Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 736 - Yemen War Mosaic 736

Yemen Press Reader 736: 21. April 2021: Kompletter Film: Hunger Ward – Dauerhafter Frieden erfordert saudische Entschuldigung und Kriegsentschädigungen – Der falsche Ansatz von USA und Saudis ..
Bei diesem Beitrag handelt es sich um ein Blog aus der Freitag-Community

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

... Der falsche Ansatz der USA und der Saudis für Frieden im Jemen – Jemen im Ramadan 2021 – Übersicht, Risiken im Jemen – Die Schlacht um Marib – Die militärische Anpassung der VAE im Bab El-Mandeb – Maribs Abstieg zurück in den Krieg – Hadhramaut: Können lokale Anstrengungen die Trennungen des Krieges im Jemen überwinden? – Steiner, Riazi und Freeman, eine Botschaft der saudischen Lobby – und mehr

April 21, 2021: Film (complete): Hunger Ward – Lasting peace requires Saudi apology and reparations – The flawed US-Saudi approach to peace in Yemen – Yemen in Ramadan 2021 – Yemen Risk Overview – Marib battle – The UAE’s Military Adjustment in the Bab El-Mandeb – Marib’s descent back into war – Hadhramaut: Can Local Efforts Transcend Wartime Divides in Yemen? – Steiner, Riazi, and Freeman, A Message from the Saudi Lobby – and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-736b-yemen-war-mosaic-736b

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp12b Sudan

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade

cp13b Söldner / Mercenaries

cp13c Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage

cp13d Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp17a Kriegsereignisse: Schlacht um Marib / Theater of War: Marib battle

cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle

cp19 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification

***

**

*

(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-einfuehrende-artikel-u-ueberblicke

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

(*** B H K P)

Hunger Ward – the complete film!

Two female health care workers fight to save the lives of hunger-stricken children within a population on the brink of famine.

Mit Bildern aus zwei der am stärksten belasteten Stationen für die Notfallernährung von Kindern im umkämpften Jemen dokumentiert HUNGER WARD den Kampf zweier Frauen gegen die weitere Ausbreitung einer menschlichen Katastrophe vor dem Hintergrund eines vergessenen Krieges. Ohne je den Blick abzuwenden, zeichnet der Film Porträts von Dr. Aida Alsadeeq, Schwester Mekkia Mahdi und ihrer gemeinsamen Arbeit, das Leben unterernährter Kinder in einer vom Hunger gezeichneten Bevölkerung zu retten. HUNGER WARD zeigt mit beispielloser Präsenz in einer sensiblen Konfliktgegend den Mut bedingungslos engagierter Ärztinnen und Ärzte inmitten einer der schlimmsten humanitären Krisen der Welt.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S8I6H4uKhJQ

Bericht zum Film: https://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/hunger-ward-dokumentarfilm-jemen-hungerkrise-1.5245573

Homepage: https://www.hungerward.org/

Reports: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/29/yemen-doctors-front-line-humanitarian-crisis-hunger-ward/

https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-12-11/film-shows-how-yemens-health-workers-struggle-save-young-victims-malnutrition

https://deadline.com/2021/01/hunger-ward-director-skye-fitzgerald-documentary-interview-news-1234673571/ = https://www.syriahr.com/en/200452/

https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/story/2021-04-02/oscar-documentary-yemen-hunger-ward-skye-fitzgerald

https://deadline.com/video/hunger-ward-director-skye-fitzgerald-documentary-exclusive-clip-mtv-documentary-films-news/

https://deadline.com/2021/04/hunger-ward-oscar-interview-deadline-contenders-nominee-1234731738

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/bearing-witness-crisis-yemen-182313

https://www.wfp.org/stories/safiah-and-young-family-among-millions-trying-keep-hunger-bay-yemen

Films, Skye Fitzgerald in interview: https://www.undispatch.com/inside-yemens-hunger-wards

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0YkQa7Amhis

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7PNBKGqKyk4

https://www.pbs.org/wnet/amanpour-and-company/video/famine-yemen-putting-half-million-children-risk-ndae4r/

https://www.opb.org/article/2021/03/18/hunger-ward-depicts-the-effects-of-war-and-famine-on-children-in-yemen/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksZuggstK0Q

and

(* B H K P)

Film: How the war in Yemen 'devastated an entire generation'

Skye Fitzgerald discusses the dire humanitarian crisis in Yemen, as shown in his Oscar-nominated film "Hunger Ward," alongside correspondent Nima Elbagir.

https://edition.cnn.com/videos/tv/2021/04/19/amanpour-yemen-hunger-ward-skye-fitzgerald-nima-elbagir.cnn

and

(B H K P)

Wikipedia: Hunger Ward

Hunger Ward ist ein US-amerikanischer Dokumentar-Kurzfilm von Skye Fitzgerald aus dem Jahr 2020. Er handelt von der Hungersnot in Jemen und dem Einsatz zweier Frauen gegen das Hungerleiden von Kindern.

Der Dokumentarfilm porträtiert die Arbeit von Dr. Aida Alsadeeq im Sadaqa Hospital in Aden und Schwester Mekkia Mahdi, die von der Verbundsklinik Aslam Clinic aus die verschiedenen Kräfte koordiniert.

Der Film zeigt die Behandlung und Pflege betroffener Kinder. Er weist auf die spezielle Situation im Rahmen des Bürgerkriegs hin, das Leid der hungernden Kinder und die Trauer der hilflosen Eltern. Gezeigt wird unter anderem das Sterben eines Mädchens, für das die streng islamische Großmutter der Ärztin die Schuld gibt. Gezeigt wird ebenfalls die erfolgreiche Behandlung eines Mädchens mit Glutenunverträglichkeit. Am Ende wird der Zusammenbruch einer Mutter dokumentiert, die gerade ihre Tochter verloren hat.

Es folgt ein Appell der Ärztin den Krieg und den Hunger in Jemen zu beenden und die Stimmen der einfachen Leute des Landes zu erhören. Sie könne sich nicht an das Sterben gewöhnen und jeder Verlust wäre schwer zu ertragen. Es folgen Texttafeln, die eine direkte Verantwortung Saudi-Arabiens bekräftigen, die sowohl Nahrungsmittellieferungen blockieren als auch die Bevölkerung durch Luftangriffe dezimieren. Auch den Vereinigten Staaten, die Saudi-Arabien mit Waffen und Ausrüstung unterstützen wird eine Schuld zugesprochen. Zudem seien Großbritannien, Frankreich, die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate, der Iran sowie die Huthi in den Konflikt involviert.

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunger_Ward

and

(B H K P)

Wikipedia: Hunger Ward

Hunger Ward is a 2020 American documentary film directed by Skye Fitzgerald and Michael Shueuerman. The film deals with the ongoing famine in Yemen and the efforts of two hospitals to combat the resultant child malnutrition.[1] It was nominated for the Academy Award for Best Documentary Short Subject at the 93rd Academy Awards.[2]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunger_Ward

(** B P)

Lasting Peace for Saudi in Yemen Requires a Public Apology and Reparations

While the Saudis, prodded by the new US Administration, are now looking for a way out of the quagmire of the war, Riyadh's diplomacy has so far been unsuccessful. Meanwhile, the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen has only worsened. The Saudis continue to punish the Yemeni civilians by using the air and naval blockade as a bargaining chip to exact concessions from the Houthis, who have no intention of giving in and have very different ideas about how the war should end.

I also have my own ideas about how the war should end. I believe that in order to achieve lasting peace and not a temporary ceasefire, the Saudis must pay for their war crimes. They can't bring back the dead, but they can pay reparations to Yemen and the war's victims. As a first step, the Saudis should investigate their own conduct in the war and seek to understand the magnitude of destruction and death they have caused in Yemen. After their own internal deliberations, the Saudis should publicly apologize to the Yemeni people. While such an apology would be largely symbolic, it would lay an important foundation for reconciliation between the two countries. Acknowledging one's mistake to your enemy is the way Yemenis resolve their own tribal disputes, including violent struggles that cause mass deaths. Yes, the Saudis have killed hundreds of thousands of Yemeni people as a result of military operations and their after-effects, but it's not too late to make peace. One need look no further than the Yemeni tribal arbitration process, which provides a model for successfully resolving complex and violent disputes. Deeply entrenched in Yemeni society, the tribal norm of acknowledging wrongdoing has enabled even the most bitter of enemies to make peace.

The gesture of acknowledgement obliges the party upon whom the injustice was inflicted to accept the apology and ask for a fair resolution. Resolution often takes the form of compensation and guarantees that such wrongdoing won't be repeated. For the Saudis, this process would involve a public apology and an end to all military operations and actions, including bombing runs and the blockade. In return, the Houthis would end the missile and drone attacks they have launched at Saudi Arabia as retaliation.

If the Saudis take the steps described above, the Houthis will be under enormous pressure to reciprocate by ending their military operations. If the Houthis choose, despite Saudi's apology and demobilization, to prolong the conflict, they would lose a great deal of popular support all across Yemen. The Houthis seem to understand this and have already showed and conveyed a willingness to consider Saudi peace initiatives.

Following an apology and a truce, the Saudis should take the most important step at achieving a durable solution to the Yemen war — compensating the war's victims. The Saudis, of course, have the means to do that, and they should do it immediately. Largely defenseless, the Yemenis have felt a great a sense of humiliation as the Saudis have killed combatants and civilians indiscriminately. The great toll of casualties has resulted in a popular outcry among the public and calls for revenge against the Saudis. A new Yemeni generation has been born knowing no enemy but Saudi Arabia. The Yemeni public, in public discourse and private discussion, has exhibited a hunger for revenge and resistance against the Saudis that can only be sated by direct and transparent action by the Saudis to make amends.

Saudi reparations should go to individual victims and toward more general purposes in order to boost the Yemeni economy and restore public services. Absent reparations, the Yemenis will nurture a deep sense of grievance against the Saudis that is already brewing in the country and that will prevent real peace between the two countries.

The time has come for the Saudis to try and repair as best they can the damage they have wrought over six years of war. They should do it now before it's too late. Riyadh can choose to have once again a peaceful neighbor or an enemy at its southern border. Saudi self-interest requires that they take the path of peace.

There are hopeful signs. The Americans and Saudis have spoken positively about the UN brokered peace plan. In order to achieve a sound peace plan that is acceptable to all, though, the Saudis must apologize and compensate the war victims. Only then will the Yemeni people put the war in the past and move forward in peace – by Ahmad Alghobary

https://dawnmena.org/lasting-peace-for-saudi-in-yemen-requires-a-public-apology-and-reparations/

(** B K P)

Biden’s Yemen envoy in the hot seat

We cannot accept at face value that the US and Saudi Arabia are committed to peace when their actions demonstrate the opposite.

U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking will testify before both houses of Congress today, addressing the House Foreign Affairs Committee first, followed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Members of both panels have expressed consternation at the lack of progress in U.S. efforts to address the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Yemen, and this frustration may come through in these hearings.

Pressure has grown from activists, celebrities, and members of Congress for the Biden administration to demand that Saudi Arabia lift the blockade on Yemen that is contributing to conditions of severe food insecurity

Members of Congress should press Lenderking on these points, specifically why the State Department appears to be ignoring statements by the World Food Program, which cites the blockade as the single most important humanitarian concern for Yemen.

They should also ask for clarification about why the U.S. government blames the Hadi government for the restrictions and ignores Saudi Arabia’s responsibility. The Hadi government lacks the on-the-ground capability to enforce its own edicts, while the Saudi government selects which of Hadi’s preferences align with its own agenda. In this case, working to prevent the Houthis from acquiring fuel revenues that the Saudis know will help fund their war effort lines up with the Hadi government’s desire to maintain the facade of its own control over Yemen. In addition, Lenderking needs to explain why Washington is tacitly supporting the starvation of Yemen by not pressuring Saudi Arabia to lift the blockade.

Lenderking will probably try to shift the hearing’s focus to the looming humanitarian catastrophe in the city of Marib.

If Saudi Arabia and Lenderking are concerned about Marib, they should propose a means of providing assistance to the population there, such as a UN-led international effort to help move IDPs away from the front lines to other parts of Yemen.

