Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 733 - Yemen War Mosaic 733

Yemen Press Reader 733: 8. April 2021: Kriegsverbrechen der saudischen Koalition – Wie jemenitische Haushalte versuchen, mit ihrer Situation umzugehen – Der Krieg hat Jemens Wirtschaft verändert
Bei diesem Beitrag handelt es sich um ein Blog aus der Freitag-Community

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

... Der Konflikt hat Jemens Wirtschaft verändert, Auswirkungen auf den Frieden – Wasserkrise im Jemen – Die Rolle von Jemens Frauen in Krieg, Frieden und Sicherheit – Die neue Hadi-Regierung – Saudi-Arabiens Kampf um eine Ausstiegsstrategie im Jemen – und vieles mehr

April 8, 2021: Saudi coalition war crimes – How Yemeni households try to cope with their situation – Conflict has changed Yemen’s economy and implications for peace – Water crisis in Yemen – Women’s Role in Conflict, Peace and Security in Yemen – The new Hadi government – Saudi Arabia’s scramble for an exit strategy in Yemen –and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2:

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp12b Sudan

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade

cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage

cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp17a Kriegsereignisse: Schlacht um Marib / Theater of War: Marib battle

cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle

cp19 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification




(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

(** B K pH)

The first report of the national team in charge of dealing with the Group of Eminent International & Regional Experts on Yemen.

The report highlights what the National Team - in cooperation with civil society on the most prominent crimes and violations of International Humanitarian Law & International Human Rights Law committed by the American-Saudi-Emirati aggression coalition on Yemen during the period (26-March-2015) to (30-June-2020)

The report highlights what the National Team - in cooperation with civil societyorganizations and relevant authorities - undertook to monitor and document the most prominent crimes and grave violations committed by the US-Saudi-Emirati aggression on Yemen, which are considered war crimes against humanity and genocide, flagrant violations of International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, the Charter of the United Nations, international agreements, treaties and covenants. The report considers what is happening on the Republic of Yemen an international aggression carried out by the aggression coalition, duringwhich it bombed Yemen, killing people, destroying capabilities, violating sovereignty, threatening security, damaging unity and territorial integrity, occupying some of its lands, islands, military ports, and coastal cities, and announcing- in an official way - sending forces and land war equipment to Yemen and forming armed groups, forces and militias from mercenaries.

The report sheds light on the background of aggression, the political situation in Yemen since 2011, and the subsequent increase in regional and international interference by the Gulf Cooperation Council and the United States of America, Britain, and the rest of the so-called ten countries that sponsor the political settlement; to abort the popular revolution of February 11th in Yemen, that took place against the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his regime. Such interference was exemplified by the Gulf Initiative and its Timed Implementation Mechanism, used as an open pretext for further interference in Yemen's affairs, and to impose hegemony on its sovereignty, security, unity, independence, and territorial dominion, and as an ideal means of occupying, dividing its land, monopolizing its wealth and capabilities, controlling its coasts, ports and islands, stealing its rare trees and monuments, plundering its fish wealth, and exploiting its distinguished geographical location on land, sea and air, until the announcement of the American-Saudi-Emirati aggression on Yemen on February 26, 2015, under the pretext of thealleged legitimacy that actually came to an end on February 21, 2014 according to the Gulf Initiative and its Timed Implementation Mechanism.

The report provides documented facts about the deterioration of the humanitarian situation, which has become the world worst humanitarian disaster according to the reports of the United Nations and international governmental and non-governmental organizations, resulting from the incessant imposition of siege and economic warfare, the arbitrary measures, and restrictions, the use of starvation as a weapon of war, and collective punishment against Yemeni people.

(** B E H)

The best way to help Yemenis survive might not be what aid organizations think

Struggling households throughout Yemen access food and services in surprising ways, our research finds.

How do Yemenis get by, given the difficult conditions? In our recent article, we show that people spent down household assets — and they turned to local “functional markets” to access critical goods and services. These markets have adapted to work within the constraints of the conflict, and their presence has important implications for policymaking toward Yemen. While “big-ticket” economic programs are tough to deliver and can be politically contested, our research suggests that supporting localized markets may have a more direct impact in assisting Yemenis.

To understand these markets, we used a stratified random sample to select 877 households across both sides of Yemen’s conflict. We selected 22 sampling sites along three dimensions: whether respondents live under Ansar Allah (the Houthis) or under the control of the internationally recognized government; higher vs. lower economic development; and higher vs. lower levels of violence. At each site, we employed a systematic sampling method, with survey takers approaching every nth house to interview the head of household. Our sample had a 91 percent response rate, for a final sample of 801 households. We also conducted focus groups and interviews across the country to validate our findings by talking with young people, women, officials, academics, security officials and businesspersons.

The survey results demonstrate the profound effects of the conflict on Yemeni households. Overall, respondents reported economic insecurity as among the most significant threats: 30 percent said lack of opportunity for income was the greatest threat they face, alongside 28 percent reporting “renewed violence.”

Income opportunities in Yemen’s private and public sectors have withered. For example, survey responses in Houthi-controlled areas reveal that public sector employment has dropped 11 percent since 2015. And since many who work in public-sector jobs have not been paid for months, even those who self-report as employed do not necessarily have an income. The result is that armed-group employment provides the most stable income. When asked about income opportunities for young men, 61 percent of respondents in the government-controlled areas and 35 percent of respondents in Houthi areas responded that joining the military or other security forces is consistently the best option.

Food prices have risen with the blockade of Houthi areas and the high cost of imported goods and transportation. The widespread drop in income compounds the affordability problems. Yemenis spend nearly four times as much on food as any other expense, including housing, health care and transportation. Across our sample, food made up half of reported household expenditures, a much higher ratio than in other countries in the region. To compare, Algerians spend 37 percent of household income on food.

How do households cope?

Yemenis have coped with loss of income by using savings and selling possessions. Since 2015, 62 percent reported depleting their savings, or selling off possessions to pay for food and water, most notably jewelry and family heirlooms. Our focus group participants reported almost entirely cutting meat, cheese and sweets from their diets to save on food costs. Some reported their households had switched to only sharing two meals a day. “We live by austerity,” they told us.

Yemenis have also coped by searching for opportunities elsewhere. Indeed, internal displacement can be a result of economic concerns as much as violence. Since 2015, 18 percent of our sample had relocated, 63 percent of them leaving areas under Houthi control. Half of those displaced to government areas reported “fleeing trouble” as their reason for relocating, and across the sample 40 percent stated economic concerns such as “to get work” and “tough to get by” as driving their displacement.

What do Yemen’s functional markets offer?

We also found that markets and businesses adapted to Yemen’s crisis. The economic crisis has left many Yemenis dependent on what we call “functional markets.” There’s some degree of regulation, although it’s not always clear which authorities have the right and ability to intervene — and those involved in these markets may be vulnerable to exploitation by outside groups. These markets have flourished in Yemen, meeting basic survival needs for many households by enabling steady access to fuel, clean water, cooking gas and currency exchange.

Businesses and individuals at the center of these markets have found ways to survive in the conflict context, negotiating the divergent political demands of Sanaa and Aden and protecting themselves against armed groups – By David Wood, R. Joseph Huddleston and Harshana Ghoorhoo

referring to

(** B H)

Functional Markets in Yemen’s War Economy


Our article explores the economic activities of households operating in Yemen’s protracted conflict. We examine the growth and maturation of what we call the ‘Functional Economy’ in Yemen, in which Yemenis engage in economic transactions away from standard regulatory bodies through agreements of ‘how to do business’ with a range of authorities that are not internationally recognised. We distinguish this from ‘black markets’ and ‘illicit’ economic behaviours because most of the transactions would take place in a controlled environment in normal times or under peacetime governance, but the civil war has displaced them. In Yemen, the functional economy has come to serve Yemeni households providing essential goods and income, and for some activities, such as currency exchange, are preferred to any official regulated markets. On the other hand, alternatively regulated markets may be less functional as they also present opportunities for rent-seeking and, more importantly, can reinforce the political and economic bonds between Yemenis and non-recognised authorities, weakening the internationally recognised central state. Further, such activity has an impact on the potential for peaceful resolution of the conflict. The paper proposes that the ‘good’ of such activity, and hence the extent to which it is ‘functional’, should be judged by whether it provides access to essential goods and income, and whether it helps promote peaceful resolution. This evaluation framework enables better international policy responses to the economic situation that arises in protracted conflict. We use household surveys, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews to explore these developments from several angles.

(** B E P)


To explore how civilians and economic actors use functional markets to cope with conflict, as well as how they might affect peace prospects, we conducted a survey of 801 Yemeni households living both in areas controlled by the internationally recognized government in Aden, and in areas controlled by Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis.

In our conversations with Yemenis, we found that many if not most citizens turn to functional markets to purchase basic goods and services, including cooking gas, food, medicine, and currency exchange. Many say they rely on the “black market” because they are unsure of the legal status of the markets they use. As one respondent explained, “We…can’t distinguish between what is legal and illegal anymore…we are just looking to survive.”

Research in other conflict zones shows similar profit-driven “shadow economies” and survival-driven “coping economies.”

While Yemen’s functional markets play a vital role in providing essential goods, they are vulnerable to exploitation by state and non-state authorities that profit from the conflict. In Ansar Allah-controlled areas, respondents reported fines and appropriation of businesses as a likely consequence of violating regulations. One striking example was the conditional nature of cooking gas prices—in Ansar Allah areas, one gas cylinder costs ten times as much for households that had not sent their sons to join the security forces, raising to price to YER 14,000 ($25), instead of YER 1,200 ($2).

Despite this dynamic, commerce and basic business relationships continue across conflict divides. Business owners we spoke with have maintained networks of support and influence with local governments, militias, and other security forces, and with business owners on the other side of the conflict. Some Yemenis we interviewed believe these business relationships could be a pathway towards slowing violence.

It would not be the first time local business communities played a vital role in peace talks.

Conflict economies often do not attract the attention of international actors because of their decentralized and unregulated nature. Agencies trying to deliver food aid or broker peace agreements often prefer to work exclusively with internationally recognized actors. But this is counterproductive, as the US designation of Ansar Allah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization demonstrated. In Yemen, as in other conflict zones, local authorities are often more trusted than their national-level counterparts, who may have little involvement or insight in the day-to-day goings-on of local economies.

Functional markets in Yemen are meeting people’s basic needs, despite their vulnerability to exploitation by conflict actors. In this light, the good of a functional market in these complex contexts should be appraised by its ability to serve people, mitigate catastrophe, and contribute towards peace. It follows that the policies of governments and international agencies involved in Yemen’s conflict need to adapt to support these markets where they are working well—for example, where they provide income and essential goods and services—and only work to obstruct them when they prop up combat efforts, empower or create spoilers, or disincentivize participation in peace processes. Of course, functional markets may do both. But ignoring this context and insisting on working only with recognized authorities is to try to attempt to build peace in a vacuum. Only a strategy that pays heed to the stakes for all influential actors stands a chance to bring about peaceful change – by Joseph Huddleston

(** B H)

Yemen’s Water Crisis: A New Urgency to an Old Problem

In Yemen’s complex humanitarian crisis, water scarcity, conflict, and climate change impacts are interlinked. The use of water as a weapon accelerates the emergency. Germany and other EU member states should support technical solutions to reduce the agricultural sector’s water dependency. Politically, they should strengthen communities’ self-management of water governance.

Yemen’s acute water scarcity poses a serious threat to the country’s stability and security. While the past six years of conflict cannot be attributed solely to water shortage, it is an important contributor. Studies reveal that water scarcity acts as a security threat multiplier in regions characterized by rising population, social and political tensions, as well as ineffective and unaccountable state institutions – such as in Yemen. The recent impacts of climate change and armed conflict on the country’s dwindling water resources create a new urgency to address this old problem.

Yemen’s government, crippled by its weakness and corruption, has not been able to effectively address the water crisis. The government’s failure to meet citizens’ basic needs, including water and food, led to a growing popular discontent, which culminated in the 2011 uprising that brought down the regime of Ali Saleh. Water woes can also be linked to the fuel crisis that sparked protests in 2014 and facilitated the Houthis’ takeover of the capital Sana’a.

In past years, water scarcity has forced many Yemeni families to leave their villages and move to the cities. In some instances, entire villages disappeared due to lack of water. This rural migration added stress to cities already running out of water. In the city of Taiz, for example, public networks deliver water only once every thirty to sixty days. Furthermore, due to the current conflict, reports reveal rising tensions between internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities over the sharing of limited resources – a problem that is likely to intensify.

