... Wie die Huthis das Bildungssystem an sich gerissen haben – Wo ist Al Kaida jetzt? – Der Beginn des Endspiels für den Nordjemen? – Jahrhunderte alte Misstände in der Region Tihama dauern an – Ein neuer Krieg im ölreichen Südjemen – Die Auswirkungen von Überweisungen auf die Wirtschaft des Jemen – Jemens Wasserkrise – Die Risiken von Reisen im Jemen – und mehr
Oct. 19, 2021: The Yemen Review, September 2021 – The Houthis’ fatal military success – STC, Hadi government face public outrage – How the Houthis seized the education system – Where is AQAP Now? – The beginning of the endgame for northern Yemen? – Century-old grievances continue in Yemen’s Tihama region – A new war in oil-rich southern Yemen – The impact of remittances on Yemen’s economy – Yemen's water crisis – The risks of travelling in Yemen – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-765b-yemen-war-mosaic-765b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp11 Deutschland / Germany
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp12a Katar-Krise / Qatar crisis
cp12b Sudan
cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade
cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage
cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy
cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism
cp15 Propaganda
cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
cp19 Sonstiges / Other
Klassifizierung / Classification
***
**
*
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:
Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-einfuehrende-artikel-u-ueberblicke
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
(** B K P)
The Yemen Review, September 2021
Contents
September at a Glance
The Political Arena
Developments in Government-Controlled Territory
Developments in Houthi-Controlled Territory
International Developments
At the United Nations
State of the War
Houthis Capture Al-Bayda; Government Forces Retreat in Marib and Shabwa
Coalition Airstrikes Resume in Taiz
Houthi Missile Attack Kills 12 in Hajjah
Economic Developments
Collapsing Currency, Living Conditions Spur Widespread Protests in South Yemen
YR Depreciation Creates Unprecedented Money Transfer Challenges
Bank of England Unfreezes 82 Million Pounds
IRG Officials Discuss SDR Unit Options with World Bank
Features
Houthis Forces Press Onslaught in Marib
Analysis: Tribes Bear the Brunt of Houthi Advances
Commentary: The Houthis’ Fatal Military Success
Southern Streets Erupts in Protest
Analysis: STC, Yemeni Government Face Public Outrage
Commentary: The South’s Hot Summer
Education to Indoctrination Under the Houthis
Commentary: How the Houthis Seized and Remade the Education System
Analysis: Curriculum Changes to Mold the Jihadis of Tomorrow
Al-Qaeda in Yemen
Analysis: Where is AQAP Now?
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15218
(** B K)
Tribes Bear the Brunt of Houthi Advances
By Ali al-Sakani
Houthis Seek to Divide the Tribes
The Houthis are trying to break the Murad tribe for a number of reasons. Murad is the biggest Shafei Sunni tribe in Marib governorate and in the Madhaj tribal confederation; it also has a long history of resisting Zaidi inroads into the area.
Houthi Strategy: Find the Weak Link in the Chain
Tribes Try to Regroup
The unity of Marib’s tribes and its political, military and tribal leadership, along with the support of Saudi-led coalition airstrikes, have been crucial factors in resisting Houthi incursions and preventing the fall of the governorate. When government forces suffer a setback, the tribes send backup.
Ill Winds Blow for Anti-Houthi Forces
Although airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition have played a vital role in slowing down Houthi advances by targeting heavy armored vehicles and reinforcements, government-aligned forces face a number of challenges. The coalition started gradually reducing logistical support for the national army last year and suspended some aid in March, a military official told the Sana’a Center.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15218#Tribes_brunt
(** B K)
The Houthis’ Fatal Military Success
Commentary by Abdulghani Al-Iryani
Most, observers and activists alike, now acknowledge that the Houthis are winning, but the question is what are they winning?
The Houthis’ most obvious victory is the division and discord of their opponents. Their military posture, bearing down on Marib and extending their reach into southern Yemen, is cause for celebration in Sana’a, Tehran, and capitals of the “Resistance”. Each military success for the Houthis strengthens their most radical and ideological faction at the expense of the moderates, both within the Houthi movement itself as well as in their larger coalition, which includes the reconstituted Sana’a-based elites of the former regime of the late Ali Abdullah Saleh, alongside tribal leaders from all over Yemen. The radical wing is ideologically committed to the Zaidi concept of Wilayah, restricting the right to rule for the descendants of Hasan and Hussein, grandsons of the Prophet Mohammed.
So, as Saudi Arabia waves the white flag and seeks a deal with the Houthis that satisfies its security concerns and, according to Saudi insiders, lets the Yemenis keep fighting, Islah is moving toward accepting the Houthis’ deal for Marib. This deal would likely lead to a more comprehensive agreement that would reproduce the pre-1962 theocracy, where the Sunni Islah becomes the junior partner of the Zaidi Houthis. Should that happen, it would produce a theocracy that offers no place for non-sectarian groups or southern Yemen. The Yemeni state would not survive that.
Nor will any deal between the Houthis and their opponents last. Excluded constituents will rise, and the Houthis will eventually find themselves fighting a number of different groups on multiple fronts, including the northern Zaidi demographic that has so far taken up arms to repel external “aggression.”
Houthi military successes are making them less likely to compromise on the principle of Wilayah and the absolute authority of the Sayyid, and therefore unable to share power in a way that creates these checks and balances. That could lead to the destruction of the Yemeni state. That is, in essence, what the Houthis are winning.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15218#Houthi_fatal_military_success
(** B P)
STC, Yemeni Government Face Public Outrage
By Hashem Khaled
Thousands of people flooded streets of cities across southern Yemen in mid-September, protesting dire living conditions, the collapse of public services and an unprecedented drop in the value of the Yemeni rial (YR). Various levels of protests, strikes and general civil unrest were seen in the governorates of Taiz, Al-Dhalea, Lahj, Aden, Abyan, Shabwa, Hadramawt, and Al-Mahra.
The protests coincided with deepening tensions within the anti-Houthi coalition. Infighting between the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the Saudi-backed internationally recognized government of President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi has paralyzed the alliance and turned the south into a battleground even as the Houthis continue to advance on the governorates of Marib, Al-Bayda and Shabwa.
Aden Violence
The most violent protests occurred over three days, September 14-16, in the STC-controlled interim capital of Aden, where three protesters were killed and many others were injured.
Witnesses said STC forces used tear gas and opened fire with live ammunition to disperse crowds after angry protesters attempted to storm the STC headquarters in Crater district. Protesters also blocked major roads and threw stones at security forces in Crater and Khor Maksar district.
Mukalla Protests
Meanwhile, in Mukalla city, the capital of Hadramawt governorate, hundreds of protesters burned tires in the streets to protest electricity outages.
Demonstrations in Wadi Hadramawt, Taiz and Shabwa
In Sayoun and Tarim, desert cities in the northern Wadi Hadramawt region, which is largely under the control of the Yemeni army’s First Military Zone, hundreds of protesters flooded the streets and blocked roads, criticizing the Saudi-backed Hadi government for the collapse of the economy.
Since early 2021, the value of the Yemeni rial has plummeted in areas under control of the internationally recognized government, reaching a record YR1,200 per $US1 in recent weeks.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15218#Public_outrage
(** B P)
The South’s Hot Summer
Commentary by Hussam Radman
Over the past six years, citizens in South Yemen have become accustomed to the scorching temperatures during the summer that are accompanied by deteriorating services. The situation, however, dramatically worsened in September as protests demanding better services escalated at the same time as the Houthis made incursions into the south.
Southern governorates were supposed to witness a breakthrough during September after the governors of Aden, Al-Mahra and Hadramawt traveled to Riyadh, where they held intensive meetings with Yemeni Prime Minister Maeen Abdelmalek Saeed and Saudi ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al-Jaber. The purpose of these talks was to set clear mechanisms for the flow of local revenues into the government’s accounts, which will help cover some of the cost of a Saudi oil derivatives grant, a US$422 million deal announced in April to subsidize fuel for power plants in Yemen.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia intensified its diplomatic efforts to revive the Riyadh Agreement, attempting to convince the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and President Hadi to reach an agreement for the Yemeni government’s return to the interim capital, Aden. According to Yemeni government officials, Saudi Arabia promised that the cabinet would return to Aden on September 15. As usual, however, that promise failed to materialize.
A new dynamic has entered the conflict in the south: the Houthi movement’s foothold in Shabwa and popular demonstrations against ruling authorities. This new dynamic threatens the two pre-existing major actors: the STC and the Hadi government, both of which exploit popular discontent to attack one another.
The only way to end this current cycle is through a coherent civil network to lead the protest movement toward a reform program and the development of a decisive international approach, led by the international quartet (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, US and UK) and the UN envoy to help implement the Riyadh Agreement and save the economic situation.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15218#South_Summer
(** B P)
How the Houthis Seized and Remade the Education System
Commentary By Salam Al-Harbi
Like nearly every aspect of Yemeni society, the state of education in the country has suffered severely during the war.
Indeed, like Yemen’s competing central banks and much of its bureaucracy, there are two ministries of education.
In Houthi-controlled territory, students, teachers and administrative employees have been subjected to an intensive identity change.
As they have done in most state institutions, the Houthis replaced much of the leadership within the Ministry of Education.
The Houthis have also made changes to school curriculum as well as to school holidays, instituting 16 different political and religious celebrations,[2] including Ashura, a Shia holiday never previously commemorated in Yemen, even under the Zaidi imams.
School directors in each district meet every Wednesday to listen to a lecture either by Abdelmalek or his late brother Hussein, the movement’s founder, in dedicated halls. Attendance is taken, according to one director who spoke to the Sana’a Center on the condition of anonymity; attendees are aware that they are being evaluated. According to an official who administers tests in Sana’a, the Houthis also give high grades to high school students who fight on the frontline regardless of whether or not they attend classes.