Instead, Lenderking and the Saudis argue that the blockade should only be lifted if the Houthis agree to a ceasefire in Marib. This argument is problematic because it operates under a logic that considers the ongoing starvation of Yemenis to be an acceptable bargaining chip. Moreover, Lenderking and the Saudis know that their various ceasefire proposals are likely to be rejected by the Houthis, who believe they are winning the war and thus have no incentive to negotiate a ceasefire. Saudi Arabia and Lenderking portray the Houthis as uninterested in coming to the negotiating table, which is accurate. The Houthis are virtually certain to reject any negotiation defined by the terms of UN Security Resolution 2216, which requires that they give up their weapons and territory. Thus, for Riyadh and Washington to continue to propose ceasefires under this framework, while knowing full well that it will be unacceptable, amounts to the intentional prolonging of the war.

The Saudis and the Hadi government have lost the war. Their insistence that the Houthis accept their terms before they lift the blockade reflects their unwillingness to accept this fact. The U.S. government’s unwillingness to acknowledge that the position of the Hadi government — and therefore the Saudi position — is untenable, appears to be motivated by Washington’s animosity towards Iran. The government continues to frame Yemen through the lens of Iran

If, as they claim, Riyadh and Washington are committed to ending the violence in Yemen, they will need to shift their approach. The Houthis are not interested in ending the violence, as it has offered them gains beyond what they thought possible – by Annelle Sheline

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/04/21/bidens-yemen-envoy-in-the-hot-seat/

(** B H K P)

Ramadan Brings No Relief for Yemen as Saudis Block Chairties and Turks Unleash Foreign Mercanaries

Just as it transferred mercenaries from Syria to the conflict zones in Libya and Azerbaijan, Turkey — the financial and spiritual capital of the Muslim Brotherhood — is now doing the same in Yemen’s oil-rich Marib.

The Kingdom has ramped up efforts during Ramadan to stem the tide of charitable giving under the pretext of unifying relief efforts under the umbrella of the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center. Of course, any aid that does arrive does not reach the most populated areas of Yemen, which are under Houthi control, leaving most of the country effectively cut off from aid. To make matters worse, the Saudi government has banned thousands of Yemeni expatriates from returning to Yemen to reunite with their families during Ramadan and bringing with them the money they’ve earned working low-wage construction and other hard-labor jobs for the Kingdom’s wealthy. The Kingdom has kept hundreds of Yemeni expatriates trying to return home detained at the al-Wadiah crossing since March 24, under the pretext that their SUVs are banned from crossing the border as they could potentially be used in battle.

The Sana’a-based Land Transportation Regulatory Authority said in a statement on Saturday that nearly 2,000 vehicles owned by families trying to return home from Saudi Arabia have been held at al-Wadiah for over 20 days. Reports have also surfaced of widespread abuse by Saudi authorities, who are accused of beating stranded motorists with electrified batons when they tried to hold a vigil on April 5 to protest their detainment.

Despite the magnitude of the humanitarian disaster in the country, the primary focus of the international community, including the UN, has been the impending Houthi takeover of the oil-rich Marib province. As Adel al-Hajajji put it, “the lives of Yemenis suddenly become the concern of the international community, particularly America and its allies, when it comes to oil, as usual.”

As the Houthis close in, Saudi forces are increasingly showing their desperation. In a move that mirrors accusations against the Kingdom in places like Syria and Libya, local reports indicate that Saudi Arabia recently reinforced its ranks in Marib with Salafist mercenaries brought in from the battlefields of Azerbaijan, Libya and Syria, combatants known for their effective use of armed Turkish drones.

Turkey, Muslim Brotherhood weigh in

The foreign fighters, long a staple of proxy conflicts across the Middle East, fight under the banner of the Al-Islah Party, the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Just before Ramadan, a large group of Syrian mercenaries is reported to have arrived in Marib. A Houthi official told MintPress that most of the fighters crossed the sea from ports in Somalia, while others crossed the border into Yemen from Saudi Arabia. “Many of them were killed and injured in direct confrontation, by ballistic missiles and by drone attacks.” The official went on to say that Turkish-built drones have already been spotted participating in the fighting. In March, a Turkish Karayel armed drone was downed in al-Jawf, an area adjoining Marib.

Just as it transferred Syrian mercenaries to the conflict zones in Libya and Azerbaijan, Turkey — the financial and spiritual capital of the Muslim Brotherhood — is now doing the same in Yemen’s oil-rich Marib. Both Islah and Houthi sources told MintPress that Saudi Arabia and Turkey are cooperating in Marib, the last major stronghold in Yemen of both Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood. Usually at political loggerheads, sources say Islah Party leaders have worked with Qatar, another Muslim Brotherhood stronghold, to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, using their shared desire to retain influence in Yemen as a carrot for rapprochement. In a recent statement uncharacteristic of the Turkish government, the Turkish foreign ministry said “Turkey stands with Saudi Arabia and its people against the Houthi attacks that target Saudi oil facilities.”

Mercenaries, drones, and bombs

The Violations Documentation Center in Northern Syria, a local group that tracks and reports human rights violations, released a report stating that Turkish intelligence services had assigned Syrian jihadist leader Kamal Taha Al-Faihan, nicknamed Abu Faisal Al-Mujahid, to recruit Syrian fighters to send to Yemen. According to the report, the fighters were offered $2,500 monthly; $100 of this amount would be deducted for document expenses, fighters would receive $400 in cash initially, and the remaining $2,000 would be paid to their families after the move to Yemen.

Local reports and leaked audio indicate that Turkey is pursuing the same recruitment strategy in Marib. The Syrian news outlet Shaam Times reported that 300 Syrian fighters have already joined the ranks of the al-Islah militia; and Yemen’s North Press Agency, citing a source inside the Syrian armed extremist group Sultan Suleiman Shah, reported that the Syrian National Army, another armed militant group backed by Turkey, “has been working for weeks to prepare dozens of militants to send to Yemen.” – by Ahmed Abdulkareem

https://www.mintpressnews.com/yemen-saudi-arabia-block-chairties-turkey-unleashes-foreign-mercanaries/276781/

(** B H K P)

ACAPS: Yemen Risk Overview: Outlook for December 2020–May 2021 (March update) | Risk Update 15 April 2021

Risk 1: Depletion of foreign currency reserves drives inflation up; eroded purchasing power and high food prices result in increased levels of food insecurity.

Sources of foreign currency inflow in Yemen – especially oil exports, humanitarian funding, and bilateral financial support – remain constrained. The average exchange rate for the new Yemeni rial (YER) banknotes under the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) was higher in March than in February. Remittances also remain below pre-COVID-19 levels, although they are likely to increase during Ramadan. IRG revenues from oil exports are expected to remain limited because of global crude oil prices decreasing again at the end of March, along with limited exports from Yemen. The decrease in oil price is the result of a decline in demand caused by movement and travel restrictions following the resurgence of COVID-19, as well as the decision by OPEC+ (the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, which includes the ten additional oil-exporting countries besides the formal OPEC members) to increase global supply to regulate prices (The Indian Express 14/04/2021).

Although food imports will continue, food prices are expected to follow the exchange rate and are therefore likely to increase and diverge among different geographic areas of control. Price inflation remains the most commonly reported constraint when accessing food and WASH items, fuel, and water trucking services (REACH 06/04/2021). The increase in food prices has led the Yemeni people to adopt negative coping strategies, such as reducing the number and/ or size of meals, borrowing food or requesting help from friends and relatives, and relying on less expensive food (IRC 26/03/2021). In the long term, these behaviours are likely to have a detrimental effect on people’s health, making them more vulnerable to food insecurity, malnutrition, waterborne diseases, and other disease outbreaks.

Risk 2

Reduced capacity to deliver assistance – because of further cuts in humanitarian funding – impacts millions of people in need.

On 12 March, the US government announced that it would resume support to humanitarian organisations operating in northern Yemen following severe cuts from USAID in April 2020 (Deutsche Welle 13/03/2021). This support, along with the US strategy to stop military aid to the KSA in Yemen and the launch of KSA’s new peace initiative, could result in increased funding to Yemen; the most significant donors so far have been the US, the UK, and the KSA. As at the beginning of April, only USD 487 million of the USD 1.7 billion pledged to the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan – out of the USD 3.85 billion required – has been disbursed (FTS accessed 07/04/2021). A lack of funding is likely to reduce humanitarian organisations’ capacity to respond to the increasing needs of the Yemeni people.

Risk 3

An attempt by the Houthis to enter Marib city intensifies the conflict, leading to mass displacement, civilian casualties, disruption to livelihoods, and lack of humanitarian access.

The Houthi offensive against IRG forces in Marib began in February and continued throughout March; there is no indication that it will end anytime soon. Since 8 February, over 18,000 people have been displaced, mainly from or within the Sirwah district. Airstrikes also caused civilian casualties and damage to civilian homes.

Risk 4

Sudden decline in public service provision in IRG-held areas leaves millions of people requiring external assistance for their basic needs, while humanitarian access is also reduced.

At the beginning of March, Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed announced that the IRG would take steps to address the deteriorating economic and service issues in the south. A committee led by the IRG Ministry of Oil and Minerals will work to return the Aden refinery to its previous capacity, and the Yemen Petroleum Company will organise fuel distribution to reduce the demand for foreign currency. The fuel donation pledged by KSA may also contribute to addressing the long-sustained power outages recorded in the past months in Aden (Debriefer 11/03/2021), but it is unlikely that this donation will be sufficient to support power grids during the hot summer months. On 16 March, ongoing protests regarding unpaid salaries and deteriorating public service provisions in Aden and other governorates under the IRG culminated with protesters storming the presidential palace

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-risk-overview-outlook-december-2020-may-2021-march-update-risk-update-15-april

(** B K)

Large-scale Huthi offensive roils Yemen's oil-rich Marib

The loss of Marib, gripped by a worsening humanitarian crisis, would be a heavy blow to the government, giving the Iran-backed rebels more leverage in any future negotiations or even spur them to push further south, observers say.

Hundreds of combatants have been killed since the large-scale offensive began in February, according to local sources.

Loyalist commanders say the rebels are sending wave after wave of fighters towards frontlines around Marib city, the regional capital, from seemingly inexhaustible reserves.

"The Huthi strategy is... aimed at exhausting (us)," a Yemeni commander told AFP at the sand-swept Al-Kanais battlefront in the north of the city, where loyalist soldiers crouched in sandbag-ringed foxholes and heavy machine guns were loaded on the rear of pickup trucks.

In a pattern emerging across multiple frontlines, the commander said the Huthis are pushing zealous waves of young recruits, many of them children, with the goal of wearing out loyalist forces and depleting their ammunition.

Hours-long gun battles are typically followed by a brief lull to collect the dead bodies.

Then a more lethal wave of experienced Huthi fighters moves in under the cover of constant shelling, the commander said of a desperate rebel strategy that is heaping pressure on loyalist forces.

"The Huthis don't care how many of their men die," he added, a point echoed by other Yemeni officials, including Marib's governor Sultan al-Aradah.

"They are sacrificing the people of Yemen... But they will not be able to reach Marib no matter the price we have to pay," added the commander, who requested that his name be withheld.

Marib is already paying a huge price since the Huthis, who set their sights on taking the area last year, relaunched their offensive in February on the back of large reinforcements.

The city of Marib and some outlying areas make up the last pockets of government-held territory in the north, the rest of which is under rebel control, including the capital Sanaa.

Non-aligned observers of the conflict are alarmed at the high casualties around Marib, with one international official telling AFP "the Huthis seem to have a lot of fighters to throw into the battle".

"At the end of the day, the Huthis will say, 'We still have fighters... and we can sacrifice people and young men'," this official said.

Marib is home to hundreds of thousands of civilians already uprooted by Yemen's ongoing conflict –- and they face the prospect of being displaced again in a country with fewer and fewer safe havens.

Western officials defend Biden's decision, saying the designation, which came late in the Trump presidency, would have worsened Yemen's humanitarian crisis by further impeding access, while doing nothing to blunt the Huthis' military ambitions.

