware that the war in Yemen will not stay in Yemen if it continues. Oman has already dealt with thousands of displaced Yemenis moving across Oman’s borders, increased smuggling, and the expense of providing vast amounts of critical humanitarian aid. This all comes at a time when Oman faces a financial crisis induced by low oil prices, debt payments, and the global economic fallout from the responses to COVID-19.

Al-Mahra, the Yemeni governorate that shares Oman’s border, had been a bastion of stability throughout much of the war. This stability was largely due to the cohesiveness and traditions of the tribes in al-Mahra, whose territory encompasses most of the governorate. [3] The Omani authorities are well-placed to mitigate conflict in al-Mahra because they have long enjoyed good relations with tribal elites, whose territory extends into the neighboring Omani governorate of Dhofar. [4]

Control of the border with Yemen is critical to Omani security. However, controlling the long border, which traverses mountains and deserts, is challenging even with Oman’s well-trained and equipped Border Force, which is a mechanized infantry brigade. Smuggling along the border, which has been long a mainstay of the al-Mahri economy, is still rife. [5] To help control smuggling and maintain stability and security, Oman has relied on its longstanding relationships with al-Mahra’s tribal elders, many of whom are dual Yemeni-Omani citizens. Oman views al-Mahra as an important buffer between it and the chaos that has engulfed most of Yemen.

Saudi ambitions in al-Mahra now threaten the stability the governorate once enjoyed. Over the last two years, Saudi Arabia has become involved in the governorate’s tribal politics and has also established a military presence in the capital of the governorate, al-Ghaida, and allegedly in the district of Hawf (Middle East Monitor, October 1, 2018; Middle East Monitor, October 6). In addition to hard power, the Saudis have tried to exert soft power by establishing Salafist-inspired madrassas in al-Mahra. Through protests and some armed confrontations, people in al-Mahra are fighting back against what many view as a Saudi takeover of the governorate (al-Jazeera, February 18).

Saudi Arabia views al-Mahra as valuable real estate. Control of or influence in al-Mahra would allow the Saudis access to the Gulf of Aden. Saudi Arabia has long wanted to construct a pipeline through Yemen that would allow it to decrease its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. [6] The Saudis also view their military and influence operations in al-Mahra as a way of exerting pressure on Oman at a time when Oman is perceived as vulnerable due to its weak economy and the recent death of Sultan Qaboos in January. Saudi Arabia and the UAE want to force Oman out of what they view as the Iranian and Qatari orbit – by Michael Horton

https://jamestown.org/program/yemens-war-tests-omans-neutrality-focusing-on-the-saudi-footprint-in-al-mahra/

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

(** B H)

What Happens When COVID-19 Hits the World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis?

Bombed and battered by nearly six years of war, Yemen’s hospitals were struggling long before the country’s first confirmed COVID-19 case in April. The country doesn’t have enough doctors, ICU beds, ventilators, or testing to get a handle on the scope of the problem, case count, or casualties.

When Yemen’s first COVID-19 case was confirmed in April, many expected the disease to decimate the already hurting country.

Although the current case numbers and fatalities are unknown – and Yemen’s official numbers, as of publication, are 2,064 cases and 601 deaths are undoubtedly only a fraction of the real number – the virus appears to have receded in Sana’a. After a brief shutdown this summer, the city has largely returned to life and few people are wearing masks or socially distancing. Whether COVID-19 has largely run its course in Yemen, or whether this is a lull before another spike in cases, is unclear.

What is clear, at least so far, is that COVID-19 has not been the knockout blow many feared. Instead, the virus has become just one more challenge – to go along with cholera, food shortages, a lack of potable water, a cratering economy, and bombings – in a war in which most of the dead are uncounted. In Aden, a new though not yet peer-reviewed study using satellite imagery suggests that death rates in the southern port city may have doubled over the summer as a result of COVID-19.[23]

The World Health Organization has noted the sharp decline in the reported COVID-19 cases, but has blamed it on difficulty in accessing health care, underreporting by the health officials, and fear of seeking treatment, among other reasons.

Anecdotally, Sana’a’s COVID-19 peak appeared to have hit between mid-May and July, when the 16-bed ICU at Kuwait Hospital was filled to capacity. During that period, patients arriving in need of an ICU bed would be turned away, recalled a second doctor, who was a member of the hospital’s medical staff. “We would tell incoming patients that there was nothing we could do beyond the ER,” Dr. Hanan said.

In Taiz, Yemen’s second-largest city, nurses and officials noted a significant decline in the number of suspected COVID-19 cases around the same time.

While it’s too early to say the outbreak is over, the panic over COVID-19 appears to have largely vanished in much of Sana’a and Taiz. On October 29, thousands of people in Sana’a celebrated the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday by marching through the streets. Restaurants, indoor halls, and schools which were closed earlier this summer have re-opened.

The Houthis’ decision to not release public data on cases and deaths may also have been rooted in financial concerns over the impact of shutting down an already anemic economy that has been all but destroyed by the last five years of war. Add in the fact that, regardless of the numbers, the Houthis were not in a position to implement effective mitigation strategies and the “secrecy policy” appeared as the course of least resistance, while also shielding the Houthis from potential public outcry over their handling of the virus response.

Al-Moayad believes that the majority of Yemenis sickened by COVID-19 didn’t seek treatment, but he also believes that cases “have, indeed, significantly dropped to the point where you could say there are hardly any new cases.” A hospital administrator in Sana’a agrees: “While you can’t say that the outbreak is over, there’s been a decline in new cases.”

How people will respond if, as elsewhere, COVID-19 surges again this winter, is unclear – by Shuaib Almosawa

https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/11814#COVID

(A H)

Govt-controlled areas in Yemen report zero virus cases

https://www.arabnews.com/node/1759731/middle-east

(B H)

IOM Yemen COVID-19 Response Update (18 - 31 October 2020)

IOM teams continue to monitor countrywide COVID-19 movement restrictions. Two of five international airports—Aden and Seiyun—remain open for commercial and humanitarian flights. The Sana’a airport, after nearly a month of closure, is also now open for regular humanitarian flights. Fifteen sea border points and three land border points are partially open for movements, and 10 transit points in Taizz and in Al Bayda remain active to monitor public movements between southern and northern governorates. During the month of October, no Yemeni returnees from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) through the Al Wadea border entry point were recorded by IOM teams.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-covid-19-response-update-18-31-october-2020

(* B H)

Zweifel an Zahlen zu Coronainfektionen

Jemen: Offiziell hat das kriegsgebeutelte Land kaum »aktive Fälle« zu verzeichnen

Mit knapp über 2.000 registrierten Infektionen hat der Jemen die wenigsten bestätigten Fälle, doch liegt die Dunkelziffer im kriegszerstörten Land wohl um ein Vielfaches höher.

Wegen des Krieges und der daraus resultierenden katastrophalen Lage des Gesundheitssystems, der Hungersnot, der grassierenden Choleraepidemie und der großflächig zerstörten Infrastruktur warnte das WHO-Regionalbüro bereits Mitte März vor einer »Explosion der Zahlen«, sollte das Coronavirus in den Jemen gelangen. Eine Waffenruhe für humanitäre Maßnahmen, die im April zur Eindämmung des Virus vereinbart worden war, wurde umgehend von den Kriegsparteien gebrochen.

Das Land war der letzte Staat der Region, der von der Pandemie erfasst wurde. Nach der Registrierung des ersten Falls am 10. April wurden Gegenmaßnahmen ergriffen, darunter Schließungen von Cafés, Restaurants und Moscheen sowie Ausgangssperren in größeren Städten. Dennoch ließ sich die Verbreitung des Virus nicht vermeiden.