The Houthis also impose strict supervision on private education, which has become increasingly popular as the quality of public education has deteriorated.
Hussein Hazeb, a tribal sheikh and member of the GPC, is the minister of higher education in the Houthi government. But his deputy and undersecretaries, who set the ministry’s policies, are all Houthi members
Since seizing Sana’a in September 2014, the Houthis have appointed three loyalists as directors at the University of Sana’a.
The Houthis have changed the names of university halls to commemorate the movement’s symbols. They prohibit mixed graduation ceremonies and banned photos of male and female graduates together. A percentage of each faculty is now allocated to the children of Houthi members who were killed fighting in the war. Those students are exempted from all fees.
The Houthi approach to education aims to mold the social and national identity of children to the group’s sectarian ideology and political ends, at the expense of actual knowledge and skills acquisition. This represents a long-term threat to peaceful social co-existence in Yemen, with the potential to give rise to new generations of students who view diversity, difference, critical thinking and indeed knowledge and science as things to be feared and attacked. This sort of ‘education’ threatens the country’s stability by planting the seeds for future conflicts. It also robs Yemen of the skill sets its people need to rebuild and develop the country. The war presently tearing the country apart, creating such suffering for Yemenis and sending children to the frontlines, is already horrific; Houthi efforts to condemn Yemen’s children to such a future and much worse is truly abhorrent, and must be resisted however possible.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15218#Houthi_remake_education_system
(** B P)
Curriculum Changes to Mold the Jihadis of Tomorrow
By Manal Ghanem
Since its takeover of Sana’a in 2014, the armed Houthi movement has cemented its hold over northern Yemen. An important part of this has been its extensive focus on education, systematically targeting the youth with Houthi ideology. This has meant moving from a civic education to one with a more religious point of view – a move similar to that made after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini’s followers changed school curriculums in Iran as a way of shaping the next generation.
In Yemen, courage is easily linked to martyrdom. Stories of brave men defending their country have been the backbone of folktales in the culture for centuries. The concept can be easily manipulated to depict bravery as an effort to defend the homeland against an enemy. Today, after seven years of conflict, a revised integration of this concept is seeping into the minds of children. The stories are no longer of heroes in farfetched scenarios; they are now real examples of their fathers, brothers and cousins. The Houthi movement is molding future generations of fighters.
Where it all Began
Since coming to power, the Houthi authorities have implemented a sectarian agenda to ensure the loyalty of children in the future and persuade adults to fight on the frontlines today.[3] In education, after more than seven years of rule, the changes that have been made to the school curricula and in the education system more broadly are easy to see. Examples include what might appear to be small changes in how a Quranic verse is interpreted, but these changes completely alter one’s understanding of the text.
Changes started in Sa’dah, where the group integrated their literature through distributing writings by the group’s founder, Hussein Badr al-Deen al-Houthi.[5] The teachings of Al-Houthi became the main curriculum in the governorate in 2010.
Initially the changes were slight, but for the 2021/2022 school year, the Ministry of Education in Sana’a issued a modified curriculum in Islamic studies, the Holy Quran and social studies for primary school. These introduced new lessons and modified or deleted original lessons covering civic rights, the role of women and the history of influential figures that shaped the history of Yemen.
The Houthis have also instituted changes at technical, vocational and community colleges, all under the broad pretext of “protecting the faith”. As part of this process, the Houthis have monitored what professors teach in the classroom as well as the political views of those professors and teachers.
The Process of Change
For the Houthi movement’s ideas and beliefs to be instilled among school students – and changes in the curricula to be realized smoothly – the group has been prepared to change and remove school principals from their jobs, replacing them with Houthi loyalists. According to Yahya al-Yinai, a spokesperson for the Yemen Teachers Syndicate – a group loyal to the internationally-recognized government – these tactics have now left the Houthis in control of 90 percent of the schools in the northern highlands.[10]
To fund the printing and distribution of the new curricula, the Ministry of Education (MOE) in Sana’a has imposed fees on students at public schools as ‘community contributions’ (elementary students pay 500 Yemeni rials (YR) and secondary school students pay between YR1000-YR1500 monthly).
What Has Changed
Changes in primary school textbooks targeted four curricula: the Arabic language; Islamic education; Civics and History. Amendments to the Civics curriculum included lessons that glorify the Houthi movement’s history since they took control of Sana’a and the events that accompanied that period. For instance, these lessons frequently describe the Saudi-led Coalition as being supported by the “American-Zionist alliance,” and depict the Houthis as the protectors of Yemen.
All students are mandated to take an active role in religious activities[18] and ‘patriotic’ events,[19] which highlight the Houthis’ role in defending the homeland and stress the internationally recognized government’s complicity in the deaths of Yemeni civilians.
Summer Centers for Indoctrination
Changes in the school curricula to have an impact on students take time – longer than the Houthi authorities wish to wait. To accelerate the process, the group has been reviving summer schools and centers and devoting more resources to them, strengthening their prevalence and acceptance. These centers have received significant attention from the group’s leader, Abdelmalek, and his brother, Yahya, the education minister.
As a result, the Houthi authorities have established almost 3,700 centers across 16 governorates. These centers are controlled by the Houthi leadership and the educational content taught to participants is designed by the Houthi authorities. Attendance is promoted in mosques by preachers and other influential figures, with participation bringing recognition to children and their families. Not surprisingly, the Houthis also do not allow any unaffiliated summer study centers to be established.[20]
In several instances, parents spoke of their children being influenced by their classmates during these summer schools to join the fighting. Many children have also run away from their homes to join active frontlines without their parents’ consent after being influenced by peers who have been trained at these summer centers.
Jihad Magazine for Kids
Many of the teachers interviewed said that society and the media play a larger role in shaping students’ awareness and culture than school does – a point the Houthi movement has been aiming to exploit.[27]
The Houthi authorities have created a monthly magazine, called Jihad, that targets children with fancy illustrations.
The Houthi authorities are thus applying educational changes, leveraged by social propaganda, to influence Yemeni society and make the changes they want to see. The ramifications of these changes will become apparent in future, as the social fabric of Yemeni society goes through tectonic shifts.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15218#Curriculum_changes
(** B T)
Where is AQAP Now?
By Elisabeth Kendall
Al-Qaeda in Yemen appears weaker now than at almost any point since its Saudi and Yemeni branches united to form Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2009. The group’s fortunes peaked in 2015 when it established a proto-state in the eastern port city of Mukalla, taking advantage of the security vacuum and increasing sectarianism as Yemen’s civil war spiraled into an internationalized conflict. But the past five years have seen it steadily decline. Today, AQAP is no longer able to govern enclaves, hold territory or even operate effectively in the shadows. Its frequency of operations is less than 10 percent that of its guerrilla peak in 2017. However, it would be premature to write off the group.
AQAP’s current decline is the result of a barrage of challenges that the jihadis have faced, both external and internal. The external pressures have come from international counter-terrorism efforts that intensified after 2016 when AQAP was ousted from Mukalla by Emirati forces and their local allies. That was less a defeat than a strategic decision to withdraw to avoid urban warfare and heavy losses.[32]
The UAE’s subsequent recruitment of local forces in key areas across the south ramped up the pressure on AQAP, not only combating it but also disrupting its recruitment and retention abilities. AQAP’s irritation and concern at the creation of these UAE-backed southern forces was clear in at least four statements released by the group in 2017, warning local tribes against siding with the new forces.[33]
In some areas, AQAP was able to capitalize on resentment generated by the UAE’s increasing influence in the south, its backing of the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) formed in 2017 and human rights violations committed by the UAE-backed forces in the name of security. Overall, however, AQAP was successively degraded and, by late 2018, its operational activity was largely limited to Al-Bayda and Abyan.
AQAP has also suffered from internal pressures at the hands of informants and agents provocateurs recruited from or planted within the jihadi movement itself. B
By late summer 2020, the remnants of both AQAP and IS were largely cleared from Al-Bayda following a Houthi offensive, which was portrayed as a counter-terrorism operation. The ‘success’ of the Houthi operation likely relied on a combination of conspicuous killing and covert dismantling in the case of IS,[42] coupled with a negotiated exit for AQAP, whose fighters shifted to Marib or headed south to lie low or join new battlefronts flaring up between government and STC-affiliated forces.
The upshot of these various external and internal pressures faced by AQAP – the infighting, suspicion, high leadership turnover and organizational paralysis they brought – is that AQAP has fragmented.
Whatever the truth behind this and other rifts, what is clear is that serious internal disagreements over priorities and loyalties have boiled over, and that Khalid Batarfi, who succeeded Qasim al-Raymi as AQAP’s overall leader in early 2020 after the latter was killed in a US strike, has proven a controversial leadership figure.
It is likely that AQAP, weakened and fragmented, is now making common cause with more mainstream militias active in the Yemen war,[46] whether by pragmatic choice or practical necessity. There are several areas in which jihadi interests overlap with assorted political, economic and criminal interests. These include profiteering from the war, stoking tensions in the Saudi-led coalition, spoiling democratic ambitions, scuppering the 2019 Riyadh Agreement and squashing hopes of a separate southern state, which jihadis see as a man-made border dividing the umma and a throwback to the godless days of socialism.
AQAP’s core goals remain unchanged and were firmly restated in its September 2021 booklet: to expel unbelievers from Muslim lands and, ultimately, to establish a caliphate.