But one Western official said he slammed the Marib offensive as a "big mistake" during direct talks with Huthi negotiators, drawing parallels with stalemated fighting during World War I that only added to widespread suffering.

Meanwhile, Marib's tribes have responded to local calls to send their men to reinforce frontlines alongside the loyalists, with many saying that the terrain offered them an edge over the Huthis, known to be more adept at mountain warfare.

Describing themselves as "sons of the desert", many Marib tribesmen see a military advantage in a largely flat desert landscape dotted with scrubby bushes.

https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210421-large-scale-huthi-offensive-roils-yemen-s-oil-rich-marib = https://www.rfi.fr/en/large-scale-huthi-offensive-roils-yemen-s-oil-rich-marib = https://www.thenationalnews.com/gulf-news/yemen-s-sons-of-the-desert-fight-to-save-homes-from-houthi-offensive-1.1207887

(** B K P)

The UAE’s Military Adjustment in the Bab El-Mandeb: From Power Projection to Power Protection

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) are reshaping their military posture abroad, reflecting their recalibrated foreign policy. This especially regards the Bab el-Mandeb area: as the Emiratis have partially withdrawn from the military bases in the Horn of Africa (Berbera in Somaliland and Assab in Eritrea), they are strengthening the pivot on Yemen’s coasts and islands: Perim, Mokha and Socotra. This reorganization mirrors the UAE’s tactical policy shift from power projection to power protection: the Emirati armed forces seem to have temporarily moved from a power projection-oriented expeditionary force to a reactive and monitoring force focused on power protection. With a special eye on securing maritime waterways for energy and trade.

Less is (now) more? The minimalist face of the (same) Emirati foreign policy

This power protection choice operationalises the recalibrated course of the UAE foreign policy, started in mid-2019, when Iranian-likely attacks against oil tankers around the Arabian Peninsula waters (included off Fujairah’s coasts in the Gulf of Oman) pushed the Emirati federation to adjust its foreign policy priorities given changed threat perceptions. This reassessment, embodied by the appointment in 2021 of a new Minister of state for Foreign Affairs, Shaykh Shakhbout bin Nahyan (who replaced Anwar Gargash, promoted diplomatic advisor to the UAE president), suggests a less assertive and more minimalist foreign policy (exemplified by the military withdrawal from Yemen, the support for the new interim government in Libya, and reduced presence in the Horn of Africa) than before, following years of overstretched engagement in the region.

Post-2011 UAE foreign policy saw the Abu Dhabi-led and military-oriented attitude prevailing over Dubai’s commercial-oriented posture: it was keener on mediation than the former. However, since 2019, the balance has gradually reversed. The Emirati policy shift towards power protection was triggered by a series of factors: the UAE has already achieved its geostrategic goals and now wants to preserve them; it managed to build a network of allies and proxies allowing it an indirect, less risky cross-regional influence; a renewed regional balance is in the making after the Abraham Accords (Israel), the Al Ula Declaration (Qatar), and the beginning of Joe Biden’s US presidency; the willingness to improve its international image in the year of the UAE Golden Jubilee (2021).

In other words, the current power protection course of the UAE would be nothing less than the tactical “phase 2” of power projection. Therefore, this choice has to be framed within the same post-2011 foreign policy.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) are reshaping their military posture abroad, reflecting their recalibrated foreign policy. This especially regards the Bab el-Mandeb area: as the Emiratis have partially withdrawn from the military bases in the Horn of Africa (Berbera in Somaliland and Assab in Eritrea), they are strengthening the pivot on Yemen’s coasts and islands: Perim, Mokha and Socotra. This reorganization mirrors the UAE’s tactical policy shift from power projection to power protection: the Emirati armed forces seem to have temporarily moved from a power projection-oriented expeditionary force to a reactive and monitoring force focused on power protection. With a special eye on securing maritime waterways for energy and trade.

Scaling down from the Horn of Africa: Berbera and Assab

Between 2019 and 2021, the UAE reduced its military footprint in the Horn of Africa, reconsidering the outpost in Berbera (Somaliland) and then downsizing its presence in Assab (Eritrea). This is firstly related to the end of the Emirati consistent military deployment in Yemen. The Assab base was fundamental for the UAE-led operation to regain Aden in mid-2015: it housed Emirati, Yemeni and Sudanese soldiers engaged in Yemen and here transiting, also for training.

In 2019, the UAE’s project for a military airport in Berbera was turned into a civilian one ; nevertheless, the Emirati DP World keeps the port concession for Berbera. Between December 2020 and March 2021, the Emiratis partly left the military base built in Assab , although the UAE retains a thirty-year leasing for the base granted by Asmara. In 2015, the Emiratis HAD expanded the port and the airstrip, building barracks and a field surgical hospital to heal wounded soldiers.

Stepping up in Yemen: Perim, Mokha and Socotra

As the Emiratis scale down their military role in the Horn of Africa, they are stepping up -directly and indirectly- their military positioning in Yemen’s coasts and islands (Southern Red Sea). Part of the UAE’s fighter jets and Chinese-manufactured UAVs previously stationed in Assab (which were deployed in Yemen and Libya), would have been relocated at Sidi Barrani, the Egyptian airbase close to the Libyan border. In the past, this base was the probable destination of air bridge flights for equipment and supplies from the UAE: today, the Emirati geopolitical alignment with Egypt and Russia in Libya is still strong. In the Northern Red Sea region, the UAE has strengthened military cooperation with Egypt. In 2020, Cairo inaugurated the Berenice interforce base at the presence of the Abu Dhabi crown prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan: in the future, the base could serve as the UAE’s strategic door on the Red Sea.

However, the focal point of the UAE’s tactical adjustment is the Bab el-Mandeb, and particularly Perim (Mayyun in Arabic), a small Yemeni island in the strait. In the first months of 2021, the Emiratis built, according to satellite imagery, an airstrip and an airbase which could host large military transport aircraft. The uphill location could be kept for future electronic warfare and signals intelligence. In mid-2015, Yemen’s internationally-recognized government succeeded in recapture the island from the Houthis; since 2019, Emirati soldiers have been replaced by the Saudis in Perim –where the Emirati-supported Yemen Coast Guard has restarted to operate - as well as in Mokha and Khawkhah, both in the Southern Red Sea.

In Mokha, Yemen’s port city close to the Bab el-Mandeb (Taiz governorate), the UAE supports the West Coast forces led by General Tariq Saleh, former chief of the Presidential Guard and nephew of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh

Socotra is the third “dot” in the Emirati reshaped posture around the Bab el-Mandeb. Following the Abraham Accords, the UAE and Israel will plan intelligence cooperation in the island to control Iranian activities in the Western Indian Ocean-Red Sea complex. The Emirati-supported Southern Transitional Council (STC), who seized Socotra in mid-2020, greeted the UAE-Israel diplomatic normalization, although it didn’t issue an official statement on the matter.

Refocusing on the Bab el-Mandeb and maritime security

As part of its recalibrated foreign policy, the UAE’s military adjustment in the Bab el-Mandeb emphasizes how much the strait stands at the top of the Emirati regional strategy. In fact, carving-out a good placement in the area allows the Emiratis to preserve their post-2011 geopolitical gains, assuring freedom of navigation and containing both Iran’s coastal influence (ex. Hodeida) and Ansar Allah and Iranian-related destabilising activities in waterways (ex. attacks with ballistic missiles, armed drones, sea mines and Water Borne Improvised Explosive Devices-WBIED).

In this framework, the UAE is likely to continue to enhance its support to the Yemen Coast Guard, whose insufficient capacity is due to persisting politicization, absence of a unified command structure, corruption and intermittent or even lacking salaries. In 2016, the UAE and Saudi Arabia trained new guard units on the coast of Hadhramawt; the Emiratis remained on Zuqar island (Hanish archipelago) until October 2019 to train members of the coast guard.

In the Bab el-Mandeb area, cooperative security initiatives are on the rise and the UAE is indirectly involved.

The UAE’s tactical shift from power projection to power protection marks another season of the Emirati post-2011 foreign policy. The Bab el-Mandeb was -and is- central to this strategy: in its waters, the Emiratis test their geopolitical weight between cross-regional ambitions and responsibilities. While in the past it might have been with direct military presence on the Horn of Africa’s coasts, today it occurs through local partners and outposts on Yemen’s rimland – by Eloenora Ardemagni

https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/uaes-military-adjustment-bab-el-mandeb-power-projection-power-protection-30108

(** B H K)

Marib’s descent back into war is shocking, but it shouldn’t be a surprise

‘Every day, you turn on your mobile and you read the news that one person’s friend is dead, another is dead.’

When I visited Marib three and a half years ago, it was being sold as an island of stability and prosperity in the middle of Yemen’s violent war. I didn’t quite buy that line, but I also didn’t foresee the danger and dread that are bearing down on the central province and city now.

In the past few months, thousands of people have been forced to run from bombs and bullets as a Houthi rebel offensive closes in on the area. The reports of fighters dying in brutal battles and missiles ripping through residential neighbourhoods and camps where displaced people are sheltering could not not be further from the image I and other journalists were presented with in late 2017.

The difference is stark, but perhaps in countries as bitterly divided and decimated as Yemen has become, such a drastic change shouldn’t come as a shock. As many Yemenis have learned over the past six years of war, even the things everyone should be able to take for granted – safety, home, regular meals – often don’t last.

Before war broke out in March 2015, Marib was seen as something of a sleepy backwater, albeit one with a proud and rich history that includes the Queen of Sheba (Bilquis in Arabic). Over the first year or so of the conflict, it then became a fiercely contested front line in a battle between Houthi rebels (then allied with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has since been killed) and an internationally recognised government, backed by a now increasingly frayed Saudi Arabia- and United Arab Emirates-led coalition.

But by the time I arrived, the area was firmly in the hands of the coalition and the Yemeni army, which boasted a large base in the city. Business was booming, construction was everywhere – there was even talk of a new airport and a state of the art football stadium (the first never materialised, the latter did).

While most Yemenis were living amidst a cholera epidemic, clean water here was flowing into homes from a dam that only a few years earlier was being fought over.

Hundreds of thousands of people – maybe even millions – came to live in Marib, escaping war or persecution elsewhere in the country, and the area became a safe haven of sorts for those opposed to Houthi rule.

It’s the same with Marib. For the last month, it has been the place making the news (in so much as Yemen is ever really high on the media’s agenda), while places like Hodeidah, where acute malnutrition among young children is worryingly high, or Taiz, where fighting is raging and children are being killed and wounded, are neglected.

But battles and sieges often take a long time to progress. Troops move, politicians machinate, peace talks make progress in fits and starts and then reverse course. At the same time, prices rise and people have less and less money to eat... Until there’s a breaking point.

Deaths from bombs and guns and cholera and COVID-19 happen fast, but sometimes we don’t see the signposts leading up to the big thing.

This isn’t just true in Yemen, even though as a foreign correspondent it’s easy to fall into the dangerous trap of looking at other countries through a different lens than your own. I’m an American citizen, and recent events that were devastating and felt unpredictable – the storming of the Capitol, for example – had actually been brewing for a long time. There were big flashing red warning signs, and for the most part, they were ignored by those who should have been paying attention.

Perhaps the scariest part of all this is that when you’re right in the middle of it, even if you see disaster edging towards your doorstep, it’s hard to know what to do.

With no certainty of where to go or what will happen next, leaving home is now an agonising choice many Yemenis in Marib may have to make once more – by Annie Slemrod

https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/editors-take/2021/4/19/the-crushing-inevitability-of-yemens-war

(** B P)

The Case of Hadhramaut: Can Local Efforts Transcend Wartime Divides in Yemen?

At this precarious juncture for Yemen, peace-building and state-building efforts will require bottom-up models that focus on accounting for wartime shifts in power. Such efforts will need to work to ameliorate local tensions, to facilitate the transition of postconflict Yemen into a more effective governance system.

