Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 753 - Yemen War Mosaic 753

Yemen Press Reader 753: 31. Juli 2021: Was treibt saudische Luftangriffe im Jemen an? – Saudische Luftangriffe im Juli 2021 – Dschihadistische Militanz und Huthi-Aufstände im Jemen – ...
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Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

... Saudische Beziehungen zur jemenitischen Islah-Partei – Die Besetzung Sokotras durch die Emirate hat weitreichende Auswirkungen – Schüren europäische Waffen weltweit Kriege und Konflikte? – und mehr

July 31. 2021: What Drives Saudi Airstrikes in Yemen? – Saudi air raids in July 2021 – Jihadi militancy and Houthi insurgency in Yemen – Saudi Relations with Yemen’s Islah Party – UAE Occupation of Socotra Has Far-Reaching Implications – Are European arms fuelling wars and conflicts worldwide? – and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2:

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade

cp13b Söldner / Mercenaries

cp13c Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage

cp13d Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp17a Kriegsereignisse: Schlacht um Marib / Theater of War: Marib battle

cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle

cp19 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification




(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

(** B K P)

What Drives Saudi Airstrikes in Yemen? An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamics of Coalition Airstrikes, Houthi Attacks, and the Oil Market


Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has led a foreign military intervention against the Houthi movement, which took over major parts of Yemen. The intervention, which manifests mainly in airstrikes, has attracted widespread controversy in media and politics as well as a large body of (qualitative) academic literature discussing its background and ways to escape it. Complementary to these efforts and connecting to the literature on oil and conflict, this study provides unique quantitative insights into what drives the extent of military interaction. We use a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to analyse the interactions between Saudi airstrikes in Yemen, gains of the Houthi movement on Yemeni ground, their attacks on Saudi Arabian soil, and crude oil prices. Our approach builds on high-resolution data from the Yemen Data Project and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project. Our results show not only that the airstrike campaign has been factually impotent to repulse the Houthi movement but also that the movement’s expansion in Yemen has not driven Saudi airstrikes. These findings draw both suitability and justification of the intervention further into question. Moreover, although the data fail to show that oil price levels drive the developments, our model identifies oil price volatility as a determinant for the airstrikes. However, the intervention has, in turn, no significant effect on oil markets. Besides adding to the academic discourse on oil and conflict, our results have implications for energy and climate policy: a coordinated transition might not deteriorate regional security, while uncertainty and fluctuations can increase conflict potential.

In his letter requesting military assistance from the GCC, Yemeni transition president Hadi expressed his concerns of Yemen being “dragged into a war that will consume everything”. After more than five years, and despite numerous peace initiatives and ceasefires, an end to Yemen’s all-consuming war is out of sight.

Therefore, our article has taken on the challenge to provide first numerical insight into the war’s dynamics and, in particular, the question of whether the coalition airstrike campaign has been driven by and effective against the rising Houthi movement in Yemen. To this end, after a thorough discussion of the conflict’s background and the reasons for Saudi Arabian military engagement discussed in the literature, we have used a VAR model to assess the interplay of Saudi Arabian airstrikes, Houthi attacks inside and outside of Yemen, and oil market developments.

Our findings have clearly and robustly shown that the extent Saudi Arabian military engagement has neither been driven by efforts to save Yemen, nor that it has been successful in deterring the Houthi movement from holding their grip on Yemen; an increase in Houthi attacks on Yemen does not produce an increase in airstrikes, and Saudi airstrikes do not cause a significant reaction from Houthi attacks inside Yemen. Instead, coalition airstrikes on Yemen both cause and react to Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabian territory. Thus, and as a bottom line, the military intervention is self-reinforcing, unsuitable for changing the situation inside Yemen, and unresponsive to its official purpose. Instead, our results have proven that oil market volatility exacerbates the airstrike campaign. While—contrary to what might be expected from the literature on oil and conflict—there was no evidence of oil price levels affecting the airstrike campaign, their volatility causes a prolonged increase in the number of strikes.

We are aware that other drivers may not be considered due to the empirical setup, which forces us to restrict their numbers. Nevertheless, we have included the most central conflict variables, and the oil price proxies a wide range of global/Saudi economic indicators. Moreover, in this article, we have given ample proof for our results’ robustness, which extends to alternative measures and alternative model specifications.

With this, our article provides a substantial contribution to the academic and political discourse on the Yemen conflict as well as the literature on the nexus between conflict and oil prices. Regarding the latter, our results show that oil does not only play a role in the onset of conflict, but it even affects the dynamics and extent of war. These findings offer new research perspectives towards a generalisation of the results and a theoretical elaboration of the role of oil price volatility in conflict behaviour. Moreover, these insights provide guidance for global climate policy, which is going to decrease oil prices. On this point, our results suggest that decreasing prices themselves do not necessarily threaten regional stability, but that climate 22 policy needs to ensure a certain and smooth transition to prevent conflict. This result is in line with other studies (e.g. Ansari & Holz, 2019) emphasising that the energy transition itself is not bound to cause systematic agitation, but that uncertainty needs to be the primary concern.

While our research approach is not suitable for verifying the exact underlying political and behavioural mechanisms, it has provided robust, empirical insight into the conflict’s dynamics. On this point, we are convinced that our research has significant implications for discourse and policy. Our findings clearly show that the military intervention has been unsuccessful; it has proven unable to suppress the Houthi movement, and there is no evidence that the movement’s grasp on the country—the official reason for the intervention—affects the airstrike campaign. Instead, our analysis has shown that the airstrike campaign reacts to attacks on Saudi Arabian soil and oil price volatility. Although the former may constitute a legitimate case of territorial defence, the shape and the timing of the airstrike response we found in the data suggest that retaliation, legitimacy-seeking, and increased risk-taking behaviour play major roles. This is corroborated by oil price volatility driving the military strikes, a factor that could not be further from the intervention’s official target and instead connects to the abovementioned behavioural themes. Therefore, we are convinced the results should draw the intervention and arms exports to the region further into question and increase international scrutiny – by Dawud Ansari, Mariza Montes de Oca, Helen Schlüter a

Full document:

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Civilian Casualties at Record Half-Year Low

Lowest number of civilian casualties recorded in a six month period in first half of 2021

In the first half of 2021, Yemen Data Project recorded the lowest number of civilian casualties in air raids for a six month period since the Saudi-led bombing began in 2015, continuing the trend in falling civilian casualty rates seen since the second half of 2017.
The rate of air raids also reduced in the first half of the year. 2020 saw an 82% increase in air raids from 2019. By contrast, 2021 first-half air raid rates declined by almost a third from 1,088 in the same period last year to 741 - 2% higher than the first six months of 2019.
Despite the falling numbers, air raids in the month of June increased by 44% month-on-month to 133 from 92 in
May. Farms, a civilian vehicle, and residential areas in Marib and Hajja were amongst the targets hit in June. One civilian was killed and two more injured in the bombing of a residential area in the Midi district of Hajja on 29 June.
Airstrikes in Sirwah continue record highs
In June, the frontline district of Sirwah - the most heavily bombed district in Yemen over the last six years - saw the highest rate of monthly bombings (39) in four years. The continued focus of bombings in the Marib district reflect the intensified violence on the ground, instigated by an ongoing
Houthi military offensive launched earlier this year in the governorate. YDP recorded up to 372 individual air strikes* in Sirwah - an average of more than 12 individual strikes per day in June.
Marib has been the mostly heavily bombed governorate for more than a year - in keeping with the
military confrontations. In June there were more than twice as many air raids in Marib than in the second most heavily bombed governorate of Sa'ada.

The highest number of air raids recorded in a single month remains September 2015 at 920, which was also the deadliest month in the air war when at least 756 civilians were killed.
April 2015 saw the highest number of civilian casualties (fatalities and injured) in a single month at 1,745.
In YDP's data the air raid* figure is the most conservative. The true number of individual airstrikes ranges from the
minimum of 23,226 to a maximum airstrikes of 66,034 since March 2015.

In June 16% of bombings hit civilian targets** and 22% hit military targets. In 62% of air raids in June the target could not be identified. Of the 50 air raids where the target could be identified, 58% of bombings hit military targets. 42% of identifiable targets were civilian.

Of the 34 air raids where the target was identified in April 2021

16 hit residential areas, killing 1 civilian and injuring 2.

2 hit farms.

1 hit a civilian car.

1 hit a road.

1 hit a private business.

Marib continues to be the most heavily bombed governorate. 56% of all Saudi-led coalition air raids in June targeted Marib. Sirwah was the most heavily bombed district in the country for the sixth consecutive month with 53% of air raids in the month in Marib hitting the district.
At least 188 air raids have hit Sirwah in the first half of 2021 with up to 1,619 individual airstrikes - an average of 9 airstrikes per day from January though June. The district is the most heavily bombed countrywide.

Sa'ada was the second mostly heavily bombed governorate in June with 34 air raids - the highest monthly rate in Sa'ada since the same rate was recorded in January. 81% of all air raids in the month hit the governorates of Marib and Sa'ada.

(** B P T)

Jihadi militancy and Houthi insurgency in Yemen


This chapter examines jihadi militancy and the Houthi insurgency in Yemen in their historical contexts. It provides a brief overview of the modern history of Yemen. It also examines the emergence of al-Qaida in Yemen, its merger with the Saudi branch to form al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in 2009, and its evolution during the course of the ongoing civil war. It briefly addresses the fleeting rise of the Islamic State in Yemen in 2014 and explains why it failed to flourish. Finally, the chapter turns to the much more significant Houthi insurgency, which took over the reins of government, sparking an internationalized civil war in 2015. It examines from where the Houthis came and how they were able to quickly overrun much of the country.


Yemen has long been plagued by conflict. The main fault line is between northern and southern Yemen, which were separate countries before they signed an awkward union in 1990. Within four years, they were already at war, and tensions remain high to the present day. Numerous other divides exist, which tend to fall along tribal lines. Tribal leaders, laws, and customs continue to occupy important positions in Yemeni society, exacerbated by the lack of strong state institutions. Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh famously likened dealing with Yemen’s tribal elites to dancing on the heads of snakes.

Politicians are not alone in exploiting Yemen’s fault lines. Yemen’s main terrorist group, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has tried to frame north-south tensions as a holy war between Sunnis (southerners) and Shia (northerners). Yemen attracts terrorists in a number of ways. Its topography of deserts, mountains, and wadis (valleys) makes it easy to lie low and engage in paramilitary training. Moreover, its civil war chaos, government exodus, disillusioned population, and critical humanitarian crisis make it a rich recruitment ground for vulnerable and angry young men.