In Yemen, water and land are closely associated with identity, especially in the Northern Highlands that maintain strong tribal values. Thus, competition over these resources can quickly spiral into a large pattern of conflict. In fact, a study by Sana’a University researchers found that 70-80 percent of all rural conflicts in Yemen are related to water, including tribal, sectarian, and political conflicts.

A continuing government failure to enforce equal water distribution further heightens these tensions, especially as the social and economic impacts of Yemen’s rapidly depleting water are unevenly distributed. The scarcity highlights different forms of unequal competition over water use: between tribes, between large landowners and small farmers, between urban and rural communities, and between domestic and agricultural uses. Power dynamics on the ground favor those with more power and money. Hence, the water scarcity is disproportionately felt more by small farmers, poor downstream communities, and women and children.

Population Growth, Climate Change Impacts, and Shrinking Agricultural Productivity Deepen the Economic Crisis

Yemen’s massive population growth intensifies water demand and strains water supplies, especially given the country’s dry and arid climate. Already in 2012, the per capita water availability was assessed as low as 86 cubic meters per year, one of the lowest in the MENA region. Yemen’s water insecurity and its high youth population could be a volatile mix, especially considering that many young men are armed, unemployed, and frustrated.

Moreover, climate change impacts have become more visible in Yemen, placing additional strains on water security. Estimates of future rainfall variability show that drought periods are likely to increase. Similarly, it is expected that a high rise in temperatures could lead to higher evapotranspiration rates. Rising sea levels have leaked into freshwater coastal aquifers, worsening the water supply of three of the country’s major cities.

The impacts of water shortage on economic growth and job creation further deepens poverty and food insecurity. More than half of the country’s workforce is employed in agriculture, a sector that uses at least 90 percent of Yemen’s water resources. Hence, resource depletion, coupled with climate change and conflict, poses a serious threat to agricultural productivity and, consequently, food security and livelihoods.

(** B H P)

“Women Nowadays Do Anything.” Women’s Role in Conflict, Peace and Security in Yemen

Diese Study stellt die Ergebnisse qualitativer Forschung vor, die der Yemen Polling Center (YPC) in Kooperation mit CARPO und Saferworld in Ibb und Aden durchgeführt hat. Der Fokus liegt hier auf den Auswirkungen des Krieges auf Frauen und ihre Familien in diesen beiden Regionen, insbesondere im Hinblick auf Fragen der Sicherheit und auf die Rolle, die Frauen in der Herstellung von Sicherheit und Frieden spielen und gespielt haben.

Women are having a positive impact in sustaining community cohesion and promoting peace at the local level through diverse strategies, including within their families, in humanitarian work, psychosocial support and in civic life. Participants in our research offered a holistic understanding of peace, which they saw as not only being about ending the war but also about ensuring access to basic services, including security

Women’s roles in relation to peace and security during this conflict have not always aligned with preconceptions about their roles in Yemeni society. Some women in Aden report that the war has empowered them and made them stronger, more resilient, and more self-reliant than before, highlighting how conflict can affect gender roles in positive as well as negative ways.

At the same time, the conflict has also had an isolating impact on women, as a gendered understanding of risk obliges women to stay at home. Women identified several security obstacles to their public participation, including: checkpoints, restrictions by their families due to security concerns, threats posed by armed groups, and the resurgence of restrictive gender norms promoted by conservative groups.

Security and livelihoods emerged as women’s biggest concerns. The proliferation of weapons and armed groups and the general sense of lawlessness were the most often cited security concerns. Unemployment, inflation, currency depreciation, shortages in essential goods and the threat of losing the head of household were significant worries concerning livelihoods. Women displaced by the war are the most vulnerable and are often excluded from community protection mechanisms.

Child protection also emerged as an important area of concern, with participants citing random shootings and unexploded ordinance, recruitment into armed groups, exposure to violent political and religious ideologies, and drugs as worries.

Participants reported that the war had negatively affected women’s mental health, especially in Ibb. While in Aden the war is seen to be over, people in Ibb feel that they are still experiencing the worst of the conflict.

Women’s understanding of their contributions to peace varied according to their specific experiences. In Aden women’s activities such as preparing and delivering food and water for fighters, nursing the wounded, manning checkpoints, and – in a small number of cases – even taking up arms were cited as contributions to peace.

Participants identified opportunities for women’s participation in peacebuilding, including: campaigns against violence and the bearing of arms; awareness-raising campaigns about community peace and education, particularly engaging youth; promoting the inclusion of women across all levels of decision-making, including in the security sector; psychosocial support within their communities; and child protection initiatives.

and study in full:

(** B P)

Yemen’s Power-Sharing Cabinet: What’s At Stake?

The new government was not formed in a stable country and of one party, or even from a coalition of harmonious parties. It was formed after long and difficult negotiations between warring sides that have thousands of fighters, brigades and heavy weapons and do not agree on principles, paths or goals. This process began in November 2019 with the signing of the Riyadh Agreement, the Saudi-backed deal to end the conflict in southern Yemen between the Yemeni government and the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) and bring them together in a unity government. However, the two sides continued fighting on and off throughout 2020 in parallel to cabinet formation negotiations before finally reaching an agreement on December 18 to form a 24-member government. Its return to the interim capital Aden marked a homecoming of sorts, after years of operating largely in exile, before the missile attack nearly brought the emerging consensus to an end.

Yemen is currently at an inflection point. The cabinet formed in December 2020 faces a litany of challenges. Its ability to address critical issues and navigate Yemen’s fractured political landscape will determine the new government’s success or failure in regaining public trust and governing with heightened legitimacy, and ultimately, the future direction of the country. In an effort to judge the cabinet’s chances of increasing stability, deescalating violence and political tensions, and setting the stage for a future political process to end the conflict, this policy memo analyzes the main priorities and opportunities for the new government, and the challenges and risks it faces from various domestic and international actors. It ends with recommendations on how international stakeholders on Yemen can positively contribute to the success and stability of the new government.

After the new government was announced, many Yemenis were hopeful that the new cabinet could bring greater stability to the country. This optimism is partly attributed to the fact that the cabinet brings together most major Yemeni political actors together under a single umbrella. A united front on the government side is a major achievement and has been seen as a necessary precursor for eventually negotiating a comprehensive peace to end the civil war. Forming a unity cabinet also forestalled local and international fears over the potential complete collapse of the Yemeni state, which had been growing over the past year amid military setbacks against the Houthi movement and the entrenchment of militias and non-state actors in nominally government-held areas. Finally, there are hopes that the new government can work immediately to halt Yemen’s economic deterioration, improve the humanitarian situation and focus on the provision of essential services.

On the negative side, the parties represented in the government failed to nominate a single woman to a cabinet post.

Cabinet’s priorities

The new government has a long and urgent to-do list. Many of the challenges it faces are not new, but rather issues left unresolved in past cabinets, which suffered from infighting and the fact most ministers did not reside in Yemen, while the year-long delay in forming the current cabinet also wasted crucial time. According to Prime Minister Maeen Abdelmalek Saeed, the cabinet’s main priorities are “reforming the economy, stopping the deterioration of the value of the Yemeni rial and fighting corruption.”

Chances of success

Although the government is facing unprecedented challenges, it’s supported by the circumstances during this exceptional political opening. As noted, there is generally a sense of optimism and popular trust among the Yemeni public for this new government, which should encourage the latter to work to make a tangible difference. The international community’s backing of the new government also helps generally while Saudi and Emirati support for Prime Minister Maeen Abdelmalek specifically, given the influence of the two main players in the Arab coalition with a spectrum of Yemeni actors on the ground, should help to facilitate the cabinet’s agenda.

The new cabinet also benefits from its small size and the absence of previous rivalries.

Another positive indication was that political factions participating in the government did not select their most hardline members to represent them in cabinet; rather, the ministers chosen are generally viewed as non-confrontational. For example, this is the first government in which both Islah and the STC are represented, and the ministers selected to represent each party do not have a history of personal hostility toward the other. This effort toward greater harmony starts at the top with Prime Minister Maeen Abdelmalek, who avoided major clashes with the country’s major political stakeholders over the past two years and managed to keep open lines of communications with many rival parties, including the STC and Islah. The attacks on the airport further solidified the conviction that everyone in this government is targeted, and thus, they are in it together.

Finally, popular sentiment among government and STC supporters appears to be trending toward consensus. There is little support among Yemenis in general, and Adenis in particular, for a renewed battle for the interim capital.

Threats and challenges

Threats and challenges to the success and longevity of the cabinet may potentially come from a variety of domestic and foreign actors. These include: the new government itself, President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, Vice President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and the Islah party, hardline allies of President Hadi, the Houthi movement and Iran, jihadist groups Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State (IS), the STC, UAE-backed Yemeni components other than the STC (former Aden security chief Shalal Ali Shayea, Brigadier-General Tareq Saleh, the Giants Brigades), the UAE itself, and Saudi Arabia.

President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi

President Hadi has a long history of not committing to agreements that would limit his monopoly on power. When parties attempt to contest unilateral decisions, Hadi waves the sword of ‘constitutional legitimacy’ granted to him as the elected head of state.

Vice President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and Islah

General Ali Moshen and Islah play the role of the fighter and the negotiator very wittingly. They are with the legitimate government’s stance of engaging in dialogue and reaching consensus, but at the same time, they stand ready to fight, aided by staunchly loyal forces on the ground.

Hadi’s hardliners

In his struggle against the STC and the UAE, President Hadi has relied on a loyal network of political and military leaders.


The STC achieved several wins through the Riyadh Agreement – the most important is the legitimacy gained by participating in the government and the right to be partners in authority. This is a big step up from its former status as a single-issue secessionist organization with a militant component, backed by a foreign party. The other major victory is that it did not abandon its right to demand separation for the south in the future – despite its participation in a unity cabinet – or accept conditions that would force it to give up its military power. As a result, the STC is one of the parties most pleased with the current environment of consensus and partnership – by Khaleed Ameen

(** B P)

Saudi Arabia’s scramble for an exit strategy in Yemen

A power-sharing agreement must give key players in Yemen’s devastating war a seat at the table with equal access to state resources, analysts say.

However, Houthi rebels are well aware of their current position and leverage. As it stands, Saudi Arabia and its allies could potentially be forced to withdraw without the Houthis having to make any concessions. Hence, their initial rejection of the proposal did not come as a surprise, particularly as it offered “nothing new”.

The latter is an accurate statement, according to Steven Hurst, department head of history, politics and philosophy at the Manchester Metropolitan University.

“The peace plan they have put forward now is a revised version of one they advanced in 2020 rather than anything new,” said Hurst.

Nonetheless, the Houthis’ chief negotiator, Mohammed Abdulsalam, stated his willingness for further talks with Riyadh, Washington, and Muscat to facilitate a peace agreement.

The Houthis’ strong military position is not the only conundrum for Saudi Arabia, however.

The United States, Saudi Arabia’s most important ally for more than half a century, also played a pivotal role since March 2015 when then-President Barack Obama authorised US forces to provide logistical and intelligence support to the Saudis, Hurst said.

According to Hurst, Biden’s move on arms sales is, therefore, not just about the situation in Yemen, but also a signal to the Saudis that where he perceives Riyadh’s actions as detrimental to American objectives and interests, he will not hesitate to assert US prerogatives at its expense.

What is almost certain is the domino effect of Biden’s decision has had for MBS’s prerogative in Yemen. Ending the support for the war might even be the main reason for Saudi Arabia’s scramble for peace, Hashemi said.

The peace plan is the kingdom’s way to present itself as supportive of US interests in the region and a reliable Western ally, but it remains a “superficial diplomatic effort”, he said.

However, Washington’s influence on facilitating a peaceful solution might be limited.

“The only real leverage the US has is with the Saudis and, by implication, with their proxies. They have no real leverage over the Houthis or their Iranian backers,” said Hurst.

However, even the leverage on Saudi Arabia was limited for two reasons in particular.

“First, US arms sales will not entirely stop Riyadh’s ability to continue to engage in the conflict. Second, the situation in Yemen is sadly not important enough to the United States for the Biden administration to issue the Saudi government with the kind of ultimatum that might compel them to make peace regardless of their preference,” according to Hurst.

The latter raises the question of what constitutes a conceivable road map towards peace. While there appears to be a theoretical path, the facilitation is another question entirely given to the actors involved.

Hashemi’s suggestion – which concurs with the view of former UN special envoy to Yemen Jamal Benomar that he recently opined in a British newspaper – requires a devoted joint effort.

“A power-sharing agreement is needed among the Yemenis. This must give all the key players a seat at the table, and it must be based on a vision where everyone can have equal access to state resources, political representation, and basic security guarantees,” said Hashemi.

This power-sharing approach would mark a stark contrast to previous propositions.