Durch statistische Aufarbeitung der Daten ermittelte die LSHTM, dass in Aden zwischen April und September 2.100 Menschen an Covid-19 verstorben sein könnten.

Damit läge die Zahl der Coronatoten einer einzigen Stadt weit über der in der offiziellen Statistik für das gesamte Land, die sich auf etwa 600 beläuft. Bereits im Mai hatte das Entwicklungshilfeportal »Devex« von Modellrechnungen der WHO berichtet, wonach sich im Jemen bis zu 93 Prozent der Bevölkerung mit dem Coronavirus infizieren könnten.

https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/389820.jemen-zweifel-an-zahlen-zu-coronainfektionen.html

(B H)

Malak’s story: A hero in the fight against coronavirus

Malak is only 12 years old. Her country, Yemen, has been devastated by civil war, by drought and food shortages, and now by the COVID-19 pandemic. Malak says:

The situation is so bad with coronavirus. A lot of people died. Many people lost their jobs. Schools are closed and we can’t study.

Malak lives with her family in Taiz, Yemen, and like all of us, she’s worried about how coronavirus will affect her family:

CARE and our partners are supporting people in 69 countries, including Yemen, to fight back against COVID-19. We’re providing hygiene kits, clean water and nutritious food to families and promoting safety and hygiene awareness to help people protect themselves against coronavirus and help communities prevent the spread of the virus.

In Yemen, CARE community health worker, Samah, taught Malak and others key tips on keeping safe.

https://www.careinternational.org.uk/stories/malaks-story-hero-fight-against-coronavirus

Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H5uksCcJtBA

cp2 Allgemein / General

(* A K P)

Interactive Map of Yemen War

https://yemen.liveuamap.com/

(A K P)

Breaking: Reports of #Saudi occupation forces leaving #Marib #Yemen to return home. Are they leaving for good or another conflict is looming? Is Saudi war about to end to deprive @JoeBiden from a card against the monarchy?

https://twitter.com/AliAlAhmed_en/status/1325955116759920643

Keep your eyes on #Yemen as #Saudi invasion is withdrawing while it keeps its hand picked @HadiPresident under lock&key & the Southern Forces are leaving #Riyadh & their alliance with Hadi. This could be to preempt @JoeBiden administration

https://twitter.com/AliAlAhmed_en/status/1325967873425223680

(A K P)

Houthis warn int'l navigation lines at risk

Militants of terrorist groups are moving from the Yemeni central governorate of Baydha to the western coast, the Houthi group said Sunday based on intelligence, warning "this poses perilous risk for the international navigation routes."

The Houthi forces are committed to the application of Stockholm pact concerning the Hodeida ceasefire, the Houthi senior negotiator at the Hodeida redeployment team told the UN Mission to Support the Hodeida Agreement (UNMHA's) vice-chairman.

The United Nations needs to assume its role and force the coalition to stop violations and warplanes and spying drones sorties in Hodeida, Ali al-Moshiki, also Houthi deputy chief of staff, added at meeting with Daniela Crosslake, according to the Sana'a-based Saba.

https://debriefer.net/en/news-21045.html

(A P)

Karman accuses Saudi Arabia, UAE and Iran of destroying Yemen

Yemeni Nobel peace prize laureate and human rights activist Tawakkol Karman on Monday accused Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates of supporting counterrevolution and arming extremist groups in countries that have seen popular uprisings for democracy.

In a speech to the NATO 2030 Youth Summit and Munich Security Conference, she said: "In my country, Yemen, there is a war which has been continuing for six years. This war is led and fueled by regional players such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran to kill the dream of the Yemeni people for building a new democratic and stable Yemen".

This war has created the world's largest humanitarian crisis, she said, criticising the failure of the international community to put an end to the disastrous war.

The Munich Security Conference chose Karman as a model of struggle for peace and an important voice for empowering women in the world.

https://debriefer.net/en/news-21054.html

(* B K P)

Yemen: Currency Retreats, Polio Returns, Fighting Persists

Seaborne trade and smuggling between Somalia and Yemen has resumed. Yemen has traditionally been the major trading partner for Somali outlaws. Kenya was OK for raiding but for doing business Yemen was the place to go. The Somalia-Yemen connection was never completely severed by the civil war that broke out in late 2014. For a few years the Arab naval blockade was very disruptive to lucrative smuggling activities. This included people smuggling (Africans headed for Saudi Arabia and points north) as well as imports of weapons and other contraband. There has been no serious Somali pirate threat (the seizure of large ships) since 2012 and the most active pirates now appear to be operating out of port towns in southeast Yemen. Iran has tried to take advantage of this by basing its smuggling efforts in northern Somalia rather than sending the smuggler boats all the way from Iranian ports.

The international naval blockade force off the Yemeni coast detected the base switch and paid more attention to smuggler boats moving between Yemen and Somalia. This traffic has been much reduced since the Yemeni civil war escalated in 2015 and the recent increase in traffic is often illegal operations. The Americans have maritime surveillance sensors that can accurately detect and track small boats. This makes it difficult for the smugglers to try and sneak across at night. The anti-smuggling efforts have reduced the volume of Iranian military supplies getting through.

Polio Priorities

Yemen was declared free of polio in 2006 and now the dreaded disease is back. A growing number of infants in rebel held areas are coming down with polio because some Shia rebels have been spreading rumors that the polio vaccination is part of a Western plot to poison young Moslems. These rumors have been discredited by nearly all Moslem clergy, but these delusions are still preached by some fringe clerics and enforced by rebel commanders who refuse to allow foreign aid groups to bring polio vaccine into rebel held areas.

Currency Collapse Continues

For the last year the Yemeni economy has suffered accelerating decline and the best measure of that is the falling value of the Yemeni rial. Currently it costs 840 rials to buy one dollar. This is down from 720 rials per dollar in July. That’s what it was in late 2018 and a lot of foreign exchange was spent to get it back under 700 rials per dollar. In early 2020 it was 623 rials per dollar but has been rising ever since. The currency collapse has been accelerated in early 2020 when the rebels banned the use of new rials issued by the government based in Aden. Enforcing the ban is seen as another money raising opportunity for the rebels. The distinctive new southern rials can be seized in the north and used by the rebels to buy things from the south.

https://www.strategypage.com/qnd/yemen/articles/20201109.aspx

(* B H K P)

Coronavirus pandemic intensifies humanitarian disaster in Yemen

Many Yemenis live far from a clinic and are left to fend for themselves if infected with the coronavirus. The virus spreads virtually unchecked. “There is hardly a family that has not been affected by the pandemic,” Stöbe reports.

Doctors Without Borders erected a specialized COVID-19 clinic whose 40 beds were immediately filled. “The mortality was very high because patients came too late,” Stöbe explained. “The average length of stay was five days—but not because people recovered, but because they died.” The clinic contends with a chronic shortage of personnel and materials. Moreover, the staff must transport oxygen bottles across residential districts devastated by war.

The high mortality rate is primarily due to the preexisting, unimaginable humanitarian catastrophe in the country from a years-long civil war and an imperialist-backed bombing campaign.

Ten million human beings are threatened by starvation, as reported this summer by the German broadcaster Tagesschau. It has been two years since the aid organization Save the Children reported that 85,000 Yemeni children had starved to death.

Other diseases—cholera, malaria, dengue fever—are taking an additional toll. Just this year over 110,000 people contracted cholera. A cholera clinic set up and operated at great personal sacrifice by Doctors Without Borders volunteers was bombed by Saudi fighter planes in the battle for the port city of Hodeidah.

The coronavirus pandemic is only accelerating the enormous catastrophe long wrought by imperialism. As a result of the war, the country is lacking not only necessary health care, but clean water for drinking and washing, sanitary systems, sufficient nutrition, shelter, as well as prospects for the future—in short, every elementary necessity for a healthy life.

