Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 741 - Yemen War Mosaic 741

Yemen Press Reader 741: 18. Mai 2021: Jemen: Wichtige humanitäre Entwicklungen im Jahr 2020 und Ausblick auf 2021 – Versteckte Narben: Jemens psychisch kranke Patienten – Ein rostiger Öltanker..
Bei diesem Beitrag handelt es sich um ein Blog aus der Freitag-Community

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

... Ein rostiger Öltanker ist eine drohende Umweltkatastrophe Waffenschmuggel vom Iran in den Jemen – Der Jemen-Krieg und das internationale Gesetz über bewaffnete Konflikte USA: Die saudische Lobby im Jahr 2020 und mehr

May 18, 2021. Yemen: Key humanitarian developments in 2020 and outlook for 2021 – Hidden scars: Yemen’s mentally ill patients – A rusting oil tanker is an environmental catastrophe to happen – Smuggling arms from Iran to Yemen – The Yemen War and International Law on Armed Conflicts – US: The Saudi Lobby in 2020 – and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2:

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp12b Sudan

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade

cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage

cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp17a Kriegsereignisse: Schlacht um Marib / Theater of War: Marib battle

cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle

cp19 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification




(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

(** B H)

Crisis Insight: Yemen Crisis Impact Overview - Key humanitarian developments in 2020 and outlook for 2021 (10 May 2021)

Civilians and civilian infrastructure

Armed violence resulted in several mass casualty events, and conflict continued to impact critical civilian infrastructure – particularly healthcare infrastructure.

Civilians and critical civilian infrastructure continued to be affected by conflict expanding into new areas. In 2020, active frontlines began to move closer to the inhabited areas of Al Jawf and Marib governorates. Nearly 800,000 displaced people continue to live in Marib governorate, which was previously seen as a place of relative peace and safety. At least 20 incidents of more than ten civilians being injured or killed were reported across Yemen in 2020, and over 18 health facilities were hit by either an airstrike or shelling (an increase of 50% from 2019), restricting access to critical healthcare for 200,000 households.


People in Yemen continued to experience displacement as a result of the war and other factors, such as flash floods and COVID-19; the number of displaced people rose dramatically in Marib and Al Jawf, and overall challenges are increasing for IDPs

Peace negotiations and decreased conflict resulted in the reduced movement of people in governorates such as Hajjah. Other governorates, such as Al Jawf and Marib, saw increased displacement as a result of expanding conflict. Many households have been displaced multiple times throughout the conflict, which resulted in a dramatic reduction of income opportunities and depletion of savings for them and their host communities.

Protection and vulnerability

Health workers and people dependent on remittances have emerged as new vulnerable groups.

The protection risks present in previous years have been aggravated by continuous conflict, increased challenges for humanitarian operations, and reduced funding. The COVID-19 pandemic further complicated the situation. Health workers, people dependent on remittances, people with underlying health conditions, and daily wage workers emerged as new groups considered ‘vulnerable’.

Humanitarian access

COVID-19 and other factors have increased access constraints, affecting the quality of services provided.

While progress was made with authorities concerning programme approval in 2020, the overall operating environment remained extremely challenging. Access was impeded for security, physical, and bureaucratic reasons. Humanitarian operations faced increased restrictions and costs related to reduced funding. An estimated nine million people experienced access constraints in meeting their needs.


Deteriorating economic conditions continued to affect people’s purchasing power.

Economic conditions worsened for the Yemeni population because of the conflict and varying macroeconomic trends. The situation has further decreased people’s purchasing power, making it harder for households to pay for their needs.

Document in full:

(** B H)

Hidden scars: mentally ill patients lost in Yemen’s war

With one psychiatrist for 750,000 people and huge stigma about mental health, patients get little help

With no end in sight, an entire population is struggling to cope. According to the World Health Organization, a fifth of those living in war zones are likely to be suffering from some form of mental disorder, including depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), or psychosis. In Yemen, where soaring poverty rates have added to trauma and the healthcare system has been targeted, depleted and neglected, that figure is likely to be higher.

Data is limited, but from 2014 to 2015 there was a reported 40% increase in suicides recorded in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. And in one of the few scientific studies on mental health carried out, nearly 80% of children surveyed in 2018 showed symptoms of PTSD.

At the Taiz mental health hospital, one of four public psychiatric facilities in the country, patients fare little better than at home. Just two nurses are responsible for 143 severely ill inpatients. Many are shackled to stop them escaping and almost all are heavily sedated, roaming through the corridors in a haze of consciousness.

Several male patients seemed confused at the sight of a visitor coming through the double-bolted metal gates and into the hospital’s main courtyard. Their grey tracksuits smell of urine. One thin man in his 30s saw his father shot dead in front of him. He has barely uttered a word since then.

“For lots of people, the stigma controls their outcome,” says Mulhi. “If you are mentally not well, people will feel you are weak, or you’re not good at religion, or it’s from the devil. Our society doesn’t believe in [being] mentally ill.”

This cultural factor combined with the extreme stresses of war is why, Mulhi believes, so many family members end up locking away their loved ones or bringing them to the centre. “They just want to get rid of them. It’s very sad.”

Psychiatric specialists such as Mulhi have become rarer, many leaving for less stressful, safer environments. About 40 remain in Yemen today to serve a population of 30 million. Women often go untreated, their psychological suffering ignored entirely. Many seek out unqualified opinions or try whatever unproven treatment they can find. Several villagers in Aqeeqah said they had paid thousands of Yemeni rials to treat mentally ill family members with electric shock therapy, only to discover that it worsened their condition.

For professionals who continue to offer their services, resources are scarce. Mulhi’s centre is entirely dependent on government funding, which is barely enough for a quarter of the medication necessary to manage his patients. Until December 2019, the hospital had received financial aid from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), one of the few international agencies to prioritise mental healthcare in Yemen. But a reduction in its own funding forced it to withdraw support.

In recent years, international donations to Yemen have been in freefall.

Last year the UNFPA closed 80 of 180 healthcare facilities, some of which were providing psychosocial services for Yemen’s population at large. This year, having only reached 13% of its necessary budget, it expects to close more.

“Mental health was not, and is still not, one of our main concerns,” says Yemen’s deputy public health minister, Dr Ishraq al-Subaie, who acknowledges that all programmes and initiatives to tackle mental health problems are on hold.

“Our efforts have been focused on rebuilding hospitals, treating the war-wounded and addressing reproductive healthcare. With the current state of the economy and the outbreak of Covid-19, we’re unable to cope,” she says. “Mental health has been completely neglected.”

For staff at the Taiz centre, the idea of rehabilitating, rather than restraining, their patients is scoffed at. “Of course no one here is getting what they need,” says Mulhi. “But the situation right now is not safe for us, let alone for the mentally ill. All we can do is contain them.

“This is just the spark. The lightning hasn’t yet come. Just like American soldiers went to Vietnam and are still suffering now,” he says, adding: “This war, this mental burden, this tragedy will bring a picture of mental illness in the future that I am afraid we will not be able to face. Hopefully I won’t be in this life at that time, inshallah. Hopefully I’ll be buried by then.” – by Isobel Yeung

(** B E H P)

A Rusting Oil Tanker Off the Coast of Yemen Is an Environmental Catastrophe Waiting to Happen. Can Anyone Prevent It?

The giant rusting ship has had virtually no maintenance since Kulaib departed. The sea chest valves that once fed its cooling system have rusted and can’t be completely shut, he says. The ship’s fire-extinguishing system no longer functions. And power comes only from a small generator on deck that provides lighting and heat for a skeleton crew of SEPOC employees.

On May 27, 2020, a ruptured pipe caused seawater to flood the engine room. A repair job that under normal circumstances should have taken four hours ended up taking five days of nonstop work, according to an emergency case report seen by TIME. It took a team of local divers to seal the sea chests’ external openings underwater. Only then could the SEPOC crew onboard patch up the damaged pipe in the sweltering engine room. Their repair job is just about holding, Kulaib says. More dangerous still is the oxygen that could be accumulating in the Safer’s 34 oil tanks and mixing with volatile crude fumes because of inert gases’ seeping out of corroded seals, he says. “Any spark, believe me, will end with a big explosion on that ship.”

The consequences would be unfathomable. Estimated to hold 1.14 million barrels of crude (47.9 million gal.), the Safer could spill four times the amount of oil the Exxon Valdez leaked into Prince William Sound in 1989. And it would add another dimension of catastrophe to Yemen, a country already enduring the world’s worst humanitarian crisis amid a six-year war that is only becoming more complex.

A fire on board might be even worse. Up to 5.9 million people in Yemen and 1 million more in Saudi Arabia could be exposed to very high air-pollution levels, completely overwhelming a health care system already on its knees as a result of the COVID-19 crisis.

Yet despite the U.N. Environment Programme chief Inger Andersen’s warning last year that “time is running out” to avert a “looming humanitarian, economic and environmental catastrophe,” attempts by U.N. recovery teams to negotiate access to the FSO Safer with the Houthis who control it have repeatedly stalled.

For some, the Safer’s rotting mass is emblematic of the international community’s inertia in the face of the six-year war. “They are trying to do the same thing over and over again,” Raphael Veicht, Doctors Without Borders’ head of mission in Yemen, says of negotiators in the U.N.-brokered peace talks. “They’re not able to change the mediation mechanisms, they’re not able to think out of the box and they’re not able to come up with something new—and this just protracts the conflict.”

It’s hard to raise the alarm about a disaster that hasn’t happened yet.

But the conflict in Yemen also helps explain why so little has been done to address the ticking time bomb on its shores. The Houthis retain control of the ship and have repeatedly knocked back the international community’s attempts just to assess the state of the vessel, let alone extract the oil from it.

