Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 751 - Yemen War Mosaic 751

Yemen Press Reader 751: 17. Juli 2021: Augen lügen nie – Ernährungssicherheit Januar bis März 2021 – Schlupflöcher im Riad-Abkommen verschärfen Spannungen im Jemen – Verstöße in Aden Juni 2021
Bei diesem Beitrag handelt es sich um ein Blog aus der Freitag-Community

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

... Staatsmachtphantasien können den Krieg im Jemen nicht lösen – Journalist Adel Al-Hasani vom STC inhaftiert und gefoltert – Steigende Preise und Jemens rivalisierende Zentralbanken –Differenzen zwischen den VAE und Saudi-Arabien werden weiter eskalieren – Britische Waffenverkäufe an das Saudi-Regime dreimal höher als bisher angenommen – Dokumente zeigen US-Druck auf frühere jemenitische Regierungen – und mehr

July 17, 2021: The eyes never lie –Food Security January to March 2021 – Loopholes in Riyadh Agreement exacerbate tensions in Yemen – Violations at Aden in June 2021 – Fantasies of state power cannot solve Yemen’s war – Journalist Adel Al-Hasani jailed and tortured by the STC – Prices soar and Yemen's rival central banks – Why the UAE-Saudi differences will continue to escalate – British arms sales to Saudi Arabian regime three times higher than previously thought – Documents show US pressure on previous Yemeni governments – and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2:

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp12b Sudan

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade

cp13b Söldner / Mercenaries

cp13c Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage

cp13d Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle

cp19 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification




(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

(* B H)

Explainer: The War in Yemen Explained in 3 minutes

(* B H)

Yemen Humanitarian Crisis

The humanitarian crisis in Yemen remains the worst in the world. Six years of intense conflict and severe economic decline, combined with recent famine and cholera has put 66 percent of the population – 20.7 million people – in need of some form of assistance. This dire situation has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

According to the UN, well over 200,000 people have been killed since 2015 by fighting, malnutrition, disease, and lack of basic services due to the war. More than 4 million people have been forced from their homes to seek shelter from disease and violence.

Women and children are already dying from malnutrition in Yemen, and the situation could grow far worse: 3.2 million people need treatment for acute malnutrition, including 2 million children under age 5. There are around 1.1 million malnourished pregnant and breast-feeding women, and more than 3.25 million women in Yemen are facing increased health and protection risks.

On top of this, there were 344,000 suspected cholera cases and 621 deaths in 2019. Of the total cases, 22 percent were children under age 5.

The war in Yemen is having a disproportionate impact on Yemeni women and girls, who are exposed to increased risk of violence, exploitation, and abuse while having a harder time accessing basic health care, including maternal and child health. Hunger and famine are a direct result of war and can only fully be eliminated by bringing the conflict to an end.

How to Help Yemen: What CARE is Doing

CARE is working tirelessly to reach those in need. While humanitarian agencies like CARE are reaching an unprecedented number of people, it is very difficult to operate in many areas of Yemen, particularly when trying to reach people trapped behind front lines or displaced from their homes.

(* B P)

Film: The Houthis: History

The Houthis rapid rise to dominate the scene in northern Yemen and the subsequent civil war in the country put them on international radar. Who really are they? Here we look into the history they claim and the history others have documented.

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

(** B H K P)

Yemen conflict – The eyes never lie

When the conflict in Yemen broke out, I wrongly assumed that it would only last a few months. Yet here we are, six years later.

Until you have lived in a warzone, you can’t really imagine what it’s like.

When you walk the streets, you are stalked by death. A stray bullet, sporadic fighting or unpredictable shelling. This is our normal.

I am not afraid of death. But I am afraid of what will happen to my five-year-old daughter if I depart this world. I live for her and I live to see the Yemen of old.

I’m writing these words because this year is a personal anniversary for me. It is 10 years since I joined the ICRC. A chance to reflect.

When I landed the job as a fresh-faced 23-year-old, I remember whispering to myself that life was finally smiling on me. I couldn’t have been more wrong.

Refusing to shop

When conflict broke out in earnest in March 2015, it was so hard to comprehend what was happening.

Neighbours and friends started abandoning their villages. People rushed to buy whatever food they could.

The country has been to the brink of famine several times since then. Even today, food shortages are acute and malnutrition rates are sky-high.

More than 16m people are ‘food insecure’. Insecure? I find this word strange. It hides the reality. Let me tell you what insecure looks like.

Women and children begging on the street for the smallest piece of bread.

Starving children with nothing on them but skin and bone. Food prices that have rocketed by 150%. This is the reality.

Sometimes I refuse to go shopping because I feel guilty buying food while others go hungry. I feel so helpless. The needs go beyond our capabilities.

My job means I have travelled to every corner of this beautiful country. It’s a privilege and I am lucky to have met so many people along the way.

The characters are different, but the stories are the same. I remember meeting an old lady undergoing treatment at one of the ICRC-supported cholera centres in Hodeida.

Two faces of Yemen

Desperate people make desperate decisions to survive. It starts with selling your possessions – jewelry, clothes, furniture. Then you sell your house, knowing that you’ll end up on the street.

This is what war does. It crushes you in every way and forces you to make heart-breaking decisions.

But only recently have we started paying more attention to the damage that it inflicts from a mental health perspective.

I’ve met so many people with deep psychological problems. You think that they must be strong people to have survived this far. Maybe. But mentally they suffer every day.

The sound of shelling and explosions is a constant source of torment. Families can’t afford to pay for medical treatment so they live with the mental scars.

I worry about the impact on future generations. Children have witnessed so much violence and destruction and there just isn’t the support in place to help them.

I’ve met children who refuse to go to school for fear of being targeted. Some have retreated into their shell, becoming very quiet and introverted.

Others have become desensitized to the violence. The long-term mental-health consequences are going to be severe.

This is Yemen today. But I remember a different Yemen – by Basheer Omar

(** B H)

Yemen | Food Security Quarterly Review - Q1 2021

Key drivers, beyond conflict and COVID-19

Exchange Rate: The rial depreciated to reach YER 921/USD1 at end of May, and further to YER 943/USD1 at end of June

Fuel imports: Decreased by 76 percent compared to the same period in 2020, and reached critically low levels during January-April 2021

Fuel prices: Prices of petrol and diesel increased by more than 100 percent, across Yemen

Food imports global food prices: Food imports during January-April reached 1.5 million mt, 66 percent higher than January-April 2020

Global food prices: Rapid and concerning increase in global food prices which increased by 31 percent in April 2020, compared to April 2021, reaching the highest level since 2014

Humanitarian assistance: Increased by 10 percent during Q1 2021, and further by 34 percent during Q2 2021 to nearly 289,338 mt

The cost of food (household purchasing capacity)

MFB in areas under IRG: Increased by 19 percent during January-April 2021, to reach another all-time peak of YER 8,755 at the end of April 2021

MFB in areas under Sana’a-based authorities: Started rising in March 2021, during which it increased by 10 percent (largest monthly increase in the north since October 2018), followed by 5 percent increase during April to reach YER 6,374

Essential food items with highest annual inflation rate in April 2021 Areas under IRG: Wheat flour, vegetable oil and red beans increased the most, by 63 percent, 81 percent and 61 percent respectively Areas under Sana’a-based authorities: Wheat flour and vegetable oil increased by 21 percent and 51 percent respectively

Household access to food, March 2021

Prevalence of inadequate access to food: Increased to 42 percent during March 2021, after having slightly decreased to 39 percent and 40 percent during January and February 2021, respectively

More than half of the governorates (13 governorates), had “very high” prevalence of inadequate food consumption during March 2021 (≥40 percent); the highest was recorded in Lahj (63 percent), Amran (59 percent), Shabwah and Ad Dali’ (57 percent), followed by Al Jawf and Raymah (56 percent)

Prevalence of poor access to food: Increased to around 20 percent or more in nine of the governorates. Prevalence was highest in Lahj (28 percent), Raymah (26 percent), Abyan (23 percent), Shabwah (22.5 percent), Al Jawf and Amran (21 percent)

Dietary diversity: The majority of households rely on cereals, fats and sugars for their food consumption. Households with poor food consumption consume pulses, proteins, fruits, dairy and vegetables less than once a week, for which prices increased

Food-based coping strategies: Nine out of every 10 households relied on food-based coping strategies during March. Nearly half of the households scored high rCSI value (>19) and have crossed the identified threshold for IPC 3+ phase classification

Access to food for the assisted population: Relatively stabilized during March in areas under IRG at 39 percent, it however worsened in areas under Sana’a-based authorities from 37 percent in January 2021 to 43 percent in March

(** A P)

Loopholes in Riyadh Agreement exacerbate tensions in Yemen

In a letter sent to the UN Security Council, the STC expressed its readiness for the internationalisation of the dispute with the Yemeni government.

A recent statement by the Yemeni official government’s team tasked with applying the Riyadh Agreement renewed tensions with the Southern Transitional Council (STC), amid indications the dispute could turn into an internationalised crisis in the absence of precise mechanisms that would compel the two sides to implement the agreement’s provisions.

“The STC is not committed to applying what was agreed to and is responsible for delaying the government’s return to the interim capital to resume its duties,” the team said in a statement carried by Riyadh-based Yemen’s news agency Saba.

“The team made responsible proposals paving the way for the government to return and safely, independently do its duties,” the team added. “But this has yet to be achieved, as the STC reneged agreement on halt of escalation and securing the government’s offices.”

Yemeni political sources told The Arab Weekly the dispute could be heading towards internationalisation. They noted that some permanent members of the UN Security Council have been examining the implementation of the agreement and threatening to impose sanctions on Yemen parties that seek to reignite the conflict.

Some Yemeni political players have reportedly been attempting to obstruct the Riyadh Agreement, which was signed in 2019 to end a political and military conflict between the Yemeni government and the STC.

In a letter sent this week to the Security Council, the STC said it was ready for the internationalisation of the dispute and the ensuing political repercussions.

Lenderking called on Tuesday for “ending the escalation in Marib and implementing the Riyadh Agreement to ensure the return of the government to Aden and improve the lives of Yemenis,” in a clear indication that the dispute between the STC and the government of President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi has been as detrimental as the conflict in Marib, where the Iran-backed Houthis have been attempting to gain key territory.

Observers say that the search for a solution outside the Riyadh Agreement proves that the problem lies within the agreement itself. The government and the STC, the observers note, have been dealing with the Riyadh Agreement as if it would never be implemented, with each party interpreting the provisions so as to serve its own vision and interests.

The statement of the Yemeni government’s team stressed on Tuesday its commitment “to the Saudi-sponsored understandings agreed with the STC team providing for cessation of all forms of military, security, political and media escalation and to requirements for the government to return to Aden.”

The past few days were marked by rising political tensions after the governor of Aden Ahmed Hamed Lamlas, who is with the STC, issued a package of decisions that include appointing officials in a number of service and economy sectors in the interim capital, Aden.

The governor’s move came in response to what the STC has consistently described as a “policy of collective punishment” adopted by some government officials against residents of southern areas. This “policy of collective punishment”, the STC says, aims at exerting pressure on it in the media and among people, holding it responsible for the economic and financial collapse that has exacerbated the suffering of Yemenis.

Media websites close to the Yemeni government leaked memos issued by Yemeni Prime Minister Maeen Abdul-Malik to the governor of Aden calling on him to rescind his most recent decisions that were described as “unconstitutional.”

This comes at a time when the STC is, in turn, accusing the government of ignoring the Riyadh Agreement and making civilian and military appointments in violation of the agreement’s provisions.

Official spokesman for the STC Ali al-Kathiri said that Tuesday’s statement did not represent the Yemeni power sharing government, in which the STC is represented, but that it was issued by a “party in the legitimacy camp.”

The Deputy Head of the Media Department in the Southern Transitional Council Mansour Saleh denied the existence of any escalation on the part of the STC, noting that “the reality confirms that there is no political desire for the return of the government, but rather there is a attempt to disrupt the process, reject obligations and harm citizens for the benefit of a political agenda.”

In a statement to The Arab Weekly, Saleh considered that the decisions of the governor of Aden fall within his powers and that they come “to save state institutions that have been subjected to systematic destruction for six years. These decisions are aimed at saving citizens and providing services to Yemenis.”