The imperialist powers, especially the US, but also Germany, support the belligerence of Saudi Arabia because they consider Riyadh an important ally in their conflicts with Iran, Russia and China

https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/11/09/yeme-n09.html

(B H K P)

Lack of Resources in Yemen Due to COVID-19 and Violence

Yemen, a country bordering both Saudi Arabia and Oman is facing increased hardships with its resource distribution. Undergoing a devastating period of political instability in addition to the outbreak of COVID-19, Yemen is tasked with overcoming numerous humanitarian obstacles. However, amidst the uncertainty, nonprofit organizations have stepped up to fight the lack of resources in Yemen in times of turmoil.

https://www.borgenmagazine.com/lack-of-resources-in-yemen-due-to-covid-19-and-violence/

(B H K P)

Peace is Possible for Yemen

First, suspend arms sales. The United States has sold billions in weapons to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two of the principal parties to this conflict. This is despite clear evidence that U.S. weapons used in strikes in Yemen have killed children and other civilians. Congress has voted in a bipartisan manner to suspend arms sales and transfers to help reduce violence there, but these actions have been vetoed by the White House. As Yemen faces the threat of famine and COVID-19, now is the moment to redouble efforts. The U.S. Government should suspend weapons sales and transfers to any party to the conflict in Yemen, as long as a substantial risk remains that such arms could be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law. It should encourage allies to do the same.

Second, end the aid suspension. Humanitarian and development programs help babies who are dying of painful malnutrition, allow children to attend school, prevent health system collapse, and provide sanitation and hygiene services in a country where nearly 70% of people do not have access to clean water. However, reduced funding jeopardizes these critical programs.

Lastly, press for peace

https://www.savethechildren.org/us/what-we-do/election/peace-is-possible-for-yemen

(* B K P)

Film: The War in Yemen: An Update

Presented by CIPS and the National Security Policy Network

The poorest country in the Arab world, Yemen has been devastated by war, violence, corruption and mismanagement. Yemen went through the emergence of the Houthi insurgency, the revival of southern separatism, and the emergence of a strong local Al Qaeda franchise in the 2000s. After the uprisings sweeping through the region reached Yemen in 2011, there was a brief moment of hope; this was rapidly eclipsed, however, by the collapse of the national dialogue process, the onset of civil war, and the Saudi-led intervention.

This virtual panel will provide an opportunity to take stock of this complex situation in Yemen.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RX4yg1eufvc

(* B K P)

YEMEN: CIVIL WAR, JIHADISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM

The Yemeni civil war, which began in 2015, has led to a strong fragmentation of central power and security forces, with the emergence or expansion of local authorities, para-state militias and Islamist terrorist groups.
Over the years, a multiplicity of interconnected local conflicts have developed that involve regional and international powers. The main actors involved in these conflicts are the Ḥouthī, the internationally recognized government, with the support of the Saudi-led coalition, the secessionists of the STC, supported by numerous local militias, and the terrorist groups of AQAP and ISY.
The report, after describing the Yemeni context and the complex situation of the civil war and the actors involved, analyzes in depth the jihadist organizations present in Yemen and their operations, attempts to analyze the counter-terrorism measures and the problems related to the scope of security and provides conclusive forecast analyzes.

https://www.analyticaintelligenceandsecurity.it/ricerca-e-analisi/yemen-guerra-civile-jihadismo-e-counter-terrorism

(* B P)

The Conversation

Q&A with Anna Karin Eneström, Swedish Ambassador to the UN

Ambassador Eneström: I think we see as the conflict goes on that it is getting more complex. It’s getting more fragmented. It’s more difficult to get Yemen on the right track. We are seeing the institutions being weakened. But I think there were some positive signs when it comes to dialogue and de-escalation. We saw some stabilization in the south with the Riyadh Agreement. Unfortunately, we see that this is backtracking now. That’s one of the reasons why we see it as acute right now from the political point of view. We also saw that the UN Secretary General called for a humanitarian cease-fire in Yemen, as in other conflicts, and we have not really seen any results from that. So, that is on the political side, and on the humanitarian side, it’s looking really bad right now. It’s not only the humanitarian situation on the ground, but also the fact that the humanitarian appeal is funded I think around 40 percent and this is really worrying. I come from a huge humanitarian donor. We are trying to do everything we can to get more funds into the humanitarian situation.

We strongly feel that the support to the UN special envoy is more important than ever. This is not the right time to change the strategy of the UN. What we can do is support the UN system but also do whatever we can as the international community to push the parties, because the responsibility is actually on the parties. Then of course, eventually I think it is important that the UN get a broader mandate as we go, hopefully, into a more consolidated process when it comes to peace and stability and building peace, which we of course hope we will end up in. Then you will need a more comprehensive mandate for the UN to act on the ground.

I think it is extremely important for us and for others in the international community to keep Yemen high up on the agenda, both on the political agenda and on the humanitarian agenda.

https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11970 = https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/11814#QandA

(* B K P)

Prisoner Exchange in Yemen is Welcome but Insufficient to End War

Yemenis want to live in peace, not just see prisoners being exchanged. Although the prisoner swap raises hope that the warring sides are inclined to overcome mistrust and restart more substantive negotiations toward a lasting peace, whether this will end the long war and suffering of the Yemeni people is still questionable.

While the swap is certainly a positive move, much more work still needs to be done for peace to prevail. Clashes will continue until a ceasefire is in place, which means that the daily suffering of Yemenis will remain, and likely deteriorate further, especially with the coronavirus outbreak battering the most vulnerable and the country’s economy.

In the six-year-old Yemeni war, all the warring parties share responsibility for the situation that Yemenis live in today.

It could be argued that if countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, or Iran had not become involved, the situation would not have worsened to this extent. Their involvement has only further complicated the war. The same argument applies to Western governments selling arms to the Saudi-UAE-led coalition. These governments’ unconditional support to Saudi Arabia and the UAE seems to have led Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to act irresponsibly without being concerned about any potential consequences. This is because such governments have been putting their interests ahead of their values.

The Military Solution Has ‘Failed’

History has taught Yemen that foreign interventions are not a determining factor in creating a win for any of the warring parties.

It is evident now more than ever that the current conflict in Yemen has no military solution. Despite the Saudis spending billions of dollars on this war, they have still failed to defeat the Houthi rebels, who even managed to improve their military position.

Only a political solution has any chance to settle the conflict now forcing Yemenis to live through the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. The warring parties should put their country and its future first and start the necessary dialogue. They can build on the achievement of this recent exchange of prisoners, but it remains to be seen whether they will be able to take a step that actually gives Yemenis hope.

https://insidearabia.com/prisoner-exchange-in-yemen-is-welcome-but-insufficient-to-end-war/

(B P)

A disaster is waiting to happen on the Yemeni coast

The UN, the Yemeni government and international experts have warned about the potential for catastrophe for years, but the Houthis refuse to put the interests of Yemeni people above their own short-termed gains. Every day that the Safer continues to be at sea in its present condition, the risk of a man-made disaster increases. The Houthis must not be allowed to destroy Yemen’s coast. The oil on the tanker must be offloaded, and the ship decommissioned, even if the parties to the country’s conflict have yet to reach a consensus.

https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/editorial/a-disaster-is-waiting-to-happen-on-the-yemeni-coast-1.1105777

My remark: From UAE, with anti-Houthi bias.

