Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 706 - Yemen War Mosaic 706

Yemen Press Reader 706: 7. Januar 2021: Besuch im Sadaqah-Krankenhaus – 2020, ein weiteres Jahr der Straflosigkeit im Jemen – Hadi-Regierung dient saudischen und emiratischen Interessen ...
Bei diesem Beitrag handelt es sich um ein Blog aus der Freitag-Community

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

... Die UN als Vermittler im Jemen – Parallel-Militärs: Kampfverbände im Jemen-Krieg – Wachsender Medien-Einfluss der Huthis – Saudi-Arabien und Oman konkurrieren um Jemens Mahra – Absage des TEDx Seiyun für Frauen – 387 Tage Al-Kaida-Herrschaft in Mukallah - Wie Jemen Covid-19-frei wurde – und mehr

January 7, 2021: Visit at Sadaqah hospital – 2020, Another year of impunity in Yemen – Hadi government serves Saudi and Emirati Interests – The UN as mediator in Yemen – Parallel militaries: Armed forces fighting Yemen’s war – Houthis’ growing media footprint – Saudi Arabia, Oman compete for Yemen’s Mahra – Cancelling TEDx Seiyun Women – 387 days of Al Qaeda rule at Mukallah – How Yemen became Covid-19-free – and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-706b-yemen-war-mosaic-706b

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavitrus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain

cp11 Deutschland / Germany

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp12a Katar-Krise / Qatar crisis

cp12b Sudan

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade

cp13b Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle

cp19 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification

***

**

*

(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-einfuehrende-artikel-u-ueberblicke

(* B H K P)

Film: Restore Hope: The Saudi-Emirate Way.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SL1GRzrexNs

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

(** B H)

Jemen: Hunderttausende Kinder werden sterben

Während die UN daran arbeitet, eine Hungersnot im Land zu verhindern, arbeiten Ärzte und Krankenschwestern an vorderster Front darum, Leben zu retten.

In den Fluren des Al-Sadaqah-Krankenhauses weint ein Kind. Der zwei Monate alte Abdullah wird in einen blau gestrichenen Untersuchungsraum getragen, um gewogen und gemessen zu werden. Er ist geschrumpft und sein Bauch durch schwere akute Unterernährung angeschwollen. Sein Gesicht ist eine verschrumpelte Maske des Schmerzes. Die Ärzte legen ihn an eine hölzerne Messvorrichtung und wiegen ihn dann in den Armen seiner Mutter. Er ist nur 50 cm lang und wiegt 2,5 Kilo – die Hälfte eines gesunden Kindes seiner Größe.

Al-Sadaqah steht an der vordersten Front der jemenitischen Hungerkrise. Jahre des Krieges und eine grassierende Inflation haben den Kindern des Landes Hunger und Not gebracht. In das Krankenhaus, ein klobiges Gebäude aus sowjetischer Zeit in der südlichen Stadt Aden, bringen Mütter ihre unterernährten Söhne und Töchter in einem verzweifelten Versuch, sie zu retten.

Manche Familien sind tagelang unterwegs, um Al-Sadaqah zu erreichen, und geben alles kostbare Geld aus, das sie für die Reise zum Krankenhaus haben, um ihre Kinder zu retten. Die Hungerkrise im Jemen ist inzwischen überwältigend. Während der Krieg weitergeht, drohen im nächsten Jahr rund 13 Millionen Menschen im Land zu verhungern. Ohne die Hilfe des Welternährungsprogramms hätten 20,1 Millionen Menschen im Jemen keinen verlässlichen Zugang zu ausreichend Nahrung.

Die Jemeniten lebten schon vor Beginn des aktuellen Krieges im ärmsten Land des Nahen Ostens, und jeder Arzt, der sich mit dem Thema beschäftigt, wird Ihnen sagen, dass Unterernährung im Land bereits weit verbreitet war. Der Unterschied ist, dass der Konflikt nun die Arbeitsplätze und Lebensgrundlagen der Menschen vernichtet hat und die Unterernährung grassiert, weil sie es sich nicht leisten können, ihre Kinder zu ernähren.

Die Auswirkungen dieser Abwärtsspirale sind in Al-Sadaqah deutlich zu sehen. Am 20. November befinden sich 17 Kinder auf der Station und weitere warten auf ihre Aufnahme. „Jedes Mal, wenn wir ein Kind entlassen, warten fünf weitere darauf, sein Bett zu übernehmen“, sagt Dr. Maha Sulaimani, Kinderärztin und Leiterin des Zentrums für therapeutische Ernährung des Krankenhauses. Unterernährung ist lebensbedrohlich – laut UNICEF ist fast die Hälfte aller Todesfälle bei Kindern weltweit auf Unterernährung zurückzuführen – und ein Mangel an richtiger Versorgung kann zu Verkümmerung und kognitiven Einschränkungen führen.

Kliniken in weiter entfernten Gebieten des Jemen sind überfordert, und das zu einer Zeit, in der die finanziellen Mittel aufgrund von COVID-19 drastisch zurückgegangen sind.

In den Fluren des Al-Sadaqah-Krankenhauses weint ein Kind. Der zwei Monate alte Abdullah wird in einen blau gestrichenen Untersuchungsraum getragen, um gewogen und gemessen zu werden. Er ist geschrumpft und sein Bauch durch schwere akute Unterernährung angeschwollen. Sein Gesicht ist eine verschrumpelte Maske des Schmerzes. Die Ärzte legen ihn an eine hölzerne Messvorrichtung und wiegen ihn dann in den Armen seiner Mutter. Er ist nur 50 cm lang und wiegt 2,5 Kilo – die Hälfte eines gesunden Kindes seiner Größe.

Dr. Maha inspiziert Abdullah, nachdem er gemessen wurde; sie schüttelt den Kopf. Es ist abnormal, ein so unterernährtes Kind so jung zu sehen, selbst auf dieser Station, und die Situation schmerzt sie sichtlich. „Das Kind ist ein sehr kleines Baby, okay. Aber die Rippen sind sichtbar“, sagt sie. „Der Bauch ist vorgewölbt, und die Beine und Arme sind frei. Man kann sogar das Schulterblatt hinter seiner Schulter sehen.“ Sie sagt, dass der Durchfall und das Fieber, die Ghada dazu veranlassten, Abdullah ins Krankenhaus zu bringen, Symptome einer potenziell gefährlichen Unterernährung waren.

https://nex24.news/2021/01/jemen-hunderttausende-kinder-werden-sterben/

(** B H K P)

Another Year of Impunity in Yemen

Press briefing on human rights situation in Yemen 2020

From January 1 to December 31, 2020, Mwatana for Human Rights documented about 1020 incidents of harm to civilians and civilian objects in Yemen in which more than 900 civilians were killed and injured, Mwatana said today in its annual briefing on the human rights situation in Yemen. The incidents documented across the country were committed by the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group, the Saudi/UAE-led coalition, the forces of the internationally recognized government of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi and armed groups loyal to it, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council and the UAE-backed Joint Forces on the Western Coast, and Saudi ground forces.

The warring parties continued their wider assault on human rights in Yemen, with civilians killed, wounded, arbitrarily detained, disappeared and tortured. The warring parties also obstructed humanitarian aid, recruited and used children, occupied schools and hospitals, and attacked healthcare and humanitarian workers.

Radhya Almutawakel, the chairperson of Mwatana for Human Rights, said: “Violations and attacks have continued for the past six years, each time causing new and more profound damage and reinforcing the urgent need to immediately move ahead towards accountability and redress. Yemeni men and women desperately need states to stand with justice, and activate real pathways towards accountability for perpetrators and redress for victims.”

In 2020, the ongoing conflict in Yemen caused the deaths of hundreds of civilians and the displacement of tens of thousands. Vital civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and service facilities, were damaged and destroyed, all while a pandemic raged in a country witnessing what the UN describes as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. There was an escalation in fighting in certain areas, particularly in Al Jawf, Ma’rib, Al-Bayda, Abyan and Taiz governorates, with violence taking a clear toll on civilian populations. The exchange of detainees which took place in mid-October 2020 between the parties to the conflict, facilitated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Office of the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, constituted an important step in one of the most difficult human rights portfolios: arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance. Millions in Yemen are still hoping to see a credible peace that would put an end to the armed conflict raging in the country since late 2014.

The year ended with a horrific attack on Aden International Airport on December 30, 2020, coinciding with the arrival of the new Yemeni government to the city. Dozens of civilians were killed or injured in the attack, including ICRC staff members and journalists. Mwatana is investigating the incident.

Mwatana conducts in-depth investigations in the field, including direct inspections of attack and incident sites and interviews. During 2020, research for the documented incidents included at least 1991 interviews in Arabic with witnesses, relatives of victims, survivors, and doctors, in addition to the examination of documents, photos, videos, and other material evidence.

Air Strikes

Air strikes continued to kill and wound civilians and damage and destroy civilian objects. During 2020, Mwatana documented at least 26 Saudi/UAE-led coalition air strikes which killed at least 99 civilians, including 41 children and 15 women, and wounded at least 81 civilians, including 42 children and 19 women.

Ground Attacks

Shelling on populated areas has resulted in significant damage to civilian objects and severe civilian casualties. in 2020, Mwatana documented nearly 111 cases of ground shelling that killed 115 civilians, including 32 women and 39 children, and wounded at least 299 civilians, including 52 women and 120 children. The Ansar Allah (Houthi) group was responsible for 54 of the documented incidents, while Yemeni government forces, Saudi ground forces and armed groups loyal to the Saudi/UAE-led coalition were responsible for 33. Mwatana was unable to determine the warring party responsibile for 24 incidents.

Landmines

In 2020, Mwatana documented approximately 38 mine explosions that killed 27 civilians, including 14 children and 3 women, and wounded 41 civilians, including 25 children and 5 women. The Ansar Allah (Houthi) group was responsible for planting all of the mines in the documented incidents.

Recruitment and Use of Children

In 2020, Mwatana verified the recruitment and use of at least 170 children, including at least 33 girls. Ansar Allah (the Houthis) recruited 80 percent of these children, while government and pro-government forces recruited nearly 8 percent, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council forces 10 percent, and the UAE-backed Joint Forces on the Western Coast 2 percent.

Humanitarian Aid Obstruction

In 2020, Mwatana documented at least 80 incidents of warring parties impeding the flow of humanitarian relief supplies and essential items to civilians. The Ansar Allah (Houthi) group was responsibile for 74 of the documented incidents, government forces for 5 incidents and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council forces for one incident. The humanitarian crisis has also been exacerbated by the restrictive conditions imposed by the Coalition on the entry of fuel into areas controlled by Ansar Allah (the Houthis), as fuel is crucial for sectors that are vital to civilians, including the health and service sectors. The Saudi/UAE-led coalition also continues to close Sana’a airport to commercial flights.

Attacks on Schools

The warring parties caused significant damage to schools and education facilities. In 2020, Mwatana documented at least 79 incidents impacting schools, including attacks on schools and the occupation and use of schools for military purposes. The Ansar Allah (Houthi) group was responsible for 62 of the documented incidents, government forces for eight, the Saudi/UAE-led coalition one and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council forces one. Ansar Allah (the Houthis) shared responsibility with the Coalition in two cases including both an airstrike and military occupation of the school. Government and pro-government forces shared responsibility with Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in four incidents of ground fighting. The UAE-backed Joint Forces and Ansar Allah (the Houthis) shared responsibility in another incident of ground fighting.

Attacks on Health

In 2020, Mwatana documented 42 incidents affecting health, including 13 cases of denial of access of medical supplies, 6 cases of ground shelling impacting health facilities, 12 cases of armed assault and occupation of health facilities, and 11 cases of arbitrary detention of health workers. the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group for 22, Government and pro-government forces were responsible for 15 of the documented incidents, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council for four, and the UAE-backed Joint Forces on the Western Coast for one.

Torture

In 2020, Mwatana documented 38 incidents of torture. The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council forces were responsible for 24 of the documented incidents, including one involving a civilian’s death in detention. The Ansar Allah (Houthi) group was responsible for six of the documented incidents of torture, four of which involved deaths in detention. Government and pro-government forces were responsible for six other incidents, and the UAE-backed Joint Forces one incident. In one incident, Eritrean forces tortured seven Yemeni fishermen while they were detained in Eritrea.

https://mwatana.org/en/2020-press-briefing/

and shorter survey:

(* B K)

Saudi-led airstrikes in Yemen killed 99 civilians in 2020, monitor says

According to Mwatana, a majority of the civilians who died in coalition airstrikes last year were women and children.

The Saudi Arabia-led air war in Yemen was responsible for nearly 100 civilian deaths in 2020, according to a new report released amid an 11th-hour effort from the Trump administration to sell more arms to the kingdom.

Coalition airstrikes in Yemen killed at least 99 civilians, including 44 children and 15 women, said a 2020 analysis released Tuesday from the independent Yemeni monitoring group Mwatana. At least 81 civilians were injured in air attacks last year, a majority of them also women and children.

The report, which is based on nearly 2,000 interviews with victims, eyewitnesses and on-the-ground health care and nongovernmental organization workers, documented human rights violations committed by all parties to the conflict, including the Houthis, forces loyal to Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council.

https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2021/01/yemen-saudi-arabia-airstrikes-coalition-casualties-houthis.html

(** B P)

Shaken by Attacks, Yemen’s ‘New’ Government Serves Saudi and Emirati Interests

Yemen has again formed a new government amid a worsening humanitarian crisis. The new entity could be another ineffective compromise, created to serve Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates’ interests even as new attacks on Aden’s airport raise additional concerns on its viability.