(** B P T)

Sam issues its report on the most prominent violations that occurred in the city of Aden during the month of June 2021

SAM Organization for Rights and Freedoms issued its report on the violations monitored by its team during the month of June of the year 2021, in the city of Aden, stressing that the city still suffers from serious consequences and multiple violations across several levels, due to security imbalances, and the failure to implement the Riyadh Agreement Between the legitimate government and the Transitional Council, calling on the international community to shoulder its legal and moral obligations and work to find a formula that restores security, ends security imbalances, and ends the terrible violations committed in the country .

The organization said that its report included documenting cases of killings and executions, in addition to arbitrary arrests and kidnappings that were distributed across several areas of the city of "Aden", holding the Transitional Council primarily responsible for the repeated attacks in the areas under its control .

The "Sam" that last month saw a number of abuses ranging from murders, assassinations, arbitrary arrest and Alachtvaoualksra, which became committed weekly that were not on a daily basis in the temporary capital of Aden, and the citizen is a victim or a soldier with security multiple titles .

Various Aden districts witnessed assassinations and killings under torture, for political reasons, including criminal revenge, which took place without knowing the killer or tracking him down and arresting him, and kidnappings of citizens took place as a kind of projection of force at this or that security agency, in addition to news of dozens of threats and prosecutions against activists. And the Islamists that local newspapers and websites talk about every day statements, in which they attacked each other and threatened more chaos in the city, in addition to the series of previous fighting events that took place in "Crater" and "Bir Fadl", in addition to the January 2018 events. And August 2019, which was among the military forces of the Transitional Council .

The city of "Sheikh Othman" lived in a state of bloodshed, fear and panic following the outbreak of clashes between the transitional military factions, using light and medium weapons in the middle of the city's crowded streets, leaving more (14) dead and more than (20) wounded, and destroying many citizens' properties. .

The human rights organization stated that the most noticeable thing this month is the continuation of the campaign of arrests and enforced disappearances, which amounted to (11) cases of arrest and kidnapping of political activists, preachers and imams of mosques, after they were arbitrarily arrested and on malicious charges, such as raiding and kidnapping supporters of the Islamic movement. This is a behavior that some of the leaders of the UAE-backed Transitional Council have been practicing. Among those leaders: "Saleh al-Sayed", commander of the newly appointed Fifth Brigade, along with leaders of battalions from the Anti-Terrorism Service led by "Yusran al-Maqtari" who is in the UAE, where these militias raid homes and tamper with them during arrests .

"Sam" indicated that her team monitored complaints from many families of victims of arrests and enforced disappearances in the city, about not knowing the whereabouts of their children's detention, since their abduction for nearly a year, without any interaction with them, which increases their grave concern and fears for the safety of their lives .

Reference is made here to the Southern Transitional Council's seizure of official media such as the "Yemeni News Agency Saba" in Aden, the expulsion of its employees, and its name replaced by "Aden News Agency", and the continuation of violations against media activists and journalists.

Incidents of mysterious disappearances have returned again, as this month (4) cases of disappearance were recorded in the city, including cases of a woman, a child, a soldier and a fisherman. Most of these kidnappings are politically motivated and some of them are motivated by money .

The most prominent murders and assassinations, Extrajudicial arrests and kidnappings, Mysterious disappearances


Finished "Sam"Its report, stressing the serious and alarming impact of the violations of the Transitional Council in Aden in particular and the parties to the conflict in general, on Yemeni civilians, and the extent to which they enjoy their basic rights, calling on the Yemeni parties to declare Yemen's supreme interest, and demanded the coalition countries to respect Yemen's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as the organization stressed the The need for the international community to assume its legal and moral responsibilities, foremost among which is protecting the rights and lives of Yemeni civilians from violations that take place through multiple parties, and working to find a consensual UN solution that guarantees a ceasefire and bans any country from interfering in Yemen’s internal affairs, and the formation of a UN committee to investigate the effects of the violations committed by the various forces in preparation for presenting them to a fair trial for the crimes committed against Yemenis, stressing that any political solution for Yemen must pass through legal methods by applying the rules of international law in all the violations that occurred, taking into account the submission of each party that contributed to the deterioration of the situationHumanitarian conditions in the country for trial.,10,A,c,1,69,71,4262,html

(** B P)

Fantasies of State Power Cannot Solve Yemen’s War

Since Yemen descended into chaos almost a decade ago, the UN and the international community have struggled to negotiate a political settlement to the war. Yet, despite the passage of multiple UN Security Council resolutions and the establishment of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen in 2012, there is precious little to show for these efforts. Yemen remains a country divided—not in half, but along a spider web of innumerable political and social fault lines. In 2020, the country had the second-highest number of people in food crisis in the world. Nearly a quarter of a million Yemenis have died because of the war.

It should come as no surprise that the ongoing international efforts at peace-building have yielded so few successes. The international community’s strategy for mediating an end to the complex war in Yemen is fundamentally misguided. It relies on the delusional belief that a single, strong unitary state could somehow be revived to rule a unified Yemen. In reality, power in Yemen is divided between a dizzying array of actors. Some, like the Houthis and the exiled government of the president, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, are pretenders to state power. Others function as hybrid or nonstate actors, some armed and some civilian. Just as all are part of the conflict, all are likely to be part of a future peace. The sooner the international community and its mediators dispense with their Westphalian fantasies of a resuscitated Yemeni state, the sooner they can understand the reality of Yemen’s conflict—and craft a way forward.

The idea that a Yemeni state could emerge from the ashes of the war and establish a monopoly over the use of force within its territory is based on several false assumptions. It fails to grasp the realities on the ground by overlooking the many nonstate armed actors that have evolved over the past six years, and which are now shaping local politics and the overall architecture of the conflict. Most of these groups not only operate entirely outside the control of the Yemeni government, but also compete with it. They have multiple local, sometimes fluid, agendas. Further, many of them operate with heavy influence from regional backers whose goals may not be aligned with the West’s aim of building a sovereign and functional national state in Yemen.

Recognizing and accepting Yemen’s fractured reality is critical for identifying alternative approaches that could support effective interventions to mitigate the war and to develop strategic and long-term policies to address regional security.

This report examines the array of nonstate armed groups that have emerged during the war—groups that are not included in the current UN-led negotiations in Yemen. In particular, the report looks at the main nonstate armed groups that were created by the United Arab Emirates in southern Yemen and on the country’s west coast. The analysis is based on interviews with eighty-two individuals, including twenty-four military and security officers, members of four armed groups, and dozens of local officials, political actors, tribal and community leaders, journalists, civil society leaders, and ordinary citizens. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, most interviews were conducted remotely. The author also consulted previous studies, including reports by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), news articles, and the social media feeds of armed group actors, political leaders, and activists. Most of the interviews cited in this report were conducted between 2019 and April 2021. However, the report also draws on the author’s twenty years of research in Yemen.

The Importance of Hybrid Groups

A detailed catalogue of the armed groups operating just within the Emirates’ sphere of influence in the anti-Houthi camp attests to the complexity of the distribution of power in Yemen. It also shows the difficulty of establishing unified central leadership in the country. An accounting of these groups points to a future in which governance will have to mediate bottom-up factionalism as well as top-down, national-level political competition.

These hybrid groups will continue to have power even if the Emirates reduces its involvement. Eroded state structures, a civil war that is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, and the strong presence of competing national and foreign powers will sustain these actors. With a rapidly growing war economy, they will continue to solidify their local power and can always act as spoilers even if they cannot supplant the state. Yemenis who want to govern will have to find a way to co-opt or win the loyalty of these groups—or else will find themselves indefinitely engaged in low-intensity warfare. International mediators, similarly, cannot resolve Yemen’s war if they only address the national-level players; those national actors are simply too disconnected from the real local distribution of power.

A power-sharing agreement between the Hadi government and the Houthis will not stitch Yemen back together or give birth to a functional national government that can hold sway over existing armed actors. Even if representatives from these forces are brought to the negotiating table, it is unlikely they will be integrated under a national umbrella organization: national actors are the target of too much mistrust and too many long-standing grievances. These groups will likely retain their arms to maintain their leverage for any future political bargains.

Nonstate armed actors are central to the conflict landscape, and the international community needs to reconstruct its understanding of this landscape accordingly. Hybrid groups can make or break peace-building efforts in Yemen.

Below, an overview of the trajectory of the war in Yemen shows how hybrid actors in the country proliferated—and how the on-the-ground reality has drifted far from the international community’s current framework for peace.

The Way Forward

The armed groups described in this report will likely continue to wield local power and compete with provincial and national governments, even if the Emirates reduces its involvement in Yemen. The groups’ emergence is the result of a combination of factors, including power struggles between actors at the national and subnational levels, competing perceptions of the social contract and shape of the Yemeni state, long-standing grievances, and a cycle of exclusion that the current UN-led peace negotiations have reinforced. As a result, Yemenis who want to govern will have to find a way to co-opt or win the loyalty of these armed groups—or else will find themselves indefinitely engaged in low-intensity warfare

The current circumstances are not conducive to reinstating a central government that can hold authority over all these armed groups. Attaining peace and building the state in Yemen will not be achieved through a political settlement between the Hadi government and the Houthis. In fact, such a settlement would likely cause more disintegration, as armed actors who feel left out resort to violent ways to assert themselves. The international community needs to think of realistic and practical ways to help Yemen—and be prepared to invest for the long term. To reverse the cycle of fragmentation, the question of hybrid actors must be addressed. If hybrid actors are not supervised, they may become predatory and evolve into a significant security problem.

As part of its support for the peace process, the international community should consider supporting interventions and programs targeting hybrid actors in a way that promotes their role in security provision. At the same time, interventions should develop mechanisms that link hybrid actors to civilian authorities and hold those actors accountable for their actions. This report offers the following suggestions: – by Nadwa Al-Dawsari

(** B P)

He Exposed The World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis. U.S. Partners Jailed And Tortured Him.

Journalist Adel Al-Hasani told HuffPost how the UAE and its allies in Yemen tried to silence him, and warned of further human rights violations.

Al-Hasani ultimately spent six months detained in the custody of the Southern Transitional Council, the U.S.-linked militia that has taken over southern Yemen amid the country’s ongoing civil war. The organization ― which receives American weapons and other support from one of Washington’s closest partners in the Middle East, the United Arab Emirates ― never fully explained why Al-Hasani was detained, and a local judge ultimately determined that he had to be released.

In Al-Hasani’s first interview since his release in March, he said he sees a clear reason for his six-month imprisonment: The group wanted to silence him.

As a reporter and fixer for international news outlets, Al-Hasani’s work has been vital to global awareness about the devastating humanitarian crisis in Yemen, where fighting has killed thousands of civilians and forced millions of people to live in famine-like conditions. He has contributed to groundbreaking stories, including work that has won an Emmy, and been nominated for an Oscar and a Peabody Award, while almost never receiving public credit for the work.

In the U.S., that reporting has sparked a furor over America’s role in Yemen’s suffering.

Al-Hasani helped CNN produce a 2019 package on illegal Saudi and UAE weapons transfers to extremist militants and other Yemeni partners that prompted a congressional uproar and a Pentagon investigation.

“Journalism in Yemen is being slaughtered from ear to ear,” he told HuffPost.

And it’s not just journalists who suffer ― it’s millions of people trapped in conflict who are losing their best hope of holding their rulers accountable.

Representatives of the UAE and the UAE-backed southern council repeatedly tried to bribe and bully Al-Hasani, he told HuffPost. Although he was released this spring, after HuffPost revealed his detention and the Biden administration pushed the UAE for his release, Al-Hasani still fears for his safety ― and for the fate of the country he has now fled.

A State Department spokesperson confirmed to HuffPost that the U.S. advocated for Al-Hasani’s release, the first time the agency has done so.

“Targeting journalists for doing their jobs is unacceptable,” the spokesperson wrote in an email. ”We will continue to advocate for the immediate release of anyone arbitrarily detained, including with partner governments like the UAE, and urge all parties to the Yemen conflict to respect human rights.”