(A P)

Released journalist transferred to hospital

One of the recently released journalists, Hesham Tarmoom was transferred on Wednesday to the hospital following his health deterioration due to chronic diseases he contracted while in the Houthis-run detention for over five years.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-43064

(A P)

Houthis using detained journalists as leverage, [Hadi] government says

Information minister in Yemen's internationally recognised government Muammar Al-Eryani on Tuesday accused the Houthi group of using the detained journalists who it lately sentenced to death as political leverage.

https://debriefer.net/en/news-20931.html

(A P)

30 lawyers, rights activists form coalition to defend journalists in Yemen

More than 30 Yemeni lawyers and human rights activists have formed a new coalition aimed at defending journalists persecuted for carrying out their work across Yemen.

The Media Freedoms Observatory in Yemen said in a statement yesterday that the “lawyers in defence of journalists” coalition aims to defend Yemeni journalists who are arrested, interrogated or tried in connection with their journalistic work as well as provide legal advice and training for them.

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201104-30-lawyers-rights-activists-form-coalition-to-defend-journalists-in-yemen/

(* B P)

[from 2019] YEMEN AT THE BEGINNING OF 21ST CENTURY: A VERY POOR AND STILL AN “ATTRACTIVE” COUNTRY FOR THE INTERESTS OF RELEVANT POWERS IN THE REGION

In order to understand why Yemen is perceived and labeled today as the opposite of theYemen during the well-known trade Kingdoms from the ancient times, especially the Sabaeanone, a short glance in its history and its topography, as well as demography, will help but notanswer to what happens today. For a researcher to come closer to the reality of today’s Yemen, first of all he/she must take into account that this state has always been a place where interestsof different types of actors met; the next aspect that should not be missed is that the separation de facto and de jure of the two main regions/states, each of them with specific characteristics. Also, from a religious perspective, it must be remembered that Yemen remained divided between the Shi’a Zaydi school in the north and Shafi’i, most common Sunni school in thesouth and along the coast.

Last but not less important, the interference and interests of the great powers with regard to at least the geo-strategic position of this country shouldn’t be forgotten, and that due to its history, where the legitimacy of a single government throughout the territory has proven itself over time an utopia, Yemen seems to be a good place for some state and non-state actors toexperience scenarios, but not only.

https://www.academia.edu/40960645/YEMEN_AT_THE_BEGINNING_OF_21ST_CENTURY_A_VERY_POOR_AND_STILL_AN_ATTRACTIVE_COUNTRY_FOR_THE_INTERESTS_OF_RELEVANT_POWERS_IN_THE_REGION

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

(A K P)

Three oil tankers dock at Hodeida seaport

Thee ships carrying oil derivatives docked on Monday at Hodeida seaport, said the executive director of Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC).

Ammar al-Adrai said that the ships have been seized by the Saudi-led aggression coalition for periods ranged between 85 - 220 days with a delay fines estimated at $11.3 million (40 percent of the shipments' cost).

Two of the ships are carrying 59,624 tons of gasoline and a ship carrying 29,690 tons of diesel, YPC spokesman Esam al-Motawakel said.

https://www.saba.ye/en/news3115599.htm

and also https://hodhodyemennews.net/2020/11/10/three-petroleum-vessels-finally-make-port-in-yemen-after-months-of-illegal-saudi-detention/

(B K P)

Saudi block food and fuel entry into #Yemen

Infographic

https://twitter.com/AishaJumaan/status/1324481989408292864

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

Siehe / Look at cp1

(A H)

SMEPS: In light of our protection of #Human_Capital during theongoing conflict in #Yemen, we continue building a school for girls in the Sharaf Bilad Alraimi village, Otoma #Dhamar.

https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1325866677775585283

(B H)

[Sanaa gov.] Minister of Health #Taha Al-Mutawakl : confirms the death of a mother and six newborns every two hours, and the equivalent of 340 children per day in #Yemen, due of the catastrophic humanitarian situation Yemen is experiencing as a result of the aggression & blockade

https://twitter.com/ghalebalsudmy/status/1325940081056755712

(B H)

RDP | WASH Success Story | Nov 2020 | Yemen

By Rehabilitating Three Water Schemes, Safe Drinking Water Becomes Easily Accessible to 25,226 Individuals in Khayran Al Muharraq and Al-Qafr Districts of Hajjah and Ibb Governorates.

In September 2020, RDP successfully completed the rehabilitation of three water schemes which included the construction of two main water tanks of 100 cubic meters/each, two pumping rooms, rehabilitation of three collective water tanks, construction of 25 water distribution points, and installation of solar panel systems with a total capacity of 108.58 kW. 19,514 beneficiaries in Khayran Al Muharraq district and 5,752 BNFs in Al-Qafr district have directly benefited from the WASH response project taken place in the targeted districts of Ibb and Hajjah governorates. Thanks for the generous contribution and continuous support of YHF which helped thousands of people get adequate access to safe drinking water and no longer have to cut across long mountainous roads to get jerry cans filled with unsafe water. Two wells have also been protected and safe with no more animal faeces surrounded. Most of all, provision of clean water helped minimize the spread of infectious diseases such as cholera

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/rdp-wash-success-story-nov-2020-yemen

(B H)

Over 12,000 internally displaced people supported with housing and sanitation in Yemen with funding from Japan

More than 12,300 people were supported by UN-Habitat’s project for internally displaced people (IDPs) in Al-Hudaydah Governorate in Yemen thanks to funding from the Government of Japan.

The project focused on female headed households supporting over 1,000 people with the rehabilitation of 148 housing units while the construction of 63 public pit latrines in IDP sites in Al Khawkha and Al Tuhayta supported 1,700 people.

In addition over 6,600 people were educated on COVID-19 and 3,000 received hygiene kits.

https://unhabitat.org/over-12000-internally-displaced-people-supported-with-housing-and-sanitation-in-yemen-with-funding

(B H)

#Yemen conflict is most impacting the forgetten communities like Thi-Esara, Majz, #Saada. So SFD pitches a multiple support (rain harvesting tanks+land rehab.+labor wage) to produce food & water and address the vulnerabilities that they are reeling with. (photos)

https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1325483381925310466

https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1325477130432606210

(A H)

Film: Where 80% of the population are currently in need of humanitarian assistance - A huge #thankyou to @karmagawa and @timothysykes for providing shelter to displaced families in the midst of this crisis.

Help us do more: https://give.partners.ngo #Yemen @monarelief

https://twitter.com/PartnersRelief/status/1325431541342695424

(A H)

Based on a fund sent by Partners Relief and Development @monarelief's team in Hodeidah governorate in western #Yemen was able to deliver school backpacks to 100 orphan students. Our project will target 1000 students in Sana'a and Hodeidah..

@monareliefye (photos)

https://twitter.com/monarelief/status/1325531856100614149

(B H)

A total lack of accessible road had forced the villagers to count the COFFIN as a lifesaving tool to help their patients seek life. This also summerized how mobility & livelihoods of 15K ppl behind this mountain looked like before our intervention in Majrana, WisabAl-Aali #Dhamar (photos)

https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1325134923439738881

https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1324945529856548865

https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1324391079278448642

https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1324387332250869771

(A H)

@monarelief's team in Sana'a provided today 150 orphan girl students with all supplies (school backpacks, uniforms, scarf, shoes and notebooks, etc.) to encourage them to continue studying. The project was funded by Partners Relief and Development.

https://twitter.com/monarelief/status/1324110439064764416

(B H)

UNO warnt vor Hungersnot in verschiedenen Teilen der Welt

Die UNO hat vor möglicher Hungersnot im Jemen, im Südsudan, in Burkina Faso und im Nordosten Nigerias gewarnt.

Die Menschen, die in diesen vier Gebieten leben, "sind mit einer schweren Hungersituation konfrontiert", hieß es im Bericht der FAO und des WFP.