Meanwhile two factions within the Saudi-led coalition, Yemen’s internationally-recognized government – headed by Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi – and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), have failed to see eye-to-eye, despite the Riyadh Agreement, which was designed to resolve their differences and reunify the coalition.

The agreement was rather a fragile truce between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as Riyadh backed Hadi’s government while Abu Dhabi supported the STC. It aimed to salvage their diverging alliance, after both countries supported these rival factions to secure their own geopolitical stakes in Yemen.

Saudi Arabia and Hadi wanted to reconcile the coalition to fight the Houthi rebels

Though the deal’s progress remained stagnant for most of 2020, due to these conflicting aims, new attempts to advance it occurred in December, after the Hadi government and the STC finally agreed to form a unity government.

As the new cabinet assesses the implications of the deadly attack, past friction between the Hadi government and the STC could also jeopardize a long-term settlement.

Despite the STC’s surprising backtracking on its opposition towards working with Hadi, some Yemeni ministers have also raised concerns over the STC’s role in seizing Socotra, suggesting ongoing divisions within a new government.

Adding to these obstacles, Biden’s US presidential victory could be a catalyst behind the latest government formation. As he may end the impunity that the Trump administration gave Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, both countries could therefore be rushing towards an agreement over Yemen, to create the impression that they are supporting peace.

However, even if Riyadh does permanently scale back its overt military operations, it could still have freedom to manipulate Yemen’s politics through supporting various actors, which Biden may overlook.

“The Saudi ambassador has just finished announcing the formation of his secretariat, which will help him complete the Saudi scheme, tampering with Yemen, guardianship and domination, and dividing it into parts,” Yemeni Nobel Prize winner Tawakkol Karman tweeted about the new government formation.

The agreement brought hope that it could temporarily prevent violence in parts of Yemen — excluding Houthi-controlled areas — but the recent airport attack has cast doubt on this assumption; and, continued external interference could hinder efforts to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, reinvigorate its collapsed healthcare system, and stabilize its devastated currency.

Meanwhile, some analysts have perceived the UAE’s drawdown in Yemen since late 2019 as a sign it has abandoned its geopolitical interests in the south. However, its actions since then suggest otherwise. After all, the STC’s seizure of Socotra and its resisting of Hadi’s efforts to reassert control over the south could not have occurred without renewed Emirati patronage. Moreover, Emirati weapons shipments to STC-aligned militias in Abyan were observed in November 2020, indicating Abu Dhabi is still covertly backing the separatist faction.

The STC’s presence in the new government could enable Abu Dhabi to gradually weaken Hadi’s influence, as the Yemeni President has previously restricted the UAE’s aims of controlling south Yemen’s ports. And should renewed tensions occur within the government, it may lead to another split which the UAE could look to exploit.

Recent revelations from Al Jazeera, which Middle East Eye reviewed, alleged Emirati use of commercial aircraft for arms transfers to Yemen, employing charities such as the Emirati Red Crescent which actually carried out intelligence and political operations. While the UAE has long sought to control south Yemen’s port of Aden, it also reportedly sought to use al-Mokha’s port as a military base.

Biden’s approach will therefore be crucial for the success of any peace process.

Yet given Abu Dhabi’s more favorable image within the Democratic Party and Biden’s reticence to condemn its actions, compared with Riyadh, this may still guarantee a degree of impunity from Washington.

This latest agreement to solidify a government, backed by two countries which have waged war on Yemen, could trigger more violent pushback from domestic factions even as it yet again fails to address the country’s needs. Saudi Arabia and the UAE still have the freedom to manipulate the fragile nation’s politics, and any arrangement under their auspices will not succeed in improving Yemen’s stability nor prevent its looming famine – by Jonathan Fenton-Harvey

https://insidearabia.com/shaken-by-attacks-yemens-new-government-serves-foreign-interests/

(** B P)

INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION QUO VADIS?

The UN as Mediator in Yemen’s Complex Civil War

Achievements, Challenges andLessons Learned from 2015-2018

This thesis provides a nuanced assessment of the effectiveness of the United Nations (UN)-led mediation process in Yemen’s civil war between April 2015 and February 2018 in order to detect lessons learned for one of the main challenges of our time: effective conflict management. Based on latest developments in armed conflicts, civil wars are the most destabilizing threats in the current international system as well as the most difficult types of conflicts to manage and terminate (Zartman 1995; Licklider1995; Walter 2002). Especially since 2011, revolutionary dynamics and state fragility in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region led to highly complex internationalized civil wars that involve major-power tensions and features of proxy-warfare. Against this backdrop, the very limits of the “standard regime” employed by the international community to manage civil wars in the post-Cold War era, namely: mediation and peacekeeping, are being tested sharply (Gowan & Stedman 2018: 171, Crocker2007).

This thesis contributes to one possible way the regime could survive: namely through lessons learned (ibid: 178). While much is known about UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding, less so about UN civil war mediation (Beardsley 2010: 1). Hence, the thesis focuses on third-party mediation as the most common form of conflict management with a special emphasis on the effectiveness of the UN as a leading actor in applying this standard treatment (Gowan & Stedman 2018: 171).

Through utilizing six key conditions for mediator effectiveness from Bergmann(2017) in expert interviews, the thesis finds that the low degree of UN mediator effectiveness in Yemen was mainly related to the (coherent) partisanship of the UN Security Council (UNSC), whose Chapter VII resolution 2216 functioned as mediation mandate and rendered an impartial and balanced process impossible. This added to the missing leverage of the mediator on all sides and to the missing willingness of the parties to compromise as well as to the restraint of major P-5 and western governments to reign the regional actors in. Most apparent lessons learned include the need to reflect the complexities involved in the mandate and throughout the process. The mandate should allow for the inclusion of all actors directly or indirectly involved through negotiation formats on several levels. Incentives and disincentives need to be revised, highest priority and sufficient funds should be allocated to UN mediation and above all,an impartial and balanced process should be safeguarded against all odds as this tackles the trust in and the very credibility of the UN and the integrity of the rules-based system of international relations as a whole (Hill & Shiban 2016: 20) – by Sarah Ultes

https://www.academia.edu/43144253/INTERNATIONAL_MEDIATION_QUO_VADIS

(** B K P)

Parallel militaries: Anatomy of the armed forces fighting Yemen’s war

The determination of Saleh and his son to build a family-led military to parallel and dominate the state’s armed forces raised alarms among the country’s leaders, including senior officers in the army. These concerns helped fuel the 2011 Arab Spring uprising, during which Ali Mohsen and other political and military officials defected from the government and joined the protestors.

Restructuring the military: Hadi’s most difficult challenge

The restructuring of the military was an important demand of the youth in Sana’a’s Change Square and a main priority of President Hadi, who saw ending the divisions within the military and establishing one unified entity as urgent and necessary. In April 2012, Hadi started the restructuring process by forming teams to study proposals for restructuring. In December 2012, the new president issued a number of decrees to restructure the national forces, dismantle what remained of Saleh’s network and put the military firmly under the control of the Ministry of Defense.

The decrees dismantled Ahmed Saleh’s elite Republican Guard and Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar’s First Armored Division, the country’s largest military unit, and ordered the reorganization of the military regions.

The most important decrees removed Saleh’s family patronage network from the military, appointed Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar an advisor to Hadi for defense and security affairs and delegated Ahmed Saleh as ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. Air Force Commander Muhammad Saleh Al-Ahmar was appointed assistant to the Minister of Defense, while Saleh’s nephews were divided between two military attachés and brigade leaders.

The process of restructuring the military and raising its professional standards was a focus of one of the working groups of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which acted as a forum to resolve the country’s political divisions following the uprisings. Yemen’s Houthis took part in the conference but were displeased with the NDC’s outcomes. The group exploited the divided military and Hadi’s unpopularity, staging a coup and successfully taking over the capital in September 2014.

Houthi control

While the country made progress with the restructuring of the military and looked forward to moving beyond the conflicts of the past, the Houthis began their expansion from Saada towards the governorates of Hajjah, Al-Jawf and Amran.

The shape of the Yemeni military today

After the Houthi takeover of Sanaa in September 2014, they advanced toward Aden, Taiz and Marib with the help of forces loyal to Saleh.

In Marib, the popular resistance, in alliance with the Third Military Region, which oversees military operations in Marib and Shabwa, and the armed Brigades in Marib, led an offensive against the Houthis. These brigades included the 14th Armored Brigade, led by Brigadier General Mohsen Al-Da'ari, and the 312th Brigade led by Brigadier General Abd Al-Rab Al-Shaddadi, as well as the 107th Brigade led by Brigadier General Khaled Yaslam. Support for these units increased following the intervention of the Saudi-led Arab coalition on March 26, 2015.

In Taiz, a group of popular forces and military brigades, the main one being the 35th Brigade, withstood advances by the Houthi-Saleh forces by forming a wall in the city.

Other military leaders were later captured while inspecting the forces of the Fourth Military Region. Ali Nasser Hadi, who was the head of the 4th Military Region, was killed while fighting in Al-Tawahi, a neighborhood in Aden, while military units and citizens kept up the fight until May 2015, when the coalition intervention changed the equation in Aden.

The army formed a number of brigades throughout southern governorates, including the 141st Brigade led by Brigadier General Hashem al-Ahmar, the 314th Brigade, the 21st Mechanized Brigade, the 25th Brigade and the 101st Infantry Brigade. The military brigades in Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra governorates did not participate in the war, according to Al-Maqdashi, who had been appointed chief of staff of the military in May 2015, before being appointed defense minister in 2018.

The Hadi-led government started formally setting up a framework for rebuilding the military, and Major General Abd Al-Rab Al-Shaddadi was appointed as commander of the Third Region in April 2015. Ali Mohsen was appointed deputy supreme commander of the armed forces.

In July 2015, President Hadi met with the National Defense Council for the first time since the Houthi coup and decided to incorporate the popular resistance that arose to fight the Houthis into the military, Al-Magdashi said.

"The brigades of the Third Region and other areas existed, but it was emptied of manpower, so we had to reinforce some units with elements of the popular resistance in the southern governorates, Marib and Al-Jawf, after undergoing training,” Al-Magdashi added.

The First and Second Military Regions in Hadramout were unchanged during the rebuilding of Hadi’s military. However, the Seventh Military Region, in Marib, expanded its area of operations towards the Nihm mountains near the capital Sana’a. The Fifth Military Region formed inside the Saudi border city of Samtah and then moved to Haradh and Midi in Hajjah governorate on the Red Sea coast. The remaining military regions were unchanged from the previous military structure, according to the Minister of Defense.

Additional units were formed that were not based on the previous military structure, due to urgent needs, and these units are under the command of the chief of staff, according to a Brigadier General who works in the Operations Department of the National Military.

According to the defense minister, there are approximately 320,000 members of the military in the Hadi-led government. The Fourth Military Region (Aden - Taiz - Lahj - Abyan – Al Dhale) is the most populous, as it represents 56 percent of the military’s forces, according to information obtained by Almasdar Online from an informed military source who was not authorized to speak with the press. The Third Military Region is the second most populous of military forces with 13.8 percent, with the Second Military Region containing 9.5 percent of the country’s military forces. The Seventh Military Region contains 6.3 percent of military forces, followed by First, Sixth and Fifth Military Regions. The country’s army reserve comprises 1.8 percent of military forces.

Those military regions with fewer numbers of military forces face more confrontations with the Houthis than more heavily populated regions. The source specifically mentioned these regions as the Seventh, Sixth, Fifth and parts of the Third and Fourth Military Regions.

The Houthis:

Since the Houthis began their attack on Amran in 2014, they called their forces the Popular Committees. After their takeover of the capital, the forces were then referred to as the Military and the Popular Committees. After Hadi fled Sana’a following the Houthi takeover, the Houthis maintained the military institution that had in place. But do the Houthis actually run a professional military?

It is extremely difficult to obtain information about the composition of Houthis forces. However, an official in the Military Manpower Authority, government soldiers largely left and joined the ranks of the Hadi-led government. Some forces left Yemen altogether. The Houthis security apparatus imposes its authority over all those within its ranks, monitoring them closely to ensure confidentiality of the group’s movements and information. And despite the dozens of requests for comment that the editor made to military officers who remain in Sana'a, and whom the Houthis use as public faces of the military, no responses were provided.

The Houthis maintained the façade of having a professional military in the structure of the one Hadi had led during his time in Sana’a, in order to intimidate their opponents with their size, discipline the experienced professionals who remained in Sana’a.

Saleh's alliance with the Houthis had kept a group of officers loyal to him in the military command, but they were without any actual power or decision-making capabilities, and after the disintegration of the alliance, most fled. The Houthis removed any of the remaining officers whose loyalties they doubted.

In 2017, the Houthis appointed their most prominent commanders as commanders of the military regions, and pushed them to the forefront, and rearranged the range of operations according to their own vision. It did not completely adhere to the division that was approved by the restructuring decrees in 2012.

Parallel Forces of the Military:

Parallel to the process of rebuilding the military by the chief of staff, with logistical support from the Arab coalition, the coalition forces themselves were building parallel forces of popular resistance units. These units were not formally part of the military but are controlled by the Saudis and Emiratis financially and administratively. The leaders of these new units were chosen from Salafi leaders and tribal sheiks.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have established nearly 60 new units, brigades and battalions, within the past five years, according to an official who works on this file in the presidential office. The brigades and units that Saudi Arabia supervises are limited to those along their border with Yemen, especially the areas bordering the governorates of Saada and Al-Jawf.