Fortunately for Yemen, there are examples of subnational areas that have enjoyed a modicum of success and cohesion, even during the war, and which the beleaguered country can draw upon as “bottom-up” models for peace and state building. The governorates of Hadhramaut and Ma’rib are two such examples. In Hadhramaut especially, local authorities and local communities have played a crucial role in preventing the governorate from being stuck in a devastating civil war or trapped in political tensions, while also uniting to lobby for the governorate’s collective concerns with national-level authorities, most notably gaining the devolution of a share of oil resources. Perhaps even more importantly, the governorate’s local communities were able to come together in 2017 to independently organize a conference, called the Hadhramaut Inclusive Conference, to unify the political vision of Hadhramaut.1 The conference presented a consensus on revenue sharing and autonomy that has nudged the governorate toward greater local control over economic resources and security.

None of this is to say that Hadhramaut has been immune from the fallout of Yemen’s war. The governorate has been effectively bisected into two different sociopolitical ecosystems, while internal and regional divisions have threatened to disrupt its relative calm. Still, local elites’ and stakeholders’ willingness and ability to pursue inclusive political organizing have often allowed them to transcend the divides—at least on a theoretical level. These groups and individuals have put forward consensus-based proposals that remain relevant both for the current movement and for postwar trajectories.

Hadhramaut’s unique model is a result of the intersection of a long-standing, unique Hadhrami identity—both within Yemen and in the centuries-old Hadhrami diaspora—and a de facto decentralization. The war has fragmented Yemen’s political system and created a power vacuum to an extent that has arguably never been seen in the country’s modern history. Yet the broader outlines of a locally driven, “bottom-up” federalism have emerged in Hadhramaut—even as the central government of Yemen has weakened. And so far, Hadhramaut has succeeded in mitigating or avoiding the worst outcomes of Yemen’s violent internal conflicts. The governorate’s model can be instructive for peace and stability in other governorates as well, especially if Hadhramaut’s history is properly understood.

In the context of the current war, the bulk of international discourse on Yemen has largely focused on formal political negotiations—“Track One” processes, in the argot of international negotiators. International discourse has paid little attention to local dynamics. But developments outside of traditional power centers in Yemen are bound to shape the country’s future as much as higher-level political dynamics. Notably, owing to its economic potential, its fossil fuel wealth, and its position at the intersection of national-level and southern Yemeni politics, Hadhramaut is destined to play a significant role in postconflict Yemen. And, with Yemen increasingly fractured, the intersection between Hadhrami identity and governance constitutes a significant test case for the potential role of consensus-based coalition building and stabilization, both for Hadhramaut and for its relationship with the rest of Yemen. Hadhramaut’s experience thus presents both a model for success and a warning: it illuminates a possible path toward a shared vision that transcends the wider political divides facing the country, but also shows how years of conflict have widened fractures and divisions that, in the past, may have largely remained below the surface. Thus, the governorate’s experience is relevant not just in Yemen, but throughout the wider region, particularly as increasing state fragility deepens the importance of internal dynamics and the necessity of bottom-up approaches in the many states dealing with conflict. Hadhramaut shows that identity-based, bottom-up approaches can be seen as a constructive tool for both peace building and state building in societies riven by conflict. While acknowledging the area’s struggles, Hadhramaut’s model can be used as a blueprint in other polities and communities in Yemen and in the region.

A Distinct Identity

Among the key attributes that set Hadhramaut apart from the rest of Yemen is its distinct identity, which includes one of Yemen’s most prominent diasporas. This identity has played a key role in much of the evolution of the governorate’s politics, particularly on the local level.

War Threatens to Divide Hadhramaut

Despite Hadhramaut’s history of a distinct and coherent identity, it has also at times suffered from divisions, and the fallout from Yemen’s ongoing conflict has proven particularly divisive.

The dynamics of the current conflict have caused a resurgence of division in Hadhramaut

Efforts at Unity

Over the past decades, a number of initiatives have tried to synthesize the different views of Hadhramis under a unified vision. Consistently evolving, these initiatives have largely aimed to transcend the governorate’s political divisions while uniting key stakeholders to strengthen efforts to push for a platform of key reforms and proposals.

The Formation of the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance

Elites dominated the process of drafting “Hadhramaut: The Vision and the Way”—in addition to many other aspects of Yemen’s transition after Saleh’s twenty-two-year presidency ended in 2012. But a few years later, events in Hadhramaut reawakened long-dormant grassroots activity in the governorate.

The Hadhramaut Inclusive Conference

In mid-2016, the HTA called for an “inclusive conference” to shape the governorate’s political vision.34 In some sense, the conference represented a fusion of both local leaders and traditional elites.

The Southern Transitional Council

Amidst the formation of Hadhramaut-focused bodies, many in the governorate have continued to prioritize southern issue-focused politics. While numerous figures have been active in both the governorate and the larger southern region of Yemen, there have nonetheless been tensions between the two political spheres—particularly since the emergence of the STC, which has pushed forward the question of whether local elites and power brokers should prioritize a potential return to pre-1990 borders, or simply work for greater autonomy in Hadhramaut.

A Hadhramaut Model?

Hadhramaut remains a governorate divided. This is true with regard both to security dynamics and to politics. Still, key Hadhrami stakeholders have managed to pursue efforts toward cross-partisan politics that have managed to transcend the governorate’s current fault lines.

These stakeholders’ success has been limited, and they have not managed to resolve tensions, though they have dampened them.

Potential Paths Forward

While short-term conflicts alter political systems, long-term conflicts create new societal dynamics. New dynamics have emerged in Yemen that are influencing the potential political paths of Hadhramaut and creating three possible future scenarios for the governorate. In one, Hadhramaut would be an independent federal state within a unified Yemen. In another, Hadhramaut would be an independent federal state within a larger southern Yemeni state. And in a third scenario, Hadhramaut would be a fully independent state. The first scenario is the most likely potential scenario, as long as support for Yemen’s continued unity remains the stated policy of nearly every key international stakeholder involved with the country. The second federal path is possible but needs international recognition for separation, which has yet to materialize in any substantive fashion. The third scenario is unlikely as there is, so far, no sign of anything resembling actionable support for a fully independent Hadhramaut at the international or the national levels – by Adam Baron and Monder Basalma

https://tcf.org/content/report/case-hadhramaut-can-local-efforts-transcend-wartime-divides-yemen/?agreed=1

(** B P)

Steiner, Riazi, and Freeman, A Message from the Saudi Lobby

How to Make a Gulf Monarchy All-American

The Saudi Lobby Moves from K Street to Main Street

That spring oil dispute was far from the first setback the Saudi lobby had faced in Washington in recent years. From the disastrous Saudi war in Yemen to the brutal murder and dismemberment of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, Congress had ample reason to turn its back on that country. Perhaps not so surprisingly, then, in a series of bipartisan bills that passed the House and the Senate, Congress sought to end America’s military involvement in the Saudi-led coalition’s brutal war in Yemen and halt arms sales to the Kingdom. Fortunately for the Saudi lobby, it had President Donald Trump, long wooed by the Kingdom’s royals in the most personal of ways, as a safety net to veto those bills and protect them from punishment for their many misdeeds.

Yet, in 2020, as the coronavirus pandemic ravaged America, it became increasingly clear that Trump’s reelection prospects were dimming and, with them, that guarantee of eternal protection.

And so, the question arose: What was an authoritarian government with oodles of lobbying money but dwindling influence in Washington to do as the prospect of a Joe Biden presidency and a Democratic Congress rose? The answer, it turned out, was to move its influence operation from the Beltway to the heartland.

The Saudis Shift to the States

Since becoming ambassador in February 2019, Princess Bandar Al-Saud found herself spending ever more time with people outside the Beltway, particularly in states that were reputed to have deep ties to Saudi Arabia. From Maine to Iowa to Alaska, the Saudi ambassador began a campaign of courting Main Street America.

Ambassador Bandar Al-Saud’s road show would only sweep on, right past the election and inauguration of President Joe Biden. In late January, she would be at the World Affairs Council in Dallas/Fort Worth and, in March, the Houston World Affairs Council. As always, attending would be business leaders from the area, including (you won’t be surprised to learn) prominent oil executives. Whatever local issues she might focus on in such talks, the ambassador always kept the main focus on the splendors of MBS’s Vision 2030 plan and just how important it was to strengthen the decades-long relationship between the two countries.

Oh yes, and each of these events had one other thing in common: they were all organized and promoted by Saudi Arabia’s registered foreign agents.

Despite appearances, such events weren’t the product of meticulous planning by Saudi diplomats or Ambassador Bandar Al-Saud herself. Instead, the Saudis have done what many foreign governments do here to make their message heard. They hired lobbyists and public relations firms. In this case, one firm has largely been responsible for the way the Saudis have gotten the word out so far beyond the Beltway: the Larson Shannahan Slifka Group.

Also known as LS2, Larson Shannahan Slifka describes itself as a “bipartisan public relations, government affairs, public affairs, and marketing firm headquartered in Des Moines, Iowa.” It boasts an impressive collection of clients, including Walmart and the Ford Motor Company. Absent from its website, however, is any hint of the extraordinary amount of work it’s done to boost the Saudis nationally since signing a contract with the Kingdom in November 2019 worth $126,500 a month. In its FARA filings, that firm has reported conducting more than 1,600 political activities on behalf of the Saudis — more, that is, than all the other firms working for the Saudis combined in 2020, according to a soon-to-be-released report on the Saudi lobby from the Foreign Influence Transparency Initiative at the Center for International Policy, where we work.

And whether any of those Americans realized it or not, they were being swept up in a campaign to give the Saudis local clout nationally and so pave the way for a Saudi public relations rehabilitation campaign in Washington, D.C., itself.

Creating American Grassroots for a Gulf Monarchy

There’s a fairly simple pattern to the way the Saudi lobby has been wooing the states to woo Washington. First, Larson Shannahan Slifka launches a local campaign, including hundreds of calls and emails to state legislators, chambers of commerce, university professors, small businesses, and just about anything or anyone you can imagine in between. Some of those ties, in turn, create opportunities for influential media moments such as, for example, when Saudi embassy spokesman Fahad Nazer — a former FARA-registered Saudi agent — conducted interviews with South Dakota Public Radio last October and Michigan’s Big Show this February.

Other lobbying activities have led to crucial Saudi outreach events, filling the seats (or Zoom invites) at think-tank discussions, business forums, or even interfaith dialogues.

While describing audiences in such local forums as responding with “overwhelmingly positive feedback” to the Kingdom’s messaging, one key fact is always omitted: that the events themselves were orchestrated by the Saudi lobby. Reading the glossy accounts of them, members of Congress and their staff normally have no idea that the meetings — and not just the press releases they’re receiving — were products of that very lobby. In other words, by omitting such details, the Saudi lobby has effectively launched an astroturfing campaign to influence Congress when it comes to future relations with the Kingdom.

The Consequences

Of course, there’s nothing new about such lobbyists hired by foreign countries touting trade with the U.S. or anything necessarily unethical about promoting such ties. However, even as the Saudi lobby has eagerly peddled a rose-tinted story of the Kingdom’s increasingly diversified economy, expanding women’s rights, and exciting tourism opportunities (despite the pandemic moment), policymakers and the media that cover them should remember that such a narrative is, at the very least (and to put the matter as politely as possible), incomplete.

In reality, however, even if a promised future economic boom between the two countries were to materialize, it would hardly ameliorate the Kingdom’s many negatives, from the catastrophic famine it continues to stoke in Yemen to its blatant human rights violations. Members of Congress and local public servants alike should beware. What may seem like a spreading grassroots show of support for the Kingdom could, in fact, be just another mirage in the desert – by Ben Freeman

https://tomdispatch.com/how-to-make-a-gulf-monarchy-all-american/ = https://www.counterpunch.org/2021/04/21/the-saudi-lobby-moves-from-k-street-to-main-street/

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

(* A H)

More than 19.5 tons of #vaccines arrived today through #Sanaa International Airport which will be used for routine immunization for 400,000 #children under 2 across the country.

https://twitter.com/UNICEF_Yemen/status/1384559992473272328

(B H)

#Yemen is currently seeing a second wave of #COVID19. As during the first wave, @MSF teams are responding in #Sanaa, where we are treating patients in two hospitals: Al-Kuwait and Al-Jumhouri.

https://twitter.com/msf_yemen/status/1384578006669303815

(* A H)

60 new cases of coronavirus reported, 5,918 in total

The committee also reported the death of 6 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 20 others.
1,059 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

http://en.adenpress.news/news/32762

(A H)

Former security chief of Aden dies from COVID-19

http://en.adenpress.news/news/32765

(A H)

Yemeni gov't officially warns against increase in Covid-19 infections

The Yemeni Aden-based ministry of health on Monday warned of an increase in Covid-19 infections to more dangerous levels, with the people recklessly dealing with precautious measures announced by health authorities.
Wrong actions – like persistent gatherings at markets across Yemen – "seriously portend a rise in the pandemic curve of Covid-19 infections to a level more dangerous and harder than that we are currently suffering," the Yemeni health minister said on Facebook.
"We're watching with deep concern daily field reports and statistics on the growing infections,"

https://debriefer.net/en/news-24587.html

(A H P)

Yemen starts COVID-19 vaccination campaign

Yemen’s COVID-19 vaccination campaign began in government-held areas on Tuesday three weeks after the first shipment from the global COVAX vaccine-sharing scheme arrived in the war-torn country.