If the Biden administration is serious about maintaining that standard ― and getting Yemen on a path to recovery ― U.S. officials will have to work to make America’s partners change course.

‘When My Father Came, He Didn’t Recognize Me’

Al-Hasani’s nightmare began on a Thursday that was busy, but not out of the ordinary. As he often did, he was using his contacts and expertise to help foreign journalists. Authorities in Yemen’s port city of Mokha had detained two French correspondents he was set to work with, and Al-Hasani set off to secure their release. He texted Saeed Al-Mahiri, an Emirati who works with southern Yemeni forces like the ruling militia in Mokha, to seek help.

Like many players in the war’s various factions, Al-Mahiri knew Al-Hasani and his work. He had even granted the reporter a rare interview in 2018. That night, Al-Hasani told him he was en route to his French colleagues. Al-Hasani believes the Emirati may have learned more about their reporting plans from UAE allies who had confiscated the French journalists’ phones. (Al-Mahiri did not respond to a request for comment on his involvement.)

Thirty minutes after the two men stopped messaging, Al-Hasani reached a checkpoint called Al-Alam, on the outskirts of Aden. He had negotiated his way through hundreds of checkpoints over years of reporting. But the rules had suddenly changed. The guards arrested him and took him to the nearby Dawfas checkpoint, run by a notorious southern council official named Hussein Halboub, who is identified in Yemeni media as the deputy commander of the post. Halboub told guards to move Al-Hasani from his car to a back room.

For three hours, they kicked and punched him while accusing him of murder and espionage. The interrogation only ended so Al-Hasani’s captors could move him to the next phase of his ordeal. They took him, blindfolded, to Beir Ahmed ― a makeshift jail where UAE officers have deployed sexual torture against detainees.

Bruised and terrified, Al-Hasani was left alone in a brightly lit room with a small window. He saw two pickup trucks pull up after about an hour; two men got out, one in the uniform of the UAE-backed southern forces and the other in a black jacket with a black scarf covering his face. It was an outfit Al-Hasani associated with al Qaeda, and it made him panic: Would he be transferred to the custody of one of the extremist militant groups known to work with America’s partners in Yemen? – by Akbar Shahid Ahmed

Remark: Perhaps I would have suffered this fate or worse when UAE-backed STC forces stopped & interrogated me in Aden around 2 months ago. Realizing that they will surely treat me like the enemy when finding out I'm journalist, I was lucky to get away, though they still confiscate my phone.

(** B E H P)

Prices soar as Yemen's rival central banks tussle away from the battlefield

Fighting may have reached a bloody stalemate but away from the north-south frontline a battle between rival central banks has splintered the currency and helped send prices soaring.

Spiralling inflation has compounded the misery in a country where most of the 29 million people rely on aid to stay alive.

Each side also has a central bank with opposing policies.

The Aden central bank, which has access to international financial markets, has increasingly turned to printing new currency notes to cover the government's deficit and pay public sector wages, especially those of security and military forces.

That has inevitably sparked criticism in the north, where only the increasingly tattered old riyal notes are accepted.

"Aden's central bank has signed contracts with private companies to print 5.32 trillion riyals over the last six years," said Hashim Ismail, governor of the central bank in the northern capital Sanaa. "We can fairly say that it is three times what Sanaa central bank printed in 60 years."


The result is that even Yemen's exchange rate is split. The rate for the new notes in Aden hit 1,000 riyals to the dollar this week. In Houthi-held Sanaa, the rate was about 600.

Aden central bank, which did not respond to several requests for comment, has sought to shore up the weakening currency by doubling interest rates last year and warning foreign exchange houses against exceeding the official exchange rate of 580 riyals.

The Aden government said on Tuesday it had "full confidence" that Saudi Arabia would intervene before the economy collapsed.

President Abd-Rabu Mansour Hadi, whose government was ousted from Sanaa by the Houthis in late 2014, moved the central bank to Aden in 2016. He accused the Houthis of squandering $4 billion of bank reserves on the war. The Houthis say the funds were used to finance food and medicine imports.

Rafat Al-Akhali a fellow of practice at Oxford's Blavatnik School of Government, said the northern exchange rate was kept artificially strong. "The exchange rate is maintained through suppressing demand and completely controlling supply," he said.

He said the government in the south "continues to use questionable processes in payment of public salaries with no clear payroll for military and security forces."

The IMF and the United Nations has tried since 2018 without success to reunite the central banks as part of wider stalled efforts to end the war.

Hadi's government accuses the Houthis of diverting port revenues from Hodeidah, the main entry for Yemen's commercial and aid flows. The Houthis want the coalition to lift the blockade before agreeing to any renewed peace talks.

With the Muslim holiday Eid al-Adha approaching in July, supermarkets in Aden have tried to lure customers in with offers on imported items. But many people cannot afford even basics.

"Our situation in Aden has deteriorated so much," said Oum Ahmed Nabeel, a government employee in the southern port city – by Reyam Mukhashaf and Abdulrahman Al-ansi =

and very similar:

(** B P)

Why the UAE-Saudi differences will continue to escalate

Saudi resentment against the UAE, its main ally, grows further from the Yemen war to OPEC differences. Abu Dhabi, however, continues to pursue a foreign policy that conflicts with Riyadh's.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia have long been considered as the leading states of the Middle East with Riyadh being the financial hub of the Arab world. But in the past few decades, the rise of the UAE as a commercial powerhouse began to change that equation.

Under Mohammed bin Zayed, Abu Dhabi is no longer a silent spectator of the Middle East's conflicts. Zayed has increased the country's involvement in various political conflicts from Egypt to Libya and Yemen, using its political and financial partners in the Western world to cement its influence across the Middle East. Lastly, the recent crisis in OPEC made it clear that the UAE will not operate under the shadow of Riyadh anymore, angering the Saudis.

While Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has initially appeared to follow his UAE counterpart’s guidance to bring a new approach to Saudi politics, Abu Dhabi’s increasing regional clout across the Middle East frustrates the ruling class in Riyadh, according to different sources.

“The crisis [between UAE and Saudi Arabia] is much bigger than OPEC,” says a Kuwaiti political figure, who is in regular contact with high-level Saudi officials including the high profile figures from Saudi's intelligence agency.

Referring to the recent clash between the two oil-rich Arab countries in OPEC over oil production levels and extending output cuts to the end of 2022, the source, who wished to remain anonymous, tells TRT World that the anti-Emirates anger in the Saudi capital is simmering. Based on his conversations with one of the top officials in the Saudi foreign ministry, he said: “Bigger things are coming".

The source added that the further deterioration of Saudi-UAE ties is inevitable.

“We believe there will be more actions.”

The tensions first began with the Yemen war, he explained.

“The first clash happened with the Yemen war. While the other part (UAE) controls some border areas and actually occupies some lands such as Socotra and Bab el Mandeb, Riyadh no longer has control over Yemen, not even one percent,” says the Kuwaiti source.

Socotra and Bab el Mandeb are strategically located islands. Socotra is located in the Gulf of Aden and Bab el Mandeb is located in the Red Sea between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.

The Saudis are still in Yemen “to protect their dignity because they can’t just leave,” the source views. On the other hand, the UAE controls every ship’s entrance to the Red Sea. “They do that because they have military bases in both Djibouti and Bab el Mandeb,” the source informs.

Bulent Aras, professor of international relations at the Qatar University, also sees the Yemen war as a crucial factor behind the worsening ties. After the Biden administration decided to end its engagement in Yemen, the UAE-Saudi alliance lost a critical backer, incrementally widening a trust gap between the two countries, the professor views.

UAE’s global influence

The Kuwaiti source also draws attention to an important competition between the two Gulf countries over gaining more influence across the Western world.

The UAE has “more control and more effects” over the Western world, developing better relations with China, than the Saudis, he says.

Riyadh’s recent reach to both Qatar and Turkey, the two regional allies, also became a deteriorating factor between the UAE and the Saudi kingdom, according to the source. “Riyadh is trying to get back relations with both Turkey and Qatar that made the other part [the UAE] very upset,” the source says.

Beyond all differences, the UAE has contacts with some countries in an effort “that may also affect the interior security of Riyadh”, says the source.

In return, Riyadh has launched its own political campaign across the Western world to stop some European countries like Germany and Italy arming the UAE, the source says – by Murat Sofuoglu

My remark: More in cp2.

(** B K P)

Großbritannien nutzte geheimes System, um Waffen an Saudi-Arabien zu verkaufen

Eine britische Organisation, die sich für die Beendigung des internationalen Waffenhandels einsetzt, hat bekannt gegeben, dass die britischen Waffenexporte nach Saudi-Arabien seit Beginn des Krieges im Jemen im Jahr 2015 dreimal so hoch waren wie bisher angenommen.

Die Kampagne gegen den Waffenhandel gab bekannt, die britische Regierung habe trotz glaubwürdiger Beweise für Kriegsverbrechen des Königreichs ein geheimes offenes Lizenzsystem verwendet, um weiterhin Waffen an Riad zu verkaufen.

Ihre Untersuchung ergab, dass Großbritanniens Betrieb des parallelen und weniger transparenten „offenen Lizenz“-Systems den Waffenherstellern ein offeneres grünes Licht gibt, um bestimmte Waffen ohne Geldgrenze an ein bestimmtes Land zu verkaufen.

Es stellte ferner fest, dass das Vereinigte Königreich zwischen 2014 und August 2019 eine offene Lizenz für Bomben und Luft-Boden-Raketen für Saudi-Arabien betrieben habe.

Die Forscher untersuchten auch die Konten von Unternehmen, von denen bekannt ist, dass sie Waffen an Saudi-Arabien verkauften, und stellten fest, dass der Umsatz des britischen multinationalen Waffenherstellers BAE Systems beispielsweise fast 17 Milliarden Pfund (23,5 US-Dollar) betrug.

Infolgedessen schätzen sie den realen Wert der Exporte auf fast 20 Milliarden Pfund (27 Milliarden USD).

„Die Verwendung offener Lizenzen bietet der Regierung auch einen bequemen Taschenspielertrick, wenn sie aufgrund von Ereignissen wie Kriegen, Militärputschen oder öffentlich gemachten Menschenrechtsverletzungen wegen Waffenverkäufen an ein bestimmtes Land unter Druck gerät“, warnt der Bericht.

Katie Fallon von Campaign Against Arms Trade, die die Untersuchung durchführte, erklärte: „Die Verwendung offener Lizenzen verbirgt das wahre Ausmaß des britischen Waffenhandels und macht es unmöglich zu wissen, welche Mengen an Waffen weltweit verkauft werden.“

Die Rüstungsindustrie findet zu einem großen Teil im Verborgenen statt, und so mögen es die Waffenhändler. Solange die weit verbreitete Verwendung von offenen Lizenzen andauert, werden die wahre Natur und das wahre Volumen des britischen Waffenhandels einer Überprüfung und damit einer sinnvollen Kontrolle verborgen bleiben“, sagte Fallon.

(** B K P)

British arms sales to Saudi Arabian regime three times higher than previously thought, investigation finds

Probe of secretive open licence system finds total sales since Yemen bombardment began is close £20 billion

Britain has exported around three times as much weaponry and military equipment to fuel Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen than previously thought, according to a groundbreaking new investigation.

The government’s official figures say ministers signed off £6.7 billion worth of arms sales to the autocracy such a bombs, missiles, and aircraft since the country started its bombardment of neighbouring Yemen in 2015.

But researchers drilling deeper into official records and those of arms manufacturers say the true figure is likely to be closer to £20 billion because the official numbers do not include sales conducted under an opaque "open licence" system.

The UK government boasts about having "one of the most robust and transparent export control regimes in the world" and publishes the value of arms exports approved under standard licences. It also details what kind of weapons were sold and who they were allowed to be sold to.

But the government also operates a parallel, less transparent "open licence" system which give a more open-ended green light to manufacturers to sell specific armaments to a specific country without a monetary limit.

Between 2014 and August 2019 the UK operated an open licence for bombs and air-to-surface missiles to Saudi Arabia, for a type repeatedly used in the war in Yemen.

Separately, equipment and components for use in the Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft, also used in the same bombardment, have been covered by an open licence.