Kulaib says that operationally, reviving exports from the Safer today is totally out of the question. Although the Houthis and even the U.N. team are talking about repair and maintenance, he says, “this can never happen. It’s not repairable. The engine room is already out and can never be repaired.”

An environmental catastrophe in waiting

It’s difficult to picture the sheer scale of a 1 million-barrel spill.

As well as an immediate humanitarian disaster, it would cause a lasting environmental catastrophe. The Red Sea is one of the world’s richest and most biodiverse marine ecosystems: home to endemic fish species, mangroves and the only coral reefs known to be resistant to sea-temperature rises.

The winter scenario poses a particular threat to Saudi Arabia, where desalination plants dot the coastline from the southern city of Jizan near Yemen’s border up to the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, which separates Saudi Arabia from Egypt. So acute is the kingdom’s dependence on desalinated water, which accounts for roughly half of its requirements, that in 2018, the state-run Saudi Saline Water Conversion Corporation commissioned nine new plants along the Red Sea coast.

“The risk is real. One can only look at previous oil spills at the Persian Gulf (or Arabian Gulf) and Israel, which have resulted in a shutdown of several coastal desalination plants in the past,” says Manal Shehabi, an expert on oil economies in the Gulf at Oxford University’s Institute for Energy Studies.

All confirm that the disaster is imminent’

But as with the war, the people who stand to be worst affected by a spill are Yemeni civilians.

Around a third of the population along this strip of the Red Sea coast has been displaced, some multiple times. Large parts of the population do not have access to primary or secondary health care, and the only commodities that make it from the coast to northern Yemen are fish and small quantities of red onions. At some points the front line is so close to the coastal road that trucks are forced to drive for miles along the beach. There, fishermen like Akram continue to ply their trade despite the risks.

One oil-spill scenario that Risk-Aware modeled for the British government in 2020 shows the entirety of fisheries on Yemen’s Red Sea coast inundated, representing a $1.5 billion loss in income over 25 years. Veicht says if poverty forces people to fish no matter how paltry the catch, “then we have to deal with the poison. It’s just a horror scenario.”

Along the Red Sea coast there is no visible mitigation taking place, says Veicht. “There is no preparation, no contingency planning, no protective measures going on at all.”

Occasionally, a chartered fishing boat visits the Safer, bringing food, spare parts and drums of diesel for the generator. And about every month, the crew gets shore leave and is replaced by a new staff rotation. “All confirm that the disaster is imminent,” wrote engineer in charge Yasser Al Quatabi in the May 2020 emergency case report seen by TIME, “but when it will exactly happen, Allah alone knows that.” – by Joseph Hincks (with photos)

(** B K P)

Special Report: How Iran smuggles weapons to Yemen

Almasdar Online tracks the web of smuggling routes Iran uses to secretly deliver drones, missiles and other military technology to the Houthis

Evidence of overt Iranian support for the Houthis appeared shortly after the Houthi coup that unseated the internationally recognized government of President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi in Yemen’s capital Sana’a in September 2014. Iran established an air bridge in early March 2015 to Sana’a airport for the first time in years, with 14 flights per week. According to Yemeni officials, Tehran used those flights to transfer IRGC experts and military technology. Iranian officials claimed the flights were delivering humanitarian assistance via the Iranian Red Crescent.

In March 2017, Reuters reported on Iran’s intention to bolster the Houthis and consolidate their control in the region, calculating that the war they were waging would “help determine the balance of power in the Middle East."

An unnamed senior Iranian official told Reuters that then-commander of the Quds Force, General Qassem Soleimani, met with senior IRGC officials in Tehran in February 2017 to discuss ways to "empower" the Houthis. The Quds Force is the foreign operations wing of the IRGC that implements Iran's expansionist project in the region by supporting sectarian militias in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.

At the meeting they agreed to increase the volume of assistance to the Houthis through training, weapons and financial support, given that "Yemen is the region in which the war is fought by real proxy," the source said.

Iranian smuggling not limited to weapons

Although Yemeni officials have accused Iran of supporting and arming the Houthi dating back to the beginning of the six so-called Sa’ada wars between the Houthis and the government of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh from 2004 to 2010, the first seizure of Iranian weapons bound for the Houthis was announced in early 2010.

Before the arms embargo, Iran used commercial ships manned by Iranians, Afghanis and Shia Arabs to deliver weapons to the Houthis. For the most part, the shipments were carried out undetected along Yemen’s largely unpatrolled coast that stretches more than 2,500 kilometers along the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.

According to multiple sources, including a counter-smuggling security official who spoke to Almasdar Online on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the media, the foreign smuggling routes are numerous and varied. Some ships sailed from Iran to Thailand, then from Thailand to Yemen because there is less suspicion of goods coming from Thailand to Yemeni ports.

The sources said that land-based smuggling through the Sultanate of Oman to the Yemeni governorate of Al-Mahra is one of the main routes

Smugglers also use the port of Djibouti to smuggle the goods under the cover of fake companies or organizations.

Stages of smuggling

Based on the purported confessions of captured smugglers, conversations with specialists and investigative reports, the process of smuggling Iranian weapons to Yemen mostly takes place via the sea and then over land. The maritime phase is divided into three stages. The first phase starts from Iranian ports and ends at a specific point between the Sea of ​​Oman and Iran. From there, the second phase begins and the arms are shipped to points off the coasts of Oman and Yemen, or to an intermediary country such as Thailand, Somalia and Djibouti. At that point, the third phase of the smuggling journey carries the weapons shipments to less than 10 kilometers from Yemen’s shores.

The route of smuggling of arms shipments at the maritime stage is subject to the nature of international inspection procedures in Yemeni waters, and smugglers often go to the shores of Somalia and Djibouti to avoid checkpoints, and from there another team begins to deliver the shipments to the shores of Yemen, usually preceded by fake shipments to explore the smuggling route.

According to a Coast Guard officer, cargo boats advance 10 kilometers ahead of smuggling boats in order to alert the smugglers of any signs of search or interception vessels.

As soon as the weapons shipments arrive on Yemeni shores, they are transferred to secret warehouses, where they are divided into batches and loaded onto trucks and cargo vehicles transporting commercial goods to Houthi-controlled areas in Sana’a and Sa’ada.

As for arms shipments that reach Omani ports, they are shipped and smuggled either through the land ports between Yemen and Oman, or they are transported in fishing boats to the coasts of Yemen’s Al-Mahra and Hadramout governorates, after which the land-based smuggling phase begins, as previously described.

and also

My comment: As claimed by the anti-Houthi side.

(** B K P)

Investigating disasters caused by Yemen War and Role of Intl. Law on Armed Conflicts

At the fourth pre-session of the international conference on international law and armed conflict in the region, a faculty member of MOFID University, Mohammad Habibi Majandeh, pointed to the issue of military intervention of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen with a focus on “criticism of the doctrine of intervention with invitation” and stated, “What we are witnessing today in Yemen, as the United Nations has described it, is the worst humanitarian disaster in the contemporary world of today.”
He continued, “This tragedy has left the small country of Yemen with a population of about 28 million, which was considered as the poorest Arab country in the region before the Saudi-led coalition military aggression, in a very critical situation in a way that about 150,000 people in Yemen have lost their lives and consequently, hundreds of thousands of Yemeni people have been injured and/or disabled.

Mohammad Habibi Majandeh, who is a jurist, raised the question whether such military intervention is justifiable from perspective of international law, saying, “I believe that this military intervention is not justified from perspective of international law. Although justifications have been raised for it, these justifications do not have the ability to stand up in the face of these challenges. The Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen, which has resulted in nothing but destruction, cannot be justified under international law in the contemporary world.”

“That legitimate collective defense requires a foreign military attack which is completely rejected here. What is raised as indirect military aggression, i.e. Iran's claim of support for the Houthis (Ansarullah Movement in Yemen), firstly because level of support does not reach the threshold that Houthis’ measures can be attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and secondly the Islamic Republic of Iran is not explicitly mentioned in the documents and correspondence as intervening countries in a way that the Islamic Republic of Iran itself has categorically denied any interference in Yemen’s war, so, this claim is also rejected.”

He said, “The most important reason for recognizing Mansour Hadi's government seems to be the resolution issued by the UN Security Council (UNSC) after the Saudi-led coalition attack, in which it (UNSC) referred to the legitimacy of Hadi's government.”
He concluded that since many countries including Russia, China, Iran, Iraq and Oman opposed the military attack on Yemen and called it contrary to international law, therefore, it cannot be said that there was an international consensus to recognize Mansur Hadi as president.
International law cannot be indifferent to the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen

Emphasizing that international law cannot be indifferent to this humanitarian catastrophe, Majandeh said, "Any basis for justifying military intervention in Yemen, that has led to such consequences and damages, must be measured and evaluated with other areas of international law, the most important of which is the right to self-determination.”

In the end, he reiterated that a foreign interventionist cannot intervene to suppress a nation and create a human catastrophe. Therefore, the theory of intervention with invitation on the issue of Yemen should be considered and revised.

Rights of occupation must be considered in the current situation in Yemen

Following this virtual meeting, Professor Marco Sassoli, a faculty member of the University of Geneva, stated, "I want to speak about international humanitarian law. I think the sad situation in Yemen is an illustration of the pertinence of humanitarian law, because if it was respected, the situation would be totally different."

He reiterated that it also indicates some deficiencies of the existing rules.

"The first problem in humanitarian law is obviously the classification of the armed conflict of international and non-international. Normally we have to strictly separate these to arenas. The question which rises regarding the classification of the conflicts under humanitarian law in case of Yemen’s war is who was the head of government of Yemen when Mansour Hadi asked for the intervention of the Saudi led coalition?" he remarked.