“Until now, the US-Saudi peace plans have been predicated on Houthi surrender, which is a non-starter for peace in Yemen,” Hashemi noted.

One party, in particular, will hence have to display its proclivity for change.

“In this context, Saudi Arabia is the recalcitrant party in blocking a genuine peace plan for Yemen.”

On the other hand, Iran could potentially be persuaded, albeit, with a caveat, Hashemi suggested.

“I think the Iranians would support a peace effort based on the outline of the former UN special envoy [Benomar]. A fundamental problem here is the absence of US-Iranian diplomatic engagement.”

Whether the encumbrance of antipathy between Washington and Tehran can be overcome could thus be one of the keys moving forward for peace in Yemen – by Thomas O. Falk

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

(* B H)

Film: Second wave of COVID-19 infections overwhelms Yemen| World's worst humanitarian crisis| English News

(* A H)

72 new cases of coronavirus reported, 5,047 in total

The committee also reported the death of 10 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 64 others.
2,344 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day.
According to the daily counts over the past hours, the total number of confirmed cases of coronavirus has reached 5,047, including 986 deaths and 1,886 recoveries in the liberated areas of Yemen.

(A H)

Senior cardiologist dies from COVID-19 in Hadramout
(* B H)

Yemen gravediggers, bulldozer join forces against Covid

People are struggling to bury their dead in the southwestern city amid a surge in cases of coronavirus that the war-torn country is badly equipped to combat.

Besieged for years by Huthi rebels and their snipers, the gravediggers of Taez are under constant threat and cannot work fast enough.

Health measures, such as wearing surgical rubber gloves to bury Covid-19 victims, are not a priority here.

"We are receiving nine or 10 bodies a day," Shaban Qaed, a cemetery official, told AFP.

"We brought in people from the marketplace to dig with us but still haven't been able to keep up with demand for new graves, and we've had to hire a bulldozer."

"Why is there no government move to stop the spread of the pandemic?" read one sign held by Taez residents staging a protest at the cemetery.

"There's a lot of neglect and shortcomings on the part of the government, which is not performing its role," protester Ahmed al-Bukari told AFP.

"There were some measures during the first wave of the virus but still not up to standard," he said.

"For the second wave, which is more severe, authorities in Taez are not living up to their responsibility to protect people." =

(A H)

94 new cases of coronavirus reported, 4,975 in total

The committee also reported the death of 21 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 50 others.
2847 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out the same day.

(A H P)

Taiz Emergency Committee on Coronavirus closes amusement parks, wedding halls, and shopping malls./Awam Online

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Taiz deputy governor dies of Covid-19

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Technical committee discusses distribution of covid-19 vaccine

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83 new cases of coronavirus reported, 4,881 in total

The committee also reported the death of 9 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 34 others.

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Calls for curfew in Taiz following Covid-19 spread

Humanitarian groups and activists have called for urgent curfew in the Yemeni southwestern city of Taiz, after the populated city saw awful increase in number of Covid-19 infections.
In the last two weeks, Taiz became one of the three Yemeni governorates most affected by the pandemic, amid dire lack of medical supplies and oxygen cylinders at health facilities.
Last week, Taiz University announced pause of study at all its faculties, and the local authorities instructed stricter precautious measures to counter the pandemic.

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101 new cases of coronavirus reported, 4,798 in total

The committee also reported the death of 14 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 23 others.

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A massive outbreak of COVID-19 has been hitting Yemen for more than a month. Horrific news come from many provinces daily. In some provinces people prompted to use dredgers to help dig graves for the victims. The problem is that people still ignore it (photos)

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#Taiz: more graves are being dug amid a spike in deaths from Covid-19 in the province in southwest #Yemen. Photo has been published by social media accounts and news websites

Another photo:


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Covid-19 spreading rapidly in Saudi-occupied city of Taiz

The residential neighborhoods in the center of Taiz city, which are under the control of Hadi’s puppet government, are experiencing an unparalleled health disaster, a local source said on Saturday.

The source explained that the death rate as a result of the new series of coronavirus has increased significantly, saying that “Due to the slow digging of graves by manual means, excavators now being used for digging graves in large numbers.”

He confirmed that he witnessed the burial of 20 bodies during the past 24 hours, including three persons from the same family.

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Houthi Corruption Hikes Number of Pulmonary TB Cases in Yemen

Over the last few years, tens of thousands of Yemenis living in insurgency-held areas have been infected by pulmonary tuberculosis (TB) as health centers struggle with being deprived of key resources snatched away by Houthi militia leaders.

Patients with active TB were mostly concentrated in Houthi-run areas suffering from poor sanitation and health services.

Medics and health staffers in centers specialized in fighting the lung infection in Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen have reported a surge in positive cases, recording a staggering 40,190 new patients in as little as three years.

Infections were recorded in the governorates of Sanaa, Ibb, Dhamar, Saadah, Hajjah, Amran and Al Mahwit.

In 2019, the lung disease peaked with 15,355 infections recorded within a single year. The number of cases detected in 2018 and 2020 stood at 11,885 and 12,950 respectively.

Medics warn that the figures are not exact, with high chances of many cases going undiagnosed.

My comment: If a Sausi source blames the Houthis for this, it’s rather odd.

(A H)

Occupied southern Yemen plagued by epidemical diseases amidst inaction by leadership

About 25 citizens have died as a result of the spread of fevers and epidemics amid the collapse of services in all health facilities in Yemen’s southern city of Aden, according to medical sources.

The sources blamed the Ministry of Health in the Saudi-backed Hadi government for the worsening health situation in the city.

Meanwhile, a writer and human rights activist, Lula Ali, explained that Covid-19 is spreading at an alarming and frightening rate in Aden, without any serious precautionary measures taken by the government.

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Yemen: Health Cluster Bulletin, February 2021

The cumulative total number of suspected Cholera cases from the 1st of January to the 28th of February 2021 is (9643) with (2) associated deaths (CFR 0.02%). Children under five represent (25.94%) whilst the elderly above 60 years of age accounted for (6.23%) of total suspected cases. The outbreak has so far affected in 2020: (14) of 23 governorates and (175) of 333 districts in Yemen

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Yemen’s Forgotten HIV Patients: Sami’s Story

In much of the world today, a diagnosis with Human Immunodeficiency Virus, more commonly known as HIV, is no longer a death sentence. But only if the right drugs are available.

However, in countries in acute crises, medication and health care can be hard to come by. This is the case in Yemen, which is entering its seventh year of conflict and crisis.

Like many other young people in Yemen, and across the world, Sami’s knowledge of HIV was extremely limited.

“The doctor explained more to me about the virus because I had no idea what I would be dealing with,” said Sami, who knew he was facing a future of rejection.

“I remember that at the time I cried as if the world had come to an end,” he added.

He felt like his world was imploding. He saw what years of conflict had done to his country’s public institutions, now barely able to support his people. He did not know if he could access treatment and whether the virus would continue to take hold of his body.

But Sami was lucky. His doctor told him about an ART site in Aden city that could provide help.

An ART site is a health facility that provides care services and medicine to people living with HIV. This includes preventive, diagnostic, awareness and nutritional advice, as well as curative and counseling services.

cp2 Allgemein / General

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Interactive Map of Yemen War

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Yemen War Daily Map Updates, April 3 to 7

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Yemen - Peace Remains Elusive

With Marib in the Houthi’s crosshairs, it is unlikely that there would any cessation of hostilities soon. Riyadh would have to respond to the Houthi onslaught which many speculate is at Iran’s behest as the Iranian leadership chafes under sanctions and has yet to get any positive signal of the USA returning to the nuclear deal. Iran had demanded the lifting of all sanctions before any talks take place and upping the ante in Yemen with a cost to Saudi Arabia could very well have figured in Iranian calculations.
But as the Houthi spokesman had said …“The humanitarian side must be separated from the military one,” …“We were asked for a comprehensive ceasefire … but the first stage is to open the sea ports and airports, then go towards the process of a strategic ceasefire, which is stopping the strikes, missiles and drones. “When the sea port and the airport open, we’re ready to negotiate.” Words that suggest that the plight of the people of Yemen is of secondary importance to the Houthis as compared to the objective of controlling the whole of Yemen.
So the proxy war will continue even as diplomatic efforts and pressure tactics are being utilized to make peace less elusive.

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Time to Rethink International Intervention in Yemen

In 2011, the United States and the international community were alarmed as protests spread across the capital Sanaa and other cities in Yemen to demand the removal of the Saleh regime

Months of shuttle diplomacy led by ambassadors of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union resulted in a transitional deal, commonly known as the GCC Initiative. It was signed in Riyadh by Saleh and the Islah-led opposition coalition known as the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). It outlined a two-year political transition process in which Saleh relinquished power to his vice president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, and a new government was set up with power divided between Saleh’s ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) and the opposition coalition. In a statement, President Barack Obama welcomed the signing of the GCC deal, describing it as a “historical transition.” Hadi was then elected in uncontested elections and became president in February 2012. Yemen then went through a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in which different Yemeni political factions and social groups discussed a roadmap for Yemen’s future that would lead to a referendum on a new constitution.

The GCC Initiative was highly ambitious but deeply flawed. While it provided a roadmap that looked good on paper, it overlooked the underlying causes of the conflict and assumed that Saleh and other signatories were genuinely interested in reform.

To prevent further escalation, on September 21, 2014, UN Envoy Jamal Benomar negotiated the Peace and National Partnership Initiative (PNPA). Building on the outcome of the NDC, the PNPA outlined yet another transition process that includes forming a new “competency-based” government, increasing power-sharing by appointing advisors to President Hadi from the Houthis and the southern peaceful movement that preceded the current Southern Transitions Council (STC), and formulating detailed sequential steps to draft and administer a referendum on a new constitution. A “security annex” to the agreement outlined steps to de-escalate and resolve conflicts through negotiations.

The UNSC failed to describe the Houthis’ and Saleh’s incursion into Sanaa and the toppling of the government as a coup. In the following months, Houthi-Saleh forces pushed into other parts of Yemen, stormed President Hadi’s home and killed 11 of his bodyguards, and placed him and his entire cabinet under house arrest, prompting the resignation of Hadi and the cabinet in January 2015.

The Stockholm Agreement has “normalized Houthi military gains,” as Ibrahim Jalal notes, at the expense of the Yemenis while failing to force the rebel group to make concessions.

Diplomacy vs. Reality

Western diplomacy, however, is unlikely to succeed for several reasons. First, it has not built any leverage over the Houthis, who are determined to expand militarily and have so far failed to demonstrate any signs of a commitment to de-escalation, much less peace. The Houthis define the war in Yemen as one between them and Saudi Arabia. They consider themselves the only legitimate representatives of Yemenis, labeling the Yemeni government and all forces opposed to their hegemony as “Saudi mercenaries” and “ISIS.” International mediation might succeed in ending Saudi military intervention, but that will allow Houthis to expand militarily inside Yemen. In a recent interview, Marib’s Governor Sultan Al-Arada noted that the Houthis would easily take the city if air strikes stopped. This poses a moral dilemma to the international community, which so far has failed to protect civilians from Houthi violence.

Even under the unlikely scenario where Houthis agree to make concessions, negotiations would likely result in a political settlement between the Hadi government and the Houthis that would repeat past mistakes, when power-sharing among the political elite exacerbated conflicts. As Yemeni analyst Maysaa Shuja al-Deen states, “Every power share in Yemen led to a war”—a situation that has become a recurrence in Yemen, thanks to the international community.

Beyond elite bargains, the situation in Yemen has evolved a good deal over the past years, during which the goal has been to reinstate a national government in Sanaa or elsewhere in the country. This is a tall order. Yemen is currently divided into at least five cantons of political and military control with emerging political and armed actors, and most have animosity toward both the Hadi government and the Houthis. These actors could spoil any future agreement if it does not address their interests or grievances.

Stitching Yemen back together is yet another overly ambitious goal that is divorced from the reality on the ground. As Abdulghani al-Iryani explains, “centralization is what destroyed Yemen, not the lack of it,”

It is time for the international community to revisit its approach in Yemen. Unintended consequences of past interventions did more harm than good. Carrying on with the same mentality and tools will further destabilize the country and create more incentives for violence. The international community needs to look beyond elite bargains and think of ways to help Yemen realistically. Importantly, the current negotiations must expand to include more actors that have emerged during the past six years. In particular, civil society and local women’s groups should take part in the dialogue. In lieu of using their influence to push through a quick deal that will likely benefit the Houthis at the expense of the country, the United States and the international community should work to mitigate the impact the conflict has had on civilians and critical infrastructure by increasing development aid. To reverse the cycle of deterioration, the international community should try to stabilize the Yemeni currency, support the local economy, and strengthen governance and security, where possible, in a way that is consistent with the aspirations of the Yemeni people for a more secure, just, peaceful, and democratic Yemen.