This chapter provides an overview of Yemen’s modern history, which is necessary to understand the origins of today’s conflicts. It then explains the emergence and development of AQAP and the Islamic State in Yemen, assessing their respective goals and strategies and the extent of their success. Finally, it examines how the Houthi insurgency managed to take over the reins of government and overrun much of the country in 2014.


It is reasonable to conclude that the rise of the Houthis’ political arm Ansar Allah over the past decade and the growing regional influence of Iran have occurred in tandem rather than being inextricably linked.70 While the Houthi alliance with Iran sprang more from necessity than ideological alignment, the longer the conflict has dragged on following the internationalization of Yemen’s civil war in 2015, the more vulnerable the Houthis have become to Iranian influence. This is of obvious concern to the Saudiled coalition of Sunni states fighting to restore Yemen’s internationally recognized government. A war that essentially grew out of a domestic political dispute has turned into a drawn-out international power struggle with sectarian overtones using proxy forces in Yemen.

Yemen looks to be in the process of fragmenting. The north-south divide remains a potent issue. In 2017, a well-organized political body known as the Southern Transitional Council emerged in Aden, the capital of the former South Yemen, with aspirations for the south to secede. Funded by the United Arab Emirates, it recruited and trained local forces across the south. These forces have clashed multiple times with the formal Yemeni military, which holds firm to the concept of a united Yemen. Although the southern secessionists and the Hadi government signed a peace deal in Riyadh in 2019 and a power-sharing cabinet was formed in late 2020, violent clashes persist.

There are also fragile fault lines inside Yemen’s former South, where significant sectors of the population oppose the notion of secession, control by Aden, or influence by the United Arab Emirates. In the eastern governorates of Hadramawt and al-Mahra in particular, regional independence movements have emerged. There is, therefore, the potential for new fronts to open in Yemen. As a result, even if a peace deal is reached in the main war between the Houthis and the Yemeni government, translating this into peace on the ground has become increasingly difficult.

There are some parallels between the respective rises of the Houthi and Sunni jihadi insurgencies in Yemen. The Houthis originally attempted to win support much as al-Qaida had done during its zenith of 2015–2016: by plugging into widespread discontent and claiming to stand against ineffective government and endemic corruption. Similarly, both the Houthi and the Sunni jihadi insurgencies then Elisabeth Kendall 92 attempted to re-frame their popular appeal in religious terms that would accord with their respective sectarian narratives.

The Houthis have characterized themselves increasingly as true Muslims battling an infidel government that collaborates with both al-Qaida and the Islamic State as agents of the United States and Israel.73 Conversely, al-Qaida fighters characterize themselves as true Muslims battling infidel Houthis who collaborate—however improbably—with both Iran and the Islamic State as agents of the United States and Israel. Finally, Yemen’s Islamic State fighters characterize themselves as true Muslims battling infidel Houthis who collaborate—even more improbably—not only with Iran but also with the Hadi government and al-Qaida as agents of the United States and Israel.

While the Houthis have retained a strong position during the ongoing war, both AQAP and the Islamic State in Yemen are shadows of their former selves. At the start of the war, AQAP in particular had been able to exploit the security vacuum, humanitarian crisis, and booming smuggling economy to bolster its support, influence, and funding. The Islamic State did not fare as well as AQAP in Yemen, partly owing to its weak understanding of tribal dynamics, inability to construct locally attuned narratives, weak religious credentials, and overbearing leadership style.

Nevertheless, although the jihadi groups were by 2020 weaker than they have ever been, the ideas and motivators that underpin the Salafi-jihadi movement in Yemen persist. Moreover, while the groups may recede and move underground, they do not fully disappear. By early 2021, there are signs that AQAP may be regrouping in the south. Yemen’s jihadi militancy should therefore be seen as dormant or managed rather than absent or defeated – by Elisabeth Kendall

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An Exceptional Case: Saudi Relations with Yemen’s Islah Party

Yemen's Islah Party and Saudi Arabia have enjoyed a special relationship for over a decade, but now internal politics threaten to tarnish this unique partnership.

Following the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's March 2015 announcement of the launch of the Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthi militia in Yemen, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah) was the first party to support the intervention. In response to this pro-Saudi stance, Houthi militants incurred heavy costs on the Islah Party, launching a wide campaign of kidnappings against Islah Party leaders and seizing the party headquarters in more than one city.

Hence, Operation Decisive Storm represented a new beginning for the Islah Party in its relationship with Saudi Arabia. This relationship has now gained considerable depth and strength. Several of the party's leaders, media outlets, and many of its supporters have fled to Saudi Arabia, and, in line with Saudi efforts in Yemen, party members have also actively engaged in the popular resistance that was formed in more than one Yemeni city to fight the Houthi militia, as in the city of Taiz. Consequently, many of the the Islah Party's leaders, cadres, and members were killed in combat, marking a considerable sacrifice in pursuit of a shared goal with Saudi Arabia.

And yet, the relationship does face challenges. Differing goals between the Islah Party and Saudi Arabia, Emirati coldness towards the Islah Party, and changing popular attitudes in Yemen all signify potential dangers for the relationship. Looking forward, changing conditions on the ground in Yemen could make the existence of even this special, historic relationship untenable, and the progress of the war itself will be critical in defining the future of this relationship and a political settlement to the Yemeni conflict, if it ever occurs.

An Unlikely Pair

Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the Islah Party, an Islamist party often condemned for its affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, is exceptional because it contrasts against Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Muslim Brotherhood generally. As of now, the relationship defies conventional diplomatic boundaries in the region, and yet, it has continued to survive, and both parties have shown a willingness to sacrifice for the sake of the relationship.

Though Saudi Arabia maintained a longstanding connection with Party Leader Shaykh Abdullah bin Husayn al-Ahmar dating back to the 1990s, when he founded the party, the Saudi relationship with the Islah Party solidified in a real way following the 2011 Arab Spring protests.

Since then, Saudi Arabia has worked to promote its relationship with the Islah Party and pursue the mutual goals between the kingdom and the party, which initially included combatting leftist groups in Yemen at the end of the twentieth century. Now, those interests center chiefly on combatting the expansion of the Houthis.

These shared interestshave helpedmaintain relations even at the most difficult junctures, such as the unease following the Houthi takeoverof the Yemeni capital Sanaa on September 21, 2014,

As a result, today, many of the groups within the Islah Party are under Saudi influence or are connected to Saudi Arabia in various capacities. Tribal religious leaders, academics, and other prominent community leaders in southern Yemeni governorates such as Al-Jawf, Saada, Hajjah, Hadramawt, Amran, Sanaa, and even Marib, have strong relations with Saudi Arabia.

Furthermore, the Islah Party tends to make serious efforts in keeping its relationship with Saudi Arabia safe. The Islah Party is willing to publicly support Saudi Arabia’s role in the Yemeni conflict, to the point that it devoted some materials in its party platform toSaudi relations. In addition, Islah Party media has avoided criticizing Saudi involvementin Yemen, and has even suspended party membership of figures such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Tawakkol Karman, who had repeatedly criticized Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The party has likewise refused to communicate with Iran or take other steps in the region without Saudi cooperation or support.

Likewise, both sides seem willing to take criticism from allies over the unique nature of their relationship.

Since then, Saudi Arabia has pursued a policy of limited inclusion for the Islah Party on ‘coalition’ matters, in contrast to the UAE’s ‘stick approach’ to Islah. Media platformsbacked by the UAE and Qatar (despite their opposing positions) have questioned the Saudi relationship with the Islah Party and tried to drive a wedge between them.

Underlying Cracks in the Relationship

Despite the strength of their relationship, however, there are some foundational difficulties that exist within it. Differences in opinion and potential coercion towards maintaining the relationship indicate that the kingdom and the party may not be purely aligned.

For instance, Saudi Arabia’s and the Islah Party’s approaches to the war in Yemen do differ in notable ways. As part of that difference, the Islah Party has tried to present the war in Yemen in political rather than sectarian terms,unlike the Saudi press has done. Furthermore, the Islah Party has also said it does not want to proceed unilaterally and prefers to continue to work in political coalitions.In this sense, it seems the party realized the magnitude of the many challenges facing the Yemeni state and hence sought to avoid being targeted alone.

Shared Needs

At present, a split is unthinkable; both Saudi Arabia and the Islah Party realize that their relationship is currently a matter of necessity—at least while the war continues in Yemen. Likewise, the Islah Party realizes the importance of Saudi military, political, and economic clout in Yemen, particularly with regard to the conflict inside the Yemeni government prior to the Houthi coup. For its part, Saudi Arabia realizes the potential of Islah and its current and potential role for managing the balance of power in Yemen

According to the Islah Party’s current media statements, it seems that party leadership will continue to try to reassureSaudi Arabia and depend on its support. At the same time, its stances have limited the party’s choices within the broader Yemeni political sphere and its ability to maneuverindependently of the Saudi agenda. At this juncture, much in the Saudi-Islah relationship depends on the fate of the war itself – by Mutahar Al-Sofari

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UAE Occupation of Socotra Has Far-Reaching Implications

Although there is no apparent relation between Socotra Island and the ongoing conflict with the Houthi rebels, the UAE is using the Saudi-led intervention as a cover to achieve its own political, economic, and military interests in controlling the island of Socotra. It possibly aims at forcing Socotra into secession in order to integrate it to UAE territory in the future. The majority of the islanders have recognized the Emirati presence as “an unwarranted and illegitimate one,” a situation that has led to a series of violent clashes between locals and UAE troops in Socotra.

UAE Economic Ambitions in Socotra

Many observers reckon that the UAE interest in Socotra is not only geopolitical, but economic as well. The island has gained international fame for the presence of rare plants, whose oil extracts are used in various industries. Socotra is also a leading tourist destination thanks to its coral reefs, rare species of birds, beautiful natural sites, and abundant biodiversity, making it a potential economic asset for the UAE.

However, the main economic motive behind UAE occupation of Socotra Island is Abu Dhabi’s ambition to secure the management of Aden ports for Dubai Ports World (DP World), many sources allege.

It can therefore be assessed that DP World is striving to control all Yemeni ports and the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, to realize its ambition of turning the port of Aden into a major trading center for the UAE.

To achieve this strategic goal, the UAE appears to have resorted to several shadowy methods, among them the bribery of local influential figures. In fact, some sources in Yemen allege that after the country’s President, Mansour Hadi, turned down the UAE proposal in 2016 to lease the island of Socotra for 99 years in exchange for a large amount of money, the UAE started to offer bribes to prominent social and tribal dignitaries.

Furthermore, the UAE has been accused of manipulating and funding the Southern Transitional Council (STC) since 2020, to get a foothold in the island without any direct involvement. Since then, the STC has become one of the most devoted Emirati agents in Yemen.

