Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 758 - Yemen War Mosaic 758

Yemen Press Reader 758: 7. September 2021: Fotoausstellung: Jemen, Konflikt + Chaos – Hunger als Waffe der Kriegsparteien Jemen – Wie der neue UN-Gesandte die Grundlage für Frieden legen kann ..
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... Gewalt bedrängt den „sicheren Hafen“ Marib – Zugangsprobleme im Jemen – Kosten des „Krieges gegen den Terror“ – und mehr

September 7, 2021: Photo exhibition: Yemen, Conflict + Chaos – The Use of Starvation by Warring Parties in Yemen – How the new UN envoy can lay foundations for peaceViolence closes in on ‘safe-haven' Marib – Access challenges in Yemen – What the “War on Terror” has cost us so far – and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2:

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp11 Deutschland / Germany

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade

cp13b Söldner / Mercenaries

cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle

cp19 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification




(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

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In Kürze: 10 Fakten zur Situation im Jemen

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Yemen’s Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering

Yemen’s internal divisions and a Saudi-led military intervention have spawned an intractable political, military, and humanitarian crisis.


The seven-year-old conflict in Yemen is between the internationally recognized government, which is backed by a Saudi-led military coalition, and Houthi rebels supported by Iran.

The country’s humanitarian crisis is said to be the worst in the world, due to widespread hunger, disease, and attacks on civilians.

As the UN-backed, two-party peace process has stalled, some experts have suggested that better representing the many parties involved in the conflict would yield better results.


Yemen, a small country on the Arabian Peninsula, has become the site of grievous civilian suffering amid an intractable civil war. Many analysts say the fighting, now seven years old, has turned into a proxy war: Iran-backed Houthi rebels, who overthrew the Yemeni government, are pitted against a multinational coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The involvement of other combatants, including an al-Qaeda affiliate and the self-declared Islamic State, as well as the emergence of rival factions within groups, has complicated the picture.

The conflict has displaced more than one million people and given rise to cholera outbreaks, medicine shortages, and threats of famine. The United Nations calls the humanitarian crisis in Yemen “the worst in the world,” and the situation could spiral further as foreign aid has slowed amid the COVID-19 pandemic and peace negotiations have stalled.

What are the prospects for a solution to the crisis?

Observers worry that friction among regional actors, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, is prolonging the war. Conditions deteriorated in late 2019, when the Houthis claimed responsibility for a missile attack on Saudi oil facilities. UN monitors concluded that the Houthis did not carry out the attack; the Saudi-led coalition blamed Iran.

Yet, some analysts say that a thaw in Iran-Saudi Arabia relations in 2021, driven in part by the economic toll of the COVID-19 pandemic, possibly signals a détente is on the way in Yemen. Meanwhile, other experts argue that viewing the war as a two-party proxy conflict, as exemplified by UN Security Council Resolution 2216, is unproductive given the fragmentation of anti-Houthi forces and the involvement of foreign powers. Peace talks that involve more political parties and civil society groups could level the playing field, they say.

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Decoded | Yemen civil war: Who is fighting whom and why

When Saudi Arabia launched strikes at the Houthis in 2014, it said the war would be over in weeks. But the civil war is still going on for about seven years, with the Houthis remaining firm in the capital Sanaa.

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

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Yemen: Conflict + Chaos - A special exhibition at Visa pour l'image

Over the last four years, photographer Giles Clarke has reported from Yemen for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Visa pour l'image, one of the world's most famous photojournalism festivals, is featuring his work in a special exhibition.

With a unique humanitarian approach Giles documents the tragedy of a country devastated by war, but also portrays the resilience and strength of its people (Photos)

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Starvation Makers: The Use of Starvation by Warring Parties in Yemen as a Method of Warfare

Executive summary:

In Yemen, parties to the conflict have deprived civilians of objects that are essential to their survival (OIS), starving them, in some cases to death.

When asked about the impacts that warring party attacks and other conduct have had on their lives, people across Yemen described dire effects on food sources, water sources and critical civilian infrastructure. After the Saudi and United Arab Emirates-led coalition started bombing artisanal fishermen in the waters off Al-Hudaydah, one woman said her “son was no longer able to go fishing.” They “decided to flee,” fearing [they] would either die from starvation or that [a Saudi/UAE-led coalition] aircraft would kill [them].”[1] The sea “meant everything for the community”[2] but had become a place of fear. Some fishermen had no choice but to return to fishing, “because [they] have no other source of food or income.”[3] Similarly, in Dhubab District in Taiz governate, a man talked about how the Ansar Allah (Houthi) armed group (Ansar Allah) had laid landmines everywhere, with “no signs or maps showing their whereabouts,” becoming “a threat to all of [them].”[4] Residents of areas in which landmines had been planted by Ansar Allah said that they had not “suffer[ed] from starvation or water scarcity before the mines were planted, and [their] livelihood was fine,” but because of the landmines, they “stopped herding, logging, and agriculture, and [their] water has been cut off.”[5]

Following a year-long investigation, and several years of research and documentation across Yemen, this Mwatana for Human Rights (Mwatana) and Global Rights Compliance (GRC) report documents conduct of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition—acting with the consent of the internationally recognized Government of Yemen and fighting with the Yemeni military—and Ansar Allah that has likely violated prohibitions under international humanitarian law (IHL) and international humanitarian law (IHRL).

In Part G, we document airstrikes by the Saudi/UAE-led coalition on farms in Abs District in Hajjah Governate, on water facilities in the Sahar and Kitaf wa Al Buqa’a districts in Saada Governate, and on artisanal fishing boats and equipment in Alluheyah District in Al-Hudaydah Governate. The attacks destroyed, damaged and/or rendered useless OIS, namely agricultural areas, irrigation works, livestock, foodstuffs, water infrastructure, fishing boats and fishing equipment. Airstrikes on fishermen, in particular, instilled fear in the fishing population, preventing them from fishing at their pre-existing capacity.

In Part H, we document Ansar Allah-imposed restrictions on humanitarian relief actions in Saada Governate and their widespread use of landmines in Taiz Governate. Restrictions on humanitarian organizations’ operations and the diversion and redirection of humanitarian aid to Ansar Allah-loyalists constituted effective refusals to consent to humanitarian relief action and to allow and facilitate the passage of impartial relief action; restrictions were so severe that they forced the World Food Programme (WFP) to suspend its operations in 2019 and again in 2020. Ansar Allah actions deprived civilians of indispensable aid, including food. Ansar Allah’s widespread and indiscriminate use of landmines in wholly civilian areas, including in the Al-Omari area of Dhubab District, Taiz Governate, constituted attacks on grazing and agricultural areas (OIS) that damaged, destroyed or otherwise rendered the areas useless. The widespread and indiscriminate use of landmines in the area, which have injured and killed some shepherds and their livestock, has instilled fear in the farming population, preventing them from accessing agricultural land.

Mwatana and GRC conclude that members of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah used starvation as a method of warfare. Their conduct severely impeded civilians’ access to food and water, and they acted in spite of the widespread knowledge of the dire humanitarian situation in Yemen, where people, including children, were dying from starvation. Members of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah were aware of the virtual certainty that, following their conduct, starvation would occur in the ordinary course of events—that is, without humanitarian intervention—or intended to use starvation as a method of warfare.

Further investigation with a view to mapping and identifying those responsible for the use of starvation as a method of warfare, as well as other crimes committed in the context of the conflict in Yemen, is required to determine the identity of the perpetrators and the mode/s of liability under which they may be held responsible.

1. Parties to the conflict in Yemen committed starvation as a war crime

This report focuses on the use of starvation as a war crime in the conflict in Yemen. We analyse the conduct of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah in the context of the IHL prohibition and the corollary war crime.

IHL prohibits the use of starvation as a method of warfare. Article 14 of AP II prohibits the use of “starvation as a method of warfare” in non-international armed conflicts, stating that “[it] is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, [OIS], such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.”

Using starvation as a method of warfare is a war crime. As recognized by Article 8(2)(e)(xix) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in addition to the conduct Article 14 of AP II prohibits, wilfully impeding relief supplies may also constitute the war crime of starvation. Although the ICC does not currently have jurisdiction over the parties to the conflict in Yemen, the definition under the Rome Statute is nevertheless relevant. It provides the most recent and comprehensive articulation of the crime of starvation. Any future domestic proceedings based on universal jurisdiction are likely to rely on the Rome Statute (see Part F, Section 2).

After finding that the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah intentionally (Part G, Section and Part H, Sections and, and unlawfully (Part F, Sections 1.2.2 and 2.2.1; Part G, Section 5.2.1; and Part H, Sections and, deprived civilians of objects which constituted OIS, and that Ansar Allah wilfully impeded relief supplies, we examine whether members of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah may have intended to starve civilians or whether they had knowledge of the virtual certainty that starvation would result from their actions in the ordinary course of events (that is, without intervention); the defining mens rea element of the crime under Article 30 of the Rome Statute.

The report assesses a range of indicators of intent relevant to determining whether starvation as a war crime was committed. Indications of intent in conflict are rarely overt, particularly with respect to crimes that require specific intent, like starvation. Instead, indirect or circumstantial evidence from which intent can be inferred is often necessary to determine what was in the minds of the perpetrator/s when they decided on, ordered, or otherwise assisted or participated in the conduct documented. It is also difficult, although not impossible, to establish that a single attack on OIS or restriction of access to OIS was carried out with intent to starve civilians. Bearing this in mind, the pattern of conduct—relied upon in numerous criminal trials in which war crimes have been prosecuted—and the context surrounding the attacks becomes vital to understanding why individuals acted as they did.

1.1. The general context in which the conduct occurred

Food insecurity is not incidental to the conflict in Yemen—the conflict, and the conduct of the warring parties, drives it. When the conflict began in 2014, approximately 41% of the population in Yemen was food insecure (see Part E, Section 2.1). According to the WFP and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OHCA), the percentage of the population that is food insecure has increased almost every year since 2014. In early 2021, WFP reported that Yemen was “headed straight toward the biggest famine in modern history,” with “over 400,000 children at risk of dying” and 16.2 million people facing acute food insecurity (see Part E, Section 2.2).