The forces established by the UAE are concentrated in southern governorates. They were established starting in mid-2015 as independent units. These UAE-funded and trained forces participated in liberating Aden from the Houthis.

These units were initially placed under the umbrella of Southern Resistance, but soon many were organized under a new name, the Security Belt Forces. The UAE established the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and it served as a political umbrella organization. These forces, under the leadership of the STC, became the Logistics and Support Forces.

In April 2016, the UAE oversaw the liberation of the coastal city of Mukalla, the capital of the Hadramout governorate, from the control of Al-Qaeda.

The UAE immediately began building a new unit, the Hadrami Elite Forces, which it still runs from Al-Rayyan airport. They are formally part of the military but are led by the UAE.

A few months after the liberation of Mukalla, the UAE established the Shabwani Elite Forces in neighboring Shabwa governorate, with the aim of tracking al-Qaeda terrorists.

All of these forces in Aden, Shabwa and Hadramout are under the umbrella of the STC. With the exception of the Hadhrami elite, all were part of the rebellion against the Hadi-led government in August 2019, which led to the government’s expulsion from Aden. The sides came together and signed the Riyadh Agreement in November 2019, which seeks to form a power-sharing government between the quarreling anti-Houthi allies..

The UAE also formed a number of combat brigades in 2016 and 2017 called the Giants Forces, consisting of tribesmen and Salafists from Al-Dhale, Lahj, Aden and Hodeidah. They were sent to the western coast and Bab Al-Mandab.

At the beginning of 2018, Tariq Saleh fled to Aden after his defeat and the killing of his uncle, former President Saleh, by the Houthis in Sana’a.

Emirati forces received him in Aden and provided him with the support to build new forces and join the battle against the Houthis. After four months, Tariq’s forces were transferred from Aden to Mocha to join the operations that were taking place to liberate Hodeidah. He has not recognized the legitimacy of President Hadi, and remains backed by the UAE.

In July 2019, the UAE merged the forces fighting on the western coast under the name Joint Forces. These included the Republican Forces, the Giants Forces and the Tuhami Resistance.

According to sources in the Presidential Office unauthorized to speak with the press, some of these brigades and formations, whether in the STC or the Giants, or those on the Saudi-Yemeni border, were established under the orders of President Hadi, but are not formally part of the military. They are instead under the command of the Emiratis.

Defense Minister Magdashi said that while it was up to the president and political leadership to decide what to do about these units that exist outside the military, as long as they are not integrated, “they are considered a militia.”

Parallel forces of the Yemeni military and their branches:

https://al-masdaronline.net/national/915

(** B P)

[from June 2020] A Battle of Hearts and Minds: The Growing Media Footprint of Yemen’s Houthis

The little attention that is given to Houthi media in contemporary analysis tends to focus on military developments in Yemen’s war and, occasionally, political speeches delivered by Hussein’s successor and half-brother, Abdulmalek. But the group’s content production is rapidly expanding to include family entertainment and lifestyle shows, extravagant music videos, and autotuned recitations of popular poetry. With this range of products, the group targets specific audiences throughout Yemen and the region, as well as their foreign and domestic foes.

How the Houthis Changed Yemen’s Media

A crucial step in the 2014-15 Houthi takeover of Sana’a was the seizure of state-run media outlets and the silencing of political opponents and critics. The brutal suppression of independent journalism that emerged under the Houthis in 2015 continues today. Numerous reports reveal that the Houthis arrest, imprison, and torture journalists. On April 11th, 2020,, four Yemeni journalists were convicted of espionage and sentenced to death in a Houthi court.

Many of the newspapers, TV channels, and radio stations that continue to operate under Houthi leadership are largely neglected by the group. Resources and creative energy instead are diverted to the Houthis’ flagship media network, Al-Masirah. Established in south Beirut in 2012, the network shares a close relationship with Hezbollah’s Al-Manar, and the two outlets are similar in terms of production quality and design.

The Houthis are fully aware of the crucial role that journalism plays in Yemen’s war. This is clear not only from their media output, but also from their own analysis of the topic. An op-ed published late last year by pro-Houthi journalist Zaid al-Ba’auh explains the importance of the media in times of conflict. He asserts that “one of the most important means of psychological warfare is media—whether audio, visual, or textual—because it invades people directly, especially those who have no awareness or discernment to protect themselves.”

The group regularly asserts that this form of psychological warfare is used against them by their regional and international rivals, and the Houthis are committed to instrumentalizing media as a counterweight to what they see as Saudi, American, and Israeli propaganda.

Houthi Military Propaganda and Poetry

The Houthis and their supporters have developed their own signature messaging campaigns designed to mobilize and attract followers. Popular themes include a condemnation of coalition airstrikes and praise for Houthi military successes. Footage and images that support these themes are widely shared and repurposed for a range of propaganda pieces, including Houthi-produced documentaries and fundraising campaigns.

Other Houthi productions are more creative and appeal to a broader audience. Possibly the most versatile and beloved form of Houthi propaganda is their poetry. Their zawamil and anasheed (singulars zamil and nasheed) are commonly described as war poems or anthems, but their subject matter ranges from international politics and religious tradition to social issues and praise of leaders. Houthi zawamil frequently include threats to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and the United States, and are intended to inspire followers and intimidate rivals.

Although Houthi media encompasses a range of topics, their messaging frequently targets the United States and promotes anti-Semitic tropes. These themes are sometimes most visible when Houthi-affiliated presenters are not discussing Yemen’s conflict, but when they are commenting on social issues. An example of this can be seen on the Al-Masirah program The Mask (on air from 2012 to 2019), which analyzed popular film and television. The show’s critiques of Hollywood demonstrate a sincere appreciation for American cinema and knowledge of American history and culture. Nonetheless, the host and her guests condemn the United States on issues such as racism, while simultaneously trotting out their own anti-Semitic conspiracy theories.

Clips like these are more effective than military propaganda at highlighting Houthi messaging strategies and their broader worldview. The mere existence of a show like The Mask—one of the first programs aired on Al-Masirah—demonstrates the Houthis’ early appreciation for the utility of the entertainment industry as an instrument of soft power.

Houthi Media at the Forefront of a Movement

Among the commonly held views about the Houthis, perhaps none has served the group more effectively than the notion that their expertise is limited to the battlefield, or that they are shortsighted and lack political acumen. On the contrary, the Houthis have nearly two decades of experience in creating targeted messaging campaigns and they understand the importance of propaganda during wartime. Nonetheless, the group’s experiments in soft power are often overlooked by observers who prefer to focus solely on their military capabilities.

The Houthis’ increasingly influential media apparatus presents challenges to independent journalists in Yemen, but it also gives us important insight into the group’s evolving identities and ideologies. We can expand our understanding of the group, and the conflict in Yemen more broadly, if we familiarize ourselves with all aspects of the movement and make a real effort to hear what the Houthis have to say – by Hannah Porter

https://al-masdaronline.net/opinion/17

(** B P)

Saudi Arabia, Oman compete for control in Yemen’s Mahra

Geographic position of al-Mahra province made it a sought-after zone of control for both countries

Since Houthi takeover of much of Yemen from the internationally recognized government in September 2014, the eastern al-Mahra province managed to stay far from the ongoing war in the country.

However, its geographic position along the border of Saudi Arabia and Oman made it a sought-after zone of control for both countries.

Recently, al-Mahra witnessed unprecedented divisions among local people as they organized two different gatherings supporting two different groups fighting over the leadership of the General Council of al-Mahra and Socotra.

One mass gathering took place at the house of Sheikh of the Qumsit tribe, Abboud Haboud, which ended by announcing a new leadership for the council, as an alternative to Abdullah bin Isa Al-Afrar, who is currently living in United Arab Emirates (UAE) and has been chairing the council since its establishment in 2012.

Another gathering was organized by supporters of Al-Afrar to reject the new leadership, describing it as a “coup” against the council.

This argument was not new as the area witnessed other political disputes, but the latest disagreement emerged after the fall of Socotra in the hands of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces, which happened with help from Al-Afrar.

“This action pushed some supporters to rectify the council’s course and change its leadership where they succeeded to hold a conference and select a new leadership,” Badr Kalashat, al-Mahra provincial deputy for youth affairs, told Anadolu Agency.

Oil corridor

Frequent tensions with Iran and the uncertainty surrounding the reliability of the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic passageway for oil exports from the Gulf region, have placed additional pressure on Saudi Arabia to seek delivery alternatives.

In August 2018, a leaked document revealed the kingdom’s intention to build an oil pipeline that would carry oil from Saudi Arabia to the coast of al-Mahra, Nishtun seaport, providing direct access to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.

After the rejection of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to grant Saudi Arabia control over the required territorial corridor to construct and monitor this oil pipeline, the Saudis saw a unique chance in the outbreak of Yemen’s civil war in 2014 to gain what it has been planning for years.

“Saudi Arabia sees al-Mahra as a strategic area on the Arabian Sea, far from Iran's control of the Strait of Hormuz, and considers its coasts possessing a potential threat for drug and arms smuggling activities,” Abdulsalam Muhammed, chairman of Abaad Studies & Research Center, told Anadolu Agency.

To achieve its goals in al-Mahra, Riyadh began increasing its presence in Yemen after mid-November 2017, by taking control of al-Mahra’s facilities, Nishtun port, Sarfit port, Shehen border crossings, and al-Ghaydah Airport, in addition to establishing military settlements around key infrastructure and coastal areas.

Yemeni media also reported a visit by Saudi Ambassador Muhammad al-Jaber to al-Mahra in June 2018, following feasibility studies conducted by the Saudi Aramco company.

“The Yemeni government does not oppose the Saudi project, but instead stated in many occasions that as long as the province’s sovereignty is preserved, any Gulf project must achieve the government’s interests and should preserve its rights, sovereignty and territorial integrity without provoking any regional and sectarian strife,” Muhammed said.

Omani concerns

Al-Mahra has been the most influential foreign presence for Oman, but the deepening Saudi footprint in the province created a potential risk to Muscat’s interests in Yemen.

In an effort to preserve the current balance of power and contain the Saudi ambitions in the area, Oman has traditionally relied on offering humanitarian aid and citizenship for locals as they share many commonalities with Omanis and have great relations with each other through history.

“Oman believes that the presence of the Saudi and Emirati forces in al-Mahra holds a threat to its national security,” Mutahhar al-Sufari, a Yemeni researcher, told Anadolu Agency.

“It is no longer a secret that Oman is supporting the demonstrations, tribesmen and the local community by providing aid and logistics. Last year, Oman established Al-Mahriya TV channel that focuses its coverage on criticism of the Saudi and Emirati military presence in al-Mahra and Socotra,” he noted.

Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi and his government have tried to contain the situation in the province by appointing a new governor in the province, Muhammed Ali Yasser – by Mohammed Alragavi

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/saudi-arabia-oman-compete-for-control-in-yemen-s-mahra/2098447

(** B P)

Cancelling TEDx Seiyun Women: A Discussion

Two months ago, while I was scrolling through my Facebook newsfeed, an event titled ‘TEDx Seiyun Women’ caught my attention. The event was scheduled to take place in the last week of November at Sultan al-Katheeri Palace in Seiyun, Hadhramaut. News of the event was exciting for me as well as many others in Hadhramaut and the rest of Yemen’s governorates. It was heartwarming to see young Yemeni women and men continuing to revive cultural life in Yemen despite the toll of war and instability. Yet, a few weeks later, local authorities in Seiyun imposed several restrictions to prevent the event from taking place. According to online news sources, the local authorities’ position towards the event changed to accommodate some people’s objections to the event. The main argument against the conference was that it was disrespectful of Hadhrami ‘exceptionalism,’which in this context, is associated with a conservative understanding of morality that manifests itself in limiting women’s presence in the public sphere . So what exactly happened, and how can it stimulate constructive future discussions about social change initiatives in Yemen?

Tedx conferences in a global context

TED is an acronym that stands for Technology, Entertainment and Design – and it is the name of a series of international conferences that host speakers who give talks introducing their knowledge and experiences. The main idea behind TED is to make creative ideas and inspiring experiences accessible to as many people as possible.

In 2012, a group of young women and men managed to get the first TEDx license in Yemen. Indeed the first TEDx conference in Yemen

TEDx Seiyun women

As an extension of different TED conferences in Yemen since 2012, young women came up with the idea to organize Tedx Seiyun Women, which was to be launched on 26 November 2020.

Cancellation of the conference

After the initial positive feedback on the conference idea, a considerable number of social media users began to attack the conference and the organizers, whom they accused of attempting to Westernize Hadhrami women and their society. Religion was often employed by certain groups to manipulate people and take them along to defamation campaigns that targeted the organizers and denounced them as traitors and Western collaborators.

The issue rapidly escalated and debates moved from virtual spaces to the street. Soon enough, local authorities interfered and hired a formal committee in Wadi Hadhramaut (Hadhramaut Valley), where Seiyun is located, to investigate whether the conference program fit with Hadhrami exceptionalism. The committee came up with a number of conditions to grant permission for the conference. The most important condition stated that speakers’ place of birth and residence must be Wadi Hadhramaut and that any women who were not born or did not reside in Wadi Hadhramaut must be excluded. This interference led the team of organizers to publish a press release that announced the cancellation of the conference due to TED’s withdrawal of the license that had been granted to the organizers. In a formal email sent to the organizers of TEDx Seiyun Women, TED emphasized that the only selection criteria for any TED/TEDx speaker are ideas that are worth spreading, rather than imposed selection criteria from the authorities.