The researchers also looked at the accounts of companies known to be selling arms to Saudi Arabia and found that the revenues to one company alone – BAE Systems – originating from the Saudi Ministry of Defence & Aviation, totalled nearly £17 billion over the relevant period.

As a result they estimate that the real value of exports is close to £20 billion.

"The use of open licences also offers the government a convenient sleight of hand when it comes under pressure over arms sales to a particular country due to events such as wars, military coups, or well-publicised human rights abuses," the report warns.

The Department for International Trade, which signs off all arms exports, did not dispute the findings of the study but said the UK "takes its export control responsibilities very seriously".

Katie Fallon of Campaign Against Arms Trade, which conducted the research, said: "The use of Open Licences covers up the real extent of the UK arms trade and makes it impossible to know what quantities of weapons are being sold around the world – by Jon Stone

and also

(** B P)

Jemen: Dokumente über US-Druck auf Ex-Regierung, Beziehungen zu Israel zu normalisieren, enthüllt

Das Innenministerium der jemenitischen Regierung der Nationalen Rettung hat eine Reihe vertraulicher Dokumente veröffentlicht, in denen der US-Druck auf die Regierung des ehemaligen jemenitischen Präsidenten Ali Abdullah Saleh beschrieben wird, um die Beziehungen zum israelischen Regime zu normalisieren und den Boykott von Produkten aufzuheben, die in den von diesem Regime besetzten Gebieten hergestellt werden.

Den Dokumenten zufolge hatte die US-Botschaft in Sanaa die damaligen jemenitischen Regierungsverantwortlichen aufgefordert, das Wirtschaftsembargo gegen israelische Waren zu beenden und sich nicht an Aktivitäten zu beteiligen, die als schädlich für das Regime von Tel Aviv gelten, berichtete die offizielle jemenitische Nachrichtenagentur Saba am Montag.

Diese Dokumente enthüllen die Unzufriedenheit Washingtons und Tel Avivs über den Warenboykott und die Unfähigkeit der damaligen jemenitischen Regierung, den Markt des arabischen Landes für die Unternehmen des israelischen Regimes und ihre Produkte zu öffnen.

Der ehemalige US-Botschafter im Jemen Thomas C. Krajeski hatte damals Salehs Regierung aufgefordert, Sanktionen gegen Unternehmen mit Verbindungen ersten, zweiten oder dritten Grades zu Israel aufzuheben, was von jemenitischer Seite nicht abgelehnt wurde.

Der damalige jemenitische Außenminister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi hatte später dem US-Botschafter gesagt, dass das sogenannte Embargo für US- und israelische Waren nicht wirklich durchgesetzt werde.

Aus den Dokumenten geht weiter hervor, dass die US-Botschaft das jemenitische Außenministerium aufgefordert hatte, keine Vertreter zur Teilnahme an einer anti-israelischen Veranstaltung an der Universität von Damaskus in Syrien zu entsenden.

Darüber hinaus hatte der amerikanische Diplomat die Aufhebung des Boykotts für israelische Waren durch den Jemen als grundlegende Voraussetzung für die Mitgliedschaft des arabischen Landes in der Welthandelsorganisation und seinen Zugang zu freiem Handel und internationalen Investitionen bezeichnet.

(** B P)

Newly released documents show US pressure on previous Yemeni governments to establish ties with “Israel”

The [Sanaa gov.] Yemeni Ministry of Information has on Sunday presented a number of official documents that reveal early American efforts to end the boycott of Israeli goods in Yemen.

The documents presented by the Ministry of Information revealed the US embassy’s request to the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime that ruled Yemen up until 2012, to end the economic boycott of Israeli products and to not to participate in anti-Israeli activities.

It also showed Israeli annoyance at the boycott of their goods in Yemen, while confirming that the majority of American companies have a relationship with the Zionist entity.

A document issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated May 9, 1993 showed that the US State Department carried out a campaign of pressure on the authority to open the country to the goods of the Zionist enemy and the companies associated with it.

The Foreign Ministry’s document showed that the Assistant Undersecretary of the US State Department at the time, called for a “reconsideration of the boycott policy imposed on American companies that have a relationship with Israel, since most of the important American companies have a strong relationship with Israel. The companies complain about the conditions imposed by the boycott, which calls for proving the absence of a relationship with Israel, adding that this is contrary to US laws and deprives Yemen of benefiting from the investments of these companies.”

The meeting minutes between Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi and the American ambassador in Sana’a,Thomas Krajeski, on Wednesday, June 1, 2005, shows that the US employed Saleh’s authority for lifting the Arab boycott system against the Zionist entity.

The document states that the American ambassador conveyed a direct American directive to the authority to take a clear position on the Arab boycott conference, which took place in the same month in the Syrian capital of Damascus.

The document stated: “The ambassador made it clear that the US sees the futility of the boycott and the need to lift it, not only boycott of the second and third degree but rather the boycott of the first degree for companies that do business with [Israel].”

The US ambassador said: “There is an increasing number of Arab countries that are working to violate the trade boycott system.”

The same document did not show significant opposition to the American pressures, with Saleh government officials mostly remarking that an official end to the boycott would be unnecessary. The Yemeni Foreign Minister at that time said that “the boycott system is fragile and there is no real boycott, as many Arab countries have

The documents include a memorandum classified under “Urgent” and issued by the US Embassy in Sana’a on the 4th of November 2007 and addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It stated a number of US directives to the former regime, chief among them: “Not to support or send representatives to the biannual boycott meeting held by the Arab League in the office of the Arab League in the Central District of Damascus.

The embassy memo stated: “The Arab boycott meeting not only represents an obstacle to peace in the Middle East, but also constitutes a barrier to participation in the global economy, attracting foreign investment, expanding trade, and improving relations with the United States and the international community. Yemen’s accession to the World Trade Organization requires that the government of the Republic of Yemen abandons its initial boycott of Israeli goods and services.”

The same document also reveals that the US administration was implementing a wide campaign of pressure targeting the Arab countries whose people adhere to the boycott. “The time has come for the Arab League to take a decision to close the central district office in Damascus.”

Yemen’s Ministry of Information published these documents to the public opinion as evidence of the American control imposed and enforced on Yemen prior to the September 21 Revolution of 2014

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

(A H)

Five new cases of COVID-19 reported in Lahj, Aden

In its statement, the committee said that no new cases of COVID-19 nor deaths have been recorded.
1,679 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(A H)

3 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 6,967 in total

The committee also reported the recovery of three coronavirus patients in al-Mahra. No death has been recorded.
1,282 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(A H P)

UNDP Yemen’s New Rapid Financing Facility Project Builds Community Resilience Against Future Crises

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has launched a new project aimed at supporting Yemen's national recovery from COVID-19 while building the resilience of local communities to respond more effectively to the on-going pandemic and future crises.\ \ The Rapid Financing Facility (RFF) is designed to catalyze UNDP's "COVID 2.0" offer - Beyond Recovery: Towards 2030 - through high-quality, high-impact initiatives in Hadramout's Seiyun district.

(A H)

3 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 6,964 in total

The committee also reported the recovery of four coronavirus patients in Marib. No death has been recorded.
1,388 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added

(A H)

9 new case of COVID-19 reported, 6,961 in total

The committee also reported the recovery of five coronavirus patients in Marib. No death has been recorded.
1,572 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(A H)

4 new cases of COVID-19 reported in Shabwa, Hadramout

The committee also reported the recovery of one coronavirus patient in Hadramout. No death has been recorded.
1,546 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(A H)

One new case of COVID-19 reported, 6,941 in total

The committee also reported the recovery of seven coronavirus patients. No death has been recorded.
1,267 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(* B H)

Over 4,000 new cases of malaria reported during sudden outbreak in Saudi-occupied Yemeni province

Thousands of Yemeni citizens have been infected with malaria since the beginning of this year, mostly in areas controlled by the Hadi government in Taiz province, southwest Yemen.

Health facilities in the province have recorded 4,000 confirmed and suspected cases of malaria, a media source said, quoting an official in the malaria control program in the province.

The area has already greatly suffered from the COVID-19 pandemic, which has claimed hundreds of lives.

(* B H)

Millionen Kinder verpassen wegen Pandemie Routineimpfungen

Wegen der Corona-Krise sind Millionen Kinder nicht oder ungenügend gegen andere Infektionskrankheiten geschützt.

Die Zahl der Kinder, die keine einzige Impfdosis gegen Krankheiten wie Diphtherie, Tetanus oder Keuchhusten erhielten, stieg 2020 weltweit um 3,5 Millionen auf mehr als 17 Millionen an, wie UN-Organisationen am Donnerstag in Genf berichteten. Außerdem wuchs die Zahl der verpassten Teilimpfungen.

Geld und Personal für solche Routineimpfungen seien vielerorts zur Bekämpfung der Pandemie eingesetzt worden, stellten das UN-Kinderhilfswerk Unicef und die Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) fest. = =

cp2 Allgemein / General

(* A K P)

Interactive Map of Yemen War

(* A K)

Daily Yemen War Map Updates

(* B K P)

Yemenis build siege-defying highway to safety

In Yemen's forbidding mountains, bulldozers paid for by local people are building a new road to serve as a lifeline between the besieged city of Taez and the southern capital Aden.

It is a much-needed alternative to a perilous route that has become virtually impassable, littered with axle-wrecking potholes, terrifying hairpin bends, sheer drops and carriageways so narrow that trucks struggle to proceed even in single file.

In the absence of any effective local authority, residents and businesspeople stepped in six months ago to raise cash to fund a new 182-kilometre (113-mile) alternative to the notoriously dangerous Hayjat al-Abed route.

Torrential rains that sparked a cascade of mud and rocks sounded the death knell for that road, which was the only route to Taez not controlled by the Iran-backed Huthis, who are locked in a six-year conflict with the government.

Under the control of the internationally recognised government but besieged by the Huthis since 2015, Taez, with a population of 600,000 people, is one of Yemen's most troubled cities, and it has been repeatedly bombed by the rebels.

The new road to Aden, the government's temporary capital after it was forced to flee Sanaa at the start of the war, will ease the Huthi siege, allowing in much-needed supplies of food and medicine and shortening the journey time to the south.

The new road, which snakes through the valleys, is much straighter and less cliff-hanging than the nail-biting route it replaces, and is due to open within weeks.

(* B P)

To End the Civil War in Yemen, the Local Dimension is the Key: An Interview with Maysaa Shuja al-Deen

The people of Yemen cannot attain peace without the political will of the STC, the Houthis, or whoever is there. Enhancing the local governance is a must because the local actors are more in touch with the real situation there.

  1. What is the current situation of the civil war in Yemen?

When we talk about Yemen today, we are not talking about one entity nor two entities, divided into south and north, as was the case before 1990. There are several entities in Yemen both in the south and north, and the biggest power in the north is the Houthis. They control a big part of the north of Yemen, which means that they have more than half of the population under their control.

In the north, there are also other powers such as the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Al-Islah party controlling Taiz and Ma’rib, the latter being a rich governorate, now besieged by the Houthis. On the western coast of the north, we have the military commander Tareq Saleh, the nephew of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh.

What is the picture of the south of Yemen?

We have an even more complicated picture in the south, given that there are more actors than in the north, such as the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC). STC is controlling the interim capital Aden and the western governorates Dhale and Lahj and parts of Abyan. Shabwah is a tribal governorate that is neighboring Ma’rib and is affiliated the president Hadi and Islah party has presence there. Coast of Hadhramaut is controlled by Hadhramaut elite which is supported by the UAE and affiliated the STC. Hadhramaut valley is still under the government forces control.

Al-Mahrah region is under the control of local powers. Alongside different local actors, there are also regional actors involved in Yemen, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE, who are not aligned and are not very willing to cooperate either.

How do you think it will be possible to bring the local dimension to the fore in these negotiations?

The U.S. is trying to reach a peace settlement between the Saudis and the Houthis. The idea is that the Houthis can have leverage over the Saudis because the latter represent a state; Saudi Arabia has interests in their relations with the U.S. and the rest of the world. However, this is not the case with the Houthis for many reasons. First, because they are not internationally recognized, and second, they do not have a meaningful economic or political relationship with the world, except with Iran. As a result, the U.S. sanctions applied against some Houthi individuals, such as banning them from traveling or freezing their bank accounts, don’t make any pressure on them as they don’t travel or have bank accounts outside of Yemen.