UAE-Israeli Security Coordination

Over the last ten years, the UAE has been dedicated to establishing itself as a regional and international power. It has attempted to gain favor with the US and ally with a regional superpower – Israel – which is why the UAE normalized its relations with the Zionist state in 2020 and signed the Abraham Accords.

Among the benefits of the UAE normalization agreements is the White House provisional approval of US$23 million worth of weaponry, including F-35 fighter jets, which are owned by no other country in the region but Israel.

Furthermore, the UAE wants to convey to Washington its readiness to support the American vision of countering the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy agenda in the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb strait, which is essential for protecting US bases in the region from any Iranian preemptive strikes.

Thus, the current Emirati-Israeli coordination in Socotra derives from shared interests, as Socotra represents a strategic geopolitical position from where Iranian influence can be further monitored.

As for the wider geopolitical repercussions of the Emirati-Israeli cooperation in Western Asia and the Middle East, Giorgio Cafiero, CEO and Founder of Gulf State Analytics, believes that an Israeli presence in the coastal waters of the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf would be a source of concern for Pakistan as well. Accordingly, many observers are rather uneasy about what this situation may lead to. Indeed, the UAE and Israel’s involvement in Socotra is bound to increase over the next years, particularly due to the United States’ desire to see more coordination between India, the UAE, and Israel in the Indian Ocean.

UAE Human Rights Violations in Socotra

Undoubtedly, the Emirati military and intelligence activities in Socotra, in coordination with Israel and without the approval of the internationally recognized Yemeni government, present a dangerous situation to the sovereignty of the Yemeni state. They violate the UN Security Council resolution no. 2216, which “bans the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer…[of] weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment [to Yemen].”

Three human rights organizations – namely Human Rights Watch, the International Human Rights Organization, and Rights Radar – have brought attention to the rights violations committed by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in Socotra, as well as in South Yemen, against journalists and activists.

In addition to these human rights violations, the UAE is also accused of carrying out illegal trade activity in Yemen. They reportedly use commercial aircrafts to transport weapons and set up charity organizations as a “front cover for their intelligence military activities, child recruitment, persecution of minorities, and preventing access of humanitarian aid.”

Although this resource rich and beautiful island is going through difficult and unprecedented times, due to the geopolitical and economic interests of regional powers like the UAE, one must hope that it will regain its status as a first-class tourist island. As a one local said in an interview with the Financial Times, Socotra is “a heaven on earth and should always be protected.”

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Are European arms fuelling wars and conflicts worldwide?

The US, the UK, Spain and Canada openly supply weapons to the Saudi-led coalition.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war in Yemen are just two examples among dozens of active conflicts currently raging worldwide.

Is Europe playing a role in fueling these conflicts? If so, what is that role?

The Italian Defence Industry

Italy is the fourth biggest weapons exporter in the EU. Its defence industry refused to talk to euronews about what and who they sell to, but anti-military activists were very vocal.

Leonardo is the largest Italian arms producer and it is ranked 12th worldwide. The Italian government is its largest shareholder and owns 30% of the company. Leonardo declined our invitation to give their side of the story. The Federation of Italian Defence firms (AIAD) did not reply to any of our interview requests either.

Francesco explains that "Italy has exported, in recent years, more than 50% of its weapon systems to the Middle East and North Africa". Some of the items it exports are armored vehicles, aircrafts and ships. He says that amounts to three billion euros a year in arms actually sold.

The documentary, 'Produced in Italy Bombed in Yemen' by the NGO Mwatana, indicates where some Italian exports have ended up. The footage shows the aftermath of a bombing in Northern Yemen that was carried out in October 2016 by the Saudi-led coalition. Lives were lost in this attack.

A Yemeni NGO field officer combed through the area of the attack and found parts of some explosives. The serial numbers on the debris showed that the bombs had been produced by the Italian Company RWM, a subsidiary of the German Rheinmetall.

Saudi Arabia was Italy’s main client last year after Egypt and Qatar in the Middle East and North Africa. Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest arms importer. After it engaged in the war in Yemen, its arms imports skyrocketed. It showed an increase of 61% from 2016 to 2020.

European Weapon Manufacturers

However, Italian arms aren't the only ones ending up in Yemen. The evidence of European weapons there is well documented in videos from the investigative journalism project 'Lighthouse reports'.

Belgium, Germany, France and Spain are the other European countries that have allowed exports to Saudi Arabia. Pressured by anti-war activists, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, The Netherlands and Italy have stopped or restricted their exports to Riyadh. But not France, the EU's first arms exporter and the world's third-biggest.

Amnesty International says they have evidence of France selling various kinds of military equipment to the Saudi-led coalition. French artillery, ammunition and combat vehicles have been found in Yemen.

The Sale of Arms

So are European arms sales allowed everywhere, at all times?

No - Several international treaties state that war and human rights violations should, in theory, prevent such sales. The main ones that indicate this are the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty and the European Common Position. They both thoroughly regulate arms exports and they follow the same principles.

Despite these regulations, the European map of exports speaks for itself.

France, Germany, Spain and Italy are the main exporters in the EU. In the last five years, France's main clients outside of Europe were Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but it also sold arms to the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Israel, Ethiopia and Afghanistan among many others.

Germany has exported to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, but also to countries like South Sudan and Somalia. Spain and Italy’s exports have also headed to the same volatile destinations.

Enforcing Treaties

Experts agree that the weak link in all international treaties and national laws is enforcement. Green MEP, Hannah Neumann, can explain this.

She says that "we have one common position on arms exports in the EU, but we have 27 national interpretations, 27 export systems and an increasing divergence in actual exports of member states."

Sales on the Rise

The Defence industry is considered a strategic sector for national governments. Despite the pandemic, international arms transfers have remained close to their highest levels since the end of the cold war. Middle East arms imports have grown the most in the past five years, driven mainly by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar.

Vested Interests

So who is ultimately responsible for exporting weapons to war-torn countries?

Governments grant export licenses to weapon manufacturers and tend to profit from sales as they often have stakes in the armament industry.

Is that vested interest compatible with international treaties regulating sales?

Francesco Vignarca highlights that large parts of Italy's military industry is state-owned.

"There is always an attempt to favour exports with inter-governmental agreements. They also allow the possibility for these large companies to sell even when the criteria mentioned in the laws should prevent it. There are always ways to say ‘no, but in this case the violation of human rights is not officially recognised’, or ‘the conflict is not declared’", he adds.

However, this is not unique to Italy. Amnesty International has been very vocal about France’s role in the Yemen war.

Sarah Roussel, a member of this NGO says that "on one hand, you have the minister of foreign affairs calling this a dirty war and on the other hand, France is still exporting military weapons to the two main countries engaged in this conflict. So, yes, you could say that France is being hypocritical". – by Monica Pinna

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

(A H)

16 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 7,058 in total

Yemen's supreme national emergency committee for coronavirus reported on Friday, 16 new confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the governorates of Aden (13), Shabwa (2) and Hadramout (1).

The committee also reported in its statement the death of one coronavirus patient in Hadramout. No recovery has been recorded today.
2,645 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(A H)

15 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 7,042 in total

Yemen's supreme national emergency committee for coronavirus reported on Thursday, 15 new confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the governorates of Aden (8), Hadramout (4) AL-Mahra (2) and Taiz (1).
The committee also reported in its statement the three coronavirus patients in Hadramout. No death has been recorded today.
2,702 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(* B H P)

Yemen Set to Enter a Third Covid-19 Wave

Yemeni government declared a high alert for health facilities and workers and eurged people to follow COVID-19 measures as the country braces for a third wave of the virus.

Prompted by a sudden surge in the number of coronavirus cases in government-controlled areas, Yemen’s Health Minister Qasem Buhaibeh said on Twitter on Tuesday that the Yemeni government has ordered health workers to “get ready for a new wave” and to “prepare health facilities and quarantines for a possible influx of cases,” urging Yemenis to abide by health precautions.

“We call on citizens to be careful and take the necessary precautionary health measures, as we have field indicators of an increase in coronavirus cases,” Buhaibeh said.

“The epidemiological situation in Yemen is ambiguous,” Abdulla bin Ghouth, a professor of community medicine and epidemiology at Hadramout University’s College of Medicine, and an adviser to the health minister, told Arab News on Wednesday, adding that the country has a “weak surveillance and diagnosis process” and a “crumbling health system.”

Despite not ruling out the possibility of a third wave, Bin Ghouth said that Yemen is experiencing a post-second wave period due to the stable level of new cases and deaths. “Through my weekly follow-up to the epidemiological curve, there is a constant continuation of a low level of cases, not a sharp decrease or a double rise,” he said.

At the same time, thousands of Yemeni travelers who were left stuck at home due to a shortage of vaccines have demanded that the government swiftly administer new doses, complaining that many Yemenis have lost jobs since they could not get a vaccine on time.

Mohammed Abdul Kareem, a Yemeni expatriate in a Gulf country, said that he waited three months to receive a second shot of a COVID-19 vaccine and that his visa would expire if he did not get it next month.

Double-jabbed Yemenis also complained that they have not yet received electronic certificates proving their vaccination from the ministry.

(A H P)

Yemen to receive 151,000 covid-19 vaccine doses mid-August

The Ministry of Public Health and Population is preparing to receive 151,000 new doses of the novel coronavirus vaccine.
Deputy Minister, Dr. Ali Al-Walidi, said in a press conference in Aden, that the ministry will receive 151,000 doses of Johnson & Johnson vaccine next week, out of Yemen’s quota of 504,000 doses, while 360,000 doses of AstraZeneca vaccine will arrive in mid-August.
He said the ministry will plan their distribution to the different governorates after completing the instructions manual for that.
The ministry also launched on Wednesday, an electronic platform, via the ministry's website, with the aim of facilitating the procedures for those applying for vaccination.

(A H)

Five new cases of COVID-19 reported, 7027 in total

No recoveries nor deaths have been recorded, the committee said in its statement.
2,619 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(B H)

Sameh is one of thousands of patients being treated for COVID-19 through WHO and KSRelief support across Yemen

Health care workers in the frontlines of COVID-19 and other diseases are risking their lives daily. And in Yemen, they face compounded challenges due to the damaged infrastructure and socioeconomic difficulties. Yet they continue to work under dire circumstances.

Sameh is one of 2560 people being treated for COVID-19. “The health staff are treating me so well. I would like to extend my thanks to KSRelief for providing this service and all the services they continue to provide in such a critical time. I am grateful I am now better and that I will soon be able to be discharged,” says Sameh.