The authorities’ abandonment of civil society

Currently considered the most stable governorate compared with other Yemeni governorates, local authorities in Hadhramaut present themselves constantly as supporters of women and youth interests. Officials do not miss a chance to promise tangible support for women and youth.

Here, one cannot help but question the utility of having women in decision-making positions while, in reality, authorities do not have real political will to support women, Instead, authorities domesticate women’s voices and struggles by absorbing them into a facade of official appointments and promises. I ‘Exceptionalism’ can be often used as a loose term to attribute certain characteristics to people and places and present them as natural, almost biological, traits. But what is Hadhrami exceptionalism and how is it possible to place an entire population in one homogeneous collective frame? How can it be natural to suppress groups or an individual’s various decisions?

Recently, a scanned black and white photograph from 1974 went viral on Yemeni social media. The photograph features women standing before a banner that says ‘The First General Conference for Yemeni Women, taking place in Seiyun 15-17 July 1974 under the theme: Yemeni Women Fight Ignorance’. The women in the photograph are from the General Union of Yemeni Women who organized the conference with support from the state. Personally, I keep looking at the photo and I cannot get over the word ‘Seiyun’ that visibly appears in the banner. This city was chosen to host the first women’s conference in the history of Yemen. How is it that it was quite acceptable for women to exist in a way that is now considered a violation of society’s exceptionalism? This photo shows how ‘exceptionalism’ is a social construct whose interpretations and definitions are historically contingent and conditioned by socio-political powers. For this reason, I would like to present a few questions to open essential future discussions: When exactly did the concept of women’s rights become threatening to what Yemeni society in general, and Hadhrami society in this context, claims to be its ‘exceptionalism’? Also, why is this selective exceptionalism treated as an uncontestable course of nature, rather than socially constructed boundaries for women’s dress codes or their place in the public sphere? – by Shaima Bin Othman

https://almadaniyamag.com/2020/12/18/cancelling-tedx-seiyun-women/

My comment: Already the photos – when compared to photos from our time showing women in public places and public events (if there even are any women) show the great jump backwards which Yemeni society had made in the time since 1974. Saudi “Wahabisation” has overwhelmed most Islamic countries, Yemen included. One of the most bizarre examples of this trend are Yemen’s Houthis.

(*** B T)

387 Days of Power: How Al-Qaeda Seized, Held and Ultimately Lost a Yemeni City

Fighters from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) took control of Mukalla, Yemen’s fifth-largest city and a key port on the southern coast of Hadramawt governorate, on April 2, 2015. For the next 387 days, AQAP would rule over a city of 500,000, amassing millions of dollars in revenue and recruiting hundreds of fighters to its black banner. This was AQAP’s second attempt at holding and administering territory in Yemen. Its first try, in March 2011, during the upheaval of the Arab Spring, had ended in failure when AQAP was forced to withdraw from areas under its control — Ja’ar in the governorate of Abyan and Azzan in Shabwa governorate — leaving behind an exhausted and disillusioned citizenry. But Nasir al-Wuhayshi, AQAP’s commander at the time, a former personal aide to Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan who had studied his decisions and emulated his strategic thinking, believed he had learned a number of lessons from Al-Qaeda’s first failed attempt to rule, and he was ready to try again.

Based on dozens of interviews with witnesses, journalists, human rights activists, government employees and tribal sheikhs in Mukalla and the surrounding area, this is the story of AQAP’s 387 days in power. It starts, as do most stories of Al-Qaeda in Yemen, with a prison break.

What came next was something different: a well-executed and carefully coordinated sealing of a city. The Al-Qaeda fighters – estimates range from 100 to 400 – split into at least five different groups. Three of these blocked the major roads into the heart of Mukalla — near the local branch of the Central Bank of Yemen, the city’s old port and just northeast of the 2nd Military District’s headquarters. Another group sealed off the coastal road southwest of Al-Aroud Square. The fifth group blocked a key entry from the north, along the road to Al-Ghwaizi Fortress.

Al-Qaeda’s two main bodies of fighters descended on the group’s primary targets: the central prison and the central bank.

Al-Qaeda fighters had streamed toward the prison. There were a number of Al-Qaeda fighters inside, but the most prominent figure was a heavyset 36-year-old who’d let his beard grow out during his nearly four years in prison, named Khaled Batarfi.

Al-Qaeda fighters moved on the presidential palace and the Central Security Force’s camp after raiding the prison and attacking the bank. At the palace, Al-Qaeda used a booby-trapped car as a battering ram, storming the gates after it exploded and exchanging gunfire with guards inside the palace; the battle ended and the palace was turned over to the attackers after an agreement was reached with the guard commander, Khaled al-Kazimi.

Uncomfortable Questions

Perhaps the most persistent and confounding question regarding Al-Qaeda’s takeover of Mukalla is: Why was it so easy? How did a few hundred men in pickups capture a city of 500,000, and the headquarters of the 2nd Military District, effectively seizing control within hours and consolidating it within a few days? Was it a conspiracy, incompetence or something else?

Part of the answer is that Mukalla had a hardened outer shell of military camps and bases, but once inside the city, Al-Qaeda had free range of movement and was quickly able to exert control.

Managing the City: By God, We Rule

Three years later, in Mukalla, Al-Wuhayshi tried a different approach. This time Al-Qaeda fighters introduced themselves as “Sons of Hadramawt.”[26] Instead of playing up their religious credentials, Al-Qaeda played up its local connections. They wanted to show the people of Mukalla that they were their sons and brothers, their uncles and cousins. Which is why Al-Wuhayshi, who was from Abyan, instructed fighters from Hadramawt to keep their faces uncovered while those from other areas or countries kept their faces masked, at least initially. As Abd al-Hakim bin Mahfood told the journalist Al-Batati a few months later, the fighters were “from famous Hadrami families.”[27]

Al-Wuhayshi also instructed his men not to raise Al-Qaeda’s famous black flag,[28] or even announce that they had captured Mukalla. Their story was that they didn’t “control Mukalla in their capacity as members of Al-Qaeda,” but rather as “Sons of Hadramawt.”[29] It was a semantic fig leaf, but one Al-Wuhayshi thought might allow AQAP to succeed in Mukalla where they had failed in Abyan. Part of AQAP’s insistence on being known as the Sons of Hadramawt may also have been, as the International Crisis Group suggested, an effort to avoid being targeted by US drone or air strikes.[30]

AQAP, or the Sons of Hadramawt as they were calling themselves, also announced that they weren’t in Mukalla to rule but rather to protect the city from a potential Houthi offensive.[31] Weeks earlier, Houthi forces, aided by Yemeni troops loyal to former President Saleh, had pushed into Aden. In the early Spring of 2015, just as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were beginning the direct regional military intervention, some in Hadramawt worried that the Houthis would push east along the coast from Aden toward Mukalla in a bid to control the entire country. This, AQAP announced from the mosque loudspeakers on April 3, is why they had entered the city.[32] It would be the Sons of Hadramawt, not the Yemeni government’s military or security services, who would defend Mukalla from a Houthi offensive.

Hadramawt National Council

A few days after solidifying its control over Mukalla, Al-Qaeda met with local leaders to discuss their plans for moving forward.[33] Batarfi, who emerged as AQAP’s figurehead in Mukalla after being freed from prison, chaired the meeting.[34] Batarfi stressed what Al-Qaeda had announced from mosque loudspeakers on the previous Friday: The group had no desire to rule Mukalla, it only wanted to protect the city from the Houthis.[35]

Batarfi informed local leaders that Al-Qaeda was willing to allow them and local religious leaders to choose a council from among the people of Hadramawt to manage local government institutions.[36] On April 13, that is exactly what happened. Local leaders, under the direction of Omar al-Jaidi bin Shakl, a tribal figure affiliated with Islah, and Abd al-Hakim Mahfouz, the head of the Al-Hikma Al-Yamania Association for Charity, a religious charitable society, formed a council to govern and administer most of the city’s services, including government institutions, water services, electricity and fuel.[37] (Interestingly, the Hadi-appointed governor of Hadramawt, Adel Bahumaid, remained in Mukalla during the initial days of Al-Qaeda’s takeover and was later allowed to depart the city for Riyadh.[38]) Batarfi and Al-Qaeda, however, maintained the authority to form military councils and oversee the defense of the city.[39] The Council of Sunni Scholars, a local group of religious figures in Hadramawt, witnessed and affirmed the agreement.[40]

The agreement allowed AQAP to do two things. First, it could avoid the blame for any missteps in local governance by passing the buck to the supposedly independent council. This meant that AQAP could sidestep some of the administrative issues that had hobbled its efforts in Abyan in 2011. The flip side of that was that anytime Al-Qaeda wanted to take credit for a public service, such as repairing a sewer line or expanding the electrical grid, it could directly claim credit both locally and throughout the country via social media channels. At the same time, the existence of the council served as intermediary between AQAP and outside actors, such as Hadi’s government-in-exile, Saudi Arabia and, perhaps most importantly, oil companies. Each of these could use the cover of the Hadramawt National Council to claim it was not dealing with Al-Qaeda. Indeed, in late April 2015, a delegation from the HNC, led by Bin Shakl, traveled to Riyadh to meet with President Hadi.[41]

But on the ground in Mukalla, there was little doubt as to who was in charge. As one resident told the International Crisis Group in April 2015: “The council (HNC) is widely viewed as a front to legitimize AQAP’s hold on power.” Still, the resident went on, “locals see it as an acceptable way to deal with the outside world.”[42]

Al-Wuhayshi’s Death and AQAP’s Change in Course

One country that did not see it that way was the United States. On April 22, less than three weeks after Al-Qaeda entered Mukalla, the US carried out a drone strike in Mukalla that killed Muhannad Ghallab, AQAP’s spokesman.[43] Some weeks later, on June 12, another US drone strike killed Al-Wuhayshi, the architect of the group’s velvet-gloved approach to ruling Mukalla.[44]

Al-Wuhayshi was succeeded by Qassim al-Raymi, a prominent commander within the organization

Initially, in keeping with Al-Wuhayshi’s lessons-learned approach, AQAP had charted a careful and conciliatory course, even putting out a statement in April denying rumors that it was “planning to ban musical parties or men from wearing shorts.”[47] In Al-Wuhayshi’s last public appearance before he was killed in a drone strike, he said that in a time of war it is permissible to limit the practice of hudud.[48] But that attitude did not survive his death. AQAP fighters were being killed, and the group cracked down.

AQAP established the Hisbah, or the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice.[49] Its enforcers roamed the streets in cars they had stolen during their entry into Mukalla, intimidating people, looting and making sure that unmarried men and women were not mixing.[50] Women’s faces on advertisements were blacked out, and prayer advice appeared on bridges.[51] By late 2015, the hudud punishments that Al-Wuhayshi had once warned against implementing were being routinely enforced. A woman was stoned to death for adultery, other women were killed as accused witches, men were publicly flogged, and journalists, radio presenters, and opposition figures were detained or killed.[52]

Hearts and Minds; Money and Electricity

AQAP’s attempt to win over Mukalla’s citizens with competence and cash followed a similar trajectory: an initial period of success followed by deep disillusionment. AQAP-affiliated jurists quickly worked through an extensive backlog of cases in Mukalla’s court systems. For citizens who were used to a corrupt and slow moving system, plagued by nepotism and secret deals, this was a welcome change.[53]

As in Abyan in 2011, AQAP also prioritized service provision. Within days of taking over, AQAP asked employees at the electrical company to return to work and to provide a written list of what they needed to improve production and service – by Tawfeek Al-Ganad, Gregory D. Johnsen, Muhammed al-Katheri

https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/12247

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

(A H)

One new case of coronavirus reported, 2,102 in total

http://en.adenpress.news/news/31944

(** B H)

[from Dec. 4, 2020] How war-torn Yemen managed to become Covid-free

“In one of the most baffling turn of events in a pandemic that has constantly turned up surprises,” says The Times, “the disease has apparently disappeared from Yemen as fast as it came.”
Six months ago, the international community feared the worst for the Middle East nation. “Coronavirus could spread faster, wider and with deadlier consequences in Yemen,” the BBC reported in June.

Aid workers believed that Covid-19 would tear through a country in which millions of people had no access to toilets or clean water, let alone healthcare - and in which cholera, malaria and dengue fever already ran rampant. Some were “forecasting a 90% infection rate”, according to The Guardian.
By late summer, however, hope was beginning to emerge. “There’s no corona in Yemen,” a resident in the capital Sana’a told Alex Crawford of Sky News in September.
Most Yemenis seemed to agree, and in the “bustling” old city “literally no one” was wearing a face mask. Even so, Crawford concluded, “it is difficult to believe that the country - which is suffering the world’s largest humanitarian disaster - has managed to bring it under control”.
Now, though, international observers seem more hopeful. “So far the war-torn country appears to have emerged relatively unscathed by the pandemic, reporting just 2,124 cases and 611 deaths” as of last week, says The Guardian.
While testing and data collection are “almost nonexistent”, the paper adds, doctors and health officials say “the virus is not a pressing concern”. Other measures suggest the true death toll is higher, but not by an order of magnitude.
Research conducted by the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine put the number of excess deaths at 2,100 by the end of September. Most of these fatalities are thought to have occurred early in the pandemic.
Why the outbreak has subsided remains unclear. The World Health Organization (WHO) “pours cold water on claims that so many people have already caught the disease that Yemen has become the first sizeable nation to acquire herd immunity”, says The Times.
Other theories seem no more credible, with the decline in Covid cases attributed to everything from recreational drug use to age demographics. “There’s a firm belief here that quat - which gives the user an amphetamine ‘high’ - can help ward off the crippling disease,” says Sky News. A doctor quoted in The Guardian “says ‘high morale’ and a population that skews young have kept Yemenis safe”.
Youth and the absence of obesity almost certainly helped, but “some doctors here insist that the herd immunity theory is feasible”, The Times reports – by Holden Frith

https://www.theweek.co.uk/108886/coronavirus-how-yemen-become-covid-free = http://en.adenpress.news/art/69

(A H)

A new coronavirus wave is hitting Sana’a amidst Houthi blackout /Aden Alghad.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-44319

(B H)

COVID-19 Movement Restrictions: Yemen Mobility Restriction Dashboard #19 (30 Dec 2020)

Updates on numbers of new cases in areas controlled by Sana’a DFA are not available.
• 789 migrants arrived at southern governorates (Shabwah, Abyan, and Lahj).
• No IDP Households reported COVID-19 as the reason of displacement. So far, the total number of IDPs who have cited COVID-19 as the primary reason for displacement is 1,550 households (see RDT Dashboard for more information).