(* B K P)

Audio: War in Yemen Rages On

Kathy Kelly, American peace activist and author, talks to us about the ongoing war in Yemen, where, according to reports, British forces are on the ground in eastern Yemen, providing logistical support and training Saudi troops and Saudi-backed militias. We look at what this means for the outcome of the war and claims by Western countries, including the US, that they want to end support for the Saudi campaign. We also talk about the battle for the city of Marib, how the outcome of this battle will impact peace talks, and whether the U.S. could negotiate with a Houthi government.

(* B K P)

How the West is fuelling the war on Yemen?

As the war raged on and expanded, American arms manufacturers rubbed their hands in satisfaction waiting eagerly by the telephone.

Daily airstrikes by America’s top ally in West Asia means a requirement of weapons and everyone knows the last thing Saudi Arabia knows how to build is indigenous weapons. Saudi Arabia’s arms stockpile began to run dry and sure enough the calls were made.

Top American arms manufacturers such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Raytheon clinched the most impressive contracts but many other companies also sealed agreements. The majority of these deals were made during the era of former U.S. President Donald Trump, remember the American economy was doing “so great” once during the Trump era to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars worth of contracts with Riyadh, which also brought unemployment levels down in the United States. Saudi Arabia and its partner in crime, the United Arab Emirates became even more lucrative markets. The arms manufacturers made great profit and it was truly an exciting time for these firms. However, not so exciting for Yemeni civilians who were on the receiving end of these apparently ‘precision guided missiles’.

The bombs these companies were sending to the Saudis were being dropped by American made warplanes on vital Yemeni infrastructure in addition to Yemeni markets, hospitals, weddings, funerals, schools, even school buses packed with school kids were bombed; the list is endless. To make matters worse, the Saudis relied on the Americans on which targets to strike. The Pentagon set up a ‘command and control center’ (it was later revealed that the British used this as well) to tell the Saudis, which targets to stoke. Unless the Pentagon intentionally provided civilians targets to prolong the war, this is something that must be investigated, then American intelligence has serious issues.

In any case the bombing campaign was so indiscriminate that it sparked major alarm among International Organizations, the European Union and Human Rights Groups.

But remember, the war on Yemen, started during the Barack Obama era and continues today under the Joe Biden era. It is hard to imagine that all three administrations could not foresee a humanitarian disaster by supporting Riyadh. Yes, Biden says he will end American support for Saudi Arabia but the reality on the ground proves otherwise.

However, it was during the Trump era that Riyadh enjoyed increased support from Washington. Trump’s first trip abroad since taking office was to Riyadh, where Saudi officials did their best to seduce him. In Riyadh Trump announced around $110 billion dollars worth of arms to the Kingdom including dozens of F-15 warplanes, Apache attack helicopters, Patriot missile systems, hundreds of armored vehicles in addition to thousands of missiles and bombs. However, it is important to highlight here that these sales are widely believed to have already been approved by former President Obama.

This suggests no matter who is power at the White House, the deep state is the one calling the shots.

However, the U.S is not alone in selling arms to Saudi Arabia.

The United Kingdom has sold tens of billions of pounds worth of weapons. London has also played a serious role in training Saudi military forces. This is while the UK portrays itself globally as an advocate of the International Arms Trade Treaty.

(* B K pH)

About 44,000 civilians killed, injured by Saudi-led coalition in Yemen during 2,300 days: Statistic

The Humanity Eye Center for Rights and Development revealed, in a recent statistic, that about 43,891 Yemeni citizens were killed and injured during 2,300 days of the Saudi-led coalition’s war on Yemen.
According to the center’s statistic, the number of martyrs amounted to 17,176 citizens, while the number of wounded reached more than 26,715 citizens.
The statistic elaborated that the number of child martyrs reached 3,842 martyrs and more than 4,225 wounded, and the number of martyrs from women reached more than 2,400 and over 2,832 wounded, while the number of martyrs from civilian men reached 10,934 and more than 19,658 wounded.
With regard to infrastructure, in 2,300 days, the coalition destroyed 15 airports, 16 ports, 308 power stations and generators, 553 telecom stations and networks, 2,397 water tanks and networks, 1983 government facilities, and 5,224 roads and bridges.
As for the economic facilities, the coalition destroyed, within 2,300 days, 396 factories, 352 fuel tankers, 11,479 commercial facilities, and 423 chicken and livestock farms, in addition to the destruction of more than 7,945 means of transportation, 472 fishing boats, 931 food stores, 397 fuel stations, 685 markets and 858 food trucks.
During the same period, the coalition also destroyed 575,353 homes, 179 university facilities, 1,446 mosques, and 369 tourist facilities, 391 hospitals and medical centers, 1,110 schools and educational centers, 135 sports facilities, 248 archaeological sites, 49 media facilities, and 7,733 agricultural facilities.

and also

(* B P)

Yemen: 36 violations of press freedoms over the past 6 months

In Yemen violations against media, professionals continue, against the backdrop of a war that has raged for nearly seven years.

The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate has documented 36 cases of violations of media freedoms over the past six months.

In its biannual report on the state of media freedom in the country, the Syndicate states that “36 violations were recorded between the start of this year until the end of June, affecting journalists, photographers, and media groups.”

The report documents 12 instances of kidnapping, detention, prosecution, and harassment, 4 cases of threats and incitement against journalists, and 5 cases of physical attacks on journalists, press headquarters, and other private property.

The report also documented 18 cases of groups prohibiting coverage and confiscating newspapers, and 7 cases of journalists being trialled and prosecuted.

The report claims that Houthi forces committed 20 of the total violations, or 55%, whilst the government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi in its different forms committed 10, representing 28% of the total. The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council committed 6 of those violations, representing 17%.

and also

(B H K)

Film: ICRC: There are 50 active frontlines in Yemen

The head of the ICRC says the gap between the needs of the Yemeni population and the humanitarian and development response is widening. STORY-LINE: The president of the International Committee of the Red Cross on Monday said that the response of the authorities and the international community to the needs of the Yemeni people is insufficient. Peter Maurer said that there were almost 50 active frontlines in Yemen "to which we try to respond through the support of war surgery, through the support of internal displaced communities, through the support of basic livelihoods,"

(* B E P)

Im Öl-Streit zwischen Saudi-Arabien und den Emiraten geht es nicht um Öl

Die Opec ist gelähmt, es entstehen neue Fronten im Nahen Osten. Denn der Kern der Verhandlungen dreht sich um die Zeit nach dem Öl

Streit zwischen den beiden Ländern verhinderte vor einigen Tagen eine Einigung des Ölkartells Opec mit seinen Partnern auf eine Anhebung der Fördermenge. Zwar gibt es nun Hinweise auf einen Kompromiss, doch die Rivalität zwischen Saudi-Arabien und den Emiraten wird bleiben und neue Fronten im Nahen Osten schaffen: Auf der Suche nach einer Zukunft über das Ölzeitalter hinaus sind beide Länder zu Konkurrenten geworden.

Mohammed bin Salman, genannt MBS, und Mohammed bin Zayed – genannt MBZ – prägten in den vergangenen Jahren gemeinsam wichtige Entwicklungen in der Region.

Doch nun werden MBS und MBZ zu Rivalen. Die Emirate zogen sich 2019 aus dem Jemen-Krieg zurück und ließen die Saudis mit einem Konflikt sitzen, der militärisch nicht zu gewinnen ist. Anfang dieses Jahres setzte Saudi-Arabien eine Versöhnung der Golf-Staaten mit Katar durch, der sich die VAE nur widerwillig anschlossen. Die Emirate einigten sich mit Israel auf einen Friedensvertrag, während sich die saudische Regierung als Hüterin der heiligsten Stätten des Islam mit Rücksicht auf konservative Kräfte im eigenen Land zurückhielt.

In der Opec traten die Spannungen offen zutage.

Auch wenn es vor August doch noch eine Verständigung geben sollte: Der Streit ist Zeichen eines tieferen Zerwürfnisses zwischen MBS und MBZ. Der junge saudische Thronfolger weiß, dass sein Land bisher nur schlecht auf die Zeit nach dem Öl vorbereitet ist. Er will deshalb mehr High-Tech-Firmen, Touristen und Investoren anziehen, doch die VAE sind den Saudis dabei weit voraus: In den Glitzerstädten Abu Dhabi und Dubai finden Investoren sehr gute Geschäftsbedingungen, und Ausländer können einen westlichen Lebensstil führen, der in Saudi-Arabien unmöglich ist.

MBS will aufholen, auch wenn er damit MBZ auf die Pelle rückt.

(? B E P)

Zwei Kronprinzen auf Kollisionskurs

Der emiratische Kronprinz Mohammed bin Zayed galt als Mentor des saudischen Thronfolgers Mohammed bin Salman. Jemen, Israel und Katar vergifteten ihre Beziehung. Nun liefern sich die beiden einen Machtkampf um Erdölquoten, ausländische Firmen und Touristen (nur im Abo)


(B E P)

Was der Streit in der Golfregion für den Ölmarkt bedeutet

Lange zogen Saudi Arabien und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate an einem Strang, wenn es um die Ölförderung ging. Jetzt ist ihr Verhältnis allerdings angespannt – mit Folgen für den Ölmarkt und die Preise

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Personality and ambition potentially fuel divide among Gulf states

The Saudi-UAE rivalry and the ambitions of their leaders make it unlikely that the two crown princes will look at structural ways of managing differences.

Personality as well as the conflation of genuine national interest with personal ambition contribute to the widening gap between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

It was only a matter of time before Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman would want to come out on his own and no longer be seen as the protégé of his erstwhile mentor and Emirati counterpart, Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed.

By the same token, there was little doubt that the Saudi prince and probable next monarch would want to put to rest any suggestion that it was the UAE rather than the kingdom that called the shots in the Gulf as well as the wider Middle East.

To be sure, Prince Mohammed has been plotting the UAE’s positioning as a regional economic and geopolitical powerhouse for far longer than his Saudi counterpart. It is not for nothing that it earned the UAE the epitaph of “Little Sparta” in the words of former US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis.

No doubt, smarts count for a lot but in the ultimate analysis, the two crown princes appear to be exploiting windows of opportunity that exist as long as their most powerful rivals, Turkey and Iran, countries with far larger, highly educated populations, huge domestic markets, battle-hardened militaries, significant natural resources, and industrial bases, fail to get their act together.

In the meantime, separating the wheat from the chaff in the Gulf spat may be easier said than done. Gulf analyst Bader al-Saif notes that differences among Gulf states have emerged as a result of regime survival strategies that are driven by the need to gear up for a post-oil era.

The emergence of a more competitive landscape need not be all negative. Mr. Al-Saif warns, however, that “left unchecked…differences could snowball and negatively impact the neighbourhood.

Several factors complicate the management of these differences.

For one, the Saudi crown prince’s Vision 2030 plan for weening the kingdom off its dependence on the export of fossil fuel differs in principle little from the perspective put forward by the UAE and Qatar, two countries that have a substantial head start.

My remark: More in cp1

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

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YOC: 3 to 4 M barrels of Yemen's crude oil looted every month by aggression

Executive Director of the Yemeni Oil Company (YOC) Ammar Al-Adhruee confirmed 3 to 4 million barrels of Yemeni crude oil are looted every month by the aggression without knowing the deposit of their revenues.

In a protest sit-in for the YOC employees in front of the United Nations office in Sana’a, al-Adhruee said the forces of aggression are still holding 4 ships off the port of Jizan, including 2 petrol and diesel ships for public consumption, a diesel ship for Hodeida factories and electricity, and a gas ship.

He added the period of detention of the gasoline and diesel ships reached 431 days adding fines amounting to eight million and 620 thousand dollars."

Al-Adhruee said the looting of crude oil and liquefied gas by the aggression prevents the payment of salaries to employees.