To reduce occurrence of infection and to minimize morbidity and mortality of COVID-19 WHO and KSrelief are working to advance pandemic preparedness, early detection of COVID-19, as well as through mounting appropriate control and public health containment measures. The large-scale support includes building local capacity at the ICU level, providing oxygen and essential medical and nonmedical supplies. In addition to supporting the national referral laboratory capacity through provision of equipment and essential supplies, as well as training laboratory staff.

Through this project, 173 health care workers have been trained including 70 laboratory staff in order to build capacity in 14 supported ICUs and 12 supported laboratories.

(A H)

Ten new cases of COVID-19 reported, 7022 in total

No recoveries nor deaths have been recorded today, the committee said in its statement.
2,252 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(* B H)

Impact of COVID-19 Movement Restrictions on Migrants along the Eastern Corridor, Report 16 | as of 30 June 2021

The COVID-19 outbreak has restricted global mobility, whilst heightening the risk of exploitation of vulnerable populations. This report provides a snapshot of the COVID-19 epidemiological situation and mobility restrictions, and of the current migration trends along the Eastern Corridor migration route, in addition to an analysis of the impact that movement restrictions have had in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Yemen. Moreover, it provides information on the main protection concerns for migrants and assistance provided, and COVID-19 risk mitigation measures.

(A H)

No new cases of coronavirus reported

The committee also reported in its statement the recovery two coronavirus patientsin Hadramout, in addition to the death of one patient in Shabwa.
2499 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(A H)

Four new cases of COVID-19 reported, 7012 in total

No recoveries nor deaths have been recorded today, the committee said in its statement.
2,046 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(B H)

Film: KSrelief supports WHO COVID19 Response in Yemen | Ali Story

(A P)

Five new cases of COVID-19 reported in Aden, Hadramout

The committee also reported the recovery of three coronavirus patients in Taiz, in addition to the death of one patient in Hadramout.
1871 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(A P)

Two new cases of COVID-19 reported in Aden, Hadramout

The committee also reported the recovery of one coronavirus patient in Hadramout. No death has been recorded.
1508 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(B H)

Yemen - AWD / Cholera Response Dashboard as of March 2021

(B H)

With a collapsing health system, disease outbreaks & the need for disease surveillance, WHO & @WorldBank in cooperation with the MoPHP have established 333 district rapid response teams to investigate & initiate a response to disease outbreaks & public health emergencies in Yemen (photos)

cp2 Allgemein / General

(* A K P)

Interactive Map of Yemen War

(* A K)

Yemen War Daily Map Updates

(B K P)

End Yemen’s misery

The poorest Arab country has been marred by a civil war since the last decade

Little attention is given to the plight of the Yemenis, who undeniably face the world’s biggest humanitarian crisis. Yemen, the poorest Arab country, has been marred by a civil war since the last decade, with innocent civilians being the victims of non-stop aerial bombardment, countless diseases taking lives of millions of children, and rising sectarian violence leading to unprecedented political turmoil.

Today, negotiations must not centre around the Saudis and the Houthis but must also include the broader Yemeni population. The UN and the international community must revamp its negotiation strategy. They must include the interests of local stakeholders, women, youth, tribes, and the civil society at large, whose voices have been oppressed for very long. What the Saudis, Houthi forces and rebel groups must understand is that there is no military solution to the ongoing war. New constructive agreements must see the light of day focusing on eventual peace, release of prisoners, and end of political detentions.

The Westphalian system upon which the international legal system once thrived is in a shambles today. Yemen’s sovereignty has been attacked for far too long, while the poor, vulnerable and poverty-driven Yemenis face the major toll. Realpolitik may dominate the world of international relations but those in the global community who claim to be the champions of human rights and freedom must speak much louder for the plight of the Yemeni people. The country needs medical aid and food, not bombs.

(* B H P)

Yemen’s War Against Women – Oppression Takes On Radical Undertones

If women in the Middle East continue to face oppression by virtue of their gender, at a point in our history when debates over equality and discrimination have allowed for global emancipation, Yemen is fast becoming the land where all hopes come to die … If one keeps in mind that Saudi Arabia rationalised abuse as a national cultural standard, arguing that physical violence and rape under the sanctity of marriage are not a thing, Yemen has indeed sunk pretty low to claim the title of worst abuser against women.

And yet it truly has … from the proliferation of child marriages to force virginity tests on young girls to satisfy bigoted future in-laws and standardised physical violence, the women of Yemen have been dehumanised to stomach-churning extremes. Underneath it all lies not moral degradation but Islamic radicalism. For every inch of ground women have lost over the years echo the lunacies of religious zealots – words of hate speaking of enslavement and isolation.

And if many will argue that Yemen has more immediate crises to address before one could venture on the subject of gender equality, I will posit that Yemen’s almost systemic violence against the fairer sex, is a harbinger of worse things to come – a foreteller of the hold and control extremists now exercise over this war-torn nation of Southern Arabia.

The case of model and actress Entesar Al-Hammadi, whose great crime was to violate the Houthis’ strict Islamic dress code by holding unveiled pictures of herself on her phone, and social media accounts should attest to such a dangerous trend. The young woman is currently awaiting trial on charges of corrupt behaviour and noncompliance to Islamic norms.

The victim of a broad state-run campaign against so-called ‘religious dissidents’, Al Hammadi is but one among many to have been brutally kidnapped by police for daring imagine herself free.

An Amnesty International report describes Yemen as “one of the worst places in the world to be a woman.” It said that the women survived in oppressive, deteriorating conditions, stripped of equality.

Pursued, persecuted, violated, threatened with rape, women in Yemen are owned by their male guardians without any hope for recourse. When the law reads intolerance and religious indoctrination, women have no voice and no name. The victims of a system that no longer sees them as human beings, pain has become their daily bread.

(A P)

Yemeni government demands ‘effective’ pressure on Houthis to accept peace efforts

(* B H P)

From Hais to Sana’a: A -24Hour Journey

Previously a sporadic practice, discriminatory regional acts carried out by security forces affiliated with the STC have now become widespread, obstructing access for many northern civilians who have vested livelihood interests in the South.

One of the 20+ Transitional Council armed men at the checkpoint stopped us and asked the driver, “Where are you coming from?” The driver replied, “from Mocha.” The armed man ordered him to pull over and signaled to another to search our bus.

The gunman was about 20 years old. He asked for IDs, and I handed him my passport. He took the travellers cards and the passport, and he handed them to another armed man. This man, who was about 30 years old, came to the bus and asked me and two others to get down. He told us, “You go back to where you came from. The rest of the you can continue on the bus.” I asked him, “Why us?!” He simply replied, “It is so, and if you have something to say, go and talk to the commander.”

I went with the other two passengers to the commander. He was on the opposite side of the road. with a thick beard, sitting on the driver’s seat of a military vehicle and chewing qat. The military vehicle had the emblem of the STC Security Belt Forces. We were escorted by the soldier who had asked us for the ID cards; he was still holding my passport.

After I arrived at the commander’s vehicle, I told him: “I gave my passport and did not give the card of the organization I work with.” The commander said, “Ha, are you with an organization?” I replied “yes” and showed him the business card. He replied, “then continue.”

I came back with the two passengers who were with me, all pretending to be working with an organization, when in fact we were not.

We got on the bus and set off. We had two roads to Aden to choose from, either the Buraiqa road or the Bir Ahmad Road. The driver took the Bir Ahmed Road because the Buraiqa road had checkpoints that are difficult to deal with. We arrived at Aden at the time of the sunset prayer, and then I proceeded to the Peugeot taxi terminal (local transportation terminal), to look for transportation to Sana’a. One of the drivers there asked me, “to Sana’a?” and I said “yes.”

It seemed that there were no passengers at this time. I boarded the Peugeot. I was tired from the journey to Aden. I waited for about half an hour, but only one other person came. I was about to leave and go to the nearest hotel to stay overnight in Aden, but the driver had mail deliveries to Sana’a and wanted to travel anyway.

Then someone else came along and we were four, including the driver. We moved after the evening prayer and stopped for dinner in one of the restaurants in Aden before carrying on. We headed towards Wadi Al-Qabaitta. It was about midnight when we entered the wadi.

It took us about two hours to drive through the wadi, because the road was rough. Then we arrived at the areas controlled by Ansar Allah (Houthis), and stopped at their first checkpoint. An armed man asked us, “Where are you going?” We answered: “Sana’a.” Then we continued, passing by Al Rahida, Warazan and Dimnat Khadir, before arriving at the city of Taiz.

(* B K P)

Yemen's Civil War

Peter Salisbury: I think that’s something that goes back to the National Dialogue. One of the things that was agreed on was that Yemen should be highly decentralized in the way that it was governed to prevent a regime from assimilating all the power and resources at the center. There was broad agreement that the country should become a federal state. We still have the National Dialogue Conference outcomes document that clearly says that Yemen is going to be a highly decentralized country. In fact, Yemen has laws on the books that say the same, so what we’re talking about right now is that the reality on the ground matches the vision that people had before—with the exception of the Houthi-controlled areas, which are unquestionably a highly securitized police state and where probably 70 percent of the population lives.

Realistically, federalism and decentralization tend to work best when you have strong local and national institutions, and in Yemen what we've got is weak, uncoordinated, diffuse, and mismatched institutions both locally and nationally. That means that as they approach Yemen, the international community needs to think critically about their approach. They way that they bring funds into Yemen—around reconstruction and governance—will shape the incentives for people to do things on way or another. If they decide they want to put all their effort into capacity building for national institutions in Sanaa, then we're going down that same slippery slope. But if they want to put their time and effort into making sure that we have strong local institutions all over Yemen and that those then coordinate, link up, and become part of a national system with a much stronger balance between the local and national level, that's the best way forward.

(* A P)

UN: Houthi reports on damaged oil tanker 'disappointing'

The United Nations yesterday described statements made by Houthi leader, Abdul Malik Al-Ajri, regarding oil tanker FSO Safer as "disappointing", Anadolu news agency reported.

"We have seen the recent statements from the Ansar Allah [Houthis] authorities in Sana'a on the Safer tanker issue, which we find disappointing," deputy spokesman for the UN Secretary-General, Farhan Haq, told reporters. He added that in November 2020 the UN agreed with the Houthis on a mission plan to assess the tanker and, "if conditions are safe enough onboard, to do some light maintenance to help minimize the risk of an oil spill".

"From what we can understand, the Houthis are demanding advance guarantees that the UN will complete all the potential light maintenance activities in the mission plan," Haq said, explaining that the Safer is anchored in a very dangerous site, and "advance guarantees — before verifying conditions onboard — are not possible."