Finally, as with any war, ending the one in Yemen might take a long time. The international community must be committed to engaging in Yemen for the long term in order to help create conditions for peace to materialize. Reflecting on and learning from past mistakes, coupled with drawing on a reserve of steadfastness and patience, are crucial elements that will help bring forth positive results – by Nadwa Al-Dawsari

My remark: The author is biased anti-Houthi.

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Yemen at 'tipping point' as second Covid-19 wave hits war-torn country just weeks ahead of expected cholera season

And now the country is said to be at a "tipping point" as a second wave of Covid-19 hits the war-torn country, just weeks ahead of anticipated cholera outbreaks brought on by the rainy season.

In the past month, coronavirus cases have increased 22 fold in the past month.

Yemen's health care system is unable to cope, only half of facilities operational and no one in the country has had a coronavirus vaccine.

The frontlines of the war between the Houthi rebels and Saudi-backed government forces are changing, and the once more safe Marib Governorate in the centre of the country is now coming under attack.

There are 125 camps and between one and three million displaced people in the area, but already 15,000 people have been forced to leave and camps closed since fighting began in the region in February. [Overview article]

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Film: Human rights: situation 'desperate' in Yemen, Syria

Donatela Rovera, senior adviser with #Amnesty​ International, says the situation in #Yemen​ has deteriorated during the pandemic after six years of war, with the country now considered the worst humanitarian situation in the world.

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Battle for Yemen desert city now a key to Iran, US tension

The battle for an ancient desert city in war-torn Yemen has become a key to understanding wider tensions now inflaming the Middle East and the challenges facing any efforts by President Joe Biden’s administration to shift U.S. troops out of the region.

Fighting has been raging in the mountains outside of Marib as Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, who hold Yemen’s capital of Sanaa, attempt to seize the city, which is crucial to the country’s energy

The battle for Marib likely will determine the outline of any political settlement in Yemen’s second civil war since the 1990s. If seized by the Houthis, the rebels can press that advantage in negotiations and even continue further south. If Marib is held by Yemen’s internationally recognized government, it will save perhaps its only stronghold as secessionists challenge its authority elsewhere.

The fight is also squeezing a pressure point on the most powerful of America’s Gulf Arab allies and ensnarling any U.S. return to Iran’s nuclear deal. It’s even complicating the Biden administration’s efforts to slowly shift the longtime mass U.S. military deployments to the Mideast to counter what it sees as the emerging threat of China and Russia.

Losing Marib would be “the final bullet in the head of the internationally recognized government,” said Abdulghani al-Iryani, a senior researcher at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies. “It will set the stage for the dismemberment of the Yemeni state. You’re looking at a generation of instability and humanitarian crisis. You also will look at a free-for-all theater for regional meddling.”

For a while, beginning in the fall of 2019, Saudi Arabia reached a detente with the Houthis, said Ahmed Nagi, a non-resident Yemen expert at the Carnegie Middle East Center. Citing two Houthi officials familiar with the discussions, Nagi said a back channel agreement saw both the Saudis and the rebels refrain from attacking populated areas.

But when the Houthis began to push again into Marib, the Saudis resumed a heavy bombing campaign.

For the Houthis, “they think they gain through war more than peace talks,” Nagi said. For the Saudis, “if they lose Marib, they’ll have zero cards on the negotiating table.”


The escalating conflict around Marib coincides with major changes in U.S. policy toward the war.

But fighting around Marib has only escalated even as the Saudis recently offered a cease-fire deal. Iran’s frustration over the Biden administration’s failure to swiftly lift sanctions has contributed to “an intensification of attacks by groups in Iraq, and the same in Yemen,” said Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, an Iran scholar at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute.

“Iran is trying to deliver a message to the U.S.,” Tabrizi said. “A message that the status quo is not sustainable.”

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has linked arming the kingdom to America allowing the war to take place.

“I am asking this question to the Americans: Did you know what would happen to the Saudis on the day that you gave them green light to enter the Yemeni war?” Khamenei asked in a March 21 speech. “Did you know that you are sending Saudi Arabia into a quagmire?”

Overall, American forces will remain in the Mideast as it remains crucial to global energy markets and includes major choke points at sea for trade worldwide, said Aaron Stein, the director of research at the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute. What those forces look like, however, will change as the U.S. weighs how to counterbalance Iran through a return to the nuclear deal, he said.

“It doesn’t solve the Iranian issue,” Stein said. “It puts us in a place to manage it, like we’re in hospice care.”

and also

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»Der Jemen, den wir kannten, ist Geschichte«

Sechs Jahre Dauerkonflikt haben das Land zerstört. Und doch müsse man optimistisch sein, was einen Frieden betrifft, sagt Farea al-Muslimi, Mitgründer des Thinktanks Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies (nur im Abo)

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YEMEN FSO Safer: Impact assessment April–June 2021

The coastline of Yemen’s Red Sea and of its neighbouring countries is at risk of an environmental disaster that could happen any day – with substantial humanitarian and economic impacts. It is increasingly likely that there could be an immense oil leakage from and/or an explosion of the FSO Safer, a floating storage and offloading unit anchored in the Red Sea, 60km north of the port of Al Hodeidah. If disaster strikes, the Safer could release four times the amount of crude oil that was spilled in the Exxon Valdez catastrophe of 1989 (UNEP 16/07/2020), which had major impacts on the environment and on people and their livelihoods in affected areas.

Up to 1.6 million people’s livelihoods could be impacted by the spill and subsequent cleanup operations, through damage to coastal industries and factory and port closures, as well as damage to fisheries and marine resources.

Port operations interrupted: the operations of Al Hodeidah and Saleef ports would be affected. The ports would likely have to close for two to three months, limiting fuel and food imports and putting the jobs of port workers at risk.

Fuel imports and supply routes altered: the disruption of port operations would further reduce the already restricted fuel supply through Al Hodeidah if the fuel standoff between the Houthis and the Government of Yemen continues. This would impact electricity production, health services, and transportation provisions across the country. The ports would see heavy oil contamination. Vessels that have been waiting for months in the coalition holding area but which have not yet been allowed into the port to unload would have to be cleaned. More fuel might be brought in through Aden and Mukalla to offset the shortfall, altering fuel supply chains in the country; more fuel would likely be sold through the black market and prices would likely rise

Food imports and supply routes altered: bulk food imports through Al Hodeidah and Saleef have been consistent and are at healthy volumes in the current quarter. The redirection of food imports to Aden and/or Mukalla could lead to congestion and delays in those ports; onward transport of wheat to mills would increase out of these two ports, with capacities unknown. Food prices would likely rise.

Fisheries operations disrupted: 50% of fisheries would likely be blocked from fishing by the oil spill. The livelihoods of 31,500 fishermen would be at risk, and 235,000 workers in the fishing and related industries (ice making, packaging, and transportation) could lose their jobs. The spill would presumably have devastating impacts on the livelihoods of fishermen, workers, and their families, in an industry in which 21% of fishing communities are already considered poor and 71% very poor (Oxfam 12/2017). Cost to fishing industry: USD 750 million – USD 30 million per year for 25 years.

High general impact and cleanup costs: estimated cost of cleanup – USD 20 billion. A release of oil into the water would have far greater and longer-lasting impacts than the release of particulates through fire.

or via

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Worse than Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Abandoned Yemeni Tanker Can Wreck the Red Sea

In a tweet congratulating the Egyptian government on the Suez Canal reopening last week, Yemen's de facto president, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, warned of an escalating situation if the decaying 44-year-old vessel's hull integrity were breached.

"The Safer contains 1.1 million barrels of oil [one barrel is 42 US gallons], according to Rachel Shelley, a senior environmental science research associate at the University of East Anglia and a former South Sinai resident," she told The Media Line. This is almost four times the amount of oil spilled by the Exxon Valdez in 1989, which wreaked havoc on Alaska's Price William Sound."

The Red Sea is home to five of the world's most endangered marine animals, including whale sharks, manta rays, dugongs, Napoleon wrasses, and turtles, as well as a plethora of other sharks, dolphins, and migratory birds.

"The importance of the Red Sea ecosystem cannot be overstated," Karine Kleinhaus of Stony Brook University's School of Marine and Atmospheric Sciences told The Media Line. The coral reefs of the northern Red Sea and Gulf of Aqaba are thought to be among the world's last reef communities to survive beyond the middle of this century.

The UN's spokesperson, Stéphane Dujarric, declared on January 28 that the oil tanker inspection would be postponed until March, adding that "sticking to the current inspection schedule would focus on the Houthis' cooperation."

Houthi officials recommended that the UN suspend its plans after the UN committed $3.35 million to buy supplies and prepare for personnel deployment.

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UN Radio: Democratic Yemen

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Abductees Mothers Association participates at Yemeni Woman And Making Changes For Freedom seminar

In Marib, Abductees’ Mothers Association made a presentation titled Houthi Violations Against Yemeni Women Since Assuming Control on September 21st, 2014.

The presentation was prepared for a seminar held by Yemen Women Union, titled, Yemeni Woman and Making Changes for Freedom and Winning Back the Country.

In her presentation, Al-Refayi included stories and statements of women who were subjected to physical and mental torture, verbal abuse, and detention during their travels.

She demanded releasing all abducted and forcibly disappeared women, and stopping all types of violations against them.

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Fighting the Fear: Clearing Mines from Yemen’s Rural Communities

“Mines were inside homes, behind walls, inside bathrooms, everywhere,” describes Ali, 70.

For many Yemenis, the realities of war are tangible and deadly. Ali, a farmer and a father of five, was impacted by explosive remnants of war in his village, losing critical income and carrying the heavy weight of fear and anxiety every time he left his home.

But together, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) have been working to restore safety in rural communities just like Ali’s.

UNDP’s Mine Action Project’s main aim is to build the capacity of its national demining partner so that they can better protect Yemeni communities. This is done through technical training, administrative and operational support and providing equipment that enables explosive ordnance survey and clearance. In addition, UNDP supports YEMAC and a number of International NGOs, to increase community awareness to ensure people understand the threat of mines, how to identify and avoid them, and where to report them.

These project activities are expected to reduce the risk of disaster and prepare communities to cope with the presence and negative effects of explosives.

In 2020, UNDP’s support to local partners resulted in the survey and mine clearance of over 3.1 million square metres of contaminated land across 199 districts in 19 governorates — removing the threat of more than 68,000 explosive hazards.

“Our safety has been largely restored — there are no more mines in our homes. But outside the village sometimes you find mines and other times that explode on their own. With the heat of noon you sometimes see smoke rising and when you get closer you find that it is a mine that has exploded on its own,” says Ali, thankful for the efforts of UNDP and its local partners.

“Once when two mines exploded on their own, YEMAC came and examined the area. They found many next to it. We were told to report mines immediately when we find them,” he continues. “This mountain was filled with mines. YEMAC informed us more than once, now we are more careful,” states Ali, pointing to the distant range.

“They made us more aware and told us that if we find traces of mines, we should not approach them at all, because sometimes you find mines that are not completely buried…with only half of them visible,” Ali continues. “I learned all of this from the community awareness-raising sessions. Now I know what a mine looks like and what types of mines there are,” he says proudly.

YEMAC has hosted several activities in Ali’s village, raising awareness, improving local knowledge and removing large areas of explosive ordnance that will likely result in saved lives.

“We weren’t able to sleep until they started to remove mines,” concludes Ali. “Now we can graze our livestock, we can get firewood, and we can fetch water from the well. People walk everywhere. Previously, we were afraid to walk in the area, especially when one of our children was with us.” (with photos)

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8,000 killed by landmines in Yemen's civil war: report

Landmines laid by the Houthi group during the years-long civil war in Yemen killed nearly 8,000 people so far, Yemen's state-run news agency Saba reported on Wednesday.

According to Saba, the mines and explosives planted by the Houthi militia caused a major humanitarian disaster in Yemen, killing more than 8,000 people, including children and women, since the beginning of the war in September 2014.

The explosions of the Houthi-laid landmines killed also 61 bomb disposal technicians affiliated with the national pro-government forces, it said.

The pro-government bomb disposal technicians have dismantled and destroyed more than 689,000 mines and explosive devices during the past six years in the war-ravaged country, it added.

Previous reports of humanitarian organizations suggested that Yemen has become one of the largest landmine battlefields in the world since the World War II.