OCHA reported that 66% of people needing support to treat or prevent malnutrition in 2021 are women and, of the 4.7 million people requiring treatment for acute malnutrition in 2021, 1.2 million are pregnant and lactating women (see Part E, Section 4).

Chronic food insecurity and the risk of famine have been particularly acute in the Hajjah, Saada, Al-Hudaydah and Taiz Governates, wherein the starvation-related conduct documented in this report occurred. These governates have been classified by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification as Phase 3 (crisis) or Phase 4 (emergency) throughout the conflict, with pockets of them at various times projected to be in Phase 5 (famine) (See Part C and Part E, Section 2.2).

While the number of people who have been killed during the conflict in Yemen vary by source, OCHA estimated that the conflict has directly and indirectly caused 233,000 deaths (including of persons directly participating in hostilities), with more than half—131,000 deaths—resulting “from indirect causes such as a lack of food, health services and infrastructure.”

Members of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah must have known of the dire humanitarian situation. They very likely had knowledge that segments of the civilian population were entirely reliant on access to specific agricultural produce and livestock, artisanal fishing and water infrastructure, and that the destruction of such objects and restrictions on humanitarian access would mean these civilians would be unable to access affordable food and clean water. Humanitarian organizations, as well as UN bodies such as the UN Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen (GEE) and the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen (PoE), engaged directly with parties to the conflict and reported on food and water security-related issues, and advocated for humanitarian access to ameliorate the devastating impacts the war was having on the civilian population. The Saudi/UAE-led coalition, the Yemeni government and Ansar Allah must also have known that the conduct of other parties to the conflict was exacerbating food insecurity throughout the areas in which hostilities occurred.

1.2. The manner, timing and repetition of attacks on OIS or restrictions on humanitarian access

The manner, timing and repetition of attacks on OIS and the restrictions on humanitarian access that were documented in this report, particularly in the context of the broader pattern of attacks on OIS, support a finding of intent.

With respect to the Saudi/UAE-led coalition, the airstrikes documented formed part of a pattern of repetitive attacks on similar OIS, e.g. on farms, water facilities and artisanal fishing boats and equipment, and on other types of OIS, including food markets, means of transporting food and water, and food and water storage and production facilities. Saudi/UAE-led coalition attacks on OIS have been documented by Mwatana, the GEE, the PoE and other groups. In the attacks on the water facilities documented in this report, multiple airstrikes were carried out on each facility, some of which occurred immediately after the facilities had been built or repaired.

Ansar Allah’s obstruction of humanitarian access—including arresting and intimidating humanitarian workers, blocking aid convoys and illegally seizing the property of humanitarian organizations and workers—have been widely reported on in Saada Governate and elsewhere by the GEE, the PoE, WFP, OCHA and others. As noted above, the impediments were so severe WFP suspended humanitarian operations in Ansar Allah-controlled areas in 2019, impacting an estimated 850,000 beneficiaries, and again in 2020. The GEE, Mwatana, and others have also reported on the widespread and repeated use of landmines in civilian areas by Ansar Allah, without any precautions to minimize their indiscriminate effects, in violation of IHL.

1.3. Other drivers of food insecurity in Yemen attributable to the parties to the conflict

Other factors driving food insecurity can be attributed to the Saudi/UAE-led coalition, the Yemeni Government, and Ansar Allah, supporting a finding of intent.

The Saudi/UAE-led coalition, the Yemeni government, and Ansar Allah-imposed targeted restrictive economic policies, which—in the context of a population vulnerable to fluctuations in the value of the Yemeni riyal and to disruptions to the supply chain—adversely impacted purchasing power, and consequently, access to food and water. These include the movement of the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) from Sana’a to Aden by the Yemeni Government in 2016, followed by their withholding of salaries of hundreds of thousands of civil servants, and Ansar Allah’s banning of new bills issued by the CBY in Aden, diversion of 50 billion Yemeni riyals from the CBY in March 2020, withholding of salaries, imposition of heavy taxes (some of which were funnelled to support the war effort) and other tariffs in territories under their control, including on direly needed fuel. These are just a few examples of a wide array of restrictive policies.

Since 2015, the Saudi/UAE-led coalition has also imposed a de facto naval and aerial blockade on Yemen’s sea and airports, which—with varying levels of intensity throughout the conflict—has severely restricted the flow of food, fuel, and medicine to civilians. The Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Yemeni government’s decision to keep Sana’a international airport closed to commercial flights since 2016 “has precluded thousands of civilians from accessing necessary life-saving health care and treatment,” according to the GEE, which consequently found that the Government of Yemen violated the right to food and water.

Ansar Allah has also used siege-like warfare in Yemen, which has had a particularly acute impact on Taiz, where they confiscated food and medicine critical for meeting civilian’s survival needs and impeded civilian’s movement into and out of the city. Ansar Allah has also taken direct actions that have impacted civilians’ food security, including shelling areas affecting access to food and laying mines inside the Red Sea Mills in Al-Hudaydah, which previously contained enough wheat to feed 3.7 million people for one month; a quarter of WFP’s in-country stock.

1.4. Systematic violations of IHL and violations and abuses of IHRL throughout the conflict

Warring parties’ adherence, or non-adherence, to norms and prohibitions of IHL and IHRL can provide a window into the minds of their members. According to reports by the GEE, the PoE, Mwatana and numerous international and non-governmental organizations, the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah have committed other serious violations of IHL and violations and abuses of IHRL—beyond those outlined above—in connection with the conflict, which may constitute war crimes.

The Saudi/UAE-led coalition has attacked, destroyed and damaged other critical infrastructure, some of which may also constitute OIS in the Yemen context, including food storage sites, oil and gas, roads and bridges, electricity supplies and markets, and health facilities, which are necessary to access life-saving treatment, including to prevent wasting and death from malnutrition.

Ansar Allah has also indiscriminately shelled areas affecting access to food with a particular acute impact on Taiz, including those seeking food or safety.

Numerous other violations, including unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, sexual and gender-based violence, and the recruitment and use of children and other violations against children have also been committed by parties to the conflict.

Although further criminal investigation is required to identify the perpetrator/s and their mode/s of liability, this report ultimately concludes that it is possible to find, based on the above factors, that members of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah were aware of the virtual certainty that starvation would occur in the ordinary course of events, that is, without humanitarian intervention, or intended to use starvation as a method of warfare. (see Part G, Section 5.2 and Part H, Sections 2.4.1 and 3.4.2).

2. Other violations of IHL and violations or abuses of IHRL, which may constitute war crimes

Through the conduct documented in the report, the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah, as well as the Yemeni Government, violated their obligations to respect, and in some cases protect and fulfill, the rights to food and water, as well as the rights to life, work, health and property (see Part. F, Section 3; Part G, Section 5.3.2; Part H, Sections 2.4.2, and 3.4.4).

In addition to starvation, the conduct documented in this report may violate Article 13 of AP II and customary IHL and constitute other war crimes, in particular attacks on civilians and civilian objects and terrorizing the civilian population. Ansar Allah’s restrictions on humanitarian access also violate Article 18 of AP II and customary IHL, which require parties to a conflict to consent to, and allow and facilitate, impartial humanitarian relief actions carried out without adverse distinction. For further discussion, see Part F, Sections 2.3 and 2.4; Part G, Section 5.3.1; and Part H, Section

3. Limited steps have been taken to prevent further international crimes and ensure accountability for Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah conduct

To date, steps taken at the international and domestic levels have had little impact in holding the perpetrators of international crimes accountable and ensuring reparations for civilian victims. Much more must be done to ensure accountability and redress.

The avenues for accountability and redress on the domestic level, to date, have not, and are unlikely to, meet the standards applicable to investigations and prosecutions under international law (see Part I, Section 1.3). The domestic criminal justice systems in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (as well as Iran) are unable to provide an effective remedy, either because they do not penalize the use of starvation as a method of warfare or do not ensure criminal proceedings are compliant with international law and standards governing the right to a fair trial and victims’ right to participate meaningfully in proceedings. Even if they could dispense effective justice, such States are unwilling or unable to hold perpetrators of starvation-related conduct liable (see Part I, Section 1.1).

The Yemeni National Commission of Inquiry, activated in 2015 to “investigate all alleged violations of human rights and [IHL] that have taken place since 2011 and to identify the perpetrators,” has faced significant challenges associated with its lack of structural independence, including because NCI commissioners are appointed by and report to the coalition-backed internationally recognized Yemeni Government. The NCI has also faced significant obstacles to carrying out its documentation mandate, and completed investigations have not resulted in the prosecution of alleged perpetrators (see Part I, Section 1.2).

The Saudi/UAE-led coalition’s Joint Incidents Assessment Team lacks the transparency, independence and impartiality necessary of an investigative mechanism.

At the international level, options for holding perpetrators accountable for starvation-related conduct appear to be more viable, but mechanisms which currently exist have not yet resulted in effective remedies for victims.

The GEE, in particular, has reported extensively on the conduct of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition, the Yemeni government, Ansar Allah, and other warring parties, and has laid the groundwork for future accountability mechanisms. However, it is not mandated to collect and preserve evidence for criminal prosecutions per se, nor can it prepare case files for prosecution (see Part I, Section 2.2). The GEE itself recommends the adoption of some of the measures we recommend, set out below and in Part J.

Targeted sanctions, both by the UNSC and at the domestic level, have only thus far been imposed on Ansar Allah (see Part I, Section 2.3).

The ICC currently only has jurisdiction over persons involved in the conflict who are nationals of a state party to the ICC—such as nationals of state parties to the ICC who have provided assistance to the coalition, or nationals of one of the members of the coalition, like Jordan, who are state parties to the ICC. Communications submitted to the ICC in relation to such states parties, including by Mwatana, have yet to result in the opening of an investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor (See Part I, Section 2.4). The ICC could exercise jurisdiction over Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Yemen and Ansar Allah if the UN Security Council referred the situation in Yemen to the Court, or if Yemen joined the Court or made a declaration accepting the court’s jurisdiction.