Perversely, a cease-fire could provide the catalyst for a comeback. After seven years of conflict, and in some areas many more, cycles of revenge are entrenched and it is unclear to what extent military and political leaders speak for or control local forces on the ground. If the hoped-for peace talks are not fully inclusive, or if those selected for inclusion do not hold genuine sway among the populations they claim to represent, then AQAP could seize the opportunity to resurge. It has a strong track record of harnessing local grievances and spinning them to fit its global jihadi narrative. It would therefore be wise to consider AQAP as more dormant rather than defeated.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15218#AQAP_Now
(** B K P)
After al-Bayda, the Beginning of the Endgame for Northern Yemen? - Middle East and North Africa Briefing N°84
The Huthis have taken al-Bayda, the southern approach to Marib and its oil reserves. A battle for this prize likely would not conclude the war, however. The new UN envoy should work to avert that showdown while revamping the framework for making peace in Yemen.
What’s new?After consolidating their hold upon al-Bayda, a strategically located governorate in central Yemen, the Huthi rebels are making a multi-front push into government-controlled territory to isolate, eliminate or co-opt tribal and other rivals. Their immediate objective is Marib, whose capture they hope will mark a turning point in the war.
Why does it matter? After al-Bayda, a Huthi victory in Marib seems more likely. It could deal a fatal blow to the Yemeni government and throw UN mediation efforts into further disarray. Nevertheless, Marib’s fall would far more likely shift the conflict into a new and potentially bloodier phase than end it.
What should be done?The new UN special envoy should travel to Sanaa and Marib as soon as possible to launch intensive intra-Yemeni and regional diplomacy and, with support from the Security Council’s permanent members, engage with any and all proposals to prevent a destructive battle for Marib.
Overview
At least for the time being, Yemen’s Huthi rebels have won the battle for the strategically important al-Bayda governorate. As al-Bayda lies next to oil- and gas-rich Marib province, the northernmost part of the last contiguous bloc of government-controlled territory, taking it was a significant victory. The Huthis soon made rapid gains in Marib as well as Shebwa and Abyan provinces – all of which border al-Bayda – apparently to cut supply lines connecting their various foes and expand their Marib offensive. These advances could strike a decisive blow to the government. The rebels have also divided their opponents, geographically and politically. A renewed Huthi push toward Marib city is now likely, as is massive displacement. Yemen’s UN envoy, backed by the UN Security Council’s five permanent members, should travel to Yemen to meet the country’s armed factions and their outside sponsors to seek a halt to fighting. In particular, he should get to the capital Sanaa and Marib, exploring all options to prevent a deadly showdown. He should also articulate a strategy for ending the wider war, given the failure of past approaches.
Developments in al-Bayda are arguably as important to the balance of power as the Red Sea coast battles in 2018 and the Huthi breakthroughs in northern Yemen in early 2020 and 2021 that brought the rebels to Marib’s gates. The Huthi consolidation in al-Bayda also makes deep-seated patterns clearer. The Huthis are running a well-coordinated and constantly evolving military campaign on several fronts. In parallel, they are reaching out to local tribal leaders in an effort to negotiate their way into Marib. They are aided in these endeavours by infighting and institutional decay among the anti-Huthi forces on the ground and within the Saudi-led coalition that backs them. Inertia is setting in among foreign policymakers, who ran out of ideas some time ago and, in many cases, are losing interest in Yemen as other international priorities emerge. Many foreign officials working on Yemen appear unaware of the significance of the Huthis’ territorial gains. They still make pleas for an end to fighting and peace talks but lack a common and practicable vision for achieving either.
The al-Bayda consolidation appears to be the last step toward what could be a final battle defeating government-aligned forces in Marib city or at minimum encircling and isolating them. If the Huthis win this battle, they will become the unchallenged military and political hegemon in Yemen’s north, marking an endgame of sorts for the conflict’s current phase. But the war itself would not be over and nor would the Yemeni people’s suffering. The Huthis’ capture of Marib city in itself would likely send thousands fleeing from their homes. Moreover, the rebels would probably then push southward to confront the southern secessionists in a bid to seize the whole country or at least force the southerners into a deal favourable to the Huthis over a division of territory and spoils. Such an offensive would inaugurate a new phase of war, one in which the internationally recognised government would have a much smaller role and over which would-be outside mediators would have less influence.
The new UN envoy, Hans Grundberg, has his work cut out. He will need to do two things at once. First, he should quickly engage in face-to-face talks with the warring parties to explore all options to avert a battle for Marib city and, ideally, set the stage for a nationwide ceasefire and talks over a political settlement. The starting point would be to hear out, without necessarily accepting, the Huthis’ proposals and push the government to articulate a position of its own that reflects the reality of today’s power balance. At the same time, Grundberg and his office will have to forge consensus behind a broader mediation strategy tailored to the war’s current dynamics. As Crisis Group has argued in the past, such an approach needs to include a far wider range of actors in peace talks: Yemen’s war is a multiparty conflict, not a binary power struggle between the Huthis, on one side, and the government and its Saudi backers, on the other. Given the increasing importance of economic factors in the war, a new strategy also requires the UN team to form a dedicated unit tasked with integrating an economic pillar into the mission’s peacemaking.
(** B P)
Century-old grievances continue to fester in Yemen’s Tihama region
Grievances have been piling up unaddressed in Tihama, Yemen’s Red Sea coastal plain, for almost a hundred years.
The Tihama’s great swathes of flat fertile land and rich agricultural produce made it the country’s food basket. Hodeida governorate, for instance, contributed an estimated 40% of Yemen’s agriculture produce.
Amid the growing geopolitical rivalry in the Horn of Africa, Hodeida’s geographical proximity to many of the new foreign military bases there — such as the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) base in Asab, and the U.S., French, Turkish, and Chinese bases in Djibouti — and access to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait make the region of considerable geostrategic significance. “As Yemen’s gateway to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, control of the Tihama is critical to controlling and supplying northwest Yemen,” Michael Horton, a fellow for Arabian affairs at the Jamestown Foundation, points out. The region’s importance has endured, but a range of grievances have accumulated through cycles of peace and conflict and changes in political systems over the past 100 years, piling up almost unacknowledged, including during Yemen’s historic National Dialogue Conference (NDC). These grievances remain unresolved today and in recent years wartime dynamics have only exacerbated them.
The Formation of al-Hirak al-Tihami
Inspired by the peaceful struggle of the Southern Movement (al-Hirak al-Janoubi) and resistance movements of the 20th century and beyond in Tihama, the Arab Spring uprising brought the people of Hodeida together, eventually mobilizing to form the Tihami Movement (al-Hirak al-Tihami) in 2011. But unlike the southern Hirak, al-Hirak al-Tihami does not seek secession. Instead, it demands the reversal and correction of deep-rooted political, economic, military, security, and social grievances. The movement also demands self-governance (autonomy) for the region and the allocation of a fair share of its wealth to fund local development and economic growth, consistent with the federal aspirations in Yemen or the outcomes of the NDC.
Ever since, the Zaydi elite has exploited local lands and resources, akin to the injustices experienced in Hadramawt and Aden, and failed to reverse the political marginalization begun by the royalists. Ambassador Ali al-Amrani noted that the very appointment of Tihama’s statesman Dr. Hassan Makki — who made tangible contributions to the republic’s state-building and Yemen’s reunification — as prime minister in 1974 was received with elite discomfort as he is a Shafi’e from the coast. This sheds light on another motive for marginalization: preservation of Zaydi hegemony in Yemen’s political landscape. Although former President Ali Abdullah Saleh (1978-2011) ensured the appointment of one or two cabinet ministers from Hodeida in his government and satisfied tribal figures with parliamentary seats and trade facilitation, the economic exploitation and patronage relationships, coupled with the unjust legacy of the Imamate, prevented the rise of new local merchants and influential elite, and living standards in Tihama remained low.
The NDC and exclusion from the national agenda
Even before the current phase of the conflict, the Yemeni Arab Spring that awakened nationwide demands for reform failed to bring the Tihama cause onto the domestic agenda. Although the 2013-14 NDC sought to tackle a wide range of grievances, it did not address the peaceful Tihami cause when it had a chance to do so, as it did the armed Sa’ada or peaceful southern causes.
The reluctance to address accumulated grievances and include the Tihami question as a national issue suggests that the central authorities cherry-picked grievances, depending on the nature and extent of the threats, rather than out of a true desire to bring about transitional justice and address the underlying concerns. This deepened the resentment and anger in the Tihama, which reached new heights during the war.
The rise of the Tihami Resistance
Following the Houthi takeover of Sanaa in September 2014, the Tihami movement armed itself with light weapons. The ensuing months brought the Arab Coalition’s intervention and the rise of the Tihami Resistance. Between 2015 and 2018, the UAE organized the popular resistance against the Houthis through at least 10 Tihami and Zaraniq brigades.
The Emiratis then intensively trained, armed, financed, and supervised the Tihami Resistance Forces, alongside the Giants Brigades. These forces fought the Houthis shoulder-to-shoulder and recaptured territory before the defection of Brig. Gen. Tareq Saleh, the nephew of former President Saleh, in December 2017, when the Houthi-Saleh marriage of convenience collapsed. After Tareq received Emirati support following his trip to Abu Dhabi and formed the first few brigades of the Guards of the Republic in early 2018, the Tihami Resistance Forces and Giants Brigades led the Hodeida offensive, advancing to the city’s airport and reaching the outskirts of the port by November 2018, with Tareq’s newly formed forces in the line of defense. Tareq Saleh thus did not play a major role in the battle for Hodeida and the greatest sacrifices on the Tihami coast were made by the Tihami Resistance and the Giants Brigades.