"We remain eager to help. For a UN-led solution, that starts with an assessment and, if it's safe enough, some light maintenance that we hope will buy a bit more time for a longer-term solution. We also remain open-minded regarding any other safe, quick solutions to this problem," he added.

Al-Ajri has previously claimed that the UN has retreated from the framework agreement reached for the urgent maintenance of the Safer tanker.


(* A P)

Yemen’s Houthis Block Access to Time-Bomb Tanker, Falsely Blame U.N.

On July 15, the Ansar Allah group in Yemen, also known as the Houthis, issued a statement on a previous agreement with the United Nations to carry out repairs on a neglected supertanker moored off Yemen’s west shore. There is a danger that the tanker, FSO (floating storage and offloading unit) Safer, may spill its contents -- 1.1 million barrels of oil, or four times the amount of oil spilled in the infamous Exxon Valdez disaster.

In their statement, the Houthis, who control access to the dilapidated tanker, blamed the U.N.’s Office for Project Services (UNOPS) for the failure of talks to repair the floating vessel.

“The UN presented a work plan that violates the urgent repair and evaluation agreement on SAFER tanker,” the statement said, referring to a November 2020 agreement.

But that is false. In fact, the Houthis have been backpedaling on promises to allow the U.N. mission to perform initial inspections onboard.

The U.N. replied to the Houthis in a July 26 statement obtained by VOA, calling their comments “disappointing.”

Farhan Haq, deputy spokesman for the U.N. Secretary General, said the agreement with the Houthis was to first assess the safety of the tanker before doing light maintenance. But the Houthis are demanding guarantees to conduct a full light maintenance, which could limit the danger of a spill or explosion.

“The SAFER is a very dangerous site, and advance guarantees – before verifying conditions onboard – are not possible. That is also why the November 2020 agreement explicitly conditions the light maintenance activities on the safety environment we find onboard,” Haq said.

(B K P)

Battlefronts back to stalemate as peace continues to elude Yemen

The recent battle that erupted in Al-Baydah, in the centre of Yemen, has simmered like its counterpart in Marib. Groups and formations fighting the Houthis on the battlefront failed to garner sufficient support to hold on to recent gains by the legitimate government of Yemen, allowing the Houthis to recapture some of the areas lost by them in the past few weeks.

The experience of the military operations once again demonstrated the difficulty of a military or a violent solution in Yemen.

(A K P)

the Yemeni Network for Rights and Freedoms says it has documented 4.121 violations by the Houthi militia against the health sector in 15 provinces between May 2017 and May 2021, including the killing of 62 physicians, nurses and ambulance drivers.

(* B K pH)

Yemeni City Leveled by 15,000 Saudi Shells

The depth of a massive destruction done on the Yemeni city as a result of the savage US-backed Saudi onslaught was revealed on Saturday, by a source in the local administration of the border town of Haradh in Hajjah province.

Since the beginning of the Saudi invasion in 2015, more than 15,000 shells, bombs, and missiles have been dropped on Haradh's neighborhoods and facilities, according to the Almasirah's source.

Residents of Haradh district had been fully moved to a variety of camps for displaced as well as neighboring areas, the source explained, adding that more than 70 establishments in Haradh have been entirely destroyed, the most of which are hotels and rest houses.

He went on to say that out of a total of 63 schools, 50 were entirely demolished, the remainder were partially damaged, leaving thousands of pupils deprived of an education.

He revealed that the Saudi aggression's airplanes and artillery have entirely destroyed Haradh's ancient city, as well as 85 percent of the city's dwellings in general, and that houses, shops, private hospitals, roads, and everything else related to life were all targeted.

According to the source, engineers have recommend that the cities of Haradh and Midi should first be rid of the destroyed structures before rebuilding them.

and also

(? B P)

Film: The Blockade of Yemen Continues: Updates on the crisis and what Congress can do about it

(* B P)

What's Behind the Changing Middle East?

The Middle East has been seeing many political shifts as new leaders take power in the region. The year started with the ending of the Qatar blockade. And now the Saudis are welcoming the leader of Oman, who was usually kept a distance due to his country's close ties to Iran. But as old rivals reconcile, once close allies are going through a rough patch. The UAE and the Saudis are at odds over a host of regional issues. How will the rest of the year play out? Guests: Nader Hashemi Associate Professor at University of Denver, Annelle Sheline Research Fellow at Quincy Institute.

MBS sees Saudi Arabia as the region’s rightful dominant power & is moving to seize the position of economic, transit & tourist hub hitherto held by the UAE. The rivalry could help keep both MBZ & MBS focused on economic concerns rather than militarism

MBS invited Sultan Haitham of Oman to visit after the UAE refused the OPEC+ agreement The Saudis & Omanis subsequently declared that they would open a road between their countries, bypassing the UAE & also giving Oman a direct land route to Qatar

(* B P)

Wikipedia: Federalization of Yemen

The federalization of Yemen is the proposed transformation of the Republic of Yemen from a unitary state to a federal state. Driven by the significant economic, religious, political, and historical differences between the northern and southern parts of the country, federalization has been a common and controversial proposal to resolve regionalist tensions since the unification of the country in 1990.[1][2]

The 2013-2014 National Dialogue Conference concluded that Yemen would adopt federalism in an attempt to resolve the political crisis that began with the Yemeni Revolution in 2011. A committee organized by Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi determined that Yemen would be split into six federal regions: Azal, Saba, Tihama, Aden, Janad, and Hadhramaut.[3] Azal, Saba, Janad and Tihama would have been northern provinces whereas Aden and Hadhramaut would have been southern.[4] Sana’a, the capital, was to become a federal city and would not have been part of any region. Aden, the former capital of South Yemen, would have been a part of the Aden region, but would have had special legislative and executive powers.[5] The conclusions of the Conference formed the basis of a new constitution, which was to be put to a referendum in 2015.[2]

The plan for a six-region federation received international praise, but was denounced by many within Yemen.[6] The Southern Movement suspected that the division of the south into two regions was an attempt to turn southern secessionists against each other; they preferred a two-region division between the north and the south. The Zaidi elites in the Azal region would have been left with almost no natural resources, whereas the sparsely populated Saba and Hadhramaut regions would have received nearly all of the country's natural resources.[7] Meanwhile, the Houthis were outraged that the plan would have landlocked their home governorate of Saada. The referendum on the new federal constitution was indefinitely delayed by the intensification of the Yemeni Civil War in 2015.[2] Some commentators have cited Hadi's federalization plan as one of the main causes of the civil war.[7]

(* B K P)

War and peace. The contradictions between the poles are sharpening. Around the poles: Yemen

It is clear that the so-called Riyadh Accord has failed to fuel a concerted effort between the representatives of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to put aside their political differences and refocus their attention on the northern Houthis.

The Government of National Salvation of Sanaa has made it clear that it will fight against the coalition and its mercenaries in the south and east of the country as long as the aggression does not stop and the blockade is not lifted.

It remains to be seen, therefore, how much longer the Saudis will continue with their disastrous and illegal intervention in Yemen, especially with the fall in oil prices and the internal political crises between the de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, and its rivals. The Saudis will soon discover that they have neither the will nor the resources to go through with their disastrous adventure in Yemen. =

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

(B K P)

UN, Red Sea Pirates Partners in fuel ship detention in Yemen

Yemenis warned of the starvation policy practiced by Saudi-led aggression coalition against the Yemeni people.

So, every time Yemeni oil company workers and employees have demands for the release of oil derivatives vessels detained by the US-led aggression coalition and the participation of the United Nations in this.

They stressed that the United Nations is a key partner in maritime piracy on fuel ships.

Despite the calls for distress and repeated requests for the release of the fuel ships, not a single liter of oil derivatives was allowed during 2021, YPC Executive Director Ammar al-Adhrue'e said.

He noted that 26 million Yemenis were threatened by piracy on fuel vessels and continued detention despite being granted UN permits.

"We have handed over all international reports, as well as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, to remind them of the article stipulates that all countries in the world should make every effort to stop and prevent piracy against any country in the world outside its territorial waters," he said.

Meanwhile, the company’s spokesman, Essam al-Mutawakel, stated the Yemeni people also incurred fines for detaining fuel ships last year, which amounted to $ 91 million, equivalent to Y.R 54 billion.

He said the situation in Yemen has become catastrophic as a result of the continued dete

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

(* B H)

Die Bürde, mädchenhaft auszusehen

Helle Haut, dezentes Benehmen: Im Jemen gibt es strenge Vorgaben für junge Frauen. Doch nicht nur dort wächst der Druck auf ihr äußeres Erscheinungsbild immer weiter.

Die Bürde, mädchenhaft auszusehen und sich zu verhalten, wird den Mädchen im Jemen vom Moment ihrer Geburt an auferlegt. Es ist eine Bedingung, um den Leuten zu gefallen, um der Familie keine abschätzigen Urteile einzubringen und um gute Heiratsanträge zu bekommen. Mütter konditionieren ihre Töchter dazu, sich ständig mit ihrem Äußeren zu beschäftigen, da der Wert einer Frau durch ihr Äußeres bestimmt ist. Das Äußere beeinflusst ihr Leben auf allen Ebenen, von den Heiratschancen bis hin zum Selbstwertgefühl.

Für die älteren Frauen ist es üblich, auf Partys und Hochzeiten die passende Schönheit für ihre Söhne zu finden und darüber zu reden. Als ich noch im Jemen war, hörte ich ihnen zu, wie sie diskutierten und stritten, welche Merkmale wünschenswert seien und welche nicht.

Es ist nichts falsch daran, einen Geschiedenen oder einen Menschen mit Behinderungen zu heiraten, aber der Punkt war, dass sie wegen ihrer Hautfarbe als nicht wert befunden wurde, einen gut aussehenden Mann für sich alleine zu haben. Und es wurde erwartet, dass sie ihren niedrigen Marktwert akzeptieren würde. Aber das hat sie nie getan. Sie ist jetzt dreißig Jahre alt, hat nie geheiratet, ist nie wieder zur Schule gegangen, es bleiben ihr nur noch die Mädchenpartys. Es gibt unzählige Mädchen wie Iman, ohne Zukunft, weil sie zu viel Hoffnung auf eine Heirat gesetzt haben und der Markt sie nicht annimmt.