As states like Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not ratified the relevant protocols, treaty bodies, such as the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee, are not able to receive individual complaints regarding non-compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on Yemen (see Part I, Section 2.1).

To fill ongoing gaps in accountability, non-government organizations, including Mwatana, have sought to institute criminal proceedings in Italy for complicity, targeting Italian arms manufacturers, or administrative proceedings in the United Kingdom (UK), seeking to prevent the UK government’s licensing of arms sales. Such proceedings are ongoing (See Part I, Section 3).

Given the considerable gaps in the measures currently available at the domestic and international levels, significantly more needs to be done by the warring parties, by the internationally recognised Government of Yemen, by the UN Security Council, by the UN Human Rights Council, and by States to ensure accountability for international crimes and reparations for victims.

4. What should States do to prevent and ensure accountability for Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah conduct?[6]

In Part J of the report, we set out a comprehensive range of recommendations directed at parties to the conflict, other states and UN actors aimed at preventing further violations of IHL, violations and abuses of IHRL, and war crimes, holding perpetrators accountable, ensuring reparations for victims, and strengthening the institutional and normative architecture by which states and UN actors can do so. A selection of the core, most urgent, recommendations is set out below.

We call on all parties to the conflict to cease all violations of IHL, violations and abuses of IHRL and war crimes and to take steps to protect civilians and civilian objects, including OIS, and facilitate access to full humanitarian aid, including food and water. Additionally, parties to the conflict should (amongst other things):

Full document:

Press release:

and shorter media reports:

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Yemen’s seven years of war: How the new UN envoy can lay foundations for peace

It is time to assemble an anti-Houthi negotiations delegation that reflects the realities on the ground – and that can actually enforce an eventual settlement

Although dealt a particularly tough hand, Grundberg starts with some advantages: as a Swedish diplomat he brings neutrality and the good reputation of his country, which brokered the 2018 Stockholm Agreement and is not associated with the United Kingdom or the United States. His previous position as EU ambassador has given him two years’ experience of the Yemen crisis. He can also call on the European Union, which most Yemenis perceive positively, to support his initiatives.

He faces huge constraints, but the key one is the outdated nature of the 2015 UNSC resolution 2216. The resolution is crucial as it guides the work of the special envoy.

Resolution 2216 has two major faults: it formally recognises Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi as the “legitimate” president of the country, which restricts the interlocutors with whom the United Nations can engage; and it calls for the Houthis to withdraw to their pre-2014 positions.

For the UN to contribute constructively to a solution, it must update the resolution. As long as this remains the determining document concerning the Yemeni crisis, the special envoy cannot engage effectively with other, stronger forces on the ground – namely, more representative anti-Houthi forces with more local power than the Hadi government. As for the Houthis, demanding withdrawal to their pre-2014 positions is simply unrealistic given the territorial gains they have made since that time; and even now they remain on the offensive in Marib.

Without a new resolution and international approach, the key warring parties will be allowed to remain firmly set in their zero-sum positions. Hadi’s internationally recognised government endlessly repeats its three references as the only basis for negotiations, which would safeguard its position (these are: UNSC 2216, a return to the 2011 Gulf Cooperation Council Agreement, and the implementation of the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference). The Houthis, meanwhile, demand a complete end to the Saudi blockade (including the full reopening of all international access routes, whether Hodeida port or Sanaa airport), and an end to what they term the Saudi-led “aggression” before they will even consider a ceasefire.

One of Grundberg’s first moves should therefore be to seek an updated UNSC resolution that recognises the true balance of power within Yemen. This would seek to enable the formation of a more representative anti-Houthi delegation to be the main interlocutors of the Houthis.

With a new resolution, Grundberg should help create negotiating teams that better represent Yemen’s main political, military, and social entities – in the end, negotiations must reflect the realities on the ground and involve people with the power to enforce an agreement.

At the same time, Grundberg needs to focus on addressing the international aspects of the war. International intervention in Yemen has also changed in important ways since 2015, notably in terms of a shift of US position.

Removing foreign influence from Yemen is impossible – Saudi Arabia has actively intervened in Yemen since 1934, two years after its creation, and the UAE throughout its 50-year existence – but Grundberg can still look to forge greater alignment here.

But ultimately it will be up to the local warring parties to secure peace. It is to be hoped that the exhaustion and despair of the millions of suffering Yemenis may finally influence their leaders to look beyond their own personal war-related benefits and reach a settlement. Grundberg must seize the initiative to push them in this direction – by Helen Lackner

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Film: Yemen’s frontline: Violence closes in on ‘safe-haven' Marib - BBC Newsnight

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Saudi Arabia: Yemeni Workers at Risk of Mass Forced Returns

Face Possible Return to Yemen’s Humanitarian Crisis, Loss of Critical Remittances

Saudi authorities have since July 2021 began to terminate or not renew contracts of Yemeni professionals, which could force them to return to the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, Human Rights Watch said today. Saudi authorities should suspend this decision and allow Yemenis to remain in Saudi Arabia with the ability to work.

In July, Saudi media outlets reported that Qiwa, a platform run by the Saudi Human Resources Ministry, had issued a statement about new regulations requiring businesses to limit the percentage of their workers from certain nationalities, including 25 percent for Yemeni nationals. Reuters reported in mid-August that mass job terminations were targeting an unclear number of Yemenis in Saudi Arabia. Workers who cannot find another employer to act as a sponsor are forced to leave the country or face deportation, which for Yemenis can mean a risk to their lives.

“Saudi authorities are effectively laying off and threatening to forcibly return hundreds, possibly thousands, of Yemeni professionals to an ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis in Yemen,” said Afrah Nasser, Yemen researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Saudi Arabia is always seeking praise for its ‘humanitarian contributions’ to Yemen, but this decision puts many Yemenis at serious risk.”

On August 23, the International Union of Yemeni Diaspora Communities on Facebook said, “the union condemns the continuing campaign to target Yemeni workers in southern Saudi Arabia, despite the circulating news that there was an exemption of some Yemeni academics in some southern Saudi cities in an attempt to absorb the public’s outcry and anger toward these arbitrary decisions.”

Human Rights Watch in August interviewed 10 Yemeni health workers and five Yemeni academics based in areas across Saudi Arabia, as well as a Yemeni health workers rights group. All of those interviewed requested that their identities be withheld for fear of reprisal. Human Rights Watch also reviewed documents from Saudi employers to Yemenis communicating the termination of contracts or rejection to renew contracts.

All 15 Yemeni professionals individually told Human Rights Watch that the Saudi Labor and Social Development Ministry privately decided to terminate or bar renewal of Yemeni workers’ contracts. They said that Yemenis were the only ones targeted, and that other workers had not been affected. They said that an increasing number of Yemenis whom they knew had been informed that their contracts were being terminated or were denied renewal. They also said that they were aware of some terminations among Saudi-born Yemenis or Yemenis married to Saudi women.

In mid-August, the Yemeni Doctors Living Abroad Association, an international network of Yemeni medical workers that works to raise awareness about Yemeni health workers’ rights, told Human Rights Watch that hundreds of Yemeni health workers in Saudi Arabia had contacted the association to say they had been notified that their contracts would be terminated or would not be renewed, putting them at risk of deportation to Yemen.

About half of the Yemeni workers interviewed said that their Saudi employers had called and told them orally that their contracts would not be renewed

The Yemeni Doctors Living Abroad Association on August 14 issued a petition with an appeal to the Saudi authorities to reconsider the decision and ensure humanitarian exemptions. Saudi Arabia has no laws or systems for people to seek asylum or refuge in the country.

The Yemeni government said that as of 2020 more than two million Yemenis were living in Saudi Arabia. Remittances have been a vital pillar of Yemen’s devastated economy. The World Bank estimated in 2017 that remittances sent from Yemenis in Saudi Arabia amounted to US$2.3 billion annually. Remittances sent from Saudi Arabia constituted 61 percent of the total remittances sent from abro

and also

(** B H K)

Access challenges in Yemen: Minefields and mountain tracks

Like most major cities in Yemen, Al Mocha has witnessed its share of bombs since the violence here escalated in 2015.

I am traveling here as part of my work for the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). NRC provides humanitarian aid across the country. Our teams build solar water pumps and latrines, rebuild schools and support unpaid teachers, provide cash so families can buy food and pay their rent, and construct basic shelters to help some of the four million displaced people scattered across Yemen.

These displaced communities and families are some of the most vulnerable and remote communities in the country. Many have been forced to flee by violence during the last six years, while others have fled more recently because of floods.

Driving through a minefield

On the way to one of our projects, at the Al-Yaqadha school on the city’s outskirts, we discover a minefield surrounding the road. Red and white painted stones indicate the safe route through. Above all, it is vital to avoid straying onto the red side.

This time, we are on a well-marked road, but sometimes things are not that clear. According to the United Nations, more than 263 landmines and unexploded ordnance incidents were reported between January and June 2021, across 49 different districts.

Under international law, conflict parties are prohibited from laying mines. They are also required to respect civilian infrastructure and avoid direct attacks on schools, hospitals, water systems, roads and bridges – taking precautions to minimise harm.

But little remains of the original Al-Yaqadha school except an enormous pile of rocks on the ground. An airstrike destroyed the building. Everything had to be rebuilt: classrooms, solar panels for electricity, and toilets.

Meanwhile, to get to our other “hard-to-reach” projects, we must find ways to get around these hurdles and some of the 50 frontlines in Yemen, which block many of the main roads.

A terrifying prospect

From Al Mocha to At-Thurba, from At-Thurba to Taiz: south-west Yemen is full of alternative routes through the mountains. These tend to be narrow, rocky and steep, and are mostly only accessible to 4x4s and trucks, or sometimes, donkey carts – all vying for the same space. A terrifying prospect, considering the number of narrow bends and blind turns on the roads.

After hours travelling through these mountains, we finally reach Al Selw, a few kilometres away from an active frontline. We have gone from a desert to a mountaintop, but the scenery looks similar. Houses, roads and schools are destroyed.