In return, the YOC's employees denounced at the sit-in under the slogan “the weakness of the permits of the United Nations and Inspection Committee a witness to the level of bias and absurdity” of the international silence and the complicity of the international community and UN bodies and organizations with aggression in preventing the entry of oil der

and also

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[Hadi] Yemen gov't permits entry of oil tankers to Houthi-controlled Hodeidah port

Yemen's government has permitted the entry of a number of oil tankers to the Houthi-controlled Seaport of Hodeidah "in response to humanitarian needs", Foreign Minister Bin Mubarak said on Wednesday/Aden Alghad website

My comment: It’s against all regulations that it’s not the UN but the hadi government giving “permits” for ships reaching for Hodeidah.

(A P)

Houthis urge UN pressuring coalition to release oil tankers

The United Nations is responsible for Yemenis' suffering in Hodeida, chairman of the Houthi Supreme Political Council said Sunday, blaming the UN "failure to pressure the aggressive coalition, led by the US, into releasing gasoil tankers that were already cleared."

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

Siehe / Look at cp1

(B H)


The [2017 cholera] outbreak motivated Mona, 22, to start volunteering with CARE to help stop the spread of disease in the camp for displaced Yemenis where she and her family relocated after fleeing violence in Al Hudaydah governorate in 2016. Days after arriving, Mona’s father became sick and died.

In displacement camps, the lack of sewage systems and latrines often leave people with no options but to relieve themselves in the open. In addition, many people in the camp do not have access to clean cans when filling water from pumps, exposing them to potential infections or illness, such as cholera.

In response, Mona is working to promote hygiene practices in the camp, which is especially important now in helping curb the spread of COVID-19.

“Being a displaced person has always encouraged me to do something to help other displaced people,” Mona says. “I have always had a strong desire and determination to help both my family and my community.”

Due to six years of conflict, two thirds of people in Yemen are in need of humanitarian assistance, making it the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. An estimated 4 million people have been internally displaced like Mona and her family. Amid a pandemic, Yemenis are struggling to access proper water, sanitation, and hygiene, putting them at increased risk of COVID-19.

“I [am] constantly worried that my people would get infected with cholera, malaria, and the latest COVID-19,” Mona says.

With half of the country’s health clinics closed or partially functioning, Yemen’s health system is not adequately prepared to deal with COVID-19 outbreaks (photos)

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Q&A: Supporting community health care workers during conflict in Yemen

Yemen’s health care system has been hollowed out by years of conflict and is facing a large shortage of health care staff with only 10 health care workers per 10,000 people — well below the international standard of 41 HCWs per 10,000.

Conflict and violence pose a threat not only to HCWs’ physical safety, but also to the wider population by depriving millions of people access to basic health services and treatment, according to the Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition’s latest annual report.

Now, the COVID-19 pandemic has further stretched already overworked and underpaid HCWs. “They go to faraway areas and often have to walk more than two hours because of high transportation fees,” said Samah Mohsen, Save the Children’s health and nutrition program officer in Yemen, adding that their wage often isn’t enough to cover basic expenses such as travel to the communities they serve.

Devex spoke to Mohsen to learn more about the need for training more HCWs in the country, the importance of paying them a fair wage, and what it means to serve communities in conflict-affected areas.

This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Q: What were some of the biggest challenges facing community health workers in Yemen before the pandemic? And how have these changed given the added pressures of COVID-19?

A: The biggest challenge is that the ongoing conflict makes life very dangerous and exposes community health workers to numerous security risks.

Another challenge they face is unrealistic workloads due to the low numbers of trained and employed community health workers. They are expected to carry out numerous community-based tasks both for governmental- and nongovernmental organizations, and the payment and incentives are too low and do not match their responsibilities. Community health workers often have to cover their own expenses during daily work, such as transportation to faraway areas.

The ongoing conflict has exposed community health care workers to great risk on a day-to-day basis and they often feel unsafe. One of our community health workers told me that one day during her visit to a faraway area there were sudden armed clashes and she was trapped and very frightened. She even thought that she was going to die. On another occasion, she also had to protect herself from a pack of wild dogs when visiting a remote community.

Female community health workers also tell me that their pay is too low and that it isn't even enough to cover their basic costs such as transportation, which is expensive due to fuel shortages. They often need to take a male relative with them due to the culture and the traditions in their communities and for their personal protection. This has further cost implications as they need to cover the travel- and food expenses for an additional person. So you can be very sure that no community worker is doing her job for the money.

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Yemen WANTS Situation Overview, April - June 2021

The Yemen WASH Cluster (YWC) launched the WASH Needs Tracking System (WANTS) with the support of REACH to provide high quality WASH data and inform more effective programming and planning. The WANTS comprises a set of harmonized monitoring tools which, through partner data collection, provide updated information on WASH access and needs throughout Yemen.

This Situation Overview describes all YWC partner assessments carried out between April and June 2021

and for districts in Shabwah and Taiz provinces:

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USAID: Yemen - Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #6, Fiscal Year (FY) 2021

USAID/BHA partner WFP scales up food assistance across nine governorates in northern Yemen in June, reaching more than 11 million people per month with emergency food assistance countrywide.

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WFP Yemen Situation Report #6, June 2021

In the areas under the Sana’a-based authorities, the fuel crisis improved as the Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) announced that gasoline is available at their stations starting 11 June. In June, a total of four fuel vessels have completed the discharge of 88,687 mt of fuel at Al Hodeidah port, while a total of four vessels carrying 97,900 mt of fuel continue to be held in the Saudi-led Coalition (SLC) holding area. With the improvement of the fuel crisis, WFP’s operation previously reported three-four days delay at district level where fuel was not always available has now decreased to one-two days.

The WFP Food Security Update (June 2021) reviewed food security trends in Yemen, beyond conflict and COVID-19. More households were unable to consume their minimum food needs during 2021 compared to the previous years due to an increase in global food prices since May 2020, reduction in fuel imports, the surge in global food prices and the volatility of the exchange rate. As a result, the cost of the Minimum Food Basket (MFB) has increased remarkably during 2021. The average MFB cost in June reached YER 9,133/person/month in the areas under the IRG and 6,453/person/month in the areas under the Sana’a-based authorities compared to the average MFB cost in December 2020 of 7,497/person/month and 5,445/person/month, respectively.

(* B H P)

WFP Yemen Country Brief, June 2021

Operational Updates

Under the June cycle, WFP targeted 11.9 million people with general food assistance (GFA). Of these, 8.4 million people were targeted with in-kind food assistance, around 2.3 million people with food vouchers and over 1.2 million people with cash assistance.

In the southern areas, 4.2 million beneficiaries are to be biometrically registered. By the end of June, around 1.75 million beneficiaries have been biometrically registered in the areas under the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG). In November 2020, WFP launched biometric registration and the provision of cash through GFA in the areas under the Sana’a-based authorities. By the end of June, around 117,000 people have had their biodata digitized into SCOPE, and nearly 50,000 people were biometrically registered and were either enrolled or ready to be enrolled for cash assistance.

The military escalation in Ma’rib governorate, which started in February 2021, has led to a wave of displacement. By the end of June, 22,000 people are reported displaced, while numbers remain dynamic with high population movement reported in different parts of the governorate

The WFP Food Security Update (June 2021) reviewed food security trends in Yemen, beyond conflict and COVID-19. More households were unable to consume their minimum food needs during 2021, compared to the previous years due to an increase in global food prices since May 2020

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Amid conflict and poverty, Yemen’s hospitals are struggling

In the war-torn country, even the easily preventable and treatable medical issues are proving deadly.

The area’s remoteness and inaccessibility combined with active conflict, poverty, and a barely functional healthcare system mean that few of its inhabitants have access to the healthcare that they need.

“We are in what might be called a healthcare desert here,” said David Charo Kahindi, MSF’s project coordinator in Haydan. “There are very few health facilities and things seem to be getting worse. Our paediatric admissions have increased by 45 percent compared to the same four months last year, and overall we are seeing more serious patients coming to us: while the number of people coming to the ER is stable, we are admitting double the number of them than we were last year.”

The hospital treats relatively fewer patients wounded from the fighting itself: about 15 a month. Instead, much of the hospital’s activity focuses on the needs of mothers and their children. The team has assisted 176 deliveries and admitted 92 children to the wards on average per month so far this year. The children were mostly suffering from respiratory tract infections and diarrhoea, diseases often associated with poor living conditions. Only 40 percent of the mothers who deliver in the hospital have been able to access antenatal care, which means many complications go undetected until the mother goes into labour, just like Um Ayman.

“At the end of last year we opened an operating theatre in the hospital so that we would not have to refer people to Sa’ada City [a larger town some 70kms away],” explained Kahindi. “People here are already having to travel for many hours to get to Haydan, so now it is better that we can offer care for women who need caesarean sections or people need other types of general surgery without them having to travel even further.”

Travel has become harder in recent years as the price of fuel has increased and inflation has reduced people’s buying power.

“Without better access for humanitarian organisations in the area, more people like Um Ayman will suffer – and some will even die – from medical issues that are preventable and treatable,” said Kahindi. “That cannot be allowed to happen.”

(A H)

Adequate Housing Project to rehabilitate 600 homes in Aden launched

A consultation workshop marked the launch of “Adequate Housing Project” in partnership with the Saudi Development and Reconstruction Programme for Yemen (SDRPY), Alwaleed Philanthropies (AP) and UN-Habitat to rehabilitate 600 damaged houses for low-income families in the Yemeni city of Aden.

The project aims to contribute to a sustainable solution for the vulnerable families of IDPs and returnees in Aden city to improve living conditions and the social cohesion of displaced people, returnees and their host communities, in the priority districts of the governorate.

The project, expected to benefit over 4000 people, will also support 200 unemployed youth with vocational training. Some 1600 new jobs will be created during the implementation period in coordination with the Yemeni Government and local authorities, and in cooperation with civil society organizations.

(A H)

UNHCR’s Adha appeal rallies support for displaced families in Yemen

UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, has launched an appeal on the occasion of Eid Al Adha, to rally support from the public and private sector to ensure families have the necessary means to purchase food and other essential items through its cash assistance program.
The appeal seeks to raise funds during the first ten days of Dhul Hijjah in support of displaced Yemeni families, to help them afford food and clean water.
“It is unacceptable today that fathers, mothers, children and grandparents in Yemen are living in famine-like conditions, after enduring six years of war.
“We are working hard with our partners and generous donors to ensure that displaced families who are most in need are protected from malnutrition and hunger,” said Houssam Chahine, chief of private sector partnerships for the Middle East and North Africa at UNHCR.

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UNICEF cargo plane arrives at Sana'a airport

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Photos: 200 families received yesterday food aid baskets in Dar Salm area of Sanhan district of Sana'a governorate. Our distribution was funded by @monareliefye's fundraising campaign in Patreon with the support of Partners Relief and development.

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#Yemen: with the power of perseverance, armless Rahma Al-Saba'e and one-legged Mirvat Al-Nosari on Tuesday graduated from Business Administration Dept of Al-Watania University in #Taiz. Neither disabilities nor war has stopped them from achieving their dreams. They made our day (photos)

(* B H)

Yemen: Nine out of ten displaced children struggle to have food, water, schooling

With the ongoing violence in Yemen forcing children and their families from their homes, nine out of ten children in displacement camps don’t have sufficient access to basics like food, clean water and an education, Save the Children said today. The organisation called for full access to displaced communities, to improve services for children in the camps.

Children in the camps, around half of which are within five kilometres of a front line, often have to walk for hours to find safe drinking water and wood for cooking. Many of them have no option but to work in order to help with the family income.

With the conflict in Yemen in its seventh year, some 1.71 million children remain displaced in the country and cut off from basic services. Half a million of them have no access to formal education.

In 2020, an estimated 115,000 children were forced to flee their homes because of the escalating violence, mainly around Marib and the Hodeida, Hajjah and Taiz regions. In 2021 so far, around 25,000[3] children and their families had to leave their homes.

Xavier Joubert, Save the Children’s Country Director in Yemen, said:

“Children are the first to suffer the consequences of displacement, and are impacted most. The fighting, the floods that have destroyed shelters of thousands of people, the second wave of COVID-19 and poverty are forcing people to flee - many parents cannot afford even the basics for their children.”