Was mich dazu bringt, über die Mütter im Allgemeinen nachzudenken, im Jemen, aber vielleicht auch hier, und über die Last, die sie auf ihren Schultern tragen. Im Jemen sind sie diejenigen, die sich um die Zukunft, das wirtschaftliche Wohlergehen und den sozialen Status ihrer Töchter sorgen. Sie wissen, dass sie die fremdbestimmten Standards und Normen nicht vollständig abschaffen können, früher oder später werden ihre Töchter damit konfrontiert sein, besonders wenn sie keinen anderen Weg zur Selbstverwirklichung finden, als geheiratet zu werden und eine Familie zu gründen. Auch die Tatsache, dass Internet, soziale Medien und Fernsehen im Jemen heute in jedem Haus verfügbar sind und Marketing und Werbung überall präsent sind, hat dazu beigetragen, dass die Schönheitsnormen und der durch sie geschaffene Wettbewerb noch mehr Macht bekommen haben.

(* B H)

$127 million from World Bank to shore up food security and rural livelihoods in Yemen

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) have welcomed $127 million in support, provided by the World Bank, for an interagency project to fight the spread of extreme hunger in Yemen. The project will provide rural families with opportunities to build sustainable household food security.

Humanitarian needs in Yemen continue to rise. The country is reeling from the impacts of over six years of incessant conflict and economic disruptions compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, floods and desert locusts.

Currently, 16.2 million Yemenis face crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) according to the latest Integrated Food Security Classification analysis. This includes approximately 47,000 people experiencing catastrophic (IPC Phase 5) levels of food insecurity -famine like conditions.

The World Bank grant will focus on delivering immediate support to vulnerable households through cash-for-work opportunities and nutrition support for mothers and children. The project will also provide targeted livelihoods support aimed at boosting agricultural production in the short term, while enhancing agriculture's contributions to food security and economic activity over the longer term and building capacity for food security management.

"Food insecurity is one of the most pressing human development challenges facing Yemen. Within the broader context of the ongoing conflict and economic crisis, the combination of a high household dependence on food imports, high food prices, and significantly reduced income are having a devastating impact on people's lives," said Tania Meyer, World Bank Country Manager for Yemen. "The World Bank is adopting a multi-sectoral approach to food insecurity. The new Food Security Response and Resilience project is a key piece of this operational package, integrating immediate support to households with medium term interventions aimed at building resilience to future shocks".

and also

(B H)

Yemen: “Living in a catastrophic situation”

Many Yemenis have lost jobs, been wounded, and have been deprived of earning sufficient income for their families. Dabir said, “The food basket assistance came at the perfect time. We were in desperate need of such assistance. It alleviated the heavy burdens that my family was suffering from and gave us a glimmer of hope for a decent life.

(A H)

Emergency latrines: restoring the health and dignity of Yemen’s most vulnerable populations

By improving access to safe and adequate water supplies, building basic sanitation infrastructure for households, UNICEF and SIDA have helped entire communities to adopt positive health and hygiene practices.

Proper sanitation, hygiene, and safe water supplies have never been more urgent – particularly for the country’s most vulnerable populations. Yet, less than 10 per cent of displaced people (70 per cent of whom are women and children) have access to a safe latrine, and are forced to contend with a lack of privacy, the spread of disease, and acute watery diarrhea.

Due to longstanding problems with the water network and infrastructure, families have struggled to get enough water to meet their basic needs each day. Often, they are forced to travel long distances by foot or donkey in search of communal water supplies and working wells. Sometimes, despite their best efforts, they are left without water for several days, and suffer the effects of dehydration and lack of sanitation.

When 30-year-old Nora Salem fled her home in Khab Al Sha’af, in Al Jawf governorate, northern Yemen, five years ago, she never expected to end up being the sole breadwinner for her family of nine. After her father became ill and stopped working, and because of the conflict and a lack of public services in their region, the family was displaced to the Al Ayed camp for internally displaced persons. The family had to fetch water from a well located half an hour away, and water was not always available.

“Due to water scarcity, some members of our community suffered from health issues like kidney stones, and two of my younger sisters even contracted cholera. It was a hard life,” Nora explains.

The goal of UNICEF’s emergency response project for water and environmental sanitation was to provide adequate and safe sanitation for internally displaced persons in nine of Al Jawf governorate’s camps.

UNICEF used funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) to support its implementing partner Yemen Al-Khair for Relief and Development Foundation in mobilizing local teams.

(B H)

Over 2.2 million Yemeni children starving due to Saudi blockade

“Yemen recorded one of the highest levels of acute malnutrition, with a devastating toll on children less than 5 years. Over 2.25 million children are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition during 2021. 8,525 children were saved from malnutrition from January until June 2021,” the World Health Organisation (WHO) said in a tweet on Sunday.

referring to

(B H)

Water access: Delivering durable solutions for the most vulnerable in Yemen

ACTED is intervening in Yemen, in Dhamar governorate, due to the high number of needs and the severity of the situation for both host communities and internally displaced people. Home to 2,194,159 people of which 188,166 are internally displaced, in this governorate 65% of the population need humanitarian assistance.

As part of the Durable Solutions project, ACTED intervenes in three districts in Dhamar governorate that were identified as having high levels of food insecurity and vulnerability, including high presence of IDPs: Dhamar city district hosts the highest estimated number of IDPs; Jahran district hosts the largest number of IDPs settled in collective sites; whereas Jabal Al-Sharq district has a high presence of long-term IDPs, including IDPs living in collective shelters.

To assess the level of vulnerability of three districts and identify the needs of internally displaced people, returnees and host communities, the Durable Solutions Consortium partners conducted interviews with district managers and public service provider experts. The needs of the population are extensive, ranging from rehabilitation of hospitals, health clinics and schools to restoring access to water, sanitation and hygiene, as well as providing access to income generating activities.

The construction of water infrastructures in Dhamar governorate

In consultation with local authorities, ACTED established that four water points and one water network needed to be rehabilitated or constructed in Dhamar City district.

(B H)

Yemen Cash and Voucher Assistance Snapshot (CVA) (January - December 2020)

This 2020 Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA) Snapshot provides an overview of all humanitarian and development CVA activities and the percentage of funding. It also provides a breakdown of sector-specific and Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance (MPCA) programs implemented by partners in Yemen.

(* B H)

Welternährungsprogramm: Hungerkrise im Jemen verschlimmert sich

Die Hungerkrise im Bürgerkriegsland Jemen verschlimmert sich nach Angaben des Welternährungsprogramms (WFP) von Tag zu Tag.

Die Lebensmittelpreise schiessen durch die Decke, und Millionen Menschen kämpfen, um sich und ihre Familien noch ernähren zu können, wie Tobias Flaemig vom WFP am Dienstag aus der Hauptstadt Sanaa berichtete.

Die Benzinpreise seien 90 Prozent höher als vor einem Jahr, was den Transport und damit auch die Lebensmittel verteuere.

Hilfsorganisationen und auch die Vereinten Nationen warnen bereits seit langem immer wieder vor einer Hungersnot im Jemen. Dass diese noch nicht deklariert wurde, liegt Flaemig zufolge auch daran, dass man dafür genaue Daten über Mangelernährung und Todesfälle brauche, die aber in den Konfliktgebieten kaum erhoben werden könnten. «Menschen fangen nicht an zu sterben, wenn eine Hungersnot deklariert ist - vielmehr ist es umgekehrt: Todesfälle führen zur Erklärung einer Hungersnot», sagte Flaemig. Er rief zu mehr Spenden auf. Das WFP brauche 1,9 Milliarden Dollar für den Jemen, habe aber erst eine Milliarde Dollar (850 Mio Euro) erhalten. =

(* B H)

Film: Sturzfluten im Jemen, tödliche Überschwemmungen, die die Mehrheit der Welt nicht sieht

Apocalyptic foods in Yemen the world does not see

(B H)

Yemen: Flood Snapshot (As of 30 May 2021)

Torrential rains and flooding that started in mid-April and continued into May have resulted in casualties as well as caused widespread damage to infrastructure in 37 1 districts across 14 governorates of Yemen, with Aden, Lahj, Dhamar, Abyan and Ma’rib governorates most affected.

Extensive damage was incurred by property and structures including sites hosting internally displaced persons (IDPs), houses, farms, roads, power networks and sewage systems. During such flooding events, children face a heightened risk of injuries, displacement, family separation, psychosocial distress, disease and death. As of 23 June, some 6,438 families have been impacted, mostly displaced families residing in inadequate shelters, up to 4,468 of whom required some form of urgent humanitarian assistance.

(B H)

RDP Yemen: Monthly Situation Report (June 2021)

Serving a total of 1,544 individuals of children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women with therapeutic supplements (Plumpy Sup & WSB+) in Sama and As Silw districts of Taizz Gov.

Delivering micronutrient supplements to a total of 18,330 children under 2 and 98,379 pregnant and lactating women in 12 targeted districts of Ibb, Taizz, and Hajjah Govs.

Providing food vouchers to a total number of 630 individuals (90 HHs) of crisis-affected IDPs in Bajil district of A-Hudaydah Gov.

Distributing a total amount of 658.358 MTs of food baskets to 53,410 individuals of 7,630 most affected HHs in three districts of Al Bayda Gov.

(A H P)

UNDP and the Republic of Korea Support Women’s Access to Justice and Health Security

The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are working together toward stronger gender justice and health security for 10,000 women and 10,000 children in Aden and Mukalla amid the ongoing conflict and the COVID-19 crisis.

The project, Enhanced COVID-19 Protection through Inclusive Security Governance, will work in partnership with the Yemen Women Union (YWU) to convene women leaders from the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MOSAL), and the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MOPHP) for training and capacity building.

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

(* B H)

UN: 53% of displaced Yemenis are children

Fifty-three per cent of those displaced in Yemen are children, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) announced yesterday.

The humanitarian organisation explained that Yemeni refugees are struggling "even more when being forced to flee their homes."

"In #Yemen, 53% of those displaced by the ongoing conflict are children," the UNHCR said on Twitter, adding that in spite of this, "they always find a way to be happy".

Save the Children recently reported that nine out of ten Yemeni children in refugee camps did not have access to "food, water, schooling."

"In 2020, an estimated 115,000 children were forced to flee their homes because of the escalating violence, mainly around Marib and the Hodeida, Hajjah and Taiz regions," Save the Children said in a press release, noting that some 25,000 children and their families had to leave their homes since the beginning of 2021.

(A H)

Torrential rains have swept dozens of IDPs tents in Marib and hundreds of displaced persons have been badly affected/Marib News facebook page.