According to my colleagues, access for humanitarian organisations has deteriorated steadily in Yemen over the last two years. This is because of fighting and shifting frontlines, destruction of roads and bridges, and the physical challenges of the terrain that I’ve already described. But it’s also because of bureaucratic obstacles and red tape imposed by authorities.

As humanitarians, we have movement restrictions imposed on us by the groups that control different parts of Yemen. We experience long delays in setting up our projects, and attempts to interfere in our programmes.

My humanitarian colleagues are already facing many access challenges daily. In a country where two thirds of the population now need some form of humanitarian assistance, it would be good to lighten their task.

We need rapid access to the field and the lifting of all obstacles so people can get the aid and assistance they need. All sides must agree a ceasefire and find lasting political solutions to guarantee peace in Yemen.

Meanwhile, we will continue despite the challenges, because for so many Yemenis, aid is a matter of survival.

(** B K P)

Was uns der Krieg gegen den Terror bisher gekostet hat

Die Kriege in Afghanistan und Irak, welche als Einstieg dienen sollten, und all die anderen Stellvertreterkriege hinterließen (wenn man lediglich Luftangriffe als hinterlassen zählt), Millionen von Toten, Millionen von Verletzten, Millionen von Traumatisierten, Millionen von Obdachlosen, die Aushöhlung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit, die Zerstörung der natürlichen Umwelt, die Zunahme von Regierungsgeheimnissen, Überwachung und Autoritarismus weltweit. Die Folge war sowohl zunehmender Terrorismus als auch vermehrte Waffenverkäufe, ein weitherum verbreiteter Rassismus und Fanatismus, sowie Billionen von verschwendeten Dollar, die stattdessen für einen guten Zweck hätten genutzt werden können.

Eine Kultur wurde zersetzt, eine Drogenepidemie wurde ausgelöst, eine Pandemie konnte sich leichter ausbreiten, das Recht auf Protest wurde eingeschränkt, der Reichtum wurde auf eine Handvoll Profitmacher verteilt. Das US-Militär hat sich in eine solche Maschine des einseitigen Abschlachtens verwandelt, dass in den Kriegen, in denen sie beteiligt waren, die Zahl der Opfer weniger als 1 Prozent beträgt und die häufigste Todesursache in den eigenen Reihen Selbstmord ist.

Die Kriege:

Zu den Kriegen, die mit dem “Krieg gegen den Terror”, und in der Regel mit dem 2001 AUMF (Authorization for Use of Military Force; Genehmigung zum Einsatz militärischer Gewalt) begründet wurden, gehören unter Anderem die Kriege in Afghanistan, Irak, Pakistan, Libyen, Somalia, Syrien, dem Jemen, den Philippinen, als auch die damit verbundenen Militäreinsätze in Georgien, Kuba, Dschibuti, Kenia, Äthiopien, Eritrea, der Türkei, Niger, Kamerun, Jordan, Lebanon, Haiti, der Demokratischen Republik Kongo, Uganda, der Zentralafrikanischen Republik, Mali, Burkina Faso, Tschad, Mauretanien, Nigeria, Tunesien und den verschiedenen Meeren.

Die Todeszahlen:

Unter den verfügbaren Schätzungen, welche die Anzahl der Menschen, die direkt und gewaltsam durch die Kriege starben – ausgenommen die Menschen, die erfroren, verhungert, nach dem wegziehen an Krankheiten oder durch Selbstmord usw. starben – sind folgende die präzisesten:

Irak: 2,38 Millionen

Afghanistan und Pakistan: 1,2 Millionen

Libya: 0,25 Millionen

Syrien: 1,5 Millionen

Somalien: 0,65 Millionen

Jemen: 0,18 Millionen

Zu diesen Zahlen kommen noch 0,007 Millionen Tote der US-Truppen hinzu, Söldner und Selbstmorde ausgenommen.

Insgesamt sind es dann 5,917 Million Tote, wobei die US-Truppen bis zu 0,1% der Tode (und etwa 95% der Medienberichterstattung) ausmachen – von David Swanson

(** B K P)

What the War of Terror Has Cost Us So Far

The war on Afghanistan and the war on Iraq that it was a means of helping start, and all the other spin-off wars leave (if you count only bombing from above as leaving) millions dead, millions injured, millions traumatized, millions homeless, the rule of law eroded, the natural environment devastated, government secrecy and surveillance and authoritarianism increased worldwide, terrorism increased worldwide, weapons sales increased worldwide, racism and bigotry spread far and wide, many trillions of dollars wasted that could have done a world of good, a culture corroded, a drug epidemic generated, a disease pandemic made easier to spread, the right to protest constrained, wealth transfered upward to a handful of profiteers, and the U.S. military turned into such a machine of one-sided slaughter that its casualties are fewer than 1 percent of those in its wars, and the top cause of death in its ranks is suicide.

The Wars:

The wars that have used the “war on terror,” and usually the 2001 AUMF, as an excuse have included wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, Philippines, plus related military actions in Georgia, Cuba, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Turkey, Niger, Cameroon, Jordan, Lebanon, Haiti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria, Tunisia, and various oceans.

The Dead:

The best available estimates of the number of people directly and violently killed by the wars — so, not counting those who’ve frozen to death, starved to death, died of disease after moving elsewhere, committed suicide, etc. — are:

Iraq: 2.38 million

Afghanistan and Pakistan: 1.2 million

Libya: 0.25 million

Syria: 1.5 million

Somalia: 0.65 million

Yemen: 0.18 million

To these figures can be added another 0.007 million deaths of U.S. troops, a figure that does not include mercenaries or suicides.

The total is then 5.917 million, with U.S. troops making up 0.1% of the deaths (and some 95% of the media coverage) – by David Swanson

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

(A H P)

Health Ministry distributes COVID- 19 vaccines in Aden

Ministry of Public Health and Population started in Aden on Monday, the distribution of the second batch of vaccines against coronavirus it received recently from UNICEF, the state news agency Saba reported.

(* A H)

52 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 8,108 in total

The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 21 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 4 others.

(A H P)

COVAX committee discusses results of vaccination drive

The COVAX Committee, chaired by the Minister of Public Health and Population, Dr. Qassem Beheibeh, discussed the results achieved in the first round of the immunization campaign against the emerging coronavirus (Covid-19) in a virtual meeting on Sunday.

(* A H)

38 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 8,056 in total

The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 24 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 6 others.
1,318 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added

(* A H)

67 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 8,018 in total

The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 29 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 27 others.
3,097 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.


(* A H)

Yemen records highest coronavirus deaths in a month

As many as 27 deaths from coronavirus were recorded today in areas under the control of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, the highest figure to be recorded in a month.

The Aden-based Supreme National Emergency Committee for Covid-19 said it recorded 67 new coronavirus infections and 27 deaths on Friday, bringing the total of confirmed cases of the pandemic to 8018, including 1513 deaths and 4937 recovered cases.

(* A H)

51 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 7,951 in total

The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 37 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 6 others.
3,901 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

(* A H)

31 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 7,900 in total

The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 34 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 8 others.
3,905 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added

(* A H)

40 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 7,869 in total

The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 24 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 3 others.
4,140 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added

(* A H)

Third wave of coronavirus hits war-weary Yemen

Health care facilities had been put on high alert to handle rising number of COVID-19 cases

Yemen has seen a surge in the number of coronavirus infections across government-held areas this month, amid a collapsed health system in the war-torn country.

Yemeni health authorities reported 80 deaths and 643 virus cases since the beginning of August. The provinces of Aden, Taiz, Hadhramaut and Marib recorded the highest number of infections.

The surge in COVID-19 infections has prompted the Health Ministry of the internationally recognized government to announce that Yemen has entered a third wave of the pandemic.

Yemeni authorities have called on all health facilities in areas under government control to be put on high alert to handle the rising number of COVID-19 patients.

Yemeni authorities have confirmed 7,784 cases, including 1,461 deaths, since the first COVID-19 case was recorded in the country in April 2020.
However, only four infections and one fatality were reported in Houthi-held areas in northern Yemen since last year. =

cp2 Allgemein / General

(* A K P)

Interactive Map of Yemen War

(* A K)

Yemen War Daily Map Updates

(* B K P)

Der Krieg im Jemen scheint noch lange nicht vorbei zu sein

Der Westen hat die Houthis jedoch vehement verurteilt. Washington hat Erklärungen gegen die Rebellen abgegeben und ein sofortiges Ende der grenzüberschreitenden Angriffe gefordert. Außenminister Anthony Blinken erklärte: „Die Vereinigten Staaten verurteilen den jüngsten Raketenangriff der Houthis auf Saudi-Arabien, der am 4. September in der Ostprovinz einschlug und bei dem zwei Kinder verletzt und mehrere Häuser beschädigt wurden. Diese Angriffe bedrohen das Leben der Einwohner des Königreichs, darunter mehr als 70.000 US-Bürger“. Interessant ist, dass Washington gerade wegen der humanitären Verbrechen im Jemen eine diplomatische Krise mit den Saudis begonnen hat. Jetzt kritisiert die US-Position die ebenfalls humanitäre Haltung der Houthis. Und damit reduziert sich die amerikanische Regierung auf die Rolle des „moralischen Regulators“ der Menschenrechte, obwohl sie ihren Einfluss zur Lösung des Konflikts nutzen könnte.

Obwohl Zentralasien heute ein großes globales „geopolitisches Thermometer“ ist, spiegelt das jemenitische Szenario viel von der Situation im Nahen Osten wider und verdient daher besondere Aufmerksamkeit. Schon vor Monaten sagten viele Experten ein Ende des Krieges im ärmsten Land des Nahen Ostens voraus, da sich Riad nicht nur dem amerikanischen Druck auf die Saudis, sondern auch Teheran anzunähern begann, aber die Verhandlungen kamen nicht weit genug voran, um den Konflikt zu beenden.