The conclusion of the Stockholm Agreement in December 2018 halted the Hodeida offensive and gave the Houthis a lifeline
Going by the old playbook, Tareq eventually sought to dissolve the Tihami Resistance and integrate as many brigades as possible into the Guards of the Republic and Giants Brigades, mainly through the suspension of salaries, and under Emirati supervision. Due to financial challenges and dependency on the coalition, as well as internal issues, several Tihami brigades were integrated into the two groups. However, this does not mean that the Tihamis have given up on reversing old grievances.
Contemporary manifestations of marginalization
Over the past seven years, several manifestations of deepening grievances have surfaced. The first is the exclusion of Tihami figures, including those in the resistance, from discussions concerning war and peace in their territory during the Stockholm talks, which eventually left Hodeida caught in the middle. This made for a state of neither war nor peace, with sporadic firefights continuing to deepen the humanitarian suffering and increase the number of casualties among Tihami civilians. Since Stockholm, Hodeida’s southern region has been separated from the city, and to go either way, travelers have to take a trip lasting several days, instead of one taking 30-45 minutes.
The second manifestation is Tareq’s ongoing attempt to fully quash the Tihami Resistance, whether as an extension of old grievances, in response to the failure to integrate some of these forces, or with the intention of establishing a consolidated presence on the Tihami coast. This triggered several demonstrations in al-Khokha in 2019, 2020, and 2021.
The third manifestation is the exclusion of Hodeida and the Tihama federal region — Hodeida, Hajjah, Mahwit, and Raimah governorates, which together account for nearly one-fifth of Yemen’s population, or more than 6 million people — from Prime Minister Maeen Abdul Malik Saeed’s cabinet.
Moving forward
It is clear that the grievances of the Tihami cause have continued to grow during the war, but to address this the region must develop a unified leadership to gain a seat at the table.
For the Tihamis to gradually reclaim their role in Yemen’s domestic landscape, they must adopt new tactics and a more assertive approach, given that no political party or regime has been willing to acknowledge Tihami grievances.
The current landscape in Yemen only seems to reward entities with tools of power, influence, and subjugation (i.e. arms and forces), not peaceful movements. With this in mind and for Tihama’s unified leadership to have more political clout, the Tihami movement must rehabilitate and restructure its brigades long term under a military umbrella that backs the Tihama cause, akin to how the preservation of the Hadrami Elite Forces, which are greatly celebrated by Hadramis, amplified the Hadrami cause and added a layer of security in the region.
Only time will tell if the Tihamis manage to reverse these alarming trends, and perhaps more importantly, whether the rest of Yemeni society will perceive the Tihami cause as a truly national issue, rather than one that affects only the Tihama region – by Ibrahim Jalal
https://www.mei.edu/publications/century-old-grievances-continue-fester-yemens-tihama-region
(** B P)
Yemen faces a new war in the oil-rich south
The confrontation brewing in Shabwah is not a conflict between President Hadi's government and the STC, but rather between the STC and the Islamist al-Islah Party
In less than two months, Houthi forces have managed to take control of Yemen's southwestern al-Bayda province, reportedly expelling elements of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), tribal Salafi fighters and pro-government troops.
Houthis have now moved into western Shabwah province, under the same pretext of chasing AQAP elements, as more government troops withdraw and amass in military bases around the provincial capital, Ataq. Southern elements accuse al-Islah Party-affiliated government troops of handing over territory to the Houthis while gathering troops to confront southern Shabwani Elite Forces (SEF) in southern Shabwah.
While Houthi military gains capture current headlines, the conflict brewing in Shabwah threatens the continuity of the Saudi Arabia-sponsored Riyadh Agreement of 2019, and the opening of a third Yemeni fighting front, beyond Marib and the Red Sea coast, in the south of Yemen.
The withdrawal and redeployment of pro-government troops into central Shabwah, which has several oil fields and the country's sole liquified natural gas (LNG) terminal, to counter Houthi pressure is seen by the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and its allies as an escalation in violation of the Riyadh Agreement, renegotiated in December 2020.
Southerners see troops of the legitimate government of Yemen, under President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated al-Islah Party, and their concentration in Shabwah as a new form of occupation of the south by northern forces.
The movement of pro-government troops after withdrawing from al-Bayda into western Shabwah comes after weeks of tension brewing over the presence of pro-STC Shabwani Elite Forces at the government-controlled LNG terminal at Balhaf. The latest movements of government troops seeking a Shabwah refuge adds to a fragile environment, including the fight by parties over oil resources.
The nature of the confrontation brewing in Shabwah is not a conflict between the legitimate government and the STC, which is a part of the cabinet, but rather between the STC and al-Islah.
The rivalry between the al-Islah Party and the STC now converges in Shabwah. The oil- and gas-rich southern province maintains major LNG and oil pipelines from Marib to the Gulf of Aden at the LNG Balhaf terminal, Qatan and Bir Ali ports.
The region is highly fragmented along tribal lines, an environment that facilitates patronage relationships with influence-wielding regional powers. The fight for Shabwah involves access to safe refuge, natural resources and direct access to the sea as well as just territory.
Its geographic location makes Shabwah a highly coveted region.
The Balhaf terminal is regarded as “the largest foreign investment on Yemeni soil”, and security for it fell to the UAE
While the al-Islah affiliated Shabwah governor, Mohammed Saleh bin Adio, and his followers specifically target the UAE as an occupying force at Balhaf, the small group of coalition military advisers remains an asset to the SEF amid a surge in AQAP activity since the militant group was expelled from al-Bayda province by Houthi forces this year.
The concentration of troops in Shabwah directly contributes to conflict between al-Islah and the STC. Over the past two years, STC southern secessionists in Shabwah have been at the forefront of opposition to al-Islah and the massing of government troops in the province.
The failure of Hadi’s government to address tensions in Shabwah will continue to spill onto the streets and escalate the media war between al-Islah and the STC, drawing the parties closer to direct armed clashes – by Fernando Carvajal
https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/yemen-war-new-fight-south-oil-rich
(** B E H)
The impact of remittances on Yemen’s economy
Executive summary
The importance of remittances to Yemen’s economic stability at both the macro and household levels predates the current conflict. In the context of violence and deepening economic and humanitarian crises, the significance of remittances has increased during the conflict. Remittances have become the primary source of foreign currency and play a more significant role in terms of import financing and Yemen’s balance of payments. Remittances helped mitigate the challenges that the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) faced trying to underwrite fuel and food imports, owing to the reduction in hydrocarbon revenues and decreased foreign currency reserves during the conflict compared to pre-conflict levels. The level of dependency among Yemeni households on remittances increased notably during the conflict. Remittances helped households deal with the broader socioeconomic shocks reverberating across the country, including the sharp depreciation of the local currency, loss of income, inflation, and rising unemployment, among others.
Despite the positive role that remittances have played and continue to play, their inherent vulnerability to external and internal shocks remains a major cause for concern. Externally, remittance flows are highly susceptible to labour market reforms and changing living circumstances in key host countries – especially Saudi Arabia, which remains by far the biggest source of remittances to Yemen. Remittances are also susceptible to sudden regional and global market shocks, such as those witnessed in 2020 following the onset and spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and the biggest drop in global fuel prices in 20 years. The initial impact of both developments was felt inside Saudi Arabia at the same time – March and April 2020. The longer-term impact of both developments and the response from Saudi authorities was spread out across the remainder of 2020.
Decreased crude oil export revenues and additional loss of revenue and productivity caused by COVID-19 and related mitigation measures negatively impacted the Saudi economy and Yemeni migrant workers in Saudi Arabia. A national lockdown was introduced in Saudi Arabia in late March 2020 and remained in place until the easing of some movement and employment restrictions in late June 2020. The movement restrictions essentially reduced the ability of Yemeni migrant workers to generate income. They also removed the physical ability of many to send cash remittances via formal and informal channels. This, to some extent, prompted a shift in remittance flows – from cash to digital and from informal to formal channels – with options narrowed to electronic remittances services provided by Saudi banks and correspondent Yemeni banks while movement was restricted. Sharp and sustained decreases in global fuel prices led to lower Saudi crude oil export revenues – a significant development for the world’s biggest crude oil exporter. Lower crude oil export revenues resulted in decreased spending, credit, and consumption, as well as reduced income and job opportunities for foreign workers currently working or looking to work in Saudi Arabia, including Yemeni nationals.
Internally, competing monetary policies and attempts made by the Houthis and the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG) to regulate Yemeni financial service providers (FSPs) are harming external and internal remittance flows. Forced or voluntary closures of Yemeni bank or money exchange company branches disrupt remittance flows. The implementation of a total ban on the new Yemeni rial (YER) banknotes in Houthi areas in January 2020 resulted in a significant decrease in the value of internal remittances sent from non-Houthi to Houthi areas because of divergences between the value of the rial in both areas. The impact has been significant: during the conflict, many businesses and individuals looked to support their families based in Houthi areas by seeking work in non-Houthi areas – specifically Aden and Marib.
These external and internal trends directly affected recipients’ spending and saving capacity.1 In particular, the impact of COVID-19 and related restrictions led to a significant reduction of remittance flows in March–June 2020, after which there were signs of resilience in July– October 2020, followed by clearer signs of recovery from October onwards. Any notable reduction in the total value of remittances to Yemen over an extended period is cause for concern, not only for the increased dependence on remittances during the conflict but also because of the direct link between household purchasing power and food (in)security levels. Any change in remittance flows to Yemen can directly impact the value of the rial, trade financing gap, and households’ wellbeing, in addition to indirect impacts on the stability of Yemen’s local and national economies. During March–June 2020, for Yemeni households that continued receiving some – albeit reduced – remittances, spending was limited to the purchasing of essential goods. Less fortunate households were forced to adopt different coping mechanisms, such as borrowing money to survive and prioritising certain essential goods and services over others.