Yemen on March 31 received 360,000 doses of AstraZeneca’s vaccine, part of a consignment from COVAX expected to total 1.9 million doses this year.

The campaign kicked of in the southern port city of Aden, the government’s interim capital in a six-year-old war.

The health minister and the Yemen representative for U.N. Children’s Fund UNICEF, Philippe Duamelle, received shots in a show of confidence in the vaccine.

The government’s health ministry has previously said the COVAX vaccines will be free, and distributed across the country, where the Houthis control most big urban centres. COVAX is co-led by the Gavi Vaccine Alliance and the World Health Organization to provide COVID vaccines to low-income countries.

Tuesday’s rollout covered only government-held parts of the country, said Ishraq al-Seba’ei who is with the government’s emergency coronavirus committee. But she said 10,000 doses are being sent to Sanaa via the World Health Organisation.

A UNICEF official said no vaccinations had yet taken place in Houthi areas.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-yemen-vaccine/yemen-starts-covid-19-vaccination-campaign-idUSKBN2C723H

and

(A H P)

COVID-19 vaccination campaign kicks off in Aden

The Ministry of Public Health and Population launched in Aden on Tuesday, the first phase of the vaccination campaign against coronavirus (Covid-19), the state news agency Saba reported.
The 12 day immunization operation is intended to target 317 thousand and 363 persons in 133 districts of 13 government- held governorates.
The vaccination campaign is funded by the WHO, the UNICEF and KSrelief and carried out by 1704 medical workers distributed to 426 fixed and mobile teams.
The Ministers of Public Health Dr. Qaesm Bahebeh, Civil Service and Insurances Dr. Abdunasser al-Wali, Aden governor Ahmed Lamlas, the UNICEF Representative in Yemen Dr. Philippe Duamelle and the Director of the WHO office in Aden Dr. Noha Mahmood all have taken the vaccines.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/32760

(A H P)

COVID-19 vaccine side effects discussed in Aden

http://en.adenpress.news/news/32753

(* A H)

46 new cases of coronavirus reported, 5,858 in total

The committee also reported the death of 6 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 42 others.
908 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

http://en.adenpress.news/news/32754

(* A H)

42 new cases of coronavirus reported, 5,812 in total

The committee also reported the death of 7 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 10 others.
927 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day

http://en.adenpress.news/news/32746

(* A H)

55 new cases of coronavirus reported, 5,770 in total

The committee also reported the death of 11 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 5 others.
939 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day.

http://en.adenpress.news/news/32744

cp2 Allgemein / General

(* A K P)

Interactive Map of Yemen War

https://yemen.liveuamap.com/

Daily Yemen War map Updates, April 17 to April 21

https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-april-21-2021-map-update/

https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-april-20-2021-map-update/

https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-april-19-2021-map-update/

https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-april-18-2021-map-update/

https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-april-17-2021-map-update/

(B K P)

US-Friedensbemühungen im Jemen stocken wegen Kämpfen um Erdgas-Region

Als Grund machten zwei mit der Lage vertraute Diplomaten die Kämpfe um die Erdgas-reiche Region Marib aus, einer Hochburg der vom großen Nachbarn Saudi-Arabien unterstützen Regierung des verarmten Landes. In den vergangenen Tagen haben die Huthi-Rebellen ihre Offensive zur Eroberung des Gebiets verstärkt. Sollte der Vormarsch erfolgreich sein, bekäme die Bewegung, die sich seit sechs Jahren einen Krieg mit einer von Saudi-Arabien angeführten Militärallianz liefert, einen wichtigen Trumpf in die Hand für eventuelle politische Verhandlungen. Hätten die Huthis somit die Wahl zwischen einer Waffenruhe und der Einnahme Maribs, würden sie sich wahrscheinlich für letztere entscheiden, sagte ein ranghoher Diplomat, der in der Region tätig ist.

https://www.onvista.de/news/us-friedensbemuehungen-im-jemen-stocken-wegen-kaempfen-um-erdgas-region-450664189 = https://www.finanzen.net/nachricht/aktien/us-friedensbemuehungen-im-jemen-stocken-wegen-kaempfen-um-erdgas-region-10037779

(* B K P)

Battle for Yemen's Marib scrambles U.S. push for truce

The battle for Yemen’s gas-rich Marib region is complicating U.S. efforts to reach a ceasefire needed to end a six-year-old war and secure a foreign policy win for President Joe Biden, two sources familiar with the talks and a diplomat said.

A U.N./U.S. peace initiative presented by Saudi Arabia in March proposed a nationwide ceasefire and the reopening of air and sea links, to bolster efforts to end a devastating conflict widely seen as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The peace initiative can only be saved by a “mutually hurting stalemate” in which Houthi losses reach a point where they lose tribal support, the diplomat said, adding the group has replaced seasoned fighters lost to coalition bombs with inexperienced youth.

U.S. envoy Tim Lenderking and U.N. envoy Martin Griffiths have been touring the region for discussions to try to break the deadlock and secure a ceasefire, but so far without success.

The U.N./U.S. initiative would reopen Sanaa airport, and allow fuel and food imports through Hodeidah port, both of which are controlled by the Houthis. But the movement said last month that these steps would not go far enough.

Two people involved in the talks told Reuters the main issue now is sequencing, since the Houthis insist on a full lifting of the blockade followed by a gradual ceasefire: a halt to Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and coalition airstrikes on Yemen, and then a truce with Yemen’s government.

Coalition airstrikes are the only thing keeping Marib, home to major oil and gas fields, from falling, since Houthi forces, now 15 km (9 miles) west of the city, have more advanced weaponry than pro-government troops, military sources said.

Michael Knights, an expert on Gulf military affairs with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said Saudi Arabia has enough reserves of U.S.-supplied precision-guided munitions to keep defending Marib, but time remained a factor.

The Houthis, who already control most big urban centres, have a window of time to press their offensive during hazy summer weather that reduces coalition air operations.

“If the Houthis take it, they’re going to take it in the next three months,” Knights said, adding that the group is advancing in pulses to seize ground and reinforce positions.

“The Houthis view Marib as a knockout blow. It makes them into a state with resources, a coastline, and most of the population. Whereas if you’re (Saudi-allied Yemeni president) Hadi, it knocks you out of the game,” he added.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-marib/battle-for-yemens-marib-scrambles-u-s-push-for-truce-idUSKBN2C71VN

(? B K P)

Audio: US Falters Over Yemen War, While Britain Stops Its Ears

https://soundcloud.com/proletarianradio/us-falters-over-yemen-war-while-britain-stops-its-ears

(* A P)

Yemen the topic of secret talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran

The talks were apparently brokered by the Iraqi PM

Recent secret talks reportedly held between Iran and Saudi Arabia focused on the war in Yemen, and ways to end a conflict that is one of the most dire humanitarian disasters in the world and poses a lingering security threat to the Saudi kingdom.

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-the-topic-of-secret-talks-between-saudi-arabia-and-iran-b1833852.html

(* B K P)

How the Houthis outwitted and out-fought everyone

As is most often the case with armed interventions, Operation Decisive Storm established dangerous feedback loops that only non-kinetic approaches to the war will disrupt. The UAE has recognized the need for new approaches and is recalibrating its policies in Yemen and the broader region. The UAE withdrew most of its armed forces from Yemen in 2019 and has reduced its overt involvement in Yemen, even though it still remains deeply involved in southern Yemen.

Saudi Arabia should, like the UAE, take a more realistic approach to achieving its aims in Yemen. The kingdom possesses both the means and institutional knowledge to alter many of the feedback loops that its own intervention and past policies set in motion. Before its 2015 intervention, Saudi Arabia’s primary concerns in Yemen were border security and ensuring that a populous and relatively democratic Yemen posed no broader threat. For nearly fifty years, Saudi Arabia largely achieved these aims — often at the cost of Yemeni interests—by pursuing a subtle, contextualized, and inexpensive approach to dealing with Yemen.

If Saudi Arabia wants to extricate itself from the Yemeni quagmire, it must replace military intervention with renewed and revised diplomatic and economic engagement with a spectrum of Yemeni stakeholders. By continuing its current armed intervention, Saudi Arabia risks ensuring that the problems that it faces in Yemen become ever-more intractable.

Chief among such problems is the Houthis’ development, with Iranian technical help, of a range of drones, rockets, and missiles.

The Saudi-led intervention supercharged the Houthis’ efforts to develop weapons capable of striking Saudi targets — even if only in a symbolic manner. In a striking example of what MIT Professor Eric von Hippel calls the “democratization of innovation,” the Houthis — and, by extension, their primary backer Iran — benefited from easy access to technical assistance via the internet, 3D printing, and easily obtainable advanced computer software. This, combined with a solid knowledge base, extant weapons systems, caches of parts, and components smuggled from Iran, allowed the Houthis to build up an array of weapons that amplify the asymmetric tactics they employ.

The Houthis are militarily nimble. Like all guerrilla groups, they have had to be in order to survive.

Six years of war have shown that neither Saudi Arabia (with American support) nor the UAE and their proxies can militarily defeat the Houthis. Instead, armed intervention only drives the Houthis to further excel at what they are best at: fighting. The Biden administration seems to understand this and is carefully applying pressure on the kingdom to try different approaches to de-escalating the war in Yemen.

If Saudi Arabia were to return to the kind of policy it once employed in Yemen, the kingdom could slowly regain some of the influence it once wielded. While former Saudi policies in Yemen were self-serving, they were superior to the current reliance on armed struggle. As major regional powers, Saudi Arabia and the UAE both have roles to play in any future Yemen. However, these roles depend on recognizing that the Houthis will also have a role, and an important one at that. An inability to recognize this and a failure to shift from war-making to peace-making will ensure that cycles of violence and deadly innovation on the part of the Houthis will continue with evermore grave consequences for Yemen and the region – by Michael Horton

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/04/19/how-the-houthis-outwitted-and-out-fought-everyone/

(? B K P)

Yemen, the Houthis and a ‘wish list’ (AUDIO INTERVIEW)

A long-term cease-fire could be percolating in Yemen’s five-year civil war. For the time being, though, Iran-backed Houthi rebels have yet to join.

The Media Line spoke with Elana DeLozier, a research fellow in the Bernstein Program on Gulf and Energy Policy at The Washington Institute, who discusses what she calls the Houthis’ “wish list,” their behavior and where we might expect the conflict to go – particularly under the cloud of a global pandemic.

https://themedialine.org/by-region/yemen-the-houthis-and-a-wish-list-audio-interview/

(B P)

Solutions to the war in Yemen have been absurdly fragmented, reflecting the international community's unwillingness or lack of understanding of the Yemeni dilemma. An agreement on Hodeidah, nothing of which has been implemented, and a similar distorted agreement that some seek to conclude regarding Marib. The UN Security Council meets on the oil tanker SAFER And the Security Council calls for the entry of fuel ships.