Speaking about Mansour Hadi's administration, he said if Hadi’s government is not an effective one, then the law of international armed conflict could be applied.

"Obviously, here we can see a certain impact of the UN Security Council resolutions which asked for support for Hadi’s government. This can have an impact on the interpretation of which side is the legitimate government of Yemen at the time when the intervention was consented upon. Some experts even suggest that international humanitarian law of international armed conflict should apply when there is an outside intervention even consented by the government," he stated.
“Obviously, as was mentioned, the law of international conflict could also apply if there is foreign support in favor of the rebels. But I agree with what was said that in my assessment, Iran did not have overall control over the Houthi. And I remind you that internationalization could only happen if a foreign state does not just support or help, but has overall control over the rebels."

Sassoli said that sometimes the law of international conflicts is applied, when there are hostilities between forces.

(** B P)

US: The Saudi Lobby in 2020


For several years, Saudi Arabia’s influence in Washington has been slipping, due in large part to a series of foreign policy blunders. The Saudi-led coalition’s devastating airstrikes in Yemen have led to the deaths of thousands of civilians there and, on multiple occasions, Congress has threatened to cut off sales of U.S. arms being used in the conflict.1 The Saudi blockade of Qatar in 2017 threatened to destabilize the entire Middle East and left U.S. policymakers in a precarious position, as Qatar hosts the largest U.S. military base in the region.2 And, most notably, there was widespread outrage in the U.S. and across the globe when Saudi dissident and Washington Post contributor Jamal Khashoggi was brutally murdered at the Saudi consulate in Turkey.

At every turn, however, the Saudi monarchy has been able to rely on an expansive and entrenched collection of lobbying and public relations firms in the U.S. that have worked to minimize the damage from these transgressions. Despite the best efforts of the Saudi lobby, it has become increasingly clear that Saudi Arabia has lost the battle for the Beltway and seen its influence in Washington dramatically decline. In response, the Kingdom has done what any monarchy with millions to spend on influence in America might do: shift its influence operations to the states. In 2020, the Saudi monarchy changed the focus of its influence in America from K Street to Main Street, with its Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) registered agents reaching out to individuals in nearly half of all U.S. states. This report chronicles that year of transformation for the Saudi lobby by analyzing all FARA filings made by firms working on behalf of Saudi clients in 2020.

From this analysis we found: • 123 individual foreign agents and 23 firms were registered under FARA to represent clients in Saudi Arabia in 2020; • Those firms reported, in 2020 filings, receiving $31,456,319 from their Saudi clients; • 2,834 political activities conducted on behalf of those Saudi clients; • 1,127 campaign contributions, totaling $1,516,053, made by those firms and their registered foreign agents; • 34 elected officials received $98,600 in contributions from Saudi firms that had contacted their offices on behalf of Saudi clients; • 11 times a Member of Congress or their staff was contacted by a Saudi lobbying firm on the exact day they received a campaign contribution from that firm.


For Saudi Arabia’s influence in the U.S., 2020 was a year of tumult and transition. After being repeatedly rebuked in Washington, the Kingdom shifted its influence strategy into the states. The reason for this move was rather straightforward—after years of foreign policy blunders, the Saudi monarchy had lost Congress’ support, and the only man standing between the Kingdom and Congressional punishments, President Donald Trump, was in danger of losing office.

But, in 2020, with the presidential election looming, the prospect of the Saudis losing their chief cheerleader became very real. As the Coronavirus pandemic ravaged the U.S. and the President only served to fan the flames of nationwide protests over racial injustice, the prospect of Trump losing his reelection bid became more and more likely.

With this daunting prospect looming, and as strained as U.S.-Saudi relations were when 2020 began, the Kingdom quickly added to the growing rift early in the year when they launched an oil price war with Russia that led to plummeting oil prices globally.13 This, unsurprisingly, infuriated many Members of Congress from oil producing states—including several who had previously been staunch supporters of Saudi Arabia. "We are going to fundamentally, not only reevaluate, but take actions that will start to undermine the long term relationship that many of us have supported," with Saudi Arabia, explained Senator Dan Sullivan (R-AK).14

To be sure, the Saudis’ lobbyists in D.C. worked feverishly to assuage these Senators’ concerns, including explaining in an email to dozens of Hill staffers that, “Saudi Arabia has not, and will not, seek to intentionally damage U.S. shale oil producers.”15 But, this event exemplified a painfully obvious reality for Saudi Arabia: they were losing the battle for the Beltway. So, they did what any foreign government with millions to invest in American influence would do—they took the fight to the states and launched an unprecedented campaign to influence the hearts and minds of middle-America and, by proxy, the elected officials who represent them in Washington.

This report is the story of how they did it. It’s the story of the Saudi lobby in 2020 which made 2,834 political contacts through the 23 different firms that served as Saudi Arabia’s registered foreign agents in the U.S. It’s a story of more than $31 million spent by the Saudis on these firms.16 It’s a story of nearly $1.5 million dollars in campaign contributions made by firms and foreign agents working on behalf of Saudi clients. It’s a story of how a large chunk of that money went to politicians who were targeted by the Saudi Lobby, some even receiving money the same day they met with Saudi lobbyists.

To tell this story, we at the Foreign Influence Transparency Initiative (FITI) analyzed every Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) document filed by organizations working on behalf of Saudi clients in 2020. From these documents, we recorded every single “political activity” done for Saudi clients, every campaign contribution mentioned in these FARA filings, every “informational material” distributed on the Saudis’ behalf, and every dollar these organizations reported receiving from their Saudi clients.17

If this link does not work, try via

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

(* A H)

25 new cases of coronavirus reported, 6,568 in total

The committee also reported the death of five coronavirus patients; Hadramout (4) and Taiz (1), in addition to the recovery of 19 others in Hadramout governorate.
2264 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(A H)

5 new cases of coronavirus reported, 6,543 in total

The committee also reported the death of four coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 9 others in Hadramout governorate.
1314 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(A P)

Foggy Spray Campaign Continues in Aden

(A H)

Nationaltrainer von Jemen: Al Nash im Alter von 64 Jahren verstorben

(A H)

The manager of Yemen's national football team Sami Al-Na'ash has died of Covid-19 in the interim capital Aden.

and also

(* A H)

15 new cases of coronavirus reported, 6,538 in total

The committee also said in its statement that no death has been recorded in the liberated areas of Yemen.
189 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(* A H)

16 new cases of coronavirus reported, 6,523 in total

The committee also reported the death of seven coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of five others.
201 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(B H P)

Impfskepsis auf Arabisch

Heute endet der Ramadan. Wird sich das allabendliche Fastenbrechen im Familienkreis rückblickend als Pandemie-Treiber entpuppen? Im arabischen Raum macht Beobachtern aber noch ein anderes Phänomen große Sorgen.

Der Jemen ist einer der ärmsten Staaten der Welt, seit Jahren herrscht dort Krieg. Dass das Land am Golf von Aden zu den letzten Flecken der Erde zählt, in dem sich Menschen gegen das Coronavirus impfen lassen können, ist wenig überraschend.

Welche Auswirkungen nimmt der in dieser Woche zu Ende gehende islamische Fastenmonat auf den Verlauf der Corona-Pandemie in der arabischen Welt? Gerade das gesellige Zusammensein am Abend, wenn Großfamilien und Freunde daheim oder in Restaurants gemeinsam das Fasten brechen, könne sich rückblickend als gefährlicher Virustreiber entpuppen, warnen Experten.

and a report in English:

(A H)

7 new cases of coronavirus reported in Hadramout

The supreme national emergency committee for coronavirus reported on Wednesday, 7 new confirmed cases of COVID-19, including the death of one patient in Hadramout governorate.
384 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

and also

(A H)

7 new cases of coronavirus reported, 6,492 in total

The committee also reported the death of one coronavirus patient, in addition to the recovery of two others.
806 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(A H)

IOM Supports the UN COVID-19 Vaccination Roll-Out in Yemen

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has begun its support to the United Nations (UN) COVID-19 vaccination roll-out in Yemen where cases have recently surged. The Organization is providing vaccinations at five health centres in Aden, Ma’rib, Shabwah, Taiz and Lahj.

Yemen received 360,000 COVID-19 vaccine doses through the COVAX Facility on 31 March. The roll-out of the vaccination campaign began on 20 April.

“Achieving wide-reaching immunity is vital to stopping the COVID-19 pandemic in its tracks. IOM is happy to support the vaccination campaign in Yemen to help reach that very aim,” said Christa Rottensteiner, IOM Yemen Chief of Mission.

“It is extremely important that all vulnerable communities in Yemen have access to the COVID-19 vaccine. IOM welcomes the Government of Yemen’s decision to take an inclusive approach to the vaccine roll-out by including migrants in need. Our communities will not be healthy until everyone is healthy.”

So far, over 18,500 health workers and people with medical conditions have been vaccinated across Yemen. In the next rounds of the vaccination campaign, migrants are expected to be included as per the national plan.

cp2 Allgemein / General

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Interactive Map of Yemen War

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Yemen War daily map update (except May 14)

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Film: “Merchants of war, listen to our voices.”

Mohammed is calling for peace from his home in Ibb, Yemen.

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How Saudi Arabia is Losing its War in Yemen

The futility of the Yemeni War was proven to the Saudis a year after it started, which they quickly realized. Still, they insist on continuing this war, besieging the Yemeni nation and keeping it hungry. However, the Biden administration’s decision to end its support for coalition forces sends an important message that the warfare isn’t as beneficial to the Americans as it is to the Saudis.