This report provides a detailed breakdown of major developments and trends in Yemen and Saudi Arabia over the past seven years, with a particular focus on developments that occurred in 2020 and the impact of COVID-19 on remittance flows to Yemen. The report does not claim to offer a definitive breakdown of remittance flows to Yemen (and internal remittances) and highlights limitations throughout. The analysis aims to provide critical information and recommendations that might assist policy and programmatic discussions, in addition to offering a springboard for follow-up research.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/impact-remittances-yemen-s-economy
(** B H)
Long-term projects halted in Yemen water crisis
Capital Sanaa is one of the most water-scarce cities in the world
Government projects to solve Yemen’s severe water shortage have been halted as long-term development plans are replaced by much-needed aid programmes, an adviser to the Minister of Water told The National.
In September, the World Bank’s Yemen Emergency Human Capital Project, implemented by UN agency UNOPS, announced a $30 million project to improve sanitation and reform the water supply in parts of the country.
“The project will provide around 850,000 people with access to safer drinking water and improved wastewater collection and treatment services,” said Muhammad Usman Akram, director of the UNOPS Multi-Country Office.
Najib Mohammad Ahmad, an adviser to Yemen’s minister of water and environment, said the conflict’s devastating impact cannot be matched by efforts to curb it.
“The war has stopped everything,” Mr Ahmad told The National on Sunday.
“Nothing can clean you as well as water does. It is therefore certain that severe water shortages have affected hygiene and led to spreading diseases like cholera.”
The projects that have been stopped include strategic long-term plans to build and maintain infrastructure for the efficient gathering and distribution of water.
“Yemen relies mostly on groundwater. But water consumption is higher than what is available for use,” Mr Ahmad said.
Yemenis require about 3.5 billion square metres square of water a year, but only 2.5 billion is fed into the ground annually through rainfall.
Most of the rainfall usually goes into deserts or bodies of water such as the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea.
The Houthi-controlled capital of Sanaa is one of the world’s most water-scarce cities, a study by the Ministry of Water and Environment shows.
Agriculture accounts for more than 11 per cent of Yemen’s GDP and has suffered the most due to the water scarcity, use of primitive methods and the fractionalisation of the country’s government, a joint report by the Centre for Governance and Peace-building in Yemen and the Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen in the Netherlands said in 2017.
“Yemen is known to be one of the poorest countries in terms of water. Some 93 per cent of water reservoirs are used for agriculture including the qat plant, which takes up 30 per cent of that amount,” Abdulqawi Al Sharabi, a Department of Planning official at the ministry told The National.
“People have resorted to digging wells at random to collect and retain water. The conflict and the subsequent fragmented government in the north and south means that maintenance works are difficult to achieve.”
This is reflected both in Houthi-controlled areas such as Sanaa and government-controlled Hadramout where, Mr Ahmad said, it is difficult to ascertain exactly how much water is in supply in underground reservoirs because of “weak follow-up services”.
Authorities “have no control”, Mr Al Sharabi said.
The vital and scarce commodity of water has also been used for leverage during the war.
In 2016, Human Rights Watch said Houthi guards were confiscating water, food and cooking gas from residents in Taez who were bringing goods to neighbourhoods under government control – by Ali Mahmood
(** B H K)
Militias, flash floods, and landslides: The risks of travelling in Yemen
Travelling between Yemen's cities is no longer a simple matter. Seven years of war have left deep scars on the country's landscape and made many of the old transport routes obsolete, rendering even the simplest journey an ordeal fraught with danger which few dare to embark on except in cases of absolute necessity.
A country fragmented by war
The war in Yemen has fragmented the country, leaving different regions and cities controlled by various armed factions. The international roads connecting the main cities have been closed off and the damage to airports has left most of them non-functional, ending the internal flights which used to allow travellers to move from one city to another in under an hour.
On the alternative, overland routes, Yemenis require at least half a day to travel from one city to another, especially when going from the north to the south.
They also need 4x4 vehicles able to manage the river crossings formed from rocks and boulders which have become a mainstay of these alternative roads following the destruction of the main bridges. They equally need to be able to handle roads through mountainous and rural terrain, which now form the main transport routes in many areas, like in Taiz city.
The journey from Sanaa to Aden or Taiz in southern Yemen takes ten hours at least: five hours more than it would have taken before the war. Muhammed Al-Dub'i, who works in a private business in Sanaa, said: "I visited my family in Taiz last Eid al-Adha, and the journey took more than 10 hours.
"As well as the physical hardship and the risks from the poor state of the roads, travellers are under huge psychological pressure whenever they are stopped at checkpoints belonging to either side of the conflict, where they face questions about their identity, where they are going and why.
Torrential rains cause flooding and landslides
From Sanaa to Aden, travellers are forced to travel through Taiz, and from there head through the often flooded roads of Hayfan. They then need nine hours to cross the city of Al-Turbah and travel the precipitous and dangerously winding road of Hayjat Al-Abed, which will take them into Lahj.
Vehicles passing this way may need to contend with widespread flooding in Al Maqatirah District which is in the administrative district of Lahj, especially in the rainy season, with rainfall usually occurring after midday every day.
State of disrepair: Potholes primary cause of traffic accidents
Another risk factor, aside from dangerous mountain slopes and flash flooding, are the potholes that abound on asphalt roads, most of which have not had maintenance work done on them since the war began. These are the primary cause of traffic accidents which have led to thousands of deaths and left thousands more injured.
Official statistics reveal that traffic accidents killed more than 17,000 people in 2020, the majority of which were in the Houthi-controlled areas the north and west of the country.
Violations rampant at security checkpoints
Aside from the state of disrepair of Yemen's roads, being forced to travel through flooded areas and on steep mountain passes, those travelling between Yemeni cities also fall victim to arbitrary abuse at the many checkpoints belonging to different factions.
Many of the militants or gangs manning these checkpoints verbally abuse those passing through, insulting them based on the regions they come from. Travellers have reported arbitrary measures and violations against them at checkpoints under the control of all sides of the conflict: the Houthis, the UAE-backed STC and government forces.
On the Taiz-Aden road, there are more than 20 military checkpoints, some of which belong to government forces and others to the STC. On the Aden-Mukalla route, there are more than 30 checkpoints. Many of them are simply looking to charge a crossing fee, however, travellers are subject to the whim of whoever is manning the checkpoint – by Zakaria Alkamali
https://english.alaraby.co.uk/analysis/road-yemen-militias-flash-floods-and-landslides
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
(* A H)
30 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 9,556 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 30 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 3 others.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33917
(* A H)
17 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 9,512 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 38 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 4 others.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33909
(* A H)
28 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 9,439 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 15 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of five others.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33906
(* A H)
27 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 9,439 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 16 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of two others.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33898
cp2 Allgemein / General
(* A K P)
Interactive Map of Yemen War
(* A K)
Yemen War Daily Map Updates
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-october-18-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-october-17-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-october-16-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-october-14-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-october-13-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-october-12-2021-map-update/
(B H K P)
Film: Jemen. Die größte humanitäre Katastrophe.
Jemen befindet sich im Krieg. Die zivile Bevölkerung muss ein Leiden erdulden, was kaum vorstellbar ist. Saudi-Arabien – in den öffentlichen Medien immer als das "Königreich" bezeichnet – führt einen Krieg gegen Jemen. Dieser Krieg ist völkerrechtswidrig. Die Medien schweigen größtenteils. Die Politik schweigt. Denn Saudi-Arabien liefert Öl. Und Öl ist das Schmiermittel der Kriegsindustrie. Ein Gespräch mit Mathias Tretschog.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sYgRO2oEup8
(* B H K)
Humanitarian disaster in Yemen as fighting for Marib intensifies
Of the 20 million Yemenis in need of humanitarian assistance to survive, 11.3 million are children. Of these children, around 2.3 million are acutely malnourished and 400,000 under five suffer from severe acute malnutrition. Fore stressed, “In Yemen, one child dies every 10 minutes from preventable causes, including malnutrition and vaccine-preventable diseases.”
Yemen’s economy has suffered one blow after another thanks to the blockade of its ports and the closure of its international airport in Sana’a. Its currency has sunk to one sixth of its pre-war value against the dollar in Aden, making imports unaffordable. According to OCHA, commercial food imports to the key ports of Hodeida and Saleef were down eight percent compared to this time last year, while “fuel imports were an alarming 64 percent lower.”
Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab world even before the war, has seen its GDP crash by 40 percent since 2015, leading to doctors, teachers and sanitation workers being paid late if at all over the last four years. Two million children are not in school and one in six schools are unusable. A further four million children are at risk of dropping out as unpaid teachers leave to find paid work.
Unemployment is running at more than 50 percent. The war has disrupted agriculture, manufacturing and the extraction of oil and natural gas, the country’s key exports. Inflation last year was more than 26 percent, with situation in relation to food, far worse. Between February 2016 and October 2020, wheat flour rose 133 percent, vegetable oil 96 percent and rice 164 percent, making it impossible for most Yemenis to put food on the table. Most now survive only because of international aid.
The Saudi-led military campaign was launched in 2015, with the US and UK providing weaponry, surveillance, intelligence, training and other backup support, to restore the Hadi government. It is part of the House of Saud’s efforts to maintain the rule of the Gulf petro-monarchs and their allies across the peninsular amid seething social tensions that came to a head in the Arab Spring of 2011. M
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/10/18/yeme-o18.html
(B H K P)
Hunderttausenden Kindern im Jemen droht der Hungertod
Seit fast sieben Jahren tobt ein Bürgerkrieg im Jemen. Die aufständischen Huthis stehen kurz davor, die Region rund um Marib im Norden des Landes einzunehmen, die aufgrund von Öl- und Gasvorkommen strategisch relevant ist. Die humanitäre Lage könnte dadurch noch weiter eskalieren.