To the port of Hodeidah. Thus, the country is divided by land, human beings, and an issue ... Fragmentation deals with the results of the war, not the roots of the Yemeni problem. In this way, the issue is diluted, the solution is diluted, gel solutions that are not applicable, or solutions that seek to coexist with the malaria are produced.

https://twitter.com/mohammedalqadhi/status/1383875243370971149

(* B H K P)

Film: Yemen is Starving - Can You Help? | Dr. @shireen818 is interviewed by @nihal201 @baitulmaal's relief efforts by donating!

https://www.pscp.tv/w/1OwxWVWzYkjJQ = https://twitter.com/baitulmaal/status/1383876485400776707 =

(* B K P)

«Für die Huthi ist der Krieg zu einem Lebensstil geworden»

In den USA wächst der Widerstand gegen das saudische Embargo in Jemen, das verhindert, dass dringend benötigte Güter in den Norden des Landes gelangen. Die Verantwortung der Huthi-Miliz für die humanitäre Katastrophe wird jedoch verschwiegen.

Der Stillstand im Hafen von Hudeida sei das Resultat der «saudischen Blockade», sagt die CNN-Reporterin Nima Elbagir. Seit Dezember habe die saudische Marine keinen Erdöltanker mehr in den Hafen gelassen, obwohl im Meer 14 von der Uno inspizierte und freigegebene Schiffe darauf warteten, ihre Ladung in Hudeida zu löschen. Die Statistik der zuständigen Uno-Kontrolleure bestätigt dies zumindest teilweise. So wurde im Februar keine einzige der freigegebenen 43 000 Tonnen Brennstoff entladen. Und auch im März wurde nur die Hälfte der Uno-zertifizierten Erdöllieferungen gelöscht.

Dies zeigt, dass die von Saudiarabien angeführte Koalition und die von ihr unterstützte jemenitische Regierung versuchen, die Versorgung mit wichtigen Gütern als Druckmittel gegen die Huthi-Miliz einzusetzen. Während der Inspektions-Mechanismus der Uno nur Waffenlieferungen unterbinden soll, gehen die Kontrollen der saudischen Koalition darüber hinaus. Von einer vollständigen Blockade kann indes nicht die Rede sein. Allein im März wurden in den Häfen von Hudeida und Salif in Nordjemen 450 000 Tonnen Lebensmittel entladen.

Welche Güter neben Erdöl zurückgehalten werden, ist nicht ganz klar. Bis vor kurzem liess die saudische Koalition keinerlei Containerschiffe nach Hudeida, mit denen etwa Medikamente, medizinische Geräte oder wichtige Ersatzteile für den Unterhalt der Infrastruktur geliefert werden. Eine komplette Blockade gibt es dennoch nicht. Denn die Güter können theoretisch auch über die südliche Hafenstadt Aden in den Norden gelangen, auch wenn sie dadurch teurer werden.

Allein die Brennstoffknappheit hat aber Folgen für die humanitäre Situation.

Der Hunger in Nordjemen sei jedoch nicht nur auf die Blockadepolitik der jemenitischen Regierung und ihrer ausländischen Verbündeten zurückzuführen, meint Elisabeth Kendall von der Universität Oxford. «Die Huthi tragen ebenfalls eine Verantwortung. Ihre Steuern und die von ihnen kontrollierten Verteilmechanismen sind auch ein Grund für den Hunger.» Humanitäre Organisationen werfen der Miliz schon länger vor, die Lieferung von Hilfsgütern zu behindern und Teile davon für die eigene Kriegsführung abzuschöpfen.

Vor allem aber halten sich die Huthi nicht an das Stockholm-Abkommen von 2018. Darin wurde festgeschrieben, dass die Einnahmen aus dem Hafen von Hudeida in einem Konto der Zentralbank deponiert und für die Bezahlung von Beamtenlöhnen verwendet werden sollen. Gemäss einem Expertenbericht der Uno zweigten die Huthi vor einem Jahr jedoch 50 Milliarden jemenitische Rial von den Geldern ab, ohne damit Beamtengehälter zu bezahlen. Dies bewog letztlich Jemens Regierung dazu, die Erdöllieferungen nach Hudeida zu drosseln.

All diese Nuancen scheinen die Aktivisten und Kongressabgeordneten in den USA jedoch kaum zu kümmern.

Die Huthi fordern, erst die Blockade zu beenden, bevor es zu einem Waffenstillstand kommen könne. Doch dies ist vermutlich nur ein Vorwand, um den Krieg weiterzuführen. Die Huthi sind militärisch im Vorteil, und die Blockade hat ihnen dabei vielleicht sogar geholfen. Denn auf dem Schwarzmarkt in Nordjemen ist Benzin zum doppelten oder dreifachen Preis vorhanden. Und der Schwarzmarkt wird mutmasslich von den Huthi kontrolliert.

Selbst wenn Riad vollständig auf seine Blockadepolitik verzichten würde, dürften die Huthi kaum in einen Waffenstillstand einwilligen, glaubt die Jemen-Expertin Kendall. «Sie wissen, wie fragil die international anerkannte Regierung ist und wie sehr Saudiarabien einen Ausweg aus dem teuren und zunehmend unpopulären Krieg sucht.» Die Huthi hätten hingegen bereits seit 2004 immer wieder Krieg gegen die Zentralregierung geführt: «Für die Huthi ist der Krieg zu einem Lebensstil geworden.» – con Christian Weisflog

https://www.nzz.ch/international/jemen-in-den-usa-waechst-die-kritik-an-der-saudischen-blockade-ld.1612078

(B H K)

Film: A Famine in Yemen is Putting Half a Million Children at Risk

There is an ongoing and largely ignored humanitarian crisis in Yemen, which threatens to pull America back into the Middle East. A famine is putting nearly half a million Yemeni children are at risk of starving to death. The Oscar-nominated documentary “Hunger Ward” shows this through the eyes of two female healthcare workers. The film's director joins us alongside CNN correspondent Nima Elbagir.

https://www.pbs.org/video/famine-yemen-putting-half-million-children-risk-ndae4r/

(* B H K P)

Jemen heute: Das Land der hungernden Kinder

In kürzester Zeit und unter den Augen der so genannten internationalen Staatengemeinschaft, die nebenbei an diesem Krieg ganz gut verdient – Großbritannien etwa hat vor wenigen Wochen wieder Waffen im Wert von 1,4 Milliarden an die Saudis geliefert und auch deutsche Rüstungskonzerne sind mächtig im Geschäft – verwandelte sich das Land in ein dystopisches Schlachtfeld konkurrierender Milizen, die keinerlei Rücksicht auf die Zivilbevölkerung nahmen.

Ab 2014 verbreiteten sich Hunger, Cholera und andere Krankheiten, Hunderttausende flohen, und Jahr für Jahr verschlimmerte sich die Lage. Längst war nicht mehr die Rede von Übergang, Demokratie und Freiheit, sondern nur noch Elend und Tod.

Ob sie wollen oder nicht, UN-Agenturen und Hilfsorganisationen müssen in derartigen Konflikten mit Milizen, Warlords und anderen Akteuren kooperieren, wollen sie, dass wenigstens ein Teil der Hilfsgüter ankommt. Gleichzeitig schmieren sie so die verheerende Kriegsmaschinerie, die erst das Leid erst verursacht, das zu lindern sie antreten.

Deshalb wäre eigentlich von jeder Organisation, die im Jemen tätig ist, zu verlangen, dass sie Spendern offenlegt, wie sie mit diesem Dilemma umgeht. Wie genau kommt Hilfe an und über welche Wege? Doch nichts dergleichen geschieht.

Der Jemen ist für das Hilfsbusiness heute, was die Sahel-Zone in den 1980er Jahren war. Das Land wird reduziert auf Bilder von hungernden, im Elend lebenden Kindern. Längst vergessen scheinen auch Diskussionen aus den 90er Jahren unter Hilfsorganisationen, dass es unethisch, ja fast obszön sei, mit diesen Bildern Spenden einzuwerben.

Stattdessen verdienen Mark Zuckerbergs Facebook und andere Social-Media-Konzerne bestens am Leid der Menschen im Jemen: Da ich oft über Hilfe, Flüchtlinge und ähnliche Themen auf meiner Facebook Timeline publiziere, haben die Algorithmen entschieden, ich sei ein dankbarer Kunde von Anzeigen diverser UN-Agenturen und NGOs. Gestern Abend alleine stellten sie mir deshalb kurz nacheinander diese sechs Anzeigen in meine Timeline:

Natürlich: Längst gibt es all diese empirischen Untersuchungen, dass mit Kinderbildern besonders viele Spenden eingesammelt werden können. Wer schon möchte diese Kinder, deren Namen wir auch noch erfahren, verhungern lassen?

Eine ganze Legion von ausgebildeten Psychologen und PR-Experten ist da inzwischen am Werk, die genau weiß und evaluiert, welche Texte und welche Botschaften zum Spenden motivieren. Kein Wunder, dass die Anzeigen sich so gleichen wie moderne Autos, die im Windkanal getestet wurden. Es geht um Geld und Konkurrenz, und wer das wirksamste Kinderbild in einer Werbung verwendet, der erhält die meisten Spenden.

Völlig egal, warum diese Kinder nun hungern und leiden müssen, und wo sie es tun. War es gestern der Sudan oder Äthiopien, so ist es heute der Jemen. Kein Wort, wie es dazu kam, dass sich im Jemen der Aufbruch des Jahres 2011 in eine solche Tragödie verwandelt hat.

Würde eine dieser Organisationen oder UN-Agenturen ehrlich sein, wie es mit Hilfe vor Ort im Jemen aussieht, welche Kompromisse eingegangen werden müssen mit korrupten Beamten, Milizionären und Warlords, damit sie überhaupt ankommt, in welchem Dilemma man steckt als Helfer in einem Bürgerkrieg, sie würde wohl kaum ähnliche Summen wie mit solchen Bildern generieren.

https://www.jungle.world/blog/von-tunis-nach-teheran/2021/04/jemen-heute-das-land-der-hungernden-kinder

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

(B E K P)

Fuel crisis suffocates people in Houthi-run Yemen

Acute fuel shortages have been suffocating the people in the Houthi-run regions in north and west Yemen since early this year.

Despite repeated Houthi accusations that the Saudi-led coalition and the Yemeni internationally recognised government are preventing fuel ships from entering Hodeidah, people accuse the Houthi group of exploiting measures taken by the coalition to exacerbate their suffering.

Black markets spread in the capital Sanaa and other regions controlled by the group where fuel is being sold for high prices, as much as 20.000 rials per 20 litres.

The fuel prices are deepening the suffering of the people, including public servants who have not received their salaries for years. Electric power and water tariffs and the prices of basic products have sharply increased.

And while the group claims the fuel arriving in the country through Hudaydah has been imported by traders not the Yemen Petroleum Company, people are asking why those traders are selling fuel through black markets not authorised filling stations.

On Saturday, the Supreme Economic Council said the Houthi group is selling most of the fuel imports that arrive through Hudaydah seaport in the black market to finance its war.

Around 276.503 metric tons of fuel have been imported in the first half of April, which is enough to meet the fuel needs across the country for 20 days, it said.

And 70% of the fuel has been transported to the Houthi-run regions, an average of 12.000 metric tons a day, but the group has sold it on the black

https://debriefer.net/en/news-24568.html

My comment: The Hadi government blames the Houthis for this.

(A E P)

Infographics || Key indicators for fuel flows to Yemen in first half of April 2021. (by Hadi government)

https://twitter.com/SECYemen1/status/1383470350583799811

(B K P)

Jemen wirft UNO Komplizenschaft mit der saudischen Koalition bei Piraterie vor

Die jemenitische Ölgesellschaft (The Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC)) hat die Vereinten Nationen der Komplizenschaft mit der von Saudi-Srabien angeführten Kriegskoalition bei der Seepiraterie bezichtigt.

"Die saudische Kriegskoalition beschlagnahmt weiterhin Schiffe mit jemenitischem Treibstoff unter der Schirmherrschaft der Vereinten Nationen", sagte der Exekutivdirektor des jemenitischen Ölunternehmens Ammar al-Adhrai.

https://parstoday.com/de/news/middle_east-i57652-jemen_wirft_uno_komplizenschaft_mit_der_saudischen_koalition_bei_piraterie_vor

(B K P)

Al-Adhraei: UN partner in maritime piracy on fuel vessels

The executive director of the Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC), Engineer Ammar al-Adhraei, said on Friday the United Nations is a partner in maritime piracy on fuel ships.