"Wir befinden uns an einem katastrophalen Wendepunkt", sagte die WFP-Direktorin für Nothilfe Margot van der Velden. Wenn eine Hungersnot deklariert werde, bedeute das, dass viele Menschen bereits ihr Leben verloren hätten.

https://parstoday.com/de/news/world-i54377-uno_warnt_vor_hungersnot_in_verschiedenen_teilen_der_welt

(B H)

UN: 4 countries face acute hunger, famine

Burkina Faso, Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen are seriously expected to “soon slip into famine” if conditions there undergo any more deterioration in coming months, the World Food Program (WFP) said on Friday, Anadolu Agency reports.

Citing a new report released by the Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) and the WFP, the latter warned the four countries face acute food insecurity.

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201106-un-4-countries-face-acute-hunger-famine/

(B H)

Arduous Journey of Cancer Patients in Taiz City

Day by day, Ahmed’s health has worsened until his sound began to disappear and he has difficulty speaking. With a tone full of sadness and pain, he laments his poor living conditions and his destitute family. Like most patients’ families in Taiz, his family cannot afford the cost of cancer treatment and transportation as the center is far from their villages.

Approximately 35,000 Yemenis currently have cancer, and more than 11,000 are newly diagnosed with the disease every year. In 2016, many cancer clinics closed due to a lack of staff, medicine, and equipment, creating long waiting times and forcing people to travel many miles for vital treatment. As a result, thousands face a death sentence through a lack of access to medical care, according to the World Health Organization.

http://belqeesrights.org/2020/11/05/arduous-journey-of-cancer-patients-in-taiz-city/

(B H P)

USAID: Yemen - Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #12, Fiscal Year (FY) 2020

Sana’a International Airport (SIA) closure impedes humanitarian staff movement and the importation of relief commodities.

Fuel shortages and price increases constrain humanitarian operations and raise prices of locally produced food.

USAID/BHA supports WFP to provide emergency food assistance to approximately 8.2 million people during September distribution cycle.

Escalated conflict in Marib Governorate displaces nearly 11,000 households between early January and late September, including more than 2,000 households since mid-August.

USAID/BHA supports WFP to provide emergency food assistance to approximately 8.2 million people during September distribution cycle.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-complex-emergency-fact-sheet-12-fiscal-year-fy-2020

https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-usg-response-complex-emergency-last-updated-093020

(B H)

SFD Yemen: We regard mobilizing the #development_value in times of war a shortcut driving to the #achievement_communities and the growth of socio-economic progress that allow more firm survival in the face of the humanitarian crisis and shocks in #Yemen. Do you know another easier shortcut? (photos)

https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1324391079278448642

https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1324387332250869771

(A H)

Our partners @monarelief have been on more difficult roads in #Yemen today to deliver 500 food parcels funded by @karmagawa. In Yemen 80% of the population require humanitarian assistance. Many on the brink of starvation as access to food diminishes every day across the country. (photos)

https://twitter.com/PartnersRelief/status/1324931622274134016

@monarelief's team headed by @Fatikr has just arrived in Sana'a after a 2-day food aid distribution in Seham area of Sana'a governorate where 500 families received food supplies provided by Partners Relief and Development and Karmagawa. (photos)

https://twitter.com/monarelief/status/1324473969039319040

(B H)

Rapid City and Neighborhood Profiling in Yemen – Laying the ground for a better informed and coordinated urban recovery in Yemeni Cities

UN-Habitat organized a High-Level virtual meeting to celebrate the closure of “Rapid City and Neighborhood Profiling” project. Funded by the European Union, and in partnership with Yemeni Government, the project aimed at supporting and improving the humanitarian and recovery response through providing better urban information and analysis. The result of the project was the production of seven city profiles with urban recovery plans that were verified and discussed with local government representatives from each city.

Erfan Ali, UN-Habitat Regional Representative for Arab States welcomed the attendees by saying “Yemen needs to go through a recovery process, and this needs to be done with a focus on re-building cities and towns to be safer, more inclusive, resilient and sustainable. Humanitarian assistance, development work and peacebuilding are not a serial process and are all needed at the same time, and are needed now in Yemen. We strongly believe that the urban profiling and spatial data portal can be the strong basis to formulate the urban recovery framework for Yemen’s sustainable future.”

https://unhabitat.org/rapid-city-and-neighborhood-profiling-in-yemen-%E2%80%93-laying-the-ground-for-a-better-informed-and

Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q11q4eYpZMI

(* B E H)

Yemen Socio-Economic Update, Issue 51 - August 2020

In this edition:

I: The Social and Economic Cost of War and Conflict (Estimated Damage and Losses)

II: Social Recovery

III: Economic Recovery

IV: Priorities for the Recovery and Reconstruction of Infrastructure Sectors V: Institutional and Social Peace Building

Editorial

Economic recovery, reconstruction, and reaching a sustainable peace in Yemen remains a major issue requiring a great deal of attention, reflection and early preparedness as part of the government agenda. It constitutes a key focus area within the interventions by Yemen’s regional and international partners, which should not wait nor it be delayed given its direct impact on the lives of communities, their future survival, livelihoods and economies, as well as the future of Yemen whole, both land and people. This involves levelling and configuring the public environment with all its economic, social, security and political dimensions. In addition to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure damages caused by years of war and conflict as well as the community assets, foundations of assembly co-existence, resume the development drive and create a safe and conducive environment for economic growth, jobs generation, better standards of living and incomes and HR development. Given the lean years that the country has been through, this process needs also to help in addressing challenges, difficulties, bottlenecks and deep scars in the fabric of the Yemeni society and its infrastructure, institutional and human wise. It is a holistic reform and reconstruction process involving the different components of the society, including government bodies, private sector institutions and civil society organizations, together with regional and international partners. Although these steps are important at this stage, they are just basic in formulating a comprehensive reconstruction and development agenda, should a sustainable peace accord be reached to: 1) end the state of fragmentation and conflict, 2) propel the country forward into the path of a normal life full of hope, aspiration and accomplishment, 3) reset the course for Yemen’s reintegration into its regional and international surroundings and affectively lay the foundations for stability and development. This YSEU issue sheds some light on this topic and calls for those concerned and interested to reflect on, think, debate and share ideas and visions to this end. Note: The perceived and hoped-for role of the private sector in the economic recovery and reconstruction phase is quite important. Hence, this role can only be optimized by means of true partnership with the private sector. Therefore, issue (53) will be dedicated to the topic of PPP, including a thorough coverage of such perceived role.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-socio-economic-update-issue-51-august-2020-enar

(* B H)

Yemen Protection Brief, October 2020

For more than five years, Yemen has been locked in an unrelenting, high-intensity conflict that has triggered what the UN describes as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world; with 24.3 million people in need of humanitarian assistance and protection. Since its escalation in 2015, an estimated 12,000 civilians have been killed and more than 3.6 million are estimated to be forcibly displaced. Active ground hostilities, coupled by shelling and air strikes, otien in populated areas, continue to harm civilians and cause widespread damage to civilian homes and infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, IDP sites and water and sanitation facilities.
Explosive remnants of war persist to impede freedom of movement as well as to kill and injure civilians.
Yemen is also a country prone to disasters, particularly hydrological hazards such as flash flooding, which are causing death, displacement and destruction of property. It is estimated that, since January 2020, more than half a million people have been affected by floods and heavy rains, including 300,000 in June, July and August, mostly in Marib, Taiz, Al Hudaydah,
Hajjah, Aden, Lahj and Aden governorates4. Affected families have lost their homes, crops and personal belongings.5 Outbreaks of diseases including dengue fever and cholera have also contributed to the ongoing humanitarian crisis, with a severe impact on vulnerable groups.
The rapid spread of COVID-19 in Yemen, with one of the highest fatality rates in the region,6 cannot be effectively contained due to an overstrained health system, already crippled by conflict, coupled with a lack of public health measures and awareness.
State institutions have largely collapsed due to the conflict and its resulting impacts including the inability of authorities to remunerate civil servants

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-protection-brief-october-2020

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

(B H)

Yemenis accuse Saudi of preventing them to return homes

Nearly 6 years since the Saudi regime launched fresh airstrikes on Yemen particularly on borders between Yemen and Saudi Arabia forcing desperate families to flee with no respect for neighborhood or Islamic roles and norms.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Haradh District off Jizan Region have fled into Abs district living in desperate conditions amid high temperatures.