This is where the importance of Yemeni attacks, including the recent attack on Dhahran, comes into play, underscoring the fact that the final winner of the war is the Yemenis. Therefore, it can be said that any negotiations in the future will be conducted on this basis. It is also likely the Saudis will not achieve any of their goals because they are the weakest side in this equation.

In particular, the battle of Ma’rib has sent strong signals that the fighting is in the interest of the real owners of the land, just as liberating Ma’rib from the occupation of the aggressor coalition and its mercenaries is a national duty for the Yemenis. Because the Saudi crown prince could not fulfill his promises or present a winning hand to the White House, it is now pulling away from him. Bin Salman is apparently no longer as popular in Washington as he used to be.

In brief, the situation has reached a point where the Saudis should be happy about the end of the Yemeni war. Because it puts an end to their material and human losses and prevents further erosion of Saudi military and economic capabilities.

My remark: From Iran.


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Imperialism and its sidekicks sink in a swamp of their own making in Yemen

The indomitable spirit of the Yemeni resistance is further proof that the imperialists and their proxies are incapable of winning a single aggressive war.

So long as the US believed that a warmongering alliance led by Saudi Arabia would swiftly prevail against the popular uprising in Yemen, simultaneously shoring up the USA‘s regional hegemony and boosting the profits of the US war industry, it was happy to support Riyadh’s reign of terror.

There were no horrors unleashed upon the Yemeni people from the skies above their heads that the US and its sidekick Britain would not actively support with arms and strategic guidance.

What imperialism did not bargain for, however, was the courage and ingenuity displayed by the Yemeni people in their resistance to imperial diktat, despite the massively greater odds in favour of Riyadh, armed to the hilt with the most hi-tec merchandise of death by America and Britain.

My remark: from a communist website.

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Mwatana concludes “Their Ramadan With Their Families” and “Their Eid With Their Families” campaign

Today, Mwatana concluded its campaign “Their Eid With Their Families”, which was an extension of the campaign “Their Ramadan With Their Families” that started on the first day of Ramadan April 13, 2021. The campaign aimed to shed light on the victims of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance of all parties to the conflict in Yemen.

Mwatana has published on its Arabic and English pages on social media platforms (Facebook and Twitter) 147 names of the victims of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance in prisons of Ansar Allah (Houthis), internationally recognized government of Yemen, and UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council. Moreover, Mwatana opened a new window within the campaign named “Messages From Broken Hearts” and published 35 messages hand written by the families of victims in Arabic to express their suffering and call for the release of their loved ones.

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Iran’s Zarif Says Talks With Saudi Arabia Might Ease Yemen War

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said his country’s talks with rival Saudi Arabia could spur “greater cooperation” and help end the war in Yemen.

“We’ve had some contacts with Saudi Arabia and we hope that these contacts will come to fruition through greater cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia for peace and stability in the region, particularly in Yemen,” Zarif told reporters Wednesday as he visited the Syrian capital, Damascus.

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Film: Before #Coronavirus catches them, release all arbitrarily detainees

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Film: Why Yemen's civil war is about to get worse – video explainer

More than six years after Houthi rebels seized Yemen's capital and forced its government into exile, a bloody civil war still rages across the country. Despite a Saudi-led bombing campaign that has destroyed Yemeni infrastructure and crippled its economy, the Houthis remain in control of most of the country's population centres.

The Guardian's Middle East correspondent, Bethan McKernan, explains why a new Houthi offensive could heap more misery on the millions of civilians caught in the crossfire

Yemen war: mass displacement fears as fighting intensifies in Marib

Yemen condemns international donor funding shortfall as UK cuts aid

War and famine could wipe out the next generation of Yemenis =

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Yemen: scholars call for rejection of attempts to curb Muslim sovereignty over Jerusalem

The Association of Yemeni Scholars urged the Arab and Muslim world on Monday to support the steadfastness of the Palestinians in Jerusalem, and reject all efforts to diminish their sovereignty over the holy city, Anadolu has reported.

The scholars issued their statement when the Israeli occupation forces stormed the courtyards of Al-Aqsa Mosque, using rubber-coated bullets, stun grenades, and tear gas against Palestinian worshippers. They condemned in the strongest terms the violation of the sanctity of the blessed mosque.

"The Arab and Muslim world should assume responsibility for the Noble Sanctuary of Al-Aqsa, reject all attempts to diminish the sovereignty of Muslims over it, and defend the Ummah's sanctities,"

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US and France accuse Houthis of holding Yemen’s future ‘hostage’

The US and France on Tuesday accused the Iran-backed Houthi rebels of holding Yemen’s future hostage.

US President Joe Biden’s Yemen envoy, Tim Lenderking, and Christopher Farnaud, France’s director for the Middle East at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, spoke on Tuesday.

The US State Department tweeted after the call that both countries believed “the Houthis are holding the future of Yemen hostage, continuing a long, costly offensive on Marib".

The State Department said Mr Lenderking and Mr Farnaud considered a Saudi-proposed ceasefire to be a “fair deal", and called on the Houthis to engage.

My comment: This really is BS propaganda by main western warmongers and arms suppliers.

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Iran and Saudi Arabia: Potential partners in Yemen

Looking at the two countries' rivalry in the region, Saudi Arabia cannot do much in Iraq or Syria and they both have almost the same amount of influence in Lebanon. However, Yemen is the Saudis' top priority, and Iran is using the power of its ally in Yemen, the Houthis, as a pressuring tool in the U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations.

The Saudis want to find a way to end the Yemen war and stop the Iran-backed Houthi militias’ missile and drone attacks on its land. Iran also wants Saudi Arabia to pull back its pressure campaign to stop lobbying for sanctions against Iran. This makes Yemen more suitable for any de-escalation steps between the two countries.

Therefore, any talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran will inevitably have a positive effect on accelerating the peace process in Yemen.

This new U.S. approach in the region, with no key ally, pushed the two counties to get closer and start resolving their issues regardless of their longstanding disputes. Support for the U.N.'s proposed nationwide cease-fire in Yemen and other regional security arrangements are expected to come of the talks.

I believe that talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia are more likely to continue with more rounds to break the ice and build trust. And as long as these two countries remain major players in Yemen, cooperation between them appears to be the more logical solution to ending the war in the country.

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For Yemenis fleeing war, U.S. peace efforts offer only faint hope

In the al-Jafeenah camp for internally displaced people outside the Yemeni city of Marib, Jamal al-Jaberi, forced to flee fighting near his home, is counting on the United States to help broker a peace deal and end the seven-year war.

Still, those caught up in fierce battles around Marib in central Yemen, where the worst of the fighting has been concentrated for months, have not lost hope.

“We hope the United States and the (United Nations) Security Council will strive to end the war and the attack on Marib, because in Marib there are a lot of refugees from every part of the country,” said Jaberi.

In Marib city, families worry they will not be able to afford traditional gifts for their children as they, along with fellow Muslims around the world, prepare to celebrate the Eid-al-Fitr religious holiday.

Markets were teeming with people trying to buy new clothes and dried fruits ahead of the festivities.

“Prices are too high for us to buy clothes for our kids, but at least, thank God, we made it out of our village,” said Shaher Nasser al-Koule, now living in the sprawling tent camp of Jafeenah, 5 km (3 miles) south of Marib.

There, children gathered barefoot to play in a dusty square strewn with rocks, trash, dilapidated trucks and debris from rockets and mortar shells.

My remark: Biased overview, throwing a good light at US politics.

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Yemen’s Endless Wars

For more than a century, southern Arabia has seen waves of insurgency and conflict backed by competing foreign powers.

In Yemen, the insurgents may have the advantage of geography, but the identity of the overall victor of these wars appears to rest on which internal faction can court and sustain the most international assistance. Whether the Hadi government or its Houthi opponents prevail will rest upon which country is more willing to continue to support proxy warfare in Yemen: Saudi Arabia or Iran.

My comment: Today’s Yemen War is no Saudi-Iranian proxy war.

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Who counts as a victim?

Artists operating outside these assumptions offer reminders about unseen victims. Murad Subay’s Family Photo 1 (2015), shown above, depicts a small bombed-out room of a cinderblock house in Sana’a, Yemen. On the back wall, Subay has painted a picture of a family posed in the well-known, formal pose: parents standing, beside them two children, an infant cradled in the mother’s arm. The image is slightly tilted from the blast. An oversize raven is perched ominously on the picture frame, peering down at them to signal their awful fate. Family Photo 1 is among 18 images in Subay’s ‘Ruins’ series (or ‘campaigns,’ as Subay calls his collective, consciousness-raising undertakings) launched in May 2015 in the Bani Hawwat area of the Sana’a Governorate, where, he writes, ‘the air strikes destroyed more than seven houses there and killed 27 civilians, including 15 children’.

Born in 1987, Subay has been documenting the activism and suffering of his Yemeni compatriots since the 2011 Arab Spring revolution, and especially the civil and Saudi-Iranian proxy war that began in 2014. His Faces of War Selfie Mural, mounted in Paris in December 2020, commemorates ‘more than 230,000 dead, since 2014’. Fewer people than you think outside Yemen realise that Saudi forces have been pounding the country with shells and missiles made in the US and the UK. While sometimes mentioned as among the world’s gravest humanitarian catastrophes, the plight of Yemen’s civilians rarely ‘shocks the conscience of mankind’.