Der Krieg scheint zunehmend über die Grenzen hinauszugehen, und es handelt sich nicht mehr unbedingt um einen Stellvertreterkrieg, sondern um eine Auseinandersetzung, die so lange andauern wird, bis eine Seite den absoluten Sieg erringt, unabhängig von der Vorgehensweise Saudi-Arabiens und des Iran. Die Houthis werden weiter kämpfen, und es ist wahrscheinlich, dass die Iraner und die Saudis auch in einem sich nähernden Szenario den Krieg weiter finanzieren werden, um militärisches Material zu testen und sich gegenseitig unter Druck zu setzen, um Vorteile bei ihren Verhandlungen zu erlangen.

(* B K P)


The Western media has described such cases as a wave of Houthi violence, but the reality is much more complex. By attacking Saudi oil bases, the rebels are trying to cut off a major source of funding for the Yemeni government, which has been carrying out a huge series of humanitarian crimes against the Houthi population. In this regard, rebel spokesperson Yahya Saria said: “As part of countering the criminal aggression against the country, our armed forces attacked vital targets and military bases belonging to Saudi Arabia, in particular, the Aramco facilities in Ras Tanura in the Dammam region, using eight drones and a ballistic missile”.

However, the Western attitude has been one of vehemently condemning the Houthis. Washington made pronouncements against the rebels, demanding an immediate end to cross-border attacks.

Now, the US position is to criticize the Houthis’ also anti-humanitarian attitudes. And with that, the American government reduces itself to the role of “moral regulator” of human rights, when it could use its influence to resolve the conflict.

Although Central Asia is a great global “geopolitical thermometer” today, the Yemeni scenario reflects much of the situation in the Middle East and deserves to be treated with special attention.

Increasingly, the war seems to go beyond borders, and it is no longer necessarily a proxy war, but a clash that will continue until one side achieves absolute victory, regardless of the Saudi Arabia-Iran approach. The Houthis will continue to fight, and it is likely that, even in an approaching scenario, the Iranians and Saudis will continue to fund the war as a way to test military material and pressure each other to gain advantages in their negotiations. =

(A K P)

Israel has established its presence on Yemeni islands: Yemeni ambassador

[Sanaa gov.] Yemen’s ambassador to Tehran, Ibrahim Mohammad Mohammad al-Deilami, confirms Israel’s presence in Yemeni territories, especially in a number of strategic islands.

“There is also an Israeli presence, especially in Yemeni territorial waters and some strategic islands, whether on Hanish Island, Mayun Island, or even on Socotra Island in the Arabian Sea,” al-Deilami tells the Tehran Times.

Although Saudi Arabia is known for its leading role in the war on Yemen, Israel’s presence backed by American-British green light no longer is hidden.

“This is no longer a secret as the aggressors have recognized the presence of their forces on Yemeni soil. This is not hidden and there is no attempt to cover it up by the aggressor countries,” the Yemeni ambassador says.

Some Yemeni sources accuse the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia of letting Israel on the Yemeni islands.

The Yemeni ambassador to Tehran says expelling all foreign forces from Yemeni territories is an important pre-condition to reach a political agreement on the crisis in his country.

and also

(A P)

Chairman of Kuwait Perspective Center for Strategic Studies Fayz Al-Nashwan accuses the UAE of the seeking to divide Yemen and investing money in the billions toward that goal./Yemeni Sport website

(* A P)

Yemeni security forces arrest top Houthi leader returning from Iran

Hassan Ali Al Emad was a founder of the Iran-backed rebel group and helped establish a fundraising network in Iran

Security authorities in Al Mahrah province in south-eastern Yemen said on Saturday they had arrested a top Houthi cleric who had returned to the country from Iran.

"Houthi leader Hassan Ali Al Emad was arrested while entering the land port of Shahn heading from abroad two weeks ago," Colonel Ahmed Arfeet, the director of the Criminal Investigative Unit, Al Mahrah police, told The National.

Another security source in Al Mahrah told The National on condition of anonymity that Al Emad had disguised himself as a traveller arriving from Oman but during questioning the cleric revealed he had in fact been in Iran.

Al Emad is one of the Iran-backed Houthi movement’s founders. As a young cleric he spent nearly 20 years living in Iran, where he studied in seminaries and married an Iranian woman.

Al Emad is the son of General Ali Yahya Al Emad, a prominent Houthi commander and religious leader who also helped found the movement.

Al Emad and his father were responsible for establishing a financial network in Iran to raise funds for the Houthi war effort in Saada – the Houthi movement’s stronghold in Yemen’s north-west – and since 2011 the younger Al Emad has been running a group of affiliate organisations with the aim of shoring up Iranian influence in Yemen.

and also

(* B K P)

Film: War crimes in Yemen: Lawyers call for ICC investigation into Saudi-led coalition

As the war in #Yemen continues, lawyers have called on the International Criminal Court (#ICC) to open an investigation into the Saudi-led coalition, accusing it of #war crimes and crimes against humanity. We speak to British barrister Toby Cadman, co-founder of Guernica 37

(A K P)

Saudi Arabia calls for preventing flow of arms for Yemen's Houthis

(* B P)

The Limits of a Saudi-Omani Rapprochement

Increased economic and security cooperation between Riyadh and Muscat is unlikely to lead to a deepening of relations between the kingdom and the sultanate.

A July visit by Omani Sultan Haitham bin Tariq to Saudi Arabia marks a rapprochement between the two countries, with the possibility of increased economic and security cooperation, especially with regards to the Yemeni civil war. However, this improvement in ties is unlikely to lead to a deeper relationship or signal an end to Oman’s “positive neutrality” foreign policy, particularly with respect to Iran.

Given its strategic location in the Strait of Hormuz, Oman has long had a unique relationship with Iran, which has allowed it to be a diplomatic bridge connecting Tehran to both the Arab world and the West. Muscat believes that deterring Iran should come through de-escalation and is aware that its interests are best served by remaining neutral. This approach insulates the sultanate somewhat from the effects of regional conflicts, a vital consideration for its stability as it faces a frail economic situation. As instability in the region threatens to spill across borders, Oman’s diplomacy can play a role in bringing tensions down. This approach helps establish Muscat as a trusted broker on the international stage, but perceptions of bias could damage its credibility as an honest mediator.

As a relatively new head of state who wants to make his own mark, Haitham may well be willing to improve Omani-Saudi relations. His visit came after recent protests over poverty and unemployment in the sultanate. Indeed, Oman stands to benefit economically from improved relations with Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, especially regarding the possibility of the two countries linking an oil pipeline that goes to the Arabian Sea.

It also is believed that the two sides discussed Yemen’s war and Iran’s nuclear deal. While the Saudi-led coalition failed to restore Yemeni President Abd-Rabbuh Mansour Hadi’s government after over six years of intervening, it seems willing to consider removing itself from the quagmire it has put itself in. Since Oman has proven itself as a trusted mediator in the region and has relations with the various parties involved in the conflict, Riyadh may well seek Muscat’s help in finding an exit strategy. For Oman, playing a constructive role in Yemen goes in line with the sultanate’s balanced diplomatic approach to regional matters and reduces the regional insecurity in its immediate neighborhood.

Lately, the Saudis have been increasingly backing the sultanate’s diplomacy in Yemen. In March, the state-run Omani news agency reported that the sultanate is working with Saudi Arabia, the U.N., and the U.S. for a political solution to the war. For Muscat, having Riyadh’s support is important as it elevates the significance of Oman’s diplomatic role in the Yemeni file.

Moreover, should Omani-Saudi ties improve, their rivalry in Al Mahrah may well subside. Yemeni journalist and political analyst Abdul Hakim Helal told this author, “Over the weeks that followed Sultan Haitham’s visit to Saudi Arabia, it seemed as if the tension between Riyadh and Muscat in Al Mahrah has witnessed a decrease on the ground. However, it cannot be certain this will continue forever.” Helal, who is the author of a recently published study on the Saudi-Omani rivalry in Al Mahrah, said, “The tension between the two countries in the governorate led to great tribal, social, and political polarization since Saudi Arabia established a military presence in the governorate in 2017. This makes controlling it not an easy task.”

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

(A K P)

UN ignores new health disaster in Yemen as a result of fuel run-out

The United Nations is once again ignoring a new health disaster as a result of the run-out of fuel from medical facilities due to the continued maritime piracy of the US-led aggression coalition states and their Saudi and UAE instruments, and the detention of oil derivatives vessels.

This disregard, unsanctioned and the international silence applied gave the green light to the of US-Saudi Aggression Coalition to tighten the noose on the Yemeni people by not allowing any oil ship to enter the port of Hodeida, in flagrant violation of international and humanitarian conventions and laws, exacerbating living and economic conditions.

(* A H K P)

Jemen: Beschlagnahmung von Treibstofftankern unterbricht Dienste von 100 medizinischen Zentren

Durch die Beschlagnahme von Treibstofftankern durch die saudische Aggressor-Koalition wurden 100 medizinische Zentren in der jemenitischen Hauptstadt Sanaa in ihrer Arbeit unterbrochen.

Die Gesundheitsbehörde von Sanaa gab am Montag bekannt, dass die fortgesetzte Beschlagnahme von Schiffen mit Erdölprodukten im Jemen zu Stromausfällen, der Einstellung der Dienste von 100 Gesundheitszentren und einer Reduzierung der medizinischen Versorgung für Patienten geführt habe.

Mitarbeiter der Gesundheitsbehörde in der jemenitischen Hauptstadt verurteilten die Piraterie und die Beschlagnahmung von Treibstofftankern indem sie zusammen mit der jemenitischen Ölgesellschaft eine Protestkundgebung vor dem UN-Büro in Sanaa abhielten.

Der Geschäftsführer der Jemenitischen Ölgesellschaft, Ammar al-Azrai, teilte in einer Erklärung mit, dass die Einstellung der Lieferung von Erdölprodukten zum Stopp der Dienste medizinischer Zentren führe.

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

(B H)

Jemen: Schüler ohne Schulen

Viele jemenitische Schulkinder haben bisher keinen richtigen Schulbesuch erlebt. Der Unterricht findet in provisorischen Orten statt: auf Dächern, in zerbombten Gebäuden und auf der Straße. Mit Beginn des neuen Schuljahres rückt die Hoffnung der Schüler auf eine „richtige Schule” in der vom Krieg zerstörten Stadt Taez in weite Ferne.