Abs camp is nearly 20 KM southern Jizan City. One father said nearly 450 families are living in the camp.

IDPs have accused the Saudi king Salman Bin Abdul-Aziz of targeting their homes and properties on behalf of the Americans.

Families said they are desperate to return home and farms but the ongoing Saudi war is preventing them.

They called the international community to pressure the Saudi regime to stop the war on civilians and allow them to return home (photos)

https://iranpress.com/content/29566

(* B H)

Yemen: MSF resumes outreach activities for displaced people in Abs district

Teams from Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) have recently managed to restart medical activities for displaced people in Yemen’s Abs district. COVID-19 had forced mobile clinics to suspend their activities, leaving thousands of families with even fewer possibilities for accessing basic healthcare. In parallel, MSF staff in Abs hospital are now seeing an increase in arrivals after a period during which fear of infection kept many people away from health facilities. This delayed treatment for people requiring medical attention, notably children with severe malnutrition.

It’s late September but the temperature at 8.30 am has almost reached 40°C and the hot, humid air makes breathing difficult. Families in Khudish camp, one of the most populated in the area ─ around 10,000 people according to official figures ─ see MSF vehicles approaching and know that, for the first time in months, a mobile clinic will be available to them. They start gathering in the usual location and children run because they know that in one of the cars, there is a large water carrier. And what they need right now is cold water.

“Finding clean water is one of the main challenges in these camps and people often search for it in wells, where it isn’t drinkable,” says Tareq Farhan, MSF’s medical manager. “We see many cases of diarrhoea that are due to contaminated well water.”

Mobile clinic teams also treat numerous people with skin diseases resulting from the lack of clean water and hygiene kits.

Abs district in Hajjah governorate hosts around 150,000 displaced people who had to leave their homes because of the five-year-long war ravaging their country.

https://www.msf-me.org/article/yemen-msf-resumes-outreach-activities-displaced-people-abs-district

(B H)

IOM Yemen | Rapid Displacement Tracking (RDT) - Reporting Period: 01 - 07 Nov 2020

01 January 2020- 7 November 2020, IOM Yemen DTM estimates that 26,631 Households (159,786 Individuals) have experienced displacement, at least once.

Since the beginning of 2020, DTM also identified other **1,298 **previously displaced households who left the displaced location and moved to either their place of origin or some other displaced location.

Between the 01 November 2020 and 07 November 2020, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 241 Households (1,446 individuals) displaced at least once, the highest number of displacements were seen in:

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-rapid-displacement-tracking-rdt-reporting-period-01-07-nov-2020

(B H)

Flow Monitoring Points | Migrant Arrivals and Yemeni Returns in October 2020

IOM Yemen DTM estimates that 1,038 migrants entered Yemen. Currently, IOM Yemen DTM does not have access to Manfath Alwadeeah FMP and therefore cannot report on Yemeni returnees. Since the beginning of 2020 until 31 October 2020, an estimated 34,160 migrants arrived to Yemen, and 13,895 Yemenis returned from KSA, while another 266 Yemenis returned from the Horn of Africa.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/flow-monitoring-points-migrant-arrivals-and-yemeni-returns-october-2020-enar

(* B H)

IOM Yemen Crisis Response Plan 2020

Funding Required $155,000,000

People In Need 24,000,000

Target Beneficiaries 5,329,483

IOM Vision

In 2020, IOM will address the immediate humanitarian and recovery needs of internally displaced persons, migrants and host communities, and will work to build the capacity of the relevant authorities, allowing for a more sustainable response. IOM’s approach will be comprehensive, community-based and multisectoral, focusing on governorates where needs are most acute and where IOM’s added value is the highest.

With all activities grounded in the centrality of protection, IOM’s three strategic priorities in Yemen are:

To meet the life-saving needs of individuals and communities through the provision of frontline multisectoral assistance;

To enhance the resilience of individuals and communities through the restoration of basic services and infrastructure, improved access to income-generation, socioeconomic integration and capacity building opportunities at the community level;

To promote community stability by addressing the drivers of conflict at the local level

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-crisis-response-plan-2020

(B H)

Film: A Houthi shell kills a child, traps two others, and destroys their home

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P6dexg1q_bw

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

Siehe / Look at cp1, cp13c

(A P)

Houthis continue detaining veteran Yemeni politician

The family to the Yemeni enforced disappeared politician Mohamed Qahatn demanded again on Sunday his release from the Houthis-run prison.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-43122

(A P)

GPC Leader Accuses Houthis of storming and seizing his home in Sana’a

Assistant Secretary-General of General People’s Congress (GPC), Yaser Al Awadhi, has accused the Iran-linked Houthi militia of storming and seizing his house in the rebel-held capital Sana’a.

https://republicanyemen.net/archives/26129

(A K P)

5 of Armed Forces martyrs funeral in Sana'a

Sanaa funeral on Monday in a funeral procession the bodies of a number of the armed forces homeland martyrs' who were martyred while performing their duty in the battle of defending the homeland on a number of fronts.

During the funeral ceremonies, the mourners praised the brave positions of the army and the popular committees in confronting the aggressors and invaders.

https://www.saba.ye/en/news3115578.htm

(A P)

Progress in Sana'a International Airport projects inspected

https://www.saba.ye/en/news3115520.htm

(A P)

Premier erörtert mit dem iranischen Botschafter die Kooperationsbeziehungen zwischen den beiden Ländern

https://www.saba.ye/de/news3115562.htm

(A P)

Yemen: Houthi officials meet Iran's new envoy in Sanaa

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201109-yemen-houthi-officials-meet-irans-new-envoy-in-sanaa/

and https://www.saba.ye/en/news3115477.htm

(A P)

Houthi militia illegally sentences civilian kidnapper to death

The Houthi militia militia in Sanaa on Sunday sentenced to death, the kidnapper Hadi Abdo Jaber Rajeh Al-Muslamani, who has been in prison for four years, said Abdul Majid Sabra, lawyer for the abductees in the prisons of the militia.

Houthi militia’s trial against Al-Muslamani took place illegally and without a defense lawyer, he added.

http://en.26sepnews.net/2020/11/09/houthi-militia-illegally-sentences-civilian-kidnapper-to-death/

(A P)

Iran envoy reviews humanitarian crisis with Yemeni political councilman

Iran’s Ambassador Hassan Irlou in San'a on Monday held talks with a member of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council Sultan Alsamei on humanitarian crisis in Yemen and ways to strengthen ties between the two countries.

Thanking Iran for its stances to call for an end to Saudi-led coalition indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas and inhumane blockade on Yemen, Sultan Alsamei, said people of Yemen are appreciative to Iran for its humanitarian assistance.

Alsamei said that due to good relations between Tehran and San'a, the Supreme Political Council and the Government of Yemen will provide the necessary facilities for the Iranian ambassador to carry out his diplomatic mission.