The multifaceted conflict in Yemen is illegible according to Holocaust criteria that search for the binary of ideal victims and wholly evil perpetrators but not the typical conflicts of the postwar world: namely, those involving multiple, internal and external state and private actors, driven by predatory political economies of semi-organised criminality as well as geopolitical security. As a small gesture to call these people into consciousness, I chose Subay’s haunting Family Photo 1 for the cover of my book, The Problems of Genocide (2021). They should not be forgotten. Their memory should provoke us to think again about seeing all civilian victims, and reflect on the causes of their suffering.

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

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YOC: United Nations provides cover for aggression in piracy against fuel ships

The Yemeni Oil Company (YOC) confirmed that the United Nations provides a cover for the aggression countries to continue maritime piracy and fuel ships' detention.

In a protest organized in front of the United Nations office in the capital Sana'a after Eid prayer, YOC executive director Ammar al-Adhruee said the United Nations is actively participating alongside the aggression in sea piracy acts.

Al-Adhruee said since the beginning of this year, "no liter of gasoline has been allowed into the port of Hodeida", indicating that more than 26 million Yemenis suffer from the blockade and the continuing acts of maritime piracy on ships.

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

Siehe / Look at cp1

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Jemen: „Meine Kinder sind hungrig und krank, bitte helft uns!

Die Zustände im Land werden immer katastrophaler. Zwei von drei Menschen können sich nichts zu essen kaufen. Mehr als zwei Millionen Kinder unter fünf Jahren sind akut unterernährt. Sie sind die ersten, die sterben. Die Spitäler sind zerstört. Aufgrund des fehlenden Trinkwassers haben Krankheiten wie Cholera und COVID-19 leichtes Spiel.

CARE hilft vor Ort mit Nahrung, Trinkwasser sowie Hygieneartikeln für Familien, um Leben zu retten.

„Der Jemen gehört zu den ärmsten Ländern und erlebt die größte humanitäre Krise der Welt. 24 der 30 Millionen Einwohner sind auf Hilfe angewiesen und die Lage wird mit jedem Tag dramatischer. Wir müssen JETZT handeln, um Leben zu retten!“, sagt Andrea Barschdorf-Hager, Geschäftsführerin von CARE Österreich.

Bitte helfen Sie mit einer Spende!

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Photos: No electricity, no water, no salaries Trio of hell in the province of Hodeidah

This is how I receive the children of the city of Al-Hodeidah Eid No electricity Slammed For services

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Yemen: Tens of thousands of children denied access to education after a single month of attacks on schools

Five attacks on schools in Yemen in March of this year have left an estimated 30,600 children (i) without access to education, further exacerbating an education crisis in the country, according to data analysed by Save the Children.

This is more than twice the number of attacks on education facilities reported in the last quarter of 2020. In total, more than two million children are out of education and at least 2,500 education facilities are affected by the war.

Escalating violence in areas such as Taiz have resulted in the deadliest quarter for children in almost two years, with 50 killed or injured in this region alone from January to March of this year.

In March, schools in Taiz were reportedly hit in four shelling attacks, three of which resulted in 11 civilian casualties, including four children (ii). Another attack took place in the capital of Sana’a, where a school was reportedly hit by an airstrike. Such attacks can set back the education of children in the area for years, or even the rest of their lives.

Children in Yemen continue to pay the price of this war, including with their lives. Earlier this month, reports (iii) stated that five children were killed and 12 were injured on some of the deadliest frontlines in Hodeida, Saada and Ma’rib.Just last week, Save the Children staff in Taiz reported that two more children were injured during shelling.In the past three years, nearly 1 in 4 civilian casualties have been children.

Yousif*, 13, was severely injured in a shelling attack in Hodeida late last year. He now cannot move one of his hands due to a severe shrapnel wound. Two of his friends died in the attack. Yousif* is still struggling to recover from this experience and the other injuries he sustained.

Yousif’s* father, Naser, told Save the Children: “I was at work. Then my son finished his breakfast and went to play football with his friend in a backyard next to the house. [When he returned to the house] shelling hit the backyard, and a group of boys who were playing football were injured. One of my sons called me, when I was at work. He told me that my younger son was injured in a second attack while trying to help others injured.

“Men leave their houses to find jobs and while they are away they are worried that they may come back to see their families killed.”

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Als Tearfund arbeiten wir mit unseren lokalen Partnern in drei Risikogebieten im Westen des Landes: Hajjah, Sana‘a und Ibb. In diesen Regionen sind Krankheiten wie Cholera (eine bakterielle Durchfallerkrankung) eine große Bedrohung für die Menschen.

In unseren Projekten verfolgen wir zwei Ziele:

Gesundheit stärken • Wir verteilen Nahrungsmittelpakete (bestehend u.a. aus Mehl, Öl, Bohnen, Zucker und Salz), die eine Familie für einen Monat ausgewogen ernähren. • Wir klären über Haushaltshygiene und das Vermeiden von Ansteckungen auf. • Wir geben Hygiene-Pakete und Wasserfilter aus, die die Gesundheit von über 20.000 Menschen fördern.

Wasser, Sanitär und Hygiene (WASH) • Wir bauen oder reparieren Zisternen in acht Dorfgemeinschaften, damit eine saubere Wasserversorgung für über 10.000 Menschen und Viehherden gewährleistet ist. • Wir schulen Freiwillige, die in Dörfern und Haushalten Aufklärungsarbeit leisten. • Wir befähigen unsere lokalen Partner, damit sie eigenverantwortlich und professionell Projekte durchführen können

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A reflection through the eyes of a small Yemeni child

The streets are harsh. The sky too. I don’t think I remember what Yemen in peace looked like. Baba said we are lucky we are still alive, but I don’t think it is lucky to be alive just to survive. Taiz was my most beautiful city. I was planning to be a lawyer when I grow older, now I plan to just try and grow older. Mama said that I should be grateful we were still able to put food in our bellies, this isn’t food. My parents are too thin, as am I. Mama’s once pink, round cheeks are hollows of tears. Baba’s smile takes too much of his energy. I don’t know what we have done; all I know is I was living and playing – I swear, I did nothing else. There was an airstrike not too long ago near us, it killed many of Marwan’s relatives. The Saudi airstrike happened in the night, Baba said maybe they didn’t feel it as they must have been all sleeping. I know he is lying, the sounds of their planes always wake me up.

What I don’t understand is why no one is helping us. No one is shouting at Saudi to stop dispersing weapons and bombs. No one is shouting at them to leave our hospitals alone. No one is shouting at them to stop. The ongoing silence hurts me more than the snipers ever can. Yesterday Zahra came and asked me if I wanted to play, Mama grabbed my hand and screamed “Do you want to die?” and I screamed back, “No, I want to play”. She began crying and I felt bad, but I don’t know what I said.

I heard the radio this morning saying that a quarter of all the deaths in Yemen are children. Mama says that is a very big number for such a small people, we must be bad at hiding. =

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MONA Relief food and Eid clothes distributions (photos)

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Alhamdullah, yesterday 11 May Our team distributed 55 Ramadan food basket to poor families & orphans in remote villages north Sana'a. Thank you so much to our Malaysian donors. Jazak Allah all khair. Eid Fitr Mubarak to all friends (photos)

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USAID: Yemen ‑ USG Response to the Complex Emergency (Last Updated 05/14/21)

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Yemen Food Security Outlook Update, April 2021

Key Messages

Active conflict ongoing for more than six years continues to drive high levels of acute food insecurity in Yemen through both direct and indirect mechanisms. Macroeconomic conditions continue to deteriorate, with access to food and income significantly below pre-conflict levels. Even in the presence of large-scale humanitarian assistance, widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected to persist, with worst-affected households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes. While not the most likely scenario, Famine (IPC Phase 5) is possible should food supply be cut off for a prolonged period of time.

Currently, many poor households are experiencing slight improvements in food access and reduced consumption gaps due to Ramadan

In the north, fuel imports through the Red Sea ports in late March and early April are contributing to slight relief in fuel availability relative to the worst periods of shortages since June 2020.

Currently, the beginning of the main summer agricultural season in highland areas is expected to be ending the lean season as availability of labor opportunities increases.

High levels of conflict in much of the west continue to directly impact civilians by displacing households, damaging homes and infrastructure, destroying crops and livestock, disrupting livelihoods and income-earning, and causing civilian casualties and trauma. n

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TİKA's Erenler Sofrası Keeps On Reaching Out To Needy People in Yemen

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Yemen: Pain and joy in the maternity ward

I arrived at the Taiz Houban Mother and Child Hospital two weeks ago to start working as an obstetrician and gynaecologist in the maternity unit.

I am told that the frontline is only about 10km away, but contrary to what I was expecting, war doesn’t sound like bullets and explosions. The early mornings are my favourite time to open the windows of my room and listen to the sounds of birds wildly chirping, dogs barking, and roosters calling.

In the maternity department, the sounds are more distressing.

In my job I am used to the sounds of women in labour. But, in our hospital here, faced with the limited resources of civil war, the women have no access to epidurals or any pain relief at all. There is no entonox (“laughing gas”), no morphine injections, nothing.

Yesterday, the sound was of a woman’s wailing after we broke the news to her that the baby she had been carrying for nine months inside her had passed away.

She had had another baby by Caesarean less than a year ago… and that child had passed away a few days after birth, too.

Her diabetes had been left completely unchecked through this whole pregnancy. She had developed severe polyhydramnios, or increased water around the baby.

This, and the stillbirth, are both potential complications of untreated diabetes during pregnancy.

While our team here do offer antenatal care, free of charge, the war and the devastating effect it has had on the economy means that most women still don’t attend.

The journey is too difficult and too expensive.

This means that when they arrive at our hospital, we have no way of being sure how many months pregnant they are, and any complications that have developed during their pregnancy now present in extremis.

The maternity department is a place for women.