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Small Steps Have a Big Impact for Yemeni Civilians

Landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) have left physical, emotional, and economic scars on Yemeni civilians. Survivors of these deadly dangers may lose limbs and face significant psychological trauma for the remainder of their lives. Compounding their plight, social stigmas may combine with their physical injuries and lasting mental scars to prevent them from earning a livelihood, often leaving survivors and their families in dire straits. To help Yemen’s landmine and ERW survivors begin the healing and move past these challenges, the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has partnered with Arlington, Virginia-based Marshall Legacy Institute (MLI) to provide medical care, vocational training, and self-employment opportunities. These services help survivors reintegrate into their communities and provide vital skills-based training to improve their quality of life.

Providing survivors with properly fitting prosthetics is one way this initiative is helping. Survivor Abdulrahman Abdullah Saeed Ali from the Al-Khokhah District of Hodaydah was fitted with two prosthetic legs by MLI.

Clearance Operations

Since 1997, the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) has funded landmine and ERW clearance across Yemen. Currently, PM/WRA is working with UNDP and the HALO Trust (HALO) to deploy clearance, survey, and explosive ordnance risk education teams in coordination with Yemen’s primary mine clearance organization, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC)

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Joint Statement by UNDP and UNMHA: Mines Killed 348 Civilians in Yemen in 2020

AS many as 348 people were killed in 2020 due to mines and explosive devices laid in large swaths of war-torn Yemen, The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UN Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) said on Sunday.

In a joint statement, the UNDP and UNMHA said that planting mines in Yemen continues to increase, putting the lives of many Yemenis at great risk.

“Despite the continuous and notable efforts of the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) across the country, mine contamination continues to increase, posing a significant threat to the security and safety of all Yemenis,” they said in a joint statement.

“Littered across the country, mine and unexploded ordnance contamination is a major risk of death and injury to civilians as 348 people perished in 2020,”

It added that the UNDP and YEMAC removed about 64,000 Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) last year in 16 Yemeni provinces.

and also film:


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According to Rasd records, #mines & explosive devices left by the #Houthi militia have killed(1929) people,including(357) children,(146)#women & (83) elderly. Mines were planted in residential areas, farms, & other civilians areas.


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Film: Demining the world’s most mine contaminated country

Yemen is the world’s most contaminated country. The laying of over 1 million mines near hospitals, schools, local villages and in farmland has prevented thousands of people from playing, going to school, make a living and plant crops. During an on-going conflict which has caused the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, where do demining teams start? IOHR exclusively interviewed The Halo Trust and Project Masam, two organisations that are mine-hunting in Yemen. What is the chance of a mine free Yemen for the next generation?



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Muna… a displaced woman without feet

On Sunday morning, January 25, 2020, Muna bid farewell to her young son “Raqeeb”, before going to graze the sheep and collect firewood with her little girl “Sawaher” and the women of the village.

Her village, in Maqbanah district, is subject to a suffocating siege by Ansar Allah (Houthis). Services, including household gas, are non-existent. Therefore, people depend on bringing firewood for cooking.

She says: “We went to the outskirts of Zaom hill, which has a lot of trees, to graze the sheep and collect firewood. While we were collecting firewood, one of the sheep ran up to the top of the hill, and I had to follow it and bring it back. Then, I lost consciousness and did not wake up until two days later.”

According to the description of the women who accompanied her of the incident, when the explosion sounded, they saw her flying high. When they rushed to her, they found her almost naked as her clothes got burnt and torn and she was soaked in a pool of her blood and limbs.


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Mine Action Center: Saudi-Dropped Bombs in Yemen Will Lead to Humanitarian Catastrophe

“The raids that were dropped in various areas of Yemen have represented permanent suffering and are still reaping Yemenis. They are considered to be the death of dozens of children and women,” Safra said during an event held by the National Committee and the Executive Center for Handling Mines on Sunday.

He explained that the total number of people affected by cluster bombs is 3709, including 962 martyrs and nearly 100 children, while the number of wounded reached 3,700.

and also

My comment: Why not mentioning the Houthi land mines?

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This Little-Talked About Vessel Off Yemen Threatens to Halt Red Sea Shipping, Spark Mass Extinctions

The Safer floating oil storage facility moored off Yemen’s west coast became an international security concern during the Yemeni civil war, with the vessel threatening to leak over a million barrels of crude oil into the Red Sea, a global strategic shipping artery which also contains a unique and diverse array of marine life.

Muhammad Ali Al-Houthi, leader of Yemen’s Houthi militia movement, has fired off a series of tweets warning about the condition of the Safer, urging the United Nations to do something before the ship loses hull integrity, causing its toxic cargo to ooze into the Red Sea.

Al-Houthi repeated his plea on Sunday, tweeting that after being informed of the risk of a leak turning into an environmental disasters, the Houthis invited UN experts to defuse the situation. “Months and days passed without a response, and it was demonstrated to the world that their slogans are false and that their actions were to serve US, British, Saudi and Emirati aggression and that of their allies against the Yemeni Republic. We reiterate that the United Nations will be held fully responsible for any leakage.”

On Wednesday, the militia leader suggested that the “latest excuse” made by the UN for not sending its team to the Safer was that they would need a million dollars in additional insurance if they are not met at a specific spot at sea or have to bring the ship carrying the experts to port.

Stephane Dujarric, spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, responded to al-Houthi’s tweets earlier this week, suggesting that it was “not useful to negotiate these things via public statements,” and arguing that the UN was “eager, which is probably the understatement of the year, to get people on board the tanker.”


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Safer FSO poses threats to Red Sea navigation: Yemeni gov't

The Yemeni official government on Friday warned the international community of risks posed by any spilt from or blast of the floating storage and offloading (FSO) facility, Safer, shored off Ras Isa port in the Red Sea.


(A P)

Safer official: Continuing negotiation with Houthis farce

Ongoing negotiations with the Houthi group on the floating storage and offloading (FSO) facility Safer are farce, a senior official in Safer company for oil production and explorations has said.
Safer owner's appeals in the past period aimed to get crude out of the FSO facility and to spare the region the trouble of a looming environment catastrophe, the official added in remarks to Asharq al-Awsat.

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Jemen am Ende

Der Krieg von saudischer Seite lässt sich nicht gewinnen. Aber es scheitern auch Friedensgespräche mit den Huthi-Rebellen - auch nachdem die USA die von Iran unterstützte Gruppe von ihrer Terrorliste entfernt haben. Die Huthis sehen sich am längeren Hebel und starteten eine Offensive zur Eroberung des öl- und gasreichen Gouvernements Marib.

Durch die de facto Beinahe-Monopolstellung, wenn es um Öl- und Gasressourcen im Land geht, würden sie sich entscheidende Exporteinnahmen sichern und ihre Machtposition erweitern.

Diese Bilanz zieht der Journalist Gregory D. Johnsen, der ein sehr pessimistisches Bild von der Zukunft des Landes zeichnet. Die Huthis haben kein Interesse an Friedengesprächen und verstärkten Anschläge in den letzten Wochen.

Johnson führt weiters aus, dass die Fragmentierung des jemenitischen Staates darauf hindeute, dass es in absehbarer Zukunft zu keiner Einheit kommen könne. "Den Jemen" gebe es also demnach praktisch nicht mehr. Zu unüberschaubar sei der Krieg durch die Beteiligung zahlreicher Gruppierungen von Huthis, Islah-Anhängern, der Anti-Huthi-Allianz bis zu anderen Gruppierungen mit unterschiedlichen Interessen, die weder den Krieg für sich entscheiden können noch auf Frieden aus sind.

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

(* B K P)


The U.S.-backed, Saudi-led war on Yemen has entered its seventh year. Jaisal Noor speaks to Iman Saleh, who has been on a hunger strike since March 29 to highlight U.S. complicity in the conflict.

(A K P)

Water Corporation warns of humanitarian disaster

Water and Sanitation Corporation in the Capital Sana'a, has warned of catastrophic consequences if the sewage treatment plant ceases to operate due to running out of fuel, which will lead to widespread epidemics and diseases.

A statement issued on Tuesday indicated that the continued detention of oil ships will lead to the suspension of more than 70 waterbl wells pumping about 1.150,000 cubic meters per month.

and also

(A K P)

YPC: US Leads Piracy on Fuel Ships in Yemen

Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC), various sectors, state service institutions and all unions held a protest on Tuesday in front of the United Nations building in the capital, Sana'a, after passing two years of calls to lift the blockade and enter fuel ships.

The joint statement of the protest called for the entry of all fuel ships without delay in accordance with international agreements and United Nations laws.


cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

Siehe / Look at cp1

(B H)

Yemen on the brink: “We have a vaccine for this. It is called food.”

On March 30, the UK World Food Programme (WFP) and Omved Gardens hosted their latest instalment of The Chef’s Table, which this time focused on the food crisis in Yemen followed by a live cook-along. The cross continental zoom event highlighted the critical situation in Yemen and what can be done to help. Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East and the conflict, now entering its sixth year, has led to millions fleeing their homes and food prices skyrocketing. Currently, five million people are only one step away from famine in Yemen.

Ms Symington explained that Yemen is a country that has historically imported most of its food, but that “Since the war, the price of food has sky-rocketed and now people can’t afford to buy it”. She added that the coastline and agricultural lands have been mined, destroying sources of local agriculture and compounding the severe economic decline due to the war. Ms Symington explained that just last week she had met a fisherman, Salam, on the Red Sea coast who was unable to fish and that even if he were able to fish, he would be unable to sell much of his produce. The markets have dried up given that the main market “is now on the other side of a front line.”

(* B H)

Angriff auf spielende Kinder

Abdullah aus dem Jemen spielte gerade draußen mit seinen Freunden, als im Dezember 2019 sein Dorf aus der Luft angegriffen wurde. Der damals 10-Jährige wurde schwer verletzt, sein rechtes Bein musste amputiert werden.

Schon bald nach der Operation nahm sich das Team von Handicap International dem schwer traumatisierten Jungen an. Bei dem Bombenangriff verlor Abdullah nicht nur sein Bein, sondern auch seinen Cousin, der bei dem Angriff getötet wurde. Sein Tod hat Abdullah tief getroffen. Ebenso niederschmetternd war es für Abdullah, dass er dachte, er würde nie wieder spielen, gehen oder rennen können. Seine Eltern hatten keine Ahnung, dass ihr Sohn mit einer Prothese versorgt werden könnte.

Abdullah war anfangs extrem traumatisiert. Er hatte Angst vor den Ärzten, die ihn behandelten, und schrie, wenn die Physiotherapeutin versuchte, Rehabilitationsübungen mit ihm zu machen. Er war völlig verzweifelt. Alles machte ihm Angst. Das Team von Handicap International nahm sich die Zeit, ihn zu beruhigen und sein Vertrauen aufzubauen.

Er bekam zunächst einen Rollstuhl und Achselkrücken. Dann versorgte das Team ihn mit einer Unterschenkelprothese und brachten ihm bei, wie man sie benutzt. Inzwischen kümmert sich Abdullahs Bruder um ihn. Als sein Betreuer hat dieser von Handicap International Informationen über Prothesen und deren Wartung und Reinigung bekommen. Abdullah hat gelernt mit seiner Prothese zu laufen. Die Prothese muss regelmäßig angepasst werden, schließlich wächst er wie alle Jungs in diesem Alter.

(B H)

#Good_health is a ROOT FACTOR strengthening several #resilience sectors incl. #education, #productivity, #LaborWage. SFD has constructed, rehabilitated and/or equipped 675 health facilities & built capacities of thousands of health staff across the board.

(B E H)

Yemen Joint Market Monitoring Initiative: March 2021 Situation Overview

The Yemen Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI) was launched by REACH in collaboration with the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) Cluster and the Cash and Market Working Group (CMWG) to support humanitarian actors with the harmonization of price monitoring among all cash actors in Yemen. The JMMI incorporates information on market systems including price levels and supply chains. The basket of goods to be assessed includes ten non-food items (NFIs), such as fuel, water, and hygiene products, reflecting the programmatic areas of the WASH Cluster. The JMMI tracks all components of the WASH and Food Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) as well as other food and non-food items. In light of the current COVID-19 pandemic, REACH has adapted the JMMI to begin assessing the potential impact of the pandemic on markets and on respondents' businesses.