“These boys and girls feel unsafe in their makeshift shelters, and often have to go through the day on an empty stomach. For 523,000 displaced children this also means they can’t go to class. Every day without education chips away from their future.”

Elham*, 22, is a volunteer teacher of Save the Children who lives and works at the same camp.

“The situation is very difficult for women and girls here in the camp. Just going to the bathroom at night is a challenge. They are far from our tents, there is no light on the street and many men are hanging around. We don’t feel safe. We have to gather into groups of three or take a male relative just to go to the toilet,” she says.

“Children are dropping out of school because they have to work to support their families. Several days ago, a 10 year-old boy got electrocuted while he was working. He is still in the hospital fighting for his life.

Save the Children is calling on all parties to the conflict to immediately cease all attacks against civilians and civilian objects, including schools and hospitals, and respect International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in their conduct of hostilities. We also urge donors to increase their financial and diplomatic support to children and their families in Yemen.

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Yemen Joint Market Monitoring Initiative: June 2021 Situation Overview

The JMMI tracks all components of the WASH and Food Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) as well as other food and non-food items. In light of the current COVID-19 pandemic, REACH has adapted the JMMI to begin assessing the potential impact of the pandemic on markets and on respondents' businesses.

(* B H P)

The Journey from Hajjah to Sana’a

At 8:30 a.m., the bus left the main street and went onto Sana’a Road, then headed to the Hodeidah Road. Before arriving at Nassiriya, we were stopped a post at Al Ma’abour village in Abs district: a qat tax collection point. The attendants asked us to get out of the bus and searched it for hidden qat for 15 minutes. They were disappointed when they found nothing.

We continued towards Sana’a and reached the Ain Ali check point (30 km from the centre of Hajjah District). Here, we were stopped for an hour to answer questions from armed members: “Where are you going? What do you have with you? Where are your ID cards?” We told them that we were going to Sana’a for treatment. They asked for evidence, so I showed them my medical reports. But they didn’t stop there; they asked us how many days we needed to stay in Sana’a. We told them it will take ten days. After putting our names on a piece of paper, they let us continue our journey.

When we reached the Sharis district checkpoint in Hajjah province, the gunmen there conducted through the same interrogation process before they let us continue our journey.

Next we passed through the areas of Bani Mawhab, Kuhlan and Affar and arrived at Amran province at 11:00 a.m. There, every point we passed searched us and asked us questions.

It was about 3 p.m. when we arrived at our hotel in Sana’a. It had taken us about seven hours to cross the 111 kilometers from Hajjah to Sana’a, which under normal circumstances took no more than three hours by car.

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Bahjah, a mother of 8 from #Hajjah, #Yemen, told Oxfam: “My husband is very old to work, and I am sick. We had no choice but to send our children to ask people for food or collect leftovers from restaurants. Even the food they managed to collect was not enough.”

Eleven Yemenis are dying of hunger every minute from war, Covid and climate change - Whatever all sides, internal & regional, are fighting for is not worth these innocent lives. Enough already!

(* B H)

Yemen Food Security Outlook, June 2021 to January 2022

Conflict and poor macroeconomics conditions are expected to continue to drive significantly below-average access to typical sources of food and income throughout the projection period. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist at the area level even in the presence of large-scale humanitarian assistance, with worst-affected households expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes. Although not the most likely scenario, Famine (IPC Phase 5) would be possible if there is a significant shock to commercial food import levels or if food supply is otherwise cut off from particular areas for a prolonged period.

According to key informants, all future rounds of Yemen’s letter of credit (LOC) import financing mechanism have been put on hold due to insufficient government revenue, depletion of Saudi financial support, and the rapidly depreciating local currency. Though currency is typically issued to traders quarterly, the most recent LOC distribution occurred in January 2021. As a result, traders have been accessing foreign currency at increased costs, likely contributing to more rapid food price increases via increased costs of importing both food and fuel. This is driving further reductions in household purchasing power due to the expected inability of most households to expand income-earning. As of the last week of May 2021, the cost of the minimum food basket at the national level was 20 percent higher than the already significantly above-average levels recorded at the beginning of January 2021. Further price increases are expected throughout the projection period.

In highland areas, harvesting of winter cereals has recently concluded and summer cereal cultivation is nearing conclusion. The late onset of the first rainy season and high input prices have likely reduced area cultivated under summer cereals.

(* B H)

Saudi blockade of Sana’a Airport caused near total collapse of medicine import into Yemen

The Director of the Supreme Authority for Medicines confirmed that the closure of Sana’a International Airport by the Saudi-US aggressors has caused medicine imports to Yemen to be cut off.

Dr. Mohammed Al-Ghaili said in a statement that the closure of Sana’a airport resulted in an end to the entry of medicines that require special and quick transport conditions, of which a large percentage are used to treat chronic and critical diseases.

Furthermore, the head of the inventory department at the Supreme Authority for Medicines, Dr. Ibrahim Yahya, explained that the continuation of the US blockade on Yemen is “causing a health disaster that amounts to a crime against humanity.”

He added that the import of medicines in Yemen until the end of 2020 decreased to just 40% of before, while the average need increased by 200% and in some areas by 500% for special medication.

He pointed out that the blockade halted the activity of 82 importers, resulting in the lack of over 1,329 medicinal brands. No fewer than 16 foreign pharmaceutical companies were suspended, causing a further lack of 556 medicinal brands.

(B H)

Photo: A nurse in Yemen's interim capital #Aden has offered one of her kidneys for sale to pay off debt and support her family. Nemah has worked for Basuhaib military hospital and has not received her salary for months, wrote Amal Ayash, a reporter who circulated the photo on Monday.

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Film: More than 6 years of violence in Yemen has made water a luxury.

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Film: #Education disrupted for millions of children in #Yemen. Six years of war, chronic poverty, destroyed schools and #COVID19 can do that. Watch our video to learn more on how education was derailed by the pandemic

(B H)

Solar Power Improves Yemeni farmers' Life: FAO

The sustained fuel crisis across the country has affected thousands of farmers who depend on groundwater for irrigating using fuel operated pumps. FAO, in partnership with the European Union, is supporting farmers by providing them with solar-powered pumps, water-saving drip irrigation kits along with training on improved farming practices.


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Aden and Mukalla: Yemen’s Seaside Havens

UNDP’s Crisis Support for Solid Waste, Water Supply and Sewage Institutions in Aden and Mukalla Cities Project aims to help the water and cleaning management institutions to improve the delivery of essential services, scale up their efficiency and fight off avoidable diseases.

The relative stability experienced in Aden Governorate and the city of Mukalla in Hadramout has attracted tens of thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs). But the influx of people has increased pressure on already struggling and stretched institutions, particularly the Cleaning and Improvement Funds and the Water Corporations. Unable to fully fulfill their intended roles, the institutions make do with aged equipment, limited supplies, and a lack of technical capacity. However, with increased trash in the streets and decreased access to clean water, the city streets in Aden and Mukalla had become less safe, and the risk of disease and injury more probable.

In 2019, the UNDP’s Assessing the Impact of War in Yemen on Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals highlighted the grave developmental loses amassed by Yemen’s conflict, with more than two decades of development reversed in infrastructure, institutional and technical capacities. This included the destruction or degradation of formal institutions like the Cleaning Funds and Water Corporations in Aden and Mukalla. So the Government of Japan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have stepped in to preserve, restore, and build critical infrastructure and support vital government and public institutions in these areas (photos)

(B H)

UNOCHA: Yemen Humanitarian Update - Issue 6 / June 2021

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Anxiety About Traveling from Mocha to Sana’a

After the war, the road became longer and the route changed. I have often been worried about starting the journey and enduring it until I reach my destination. With the passage of time, these journeys have become increasingly long, severe and strenuous.

After the partial lifting of the siege of Taiz in August 2016, the route changed. The journey from Mocha to Taiz took seven hours, half of it on very uneven and arduous terrain, and the other half on a road which was asphalt in name only. Large chunks of the asphalt have eroded, and in many places, large patches of the road reveal unpaved gaps. Most of the flood bridges and drainage pipes have been destroyed, either by the explosives used by Ansar Allah (Houthis) or by aircraft missile strikes launched by the Saudi/UAE-led coalition.

The two parties have not repaired this destruction, leaving the people to find their own solutions to cross over these demolished areas to sustain their lives. Sometimes people bypass them, and sometimes they fill them with rocks and earth, which exacerbates the risks during torrential rain seasons.

After the hardship of the seven hours travel to reach Taiz, one has to spend 10 to 18 long hours to reach Al-Hawban (which is situated in the same city), three to four hours of which are through the narrow and rugged Al-Aqroudh road. This road is the alternate to the road that we used to take that allowed us to travel through the downtown part of the city in only 15 minutes. (For more on the suffering of the Al-Aqroudh road, read the blog Taiz: How 10 km has turned into 62 km.)

(A H)

QRCS supports health facilities in three Yemeni governorates

In partnership with Qatar Fund for Development and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS) has launched a project to provide comprehensive health care services for the vulnerable in Yemen.

It involves supporting 10 health facilities in the governorates of Sanaa, Taiz, and Al-Hudaydah, as well as the Khalifa Hospital in Al-Turbah, a town of Taiz.

(A H)

@monarelief received today an amount of €3600 as a fund sent by our great partners in Poland @SzkolydlaPokoju. The fund will be used to purchase 100 food aid baskets to be distributed to the most vulnerable families in Sana'a governorate soon.

(B H)

Film: #Education disrupted for millions of children in #Yemen. Six years of war, chronic poverty, destroyed schools and #COVID19 can do that. Watch our video to learn more on how education was derailed by the pandemic

(A H)

Second batch of stranded Yemenis in India arrive Aden

The second batch of 153 of Yemenis stranded in India arrived at Aden Airport on Saturday, the state news agency Saba reported.

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Yemen: Health Cluster Achievements (Jan - May 2021)

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Islamic Relief Yemen 2020

(* B H)

WFP Yemen Food Security Update, July 2021

If this link does not work, try via

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

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A fire ravaged 36 homes in the district of Al-Durayhimi in Yemen's western province of Hudaydah this evening, mostly of internally displaced families. The cause of the fire is still unknown. The Houthi militants have repeatedly launched indiscriminate attacks in the area.



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Houthis have re-displaced more 1400 civilians from Beidha governorate after capturing it back from southern paramilitary forces. The families are now stranded in Yafe'a area to the south/Almashehad Alkhaleeji


(A H K pS)

800 families withdrew from alZahir in Baydha after Houthis regained control of the district

referring to

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Displaced children in #Yemen like Emtinan from #Yemen struggle the most to access #education. More than 2,500 schools have been damaged, used as shelter or occupied by armed groups. Watch the video to learn more

(B H)

Film: Al Sha'ab Camp's Displaced People Endure Dire Humanitarian Conditions

In light of the dire humanitarian conditions and the acute food insecurity, displaced people's agony in the Al Sha'ab camp grew more than ever.

(B H)

Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, 9 July 2021

During the reporting period, UNHCR assisted over 130 newly displaced families (some 780 individuals) in Marib, Al Hudaydah, Taizz and Al Dhale’e governorates with basic shelter and non-food items. Families received mattresses, blankets, jerricans to help them cook, sleep, wash and clean. An additional 40 newly displaced families received emergency food assistance as well as hygiene and dignity kits in Abyan, Al Dhale’e, Taizz and Marib. Moreover,
UNCHR distributed 674 Tehama Emergency Shelter Kits in Al Garrahi and 21 in Al Mansouri districts in Al Hudaydah.

UNHCR-supported Community Centres across Yemen continue to provide recreational activities for children affected by ongoing hostilities.

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

(A P)

Mothers of abductees call to save their sons amidst severe heat wave.

In Alhudaydah, Abductees’ Mothers Association held a protesting assembly to demand the international community to save their abducted and forcibly disappeared sons while the governorate was witnessing scorching temperatures reaching 50°C.

Mothers declared that their sons were facing unbearable conditions at prisons and detention centers which lacked the most basic needs, such as ventilation and water. Thus, their medical conditions had worsened, especially those suffering asthma and shortness of breath, and contagious skin diseases spread.