All the doctors, nurses and midwives are women as men are culturally not permitted to do the kind of work we do. No men are allowed in the hospital – they have to wait at the gates or in the surrounding area. Some women attend with a female relative for support.

The staff are skilled, hardworking, and dedicated. I am so impressed with the quality of care they provide, working under constraints and the civil war.

Each woman has her own story of pain and joy from their journey through motherhood, which in Yemen is intrinsically linked with being a woman – by Sabrina Das

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Yemen: Flash Update #2 Humanitarian Impact of Flooding | 11 May 2021

Heavy rains continued into the first week of May across some parts of Yemen causing massive flash flooding. The largest flood impact was experienced in Aden, Hadramaut, Hajjah, Lahj, Abyan, Dhamar, Ma’rib and Al Bayda governorates. Field reports indicate that the number of affected families has gone up from 3,730 on 4 May to 6,855 families by 9 May. Most of the affected people are internally displaced people (IDPs) who are living in inadequate shelters. In the district of Tarim, Hadramaut Governorate, authorities have reported that flood water swept through parts of the town, causing extensive damage to property, farms and infrastructure, including houses, power supply, roads, sewage system and sites for IDPs.

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Images reveal Yemenis faced starvation through Ramadan as humanitarian crisis grows

For the past month, locals across Yemen fasted for the Islamic Holy month of Ramadan but many faced starvation brought on by a worsening humanitarian crisis after six years of war.

Annabel Symington, a spokesperson for the World Food Programme, told Insider last month that many families who try to get food assistance said they were in a "perpetual fast" even before Ramadan began.

"'We're already fasting every day.' They'd sort of say 'we observe Ramadan in prayer only now.' Obviously, Ramadan has not in any way lost its importance for them as observant Muslims, but in terms of their ability to prepare iftar in the way they want, to prepare suhoor (pre-dawn meal) in the way they want that's gone."

Symington said many Yemeni are no longer able to enjoy their favorite foods and snacks or even basic goods since the costs of good has significantly gone up since the war started.

"Their favorite treats are either no longer available in Yemen or just so expensive that they wouldn't get it. Prices through the six years of war have increased up to 200% in some cases," Symington said.

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New IDA Grant to Preserve Food Security and Protect Livelihoods in Yemen

The World Bank Board of Executive Directors today approved a US$100 million grant from the International Development Association (IDA) and US$27 million grant from the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) to improve food and nutrition security.

The new grant will focus on delivering immediate support to beneficiary households through Cash-for-Works (CFW) opportunities and provision of nutritious food products to vulnerable households, as well as building the longer-term resilience of Yemeni households by supporting restoration of agricultural production and value chain building activities, to increase the sales of nutritious crops, livestock, and fish products.

Even before the conflict in Yemen escalated in 2015, the country already had one of the world’s highest malnutrition levels, and the situation has significantly worsened during the past six years. In 2021, over 2.25 million children under the age of five are threatened with acute malnutrition; 395,000 of them are expected to suffer from severe acute malnutrition and could die without treatment.

The recent projected figures in the Integrated Food Security and Nutrition Analysis mark a 16 percent increase in acute malnutrition and a 22 percent increase in severe acute malnutrition among children under five compared to last year’s estimate. This is the highest number on record in Yemen. An additional concern is that more than one million pregnant and breastfeeding women are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition during 2021 in Yemen.

“The situation in Yemen is unbearably heartbreaking. In addition to the ongoing conflict, Yemen is one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change and natural disasters, which further contribute to its vulnerability,” said Marina Wes, World Bank Country Director for Egypt, Yemen and Djibouti. “This new IDA grant will help Yemenis secure income through Cash for Work Projects, restore agricultural production activities, and improve nutrition at the household level.”

Agriculture is essential to support lives and livelihoods in Yemen, particularly during this challenging period. The Yemen Food Security Response and Resilience Project will assist Yemen farmers who have hardly been hit by the conflict, natural disasters and COVID-19, and increase farmers’ ability to provide food for their families and communities. The program will benefit more than 77,000 farmers allowing to restore agricultural production, including more than 19,000 women; over 26,000 beneficiaries (including more than 6,600 women) will benefit under the Cash for Work Programs; and over 518,000 vulnerable children and women will be reached through nutrition improvement activities.

The support to affected farmers will include funds for the purchase of eligible agricultural inputs, cash transfers to small farmers and women involved in agriculture, provision of small agricultural equipment and protective equipment, as well as technical support.

The project will be implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Food Programme in partnership with local institutions ensuring project activities reach throughout the whole country.

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Yemen commodity tracker (January - March 2021)

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

Siehe / Look at cp17a

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To Stay or to Go: One of the Toughest Decisions a Yemeni Can Make

Deciding to leave their home was a difficult call for Aisha and Tawfiq, but two years ago, out of fear for their lives, the couple fled their farm in Ta’iz, Yemen.

“Shells and bullets had started falling near us. We knew we were in severe danger and needed to get to a safer location,” said Aisha, describing what had pushed their family over the edge after enduring years of conflict.

“We finally left our home when we saw most of our neighbours leaving. At that time, the clashes had gotten so scary that we fled with nothing. We even left our animals behind – we just couldn’t take them," she added.

Not too long before the scariest moment of their lives, Aisha and Tawfiq’s world had been quiet but comfortable. They had a small garden where they kept sheep and chickens. Tawfiq could be found with the herd most days tending to their needs and helping the mothers raise their lambs.

Aisha and Tawfiq were lucky for a while before they became two of the 4 million displaced people in Yemen, but then about four years into the conflict, their home became unsafe. Their sheep began to die, and their farm was getting destroyed. Access to food and clean water, as well as income, became completely cut off. Almost worst of all, while comfort and even necessities for survival were gone, they were replaced with anxiety, day and night.

When the armed clashes encroached on their neighbourhood, Aisha and Tawfiq were not sure where they and their parents could go, but they knew that they needed security. They left their home by car and eventually made it to Heartha district also in their home governorate of Ta’iz. They built a small shelter with whatever materials they could find near some trees for shade and protection.

“Our life here is bad – much worse than our old one. We have needs and the money my husband makes with his motorcycle taxi is not enough. He wakes up every day to pick up people from one place to another and he earns only 2,000 YR (USD 3) per day. This shelter is not good enough to protect us from insects or the weather,” added Aisha, describing the hardship of their life in displacement.

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Meet Mohammed: “My disability never got my spirits down”

Perched on the edge of a desert in Yemen, Al-Anad camp is home to families who have fled the 6-year war. Conditions here are harsh and unforgiving. Mohammed, member of this community, changed things for the better when he joined the residents’ committee, an initiative funded by the EU. He lost a leg during the war, but that never stopped him. “I have to work to provide for my children. If I did not, they would perish.”

“When I first arrived,” Mohammed says, “they gave us a tent and we assembled it. It was a home for us.”

The father of 6 speaks quietly, sitting on a mattress with his family. That first tent has since been replaced by a wooden shelter. The view outside is of unbroken swathes of sand.

“There were so many problems,” he continues. “With the hardship, with the shelter, with finding a place to sleep.”

Building a life was not easy in Al-Anad camp, where there is little protection from the elements. There was no soil in which to plant anything and no obvious way to make a living. But Mohammed kept trying.

“When we first got here, I used to go out looking for work. I would get some vegetables and sell them in the market. My disability never got my spirits down.”

Mohammed lost his right leg during the war and uses a crutch. The sand surrounding the camp makes moving around a challenge. But, he says: “I have to work to provide for my children. If I did not, they would perish.”

Things started to change when he joined the residents’ committee, set up by the NRC with the support from the European Union. Mohammed was assigned to the maintenance team.

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Film: Yemen: 'Eid comes and we are sad' - displaced Taiz refugees on muted celebrations

Displaced refugees in the Taiz Governorate revealed their sadness over not being able to celebrate Eid traditionally. Millions have been forced to flee their homes due to the six year conflict that has devastated the country.

Many refugees compared life before moving to the camp with their current situation, describing on Thursday how they "don't have anything." The conflict has left millions in dire poverty after the cost of basic goods and fuel has sky rocketed, leaving many desperate.

One displaced refugee named Fatma Ali Abdullah said, "it is relatively calm as if there is no Eid today, just like most other days. The traditions and celebrations that we used to observe in our cities are non-existent on this camp. We cannot perform them because we do not have anything." =

(B H)

Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, 3 - 13 May 2021

Over 40,000 Yemenis have been affected by recent heavy rains and flooding across Yemen. Heavy rains continued to affect and displace thousands of Yemenis during the first week of May, particularly in Aden, Hadramaut, Hajjah, Lahj, Abyan,
Dhamar, and Marib governorates. The majority of those affected are internally displaced people (IDPs) who were already living in already precarious shelter conditions. During the reporting period, UNHCR has distributed core relief items to close to 1,500 displaced families (some 9,000 individuals), including those affected by the floods. All families received essential items including mattresses, blankets and jerricans, to meet their essential needs.
Clashes continue to be reported in Marib governorate. Last week, UNHCR assessed over 350 displaced families to identify their needs. Based on their identified vulnerabilities, UNHCR referred the families to receive protection assistance, including cash assistance and specialised protection services for vulnerable and at- risk children and survivors of violence. Some 60 displaced Yemenis in Marib received psychosocial support

(B H)

IOM Yemen | Rapid Displacement Tracking (RDT) - Reporting Period: 02 May To 08 May 2021

From 01 January 2021 to 08 May 2021, IOM Yemen DTM estimates that 5,497 households (HH) (32,982 Individuals) have experienced displacement at least once.