(B H)

Yemen: UNHCR Operational update, covering the period 10 to 15 July 2021

An escalation of hostilities in Al Baydha governorate since 2 July has resulted in the recent displacement of some 85 Yemeni families (510 individuals). Out of this, 27 families (138 individuals) relocated to Dhamar governorate, while 58 families (348 individuals) were displaced internally within Al Baydha city. Protection Cluster partners are carrying out protection assessments to determine the needs of these families.
UNHCR assessments in the north through the Initial Needs Assessment Tool (INAT) were suspended on 5 July pending further discussions on a particular form with the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (SCMCHA). For now, only the protection monitoring tool is operational to allow responses to emergency cases.
UNHCR partner Yemen General Union of Sociologists, Social Workers and Psychologists (YGUSSWP) verified the arrival of 82 new IDPs families to multiple districts in Sana’a governorate, who had been referred to a community centre to receive appropriate assistance.
YGUSSWP also reported that the number of children visiting the community centre is on the rise.

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

Siehe / Look at cp1

(A P)

Houthi-controlled areas largest hotbeds for human trafficking, [Hadi gov.] Yemeni minister says

(A P)

Mohammed Abdulsalam slams US hypocrisy on Yemen

The head of the Yemeni national delegation, Mohammed Abdulsalam, said on Wednesday that the recently issued American position has proved US support for the aggression and the siege on Yemen.

Abdulsalam affirmed on Twitter that the US positions completely contradict their repeated calls for achieving peace in Yemen.

Abdulsalam said that “the deceptive US policy is exposed ahead of any field transformation made in its favor, but when its elements and agents retreat, it rushes to change the discourse, not in response to a real reality, but rather with the goal to deceive.”


Yemen’s Houthi militia reject US call to stop Marib offensive

The Iran-backed Houthis have rebuffed the latest US call to stop their deadly military offensive on the central Yemeni city of Marib, accusing the Americans of supporting their opponents.

Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdul-Salam lashed out at the US on Wednesday for calling for the offensive to cease, and for renewing support for the internationally recognized government, accusing Washington of fueling the war in Yemen and imposing a “blockade.”

(A P)

Mass rallies held across Yemen on the occasion of Eid al-Ghadir

The Yemeni capital Sana’a and other provinces have on Wednesday witnessed mass rallies in several main squares to celebrate the annual anniversary of Al-Walaya Day, the day on which the Prophet Mohammed (Peace Be Upon Him) selected Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib as his successor.



(A P)

Sayyid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi: The forces of tyranny seek to infiltrate and exploit the Islamic Ummah

The Leader of the Revolution, Sayyid Abdul-Malik Badreddin al-Houthi, said on Wednesday that “the forces of the tyrant, led by the United States of America and the Israeli entity seek to impose their mandate on the nation by exploiting the state of chaos, disorder and cultural penetration.”

This came during his speech, which was delivered to the crowds of the Yemeni people that were celebrating Eid al-Ghadir.

Al-Houthi affirmed that “the biggest threat to the nation in this era is the enemies’ attempt to take control over us through cultural, intellectual and internal penetration.”

He explained that “the Jews are capable of confusing truth with falsehood, and are skilled in forgery at the religious level and the level of symbols and loyalties.”

“Al-Walaya [meaning “guardianship” or “governance” and referring to the Prophet Muhammad proclaiming Ali ibn Abi Talib as his successor as leader of the Islamic community] is very important in protecting the nation from penetration and the possibility of controlling and exploiting the nation,” al-Houthi added.

Sayyid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi pointed out that “the hypocrites move under the titles of faith and exploit it in order to corrupt the nation in its loyalty and operational methodology.”


(A P)

Mass rallies to mark ‘Al-Walaya Day’ planned all across Yemen


(A P)

Leader of Revolution: the Yemeni people celebrate Welayah Day as historical heritage, not a new habit

The Leader of the Revolution Abdul-Malik al-Houthi affirmed that the Yemeni people celebrate Welayah Day as a historical heritage of faith and not a new custom.

In his speech on Wednesday, the Leader of the Revolution congratulated the Islamic nation on the occasion of Eid Al-Ghadir also known Welayah Day.

He said, "The celebration of Al-Ghadir Day is an expression of gratitude to Allah and an acknowledgment of the completion of grace and the completion of religion, adding "by our revival this day, we testify to the Great Messenger Mohammed that he delivered the message that Allah commanded him to do."

Al-Houthi pointed out that among the contributions to preserving the prophetic text is the celebration of Al-Ghadir Day and talking about acknowledgment of the message of the Messenger of Allah on this day, indicating that the messengers of Allah are the channels of connection to the guiding mandate or Welayah.

Houthi conditions hinder introducing 4G service to Yemen

Yemen's Houthi government has asked mobile phone operators to transform into joint-stock companies before obtaining license to operate the 4th generation (4G) system.
"This measure is a key step and obligatory for mobile phone companies under the (Houthi-adopted) law.. and policies governing the issuance of licenses for modern generations," the Houthi-run ministry of telecommunications said in an official statement.
All the mobile phone operators in Yemen (YemenMobile, MTN, SabaFon and Y) are governed by Sana'a-based Houthi authority, as the UN-recognized government failed to move the system to an area under its control.

(A P)

Houthi militants kill 5 people including 4 family members on their farm in north Yemen

Houthi militants have killed five people including three brothers and a child, on their terraces in north Yemen's Hajjah province over alleged land dispute, Yemeni activists said on Sunday.

Activists said militants from Bani Alsabah clan led by their relative Hamed Alsabah, an influential officer in the Houthi militia's local "Criminal Investigation Department" shot dead five unarmed people and injured a sixth on Sadeq Alnajjar's farm in Saasah neighborhood in Hajjah.

(A P)

Houthis shut down internet for Marib

The Houthi militia have shut down internet for Marib to isolate the government-held province they wage a months-long war against from the world, local sources said on Monday.

(A P)

Houthi extremist accidentally kills his mother instead of his father

A Houthi extremist has killed his mother in an errant shot that was aimed his father in central Yemen's Dhamar province, it has been confirmed.

The extremist had been in dispute with his parents over not following the Houthi movement's religious hardline and used to call them "Takfeeris" a term the Houthi terrorist movement use against pro-government Yemenis.

(A P)

Watch: Iran-backed Houthis decimate citizen’s house in Bayda

The Iran-backed Houthi militia blew up the house of a citizen in the al-Bayda province, central Yemen, on Sunday with an explosion, according to a video shared by Yemen’s information minister.

Yemeni Minister of Information Moammar al-Eryani said that the Iranian-backed Houthi militia blew up the house of citizen identified as Hussein Saleh al-Barmani al-Humayqani in the al-Zahir al-Humiqan district of al-Bayda province (with film)

and film also:


(B P)

Houthis blow up 816 houses of opponents, entire villages in Yemen, government

Yemen's internationally recognised government has accused the Iran-allied Houthi group of blowing up 816 homes and entire villages across the country since 2014.

(A P)

Tribal attempts to solve tensions between Houthis, Jawf tribesmen

The Yemeni northern governorate of Jawf on Saturday witnessed military tension between the Houthi group and armed tribesmen, who engaged in fighting with the Iranian-backed group few weeks ago.
The new tensions were sparked after a Houthi security checkpoint detained a tribesman, triggering a state of alert, local sources said.
Tribal gunmen kidnapped a Houthi official in reprisal for the detention of a tribesman from Bani Nawf Tribe, Jawf information director tweeted, amid tribal and local attempts to prevent any armed clashes.

(A P)

Houthi militants assassinate Abdurahim Ali Ismael a Houthi senior militant close to the militia's leader Abdulmalik Al-Houthi. His assassination comes as part of the continuous rivalry and physical eliminations within the terrorist militia/Wasal Press and other websites

(A P)

In a new fabrication, Houthis plant Al-Qaeda and ISIS flags in Beidha and conduct interviews with allegedly [arrested] Al-Qaeda fighters to sell the propaganda that they are engaged in a showdown with Al-Qaeda, Yemen's Information Minister Al-Eryani has said/Multiple websites

(A P)

Missing Yemeni child found dismembered in Houthi military site

A child who was declared by his family missing in central Yemen's Dhamar last week has been found dead with internal organs removed from his body in a Houthi military training site, informed sources have said.

(A P)

Bani Nouf tribes capture Houthi supervisor

Violent clashes broke out between the tribes of Bani Nouf and the Houthi militia, at dawn on Thursday 22 July, in the district of Al Maslub, Governorate of Al Jawf, in north-eastern Yemen.

Armed clashes broke out between the two sides after members of the tribe kidnapped one of the supervisors of the Houthi militia from the market in Al-Hazm, the center of the Governorate.

(A P)

“A bleak future awaits Yemen. The Houthis are taking children out of schools and enrolling them in religious courses, then military courses in a hurry, and from there to the war fronts, and they end up in the cemeteries.” (photo)

referring to

(B P)

Sameera Alhawri: Today two years ago, I was abducted and forcibly disappeared by Houthis in stinky, dark basement for three months. @sameerahawri (photos)

cp6 Südjemen und Hadi-Regierung / Southern Yemen and Hadi-government

Siehe / Look at cp1

(A K P)

Saudi Arabia sends shipment of weapons to Socotra airport in Yemen

A Saudi military plane has landed on Friday at the airport in Yemen’s Socotra Island
According to local sources, the Saudi cargo plane was arriving from al-Ghaydah airport carrying soldiers and weapons on board.

(A P)

[Separatists claim:] Corruption-of-brotherhood-authority-in-shabwa-road-projects-is-revealed-by-torrents/

(A P)

[Separatists at] Zinjibar-denounces-the-high-prices-and-the-role-of-legitimacy-in-the-crisis

(A P)

[Separatists claim:] The-brotherhood-steals-state-lands-in-shabwa-under-the-supervision-of-the-governor

(A T)

UAE mercenary patrol vehicle attacked in Aden

(A P)

Yemen: STC closes Islah Charitable Society office in Aden

The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) on Thursday closed the headquarters of the Islah-affiliated Charitable Society for Social Welfare in the Dar Saad district of the Aden Governorate, Anadolu Agency reported.

Al-Islah Charitable Society is affiliated with the largest Islamic party in the country, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, which carries out charitable and humanitarian work often focusing on helping low-income families, displaced persons and people with special needs.

and also

(A P)

Hadi returns to Riyadh after undergoing medical exams in US

(A P)

Peace in Yemen requires more international pressure on Houthis, PM

(A P)


(A P)

The office of the Supreme Court's chief justice has said in a statement, "The formation of a panel by [separatist] Southern Yemen Club of Judges to undertake auditing the expenditures of Yemen's judicial power is an interference in the affairs of the judiciary and a stark violation of the judiciary's autonomy." /Multiple websites.

(* A P)

Yemen Parliament to convene in Seiyun soon

The presidency of Yemen's Parliament on Wednesday resumed its activities in Seiyun city in the eastern province of Hadhramaut.

Its Secretariat General held its first meeting in the city, and in the next weeks, it will make all arrangements and create a good atmosphere for the convening of Parliament, the state Saba news agency said.