During the rally, Abductees’ Mothers Association stated that the association had documented the imprisonment of 100 abductees and forcibly disappeared persons in Alhudaydah, 89 of whom were held by Houthi armed group and 11 held by the resistance combined forces at the west coast. For many years, abductees had been held at official and secret detention centers. Currently, some of them had been held inside shipping containers despite the horrible heat wave. They had been deprived of all their rights and their case had been ignored by all international human rights organizations and negotiating parties.

The rally statement demanded the international community to mount the needed pressure and take the necessary actions to release the abductees, and arbitrarily arrested and forcibly disappeared persons from the inhuman prisons, and provide the proper medical care.

(A P)

Shops and businesses closed across al-Hazm, the Houthi-controlled provincial capital of Al-Jawf, yesterday as part of a general strike over a new steep hike in electricity prices by Iran-backed Houthis (photos)

(A P)

A Houthi senior militant arrests and forcibly disappears three young men for deserting from the militia's warfronts/Khabar

(A P)

SAC confirms situation of Safer calls for action, holds United Nations responsibility

]Sanaa gov.] Safer agreement committee (SAC) stressed on Thursday that the status of the Safer Reservoir calls for urgent and serious action to avoid a potential disaster as time no longer allows for procrastination.

In a statement, the committee said it would like to clarify that the statement issued on June 1st which indicated that the United Nations office submitted an action plan in violation of the urgent maintenance agreement and comprehensive evaluation of Safer Floating Tank and deleted most of the maintenance work stipulated in the agreement, and it turned the evaluation work into mere visual inspection work that is not based on any criteria, a meeting was held at the request of the UNOPS, during which its pledged to present an alternative plan in line with the agreement and gave it a deadline for this purpose.

The Committee noted that it was surprised that UNOPS had handed it over the new plan, which included the same previous non-conformity plan with only a document date has been changed.

and also


(A P)

Fears of environmental disaster in Red Sea grow as UN-Houthis talks on Safer tanker fail

The UN will continue talks with Iran-backed Houthi rebels until they agree to allow its experts to begin a vital assessment of the floating oil tanker Safer, and also urged the rebels to be more cooperative.

“We are continuing our efforts to send a team to the FSO Safer,” UN spokesman Farhan Haq told Arab News, adding that the primary goal of the UN salvage expedition was to assess the damage and conduct “light” maintenance to prevent the tanker from crumbling.

“This is what we said a month ago about this: ‘The United Nations is committed to its planned mission to assess the Safer oil tanker, conduct light feasible repairs to reduce the risk of a spill and formulate evidence-based recommendations for a permanent solution.”


(A P)

Houthis use decaying FSO Safer as political card: [Hadi gov.] Yemeni official

Tawfik Alsharjabi told Saba that the Houthi militia's "recurrent rejection of UN proposals" to maintain the rusting giant ship "shows that they use the floating oil storage facility as a tool for political extortion" against the Yemeni government and the world.
He said the militia are totally "indifferent to the dangerous environmental and humanitarian consequences that will affect seven million people and the ecological system"

(A P)

Houthis say have sovereign decision, military capabilities away from foreign guardianship

The Ansar Allah group, the Houthis, on Tuesday said it has the distinction to draw policies and make sovereign decision away from foreign hegemony and guardianship.

We have military, tactical, mobilisation, training and armament capabilities with which we are gaining the upper hand in the fight and serving the interests of the people independently, the group's defence minister Mohammed Al-Atifi said in a statement carried by the Sanaa-based Saba news agency.

We are standing on the threshold of a critical stage whose impact will transcend what the aggressors imagine in their miscalculation, he said, threatening to make the member states of the Saudi-led coalition pay a heavy price in case they continued their arrogance in Yemen. He urged them to learn from the past lessons.


(A K P)

Yemeni Minister of Defence: Our new military capabilities will shock the invaders

Yemen’s Minister of Defence, Major General Mohammad al-Atifi, has said that Yemen has a new military strategy to keep up with the overall national and regional developments.

In a statement to Saba news Agency, al-Atifi affirmed that in the seventh year of aggression, “the Republic of Yemen possesses capabilities that have been achieved in a short time, defensively, offensively and at various tactical, training and armament levels.”

(A K P)

Saudi-led aggression must accept defeat, leave Yemen

Saying that the war in Yemen is no longer in the control of aggressors, the Yemeni Defense Minister said that the aggressors have no way but to accept defeat and withdraw.

Saying that Yemeni forces have a new military strategy that is in line with the developments in this country, Yemeni Minister of Defense Major General Muhammad Nasser Al-Atifi added that Yemen enjoys defense equipment at various levels such as training, weapons, and tactics.

The management of this historic and crucial war is no longer in the control of aggressors, and the Yemeni revolutionary commanders and leaders have the upper hand, the Major General said.

The aggressors have no way but to accept defeat and withdraw, he said.

(A P T)

Houthis are faking an Al-Qaeda film in Sana'a now: Activists

Yemen's Houthi militants are shooting a film in Sana'a to falsely represent Al-Qaeda in another part of the country in a bid by the Houthi militia to show themselves as fighting with Al-Qaeda, instead the government forces, activists have said.

"The terrorist Houthi militia are shooting videos in the valley and mountains of Baqlan somewhere between Bani Matar and Bilad Al-Roos districts [in Sana'a] showing gunmen in Al-Qaeda and ISIS's typical dress with arms in their possession to make it appear like a clip by Al-Qaeda in [the central Yemen province of ] Al Beidha. Please share," said Eslam Al-Azab a pro-government activist in a Facebook post. Other activists posted similar warnings.


(A P)

elements wearing the "al-Qaeda, ISIS" uniform and the ISIS flag. In preparation for its publication in the coming days in the province of #Al-Bayda as true.


(A P)

[Hadi] Government warns of Houthi attempt to disseminate fabricated videotapes of AQAP in Yemen

Yemen's internationally recognised government on Tuesday said the Houthi group is filming scenes in Sanaa province in an attempt to fabricate that they are of militants fighting it in Bayda province.

Local sources in Sanaa said the Iran-backed Houthi militia filmed scenes in the Baqlan valley and mountains between Bani Matar and Bilad Ar Rus districts of armed elements pretending to be Al-Qaeda and SIS to disseminate that those are militants fighting alongside the government forces in Bayda, the Minister of Information, Culture and Tourism Muammar Al-Eryani said in a statement on Twitter.

This comes days after the militia fabricated a statement by al-Qaeda to mislead the international community and the Yemeni public opinion about the background of the the government forces currently fighting it in Bayda, and to cover up the coordination between the militia and Al-Qaeda with Iranian support, he said.

(A P)

Sana'a based prosecution is summoning Khalil al-Omari, al-Manar TV correspondent in Yemen, for "conspiracy with a foreign state". Al-Omari had accused the spy agency of routing int'l calls to bypass int'l rates.

referring to

(A P)

Hundreds of thousands attend public funeral of famous Yemeni Mufti Mohammed al-Amrani

Hundreds of thousands of Yemenis have participated in the public funeral and Farewell for the senior Islamic scholar and cleric Mohammed Ismail al-Amrani, in the capital Sana’a on Monday.

Mohammed Al-Amrani died at the age of 100, after his health deteriorated over the past months.

The scholar, who had been serving for a long time as Mufti of Yemen and was considered a major Islamic cleric both inside and far beyond Yemen, had suffered from a medical condition at the end of last month and was hospitalised (film; photos)



(A P)

Revolution leader offers condolences on death of scholar Mohammed al-Amrani

(A P)

Iran-backed Houthis detained Yemeni journalist Fahed al-Rahabi today for reporting on storming the wedding hall and kidnapping the groom and singers yesterday in #Yemen’s northern Amran city.


(A P)

Films: 5 Hours ago Iran-backed Houthis militia stormed a wedding ceremony in Amran city, north #Yemen, and detained the bridegroom "Mukhtar al-Swudi" and singers, local residents told me.

(A P)

Senior Houthi makes serious statement: We don't know who is ruling us.'

Houthi senior militant in Sana'a Sultan al-Samiee makes a serious statement regarding government of the Houthi militia controlled territories of Yemen saying 'we don't know who is ruling us.' /Almashehad Alkhaleeji webite

(A P)

Three Houthi militants physically eliminate their brother in law Ahmed Rajeh in Dhamar in a shooting fire on him and cutting his legs/ Almashehad Alkhaleeji

(A E P)

Houthi proposal replacing banknotes with coins in group-held areas

Member of the Houthi Supreme Political Council on Thursday asked the Sana'a-based Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) to use coins in place of banknotes, in an attempt to tackle cash scarcity and damage.
The currently used banknote of 1,000 Yrs could be replaced with a coin of 100 rials, 500-Yr note with a 50-Yr coin, 250-Yr note with a 25-Yr coin, 100-Yr note with a 10-Yr coin and 50-Yr banknote with a 5-Yr coin, Mohamed Ali al-Houthi added in instructions sent to CBY.
"This is a simple, available, feasible, imperishable option and a temporary solution to face the aggression's tampering with money and to cope with cash scarcity," he tweeted.
Heavy shortage of banknotes forced Houthi-run CBY to recirculate worn bills.
But some Yemeni observers see the Houthi proposal inapplicable, citing the unavailability of 25, 50 and 100-Yr-worth coins and scarcity of the existing ones.

(A P)

Yemeni parliament may revoke membership of members suspected of treason

Yemeni Parliament has reviewed the request submitted by some of its members regarding dropping the membership of members who violated the constitution and committed crimes of high treason.

In its session on Saturday, headed by Parliament Speaker Yahya Ali Al-Ra’i, the Parliament pointed to the constitutional and statutory texts regarding the crimes and violations committed by those members. It includes those related to membership revocation for their perpetrating crimes detailed in particular in Article 193 of the bylaws of parliament, which is solely concerned with deciding on the request for revocation of membership, as well as the text of Article 195.

The Parliament members who signed the request demanded the completion of constitutional and legal procedures meant to terminate the membership of those members in parliament.

They affirmed that it has been proven through the movements and statements of these members through various media that they have evaded performing their constitutional duties and abandoned the tasks they swore to fulfill.

Based on the implementation of those constitutional and regulatory texts regarding the acts, crimes and grave breaches committed by those members, the parliament subsequently voted by a majority to revoke the membership of those members.


(A P)

Houthi group revokes memberships of 39 pro-government MPs

Members of the Yemeni Parliament controlled by the Houthi group in Sanaa on Saturday revoked the memberships of 39 parliamentarians loyal to the internationally recognised government.

Independent MP Ahmed Saif Hashid said in a statement on Twitter the majority of the members voted for the revocations and that some abstained.

He criticised the vote saying it was against the constitution and conducted without quorum.


(A P)

Only in Yemen, around 25 illegitimate Houthi MPs, who weren't elected by the last popular parliamentary vote in 2004, dismissed 39 elected MPs, mostly from GPC and north #Yemen, under the pretext of supporting the govt & Saudi-led coalition. Last yr they expelled 44 MPS too


(A P)

The Houthi militia in Sana'a are seeking to usurp the houses and assets of 39 pro-government MPs./Alharf 28 website


(A P)

[Hadi] Yemeni gov't dismisses Houthi dismembering 39 MPs as offensive move

(A P)

Dozens of forcibly disappeared people in Hodeidah are cooped up in metal containers despite blistering summer heat, a human rights league has said/Yemen Monitor

(A P)

Security forces thwart smuggling of 10 deer to Saudi Arabia

(A P)

The main Houthi militant manning Khawlan Street checkpoint in Sana'a shot dead young man Jamil Sharyan after he refused to pay an extortion, informed sources said. / Voice of Freedom website

(A P)

The Association of the Mothers of the Hostages in Houthi jail stage a rally and appeal to the international community to secure the release of their relatives in Hodeidah./Alsahwa Net

(A P)

Eryani condemns Houthi encroachment on Dhamar public stadium

A member of the Houthi militia controlling parts of northwest Yemen seized half the Stadium of Dhaafn City claiming the property on which the stadium is built belongs to his forefathers.

The militant known as Al-Awami has already started laying designs and building constructions in the stadium.

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp6 – cp19

Vorige / Previous:

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-750 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-750: oder / or

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

07:04 17.07.2021
Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
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Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
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Dietrich Klose