Irlou said in the meeting that Iran will spare no efforts to help put an end to the sufferings of the people of Yemen and for sustainable peace.

https://en.irna.ir/news/84103868/Iran-envoy-reviews-humanitarian-crisis-with-Yemeni-political

(A P)

Plea to rescue 40 Indians held hostage by Houthis

The Indian Supreme Court has sought the government’s response on an urgent plea from a 33-year-old Tirunelveli resident to rescue her husband and other Indian workers held “captive” by Houthi rebels in Yemen, the Madras-based daily newspaper The Hindu reported.
The petition said the lives of 40 Indians, including Ms. Velmathi’s husband, were in danger, adding these Indian had a right to life.
She said the Indian are trapped or “entangled” with inadequate facilities and infrastructure while “inching closer to death”.

http://en.adenpress.news/news/30485

and also https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/plea-to-rescue-indians-held-hostage-in-yemen/article33049505.ece

(A P)

Houthis wait aggression ceases after Trump's craziness ended

The Houthi group on Saturday expressed, indirectly, relief for Donald Trump's loss in the US president election 2020.
In remarks on the race, Houthi leading officials rejoiced at the misfortune of countries that normalized with Israel, particularly the UAE and Bahrain, or received criticism from Biden during his campaign.
"Trump's craziness ended," Houthi negotiator Abdul Malik al-Ajri tweeted, waiting for "the aggression on Yemen to end."
Last Friday, the same Houthi official wrote: "Trump won't dare to stay in the White House. He will leave accompanied by his dog... It's the US, not Saudi Arabia.

https://debriefer.net/en/news-21023.html

(A P)

Yemen's Houthis reject results of their own parliamentary elections

Yemen's Houthi rebels have rejected parliamentary election results in the capital after an official that is not affiliated with the group was elected as deputy speaker.

The rebels had hopes for their candidate Abdulsalam Hashal to win the election, but were shocked to find Abdo Bishr had received three more votes, with a total of 93.

The rebels refused to announce the results of the election and requested the news not be reported on local media, a source told Yemen Monitor.

As a result, the rebels called for the arrest of Bishr.

In 2019, the Houthis held elections to fill the 31 vacant seats in parliament, all of which were awarded to members of the group.

https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/11/8/yemens-houthis-reject-results-of-their-own-parliamentary-elections

My comment: Lol. Democracy, Houthi style.

(A P)

Security forces arrest men accused of promoting illegal currency

The Wahda Police Station in the Yemeni Capital arrested a 33 years old man accused of promoting illegal currency, which was printed by the Saudi-UAE aggression with the aim of harming the national economy.

The police station reported finding in his possession 267,000 riyals of illegal currency.

The Police in Ibb governorate arrested a criminal for trying to bypass, with his car, one of the security points, as he was possessing 250 thousand riyals of the illegal currency that is prohibited to be used.

Meanwhile, Ibb Police seized another person, 25 years old, who was carrying 112 thousand and 900 riyals of illegal currency.

In addition, the emergency forces branch in Al-Mansouriya district in Hodeidah governorate, captured two men having 100,000 riyals of the prohibited currency.

http://en.ypagency.net/197125/

(A P)

Film: #Houthi group stormed the wedding party of the YouTuber Mustafa al-Moumari using military patrols and took him by force, cancelling the wedding ceremony.

https://twitter.com/BelqeesRights/status/1325491271608139776

and

(A P)

Mohammed al-Houthi congratulates Youtube personality Mustafa Almawmary on occasion of his wedding

Mohammed Al-Houthi said in a tweet: “We congratulate Mustafa Almawmary for his beautiful wedding and send congratulations to him and to every groom in Yemen.”

https://hodhodyemennews.net/2020/11/07/mohammed-al-houthi-congratulates-youtube-personality-mustafa-almawmary-on-occasion-of-his-wedding/

(A P)

Houthis turn Sanaa University into place to spread extremist thoughts, says [Hadi] Gov't

The Yemeni government on Sunday accused the Houthi group of turning Sanaa University into a place to brainwash the young people and spread extremist thoughts.
Information minister, Muammar Al-Eryani, wrote on Twitter: "These manifestations which are foreign to the culture and identity of our people again prove the Iranian subversive role and that the Houthism is just an instrument to consolidate the Persian influence and hegemony in Yemen".

https://debriefer.net/en/news-21034.html

and

(A P)

A batch of students graduating from college of languages " Persian language" named ( Qassim Sulaimani ) in Sanaa (film)

https://twitter.com/hussamA123/status/1325376969719115777

Last week Houthis eliminated French studies from Sanaa University. This week, they celebrated the graduation of a group in Persian language they named the “Qasem Soleimani” batch!

https://twitter.com/Ndawsari/status/1325471974257287175

(A P)

Sana'a Warns UAE of Danger of Continued Colonization of Yemen's Socotra Island

https://english.almasirah.net/post/16071/Sana-a-Warns-UAE-of-Danger-of-Continued-Colonization-of-Yemen-s-Socotra-Island

(A P)

Ansarullah: Saudisches Beharren auf Jemen-Krieg ist ebenso zwecklos wie Trumps Machtdemonstration

Ein hochrangiger jemenitischer Beamter hat Saudi-Arabien gewarnt, dass sein Bestehen auf der Fortsetzung der militärischen Aggression gegen seinen südlichen Nachbarn keine Ergebnisse bringen wird, genau wie die vergebliche Machtdemonstration von US-Präsident Donald Trump bei den Wahlen 2020.

Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, Vorsitzender des Obersten Revolutionskomitees des Jemen, machte die Bemerkungen in einem Beitrag auf seinem Twitter-Account am Sonntag, einen Tag nachdem Joe Biden Trump besiegt hatte, um der 46. Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten zu werden.

Houthi sagte, Interaktion mit dem Jemen durch die Aufhebung der saudischen Belagerung und Beendigung des Krieges sei das Tor zu wirklichem Frieden, was Sana'a seit Beginn der Aggression immer betont hat.

https://parstoday.com/de/news/middle_east-i54394-ansarullah_saudisches_beharren_auf_jemen_krieg_ist_ebenso_zwecklos_wie_trumps_machtdemonstration

(A K P)

Heavy armed clashes have erupted between the Houthis and the tribe of Arhab in Sana’a. Source: Almashehad Alyemeni.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-43083

(A P)

Sana'a airport services illegally privileged to private company: Document

The Sana'a-based Civil Aviation and Meteorology Authority (CAMA) has granted a private company the privilege of providing the ground services at Sana'a international airport's, according to a document obtained by Debriefer.

The decision to grant Mocha this privilege was based on studies made by CAMA and the Houthi transport ministry over more than a year in order to secure additional income for CAMA amid Covid-19 crisis, an official at CAMA told Debriefer on Saturday.

https://debriefer.net/en/news-21002.html

(A P)

Houthi militia imposes ISIS-like restrictions on female university students

The Iran-aligned Houthi insurgents have imposed new constraints on female university students studying at Sana’a-based Sciences and Technology University, Yemen’s most prominent private university.

This comes three months after the militia took over the private university, detained its president, Hameed Aqlan, and unlawfully assigned new president to the university.

Last week, the new Houthi president of the university issued a circular entitled “For the Public Interest” barring female students from wearing tight, partially opened, or slight abayas (loose black robes from head to toe), using make-up, putting perfume, or showing even a small portion of hair.

The new circular sparked dismay among activists who describe it as a radical measure.

https://republicanyemen.net/archives/26094

My comment: The Houthis turn out to be the best pupils of Saudi Wahabism.

(A P)

The abductee Mohammed Ali Al-Adeeb, 60 years old, died in a prison run by the Houthi group in Al-Qafr district in Ibb governorate. He had been held for eight months for refusing to send his sons to fight with the #Houthis.

https://twitter.com/BelqeesRights/status/1325090179460247559

https://twitter.com/BelqeesTV/status/1324388757005504512

and

(A P)

Houthi torture-to-death crimes know no stop. The latest victim an elderly

The most recent crime occurred in Alqafr district, in the central Yemen province of Ibb: Mohammed Ali Al-Adeeb, 60, died on Friday after 10 months of torture at the hands of Houthis, familiar sources said.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-43082

(A P)

Iran-Yemen ties based on respect: ambassador

Hassan Irlou, Iran’s newly appointed ambassador to Yemen, has said Tehran-Sanaa relations are based on respect and equality.