(B H)

Yemen : First Standard Allocation 2021 Dashboard

A total of $50.5 million was allocated to 39 partners implementing a total of 61 projects across nine clusters as well as 18 multi-cluster projects. Funding will target more than 1.9m people in need of assistance in 74 districts across 16 governorates.

(* B E H)

Hungry Yemenis eyeing fish catch blame exports for prohibitive prices

“We used to buy fish for around 2,000 rials, or up to 3,000 rials when it was very expensive. Now a kilogram of trevally can be worth 10,000 rials,” he said. .

The riyal trades at around 1,030 to the dollar on the black market, the widely used rate, against an official rate of 580.

Yemenis in the south of a country shattered and divided by six years of war partly blame the spiraling food inflation of fish exports to neighboring countries, especially Saudi Arabia.

Large quantities of catches from the rich fishing waters of the Red Seas and Arabia off southern Yemen were also exported before the war, but the riyal was still strong enough that most local Yemenis regularly eat fish.

But the wartime plunge of the riyal has made fish a prohibitive luxury for those without hard currency. In addition, most of Yemen’s 29 million people can now only get by with some form of humanitarian assistance.

Local fishermen say fish prices have generally doubled due to soaring fuel prices that have squeezed their margins, and many prefer to send their catch abroad for hard currency.

Some impoverished Yemenis are fed up. Dozens of people in the southern province of Abyan blocked seafood trucks on the main road to Saudi Arabia last week and threatened further protests if fish prices remained prohibitive.

“The wealth of our seas goes elsewhere as poor Yemenis struggle to put food on the table,” protester Mohammad al-Mayssari said.

As a possible solution, Hashem Rabei, head of the Aden Fishermen’s Association, suggested that the Aden-based government suspend fish exports for three months. =

(B H)

Aster Volunteers Disaster Aid for Yemen

Asterians came together to help Yemeni people fight starvation. They sponsored ration kits that were sent to the homes of the affected through Aster Volunteers. The volunteers reached the most remote places only to make sure families had something nutritious to fill their stomachs with. The smiles volunteers received inexchange of donating ration kit was priceless.

(* B H)

Yemen Humanitarian Update - Issue 8 / August 2021

More than 20 million people – about two-thirds of the population – need humanitarian assistance. However, despite such staggering needs, the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) remains only around 50 per cent funded. Crucially, as of 31 August, several critical humanitarian response sectors have received less than 15 per cent of the funds needed to respond to the needs of millions of vulnerable people, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), women and children and people with disabilities.

The Health Cluster aims to provide health assistance to 11.6 million people in need under the 2021 Yemen HRP. It is also working to strengthen the health system in Yemen, which has been further weakened by the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet it remains severely underfunded, having received only 10.8 per cent of the funds required to save lives and enhance the health, safety and dignity of conflictaffected people.

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) partners have so far received only 8 per cent of the funds needed to meet the needs of 11.2 million vulnerable people in 2021. Without additional timely funding, they will not be able to adequately reduce the risk of WASH-related diseases, improve public health and preserve the life and dignity of vulnerable population groups, including IDPs, returnees and host communities.

Partners providing protection services to civilians facing serious protection risks to their safety, well-being, and the realization of their basic rights are also contending with severe funding shortages. These partners have so far received only 14.9 per cent of the funding they need, undermining their ability to assist 8.6 million people, including IDPs, women and children, older people, people with disabilities and marginalized groups such as the Muhamasheen.

Aid organizations providing services to more than 4 million displaced people have so far received minuscule levels of funding compared with existing needs. While partners providing shelter support to displaced people are 15.4 per cent funded, those working to provide newly displaced people with Rapid Response Mechanism assistance – i.e., a minimum package of critical life-saving assistance provided within the first 72 hours of displacement – are only 8.5 per cent funded. Furthermore, only 4.3 per cent of the funds needed to ensure that 1,700 IDP sites, hosting more than a million people, are safer, more habitable and better organized, have been received to date. Meanwhile, the refugees and migrants multisector has so far received just 4.7 percent of the funds needed to reduce the protection risks facing migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and provide them with sustained support to enhance their wellbeing and dignity.

And although more than 2.25 million children under 5 and over a million pregnant and breastfeeding women are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition in 2021, Nutrition Cluster partners have so far received only 29.2 per cent of the required funding.

(* B H K)

The Socio-Economic Disintegration of Yemen

According to the data released by the United Nations, an estimated 131,000 deaths in Yemen are associated with the byproducts of the civil war – food insecurity and health crisis. Approximately 25 million Yemenis are reportedly in dire need of humanitarian assistance whilst millions are at immediate risk of famine and the Covid pandemic. Due to a blatant disregard of human life and the international law on both sides, the social infrastructure of Yemen has all but crumbled while the economic snapshot appears beyond dismal.

The conflict has beleaguered the economic welfare of the entire country as Yemen currently stands on the verge of a financial collapse. Since the fissures started to widen in the political fabric of the country, Yemen has pandered beyond its reputation as the poorest country in the Middle East.

Both the IMF and the United Nations have cast grave concerns as international economists have cited that inflation would continue to soar in Yemen. The evidence concurs as a massively devaluing currency, blooming international commodity prices, and obliterated domestic industries and economic infrastructure would all but exacerbate the price hikes while the country continues to burn in the latest series of the offensive in the north. While a strong governmental intervention is imperative for an economic overhaul, it is simply impossible until the country continues to be governed by two conflicting regimes dictating divergent policies.

(* B H)

Study in streets: outdoor classes for Yemen's beleaguered children

Across the country children either have no classes at all or lack basics such as desks, chairs or bathrooms.

Many schools have been destroyed in the conflict between the government and the Huthi rebels, while others have been turned into refugee camps or military facilities.

About two million children were without school even before Covid-19 hit, according to the United Nations, which has warned the number will likely rise.

For those enrolled in the Al-Thulaya school in Taez, where annual tuition is approximately $1 per pupil, classes are held in an unfinished building.

School officials say the beleaguered government, locked in conflict with the rebels, cannot provide proper facilities. So the meagre tuition fees go almost entirely on rent for the bare, grey building, which has no glass in its windows or functioning sewage system.

Teachers at the school know conditions are completely unfit for children, noting also that there are many dropouts and runaways.

The UN children's agency said the Covid outbreak had forced an early end to both the 2019/20 and 2020/21 academic years.

It disrupted the "education of nearly 5.8 million primary and secondary school children, including 2.5 million girls," UNICEF has estimated.

The overall total could rise as high as six million, the agency warned in a July report.

(B H)

#Yemen: The #WASH Cluster has so far received only 8% of the funds it needs this year. Starting in Sept 2021, some agencies may revert to reducing critical programmes due to lack of funding.

(A H)

Photos: Amid Houthi aggressive attack on the governorate, 709 male and female students compete for coveted 50 seats at Faculty of Medicine, University of Sheba Region, #Marib Governorate. Today the students took entrance exam as part of the medical faculty admissions process.

(B H)

Child-Friendly Spaces - a safe haven for the affected Yemeni children

UNICEF and its implementing partners provide Psychosocial Support (PSS) to conflict-affected children to help them in coping with the impact of the conflict.

One of UNICEF approaches in supporting these affected children is the Child-Friendly Spaces (CFS), these friendly Spaces play an instrumental role in giving those children the opportunity to heal the scars of the conflict, giving them a chance to express themselves freely and to practice their hobbies in a safe and secure environment.

In Aden city, UNICEF runs around 15 children friendly spaces reaching children in the local community, displaced children and children with disabilities.
Through these child-friendly spaces, children receive psycho-social support, awareness on mine risks and other useful life skills.

(* B H K)

Why Yemen’s civil war is also an environmental one

A Yemeni local reflects on the ongoing civil war and its consequences on Yemen’s environment and climate change as a whole.

I spoke to Zak T Al-Thawr, who is originally from Sana’a, the capital of Yemen, which is one of the worst affected places in the country.

Al-Thawr says food insecurity had been a major issue for the country even before the war broke out, but it has definitely been exacerbated by the war: “The war has dominantly limited the ability for us to utilise our unparalleled soil fertility due to the chemicals, fragments and residues deliberately left by all the parties involved in the conflicts using illegal weapons, missiles and mines.”

These factors have led to the further aggravation of climate change consequences for the world and especially for Yemen. Al-Thawr further sheds light on another consequence of the degrading fertile lands and mentions the spiralling of the cultivation and usage of a drug called qat. Al-Thawr calls the Class C drug “as ravaging as the war”, and says over 90% of the population in Yemen have “started a regressive habit of chewing qat”.

Finding fields growing qat instead of other daily necessary sustenance crops like wheat and rice is not an uncommon sight in the country today. This is a result of acute poverty and demand for the product. Al-Thawr says qat is currently being sold for high prices and “traded across the country in outpouring amounts”.

The consequences of the war in Yemen are also driving the country towards an inhabitable space environmentally. One of the most imminent threats faced by the country is the floating oil tanker in the western region, which hasn’t received any maintenance since the area was captured in 2015 by the Houthi rebels. The tanker risks leakage of crude oil into the ocean.

Additionally, Al-Thawr says: “Houthis planted enormous amounts of mines along the coast, causing a powerful environmental and humanitarian massacre.” Since the emergence of the war, Yemen has faced several irreparable and deadly environmental crises in the form of cyclones, floods, rising sea levels, water scarcity, and increased pollution levels.

“The whole country [is] on the brink of a disastrous climate change that will lead to an unprecedented calamity in the foreseeable future,” says Al-Thawr. The plight of innocent citizens of Yemen is certainly not just limited to the innumerable amounts of humanitarian catastrophe, but also an ongoing and impending climate change calamity.

(* B H)

Film: Jemen: Schulen ohne Stühle und Toiletten

Schulbeginn im Jemen: In Taiz im Südwesten des Landes müssen die Kinder auf dem Boden sitzen. In dem von Krieg und Armut gezeichneten Land ist das keine Seltenheit.