(B P)
Film: Day 2 | Keynote | The Future of Yemen
Tawakkol Karman, Nobel Peace Laureate and journalist, gave the keynote address on Day 2 of The Pearson Global Forum on October 13, 2021.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gLNAGj00ITk
(* A H K)
Map: The State of Yemen: Q2 2021 – Q3 2021
In this edition of ACLED’s State of Yemen infographic series, Gulf Research Manager Emile Roy and Middle East Research Manager Muaz A. map key developments in the conflict between the second quarter and third quarter of 2021.
The first edition of the map can be found here. For an explanation of ACLED’s methodology for mapping territorial control in Yemen, click here.
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/state-yemen-q2-2021-q3-2021
( B K P)
ACLED Regional Overview – Middle East (2-8 October 2021)
In Yemen, Houthi forces took control of a number of locations in Al Jubah district of Marib governorate last week, including the Al Khashinah camp. The pace of their progress has slowed down compared to the last two weeks, however, possibly as the result of sustained airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition. Clashes also resumed west of Marib city last week, at the initiative of pro-Hadi forces, for the first time in weeks. Houthi forces also fired three ballistic missiles on Marib city, killing four civilians and injuring more than 30 others.
Meanwhile, the UNHCR rejected the renewal of the mandate of the Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen last week, despite UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet’s assertion that “Yemen remains the world’s worst humanitarian crisis” (OHCHR, 7 October 2021). P
https://acleddata.com/2021/10/13/regional-overview-middle-east2-8-october-2021/
(* B H K)
Scenes of death and destruction everywhere
Traveling from Al-Jawf
Our journey to Sana’a for a human rights training course started from Al-Hazm city in the centre of Al-Jawf province at 7:30 in the morning on Saturday, September 5, 2020. We set off in a Hilux SUV, passing through the Salamat area of Al-Ghail District onto the main road to the Al-Rawdh area in the centre of Al-Khalq District and then crossing the archaeological area of Baraqish, which is the southernmost boundary of Al-Jawf province. We continued on the road through the villages and areas of the Majzar district of the Ma’rib province until Al-Jawf junction.
At the Al-Jawf Junction, the scenes of the destruction resulting from the coalition airstrikes and the military confrontations between the Ansar Allah (Houthis) and the internationally recognized government forces caught our attention.
We could only see remnants of shops and other civilian properties in the ghostly Al-Jawf Junction, which is a vital point linking three provinces: Al-Jawf, Marib and Sana’a. Before 2015, this area was booming with life, lined with everything from restaurants and shops to gas stations.
We continued the journey towards Fardhat Nihm, an area we could only dream to travel through on the way to Sana’a during the past four years. But after Ansar Allah took control of Fardhat Nihm and Al-Jawf Junction at the beginning of 2020, the road was reopened.
It came as a sad shock that the Fardhat Nihm bridge was destroyed. It was the only way to cross the valley, and it had been targeted by the Saudi/UAE-led coalition aircrafts in the midst of violent clashes between the warring parties in the early days of the war. Now, instead of the bridge, both large trucks and small cars had to stumble through a difficult road to cross the valley.
At the end of Fardhat Nihm there was a checkpoint controlled by Ansar Allah (Houthis). They stopped us for a while to search the car before we went on our way. When we passed through the villages and rural areas of Nihm, the sights and scenes became even more painful.
It was our first trip on this road since it was closed due to the war in early 2015, and it took us three to four hours to travel. As we were moving, our eyes continued to gaze upon the devastation and destruction that the war had left on the sides of the road, bringing an incessant pain to our hearts seeing what our country has become. Nothing in these areas were spared the effects of war and destruction. From military vehicles and equipment to markets, shops, civilian homes and farms, all were destroyed by the military confrontations and coalition airstrikes.
https://mwatana.org/en/traveling-from-al-jawf/
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
Siehe / Look at cp1
(B H)
KHAWLA SCHOOL - NOW A SAFE PLACE TO LEARN
Many schools have been badly damaged by armed conflict and girls who want to attend school risk being harassed and even attacked. Families, fearing for their safety, are often hesitant to send their daughters to school, inadvertently furthering already existing educational gaps.
Established in 1999, Khawla School provides primary and secondary education to 653 girls. Parts of the Khawla School, including the boundary wall and classroom roof, were damaged by the ongoing conflict, but the school lacked the funding for repairs. Additionally, the school’s water network was inoperable and there was no shaded space for school events.
In response to Khawla School’s needs, the USAID-funded Yemen Communities Stronger Together Project (YCST) rehabilitated and raised the height of the school boundary wall, installed a steel portal frame for shade, upgraded the water network, and repaired the school’s roof. At the same time, USAID installed a solar water pump and disability-friendly ramps for restroom access.
https://www.usaid.gov/yemen/program-updates/oct-2021-Khawla-School-safe-place-learn
(B H P)
USAID YEMEN GOVERNANCE, PEACE AND STABILITY FACT SHEET
USAID’s Yemen Communities Stronger Together (YCST) program uses the participatory action for community enhancement (PACE) model to identify and support local-level initiatives that mitigate conflict, strengthen social cohesion, and promote the peaceful resolution of differences. PACE utilizes a step-by-step framework for building the resilience of community members, civil society organizations, the private sector, traditional leaders, and local government officials to collaboratively identify and address local issues through conflict mitigation and service delivery projects.
https://www.usaid.gov/yemen/fact-sheets/governance-peace-and-stability-fact-sheet
(B E H)
LOW-TUNNEL FARMING GROWS HIGH HOPES FOR ABYAN FARMERS
USAID Economic Recovery and Livelihoods Program organized a training for 168 farmers in the Abayan region introducing them to new seedling production technologies and low tunnel farming techniques. The seedling production technologies help reduce the time it takes to grow a watermelon crop by 6-7 weeks, dramatically increasing plant survival and decreasing the chance of diseases when the plants are transferred into the ground.
USAID experts also introduced the farmers to low-tunnel farming techniques to protect watermelon crops against common diseases and pests, including mosaic virus, which has no cure and can devastate a watermelon crop.
Low tunnel farming is a technique where plastic tunnels, also known as "quick hoops," create inexpensive tunnel greenhouses
https://www.usaid.gov/yemen/program-updates/oct-2021-low-tunnel-farming-grows-high-hopes
(B H)
Desert locust upsurge: Progress report on the response in the Greater Horn of Africa and Yemen | May–August 2021
The fight against desert locust continues in the Greater Horn of Africa and Yemen, now raging for 20 months – since January 2020. Collective efforts from governments, FAO and partners are proving extremely effective in controlling this upsurge, which is the worst to hit the region in 70 years.
Thanks to generous contributions from 29 partners, in addition to FAO’s own resources, close to USD 220 million have been mobilized towards FAO’s desert locust appeal for the Greater Horn of Africa and Yemen as of the end of August 2021. This represents 95 percent of the resources needed to continue the operation until the first quarter of 2022.
(B H)
FAO and Kuwait collaborate to enhance the resilience of vulnerable farmers through improving their access to water resources
With the support of the Government of Kuwait, FAO repaired and rehabilitated water canals and irrigation networks and constructed small-scale water infrastructures across Yemen, enhancing the availability of water for small-holder farmers.
https://www.fao.org/emergencies/fao-in-action/stories/stories-detail/en/c/1444721/
(B H)
UN: 16mn in Yemen are food insecure
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) announced on Sunday that as many as 16.2 million people in Yemen are food insecure.
"Due to protracted conflict, 16.2 million people in Yemen are food insecure, while the devaluation of the currency has further made food unaffordable, exacerbating food insecurity & increasing the number of the hungry," the UN agency's office in Yemen posted on Twitter.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20211018-un-16mn-in-yemen-are-food-insecure/
(B H)
Gallery: Yemen Silently Starves
https://christianaidministries.org/photo-gallery/yemen-silently-starves/
(* B H)
WFP Yemen Situation Report #9, September 2021
Highlights
- WFP targeted 11.4 million people in Yemen with general food assistance in September.
- The value of the Yemeni riyal (YER) continued to depreciate during September in areas under the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen.
- WFP has started data collection for the 2021 Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA).
- Military escalation is being reported from Ma’rib and neighbouring Shabwah governorate.
- On 23 September, WFP commenced a one-off food distribution round targeting 133,500 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Ma’rib governorate.
Situation Update
Food Security Situation
- WFP Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) data released in August show that while the nationwide average rate of inadequate food consumption increased slightly in August, improvement or stabilisation was observed in most of the governorates where WFP in June 2021 was able to resume monthly food assistance.
- WFP in September started data collection for the nationwide 2021 Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA). The FLSA will feed into the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis process planned for early December, inform WFP operational planning for 2022, and feed into the 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP).
Economic Situation
- In September, the value of the Yemeni riyal (YER) continued to deteriorate in areas under the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG) after breaking the YER 1,000/USD 1 barrier on 27 July. The riyal once again hit a record low in September, reaching YER 1,196/USD 1 on 26 September. As of the end of the month, the riyal traded at YER 1,141/USD 1 in areas under the IRG. Meanwhile, the YER remained stable in the areas under the Sana’a-based authorities and averaged YER 600/USD 1 in September.
- In September, only one fuel vessel carrying 8,900 mt of fuel completed its discharge at Al Hodeidah port, while a total of three vessels carrying 87,400 mt of fuel continued to be held in the Saudi-led Coalition (SLC) holding area. In the areas under the Sana’a-based authorities, all Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) fuel stations have been closed since 07 August and vehicles now refuel from the commercial fuel stations at a price rate of USD 0.93 per litre for both gas oil and gasoline, 41 percent higher than the official rate for gasoline and 31 percent higher than the official rate for gas oil.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/wfp-yemen-situation-report-9-september-2021
(B H)
WFP Yemen Country Brief, September 2021
Operational Updates
- Under the September cycle, WFP targeted 11.4 million people for general food assistance (GFA). Of these, 7.9 million people were targeted with in-kind food assistance, 2.3 million people with commodity vouchers and more than 1.2 million people with cash assistance.