(* B H)

Jemen - ein Land in der Krise

KfW Entwicklungsbank unterstützt das Gesundheitswesen im Jemen

In dieser kritischen Situation engagiert sich die KfW Entwicklungsbank im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) seit dem vergangenen Jahr verstärkt im Gesundheitssektor: 2020 und 2021 wurden Finanzierungsverträge mit der jemenitischen Yamaan Foundation for Health and Social Development über 11 Mio. EUR unterzeichnet. In drei ländlichen Gouvernoraten werden Gutscheine für sichere Mutterschaft und Geburt an arme Frauen verteilt. Die Yamaan Stiftung, eine jemenitischen Non-Profit Organisation, wurde 2010 mit Unterstützung der KfW gegründet, um die Themen reproduktive Gesundheit und Familienplanung angemessen zu adressieren und voranzubringen. Gutscheinhefte für sichere Mutterschaft werden an schwangere Frauen verteilt, sie können eingelöst werden, um den Transport zu Krankenhäusern oder Gesundheitsstationen, Vor- und Nachsorgeuntersuchungen, fachlich betreute Geburten und die Behandlung bei Komplikationen zu ermöglichen. Die Mangelernährung bei vielen Schwangeren erhöht das Risiko von Mutter- und Kindersterblichkeit; Säuglinge, die schon untergewichtig geboren werden, haben einen schwierigen Start ins Leben.

Gemeinsam mit der United Nations for Project Services (UNOPS) rehabilitiert und baut die KfW Krankenhäuser und Isolierstationen in den Gouvernoraten Lahj, Aden, Hadramout und Al Mahweet. Bis Dezember 2020 wurden für zwei Phasen insgesamt 45 Mio. EUR zugesagt. Unter anderem werden Isolier- und Dual-Use-Stationen unterstützt, so soll die Versorgung von COVID-19-Patienten im Land verbessert werden.

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UNOCHA: Yemen Humanitarian Fund 2020 Annual Monitoring Report

This report provides an overview of the Yemen Humanitarian Fund (YHF) monitoring activities from 1 January to 31 December 2020, analyses monitoring results and provides a summary of key recommendations shared with partners. The report builds on earlier YHF monitoring reports covering 2018 and 2019.

Despite access challenges, COVID-19-related restrictions and other constraints, the YHF conducted 165 monitoring visits in 2020, thereby fulfilling all of its 2020 monitoring requirements. However, the YHF changed the modality of many monitoring missions from the OCHA Humanitarian Financing Unit staff visits to monitoring by Third-Party Monitoring (TPM) companies.

Fifty-six per cent of monitoring missions assessed YHF-funded projects as performing well, 35 per cent as underperforming but for reasons beyond the partners’ control, and 8 per cent as underperforming, without an adequate justification.

The YHF reached 12,508 people through remote call Beneficiary Verification Surveys (BVS), which supplemented selected monitoring missions. The surveys were conducted by trained data collectors who administered structured questionnaires. The respondents were randomly selected from distribution lists and constituted a representative sample of project beneficiaries. Out of the 12,508 interviewed people, 12,302 confirmed that they received assistance and 96 per cent of them expressed satisfaction with the services they received.

(* B H)

“I Could Not Sleep While They Were Hungry”

Investigating the Role of Social Networks in Yemen’s Humanitarian Crisis

While external aid is saving lives in Yemen, it is not necessarily the main source by which Yemenis cope during the ongoing crisis.

So how are Yemenis coping? Experts on food security in Yemen, research from other contexts, and Yemenis themselves point to an obvious, but often under-recognized source of support: Households are relying on their social connections and support networks for survival. Mercy Corps is undertaking research to help aid actors better understand how social connections are supporting coping and survival in Yemen.

This brief report presents initial findings from a study investigating the role of social networks in Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. It includes insights from interviews conducted with nearly 100 respondents in Taiz, Yemen. Initial findings suggest:

Social networks are critical to the survival and coping of households, with socially connected households sharing both material and intangible resources with one another.

New types of supportive relationships have emerged over the course of the conflict, while pre-existing social networks have continued to provide households critical support.

Despite the key role these networks play, they have come under significant pressure and have been weakened by more than six years of conflict. Unpaid salaries, blockaded ports, depreciation of the currency, and fuel shortages have strained social connections, pushing these informal support networks close to the point of exhaustion.

Humanitarian assistance has helped households maintain and build their social connections; however, opaque selection processes for aid recipients has contributed to a rise in social tensions and even at times undermined these informal networks of support.

These preliminary findings highlight a crucial opportunity for aid actors: By accounting for social networks and social support shared between households, aid actors have the opportunity to bolster--and at the very least not undermine--these critical sources of local and mutual support.

Full study:

(B H)

Ein Café im Jemen, das von Frauen für Frauen geführt wird

Als Um Feras feststellte, dass es in ihrer Stadt im Jemen keine Freizeiträume für Frauen gibt, gründete sie ein eigenes Café und hofft, die Einstellung gegenüber von Frauen geführten Unternehmen ändern zu können.

„Es gab keine Orte, an denen sich Frauen bequem versammeln konnten, keine Orte, die der weiblichen Gemeinschaft angehörten: Das Team von der Verwaltung bis zum jüngsten Mitarbeiter ist weiblich“, sagte sie aus dem Café Morning Icon, das sie im April letzten Jahres in Marib, Zentraljemen, eingerichtet hatte.

Traditionelle, konservative Einstellungen, die viele vor Ort gegenüber Frauen vertreten, die außerhalb des Hauses arbeiten, bedeuten, dass ihr Projekt für einige Menschen neu und seltsam ist, sagte Um Feras.

„Das Wort“ Café „kann mit negativen Ideen und Überzeugungen in Verbindung gebracht werden … Jede neue Idee wird ihre Unterstützer und Gegner haben“, sagte sie und fügte hinzu, dass sie mit gutem Beispiel vorangehen möchte, um zu zeigen, dass Frauen Unternehmen führen können.

(B H)

Yemen: Health Cluster Bulletin, February 2021

A total of 2191 Health Facilities (19 Governorate Hospitals, 131 District Hospitals, 101 General Hospitals, 21 Specialized Hospitals, 620 Health Centers and 1299 Health Units) are being supported by Health Cluster Partners.

(A H P)

IWF gibt Verlängerung von Notfall-Hilfen für 28 Länder bekannt

Die Hilfsgelder sollen besonders arme Staaten wie etwa Afghanistan, Jemen und Äthiopien unterstützen, die Corona-Krise besser bekämpfen zu können

Der Internationale Währungsfonds hilft besonders armen Ländern weitere sechs Monate mit Mitteln aus dem Katastrophen- und Notfallfonds CCRT. Der IWF teilte am Montag in Washington mit, eine dritte Tranche für 28 Staaten bewilligt zu haben. Damit erhalten die Länder – darunter Afghanistan, Jemen, Äthiopien, Togo, Niger und Burkina Faso – bis Mitte Oktober 2021 Fördergelder und Schuldenerleichterungen.

(* B H)

Mideast in Pictures: Yemen's landmine victims stand up with prosthetic limbs

Yemen's land is plagued by landmines. Millions of mines, which have been buried across the war-torn country over the years, impose grave threats to the life of its citizens.

Every year, thousands of people, including children, were killed or severely injured by the mines. Most of the survivors need prosthetic limbs to support their life.

As the International Day For Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action falls on Sunday, several children, who fell victim to the landmines, tried out their new prosthetic limbs in a rehabilitation center in Sanaa.

(A H P)

Kuwait sends 15,000 boxes of dates to Yemen

(A H)

Film: Yemen – Amal Foundation marks the International Orphan Day in Aden The Amal Foundation for Orphans and the Poor held a ceremony, in Aden, the Yemeni interim capital, marking the International Orphan Day with the slogan "Together we regain hope".

(* B H)

UNHCR Yemen 2021 Country Operational Plan

Main planning assumptions and expected constraints

Yemen continues to face an unrelenting conflict triggering what the UN describes as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Some 80 per cent of the population is estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance, and food security and health indicators are amongst the lowest worldwide. With more than four million forcibly displaced people as of the end of 2020, Yemen has the fourth largest internally displaced population due to conflict worldwide. Some 135,000 registered refugees continue to be highly vulnerable, while the evolving situation in Ethiopia may see increased arrivals.

Active hostilities—14 new frontlines in 2020—and explosive hazards endanger civilians and cause widespread damage to homes and public infrastructure such as hospitals and schools.
Political instability, weak governance and rule of law, and a ravaged economy with growing currency depreciation remain distinctive features of the situation.

Within its the budgetary parameters for 2021, UNHCR is reviewing its staffing levels that currently do not match its budget and footprint. In 2021, UNHCR will reduce its presence in some areas in the south (Mukalla and Turbah) given the relatively low number of displaced persons (especially IDPs) in both areas, while setting a robust presence in Marib that hosts a quarter of all IDPs. UNHCR also plans to reinforce human resources in field offices in the north that hosts more than two-third of all IDPs countrywide. The Office will continue to exercise its refugee mandate, especially in advocating and cooperating with Ansar Allah authorities in resuming the registration process in the north, in continuing to conduct registration and refugee status determination in the Government-controlled areas, and exploring a limited set of durable solutions, including the resumption of the assisted return to Somalia once COVID-19-related restrictions ease. On the IDP front, UNHCR will continue to rely on heavily earmarked funding, maintaining a robust emergency response and supporting an increasingly protracted IDP caseload, primarily through multipurpose cash assistance and protection services through a network of community centres. UNHCR will continue to lead protection, shelter and camp coordination and camp management clusters.

(* B H)

UNDP and UNMHA Joint Statement: International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action

As Yemen enters its seventh year of conflict, and despite the continuous and notable efforts of the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) across the country, mine contamination continues to increase, posing a significant threat to the security and safety of all Yemenis.

Littered across the country, mine and unexploded ordnance contamination is a major risk of death and injury to civilians as 348 people perished in 2020. Shadowed under an ever-present fear that degrades community social structures, contamination also destroys livelihoods and has a significant negative impact on the wider economy.

Perseverance is a key component of UNDP’s national Mine Action Project and its partners to mitigate the long-term, disproportionate, impact of mines in Yemen. Together, we continue to build national capacity for removing threats posed by mines and unexploded remnants of war. UNDP works with YEMAC all of Yemen, whose overarching objective is to achieve national reach while continuing to develop and expand its capacity, despite the conflict.

“Ongoing cooperation between UNDP and YEMAC has resulted in the restoration of thousands of livelihoods, strengthened local demining capacity – including the certification of Yemen’s first woman deminer – and assisted Yemen with the implementation of key mine action convention obligations,” explains Auke Lootsma, UNDP Yemen Resident Representative.

In partnership with our national counterparts, UNDP has supported Yemen’s mine action operations since the late 1990s – primarily through institutional and technical support, capacity development, resource mobilisation, and equipment procurement. And to help ensure their work is compliant with the International Mine Action Standards and to fulfil obligations toward the Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Convention), YEMAC partners with national and international organizations to continue to develop their capacity.

(A H)

We distributed food baskets to poor families in Sana'a

I visited some families and orphans in sana'a, whose live a difficult life due to this unjust war & siege since 6 years,

During my visit, we distributed 17 basket food for the poorest families there, (photos)

and also

(* B H)

Famine Stalks Yemen, as War Drags On and Foreign Aid Wanes

For the second time in three years, the threat of widespread famine hangs over the war-torn country, where millions are displaced and struggle daily to find food.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said in a statement that “cutting aid is the death penalty.”

Rafat al-Akhli, a colleague at Oxford University’s Blavatnik School of Government who studies Yemen, said frustration over the lack of progress towards ending the war was due to concerns about the efficiency of the United Nations and its interference in aid distribution. All donations contribute less.

Although foreign aid can help Yemeni families avoid disaster, he said, the end of the war could alleviate many of Yemen’s crises.

“The real solution is to stop the conflict and restore some degree of normalcy, but what have you left out except aid from UN agencies or cash injections?” He said.

At another rural clinic near the town of Kaflat Athar, north of Sanaa, 1-month-old Amna Hussain was weakened by diarrhea and malnutrition-related vomiting. She was treated at the same clinic last year and her health improved, her mother said, and they returned every week for nutritional supplements to keep her healthy. But last month the funding cut ended the supplement and now Amna is back in the clinic.

Her mother, who refused to give her name out of embarrassment, said she and her four daughters had left her husband and gone to live with their brothers, who did not have enough to feed them.

She said, “We are like refugees in other people’s homes. “You can only appreciate what you have given.” =

(* B H)

Oscar-nominated short documentary ‘Hunger Ward’ spotlights famine in Yemen

With his latest film, “Hunger Ward” — the final installment in what he calls his Humanitarian Trilogy — Fitzgerald takes viewers inside two clinics in war-torn Yemen that treat malnourished children. With millions of Yemeni children pushed to the brink of starvation due to a civil war that’s now in its seventh year, the film is at once a heartbreaking look at unimaginable suffering in a country most Americans know little about, despite U.S. involvement in the conflict, and a stirring call to action. Nominated for an Oscar in the documentary short subject category, the 40-minute film, which is being released by MTV Documentary Films, begins streaming on Paramount+ on Friday and is playing in theaters across the country as part of ShortsTV’s annual Oscar Shorts program.