It called on the international community and international organisations to take a clear position towards Houthi practices against the Yemeni people, including prolonging the war.
Its members led by the Speaker Sultan Al-Barakani arrived in Seiyun on Tuesday amid growing tensions between the internationally recognised government and the UAE-backed southern transitional council, STC.

More recently, STC leaders said they would not allow Parliament to convene in the city.

The head of the council's assembly Ahmed bin Breik called the government and Parliament as traitors and threatened to shake the ground under their feet.


(* A P)

STC Presidency rejects convening of Yemen's parliament, calls for govt's return

President of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and Supreme Commander of the Southern Armed Forces, Maj. Gen. Aidroos Qassem al-Zubaidi chaired in the southern port city Aden on Thursday, the regular meeting of the STC Presidency in the presence of the STC's ministers in the power-sharing government.
The meeting discussed the latest developments in the southern arena, in particular the military and security situations and deteriorating living conditions.
The STC presidency expressed its firm support for the people of Hadramout in rejecting the presence of the Yemeni parliament in Seiyun city, especially under the current difficult conditions and hardship they are going through.
The meeting reiterated the STC's calls for the power-sharing government to return to Aden and end its unjustified absence, in addition to assume its responsibilities in addressing issues such as delayed payment of salaries and breakdown of essential public services among others.
The STC presidency stressed on the need for fully implementing the remaining terms of the Riyadh Agreement without any selectivity, in addition to formatting a joint negotiating team to participate in the UN-mediated inclusive political process.

and also


(A P)

[Separatists’ supporters at ]Seiyun, al-Mukalla protest against Yemeni parliament

Hundreds took to the streets of Seiyun in Wadi Hadramout on Friday night, in protest against the legitimacy's decision to hold the Yemeni parliament session in the second largest city of the oil-rich province of Hadramout.
The protesters, who raised the national flags of the South, gathered in front of the historic Palace of Seiyun to peacefully express their anger at the presence of the Yemeni Speaker of the expired House of Representatives in the province and to affirm their categorical rejection of convening a session of (dead) parliament in Seiyun city.
Earlier the same day, Hundreds of people staged a rally in the city of al-Mukalla, the provincial capital of Hadramout, against the convening of the Yemeni parliament in Seiyun city.

and also


(A P)

Yemen MPs come back home in preparation to convene in Sayoon city

A number of Yemeni MPs have returned back home from exile in preparation for convening a session in Sayoon, a city in the government-held eastern province of Hadhramout.

Local sources said, "The presidency of the parliament have arrived to Sayoon city in an official mission."


(A P)

Speaker of Yemeni parliament Sultan al-Barakani, his deputies Mohammed al-Shadadi, and Mohsen Basurah arrived Seiyon, Hadramout governorate, today (photos)


(A P)

Parliament decision could drag legitimacy and STC into war: Observers

The Parliament Speaker Sultan al-Barakani and his vices approved on Wednesday the preparations for holding the parliament's sessions as soon as possible in Seiyun, the second largest city of the southern governorate of Hadramout, the state news agency Saba reported.
The decision to convene the parliamentary sessions in Seiyun was made amid warnings launched by the Southern Transitional Council (STC) that reiterated its categorical rejection of the presence of the Yemeni parliament in Seiyun.
In a statement issued on Saturday, the STC called on the people of the province to reject the plans of convening of the parliament sessions in Seiyun and to pre-empt it by peaceful means, affirming that the parliament does not represent the Southerners nor the people of Hadramout.
According to observers, such decision could drag the two parties to the Riyadh Agreement (Yemen's government and STC) into a never-ending armed conflict.

(A P)


(A T)

Update: One dead and two wounded in explosion attack near Aden

and also

(A T)

Explosive device injures several UAE-backed mercenaries in Aden


(A T)

Soldier killed, two injured by roadside bomb in Aden

A soldier was killed and two others were injured in an explosion near a checkpoint in Aden's Khormaksar district on Tuesday.
According to security reports, terrorist elements planted explosives near the wall of the Faculty of Education in the location of the security checkpoint.

(A T)

Senior al-Qaeda leader killed in Yemen

A senior al-Qaeda leader has been killed on Monday in Shabwah province, southern Yemen.

(A P)

Regional plot to conquer Yemeni Shabwa, circumvent Marib

A regional plot is being crafted to stab the Yemeni legitimate government at back, Yemen's former minister of transportation tweeted on Monday.
The United Arab Emirates and Iran coordinate the plot that is applied by their local proxies, Saleh al-Jabwani added.
"The plot's actual execution has already begun in Baydha governorate," he claimed, as "the conspiracy evidently unveiled in the form of great cooperation between Houthis [who carried out] counterattack and the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) militia who blocked the only supply route" for government troops."
In the plot's second stage, Shabwa would be overtaken through an attack on government troops from two main axes, with Houthis attacking via Baihan-Ataq axis and the STC-run Ba Rasheed brigade advancing from Mukalla to take control of Balhaf-Ahwar coastlines, Jabwani warned.

(A P)

MPs urge Yemen President to overhaul Central Bank

Members of Parliament have called on the internationally recognised President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi to overhaul the Central Bank of Yemen and rationalise the public spending in order to control the sharp depreciation of the national currency.

The failure of the government to address the national issues, topped by the economic recovery, is exacerbating the suffering of thepeople, 14 MPs said in a letter sent to Hadi on Sunday.

The Yemeni rial is trading at around 1.000 per US dollar, down from 250 when the war started in 2014.

The MPs demanded to appoint a new and competent executive management of the Bank and commit the local governments in all provinces to deposit state revenues into the Bank.

and also

(A P)


(B P)

Wounded veterans of Saudi-led forces abandoned to their fate in India

A number of wounded in the ranks of the Saudi-led coalition currently residing in India, have complained of being insulted and threatened with imprisonment due to the failure of their leadership to fulfill its financial obligations towards them.

Balqis TV channel, which is affiliated with the Yemeni Islah Party, reported the difficult situation of the wounded, who have reached a state that they can not feed themselves.

Some wounded even confirmed that they mortgaged their passports and most of what they owned to get food and drink from restaurants and shops, in addition to their inability to pay the rent.

According to the channel, the wounded who fought in the ranks of the coalition are liable to be imprisoned at any time by the Indian police because of the accumulated debts owed to restaurants, housing owners and others, not to mention suffering from the discontinuation of treatment and the failure to perform the surgeries scheduled for them.

The wounded told the channel that they are vulnerable to permanent disabilities caused by lack of surgery, which reveals the ugliness and the extent of corruption practiced by Hadi’s government and its foreign backers.

(A P)

Oil leaking from abandoned tanker damages nature reserve in Yemen: gov’t official

An oil leakage from a long-abandoned oil tanker in Yemen started damaging the country’s nature reserve in the southern port city of Aden, a government official told Xinhua on Wednesday.

The private oil tanker Dia began to sink on July 18 off the southern coast of Yemen near the Port of Aden, leaving an oil slick of more than 20 km along the shore and causing damage to the Al-Huswah natural reserve, the only nature reserve in the city, the local government source said on condition of anonymity.

Last week, Mohammed Amzarba, CEO of the Aden Ports Administration, told the state-run Saba News Agency that the government was still having problems in refloating the Dia after multiple attempts.

and also


(A P)

Aden authorities fail to flout sunk oil tanker

Bad weather and severe winds are to blame for failed attempts to set Dia oil tanker afloat, Aden port authorities said Saturday, days after the ship sank off the Yemeni city port and leaked a great deal of oil into the Arabian Sea.
Although many attempts were made immediately after the ship sank, bad weather made it difficult to move ship, the authorities added in a statement, without details about the leakage that reached al-Haswa natural reservation.
Four derelict ships were towed out of Aden port main channel, the statement said, as other ships deserted in the area for years will be pulled soon.
A plan was developed to tow all the boats hindering navigation activity in the port. Since they posed risks to the navigation channel, the nearest ships were towed first, it added.
The port authorities will continue efforts, depending on their available resources and weather conditions, to float the oil tanker and tow it out of the channel, according to the statement.

(A P)

Protests erupt in Hadhramaut against hike in fuel prices

Scores of people took to streets of Yemen's eastern province of Hadhramaut on Sunday to protest against a hike in fuel prices.

They closed main roads in the capital city, Mukalla, and burned tires on them, eyewitnesses said.

On Saturday, the office of the Yemen Petroleum Company in the province increased the prices of benzene and diesel by 20%, maximum 600 hundred rials per litre.

and also

(A P)

STC renews rejection to making Seiyun seat for Yemeni parliament

The executive body of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Hadramout reiterated its categorical rejection of the presence of the Yemeni parliament in Seiyun, the second largest city of Hadramout governorate.
In a statement issued on Saturday, the STC called on the people of the province to reject the plans of convening of Yemen's parliament in Seiyun and to pre-empt it by peaceful means, affirming that such parliament does not represent the Southerners nor the people of Hadramout.

(A P)

UAE-backed southern separatists arrest pro-government fighters in Yemen

UAE-backed Yemeni southern separatists arrested the leaders of anti-Houthi fighters, who are allied with the Yemeni government, reports said.

According to a source within the anti-Houthi camp, the members of the security belt of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) arrested their leading members in the Al-Zahir district, south of the city of Al-Bayda, while they were returning from Aden.

(A P)

Al-Jaadi: High hopes of liberating Sana'a shattered

The orientation made by the Yemeni arm of Muslim Brotherhood organization within Yemen's legitimacy, in the path of war towards the South makes the liberation of Sana'a an elusive goal and it keeps getting more and more distant day by day, the member of the presidency of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and assistant secretary general, Fadl al-Jaadi said on Friday.
All the high hopes of liberating Sana'a from the grip of the Houthis have been shattered." al-Jaadi wrote on his official Twitter account, noting that the reason was not "the lack of support or the failure of the Arab Coalition."

(A P)

Yemen: separatists threaten to halt government meetings in south

A senior official of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) threatened on Thursday to prevent the Yemeni government and parliament from meeting in the south of the country. Ahmed Bin Brik of the separatist STC's National Assembly made his threat on Twitter, and called members of the internationally-recognised government "the dwarves who sold Ma'rib and want to legitimise their presence in the south."

(A P)

[Separatist] president-al-zubaidi-principles-and-values-%e2%80%8b%e2%80%8bof-reconciliation-and-tolerance-are-an-approach-southerners-follow-to-restore-their-state

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp7 – cp19

Vorige / Previous:

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-752 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-752 oder / or

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

09:00 31.07.2021
Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
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Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
Schreiber 0 Leser 22
Dietrich Klose