“They [enemies] do not like that relations between Iran and Yemen are based on respect and equality,” the ambassador said in an interview with the Beirut-based al-Mayadeen news channel.

https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/454356/Iran-Yemen-ties-based-on-respect-ambassador

(B P)

Yemen: Jailed Journalists Face Abuse, Death Penalty

Houthi Authorities Should Free 4 Reporters Wrongfully Convicted

Four journalists arbitrarily detained by Houthi authorities in Yemen since 2015 face the death penalty and receive inadequate medical care, Human Rights Watch said today. On April 11, 2020, the Houthi-controlled Specialized Criminal Court in Sanaa sentenced the four Yemeni journalists to death after an unfair trial on politically motivated charges of treason and spying for foreign states because of their work as journalists. The Houthi authorities should immediately quash the death sentences and unconditionally release the journalists.
Houthi authorities arrested the four journalists – Abdul Khaleq Amran, Akram Al-Walidi, Hareth Humaid, and Tawfiq Al-Mansouri – along with five other journalists during a June 9, 2015, raid on a hotel room in Sanaa, where they were working because it was one of the few locations in the city with an internet connection and electricity, family members told Human Rights Watch by phone. Throughout their detention, even before the Covid-19 pandemic, the journalists have had only irregular and restricted family visits, lack of access to legal assistance, and inadequate medical care. On October 15, the Houthis released five of the journalists as part of a prisoner exchange deal with the internationally recognized government of Yemen, but refused to include the four with death sentences.
“Houthi authorities are using compromised courts to punish journalists for doing their job, adding to the armed group’s bleak record of abuses,” said Afrah Nasser, Yemen researcher at Human Rights Watch. “These journalists should never have been arrested in the first place, much less face the death penalty.”

https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/06/yemen-jailed-journalists-face-abuse-death-penalty

(A P)

Houthis collects 20 percent of tuition in private education

The Houthis issued new decision allowing them to collect 20 percent of tuition in private schools in areas of their control, a source in Sana’a said.

The new decision led to increase of the tuition in the private schools.

Parents in the Houthis-held areas reported that this year’ tuition increased to YR160,000 to YR190,000 per one student plus the fees for textbooks and the school uniform.

The source said that the new decision obliges schools to allocate between five to ten free seats to children of Houthis dead fighters.

The source who requested anonymity for safety reasons, said that the Houthis turned the private education into a channel of financial resources to gain new wealth.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-43065

(A P)

[Hadi gov.] Yemeni embassy in DC condemns ‘anti-American’, ‘anti-Semitic’ Houthi ceremony

The Iran-backed Houthi militia “unabashedly” showcased their “appalling anti-American and anti-Semitic rhetoric” during a police academy graduation ceremony in Yemen’s Sanaa, the Yemeni embassy in Washington said on Thursday.

A video shared by the embassy on Twitter shows uniformed men holding the Nazi salute and chanting, “Death to America. Death to Israel. Curse the Jews.”

“Rather than looking like militias in traditional attire, Iran-backed Houthis seek to appear as [a] uniformed & professionalized force. Either way, it is to brutally repress the population in Yemen,” the embassy said.

https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2020/11/07/Yemeni-embassy-in-DC-condemns-anti-American-anti-Semitic-Houthi-ceremony

Film: Al-Houthi militias transform academic military colleges into sectarian incubators and Shiite seminaries Military graduates chant the Iranian wilaya slogan instead of the military department at the Police College in Sanaa ...

https://twitter.com/Ndawsari/status/1324328845919531009 = https://twitter.com/YemenEmbassy_DC/status/1324417312695484418

(B P)

Saudi Arabia Still Outraged by Presence of Iran's Ambassador to Yemen

The Saudi regime is still puzzled over how the Iranian ambassador, Hassan Irloo, arrived in Yemen. This morning, he presented his credentials to the President Mahdi Al-Mashat.

The Saudi-led aggression tried in vain to link the presence of the Iranian ambassador in Yemen with the assassination of the Yemeni Minister of Youth and Sports, Hassan Zaid, and to suggest that this assassination came within the framework of the exclusion of Yemeni political figures from the scene in favor of the Ansarullah. However, this plot also failed due to the deep respect that the martyr Hassan Zaid held for the Islamic Republic of Iran and his position in Yemen.

Saudi media outlets, after the warm welcome received by the new Iranian ambassador at the ceremony celebrating the Prophet’s birthday, tried to vent its anger and distress by promoting another failed scenario. One of is that the Iranian ambassador is the military ruler of Yemen, and that his presence is a key factor for the continuation of the war In this country. They, however, overlooked the passage of more than six years since the aggression started and it has not achieved any gains so far. The upper hand today in the military arena is for the Yemenis with or without the Iranian ambassador.

https://english.almasirah.net/post/16023/Saudi-Arabia-Still-Outraged-by-Presence-of-Iran-s-Ambassador-to-Yemen

(A P)

Business tycoon and key financier of Houthis Fares Al-Habbari has complained of Houthi intent to physically eliminate him. Source: Multiple websites.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-43047

(A P)

Houthis have closed seven scientific departments in Sana’a University. Source: Mandab Press.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-43047

(A P)

In a move that threatens to raze Old Sana’a, the Houthi militia have allowed businessmen to buy the city’s historical buildings for commercial use. Source: Multiple websites.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-43047

(A P)

The Houthi militia have begun a new campaign of extortions against all private businesses including farmlands. The militia call the extortions “Zakat”, an obligatory Islamic tax. Source of the story: Almashehad Alyemeni.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-43047

(A P)

Houthis launch new forcible donation on businesses

Sources in the capital Sana’a said that the Houthis began this week implementation of new forcible donation on private businesses.

The new donation is intended to finance school bag campaign that the Houthis distribute to children of their dead fighters with exclusion of other poor households.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-43041

(A P)

Health authority holds Houthis accountable to polio return

Minister of Public Health and Population, Nasser Baoum, said on Tuesday that the appearance of new polio cases since Yemen was declared free of the virus infection in 2006 is an inevitable result of the Houthis’ ban to vaccination in Sa’ada province.

In an online video meeting with the World Health Organization (WHO) office and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) office and the WHO Regional Representative in Cairo, Baoum called on the need to support the government’s efforts on controlling the outbreak of the polio from Sa’ada province to other provinces.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-43040

and also https://debriefer.net/en/news-20940.html

(A P)

A Houthi leader executes a civilian in cold blood in Ibb, reads the headline of a story on Bawabati.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-43036

(A P)

The Houthi militia have denied 18 marginalized Yemenis (of African descent) enrollment in Sana’a University. Source: Yemen Talk.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-43036

(A P)

Member of the #Yemen-i parliament Ahmed Saif Hashed Hashem objecting to preventing him from speaking about the Freedom Committee's ongoing investigations on detainees and abuses in Sana'a

https://twitter.com/BashaReport/status/1324017540536958976

referring to https://twitter.com/CivicCoalition/status/1323686979549208580

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp6 – cp19

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-692b-yemen-war-mosaic-692b

Vorige / Previous:

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-691-yemen-war-mosaic-691

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-691 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-691:

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm

http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/

http://www.yemenwar.info/

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

http://yemendataproject.org/data/

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

https://yemen.bellingcat.com/

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

https://yemeniarchive.org/en

06:52 10.11.2020
Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
Geschrieben von

Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
Schreiber 0 Leser 22
Dietrich Klose

Kommentare