“Hunger Ward” centers on two women, Dr. Aida Alsadeeq and nurse Mekkia Mahdi, as they struggle to save young lives in the midst of a devastating famine and a society whose very foundations have collapsed. After hearing from colleagues about the work the two women were doing, Fitzgerald connected with Alsadeeq and Mahdi via WhatsApp to see if they’d be willing to open their clinics to his cameras.

Without shying away from the horror and pain, Fitzgerald sought to bring a degree of visual poetry to the film, incorporating evocative images of a dog chained up amid bombed-out ruins, a weary but determined Mahdi blowing up balloons to give to her emaciated patients and sandals left behind by mourners after a memorial service was hit by a missile strike.

(B H)

Yemen Humanitarian Update - Issue 3 / March 2021

Prioritizing People in Need

Resurgence of COVID-19 cases in Yemen

Persistent fuel shortages undercut humanitarian operations and exacerbate humanitarian needs

Humanitarian Coordinator takes stock of needs in Ma’rib and Al Hodeidah

Displaced families relocated from schools in Ta’iz Governorate

Fire in Sana’a Immigration Holding Facility

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

(* B H)

IOM Yemen - Marib Response (29 March 2021)

The humanitarian situation in Ma’rib continues to be of concern, and while there have been various waves of conflict, the situation has shown no sign of improving. People’s lives continue to be impacted every day by fighting and thousands are being displaced from their homes and from internally displaced persons (IDPs) sites. The hostilities, which have escalated at various points since January 2020, have displaced close to 21,000 households (HHs). Of these, at least 2,622 HHs (18,354 people) have been displaced since 08 February 2021 alone because of the intensified hostilities in parts of western, northern and southern Ma’rib1 . People, many of whom were already IDPs in these areas, have for the most part moved to Arak and more recently to Kasarah, both areas in Sirwah district.

Although there were no significant changes to frontlines in March, fighting has continued to impact civilian and displacement sites and drive humanitarian needs. Protection concerns have continued to increase, with civilians reportedly being injured from nearby fighting. Local authorities are coordinating the evacuation of four sites (Al Khair, Al Mil, Al Tawasul and Idat Al Ra IDP sites) in Sirwah district, moving at least 513 HHs to Al Suwaydah IDP site, also in Sirwah. While this is an attempt to keep people safe, service gaps in Al Suwaydah (which already hosted 1,163 HH) are wide, particularly when it comes to shelter, non-food items (NFI), water and sanitation services.

Across the board, the situation is extremely concerning. Continued fighting threatens to displace hundreds of thousands more people – at least 55,000 HHs according to humanitarian contingency plans – while also increasingly constraining humanitarian access. Local authorities and humanitarian partners, who were already grappling with stretched resources while responding to the needs of some 1 million IDPs across the governorate, are now challenged even more to meet the growing needs. Those affected by the crisis in Ma’rib are some of the most vulnerable, repeatedly loosing access to basic services and livelihoods. A political solution to the crisis is urgently needed to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.

(* B H)

IOM Yemen Annual Report 2020

IOM takes a strong needs-based approach to its work in Yemen in order to reach the most vulnerable migrant, displaced and host communities. In 2020, through an integrated multisector response, the Organization continued to expand its support in underserved locations where access to communities is possible.
With a presence established during the previous year, IOM enhanced its operations in Ma’rib where the highest number of persons were newly displaced to in 2020 and which hosts Yemen’s largest displacement site. Additionally, throughout the year, thousands of migrants were stranded in the governorate and in need of assistance, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Organization also began assessments in the west coast part of the country, aiming at establishing a presence there— based out of Al Makha—where there are high needs and major gaps. Assessments were carried out throughout the year by all teams, engaging target communities, to inform the Organization’s response and to target vulnerable communities where there is a likelihood of humanitarian needs increasing due to receiving large numbers of displaced people, returnees, migrants or other vulnerable groups. These assessments were not just carried out in new locations of work like Al Makha but also in relation to all programmes carried out by IOM, for example, by the Aden team which also serves the neighbouring governorates.

(* B H)

Health needs to grow Marib, a place considered the ”safe haven” of Yemen

Dotted across Marib governorate, in northeast Yemen, are 134 camps – temporary shelters to displaced Yemenis, African migrants stranded in Yemen and members of a vulnerable minority group from Yemen known as Al-Muhamasheen. Before the start of the conflict, Marib was home to almost 400,000 people, according to local authorities. Now, it hosts nearly 2.7 million people all looking for a safe haven. MSF’s team in Marib runs two mobile clinics, which regularly visit eight different sites around Marib city, providing people with basic healthcare, reproductive healthcare, vaccinations, malnutrition treatment and mental health services. They also refer children with malnutrition and respiratory tract infections and women in need of emergency obstetric care to hospital.

(* B H)

Satellite photos of the large IDPs camp of al-Jufaynah in #Marib east of #Yemen, 2016 and 2021


(* B H)

Satellite photos of the Al-Suwayda' IDPs camp in #Marib east of #Yemen, 2017 and 2021

(* B H)

UNHCR update on humanitarian situation in Abs Hajjah Governorate

The current escalation in the fighting in Harad and Abs districts in Hajjah Governate continue to force many Yemenis to abandon their homes and seek safety in nearby areas. It is estimated that during the past two weeks more than 200 families (around 1,200 individuals) have been forcibly displaced and have sought refuge in existing IDP hosting sites in the governorate. Most newly displaced families have settled on sites located in four sub-districts, namely: Bany Thawab, Alwasat, Qutuba and Al-Bitariah in Abs district.

Following the new displacements, UNHCR’s partner, Rawabi AL-Nahdah Developmental Foundation (RADF) conducted a Rapid Needs Assessment to evaluate the urgent protection needs of those forcibly displaced. So far, since 15 March, some 679 individuals (97 families) have been assessed. The initial findings show that children and women represent 81% of the displaced population, with 31% of the assessed households (HH) being headed by women. Most newly displaced families have settled in existing IDP sites in Abs district, joining relatives who had been previously displaced.

New arrivals have shown to further increase pressure on scarce services and resources shared by the already vulnerable populations residing on these sites. The lack of health and WASH services, as well as poor shelter conditions and constant shortage of food are increasing the vulnerability of those having found refuge in these informal settlements.

Inadequate shelter conditions on sites are forcing male and female family members to live separately in gender segregated areas and in makeshift and crowded shelters, placing a further burden on displaced families. This is triggering increasing tensions within the community given the lack of privacy when a husband visits his wife and children in female designated shelters, causing separation of family members (including children from one of their parents). Lack of privacy and safe access to WASH facilities represent a major challenge, particularly for women.

Additionally, children are not attending schools due to littler or no space in classrooms as well as long distance from sites to schools. Instead many children are being tasked to fetch water for their families.

The findings further show that needs are vast and across all sectors, including health, shelter, non-food items (NFIs), protection, and food security, for the newly displaced but also for the existing populations on sites. Some 95 families (570 individuals) are in urgent need of shelter assistance, NFIs, and cash to buy food, while some 90 households have reported not having access to WASH facilities. The assessments also revealed that at least five elderly persons with chronic medical conditions require urgent health interventions.

(B H)

IOM Yemen | Rapid Displacement Tracking (RDT) - Reporting Period: 28 Mar - 03 Apr 2021

From 01 January 2021 to 3 April 2021, IOM Yemen DTM estimates that 4,515 households (HH) (27,090 Individuals) have experienced displacement at least once.

Since the beginning of 2021, DTM also identified 450 previously displaced households who left the displaced location and moved to either their place of origin or some other displaced location.

Between 28 March 2021 and 03 April 2021, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 592 households (3,552 individuals) displaced at least once. The highest number of displacements were seen in:

**Marib (429 HH) – **Marib City (409 HH), Marib (20 HH) districts. Most displacements in the governorate were interna

(A H)

Photo: Inauguration of a residential village for the displaced in the city of Al-Khokha, south of Al-Hudaydah Governorate, funded by the Kuwaiti Al-Rahma Association.

(* B H)

Humanitarian and displacement situation in Marib Governorate, Yemen

Humanitarian needs in Marib Governorate are growing as fighting escalates affecting civilians and triggering new displacements in Mahliyah, Jabal Murad, Medghal, Raghwan, Al Jubah and Sirwah districts. According to IOM, over 2,600 families have fled violence in Marib since the beginning of the year. The majority of the displacement is from or within Sirwah, where families are fleeing for the second or third time from three of the largest hosting sites, namely, Al Zur, Dhanah Al Sawabin and Danah Al Hayal. Marib hosts approximately 1 million displaced Yemenis from across the country, most of them have been sheltering there since the start of the Yemen conflict in 2015. Public services and infrastructures cannot cope with the large influx of internally displaced persons. Most of the newly displaced families have sought refuge in existing, overcrowded and underserved hosting sites in Sirwah, Marib city, Al Wadi and Al Jubah districts and nearby areas. Lack of resources, access constraints and insecurity are increasingly hindering the delivery of aid to civilians in Marib, with severe consequences for the most vulnerable.

(B H)

Livelihood Support through Multi-Purpose Cash Grants

For short and medium-term food security inter- ventions, Building Foundation for Development (BFD), funded by Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe (DKH), launched a project to enable vulnerable IDPs and marginalized people of Al Gufainah Camp to meet up with their minimum survival needs and improve their wellbeing through Multi-Purpose Cash Grants (MPCG) and Cash for Work (CFW).

Zahra was selected in the unconditional MPCG program, where she met the program vulnerability criteria of selection. Moreover, sensitization sessions with the selected beneficiaries were conducted by BFD team to guide them on best practices of utilizing the MPCG to reach food secu- rity. After receiving the cash assistance of the first round, Zahra was so relieved that she could satisfy the needs of her children to get basic items of food and the proper education. Moreover, since she did not own an oven and used the traditional method of cooking, she was able to save some portions of Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) value and thought of ways to utilize this saved amount.

(A H)

Photo: A displaced Yemeni family, who fled their homes due to war , take shelter under a tree west of the suburbs of Yemen's Taiz on April 1, 2021. =

(A H)

Yemen: Huge fire erupts in camp for internally displaced people

Investigation launched after one child killed and four injured

A child was killed and four injured, including three women, when a huge fire broke out at a camp for internally displaced people (IDP) in northern Yemen.

The blaze started at Al Jufaina camp in western Marib province on Saturday, according to Dr Khalid Musaed, manager of Yemen's IDPs executive unit.

"The cause of the fire is still unclear", Dr Musaed told The National, adding that his administration is still investigating the incident.

Twenty-five residences in the camp were burned down and ten others partially damaged.

Families whose residences were damaged or destroyed have been evacuated and hosted in a public school near the camp.

Al Jufainah is the biggest IDP camp in northern Yemen's Marib province and hosts 10,300 families. Houthi rebels have repeatedly targeted IDP camps in the province with dozens of projectiles in recent weeks.



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IOM Yemen - Fire Incident in Al Jufainah Camp | Flash Update (05 April 2021)

On 03 April 2021, a fire broke out in Sector 3 of Al Jufainah Camp in Ma’rib governorate due to an electrical fault, resulting in the tragic death of one child and the injury of one man, three women and one boy, some of whom are currently being treated in intensive care units. Those injured by the fire needing specialized care were brought to the hospital while minor burn cases were treated by the IOM mobile medical team at the site.
All those affected, who did not require immediate medical care, were evacuated by the Executive Unit for Internally Displaced Persons (ExU) to Al Wahda School located in Al Jufainah Camp. In the immediate aftermath of the fire, IOM shelter and non-food items (S-NFI) and camp coordination and camp management (CCCM) teams provided workers to clean up the area, while the installation of emergency tents for the affected families will take place soon.
IOM verified that a total of 18 shelters were fully damaged by the fire, impacting 21 households.

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

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Houthi actions towards minority groups threaten religious freedoms in Yemen: [Hadi gov.] Minister

The Houthis’ actions towards the Jewish and Baha’i communities reflect the militia’s approach towards minority groups and religious freedoms, Yemen’s information minister Muammar Al-Eryani said

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Film: Daily statistics on the names of the victims of children recruited by the Houthi group. Tuesday06April,2021

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13 deceived people [defectors from anti-Houthii fighters] return to Sana'a, including 2 leaders

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Rebels turn to poetry in battle for Yemeni hearts

Yemen's Huthi rebels, whose austere interpretation of Islam outlaws most forms of music, are increasingly turning to traditional poetry to woo support in a "soft war" against the Saudi-backed government.