In a protest organized by the YPC in front of the United Nations office in the capital Sana'a, Under the slogan "Denying the siege is an additional crime."

"The lives of 26 million Yemenis are at stake, therefore, we hold the United Nations fully responsible for the humanitarian catastrophe, war crimes and genocide," Al-Adhraei said.

https://www.saba.ye/en/news3136904.htm

and also https://hodhodyemennews.net/2021/04/17/protests-against-saudi-piracy-against-yemen-continue-as-only-7-of-fuel-needs-are-being-met/

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

Siehe / Look at cp1

(B H)

Sadaqa Welfare Fund: Ramadan Food Pack Distribution in Yemen

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-BugADnxLhU

(B H)

Film. ¿Qué está pasando en Yemen?

Yemen está al borde de la hambruna y en este país se está desarrollando una de las peores crisis humanitarias del mundo. A seis años desde el inicio del conflicto, millones de personas en Yemen necesitan asistencia humanitaria y más de 4 millones de personas se vieron obligadas a desplazarse. ACNUR está en el terreno brindando ayuda, pero no lo podemos hacer solos.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kuUyhDqILkA&t=4s

(B H)

''You cannot sell diseased animals'', Omar explains while administering a vaccine dose

Vaccination campaigns like the ones done by @FAOYemen are crucial in emergencies like #Yemen as livestock are more likely to catch diseases, which can also be a health risk to people.

https://twitter.com/FAOYemen/status/1384567707845251073

(* B H)

Audio: Jemen – Kindheit im Krieg

Statt Schule täglich Gewalt, Hunger und Tod: Fast ein Viertel der Opfer im Jemen-Krieg sind Kinder, sagt Susanne Krüger von Save the Children in Deutschland. Warum die derzeitigen Hilfen nicht reichen, erzählt sie Anja Backhaus.

https://www1.wdr.de/mediathek/audio/wdr5/wdr5-neugier-genuegt-freiflaeche/audio-jemen--kindheit-im-krieg-100.html

(B H)

FAO provides livestock inputs for rural families to sustain food production amidst soaring levels of food insecurity [EN/AR]

The intervention is expected to safeguard livelihoods, enhance resilience of affected communities and promote early recovery

The livestock sector in Yemen has been significantly affected by a conflict spanning six years, yet it is one of the remaining lifelines and income sources for the rural population. To increase the resilience of vulnerable livestock-dependent households, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) is distributing livestock input packages to over 11,500 livestock farmers in Yemen’s Abyan and Lahj governorates.

The input packages, which include 340 metric tonnes of wheat bran, 690 metric tonnes of feed block and 400 metric tonnes of molasses, are being distributed as part of a three-year programme titled “Supporting Resilient Livelihoods and Food Security in Yemen (ERRY II)”.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/fao-provides-livestock-inputs-rural-families-sustain-food-production-amidst-soaring

(B H)

Film: @IsobelYeung explores how the escalation in Yemen's conflict is impacting its most vulnerable citizens — children.

Houthi child soldiers being rehabilitated in Marib city.

“The most difficult thing i went through is when i saw corpses scattered in front of me. I hated life. I wished death,” said one of the child soldiers. He was sent to the frontline without any training.

https://twitter.com/VICENews/status/1382707259063611394

(A H)

On 11 April, we distributed Ramadan food to 50 poor families & orphans in hodeidah, Thanks so much for all donors, Jazak Allah khair (photos)

If For #donate via link http://Chuffed.org/project/food-at/food-and-medicine-for-yemen…

https://twitter.com/ghalebalsudmy/status/1383498866742284296

(B H)

Film: Trash in the street

https://twitter.com/ghalebalsudmy/status/1383877660476989447

(B H)

Infographic: Food prices in #Yemen are up to 200% higher than before the conflict.

https://twitter.com/WFPYemen/status/1383794203226898438

(* B H)

Famine looming in Yemen again as a growing number of young children die of malnutrition

Food insecurity and malnutrition are the key factors behind the number of people in need. 16.2 million people will go hungry this year (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Phase 3 or higher), including 5 million are just one step away from being declared a ‘famine’ (IPC Phase 4), including nearly 50,000 thousand people have already faced famine-like conditions (IPC Phase 5) in the first half of 2021.

At least one child dies every ten minutes of malnutrition and diarrhea – roughly 2.25 million children under 5– are enduring acute malnutrition this year. Over and above, more than a million cases of pregnant and lactating women suffer from acute malnutrition in 2021

Severe hunger therefore has become a daily reality of Children below 5 to have become the first victims-facing the specter of death at such an early age”.

Zulqarnain continues “To detect malnutrition cases among children under-5 years of age, Islamic Relief -Yemen is supporting Ministry of Public Health and populations to provide treatment and preventative nutrition services through 155 health facilities and 489 food distribution points across seven governorates in Yemen. In 2020, 130,000 acutely malnourished children and mothers received urgent treatment through our Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme for nutrition rehabilitation, while our preventative programme (Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme) served 305,038 children and mothers”.

“In the meanwhile, our Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme for nutrition rehabilitation is renewing the hope of 45,718 acutely malnourished children and mothers by the provision of essential treatment, while our preventative programme is still serving 134,594 mothers and children under 2 years with preventative nutrition services”.

With no stability across the country, Yemen’s children and their families will continue to plunge deeper into hunger and malnutrition unless there is a swift action even more necessary, particularly on the economy, humanitarian funding and humanitarian access to stave off the risk of famine.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/famine-looming-yemen-again-growing-number-young-children-die-malnutrition

(B H)

Film: Unusually ... the increase in malnutrition cases in the border directorates of Saada

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RtVQXyFJtU8

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

Siehe / Look at cp1, cp17a

(B H)

“I am happy because I will not get dirty like before when I used to take the garbage out in plastic bags,” said Ahmed, a displaced young man in Ma’rib. Through IOM and @USAIDSavesLives support, nearly 190 families received waste buckets in Husoon Aal Hadi site. (photo)

https://twitter.com/IOM_Yemen/status/1384542391890321409

My comment: IOM and USAID really celebrate themself for 190 waste buckets?? They are about US$3 to 4?? (https://www.viking.de/de/helit-papierkorb-polyethylen-gelb-33-5-cm-p-h61058-gb).

(B H)

IOM Yemen | Rapid Displacement Tracking (RDT) - Reporting Period: 11 - 17 Apr 2021

From 01 January 2021 to 17 April 2021, IOM Yemen DTM estimates that 4,956 households (HH) (29,736 Individuals) have experienced displacement at least once.

Between 11 April 2021 and 17 April 2021, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 238 households (1,428 individuals) displaced at least once. The highest number of displacements were seen in

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-rapid-displacement-tracking-rdt-reporting-period-11-17-apr-2021

(* B H)

More than 24.000 people displaced in Yemen's Marib since February

More than 24.000 people have been displaced in Marib province since the Houthi group escalated its attacks on the province in northeast Yemen in February, the Executive Unit for IDPs has said.

We have documented the displacement of 3.442 families, 24.094 persons, between 6 February to 16 April, it said in a statement on Sunday.

90% of them have been displaced from the district of Sirwah, in west, and the rest from the districts of Raghwan, in northwest, and Rahbah and Jabal Murad, in south, it elaborated.

They need shelter, food, drinking water and medical supplies, it said, calling on international aid agencies to make urgent interventions in order to save the lives of thousands of children and alleviate the suffering of the families.

Moreover, it called on the United Nations and the international community to put pressure on the Houthi group to stop its attacks on Marib and the displacement camps.

Marib is hosting more than two million IDPs who fled war in other provinces.

The Houthis are seeking to seize the oil-rich province which is considered the main stronghold of the government forces.

https://debriefer.net/en/news-24576.html

(* B H)

Yemen: Ma'rib Situation Update No. 3, 19 April 2021

Intensified fighting continues to take place across frontline areas in Ma’rib Governorate, with hostilities particularly rife in Sirwah District. This has led to large waves of displacement within the governorate since the start of the escalation in early February 2021, especially as hosting sites for internally displaced persons (IDP) also sustain shelling. Four IDP sites in Sirwah District were reportedly impacted by shelling between 22 and 29 March, according to the Government of Yemen’s Executive Unit for IDPs (ExU) as well as local humanitarian partners. Over a dozen people were reportedly injured in these incidents, and the ExU has closed all four impacted IDP sites. Some 555 families were evacuated to the nearby Al Sowayda site, which already hosted 1,163 displaced families. Initial assessments indicate pressing humanitarian needs including shelter, food, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) assistance at Al Sowayda.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that at least 2,625 families were displaced in Ma’rib Governorate between 8 February and 10 April due to the intensified hostilities, many of them having already been previously displaced and moving to areas in Sirwah District. These families are among the 1 million displaced people who live in Ma’rib Governorate – the largest IDP population in Yemen – including in some 125 IDP sites.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-marib-situation-update-no-3-19-april-2021

(* B H)

IOM Yemen - Ma'rib Response (27 March-10 April 2021)

Fighting continues in Ma’rib governorate on a daily basis, with the situation remaining volatile. Areas in Sirwah district to the west of Ma’rib city have been the worst affected, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are being forced to move numerous times. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that since February 2021 when hostilities surged once again, more than 2,625 IDP households (18,375 individuals) have been displaced. This means that, in total, close to 21,000 households (HHs) have been displaced since the start of the escalation on the Ma’rib front in January 2020.

While in 2020, a majority of IDPs moved to Ma’rib city and Ma’rib Al Wadi, this year, IOM is seeing IDPs being displaced within their districts of origin.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-marib-response-27-march-10-april-2021

(* B H)

IOM Yemen: Situation Report March 2021

While the humanitarian crisis persists, migrants continue to arrive in Yemen, although in smaller numbers than before the pandemic.

IOM teams have noted an increase in the detention and forced movements of migrants.

The situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) remains challenging. IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) estimates that 9,450 people were displaced this month, bringing the total number of displaced so far in 2021 to 27,090 people (in the locations where IOM DTM has access). In Ma’rib, the displacement crisis shows no sign of improving, with IDPs in Sirwah district being most affected in the past few months. IOM has continued to prioritize its response in Ma’rib.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-situation-report-march-2021

(* B H K)

24,000 displaced by recent escalating fightings in Yemen's Marib: gov't

Yemen's government reported on Sunday that more than 24,000 people were displaced by the recent escalating battles in the country's oil-rich province of Marib.

The Yemeni government agency that administers the displaced camps said in a statement that the recent wave of escalating fightings in Marib displaced over 24,000 people during the period from Feb. 6 to April 16 this year.

The statement indicated that the newly displaced people are facing harsh living conditions, including lack of shelter, food, drinking water and medicine supplies.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-04/19/c_139889123.htm

(* B H)

Film: This is Ma'rib, in Yemen. Over a million displaced people have taken refuge here. The ongoing fighting is putting them in danger & could force tens of thousands more to flee.

https://twitter.com/UNOCHA/status/1383601550262603777

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

(A P)

Al Houthi militia threatens merchants: hand over the database or close your stores

The Houthi coup militia launched a security campaign targeting companies, banks and shops in their areas of control, especially in the capital, Sana'a, and closed many shops after their owners refused to pay seasonal and regular taxes during the month of Ramadan.