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/covid-19-movement-restrictions-yemen-mobility-restriction-dashboard-19-30-dec-2020

cp2 Allgemein / General

(* A K P)

Interactive Map of Yemen War

https://yemen.liveuamap.com/

(* A K)

MILITARY SITUATION IN YEMEN ON JANUARY 4, 2021 (MAP UPDATE)

https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-january-4-2021-map-update/

MILITARY SITUATION IN YEMEN ON JANUARY 3, 2021 (MAP UPDATE)

https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-january-3-2021-map-update/

(* B H P)

World leaders can still avert famine in Yemen. Here’s how…

Everyone here understands that the war is what is ultimately driving the country towards famine. Because Yemen is not starving. It is being starved.

On the ground in Yemen, we have watched for nearly six years as bombs and bullets have shattered the nation’s ability to feed itself.

We work with fishermen like Suleiman, who abandoned the seas off the Red Coast province of Hodeidah because airstrikes and sea mines were killing his friends while they fished.

We work with farmers, who are being bombed in their own fields. Food imports – in a country 90 percent dependent on them – are being choked by restrictions, fees, and double inspections. A political tug-of-war over fuel is preventing crops from being irrigated or transported to markets. Aid agencies are being blocked from reaching hungry communities, and food prices are shooting up.

Those who have jobs are often not paid for them: an estimated half a million doctors, teachers, and other public servants have not received a salary in four years. One social worker we spoke to used to register vulnerable people for welfare support; now he is crowded into another family’s shelter and collecting plastic bottles for cash.

We are close to, but not beyond, the point of no return. World leaders can prevent a famine if they do four concrete things.

First, lift the blockages on vital supplies. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other nations that work with the Saud Arabia and United Arab Emirates-led coalition must broker an agreement to use fuel revenues for paying public servants, and mobilise an economic rescue package. This would bring food prices under control and enable Yemen to import enough to feed itself.

Second, restore aid so organisations like mine can assist people who need it. Gulf countries embroiled in this war have stumped up just a fraction of last year’s funds while starvation is spreading. Meanwhile United States assistance to northern areas controlled by Ansar Allah (otherwise known as the Houthis), home to 80 percent of the country’s population of around 30 million, remains suspended.

These severe cuts mean that over eight million people being supported by aid organisations have seen their food rations halved. Fathers tell us they are going hungry so their children can eat. In 2018, a scale-up in aid helped stave off famine. We need the same generous response again at this critical tipping point.

Third, end impunity.

Fourth and most urgent of all, stop the fighting. What is happening here in Yemen will be a test of our shared humanity. For nearly six years, Yemeni people have been shouldering an enormous burden. They are exhausted, grieving, and feel abandoned.

We can stand by and let this war rage on, blighting millions of lives and making Yemen a byword for death and failure. Or we can act to finally end it – by Mohammed Abdi, Yemen Country Director for the Norwegian Refugee Council

https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2021/01/06/yemen-famine-aid-funding-conflict

(* B K P)

2020 was another deadly year for Yemen with Saudi and UAE in the spotlight

As the conflict in Yemen enters its sixth year, civilians continue to bear the brunt of international inaction.

Amidst an ongoing global pandemic, 2020 was an even worse year for the people of Yemen.

https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/2020-was-another-deadly-year-for-yemen-with-saudi-and-uae-in-the-spotlight-43016

(* B P)

With Yemen on the precipice, ‘unity’ is the only path to survival

But there is more than violence that threatens this new government. They need to hold the various coalition partners together long enough to effectively engage the Houthis, which are in control in the north. What we can say is that this cabinet offers a new opportunity to build trust between the various factions sufficiently enough to ensure that none is tempted to resort to violence to gain leverage again. As more factions are given a voice and opportunities to share power within this government, less contentious initiatives like supporting suffering Yemenis and restoring basic services can also resume.

It is also important to examine where and how things can go wrong. The lack of trust between factions stems from long standing local rivalries that predate the most recent conflict, as well as influence exerted by external actors, notably the Saudis and the Emiratis.

As political arrangements in the agreement are set, the implementation of the military and security forces is vital for the new government’s survival and success. Battles between the former government and STC forces have led to much bloodshed and bad faith in the Aden, Abyan, and Shabwa regions. Each side tried to wrest military control of Aden as leverage in order to avoid dealing with the political demands of the other.

To the benefit of all sides, it became clear that using military force would not end the conflict.

The Role of the United States

It is critical that the new Biden administration alter its stance towards the conflict and the United States support of Saudi Arabia. Ignoring the various factions that have a stake in the conflict, supporting Saudi attacks that have killed civilians, and blindly backing the Saudis assault on Houthi territory is not an option.

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/01/06/with-yemen-on-the-precipice-unity-is-the-only-path-to-survival/

(* B K P)

Yemen: a new government, and a distant peace

In addition to the power-sharing component, other aspects of the agreement include military directives, guarantees, and measures to ensure security and prevent further clashes between the unit's factions. The merging of the transitional council forces in the ministries of defense and interior; The members of the Southern Transitional Council joined the security and counterterrorism forces in Aden. As well as directives to deposit all state revenues.

However, events since the formation of the government indicated that the decision is far from being reached, including the explosion that coincided with the arrival of the new government by plane to Aden airport on December 30, 2020, which resulted in the death of 26 people, including two ICRC employees.

However, no party has claimed responsibility for the attack, but the finger of blame is pointing towards the Houthis.

"inevitable" Riyadh agreement, which he says is the final hegemony of the National Salvation Government.

According to his books in the Middle East Monitor: "With blame all the other side not to fulfill their obligations under the Convention, it is clear that the de facto government in Sanaa is gaining political and senior military hand despite the external support massive that you receive Hadi South and the Transitional Council of Rathma government. ”

He added that despite the limited external support enjoyed by the National Salvation Government, it was able to carry out military maneuvers that caused significant disruption, militarily, including cross-border attacks on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

However, others argue that the Aden airport explosion, which was clearly targeting the new government, may not have been the Houthis' hand, as other parties may have gained from this bombing.

For his part, Zvi Barel of Haaretz newspaper says that the UAE is involved, as is the Southern Transitional Council, as some within the council have reservations about the unity deal, believing that the interests of the northern tribes will be given priority at the expense of the south, while there will be a sharing of their oil and gas resources.

Barel adds that the Southern Transitional Council, as well as the Houthis, possess the ability to carry out the attack. He had previously warned the Deputy Chairman of the Transitional Council, Hani bin Brik, himself against blaming the Houthi forces because “they are not the only side affected by the Riyadh agreement ... Each of Qatar has denounced Turkey will make the agreement public. ”

Evidence has been provided by analysts that could implicate the Southern Transitional Council and the Houthis, but as Adel Dashila, a Yemeni writer and academic researcher, told us in Fanack: “We need an international investigation to find out who is responsible for this attack.”

In the long term, however, there will be pressure to form a new Yemeni government to reach a political solution, Dachila said. He added, "This depends on the implementation of the security and military aspects of the Riyadh Agreement. If the Saudis implement these aspects, I think the Yemeni government will pressure the Houthis to accept a political solution and peace deals, either through negotiation or the military option.

https://fanack.com/ar/yemen/governance-and-politics-of-yemen/yemen%e2%80%8c-%e2%80%8chas%e2%80%8c-%e2%80%8ca%e2%80%8c-%e2%80%8cnew%e2%80%8c-%e2%80%8cgovernment/

(A P T)

The [Hadi] government has announce the increase of the death [and injured] toll from Aden airport attack to 135. /Nabdh al-Share’a.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-44336

(B P T)

Yemeni ambassador: Some victims of Aden Airport attack shot by snipers

A Yemeni ambassador has revealed that some of the victims killed in the attack on Aden International Airport were in fact shot by snipers.

Ambassador Abdullah Sallam Al-Hakimi said, that the Saudi-led coalition confiscated all the camera recordings and videos, in order to erase evidence of attacks on Aden Airport, pointing out that the attacks were carefully planned and organised.

Al-Hakimi confirmed that some military leaders and persons were shot in the head during the attack.

https://hodhodyemennews.net/2021/01/06/yemeni-ambassador-some-victims-of-aden-airport-attack-shot-by-snipers/

My comment: By a pro-Houthi source. They do not tell who this ambassadorclaiming this actually is – i.e. where this claim really comes from.

(* A P)

Yemen: Seeking justice for Aden airport attack

The Gulf Centre for Human Rights calls on authorities to hold to account the perpetrators of the attack on Aden International Airport that left at least 25 dead, including Yemeni journalist Adeeb Al-Janani.

Among the victims was journalist Adeeb Al-Janani, a correspondent for the Belqees satellite channel, according to local reports which stated that he was killed after being hit by shrapnel in the abdomen, while he was at the southern gate of Aden airport.

In addition, the Minister of Information in the government of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi announced in a tweet that there were ten other journalists who were wounded by the attack.

Among those injured was journalist Sadiq Al-Ratibi, a correspondent for the Yemen Satellite Channel, who suffered a severe injury to his foot and is in urgent need of special and immediate health care.

Among the injured is a spokeswoman for the Red Cross in Yemen, Yara Khawaja

https://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/2566 = https://ifex.org/yemen-seeking-justice-for-aden-airport-attack/

and

(A P)

Yemeni journalist killed, nine wounded in Aden airport explosions

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls for an international investigation into the circumstances in which a TV reporter died and nine other journalists were wounded in a series of explosions at the airport in the southern Yemeni city of Aden that greeted the arrival of a new unity government on a flight from Saudi Arabia on 30 December.

https://rsf.org/en/news/yemeni-journalist-killed-nine-wounded-aden-airport-explosions

(? B K P)

Saudi-led coalition loses its grip on Yemen

The Houthis are making gains in Yemen’s war as the Saudi-led forces face Iranian intervention and discord within the coalition. Will the Biden presidency change the West’s support for Saudi Arabia?

The defeat, at least on the symbolic level, of the coalition and its various allies in an asymmetrical conflict has helped strengthen the Houthi camp and fragment the broad spectrum of its adversaries (paywalled)

https://mondediplo.com/2021/01/04yemen

(* B P)

We (still) need to talk about Yemen

“We barely survived, we starved, we suffered and we were tormented and yet we kept saying Thank God!” one of the 3.6 million Yemenis who had to flee their homes because of the conflict in Yemen.

We need to talk about Yemen because this conflict can’t continue to be a “forgotten” one but also because Yemenis can’t only be seen as victims of a war which was forced upon them. Yemenis are resilient, they are showing it every day.

End of 2020, the EU launched an awareness raising campaign. “The idea behind the communication campaign We need to talk about Yemen is simple: in the past five years, Yemen and Yemenis have seldom received the international attention they deserve. They have rarely had the chance of telling their own stories, of talking about their personal struggles, resilience or talents. For far too long, Yemen has been a crisis we didn't hear much about, a forgotten conflict. By launching this campaign, we want to try to address this imbalance. We want to talk about Yemen, and more importantly – listen to what Yemenis have to tell us,” said EU High Representative Vice-President Josep Borrell.

The campaign comes with a virtual exhibition – Phantoms, Ruins and Reflections(link is external) – which was launched with a virtual event(link is external) bringing together Hans Grundberg, Ambassador of the European Union to Yemen, Sama’a Al Hamdani, Founder and Director of The Yemen Cultural Institute for Heritage & the Arts, also curator of the exhibition and Alia Ali, Yemeni-Bosnian-American artist whose work also features in the exhibition. Khadija al-Salami, award winning Yemeni filmmaker moderated the discussion. A message by the then EEAS Secretary-General Helga Schmid opened the event. Watch the launch event here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QIvvkmHmb0k&t=899s(link is external)

Five Yemeni artists feature in this exhibition: Hakim Alakel, Alia Ali, Obeid Salem, Ziryab Al-Ghabri, and Sarah Al-Aulaqi. Each bring their own talents to show us perhaps a different side of Yemen.

During the online launch event, then EEAS Secretary-General Helga Schmid reiterated the European Union’s support to Yemenis: “We have not only been helping Yemenis with their immediate needs and daily life challenges, but we support them also to build up their future.”

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/91143/we-still-need-talk-about-yemen_fr

My comment: The EU better should stop selling arms which keep the Yemen slaughter going on than spreading propaganda like “the European Union’s support to Yemenis”.