Short-form poems, known as zawamil, are a much-loved part of Yemen's tribal heritage, played or performed at weddings and other social occasions.

In the hands of the Huthi rebels who control the capital Sanaa and most of the north, they have become a vehicle for martial music and propaganda against the government's Gulf Arab and Western supporters.

Zawamil are popular across Yemen -- in the government-held south as well as the rebel-held north.

But the rebel administration in Sanaa has invested greater effort in their production for propaganda purposes and has stepped up its output in recent months.

Earlier this year, they released a song called "Marib is ours", composed by one of their most famous poets, Issa al-Laith, and recorded by their own production company.

"Marib is ours, not for you hypocrites, who sold your religion and nation for (Saudi) riyals," the lyrics say.

It and similar anthems lambasting the government as a puppet of Yemen's wealthy Gulf Arab neighbours dominate the air waves in rebel-held areas.

In addition to the millions of views on YouTube and SoundCloud, such compositions are regularly performed at weddings and at the traditional afternoon gatherings where Yemeni men chew the narcotic qat and talk politics.

According to Ahmed al-Arami, executive director of the Arabia Felix Center for Studies, zawamil are "the only form of music which the Huthis can allow"

"This art form is to a large extent similar in its role and purpose to the spirited anthems of jihadist and Muslim groups in general, such as (Lebanon's) Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda and (Palestinian Islamist group) Hamas," Arami said.

- 'Intercontinental weapon' -

A number of composers and vocalists in the rebel-held capital declined to speak to AFP about their poems.

But the propaganda value of zawamil is not lost on the rebels. A long article published on the website of their Al-Masirah television station described the short poems as an "intercontinental weapon" in their "soft war" against the government and its allies.

"A thousand Beethovens could not come up with (zawamil) whose words are sonnets that a thousand Shakespeares could not come up with," it said.

In their lyrics, rebel poets often take up popular Arab causes, like the Palestinian claim to east Jerusalem and its revered Al-Aqsa mosque, Islam's third holiest site.

In the song "Marib is ours", the vocalist urges listeners to "protect lands to the west and east, and liberate Al-Aqsa from the (Israeli) occupation".

Washington is a frequent target for the poets' anger because of the surveillance and refuelling support it gave until recently to the Saudi-led bombing campaign against rebel-held areas.

"Who else but America has supported strikes on homes?" one popular poem asks.

"Who else has rung the bells of war? How often has it fought us with signals and remotes and, today, it comes to us with Arabs as its guards." =

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Yemeni woman speaks out about Al Houthi rape, forced marriage

Human rights activist Samira Abdullah Al Houri spent three months in Al Houthi prisons

Yemeni human rights activist Samira Abdullah Al Houri revealed her suffering inside Al Houthi prisons, and the increasing cases of rape and forced marriages there.

Al Houri says the Iran-backed militia has resorted to force marriages, in which Yemeni women, whose husbands study or work abroad, are married against their will to Al Houthi men. The Houthis aim to increase births without lineage, raise these infants in orphanages and radicalise them.

“This way the Al Houthi group radicalise and recruit children even before they are born, a strategy to create a more vicious and notorious fighters,” Al Houri said.

Al Houri says she was kidnapped and taken to an unofficial, unknown location, and without any investigations, prosecution or court hearings. “I was sentenced to death on charges of communicating with the [Saudi-led Arab] coalition,” she said.

She added that her detention lasted more than three months in a secret prison on Taiz Street, in a place called Al Thaghata.

“I was tortured, threatened with execution and forced to record videos of confessions that I am a spy for the Arab coalition, and I am the one who gives the coordinates to them. I was forced to sign an affidavit to accept any orders or tasks they assign to me, whether they are immoral, political or military,” she says.

Al Houri says notorious Al Houthi leader Sultan Zaben, who was placed on UN Security Council sanctions list for torturing women, had supervised her torture during her detention.

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Houthis are eliminating GPC party members considered loyal to former president Saleh/Almashehad Alkhaleeji

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Because he disagreed with them, Houthis today stormed house of Mohammed Dughaysh in Amran city, north #Yemen, and killed him in front of his family.

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Iran plans to establish a university in Yemen. In an interview with Mehr News Agency, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, head of international affairs at Islamic Azad University, said that the university is planning to open a branch in Yemen

Last yr, Iran-backed Houthis rprtdly shut ovr 5 depts at Sana'a Unv, incl Frnch & Ar langs, History& Int'l Relations ,Geography, Philosophy, Archlgy &Tourism.. Now Iran planning 2establish a univ in #Yemen! Be4, Houthis imposed curriculums that glorify Iran &promote sectarianism.

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Criminal Court upholds execution of convicted of assassinating President al-Sammad

A criminal court in Hodeida province has upheld a preliminary sentence to execute imprisoned convicts of the US-Saudi aggression cell' members involving in the assassination of President Saleh al-Sammad and his companions in Hodeida city on April 19, 2018.

In the session presided over by Judge Abdul Hafedh al-Mahbashi, the trial court pronounced the judgment regarding an appeal submitted by the detained defense attorney in connection with the case.

The court also upheld the primary judgment convicting the defendants of what was attributed to them in the indictment, punishing them with death, punishment, retribution, and confiscation of all their property.

It also supported the obligating the appellant convicts to pay Y.R 3 million litigation fees to the blood guardians in the appeals stage.

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Yemen's Houthi regime eyes own Sana-based airline – report (subscribers only)

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Houthis brutally expel hundreds of African refugees

The terrorist Houthi militia is working to exert oppression against Africans in Yemen, forcing them to flee to neighboring countries, the Paris-based Middle East center for strategic studies reported on Monday.
In the same context, the Houthi militia deported hundreds of African immigrants on Saturday, April 3, the day after the dispersal of a peaceful sit-in in Sanaa by force of arms, which led to the killing of two migrants and arrest of many of them.
Yemeni activists circulated a video clip on social media of the arrival of dozens of Ethiopian refugees to the town of Haifan in southern Taiz on the borders of Lahij and the liberated Aden, after the Houthi militia expelled them from Sanaa by force.
Yemeni sources revealed that the Houthi militia deported the migrants from Sanaa days after an open sit-in in front of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to demand an international investigation into the horrific fire that occurred last month and resulted in the death and injury of 400 Ethiopians. .
The Houthis also launched a widespread campaign of arrests, and citizens in the city of Dhamar in central Yemen were made to pledge not to return to the areas controlled by the militia in the north of the country.
Sources confirmed the arrival of the first batch of migrants to areas under the control of the internationally recognized Yemeni government in Haifan, and they are now on their way to the temporary capital, Aden.

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Film: Community initiatives that fail the aggression plans ... Construction of schools in Saada governorate with self-efforts

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Houthi security official sanctioned by US dies

Meanwhile, sources linked to the Houthi group in Sanaa doubted he died of an illness, saying he was in good health and working normally


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Several Yemen women activists celebrate death of Houthi terrorist Zaben

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Yemeni Options in Self-defense and Impact on Regional Developments

Since US President Joe Biden came to power in Washington, his administration has re-read the US position on the Middle East issues. Two main issues are at the forefront of attention in the region, namely the Iranian issue, with its many ramifications, and the Arab normalization issue with the Israeli entity, regarding the US project in the region.

The war in Yemen is one of the most important issues related to the two mentioned issues, because the war launched by the US-backed coalition against Yemen and its people to pass normalization and besiege the forces capable of resisting it.

President Biden's administration deals with the Yemeni issue on the basis of reshaping the region according to the two major headings for its interests in the current stage. As an ideal solution to the Yemeni crisis, what is meant by the US is to lead to a political result that prevents the resistance forces from having political influence in the regime in Yemen, and puts the Yemeni political administration in an orbit of war against it, by Saudi Arabia specifically, which opens the way for encircling the resistance forces in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

The Biden administration is active today in reuniting its allies in the region and restoring the relations, starting with the Qatari-Gulf reconciliation, which was the first active issue after Biden took over the presidency, and moving to the Egyptian-Turkish reconciliation. Developments accelerated steps are taking place, accompanying political and economic developments, such as the expanding invading alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which will be completed with Turkey's accession to it.

My remark: A Houthi view of US politics.

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Houthi leader warns Iran not to stop uranium enrichment

A leader of the Yemeni Houthi rebels, Muhammad Ali Al-Houthi, has called on Iran not to stop uranium enrichment before the parties to the 2015 nuclear agreement return to the deal.

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Houthis disperse a protest by African immigrants in Sana'a by force in a bid to deport them home/Multiple websites

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GPC party politician Nabil Mi'ayad dies immediately after being released from Houthi jail due to torture during the detention/Yemen Voice

and also

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11 deceived [defected anti-Houthi fighters] individuals return home

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Removing Ansarullah from terrorism list US 'deceptive' game

The Chairman of the Yemeni Supreme Revolutionary Committee stressed that the US' decision to remove Ansarullah from the so-called terrorism list is 'deceptive' as the siege against Yemen is still in place.

The chairman of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee of Yemen, Mohammad Ali al-Houthi, strongly criticized the US policy towards the country.

Despite all US claims terrorism, aggression, and siege in Yemen continue, he said.

and also

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Migrants Detained in Sana'a Forced To Pay for Their Freedom

The Mwatana Organisation For Human Rights Director Radhya Almutawakel denounced that over 6,000 African migrants are inside detention centers in Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, where they remain imprisoned until they can pay a bribe in exchange for their release.

Over the last year, the number of detainees has increased in the Sa'ada's militarized zone, which is one of the main African migration routes to Saudi Arabia, although it is the scene of violent fighting and bombings.
Migrants who survive the journey are often taken in "cattle trucks" to Sana'a, and placed in detention centers, where they remain for months or years until they can scrape together US$280. This is the current price of their freedom in a bribery business that has become very lucrative.
After payment, the migrants are abandoned in desert areas close to zones controlled by the internationally recognized Yemeni government. From there, they embark on a journey without food and water until they reach a location.

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From Ethiopia to Yemen, a perilous migrant route to endless misery

In the latest disturbing development in Yemen, more than 220 African migrants have been kidnapped from outside UN offices in Sanaa and taken to an unknown destination.

Among those missing are 55 women, Al Arabiya, quoting local sources, reported on Saturday. They had previously organized vigils in front of the UNHCR building, calling for an investigation into the deaths on March 7 of dozens of African migrants in an overcrowded detention center in Sanaa.

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Black Lives Matter’s Hawk Newsome appalled by lack of coverage of Houthi massacre of Ethiopians

The horrific deaths of scores of Ethiopian migrants in a detention center in Sanaa run by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi militia is further proof that anti-black racism exists on every continent, according to Hawk Newsome, a founding member of Black Lives Matter (BLM) Greater New York.

Racial tensions and the deaths of black people in police custody have provoked repeated bouts of protest and unrest in the US and Europe in recent years.

During an exclusive interview with Arab News, Newsome said the tragedy in Yemen demonstrates the need for global, pan-African solidarity — the kind espoused by the early-20th-century New York-based black nationalist Marcus Garvey.

“This is an issue that needs attention. This is something that can’t be ignored. This is something I won’t ignore. There are 44 people murdered and the news isn’t paying attention,” he said.

“I have strong reason to believe that the news isn’t paying attention because they’re black people. It’s my duty to fight for black people across the world.”

“But the racism in the news media and on the world stage renders this a non-issue. Where is the national attention?” =

Film: =

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Parliament revokes membership of 44 MPs for standing by aggression coalition

The Parliament, in its session Saturday headed by the Parliament Speaker Yahya Ali Al-Ra'i, voted by the majority for the removal of membership from 44 of its members who had stood by the Saudi-led aggression coalition.

The procedure comes under Article 194 of the Parliament's internal regulations, and based on its constitutional and legal duties and its national duties as the representative of the Yemeni people.

and also


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GPC Leaders Fear Return of Targeting, Assassinations by Houthis in Sanaa

Today, leaders of Yemen’s General People's Congress (GPC) are fearing for their lives after their supposed ally, the Houthi militia, have ordered its affiliated media outlets to scale up attacks against GPC chairman Sadeq Amin Abu Rass.

GPC leaders fear that the falling-out with Houthis will escalate to a campaign of assassinations, arrests and raids that targets them.

It is worth noting that it was Houthis had appointed Rass as head of the GPC after killing the party’s founder and the war-torn country’s former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, in December 2017.

GPC sources in the Houthi-run Yemeni capital, Sanaa, have pointed out that the quarrel between the Iran-backed militia and their party’s leaders can be traced back to the former marginalizing and pursuing the later.

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp8 – cp19

Vorige / Previous:

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-732 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-732: oder / or

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
Geschrieben von

Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
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Dietrich Klose