Local sources said that Houthi teams from the newly created Zakat Authority went to most of the importing and manufacturing merchants, accompanied by a military force, and closed shops to force their owners to hand over a copy of the accounting regulations in preparation for imposing new taxes.

https://sahafaa.net/show7415412.html

(A P)

Abdulfatah al-Maliki, a #Yemen-i who's working in Saudi Arabia, has decided to return home 2 spend Ramadan w/ his family in Houthi-controlled al-Hawban area in #Taiz 6 days ago. As he arrived home, Iran-backed Houthis kidnapped & tortured him, then released him a dead body ystrdy

https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1384670612094808066

referring to https://twitter.com/maldhabyani/status/1384582578926129164

and also https://republicanyemen.net/archives/27791

More photos (graphic): https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1384698965711540225

(A P)

Yemeni leading figures pay hommage to martyr President Saleh al-Sammad on third anniversary of his death

https://hodhodyemennews.net/2021/04/20/yemeni-leading-figures-pay-hommage-to-martyr-president-saleh-al-sammad-on-third-anniversary-of-his-death/

(A P)

Houthis hv bn conducting an aggressive campaign 2 collect Zakat in Sanaa & other areas under their control by force for a week. They closed many shops in #Sanaa, locals told me, adding that every day they carry out a raid on shops in a particular street in the capital. (photo)

The surprising is that Houthis now asking merchants 2 pay ten times Zakat money they collected last yr, local sources said. Houthis also urge ppl 2 pay 2 their Generl authority of Zakat, which isn't part of frml state institutions, bt quasi-state body established by them in 2018.

https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1384293578055114756

(A P)

[Hadi gov.] Yemen's Media Minister Describes Houthi Militia Recruiting Process of Children in Yemen as Unprecedented Genocide

Yemeni Minister of Information, Culture and Tourism Muammar Al-Eryani strongly lashed out at the Iranian-backed Houthi terrorist militia for recruiting thousands of children, filling their innocent minds with extremist terrorist ideology and throwing them into various fronts of fighting, describing the behavior as unprecedented crime amid world community unjustified silence.

https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2219592

and also https://debriefer.net/en/news-24573.html

(A E P)

New official prices of fuel &gas in Houthi-contolled Sana'a since ystrdy accor 2 residents; -Yer 11,000 per 20ltrs fuel, -Yer 7,000 per 20litrs cooking gas (official price in Marib is 3000). Houthis used 2 sell fuel& gas in black markets,now it's official.

https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1383991887061667843

and as a reminder: https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/10323

(A P)

Houthis continue to undermine aid work in Yemen, TV

The Saudi-owned Alarabiya TV said on Saturday the Houthi group is continuing to undermine the work of aid agencies in Yemen.

The group has imposed new restrictions on licences of aid agencies to enter and travel in the country, a move which affects the delivery of urgent aid to most vulnerable people, the TV claimed.

This development was included in the weekly report of the UN office in Yemen, it said.

https://debriefer.net/en/news-24544.html

and also https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-46389

(A P)

5 detainees in a Houthi-run prison went on hunger strike protesting mistreatment and abuses, according to two rights groups

https://twitter.com/RepYemenEnglish/status/1383540776638967808

(A K P)

Film: The percentage of child victims who were recruited by the Houthis during the year2021in Yemen has increased dramatically Dhamar:6child victims are buried (12-16 years old)

https://twitter.com/abduhothifi/status/1383194478836649990

(A P)

Abducted Yemeni model in Houthi prison threatens hunger strike

Abducted Yemeni model Entesar Al-Hammadi has threatened to launch a hunger strike as the Houthis refuse to release her or allow local prosecutors to question her, the model's lawyer told Arab News on Sunday.

Khaled Mohammed Al-Kamal said that the Houthi-controlled Central Prison, where the model has been held since Feb. 20, has rejected a request to transfer the model to the court for investigation.

“My client has threatened to go on hunger strike if she is not released. She has also complained about [verbal] abuses by her [female] captors,” Al-Kamal said, adding that the Central Prison officials gave no convincing reasons for not transferring the model to the court.

“The prison has rejected three demands to transfer my client to the court. I believe that they refused to release her due to the huge media coverage of the case,” the lawyer said.

https://www.arabnews.com/node/1844916/middle-east

and

(* A P)

Entisar al-Hammadi: Yemen's missing model to be questioned by prosecutors

Famous model and actress disappeared without trace more than a month ago in a case that has divided the war-torn country

More than a month after the disappearance of Entisar al-Hammadi, a high-profile 20-year-old Yemeni actress and model who went missing along with two other women in Sanaa, a city controlled by rebel Houthis, little was known about her plight until Friday.

However, a close friend of Hammadi, speaking on condition of anonymity for safety reasons, has told Middle East Eye that Houthi authorities say public prosecutors will question Hammadi on Sunday and bring forward possible charges against her.

Social media activists, including Yemeni Feminist Voice, have accused the Houthis of arresting Hammadi because of her work as a model.

The friend said she did not know what charges might be brought against Hammadi, who would be accompanied by her lawyer, Khaled Mohammed Al-Kamal, but that this would become clearer on Sunday.

She said that Hammadi's mother had denied all accusations against her daughter and had called on the Houthis to release her.

Prior to Friday's announcement, none of Hammadi's relatives had talked to the media and there had been no information about the three women's whereabouts, even regarding the exact day they disappeared.

Last week, another friend of Hammadi, also speaking on condition of anonymity for safety reasons, told MEE: "We don't know anything about them until now."

Rumours about the case had been doing the rounds on social media, and the second friend said she also believed Hammadi had been kidnapped by the Houthis, a rebel group fighting Yemen's internationally recognised government in the country's six-year civil war.

"I think that she was arrested because of her work," the friend added, referring to the Houthis' conservative stance on the role of women.

A campaign launched by social media activists with the hashtag "Freedom for Entisar al-Hammadi" had drawn attention to Hammadi's plight, and the Yemeni government issued a statement on 12 April condemning Hammadi's alleged detention.

While some vocal campaigners have come out in support of Hammadi, many Yemenis see her work as unacceptable.

"We are Muslims, and we can't accept the work of models in our society as it is forbidden in Islam," Ashraf, a Sanaa resident, told MEE.

Ashraf's view typifies the attitude of conservative Yemenis, who reject what is perceived as "foreign culture" in their society.

Such work is "destroy[ing] Yemeni culture - it is against Islam," said Ashraf.

The case of Hammadi, whose mother is Ethiopian, has elicited some of the same xenophobia and racism she has spoken out against.

In a video circulating on social media after her disappearance, Hammadi tells a presenter on a Yemeni show aired on a pro-Houthi TV channel that "racism related to my colour... is something I face, up until today."

Some feminist activists wrote about the alleged detention of Hammadi by the Houthis on 11 April, more than a month after she disappeared.

But until now Houthi authorities have not commented on the accusation that they were linked to Hammadi's kidnapping.

Some Yemenis wonder why Hammadi and her two colleagues were allegedly detained and not any other actresses.

"There are many TV series nowadays in Ramadan, and there are dozens of other actresses taking part and working from Sanaa and other Houthi-controlled areas. So the question is why was it only Hammadi [and the two actresses] who was kidnapped?" Mohammed, a Sanaa resident, told MEE.

"I think there is a personal problem with Hammadi herself and not with her work as an actress."

Mohammed said he is wary of the rumours about the case, accusing the government of wishing to discredit the Houthis by saying they were behind the kidnapping, and that no-one really knows the truth.

"In Yemen, not only people but also the government is politicising anything," he said.

"Political people don't care about anything, but they try to exploit any issue to serve their political purpose. I hope [Hammadi] and her colleagues breathe the air of freedom soon."

Hammadi's second friend told MEE that she was kidnapped because she has a way of life that authorities in Sanaa won't accept.

"The Houthis consider working as actress and model to be haram [forbidden], so it is normal they detain open-minded people," the friend said.

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-entisar-al-hammadi-missing-model-questioned

and

(A P)

Heard some Houthi activists claiming Entisar detained while smoking grass inside an apartment. As always, Houthis ll fabricate charges agnst her like this,or prostitution,violate (their) religious identity/Quranic March, corrupt the society, serve the enemy,..

https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1383961488235274243

and

(A P)

Abductees Mothers Association statement sympathizing with abducted actor, Entesar Al-Hammadi, and demanding her release.

http://ama-ye.org/index.php?no=1653&ln=En

(A P)

SAM and the Abductees Mothers Association Are Making an Urgent Appeal to Save the Lives of Detainees inside the Houthi Controlled Military Prison

SAM Organiztion for Rights and Liberties and the Abductees Mothers Association have expressed serious concern about the increasing violations by members of the Houthi group against the detainees in the Sana'a military prison, noting that they have received exclusive information that a number of detainees in prison have been on strike for ill-treatment and delays in legal proceedings against them.

In a joint statement issued on Friday, the two organizations said that according to their statement, five detainees in the military prison had started a hunger, drink and medicine strike several days earlier because of procrastination and delays in legal proceedings, as well as illegal practices and abuses by members of the Houthi group inside the prison and they stressed that the Houthis had transported the hunger strikers to an unspecified destination to the moment.

The two organizations indicated that the detainees: Maher Al - Nahari, Amjad Mashhour, Mulhem Al - Magbuli, Saeed Khadhri and Ibrahim Adani were detained in 2015 and have been detained ever since in clear violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of the Yemeni Constitution.

http://ama-ye.org/index.php?no=1651&ln=En

cp6 Südjemen und Hadi-Regierung / Southern Yemen and Hadi-government

Siehe / Look at cp1

(A P)

STC reiterates rejection of Hadi's unilateral decisions

The Southern Transition Council (STC) reiterated its rejection of Hadi's decision to appoint a security officer to the post of the President of the Supreme Judicial Council.

http://en.adenpress.news/news/32758

(A K P)

Tribal militias enter Aden in possible new escalation of infighting

Informed sources report that the al-Sabiha tribes have on Sunday pushed dozens of gunmen into the southern Yemeni city of Aden.

The sources explained that dozens of al-Sabiha tribal militants, including Islah Party fighters who joined them in the Karsh front, arrived in the vicinity of the house of medical official Saleh Mothna al-Radfani, in the center of Aden.

According to the sources, the gunmen arrived in solidarity with Radfani, as a result of the storming of his house by the separatist Southern Transitional Council militia, demanding the extradition of those who carried out the incursion.

The sources said that the UAE-backed Security Belt militia of the STC announced a state of military alert in the vicinity of the neighbourhood

https://hodhodyemennews.net/2021/04/19/tribal-militias-enter-aden-in-possible-new-escalation-of-infighting/

(A P)

[Separatists’] president-al-zubaidi-delivers-speech-to-southern-people-at-home-and-abroad-on-occasion-of-holy-month-of-ramadan

https://en.smanews.org/south-arabia/president-al-zubaidi-delivers-speech-to-southern-people-at-home-and-abroad-on-occasion-of-holy-month-of-ramadan/

(A P)

Yemeni tribal deal allows oil trucks in Marib city

A Yemeni tribal mediation has successfully led oil and gas trucks to resume their trip to the northeastern city of Marib, after main supply route to the oil-rich city had been blocked for one week.
Last week, armed tribesmen from Al Samra Tribe in Abeeda Valley held back fuel lorries heading from Mukalla and Safer company to supply Marib's energy plants.
The gunmen demanded Marib local authorities to release a fellow tribesman reportedly jailed over charges of sabotage acts.
Following the tribal mediation, Abeeda Tribes allowed tens of detained trucks access to Marib city, local sources said, after the fellow tribesman was released.

https://debriefer.net/en/news-24559.html

(* A K P)

US Marines arrive at Al-Ghaydah Airport in eastern Yemen

Officers of the US Marine Corp have arrived at Al-Ghaydah International Airport in Mahrah province, eastern Yemen.

This was reported by Yemen Press Agency on Saturday, based on well-informed sources.

The sources confirmed the arrival of US Marines trainers during the past two days at Al-Ghaydah airport, which is under the control of the Saudi forces.

This comes after a joint US and British forces arrived at Mahrah province airport in late January.

https://hodhodyemennews.net/2021/04/18/us-marines-arrive-at-al-ghaydah-airport-in-eastern-yemen/

and also https://www.farsnews.ir/en/news/14000129000790/US-Marine-Crps-Arrive-a-Sadi-Cnrlled-Yemeni-Airpr-as-Sign-f-Sppr

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp7 – cp19

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-736b-yemen-war-mosaic-736b

Vorige / Previous:

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-735-yemen-war-mosaic-735

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-735 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-735:

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm

http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/

http://www.yemenwar.info/

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

http://yemendataproject.org/data/

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

https://yemen.bellingcat.com/

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

https://yemeniarchive.org/en

18:42 21.04.2021
Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
Geschrieben von

Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
Dietrich Klose

Kommentare