Between 02 May 2021 and 08 May 2021, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 262 households (1,572 individuals) displaced at least once. The highest number of displacements were seen in:

(* B H)

IOM Yemen: Ma’rib Response (11-27 April 2021)

Hostilities have persisted on a near daily basis in Ma’rib since a surge in clashes this February. The impact of the fighting on humanitarian needs has been most evident in the dire situation in Sirwah district. Here, IOM teams have recorded more than 2,560 households (HHs) becoming displaced from or within the district. A majority of these people were living in eight internally displaced person (IDP) hosting sites and have mostly moved to Al Sowayda and Alrawda sites still within Sirwah, with smaller numbers moving into nearby Ma’rib city and Ma’rib Al Wadi districts. The latter two districts have also received new arrivals from other areas in Ma’rib which are also being affected by fighting, such as Raghwan and Madghal districts. In total, some 2,871 IDP HHs (20,097 people) are estimated to have been displaced since February by fighting affecting different parts of the governorate; the number is likely much higher, with registration activities ongoing.

The sustained rate of displacement is concerning, and trends point to a worsening humanitarian and protection situation. Already, it is estimated that Ma’rib governorate hosts 1 million IDPs, and IOM teams working under the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) recorded over 20,000 new displacements (HHs) to or within the governorate in 2020 alone. A majority of these displacements were repeated, with IDPs having to move from one displacement site to another to flee hostilities. During the initial escalation of the conflict in Ma’rib from January to April 2020, more than 8,000 HHs were estimated to have been displaced. As of 25 April 2021, IOM estimates that 21,499 HHs (150,493 people) have been displaced in total since that time, across Ma’rib city, Ma’rib Al Wadi, Sirwah and Harib districts.

Today, displacement sites are being emptied as fighting gets closer to them. From February to April, IDPs moved from nine displacement sites in Sirwah (out of the 14 that were open at the start of the year). Incidents of armed violence are also impacting people at an unprecedented rate: in the first quarter of the year, the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP) has recorded 79 incidents of armed violence that have directly impacted civilians in Ma’rib governorate, resulting in 74 civilian casualties, including 18 fatalities (40 casualties were reported in March alone).

While needs are high and going unmet, as a result of ongoing conflict-related displacement, extreme weather is also affecting Ma’rib.

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

(B E P)

Photos: Forcing employees in various government sectors to go out in stances denouncing the coalition’s ban from entering oil derivatives, and when some tankers are allowed to enter, they do not go to the citizen, but to the yards of the Houthi supervisors and leaders Here are some special pictures of the black market monsters in some neighborhoods of Al Hudaydah, which have expanded remarkably.

(A P)

Photos: The other side of the Houthis is found in the liberated Khokha, the price per kilo of commercial electricity is 500 riyals, and in the pictures below are generators that were given by the Red Crescent to the local authority after the liberation of the city.

(A P)

Zakat in its banks What a humiliation of us, two months and build a villa

(A P)

Houthi leader kills cardiologist, his brother for opposing mosque sermon

A Houthi religious leader shot dead a cardiologist and his brother and wounded several others for denouncing his sermons at a mosque in the southern Yemeni province of Taiz, residents and officials reported on Monday.

Abdul Basit Al-Baher, a Yemeni army spokesman in Taiz city, told Arab News that Azit Al-Azi Abdul Nour opened fire at a gathering in Maqbanah district when a number of people took exception to his radical preaching.

Ahmed Al-Shameri, a cardiologist, and his brother Hamoud were killed in the shooting and others, including a child, were injured.

“The Houthi preacher angered locals after insulting the prophet’s companions and wives,” Al-Baher said.

(A P)

Millions of Yemenis rally in support of Palestine

Millions of Yemenis in the capital Sana’a and a number of provinces have on Monday staged mass rallies in support of Palestinian people and to condemn the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip.

In the mass rally in Sana’a, Mohammed al-Houthi said that the Palestinian resistance has overthrown the so-called “deal of the century” that the US was trying to impose on the world by declaring al-Quds (Jerusalem) as “the capital of the Jewish state.”

He affirmed that Yemen’s full readiness to support Palestine with their missile power, their air force, and various other types of military support.

and also



(A P)

Iran-backed Houthis imposed a ban on video & voice calls in the most popular mobile apps in #Yemen, FB's whatsApp, & messenger. Yemenis abroad used to reach out to their families at home (vice-versa) ,particularly during Eid holidays, but not anymore now, except throu VPN apps.

(A P)

Al-Houthi: Saudi Arabia Should Bomb Occupying Israeli Entity Instead of Yemen

and also

(A P)

Ansarullah Call for Protest to Support Palestine

and also

(A P)

Mohammed al-Houthi calls for united alliance with Saudi Arabia and UAE to liberate al-Aqsa

Member of the Supreme Political Council of Yemen, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, has called on Saudi Arabia and the UAE to stop the war on Yemen, accept a unification of forces and move to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque.

“I call on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and their alliance to accept the unification of forces in Ma’rib from the two parties in a parallel line, stop the battle and go all towards al-Aqsa,” al-Houthi tweeted on Twitter.

and also

(A P)

President Al-Mashat: Using Livelihood of Yemenis by US-Saudi Aggression Is War Crime

President Mahdi Al-Mashat has warned the countries involved in the US-Saudi aggression and the United Nations for disregarding the tragic humanitarian situation of the Yemeni people and the continuation of the suffocating siege for 7 years.

(A P)

Revolution leader affirms standing by Palestinian people, their resistance

The leader of the revolution Abdul-Malik al-Houthi has affirmed that the Yemeni people stand completely with the Palestinian people and their resistance.

In a brief televised speech on Tuesday, al-Houthi said the Yemeni people will remain in a state of readiness regarding all possibilities and developments.

"We will maintain continuous coordination with the brothers in the resistance movements in Palestine and the axis of resistance," he added.

"We are following with great interest the developments on the Palestinian arena following the escalation by the Israeli enemy and its targeting of Al-Aqsa Mosque and Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood", he said.

Al-Houthi praised the actions of the Palestinian people and their valiant resistance in response to the Israeli attacks.


(A P)

Yemen in Close Coordination with Anti-Israel Resistance Front

In the wake of Israel’s latest aggression against Palestinians, the leader of the revolution, Sayyed Abdulmalik Al-Houthi has voiced his nation’s full support for the oppressed Palestinian people in their struggles against the occupying entity, saying that the Yemenis are closely coordinating with the resistance axis over the latest developments.

and also

(A P)

Al-Mashat: Calls on Peoples of Arab and Islamic Nations to Support Palestinian Resistance

President Mahdi Al-Mashat called on the peoples of the Arab and Islamic nations to boycott American and Israeli goods and support the Palestinian resistance to restore its rights and liberate every inch of Palestine from the filth of Zionists.

and also

(A P)

Abdulsalam: Palestinian Resistance's Military, Missile Response Encouraged

The official spokesman for Ansarullah on Monday evening blessed the military and missile response operation of Palestinian resistance against the Zionist occupation.

and also

(* B P)

Ein junges Model in Jemen träumte von internationalen Laufstegen. Jetzt muss sie ihre Jungfräulichkeit beweisen

Die Huthi-Miliz in Jemen geht mit Folter und Vergewaltigungen gegen engagierte Frauen vor. Nun trifft ihr islamistischer Furor das Model Intisar al-Hammadi. Nach Monaten in Haft droht der 20-Jährigen ein Jungfräulichkeitstest.

Auf vielen Fotos, die das Model in sozialen Netzwerken teilte, trägt Hammadi traditionelle Kleider und ein Kopftuch. Allerdings liess sie sich auch mit offenem Haar, rotem Lippenstift, Lederjacke und einem Piercing in der Lippe ablichten. Im Dezember schrieb die schöne Frau mit den dunklen Locken und den grünen Augen auf Facebook: «Führe Krieg für deinen Traum.»

Doch womöglich hat Hammadi diesen Krieg nun vorzeitig verloren. Am 20. Februar wurde sie gemeinsam mit zwei Freundinnen an einem Checkpoint in der Hauptstadt Sanaa festgenommen. Während Wochen blieb Hammadi spurlos verschwunden. Erst Mitte April wurde bekannt, dass die von der proiranischen Huthi-Miliz kontrollierten Justizbehörden dem Model den Prozess machen wollen.

Gemäss Amnesty International wurde Hammadi mit verbundenen Augen verhört. Durch «physischen und verbalen Missbrauch» wie rassistische Beleidigungen sei sie zu Geständnissen gezwungen worden. Unter anderem würden ihr Drogenbesitz und Prostitution vorgeworfen. Das Wachpersonal im Gefängnis nenne sie «eine Hure». Wie «The National» berichtete, unterstellen die Behörden der jungen Frau zudem, an einer «wilden Party» teilgenommen zu haben.

Vor wenigen Tagen informierten die Huthi-Behörden Hammadis Anwalt, dass seine Mandantin bald einem Jungfräulichkeitstest unterzogen werden solle. Amnesty verurteilte dies scharf und forderte Hammadis sofortige Freilassung: «Erzwungene ‹Jungfräulichkeitstests› sind eine Form der sexuellen Gewalt und gelten unter Völkerrecht als Folter.»

Jemen ist eine konservative und patriarchale Stammesgesellschaft. Mit ihren Träumen wäre Hammadi wohl auch in Gebieten auf Widerstand gestossen, die nicht von den Huthi kontrolliert werden. Die Bewegung, die sich selbst Ansar Allah (die Unterstützter Gottes) nennt, will im Norden des Landes indes ein besonders rigoroses Sittenregime durchsetzen, um eine «Invasion der westlichen Kultur» zu verhindern und ihren «göttlichen Sieg» nicht zu gefährden.