"Wir warten seit vier Jahren darauf, in einer richtigen Schule unterrichtet zu werden", so der Schüler Laith Kamel. "Manchmal haben wir Unterricht im Hof, manchmal auf dem Dach, manchmal auf der Straße".

Asya Ameen Ahmad ist Lehrerin an der Al-Thulaya-Schule: "Es ist sehr eng bei uns. Die Kinder werden oft krank wegen der Umstände und der hygienischen Zustände. Sie leiden nicht nur darunter, dass die Klassen überfüllt sind, die Fenster sind nicht dicht, das begünstigt Krankheiten."

Schuldirektor Abdelghani Mihyoub: "Schüler bleiben weg, weil es an grundlegenden Dingen wie Toiletten oder Stühlen fehlt. Wir leben draußen. Der meiste Unterricht findet draußen statt." = =

(* B H)

OCHA Yemen: Starting in Sept 2021, some agencies may revert to reducing critical programmes, including in water, health and other sectors, due to lack of funding. The #Health Cluster has so far received only some 11% of the funds it needs this year.

(B H)

Yemen - Expected Floods and Protection Facilities (August 2021)


Since July 2021, an estimated 13,000 families were impacted by torrential rains and flash floods. Flooding has caused fatalities and injuries among the civilian population, including women and children, leaving many in distress and with pressing needs for protection assistance, including psychosocial support, some of which can been addressed through cash assistance.

As foreseen by the Shelter Cluster, thousands more may yet be impacted as the rainy season continues. IDPs may be forced to shelter in schools, abandoned buildings, with relatives, or to live out in the open, or in whatever is left of their damaged shelters. This will expose them to risks of becoming homeless, and expose them to associated protection risks, including due to lack of privacy and potential exploitation and abuse.

In line with the Shelter Cluster flood contingency plan, the Protection Cluster is assessing the impact in the flood-affected governorates and ready to provide support through facilities offering protection services closer to the areas expected to be affected.

(A H)

WHO cargo plane arrives at Sana'a Airport

A cargo plane belonging to the World Health Organization (WHO) arrived at Sana'a International Airport on Wednesday, carrying approximately 31 tons of medical supplies.

(B H)

Food security and nutrition information systems to enhance resilience of rural households in Yemen

Due to the need for reliable and timely food security and nutrition information to inform decision-making at the national and governorate levels, FAO and the Yemeni Government, with support from the European Union (EU), implemented a comprehensive information system approach with two initial phases between 2013 and 2020.

This promising practice brief focuses on the third phase of this programme called “Strengthening food security and nutrition information and early warning system” (2019-2021). It is a two-year EUR 5.9 million programme aimed at scaling up the geographic coverage of the food security and nutrition information systems (FSNIS) in Yemen. The programme addresses the main challenges associated with food security and nutrition information collection, analysis, and management systems in the country by supporting the setting up of a sustainable Food Security Technical Secretariat (FSTS) and food security and nutrition Governorate Focal Units (GFUs). The third phase focuses on expanding the

(B H)

Slums w/ back streets that also serve as aqueducts draining floods flowing from the #Crater #Aden tanks to the sea in the rain seasons. Engineers checking ways to improve its function and redesign its features to protect the city from flood disasters (photos)

(B H)

WHO, with photos: In the middle of an ongoing conflict, WHO and the @WorldBank are working towards strengthening the weakened health system in #Yemen through the #EmergencyHealthandNutritionProject, ensuring health services are functional, accessible & available for all.

Between 10-14 July 2021, WHO & @KSRelief_EN conducted on the job training for 30 lab staff on molecular diagnostic technologies for COVID_19, and appropriate sample collection.

To strengthen the foundation of healthcare workers in #Yemen, WHO with funding from the @WorldBank provided training to 298 health workers to build the capacity of the nutrition surveillance system implemented through the #EmergencyHealthandNutritionProject

In partnership with the @WorldBank

, WHO has provided 96 health workers with job training to scale up the Nutrition Surveillance System as part of the #EmergencyHealthandNutritionProject activities implementation in #Yemen.


cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

(B H)

IOM Yemen: Rapid Displacement Tracking - Yemen IDP Dashboard Reporting Period: 29 August To 04 September 2021

From 01 January 2021 to 4 September 2021 , IOM Yemen DTM estimates that 9,639 households (HH) (57,834 Individuals) have experienced displacement at least once.

Since the beginning of 2021, DTM also identified 580 displaced households who left their locations of displacement and either moved back to their place of origin or another location.

Between 29 August 2021 and 04 September 2021, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 471 households (2,826 individuals) displaced at least once. The highest number of displacements were seen in:

(B H)

Film: UNHCR is warning of alarming levels of humanitarian needs among the displaced communities in Yemen’s Marib governorate. Ending the conflict is the only way to stop displacement and the suffering of Yemeni people.

(* B H)

Young Migrants Survive a Near-Death Experience Crossing War-Torn Yemen

With the recent loosening of restrictions on international movements, migrant arrivals into Yemen have started to show a slow increase, although the overall numbers remain low compared to pre-pandemic years.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that in 2019 over 138,000 migrants arrived in Yemen, while just over 37,500 came in 2020. Thus far in 2021, the Organization has recorded more than 11,500 migrant arrivals to the country.

Migrants who manage to arrive in Yemen continue to face significant barriers in accessing the humanitarian services and employment necessary to survive. The pandemic and persistent conflict have pushed them further into the shadows and left them reliant on smuggling networks to get by.

Most migrants who come from the Horn of Africa arrive to Yemen’s western coast – somewhere between Hajjah and Shabwah – before they attempt to make their way onward.

The smugglers then provide transportation to those migrants who can afford the journey, taking them to Aden. Migrants who do not have money usually travel for weeks on foot to reach the same destination.

Eager to cross the borders to KSA , they then take an extremely dangerous trip from Aden to Sa’dah. On the way, many migrants find themselves caught up amid armed clashes.

While on this same route trying to cross the border in Sa’dah, Bilal was attacked and suffered multiple injuries to his head and partial loss of consciousness.

In the same violent incident, Yaseen Omar, a 27-year-old Ethiopian migrant who was travelling with Bilal to KSA, was also assaulted in Sa’dah.

He lost a lot of blood and fell unconscious after receiving multiple gunshots in his abdomen and pelvis. Yaseen was in desperate need of surgery to stop the internal bleeding.

Both Bilal and Yaseen were in life-threatening health conditions and needed to be transferred to Sana’a for advanced health care.

IOM collaborates with the Government of Germany to provide emergency and essential health services to vulnerable migrants in Yemen

(B H)

IOM Yemen: Rapid Displacement Tracking - Yemen IDP Dashboard Reporting Period: 15 to 21 August 2021

Between 15 August 2021 and 21 August 2021, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 203 households (1,218 individuals) displaced at least once. The highest number of displacements were seen in:

(A H P)

[Hadi gov.] Marib governor orders authorities to pay urgent cash, material relief aid to new IDPs

The governor of eastern Yemen's Marib has ordered the local authorities in the government-held governorate to hand out urgent cash and material relief aid to scores of civilians newly re-displaced again the Houthi militia attacking Rahabah, a Marib outskirt.

(B H)

Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, covering the period 24 August - 3 September 2021

UNHCR assisted 53,549 IDP families (some 337,464 individuals) with multipurpose cash assistance (MPCA) across 19 governorates between May – July 2021. The programme targeted displaced families residing across 49 districts classified as being on the verge of famine (IPC4+). To ensure long-term support, the majority of families received assistance to cover multiple months. UNHCR conducted regular post-distribution monitoring (PDM) exercises—the last one in July—to evaluate how the cash assistance contributed to reducing food insecurity. Results from May showed an improvement across all major indicators compared to PDM conducted in April, confirming a clear link between cash and famine prevention (i.e. food is available in Yemen but not accessible due to poverty levels amongst the IDP population). This was evidenced by the improvement in food consumption scores.

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

Siehe / Look at cp1

(A K P)

Yemeni Foreign Minister condemns US and British hypocrisy in recent statements

Foreign Minister in the National Salvation Government of Yemen, Hisham Sharaf, has on Monday called on the American and British administrations to pressure the Saudi regime to immediately lift the siege on Sana’a International Airport and all Yemeni ports.

In response to the US and British foreign ministers’ statements and their call for Sana’a to commit to an immediate ceasefire, Sharaf said: “this talk should be directed at the aggressors against Yemen, who continue to bomb us, impose a blockade on Yemeni ports and airports, and prevent the entry of oil and medicine ships.”

The Foreign Minister considered the US and British statements an attempt to “shuffle the cards in front of the world, and throw the ball into the court of Sana’a, as if we were the aggressor and the ones who started this unjust war.”

(A P)

Fierce clashes erupt in the 60-meter road in Sana'a on Sunday in a fighting between rival Houthi leaders Abu Ali Al-Hakem and Hani Qatina. Five militants were killed from both sides and others were wounded/Yemen Voice

(A P)

A traffic police man on duty was killed and three civilians were injured by a Houthi militant who opened fire on the cop while driving by him in a Sana'a street on Sunday. The Houthi militant shot fire on the cop and left him to bleed to death./Multiple websites

(A P)

A group of Zaynabiyat (Houthi religious policewomen) have graduated from an Iranian-supervised training course in espionage and implementing "dirty missions."/Okaz, a Saudi news website

(A P)

“Today, Houthis hold a new hearing of young model Entisar Al Hammadi & 3other girls on charges of "prostitution, drug possession & committing an indecent act" based on "videos, photos & messages found in their phones," Acc 2 Houthi-run Saba. =

(A P)

Council of Ministers dismisses 35 traitors, aggression coalition agents

The Council of Ministers on Sunday issued a decision to dismiss 35 people from public office for joining the aggression countries and their direct contribution to the aggression on the homeland and the Yemeni people.