- Conflict escalated in Ma’rib and neighbouring Shabwah governorate in September. According to IOM, some 35,000 people had been displaced across the two governorates so far this year as of the end of September. On 23 September, WFP commenced a oneoff food distribution round targeting 133,500 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ma’rib governorate. By the end of the month, some 20,100 people have been reached in the four districts, 15 percent of the total targeted caseload.
- WFP started data collection for the 2021 Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) in
WFP is conducting a countrywide beneficiary retargeting and registration exercise, which aims to reach 4.2 million people in the southern governorates of Yemen and 9 million in the northern governorates. As of September 2021, nearly 2 million people have been biometrically registered in WFP’s beneficiary information and transfer management platform (SCOPE) in the areas under the Internationally Recognised Government of Yemen (IRG). In areas under the Sana’a-based authorities, WFP launched biometric registration in Sana’a City in November 2020. As of September 2021, the first phase of targeting has been completed: 118,600 people have had their biodata digitized into SCOPE, and nearly 52,000 people have been biometrically registered for WFP GFA-CBT assistance.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/wfp-yemen-country-brief-september-2021
(A H P)
[Hadi gov.] Enquiry commission meets 12 victims in Taiz frontlines
The National Commission of Enquiry into human rights abuses carried out a survey today in the various neighborhoods in Taiz governorate, including Al-Rawda and Kalaba in the Qahira district, where the remaining residents suffer targeted shootings by shells and snipers, in addition to the explosion of mines planted in public roads and the corridors leading to it.
The commission’s team listened to the testimonies of 12 victims, women, men and children, and witnessed the difficult life and deprivation of food and drinking water that civilians live in in those neighborhoods and the nearby seam areas, whose residents refused to leave due to the economic situation and the inability to move and be displaced.
http://en.26sepnews.net/2021/10/16/enquiry-commission-meets-12-victims-in-taiz-frontlines/
(* B H)
War in Yemen: Don’t look away from the world’s largest humanitarian crisis
It is estimated that 15.4 million people lack access to safe water end adequate sanitation services. More than 16 million people don’t have a reliable access to food in Yemen, where food prices have skyrocketed by 150%. With 4.7 Million people threatened by acute malnourishment, Yemen is presently facing the largest food crisis in the world.
In 2020, two in three persons lacked access to basic healthcare. Yet the country is going through its worst ever cholera outbreak, with more than 2.5 million cases and nearly 4,000 deaths in December 2020. Cholera, diphtheria and now Covid-19 are compounding, while only half of the health facilities across the country are functional. (photos)
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-dont-look-away-crisis
(* B H)
Red Cross: violence in Yemen will cause systemic failure
Yemen will suffer systemic failure if violence in the country does not end, a top humanitarian official told The National this week as fighting in the northern city of Marib intensified.
“The systemic failure of Yemen is around the corner; the focus has been on systemic fighting and not on rehabilitation, reconstruction and providing basic services,” said Fabrizio Carboni, regional director for the Near and Middle East for the International Committee of the Red Cross.
The ICRC says the fighting endangers more than one million civilians who were displaced from other parts of Yemen. Many families have already been forced to flee from displacement camps.
ICRC officials have been battling donor fatigue for years to raise funds for Yemen's battered healthcare system, economy and infrastructure to fight looming famines.
Yemen’s health care faces the threat of institutional collapse, in large part because of the ongoing conflict, and needs a great amount of money.
"Donors have difficult times to mobilise funds for places like Yemen, Syria and Iraq because there’re other countries facing crises, such as Libya and Tigray [in Ethiopia]," Mr Carboni said.
The ICRC has been pleading with donor countries for financial assistance to meet "the bare minimum of humanitarian actions".
"We are not talking about luxury, but bare minimum," Mr Carboni said. "I hope the donors can see this as a duty that goes beyond politics."
(A H)
WFP and Khalsa Aid International strike partnership to support most vulnerable in two critical food crises
The World Food Programme (WFP) welcomes a contribution of US$ 2.75 million from Khalsa Aid International as part of a three-year programme to support school children in Yemen and refugees from the Tigray Crisis
(B H)
Yemen Women Protection AoR Services, Jan- Sept 2021
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-women-protection-aor-services-jan-sept-2021
Yemen Women Protection AoR Services, Sept 2021
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-women-protection-aor-services-sept-2021
(* B H)
UNICEF Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report - 1-31 August 2021
The school year started on 14 August in northern governorates and on 15 August in southern governorates. UNICEF continues its fundraising efforts to support teacher incentives in a sustainable manner for 171,600 teachers.
The Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) cluster reported that more than 50,000 additional people were displaced due to active conflict in August.
The existing funding gap of $235 million (46 per cent of the total budget) impedes timely implementation of planned interventions. Despite funding challenges, WASH is making substantive progress and has already reached a key target of the number of people accessing safe drinking water (6,839,772) through the distribution of fuel to water stations throughout the country. UNICEF was able to reach approximately 3 million people in August alone thanks to the support of the Famine Relief Fund (FRF) for the multisectoral response to malnutrition.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unicef-yemen-humanitarian-situation-report-1-31-august-2021
(A H)
Photo: From the celebrations of the Prophet's birthday at That Al-Nataqatin School "formerly Asmaa" in Bajil District.
https://twitter.com/baseem_aljenani/status/1448647333021831176
(A H)
Film: This is Jamal Street in the heart of the city of #Hodeidah. Rubbish is piled up in the middle of the street, and they are busy looting and spending millions for evenings and celebrations, and they forgot that cleanliness is part of faith, and removing harm is one of the people of faith.
https://twitter.com/baseem_aljenani/status/1448677737217015814
(A H)
Photos: He came a little while ago in front of the grocery store next to Faisal's cafe, hungry and his son is sick asking for help. Witness: This is the condition of most people in Hodeidah.
https://twitter.com/baseem_aljenani/status/1448783149597593601
(* B H)
»Kinder nehmen Drogen, weil sie Hunger haben«
Der neue Welthunger-Index 2021 warnt vor Rückschlägen im Kampf gegen den Hunger. Konflikte und die Folgen der Pandemie verschärfen Ernährungskrisen – wie im Jemen. Dort droht Hunderttausenden Kindern der Hungertod.
Jemens Volksdroge wächst an einem Strauch und wirkt ähnlich wie Amphetamin: Wer Khat-Blätter kaut, beruhigt sich, wird euphorisch, fühlt sich nach ein paar Stunden Kauen energiegeladen – auch Militärs und Milizen in dem Bürgerkriegsland putschen sich deswegen mit Khat auf.
Khat zügelt auch den Appetit – der italienischen Journalistin und Filmemacherin Laura Silvia Battaglia zufolge verbreitet sich die Droge mittlerweile als Ersatz für Essen in der gesamten Bevölkerung des Landes.
»Viele Menschen haben nichts zu essen, weil die meisten Lebensmittel importiert werden und sie keine Jobs und kein Geld haben, aber Khat-Sträucher gibt es überall, oder die Droge ist billig zu kaufen«, beobachtet Battaglia, die den Dokumentarfilm »Yemen, despite the War« (Der Jemen, abgesehen vom Krieg) über den Konflikt gedreht und lange dort gelebt hat. »Mittlerweile kauen alle – auch Kinder nehmen Drogen, weil sie Hunger haben.« Die jüngsten seien manchmal erst vier Jahre alt.
»Die Hungerlage ist sehr ernst, 2021 droht eine Hungersnot«, warnt die Welthungerhilfe in ihrem Welthunger-Index 2021, den sie an diesem Mittwoch gemeinsam mit der Hilfsorganisation Concern Worldwide veröffentlicht hat. »Alle WHI-Indikatoren im Jemen sind besorgniserregend.«
(A H)
Real time pictures: @monarelief's team distributing now food supplies to 350 of the most vulnerable families in Sana'a. Our distribution was funded by our partner in #Poland @SzkolydlaPokoju & @monareliefye's fundraising campaign in Patreon with support of @PartnersRelief
https://twitter.com/Fatikr/status/1448573069472243715
(* B H)
REVEALED: How Yemen’s war-wounded suffered unnecessary amputations
Doctors and health officials say some patients at Saudi-backed hospitals in Taiz had limbs removed when other options should have been considered
Unnecessary amputations were performed on young children and others injured during Yemen’s civil war at private hospitals funded by a Saudi government aid agency, according to doctors and health officials.
An investigation by Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ) for Middle East Eye raises serious questions about dozens of operations at three hospitals in the southwestern frontline city of Taiz between 2016 and 2018.
All three hospitals - Al-Buraihy, Al-Safwa and Al-Rawda - received financial support from Saudi Arabia's King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center (KSrelief).
The organisation has supported hundreds of aid projects in Yemen at a cost of almost $4bn since 2015, according to its own website.
It has also worked in the country with United Nations agencies including the World Health Organisation, the United Nations Population Fund and the World Food Programme.
The investigation, backed by testimonies from doctors, health officials and patients and their families, found that proper procedures were not followed by medical staff authorising and performing the operations.
It discovered that the qualifications of one foreign doctor involved in at least 44 amputations were not recognised in his own country.
And it found that KSrelief continued to fund two hospitals even after concerns were raised by local officials and through KSrelief’s own monitoring of their work.