Welches Exempel die Huthi mit Hammadi statuieren wollen, ist unklar. Das junge Model war keine politische Aktivistin. Womöglich reicht aber für die islamistischen Tugendwächter bereits ein Traum von einer internationalen Karriere als Fotomodell, um darin ein Verbrechen und eine Gefahr für die «jemenitische Identität» zu sehen.

(A P)

Yemen Applauds Palestinian Rocket Attacks Against Israeli Occupation

Yemen’s popular Anasrullah movement praised the rocket attacks by Palestinian resistance groups against Israeli-occupied territories in retaliation for the Tel Aviv regime’s raids on occupied Jerusalem Al-Quds and the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound.

cp6 Südjemen und Hadi-Regierung / Southern Yemen and Hadi-government

(A K P)

[Separatist] Security Belt Forces foil terrorist attack in Abyan

The Security Belt Forces managed on Monday, to thwart a terrorist attack launched by al-Qaeda militants on their headquarters in Lawdar district of Abyan governorate.

The terrorist attack did not cause any casualties or material damage, al-Naqib said, affirming that al Qaeda militants escaped from the heavy fire to their safe-havens in the military camps and locations under the control of the Islah Party's militias, the Yemeni arm of Muslim Brotherhood organization within Yemen's legitimacy.

(A P)

UAE-backed mercenaries in Yemen riot over lack of payment

The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) militias have on Sunday detained dozens of locomotives near the International Line in Abyan, in protest over the failure to pay their salaries.

Local sources said that the STC soldiers in Hassan area prevented locomotives from passing through the international line, because their salaries had been delayed for more than a year.

(A K P)

Infighting between mercenary forces rages in Aden

Violent clashes broke out between various UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) factions in the port city of Aden, local sources said on Monday.

The sources explained that clashes with light and medium weapons erupted between the so-called Security Belt and Al-Asifa forces, against the backdrop of a dispute on empty residential land areas in tje Bir Ahmed area in Al-Buraiqa District, resulting in the injury of two personnel.

(A H)

Three men killed in tribal vendetta in Shabwa

(A P)

Arab coalition worsens conditions is south Yemen: Southern separatist

The Saudi-led coalition has worsened the conditions is south Yemen, a leader in the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) tweeted on Saturday.
The Arab "coalition-fought war was evidently against the south," Abdurrahman al-Wali added, citing the failure of the Riyadh two deals and the armed clashes in Abyan.
"Aden was destroyed, and southern areas and entities were torn.. Mildness highly costs the people, and will be met with a coming uprising," he threatened without further details.

(A P)

Yemeni gov't: What happens in Palestine blatantly violates int'l laws

(A P)

STC condemns Israeli forces' storming of al-Aqsa

and also

(* B P)

Presidential Councils in Yemen: Exploring Past Attempts at Power Sharing and Possibilities for the Future


During the past six years of war, President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi has failed in administering the situation in Yemen on the military and political levels. For many Yemenis, Hadi, after spending much of the conflict in exile in Saudi Arabia, is viewed not as a legitimate president but as cover for the Saudi war in Yemen, given that the Saudi-led coalition regularly asserts that its intervention is entirely at the request of Hadi and the internationally recognized Yemeni government. This lack of legitimacy and authority has resulted in the proliferation of militia rule across Yemen – most notably the armed Houthi movement, but also groups supposedly allied with the Hadi government.

Still, an argument persists that Hadi, despite his failings, is indispensable as the last symbol of the legitimacy of the Yemeni state. This line of reasoning has its logic; Hadi assumed the presidency in a single-candidate election in 2012, held as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GGC) initiative to facilitate the transfer of power from former president Ali Abdullah Saleh in the aftermath of Yemen’s 2011 uprising. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015) recognized Hadi as Yemen’s legitimate president in the wake of the Houthi takeover of Sana’a. Therefore, the argument goes, dispensing with the Hadi presidency would throw the country into a constitutional crisis and open the door for the legitimization of militias that have managed to gain power in various parts of the country through force, a prospect that threatens further fragmentation and political chaos.

However, this line of reasoning crucially overlooks many devastating consequences that have resulted from Hadi’s unaccountable presidency, as well as the important fact that ending the war does not serve Hadi’s personal interests, as he would likely become dispensable in a post-conflict context. The presidential office, operating largely in exile since the war began, has become a hotbed of corruption. Meanwhile, Hadi’s efforts to marginalize southern rivals helped spawn the Southern Transitional Council, creating a massive fracture in the anti-Houthi camp.

Given that President Hadi has become an obstacle to peace and good governance, alternatives for achieving a more collaborative and accountable Yemeni government, and putting it on a stronger path politically, should be explored. One option in this regard is the formation of a presidential council; there is precedent in Yemen’s history for such a body, and the idea already has been discussed among negotiators as a potential solution for a transitional governance period post-conflict.

Now is an apt time to revive discussions surrounding a presidential council for several reasons. First, it represents a reasonable alternative for executive rule, rooted in Yemen’s modern history, in the event of Hadi’s sudden incapacitation or death to avoid a political crisis and uncertainty over succession. Second, a presidential council would install a collective mode of executive decision-making, preventing decisions from being taken by individuals, particularly important in regard to decisions that could serve narrow personal interests over the collective benefit for the country. Third, a more structured process for decision-making at the executive level would enhance transparency and provide openings for greater accountability.

It must be noted that this paper seeks only to explore how such a body could be formed on the internationally recognized government’s side. However, should such a presidential council prove successful and improve governance in the country, incorporating Houthi representation into the body is one possible avenue to consider in future peace talks.

To further explore the idea of a presidential council, it is useful to examine past executive councils in Yemen’s history, including their composition, strengths and weaknesses. This includes councils under four different presidents in the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) from 1962-1978, a ruling council in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) from 1969-1978 and, finally, a presidential council following unification in 1990. The fact that many of these councils were ultimately judged to be ineffective or overthrown by force makes such an examination more critical, in the hope that identifying past issues may help a potential future executive council avoid similar pitfalls.

Recommendations for a Future Presidential Council

Returning to the present, it is clear that any effort to form an executive council would face resistance politically. The biggest opposition within the current government would inevitably come from President Hadi and his allies, most notably the Islah party, one of the most powerful factions within the government camp. The two currently have an alliance of necessity. Hadi protects Islah from the United Arab Emirates’ hostile policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood and covers for the party’s tendency to consolidate power in areas under their control. Meanwhile, Hadi lacks a real support base given the fragmentation of the GPC, so Islah crucially provides him with popular support and media capabilities.

Thus, any initiative to form a more collaborative and accountable executive would inevitably require pressure to be exerted on Hadi. While the UN and other international stakeholders could push for such an outcome, this would run into messy issues related to state sovereignty. Therefore, there is only one actor capable of influencing Hadi’s calculus and behavior: Saudi Arabia.

As the main backer political and military backer of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, Saudi Arabia could inform Hadi that he will not receive any further support until he agrees to relinquish some of his authority to an executive council. The framing of such an initiative is crucial to assuage both Hadi and his allies. For instance, Islah, given its massive media and propaganda machine, would need to be given guarantees that it will remain a primary partner in power in Yemen.

An initiative to form a presidential council could be presented as a first step in a much-needed process of comprehensive governance reform in Yemen. There is already a recognized necessity to reactivate Yemen’s institutions, given that executive authority is the only branch of government still functioning – by Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen

My comment: A main problem for today’s Yemen is mentioned in the second sentence of the introduction: “For many Yemenis, Hadi, after spending much of the conflict in exile in Saudi Arabia, is viewed not as a legitimate president but as cover for the Saudi war in Yemen”. That’s it.

(A P)

Brotherhood militias take escapees' families hostage in Shabwa

(A P)

Yemeni southern leader released one week after abduction in Aden

A senior leader of the Southern Movement was released on Monday one week after he and his colleague were kidnapped in the Yemeni port city of Aden.
Security forces of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) released Ala'a al-Qauba, local sources said, while his abducted fellow Madram Abu Siraj is still unaccounted for.

(A P)

Kidnapped STC Official Released After 87 Days

Local sources told the press on Tuesday that the member of the STC's local leadership and head of the Information Department in Ataq district, Thabet Abdullah Al-Khalaifi who was abducted on February 14th 2021 by the Islah-linked special forces from the provincial capital has been released.

(A P)

The Hungarian tortured to death in Yemen went there to marry a local girl

Further details were revealed about the fate of György Koltai, who was abducted, tortured, and reportedly died due to the coronavirus infection in his cell. Blikk reached the head of a Yemeni human rights organisation that tried to put together the last weeks of the life of the Hungarian man.

After al-Hamidi saw that Koltai had returned to Yemen, he could not contact him. The reason for this was recently revealed when a local activist, Adel al-Husseini, told Twitter that a Hungarian man with Yemeni citizenship had been captured and practically tortured to death by the people of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which controlled the south of the country. Al-Hamidi and his organisation then began investigating the details.

(B K P)

Audio: Special Security Forces (Yemen)

The Special Security Forces (Arabic: Quwwatul Amn al-Khasah) (formerly known until 2013 as the Central Security Organization (Arabic: Quwwatul Amn al-Markazi) is a paramilitary force in Yemen under the control of the Minister of the Interior, and forms a key part of the Yemeni security establishment. The force was some 50,000 strong as of 2008, before the Yemeni Crisis began, and SSF units are equipped with a range of infantry weapons and armored personnel carriers. The force also has its own extrajudicial detention facilities.

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp7 – cp19

Vorige / Previous:

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-740 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-740: oder / or

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

07:00 18.05.2021
Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
Geschrieben von

Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
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Dietrich Klose