(* B P)

Reports: Houthis kill 61 forcibly disappeared persons

Iran-allied Houthi militiamen are blamed for killing 61 of the forcibly disappeared persons over the five past years according to activists' reports.
The Association of the Mothers of the Abductees and Forcibly Disappeared Persons (AMAFDP) reported that 40 enforced disappeared persons were killed under torture while 21 persons were used by the militiamen as human shields, the victims were held in places were seen as military targets by the Arab Coalition Forces.
The AMAFDP organized in the city of Marib on Sturda, a seminar on the International Day for the Victims of the Enforced Disappearance. It reported that there are still more than 104 persons among of them a woman have remained enforced disappeared in the Houthi militia detention centers in several governorates.

and also

(A P)

Parliament resumes sessions for current period

(A P)

Yemeni ambassador to Syria attends meeting on economic cooperation between Damascus and Sana’a

(A P)

Abdul Malik Al-Houthi: Es besteht kein Zweifel an Allianz Saudi-Arabiens mit Israel

Laut Al-Masirah am Donnerstag sagte Seyyed Abdul Malik Badruddin al-Houthi, der Generalsekretär der jemenitischen Regierung der Nationalen Rettung: "Die Unterdrückung durch die USA und das zionistische Regime ist eine gefährliche Bedrohung für die Religion, Sicherheit, Freiheit und Würde der islamischen Ummah",

Al-Houthi fügte hinzu: "Die Position des jemenitischen Volkes gegen die Unterdrückung der Vereinigten Staaten und des zionistischen Regimes ist eine aufrichtige Position, und diejenigen, die sich der Koalition der USA und dieses Regimes angeschlossen haben, liegen falsch."

Abdul Malik al-Houthi sagte außerdem, dass die Angriffe auf den Jemen und die Verschwörung gegen die Länder der Region im Interesse der USA und des israelischen Regimes seien, während diese beiden Regime die gesamte muslimische Ummah unterdrückten, vom Jemen bis Palästina.

Er hob weiter hervor: "Wenn wir bei diesem Krieg aufgegeben hätten, gäbe es bald amerikanische, britische und israelische Stützpunkte in Sanaa und anderen jemenitischen Provinzen, aber wir werden bald alle besetzten Gebiete von der saudischen Angreifer-Koalition zurückerobern."

Die Jemeniten haben heute zum Jahrestag des Martyriums von Zayd bin Ali (AS) in Saada einen großen Marsch veranstaltet und dabei auch Parolen gegen die USA und das zionistische Regime skandiert.


(A P)

Sayyid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi: All of Yemen will be liberated

The Leader of the Revolution, Sayyid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, has affirmed that “Yemen will be liberated and all areas occupied by the US-Saudi aggression will be returned.”

In his speech on Thursday, held on the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Zayd, Sayyid al-Houthi said: “The anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Zayd has great importance, linking us to a blessed revolution, of which the effects are still experienced until today.”

He added that the revolution of Imam Zayd gave an extension and continuity to seeking freedom, pointing out that Imam Zayd is a great symbol of the Islamic Nation.

Sayyid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi pointed out that “our nation needs awareness today more than ever to understand its options.”

“We face the tyrants US, Israel and their mercenaries with awareness first, and only then by fighting,” warning that “the alternative to awareness is blindness, and whoever loses awareness will act based on delusion.”

In his speech, the Leader of the Revolution mentioned the presence of US and British military bases in the occupied southern provinces, pointing out that “if we had neglected our battle, the US, Israeli and British military bases would have been in Sana’a and other provinces.”

He stressed that “the revolutionary spirit and sincere movement of our people will bring us God’s promise of victory, and we will liberate our country and restore all areas occupied by the US-Saudi aggression.”

“We will guarantee our country to be free and independent, and not subjected to occupation or tutelage,” he added, warning that those who are deceived by the forces of aggression are in reality victims of the US and Britain.

Sayyid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi explained that the tyrants US and Israel pose a serious threat to the religion, security, freedom and dignity of the Islamic nation, stressing that “this tyranny targets our nation in all fields.”

He pointed out that the Saudi aggression against Yemen and the conspiracies against the countries of the region serve the US and Israel, explaining that there is no confusion in the Saudi regime’s alliance with the US and Israel.

Sayyid al-Houthi furthermore stated that the crimes committed against the Yemeni people are more than the US is able to cover up, noting that: “There is no ambiguity that the position of our people in the face of the US and Israeli tyranny is the right position.”

and also


(A P)

Hundreds of thousands of Yemenis honour Imam Zayd ibn Ali on anniversary of his martyrdom

Hundreds of thousands of Yemenis in the capital Sana’a and a number of provinces have on Thursday staged mass rallies commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Zayd bin Ali (peace be upon him).

The participants raised banners expressing the importance of commemorating this anniversary, and emphasised the continuation of Imam Zayd’s policies, his courage and his sacrifice.

They carried slogans of freedom against the tyrannical American policy in the region, as well as banners calling for a boycott of American and Israeli goods.

and film: Aerial photography of crowds in Sana'a on the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Zaid, peace be upon him

(A P)

After acknowledging to have kidnapped 6 thousand civilians on the charges of alleged intelligence with the Arab Coalition in April 2019, the militia via its website "Security Media" re-acknowledged days ago to have kidnapped 140 new civilians on the same charge.This trumped-up charge is overly used by the terrorist militia to justify oppressing the oppositionists/Al-Islah website.

(* A P)

Nightmarish day in a Sana'a neighborhood goes unreported in media

Three people were killed and eight others were critically wounded in a new nightmarish day of clashes in one Sana'a neighborhood on Tuesday, which went unreported by Yemeni media.

Facebook activist Fahd Sultan exclusively reported on Wednesday, "Houthi gunmen accompanied by the militia's 'Director of 22 May Police Station' and local 'Real Estates Supervisor' tried yesterday to usurp by force the front yard of the house of one man in one of Sana'a's neighborhoods (the Air Force Neighborhood) and exchanged fire with the house's owner for hours."

Sultan said: "[The Houthi militants] demanded a military reinforcement of 100 militants and 10 police patrol pickup trucks. Three Houthi gunmen were killed and eight others were wounded all of them now in the ICU. The house was fully burned down with RPGs, Loe missiles and machinegun rounds. After five years of clashes, at around the Afternoon Prayer time, the house was finally stormed. The militia tightly surrounded the neighborhood and adjacent neighborhoods in search of the house owner Fadhel Alsayadi. He was not and has not been found to now. Among the killed the militia's Police Station manager and Real Estates supervisor."


(B K P)

Film: Funeral of an Ethiopian immigrant, in Al-Masirah Houthis channel, confirms continued recruitment of African refugees &immigrants by Iranian-backed Houthi militia in various fighting fronts, in a war crime &crime against humanity, &flagrant violation of intl laws and covenants.

(A P)

Yemen’s Houthis kill elderly woman in front of her children: Minister

Members of the Iran-backed Houthi militia have killed an elderly woman in front of her children in Yemen, Moammar al-Eryani, the [Hadi gov.] country’s Minister of Information, Culture and Tourism, said on Tuesday.

“Killing of old woman by Iranian-backed Houthi militia before her children in Al-Asha, Amran, reflects their brutality, criminality and indifference to blood of Yemenis,”

(A P)

Yemen Urges US, Saudi Aggressors to Prepare Retreat Plan After Afghanistan Fiasco

A senior Yemeni official has called on the US and Saudi Arabia to set out a plan for a withdrawal from Yemen, following America's humiliating retreat from Afghanistan, warning that the Arab country will eventually become a "graveyard for aggressors."

The remarks were made by Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, chairman of Yemen's Supreme Revolutionary Committee, in a post on his Twitter account on Tuesday, after the US announced an end to chaotic withdrawal efforts from Kabul's airport, effectively ending its two-decade occupation of the South Asian country.

“With the departure of the last American colonizers from Afghanistan, I call on the United States and its Saudi ally to leave Yemen too and devise a plan to that effect so that the Yemeni people can live in stability and away from occupation and guardianship,” Houthi tweeted, Press TV reported.

“The Yemeni nation will never accept occupation and guardianship, no matter how long the conflicts and confrontations last. Yemen will be the graveyard of the aggressors.”

and also

(A P)

Hodeidah Port Seize six containers

Security services in Hodeidah port seized six containers provided by World Health Organization (WHO) from the so-called King Salman Center.

Director of the Branch of the Supreme Council for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Hodeidah, Jaber al-Razhi explained that the shipment contrary to the permits provided to it.

Al-Razhi condemned the misleading actions of the World Health Organization (WHO) to bring in the shipment of nets for a people killed by missiles, aircraft and Saudi battleships.

He called on the World Health Organization to speed up the return of the shipment unless will be taken to destroy it....Calling the organization to officially apologize to the Yemeni people and their government.


(A P)

Over 5,000 tons of spoiled food belonging to WFP seized in Hodeida

The General Department of Plant Protection at the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, represented by the plant quarantine station team in the port of Hodeida, has seized 5,493 tons of green and dry peas infected with warehouse pests belonging to the World Food Program (WFP).

Director of Plant Protection Department, Engineer Hilal Al-Jashari, said "It was verified that the shipment was infected with warehouse pests in its different phases and in proportions that exceeded the permissible under the Quarantine Law."

Al-Jashari confirmed that the shipment, which the WFP seeks to bring into Yemen as aid, has been rejected and would be returned to the country of origin (the USA) after completi

and also

(A P)

Over 171 tons of UN food aid to Yemen infected with dangerous fungus

The [Sanaa gov.] Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation in Dhamar province has on Tuesday destroyed 171 tons of rotten seeds provided by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) under the guise of aid to the Yemeni people.

The Director-General of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Agriculture, Abdul Wahab Al-Khail, confirmed to al-Masirah news channel that the destroyed quantity was destined for the occupied lands in the southern governorates.

“We hold the United Nations fully responsible for bringing infected seeds that are riddled with fungi that destroy farmlands,” the Director-General said.

(B K P)

War without end in Yemen: Who are the Houthi rebels and what do they want

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp6 – cp19

Vorige / Previous:

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-757 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-757: oder / or

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

08:08 07.09.2021
Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
Geschrieben von

Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
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Dietrich Klose