(? B P)

A New Government Was Meant to Bring Hope to Yemen. But Then Aden Airport Was Attacked

The deadly attack exposes a tangled web of interests and agendas, with the roles of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia – and Israel – are as unclear as ever

Even though no one has claimed responsibility, the huge explosion that rocked the airport in Aden Wednesday, killing at least 26 people and injuring dozens more, was attributed to the Houthis.

The blast was well-timed to “welcome” the new Yemeni cabinet (paywalled)

https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-new-government-was-meant-to-bring-hope-to-yemen-but-then-aden-airport-was-attacked-1.9422077

(* B K P)

Yemen Government has Tough Road Ahead

But the newly formed government of the poorest country in the Middle East faces towering political, security, and economic challenges. Let’s have a look at these challenges

Humanitarian crisis

Crumbling Economy- Yemen is facing unprecedented economic and financial challenges, precipitated by the intensification of conflict since September 2014. The economy has also been hit by inflation, with Yemen’s currency is being traded at approximately 750 against the US dollar in the government-controlled areas. That has placed many essential goods out of reach of common people as Yemen imports 90% of its staple food. Trade has nosedived and investment is almost non-existent. Hydrocarbon production which used to be 125,000 barrels per day before the start of the conflict and accounted for 90% of exports in 2015, is expected to continue to decline.

Political Instability- For the time being it seems that all the anti-Houthis forces i.e., Government headed by President Abd-Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, Southern separatist STC, and main Sunni Islamist party Islah are united and part of the new government. But to balance a decentralized federalist state that provides equal degrees of autonomy and resource sharing to southern separatists, northern tribes, and other traditionally independent regions in Yemen will be a tight rope walk. Any Yemeni national leader should be capable of “dancing on the heads of snakes,” as the late president Ali Abdullah Saleh described the challenge of governing the poor and divided country.

Military Pressure- Yemen’s government troops and the Houthi militia are constantly engaged in regular confrontation at multiple fronts especially in the country’s southwestern province of Taiz and near the oil-rich region of Marib.

https://ekurd.net/yemen-government-tough-road-2021-01-04 = https://dailytimes.com.pk/710579/new-yemen-government-has-major-challenges-ahead/

My comment: Absurd propaganda at the end spoils the article.

(* B P)

Report: Who did lay bloody carpet for new Hadi cabinet in Aden?

Despite the fact that so far no individual or group claimed responsibility for the attack, Saudi and Hadi government’s officials attributed it to the Ansarullah resistance movement in a bid to prevent early collapse of the newly-formed government and thus cover up the big defeat in Yemen’s political scene.

Doubtlessly, key implications of the attack, which unconfirmed reports say killed the new interior minister, are the intensification of the distrust between the forces present in the new accord, emergence of the wide divisions, and destabilization of the future coalition cabinet and agreements.

The main driver behind Saudi Arabia’s push for a fast end to the divisions through putting pressure on Hadi is keeping the Arab coalition focus on Ma’arib developments and prevention of fall of the strategic province to Ansarullah which holds the capital Sana’a and much of the north along with the army and other popular resistance forces.

The agreement is, however, far from satisfactory to the STC because the council not only does not intend to hand over Socotra— where the UAE has a military base— but also it does not plan to withdraw from its controlled areas as it would interpret the exit as undoing its gains which are necessary to declare potential independence from the north. Days before the blast, the STC forces said they were opposed to the position of the new government in Aden.

Therefore, the main suspect of the attack is the southern council which itself also is responsible for the security of the airport. Also, it should be remembered that the Saudi plan to deploy the STC militant loyalists to Ma’arib, which is the traditional bastion of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, is not with the full will of the UAE and the STC is unhappy with undermining the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Islah Party position there.

On the other side, the Islah party sees itself as the losing party of the Saudi-brokered deal because its share in the government was reduced, and it was only under the Saudi pressure and a fear of losing Ma’arib that it agreed with the deal.

https://en.abna24.com/news//report-who-did-lay-bloody-carpet-for-new-hadi-cabinet-in-aden_1102828.html

(* B P)

Infographic: Media Freedom Observatory: As many as 143 violations of media freedom were documented in #Yemen in 2020, including the killing of 3 #journalists, 11 death sentences against journalists, 7 cases of abduction, and 11 cases of detention.

https://twitter.com/RepYemenEnglish/status/1345804331065499649

(A P)

Jemenitische Bürger des Stadtteils Al-Jahmiliya, des am meisten zerstörten Stadtviertels in Taez, zündeten am Weihnachtstag Hunderte von Kerzen an, um die Aufmerksamkeit der Welt den Krieg in ihrem Land zu lenken. (photo)

https://de.euronews.com/2020/12/26/kerzen-gegen-den-krieg

(* B P)

[from 2018] Women, Peace and Security in Yemen

A brief summary of the existing literature on the following topics, commenting on the strength of the evidence, and the robustness of methodologies used to conduct research on women, peace and security (WPS) in Yemen to date. • What factors (including violence against women and girls and the involvement of women/girls in combat roles) are driving and inhibiting the level and nature of engagement of women in peace-building and stabilisation activities; • How these vary across contexts (geographical, social, sector, etc.) and for what reasons; • How the conflict has affected/influenced women's engagement and the related drivers, for instance through women's experience of violence, or altering gender norms; • Whether there has been any backlash, including violent backlash, to women's engagement in Yemen; • Whether there is any evidence for how effective women's engagement in peacebuilding is in Yemen and the reasons for this; • The potential risks of enhanced women's involvement in peacebuilding going forward; • If available, any evidence of what has worked in the past to increase women's engagement in peacebuilding.

Research on WPS in Yemen tends to be geographically limited with a focus on the Western/Highland region and the Tribal South, with less research in other parts of Yemen. This makes it hard to understand geographical differences and experiences of women in other parts of Yemen.

Research on WPS in Yemen tends to depict women as passive and primarily peaceful actors, with little consideration of them as political actors and as potential influencers and contributors to the conflict.

The conflict has had a largescale negative impact on women and their rights, including in leading to increased insecurity, VAWG, restrictions on movements and poverty.

Women have shown political skills by taking advantage of key opportunities to advocate for their rights, including during the Arab Spring. This provides a platform and has set an example to inspire other women going forward.

Women’s participation in the National Dialogue led to key gender inequality legislations being successfully challenged, such as the low age of marriage for girls. However, these were never approved due to the escalation of the conflict. Women’s rights advocates had campaigned for this for decades.

Women are often able to navigate conservative social norms and be active in a number of ways at the local level, including as combatants, negotiating humanitarian access and providing humanitarian relief.

The space for women’s participation has shrunk rapidly since the National Dialogue concluded in January 2014, with all actors currently seeing women’s rights and participation as of secondary importance. This limits the opportunities available for women to influence at the national level.

In Yemen, as in many other countries in the region, there has been a negative backlash against women’s rights activists, with violence and intimidation reported across Yemen.

https://www.academia.edu/40429711/Women_Peace_and_Security_in_Yemen

(* A H)

IOM Delivers Essential Anti-malarial Drugs to Struggling Health Centres in Yemen

On Monday, 4 January 2020 a cargo plane, chartered by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), arrived in Sana’a International Airport, carrying 6.7 tonnes of anti-malarial drugs to be distributed to over 1,500 health facilities across Yemen. This essential medication is entering the country through an IOM-managed programme with support from the Global Fund’s Middle East Response Project.

Since 2017, IOM has implemented the Middle East Response Project funded by the Global Fund to support national programmes in the implementation of HIV, TB and malaria activities in five countries, including Yemen. The Global Fund’s Middle East Response Project aims to deliver uninterrupted care for essential services through the provision of diagnostic, treatment and prevention services, in often challenging operating environments.

Yemen’s public health system is at breaking point, with most Yemenis struggling to access health care. Basic medicines and medical supplies are in high demand but short supply. The COVID-19 pandemic has affected the global supply chain of essential drugs and medicines, already made more difficult in Yemen as the supply chain is already disrupted by war and conflict.

The drugs airlifted in by IOM will be utilized by Yemen’s National Malaria Control Programme (NMCP) to treat more than 200,000 people affected by malaria.

https://rocairo.iom.int/pbn/iom-delivers-essential-anti-malarial-drugs-struggling-health-centres-yemen

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

(* B K P)

YPC: 2020 Year of Saudi-American Criminal Piracy, National Economy Losses Amounted to 10 Billion Dollars

Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) held a press conference, "2020, the year of criminal piracy and gross violations under international cover", revealing that the losses of the national economy amounted to 10 billion affected various sectors as a result of the continuing piracy practices under the cover of the United Nations.

The [Sanaa gov.] Minister of Oil and Minerals, Ahmed Dars, said, "Yemen is exposed to all humanitarian violations and appeals and claims regarding oil derivatives to the UN organization has not been responded to."

He added that the detentions of fuel ships incurred large fines, and some of them amounted to more than the value of the oil derivatives the ship carried. He mentioned that there is unprecedented maritime piracy in the world, in agreement with their mercenaries, to suffocate the Yemeni People and deepen their suffering, and then be exploited in the media through their platforms and blame us.

https://english.almasirah.net/post/17017/YPC-2020-Year-of-Saudi-American-Criminal-Piracy%2C-National-Economy-Losses-Amounted-to-10-Billion

and also https://www.saba.ye/en/news3123417.htm

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

Siehe / Look at cp1

(* B H K)

Amal Hussain - Das Gesicht der Kinder des Jemen

Ihr ausgemergelter Körper, die dünnen Arme in einer Geste der Hilflosigkeit und Erschöpfung auf ihrer Brust liegend, ihren Kopf zur Seite gedreht, ist es ihr Blick in eine scheinbare weit weg liegende Ferne, der berührt. Ihr Gesichtsausdruck ist ernst, auf eine unbeschreibliche Weise abgeklärt, er strahlt ungebrochene Würde aus, ebenso, wie die Hinnahme von Scheitern. Ihr Gesicht so filigran, wie das eines verblassenden Engels.

Es war das Foto von Tyler Hicks, einem Pulitzerpreis-und darüberhinaus mehrfach preisgekrönten Fotojournalisten der 7-jährigen Amal Hussain in einer Reportage der New York Times, das erstmals das Scheinwerferlicht der Öffentlichkeit auf die Situation der Kinder im Jemen warf.

Hunger und Mangelernährung, unter denen nach Schätzungen der UN mittlerweile fast 600.000 jemenitischen Kinder leiden, und die auch Amal ins Gesundheitszentrum von Aslam gebracht haben, sind nur unzureichend mit der Armut des Landes zu erklären, oder durch Katastrophen verursacht. Sie sind vielmehr eine Folge der militärischen Intervention und es ist zulässig, sie als eine menschengemachte Folgewirkung zu bezeichnen.

Neben dem Bombardement und der Zerstörung der Infrastruktur, darunter zivile Einrichtungen, wie Spitäler, Wasserversorgungen, Schulen, Felder, Fischerboote, hat in erster Linie die über den Jemen verhängte Blockade zum Zusammenbruch der Wirtschaft geführt. Einbehaltene Gehälter, Inflation, horrend steigende Preise für Lebensmittel und Kraftstoff haben für Familien den Kauf von Nahrungsmitteln vielfach unerschwinglich gemacht. Hunger ist die Folge.

Hunger, unter dem auch Amal jahrelang gelitten hat.

Am 23. Oktober 2018 wurde Amal Hussain, immer noch krank, aus dem Gesundheitszentrum Aslam entlassen. Man riet ihrer Mutter Mariam Ali Hussain, sie in ein 24 Kilometer entferntes Krankenhaus der Ärzte ohne Grenzen, besser ausgestattet, mit einem Röntgengerät, nach Abs, zu bringen.

Die Familie war nicht in der Lage, das Geld dafür aufzubringen, sie sah keinen anderen Ausweg und nahm Amal mit zurück nach Hause. Drei Tage später, am 26. Oktober 2018 war sie tot

https://publikum.net/https-publikum-net-p-f9bcf83b-fcaa-4fa4-a605-ff5b4296e77c/

(* B H K P)

Krise in Jemen: Endloser Konflikt und drohende Hungersnot

Hier sind fünf Gründe, die International Rescue Committee dazu bewogen haben, Jemen als das Land mit der größten humanitären Katastrophe im Jahr 2021 einzustufen.

Aktuelle Lage in Jemen

80 % der mehr als 29 Millionen Jemenit*innen sind auf humanitäre Hilfe angewiesen.

20,5 Millionen Menschen haben keinen Zugang zu sauberem Wasser und sanitären Einrichtungen.

50% der Gesundheitseinrichtungen sind beschädigt.

53,2 % der Kinder sind unterernährt, was ihr gesundes Wachstum gefährdet

Humanitäre Risiken 2021

„Nie zuvor haben die Jemenit*innen so wenig Unterstützung durch die internationale Gemeinschaft erhalten - oder waren mit so vielen Herausforderungen gleichzeitig konfrontiert“, sagt Fowzi. Hier sind fünf Gründe, warum der Jemen im Jahr 2021 das Land ist, das am meisten von einer humanitären Katastrophe bedroht ist - und das schon das dritte Jahr in Folge:

Die ins Stocken geratenen Friedensbemühungen und der Wettbewerb um die Kontrolle der jemenitischen Ölfelder bergen die Gefahr einer Eskalation der Gewalt und eines noch größeren humanitären Bedarfs.

Die sich immer weiter verschärfende Wirtschaftskrise in Jemen und die Treibstoffknappheit könnten die Ölfelder von Marib im Jahr 2021 zu einem besonderen Brennpunkt für Konflikte machen. Mindestens 90.000 Menschen wurden im Jahr 2020 in Marib vertrieben. Diese Zahlen werden steigen, wenn sich die Kämpfe auf dichter besiedelte Gebiete ausweiten. Anhaltende Spannungen im Süden des Landes zwischen der Regierung und Gruppen, die mit dem Southern Transitional Council verbündet sind, lösen ebenfalls sporadische Kämpfe aus, die das Leben und die Lebensgrundlage der Bevölkerung bedrohen.

Jemenit*innen sagen IRC, dass sie sich mehr Sorgen um den Hunger als um COVID-19 machen. Dabei erhöht die Pandemie das Risiko einer Hungersnot, da sie die Wirtschaftskrise in Jemen vertieft.

Der Krieg hat die Lebensgrundlage vieler Jemenit*innen zerstört, so dass über 80 % der Bevölkerung auf humanitäre Hilfe angewiesen sind. Der Rial, die jemenitische Währung, hat allein im Jahr 2020 25% seines Wertes verloren. Steigende Treibstoffpreise und Lieferengpässe treiben die Kosten für Lebensmittel in die Höhe und behindern humanitäre Einsätze. Die Pandemie schränkt die Möglichkeiten der Menschen, ihren Lebensunterhalt zu verdienen, weiter ein. Fast 17.000 Menschen sind bereits von einer Hungersnot bedroht. Diese Zahl könnte bis Juni auf bis zu 47.000 ansteigen.

Frauen und Mädchen werden wahrscheinlich unverhältnismäßig stark betroffen sein, da der Jemen in Bezug auf das Wohlergehen von Frauen weltweit am schlechtesten abschneidet. Eine Million schwangere Frauen sind unterernährt. 120.000 Frauen und Mädchen sind von Gewalt bedroht.

https://de.rescue.org/artikel/krise-jemen-endloser-konflikt-und-drohende-hungersnot

(* B H P)

Towards an alternative vision for the existing educational system in Yemen, From the Empty Bottle Model to Critical Thinking

Upon graduation, Students’ accumulated knowledge from school is almost worthless. In school, they are merely passive recipients and are not provided with the tools needed to develop their skills.

Such a system’s output is usually unhappy graduates who spend years memorizing things they often will never need.

The current generation is living in the shadow of the worst humanitarian and educational disaster ever. Millions of children in Yemen have been deprived of formal education for years.

Moreover, millions of families live below the poverty line, making sending children to school a challenge.

In general, providing education in areas of armed conflict throughout Yemen is a challenge. But what makes it worse in areas controlled by the Houthis, in particular, is their use of schools for mobilization of child soldiers and ideologizing school curricula and activities. Furthermore, the media reports that they started the privatization of public schools. These are all crimes against the new generation’s future, which can be added to Houthis’ criminal record of murder and oppression.

What must be done immediately is finding all the available means and opportunities that can be created, not only to ensure the continuity of education but most importantly to develop it and to find alternative methods that contribute to the upbringing of a generation that can make a worthy life out of its future rather than losing its present.

To sum up, although education, regardless of its degree of quality and competence, is a right for every child, it is essential to emphasize that Yemen needs education based on quality, not just quantity. We should focus on training teachers and students on critical thinking and dialogue. We should enforce mutual respect and recognition of each individual’s independence, dignity, and mental and psychological competence and refine their various skills. This type of education will create a conscious generation, capable of making a change and immune to manipulating propaganda used by political and ideological groups today, which have led the country to the current state of political, economic, moral, and cultural deterioration.

https://fanack.com/towards-an-alternative-vision-for-the-existing-educational-system-in-yemen/

(* B H)

UN: Hundreds of thousands of Yemen children will die within months

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) yesterday warned that children in Yemen would die within "months" due to lack of humanitarian assistance.

"Without urgent action, hundreds of thousands of children in Yemen will die in the coming months," OCHA said on Twitter.

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210106-un-hundreds-of-thousands-of-yemen-children-will-die-within-months/

https://twitter.com/UNOCHA/status/1345994551346012161

(* B H)

Number of Yemeni children with Leukemia increased from 300 to 700 in Sanaa

The Pediatric Leukemia Treatment Center in Sanaa revealed an increase in cases of leukemia patients among children from 300 to 700 cases, as a result of the US-Saudi use of internationally prohibited weapons, including the airstrikes in Attan and Naqum.
The airstrikes resulted in the injury of a thousand children in the rest of the governorates as well.
The center’s director, Dr. Abd Al-Rahman al-Hadi, said that since its opening in 2014, the center has received about “1000” cases, 400 cases are frequently in the center, stressing that 30% of the cases died as a result of their delay in treatment and also as a result of the blockade that prevented them from receiving treatment abroad.
According to al-Hadi, the Leukemia Treatment Center in Sanaa suffers from tremendous pressure that exceeds its capacity because it is the only specialized center in Yemen, as the large numbers of patients coming from different governorates exceed the available capacity and medical supplies.
He held the Coalition of Aggression responsible for the death of injured children as a result of preventing the entry of their medicines.

https://en.abna24.com/news//number-of-yemeni-children-with-leukemia-increased-from-300-to-700-in-sanaa_1103578.html

(B H)

FAO Project Highlights: Yemen - Support to the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (OSRO/YEM/903/USA)

FSAC continued playing vital role in collecting, analysing and sharing information important for cluster partners, stakeholders and the wider humanitarian community to make informed, evidence-based and strategic decisions.

  • Successfully coordinated the delivery of emergency food assistance and/or livelihood support to 13.4 million vulnerable Yemenis, including in hard-to-reach areas.
  • Supported, equipped and strengthened capacity of cluster partners to respond to hazards or new shocks, and improved the quality of the food security response.
  • Enhanced inter-cluster collaboration and strengthening of linkages and convergence of programming with Nutrition, Health and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Clusters.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/fao-project-highlights-yemen-support-food-security-and-agriculture-cluster

(* B H)

Die Straße: Lebensader und gefährliches Chaos

Das Leben der Stadt Abs spielt rund um die große Straße - nachdem sie die Berge im Süden verlassen hat, führt sie gerade und flach ins Land Richtung Norden bis zur Grenze mit Saudi Arabien. Sie ist die Hauptschlagader der kleinen Stadt in der Provinz Hadscha im Nordjemen. Die Straße bestimmt hier alles: Über sie kommen die Versorgungsgüter für die Menschen der umliegenden Bezirke an, auf der Straße finden Märkte und fliegender Handel an den Fenstern der ankommenden Busse und Autos statt. Und auf ihr treffen jeden Monat Dutzende, ja Hunderte Familien aus der ganzen Region auf der Suche nach medizinischer Versorgung ein, die immer schwieriger zu finden ist und von der oft das Leben eines ihrer Mitglieder abhängt.

Die Zahl der Patient*innen, die wir in Abs behandeln, wächst stetig an. Das Krankenhaus ist in der stark vom Bürgerkrieg betroffenen Region zu einer Art Leuchtturm geworden, der sich bemüht, den großen Mangel an Gesundheitszentren in der Gegend auszugleichen. So ist es zurzeit die Anlaufstelle für etwa 1,5 Millionen Menschen.

Maryam und ihre Mutter sind vor vier Jahren aus ihrem Dorf geflohen, nachdem sie gesehen hatten, wie ihre Nachbar*innen getötet wurden. "Wir mussten uns entscheiden, ob wir bleiben und die Nächsten sind oder ob wir nur in den Kleidern, die wir in dem Moment anhatten, fliehen sollten", sagt Maryams Mutter.

"Jetzt haben wir praktisch nichts mehr, es gibt Tage, an denen wir etwas Brot zu essen haben, an anderen haben wir nicht einmal das", fügt Maryam hinzu. Sie hat keine Hoffnung mehr, nach Hause zurückkehren zu können.

Nur 25 Kilometer nördlich der besagten Straße befindet sich auch eine der Fronten in diesem Konflikt, der Millionen Menschen gezwungen hat, ihr Zuhause zu verlassen. In der Provinz Hadscha gibt es rund 150.000 vertriebene Menschen, hauptsächlich aus den grenznahen Gebieten, die den bewaffneten Zusammenstößen zwischen den Kämpfenden am stärksten ausgesetzt sind.

Ein großer Teil der im Krankenhaus behandelten Verletzungen wurden nicht durch den Krieg, sondern den lebensbedrohlichen Verkehr verursacht.

https://www.aerzte-ohne-grenzen.de/jemen-abs

(A H P)

QRCS provides life-saving medical assistance for patients with hydrocephalus in Yemen

Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS) has inaugurated a project to help the patients with hydrocephalus in Sana’a, the capital city of Yemen.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/qrcs-provides-life-saving-medical-assistance-patients-hydrocephalus-yemen-enar

(* B H)

Yemeni boy, ravaged by hunger, weighs 7 kg

Paralysed and severely malnourished, seven-year-old Faid Samim lies curled up on a hospital bed in the Yemeni capital Sanaa, having barely survived the journey there. “He was almost gone when he arrived but thank God we were able to do what was necessary and he started improving. He is suffering from CP (cerebral palsy) and severe malnutrition,” said Rageh Mohammed, the supervising doctor of the Al-Sabeen hospital’s malnutrition ward. Faid weighs only 7 kg (just over 15 lb) and his tiny, fragile frame takes up barely a quarter of a folded hospital blanket. His family had to travel from Al-Jawf, 170 km (105 miles) north of Sanaa, through checkpoints and damaged roads, to get him there. Unable to afford Faid’s medication or treatment, the family relies on donations to get him treated. Mohammed says malnutrition cases are on the rise and impoverished parents are forced to rely on the kindness of strangers or international aid to get their children treated (with film)

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-health-malnutrition/yemeni-boy-ravaged-by-hunger-weighs-7-kg-idUSKBN2991AM?rpc=401&

Photos: https://www.news18.com/photogallery/buzz/heartbreaking-photos-of-severely-malnourished-7-year-old-boy-give-peek-into-yemens-crisis-3253439.html

(* B H)

From the Houthi-controlled areas to the legitimate government-controlled areas, the corruption of international organizations goes beyond geography: In the photos, a truck carrying 387 sacks of spoiled wheat, which is not suitable for human use, belonging to the World Food Organization (WFP) has been stopped while it is on its way to distribute to the displaced in Al-Tuhaita district, south of Al Hudaydah (photos)

https://twitter.com/baseem_aljenani/status/1346047412587159552

2187 cartons of different types of biscuits belonging to the United Nations Population Fund UNFPA were destroyed in hodeidah which had expired in the warehouses and were destroyed while thousands of citizens suffer from deprivation of aid in situations of poverty and displacement (photos)

https://twitter.com/baseem_aljenani/status/1345694993307095042

In the photos, 7 thousand and 40 cartons of food supplements belonging to international organizations in AL-Hudaydah were destroyed due to poor storage. Consequently, children suffering from malnutrition were deprived of benefiting from it.

https://twitter.com/baseem_aljenani/status/1345752043403833344

https://twitter.com/baseem_aljenani/status/1346490712515350539

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

(B H)

Film: A tragedy story: a Houthi mine kills the life of citizen Abdo and orphans his five children

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8C7gaicgJA

(B H)

Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, 31 December 2020

Since the beginning of the year, to date, UNHCR has assisted over one million displaced Yemenis through its cash assistance programme.

UNHCR and partners provided non-food items (NFIs) to over 16,600 displaced persons in Marib, Al Baydah, Al Dhale’e, Taizz, Aden, Abyan, Shabwah and AlHudaydah governorates, while over 1,000 conflictaffected displaced families in Marib, Lahj and Al Hudaydah were provided with shelter assistance.

Under Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster site improvement activities, UNHCR through partner JAAHD has started providing WASH assistance to 2,191 displaced persons.

Refugee response

Since the beginning of the year, to date, UNHCR has assisted more than 36,500 refugees through its cash assistance programme. During the reporting period, some 120 refugees in Kharaz refugee camp in the south of Yemen received cash assistance.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-unhcr-operational-update-31-december-2020

(A H)

The humanitarian situation for people displaced by the conflict in Marib is dire. To alleviate their suffering, IOM collaborated with its partners, like @eu_echo to provide over 14,400 emergency kits to displaced people in Marib in 2020, through the rapid response mechanism (photo)

https://twitter.com/IOM_Yemen/status/1346104116624420869

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

Siehe / Look at cp1

(A P)

Houthis Abduct Engineers of Safer Oil Company

Iran-backed Houthi theocratic militia has kidnapped on Wednesday, three engineers work for Safer Oil Company and took them to unknown places, the Yemeni news agency said.
According to Saba, the company's statement said the Houghi gunmen abducted two engineers, Ameen al-Maqtari and Jabr al-Adashi at a checkpoint on the road between Sana'a and Marib as the third engineer, Mohammed Fowad was taken by the militia from his house in Sana'a.

http://en.adenpress.news/news/31941

and also https://republicanyemen.net/archives/26775

https://debriefer.net/en/news-22312.html

(A K P)

35 deceived soldiers return home

35 deceived soldiers, who were at the camps of the aggression forces, returned to the capital Sana'a on Tuesday.

The arrival of the deceived soldiers, including officers, came upon the call carried out by the Supreme Political Council (SPC) in response to the general amnesty decree.

https://www.saba.ye/en/news3123256.htm

(* B P)

Analysis: What’s behind Yemeni Ansarullah Anti-Israeli threats?

Yemen's Ansarullah recently announced the resistance movement is ready to release two captive Saudi pilots in return for release of Palestinian Hamas' captives held by Saudi Arabia. One of the important aspects of this suggestion is the open confrontation of Sana’a to the Israeli interests in the Arabian Peninsula and solidarity with the Palestinian resistance.

Since the start of the Saudi military aggression against Yemen on March 26, 2015 in which Saudi Arabia led the Arab coalition under Operation Decisive Storm and then Operation Return of Hope a month later, the Israeli secret role in the war has been under highlight.

This issue became clearer as time went by. In August 2019, Benny Gantz, the then-Israeli foreign minister, in a hearing session of the Knesset’s Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security said that Israel intervened in Yemen in addition to highlighting Tel Aviv’s commitment prevent what he called the Iranian influence in the region.

At the time, Yemeni media shed light on the Israeli role in assassination of Ibrahim Badreddin al-Houthi, the brother of Ansarullah secretary-general. A few months later, Abdul-Malik Badreddin al-Houthi warned the Israelis against any actions against the Yemeni people and threatened to take strong military measures against Tel Aviv.

This confrontation is now in

The Israelis have always put Yemeni developments as one of high priorities in their foreign policy agenda because of their geopolitical and historical isolation in the region and their vital dependence on access to the high seas via the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. The Israeli expansionist temperament that drives its ambition for military domination of the strategic Bab-el-Mandeb Strait between Yemen and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, which is the gate to the Indian Ocean, makes Tel Aviv one of the key influencers in the President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s repression of popular regime, the Saudi-led military campaign, and also the plans to split the war-ravaged country.

Israel's enmity to the anti-dictatorship uprisings in Yemen explain why Ansarullah’s hostility to Tell Aviv is old. In fact, the antipathy to the Israeli regime is not a sole matter of ideology or taking pro-Palestinian stance, rather, it is a matter of national interests that make Ansarullah in deeper bonds with resistant groups in Palestine and Lebanon.

According to a report published in March 2020 by Shaul Shay, an Israeli military historian and the research manager of Institute for Policies and Strategies, the Hezbollah-Ansarullah military cooperation dates back to 2009 and during the sixth Saada war. The bilateral ties even surged when in 2014 the revolutionary movement along with the army took control of the capital Sana’a.

https://en.abna24.com/news//analysis-what%e2%80%99s-behind-yemeni-ansarullah-anti-israeli-threats_1103567.html

(A P)

Houthi militia leaders decide to set up private pharmacies in public hospitals as part of the efforts to exploit all public services to their advantage./Khabar News Agency.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-44319

(A P)

Houthis to collect religious tax on Sana’a sauna services

The Houthi militia have decided to collect the One-Fifth on saunas in Sana’a city as part of the efforts to enforce the religious tax on all sources of income, local sources said.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-44320

(B H P)

Film: Massive obstruction by #Yemen's #Houthi officials in 2020 denied aid agencies unhindered access to millions of people needing life-saving food, water & health services in the midst of the unchecked spread of #COVID19

https://twitter.com/GerrySimpsonHRW/status/1346372164958777346

(A P)

Film: Civilian Zaid Awadh Omar Esa, 60, says Houthi militia killed three of his sons and blew up his home in Mokha town for refusing to allow the militia to use his house as a barrack.

https://twitter.com/RepublicanYemen/status/1346442495585087490

(A P)

Houthi leader criticizes those who picture relationship with Iran as unforgivable crime

Senior leader and negotiator of the Houthi group Abdulmalik Al-Ojari said on Monday the countries that have provoked Arabs and Muslims with normalizing relations with Israel picture the relationship with the axis of resistance, Iran and Syria as an unforgivable crime.
This is a failed way to terrorize those who build relations with countries that take anti-Israel positions, he said, in comments on criticism of his group over marking the first anniversary of the killing of Qasem Soleimani, who was a major general in the Iranian evolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

"Yemen is an independent state, not a backyard of anyone. Yemen and its interests, security, independence, unity and safety are the base of our philosophy to designate friends and enemies," he said.

https://debriefer.net/en/news-22271.html

(A P)

Houthis throttle internet speed to prevent spread of information on abuse

Houthi Shia extremists the capital Sana'a have throttled internet speed for all Yemeni governorates in a bid to prevent the constant spread of information on human rights abuses they commit in their areas of control.

As people in Sana'a are complaining of a reduced internet speed and blockage of voice-over-the –the –internet calls through WhatsApp and Imo, a source in the Yemeni Telecommunication Company confirmed "the reduction of internet speed for all governorates," to limit the spread of information on abuses and at the same time force people to return to the traditional analogue phone line where the militia can censor the calls as well impose the militia's wide range of taxes.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-44297

My comment: I doubt the reasons which are claimed here. The reduction of internet speed also blocks the Houthis themselves from spreading their own propaganda.

(A P)

Houthis kidnap the man the behind the exposure of Khitam's murder

Houthi militants have kidnapped Murad al-Banna the man behind exposure of the story of murdering Khitam al-Eshari, a mother of four, in central Yemen province last December.

Local sources anonymously said the theocratic militants kidnapped al-Banna who published on social media the story of attack by Houthi gunmen on a house in al-Odayn, of Ibb province, and the killing of Khitam, one of the latest crimes that sent shockwaves across the country.

Al-Banna was thrown in the Political Security (intelligence) jail controlled by the militants in Ibb.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-44298

and

(A P)

Houthis attack relatives of woman they killed in her house last month

Houthi militants attacked on Monday the relatives of a 25-year-old woman their colleagues in the terror group had killed in central Yemen's Ibb province last month.

Local sources said militants affiliate to Shaker al-Shabeebi, the Houthi militant who a military campaign that beat Khitam al-Eshari to death in her house, have now beat up her relatives who were in the 'court' to file a lawsuit.

After a social media campaign, the militia's 'Interior Ministry' said the case would be investigated into, only to allow the relatives to speak up and then start besieging their house and harassing the victim's relatives.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-44296

(A P)

Prime Minister: US-Saudi Aggression Lost its Military Battle, Seeks Destroying Government in Yemen

He emphasized that the aggression lost its military battle in Yemen, stressing that we are interested in protecting the internal front, the government and social norms, from penetrations.

In the context, Prime Minister reiterated the fact that the government is currently concerned with directing and controlling its performance in accordance with the constitution and the law.

https://english.almasirah.net/post/16973/Prime-Minister-US-Saudi-Aggression-Lost-its-Military-Battle%2C-Seeks-Destroying-Government-in-Yemen%C2%A0

(A P)

Hadi gov't untrustworthy to rule Yemen: Houthi PM

The Saudi-led coalition seeks to overthrow the Yemeni State, the Houthi-appointed prime minister said Monday.
From the very beginning, the Arab coalition "has worked on toppling the Yemeni State," al-Masyra quoted Abdul Aziz Bin Habtoor as saying.
Events prove that the Yemeni UN-recognized government is "unreliable for Yemen, Yemenis' life and interests, or the country's resources.
"The coalition lost all its military bets in Yemen," the Houthi official said.

https://debriefer.net/en/news-22255.html

(A K P)

Yemen's Houthis say 75 ballistic missiles fired at Saudi cities in 2020

Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi militia said they fired 75 ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia's border cities in 2020, the group's military spokesman Yahya Sarea said in a statement on Monday.

The militia also fired other 178 ballistic missiles at Yemeni cities in the past year, targeting the government military sites, Sarea said in the statement through the group's al-Masirah television.

He also said that his group in the past year launched "267 bomb-laden drone attacks on Saudi Arabia and another 180 drone attacks on the Yemeni government inside the Yemeni cities."

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-01/05/c_139641565.htm

and also https://www.farsnews.ir/en/news/13991016000228/Army-Spkesman-Yemeni-Frces-Lanched-253-Realiary-Missile-Srikes-94

(A K P)

Houthis threaten to strike new targets deep in Saudi Arabia

The military spokesperson for the Ansar Allah group, known as the Houthis, Brig. Gen. Yahya Sarea on Monday said the group has put 10 vital sites deep in Saudi Arabia on its target bank. The sites will be attacked in the future, he said.

Last year, we carried out tens of successful operations withdrones and ballistic and winged missiles against military and other vital targets deep in Saudi Arabia, he said.

We carried out 5.613 drone attacks, including 267 assaults against Saudi targets and 180 assaults on military camps and sites inside Yemen, he said.

https://debriefer.net/en/news-22258.html

and also https://hodhodyemennews.net/2021/01/04/yemen-threatens-to-attack-10-targets-within-saudi-arabia-in-the-next-24-hours/

(A P)

During Yemen’s Annual Martyr Week, Anti-American Sentiment Prevails

As the ongoing war and blockade against their country enters its sixth year, Yemenis are commemorating the annual Martyr Week amid an increasing feeling of hatred and resentment towards the United States, a feeling never seen at this level in the war-torn country.

In Yemen, a country far from the prosperous and bustling United States, the size of cemeteries has increased dramatically in the past five years, with new burial sites springing up to house victims of the weapons supplied by western countries, particularly by the United States, as well as the blockade, hunger, and disease that have accompanied them.

https://english.almasirah.net/post/16961/During-Yemen-s-Annual-Martyr-Week%2C-Anti-American-Sentiment-Prevails

(A P)

Houthi leader attacks countries normalising with Israel

The Houthi leader Abdulmalik Al-Houthi on Sunday renewed his attack on countries that have normalised relations with Israel.
In a speech aired by the Houthi group's mouthpiece Almasirah TV on the anniversary of martyr, he called for cooperation to force US military forces out of the region.
All must be concerned about strengthening cooperation and fraternity to defeat the Israeli enemy and US military bases in the region, he said.

https://debriefer.net/en/news-22235.html

(A P)

Sayyid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi speaks on occasion of Martyr’s Day

The Leader of the Yemeni Revolution, Sayyid Abdul-Malik Badreddin Al-Houthi, affirmed the “continuation of the martyrs’ path in which they offered the greatest lessons that strengthen the state of cooperation and brotherhood among the people of the nation to deter and drive out the Israeli enemy and US military bases from the region.”

In a televised speech aired by Al-Masirah TV channel this evening, on the occasion of Martyr’s Day, Sayyid al-Houthi said that that the “responsibility today is great for sacrifices, and the fulfillment of these sacrifices is a great responsibility for all of us.”

“We are concerned to confront the attack on us and our nation, and to confront the aggression that we consider as being a part of the American-Zionist attack on our nation,” he added, pointing out that “our nation deserves freedom and independence, and this will not be achieved as long as the existence of the American-Israeli hegemony continues.”

“We are confident in God and in that sacrifices make great victories. The more we provide the convoys of martyrs in our firm position, the more God will achieve victory for our nation,” he said, calling on the Yemeni people to continue supporting the fronts with money and men and taking care of the internal front.

https://hodhodyemennews.net/2021/01/03/sayyid-abdul-malik-al-houthi-speaks-on-occasion-of-martyrs-day/ = https://en.abna24.com/news//yemen-sayyed-abdul-malik-al-houthi-speaks-on-occasion-of-martyr%e2%80%99s-day_1102861.html

and also https://www.saba.ye/en/news3122957.htm

(AP)

Sayyed Abdulmalik: Soleimani, Muhandis Assassinated Because They Spearheaded Anti-US Campaign

The United States assassinated top Iranian anti-terror commander Lieutenant General Qassem Soleimani and his Iraqi trenchmate Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy head of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Units, because they spearheaded the campaign against Washington’s hegemony in the region, says Sayyed Abdulmalik Al-Houthi.

Delivering a live speech from the Yemeni capital city of Sana’a on Sunday on the occasion of the first anniversary of the assassination of the two commanders and their companions in a US terror drone strike authorized by President Donald Trump near Baghdad airport, Sayyed Abdulmalik hailed them as heroes and “martyrs of the Muslim nation.”

https://english.almasirah.net/post/16955/Sayyed-Abdulmalik-Soleimani%2C-Muhandis-Assassinated-Because-They-Spearheaded-Anti-US-Campaign

(A K P)

Mohammed al-Houthi warns Saudis to stop the war or face “great pain”

Member of the Supreme Political Council Mohammad Ali Al-Houthi on Friday called on Saudi-led coalition to stop the war on Yemen and lift blockade before the coming of what he called “a stage of pain.”

“The coalition should make peace through halting its military operations and lifting restrictions on the ports,” Mohammed al-Houthi said in a tweet, hinting at a “painful military escalation.”

https://hodhodyemennews.net/2021/01/03/mohammed-al-houthi-warns-saudis-to-stop-the-war-or-face-great-pain/

(A P)

Abdulsalam: Driving US Forces Out the Region Is the Only Punishment for Assassinating Soleimani, Al-Muhandis

The official spokesman for Ansarullah Mohammad Abdulsalam confirmed on Saturday that the driving the US troops out from the region is the only punishment that amounts to the martyrdom of the two leaders, Hajj Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis.

https://english.almasirah.net/post/16941/Abdulsalam-Driving-US-Forces-Out-the-Region-Is-the-Only-Punishment-for-Assassinating-Soleimani%2C-Al

(A K P)

Condemnations Pour in As US-Saudi Aggression Attacks Wedding Ceremony in Hodeidah

https://english.almasirah.net/post/16942/Condemnations-Pour-in-As-US-Saudi-Aggression-Attacks-Wedding-Ceremony-in-Hodeidah

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp6 – cp19

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-706b-yemen-war-mosaic-706b

Vorige / Previous:

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-705-yemen-war-mosaic-705

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-705 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-705:

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm

http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/

http://www.yemenwar.info/

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

http://yemendataproject.org/data/

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

https://yemen.bellingcat.com/

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

https://yemeniarchive.org/en

07:41 07.01.2021
Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
Geschrieben von

Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
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Dietrich Klose

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