KSrelief told MEE that it had provided support to hospitals in Taiz, Aden and Seiyun at the request of Yemen’s ministry of health.
It said its role was limited to financing treatment and it was not a supervisory authority. It said issues to do with medical procedures and the selection of medical staff were matters for Yemeni health officials.
Yemen’s health ministry told ARIJ that KSrelief’s contracts with the three hospitals were approved by local officials in Taiz. Local officials said they did not know who had approved the contracts. The ministry did not respond to MEE’s further questions seeking clarification.
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/revealed-yemen-war-how-wounded-suffered-unnecessary-amputations
(A H)
Red Cross announces delivery of 26 tonnes of humanitarian aid to Yemen
https://morningexpress.in/red-cross-announces-delivery-of-26-tonnes-of-humanitarian-aid-to-yemen/
(* B H)
Yemen: Situation Update - Humanitarian Impact in Ma’rib, Shabwah and Al Bayda, 13 October 2021
Renewed hostilities since early September have significantly impacted civilians living in parts of Ma’rib, Shabwah and Al Bayda governorates, inducing casualties and displacement as well as restricting civilians’ movements and humanitarian organizations’ access to people in need.
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), nearly 10,000 people were displaced in Ma’rib Governorate last month – the highest displacement rate recorded in the governorate in a single month this year. Critical infrastructure such as bridges and roads have also been damaged and destroyed.
The situation is most severe in southern Ma’rib Governorate, affecting districts including Al Abdiyah as well as Harib, Al Jubah and Rahabah, with IOM estimating that over 4,200 people fled the latter three districts in September, mostly towards safer areas in Ma’rib City, Al Jubah and Ma’rib districts. These districts already hosted large populations of internally displaced people (IDPs) prior to this latest escalation, with 602,000 IDPs in Ma’rib City, 9,300 IDPs in Al Jubah District and 101,000 IDPs in Ma’rib District. Al Abdiyah District, which is home to some 17,800 host community residents and hosts some 16,800 IDPs, has been militarily encircled since 23 September, inhibiting the ability of civilians to travel in and out of the district as well as impeding them from being reached by humanitarian partners.
(B H)
Feeding the hungry, from Ohio to Yemen: William Lambers
Just as we in the United States stepped up donations to feed the hungry after World War II, we also need to dramatically increase them today to help Yemen and other nations. Any break in donations ultimately leads to a break in the food pipeline that millions depend on. Tragically, that is happening again.
WFP representative Annabel Symington just told me that they are running out of food and that, without new donations, cuts would be forthcoming. Symington explains: “Initial cuts would affect 4.8 million people, with that number expected to rise in the coming months. We need $797 million to maintain curren
https://www.cleveland.com/opinion/2021/10/feeding-the-hungry-from-ohio-to-yemen-william-lambers.html = https://ohionewstime.com/feeding-hungry-people-from-ohio-to-yemen-william-lambers/269333/
(* B H)
Eltern-Kind-Beziehungen im kriegszerrütteten Jemen
Der Weg der Jungen, Männer zu werden, wurde durch bewaffnete Konflikte und eine zerrüttete Wirtschaft unterbrochen.
Yahya legt seine Papiere beiseite, seufzt und denkt an bessere Zeiten vor dem Krieg.
Wir sind erschöpft. Ich arbeite hart für meine Kinder, aber ich setze mich besonders für meinen Sohn ein“, sagt Yahya. Jetzt ist er 13 Jahre alt. Vor dem Krieg hat er nur studiert, aber jetzt sehe ich ihn auf der Suche nach Arbeit ... versuchen, ein Mann zu werden.
Hajjahs Hausmeister
Nicht alle Eltern haben den Raum, ihren Kindern Ethik und gutes Benehmen beizubringen, ihre Mentoren oder ihre Freunde zu sein. Manche versuchen nur, ihre Kinder am Leben zu erhalten.
In einem Land, in dem 22 Millionen Menschen – fast 80 Prozent der Bevölkerung – medizinische Hilfe benötigen und fast 18 Millionen Menschen unter Ernährungsunsicherheit leiden, überschneiden sich Hunger und Gesundheit mit traditionellen Eltern-Kind-Interaktionen.
Nach Angaben des Middle East Centre der London School of Economics leben mehr als 70 Prozent der Bevölkerung des Jemen in ländlichen Gebieten. Für die meisten dieser Familien sind selbst die einfachsten Gesundheitszentren zwei Stunden entfernt. Kinder, die an Unterernährung oder chronischen Krankheiten leiden, werden eher zur Belastung denn zu potentiellen Helfern. Viele Eltern überlassen ihren Kindern jedoch alles, auch wenn es keine Lösung gibt.
In Hajjah, einer bergigen Provinz fünf Stunden nordwestlich von Sana'a, nimmt Rasheed al Suwaidy seinen achtjährigen Sohn an der Hand und führt ihn durch die überfüllten Korridore des Jumhuri-Krankenhauses. Finden Sie jemanden, jeden, der Ihnen helfen kann.
Mohammed, still und klein, sieht seinen Vater an, ein schüchterner Mann in geliehener Tarnjacke und blauem Turban. Ein säuerlicher Geruch folgt dem Jungen und Urin bedeckt die Vorderseite seines grauen Gewandes, was dazu führt, dass die Leute um ihn herum ihm ausweichen und kommentieren, dass er eine Dusche braucht. Mohammad wurde mit einer hinteren Harnröhrenklappe geboren, die das Wasserlassen erschwert. Als er klein war, leiteten die Ärzte seine Harnröhre in eine Fistel direkt unter seinem Bauchnabel um.
Rasheed will seinem Sohn unbedingt helfen.
„Er ist seit seiner Geburt so und sie sagen, dass sie ihm helfen werden, wenn er ein bestimmtes Alter hat. Aber wir haben kein Geld.
https://scholargamers.com/las-relaciones-2070
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
(A H)
Photo: #Marib. Photo of a newly displaced family in al-Jubah. Over the past few weeks, more than 3000 families have been displaced from their homes south of the governorate, according to Marib’s IDPs unit. But mostly displaced to the desert and streets.
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1450208607694381057
(B H)
CCCM Cluster Yemen: IDP Hosting Sites Overview Map (September 2021)
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/cccm-cluster-yemen-idp-hosting-sites-overview-map-september-2021
CCCM Cluster Yemen: IDP Hosting Sites Overview (September 2021)
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/cccm-cluster-yemen-idp-hosting-sites-overview-september-2021
and single provinces:
(* B H)
Escalating fighting over Yemen's Marib multiplies woes
The recent wave of fighting between Yemen's government forces and the Houthi rebels in the country's oil-rich province of Marib aggravated the woes of internally displaced people (IDPs).
Large areas of Marib are still witnessing fierce battles between the two warring rivals that are both pushing ahead to seize full control over the oil and gas resources located in the strategic Yemeni city.
During the past days, the Houthis succeeded in capturing key areas from the government's grip in Marib's southern and eastern areas, causing a large wave of internal displacement for hundreds of families.
Earlier in the day, a local military source told Xinhua that dozens of families are still stuck in the Abdiya district and found it impossible to move out as the Houthis seized large areas in the district following weeks of intense battles and shelling.
"The Houthis stormed a number of areas in Abdiya and the families are going through a tragic situation, as the rebels did not allow them to leave their residential houses and move to other safe areas outside the district," he explained anonymously.
Meanwhile, the government's executive unit for administrating IDPs camps in Marib reported that the escalating Houthi military operations against Marib caused new major obstacles to the already displaced families.
It said that nearly 640 families were forced to leave their temporary displacement camps located near the areas witnessing ferocious armed confrontations.
Official estimates released previously by the local government authorities indicated that nearly 2 million IDPs from various Yemeni regions were sheltered in the city of Marib.
An official of Marib's local government confirmed that "incessant battles and indiscriminate shelling aggravated the suffering of displaced families in Marib and multiplied their woes amid lack of basic living services."
http://www.news.cn/english/2021-10/17/c_1310250053.htm
(B H)
In forests on Poland-Belarus border, migrants fight for survival
Mohammed, a 26-year-old Yemeni migrant, flew to Belarus from Malaysia in August hoping to make it to Poland and on to western Europe.
He spent two weeks in a forest near the Polish border in October, where he says he was forced across the border 11 times by Polish or Belarussian guards, had most of his belongings stolen and was cold, thirsty and hungry with only leaves to eat.
During his last encounter with Polish authorities he told Reuters that he begged for it all to end.
"When we reached the Polish army I requested 'Please kill me here now. I do not want to go back to Belarus'."
Mohammed declined to share his last name for fear of being identified by Polish authorities.
Four hours after speaking with Reuters in the damp, freezing forest on Monday evening, he was picked up by a smuggler and taken to Germany, he said in a text message.
(* B H K)
Zehntausende Menschen haben im September wegen des Konflikts im Jemen ihre Häuser verlassen
(UN) Jemen Koordinator, David Gressly, erklärte, dass aufgrund des Konflikts im Jemen im September 10 000 Menschen ihre Häuser verlassen mussten.
Gressly gab in einer schriftlichen Erklärung an, dass im vergangenen Monat 235 Zivilisten bei Zusammenstößen getötet oder verletzt wurden.
Marib Gressly betonte, dass im vergangenen Monat während der Konflikte in der Provinz 10.000 Menschen ihre Häuser verlassen mussten, und erklärte, dass es aufgrund der Konflikte in einigen Regionen zu Unterbrechungen bei der Lieferung humanitärer Hilfe, einschließlich Nahrungsmitteln und Medikamenten, gekommen sei.
(* B H K)
Statement on the escalation of fighting in Ma’rib, Shabwah and Al Bayda governorates
The UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, David Gressly, made the following statement today:
The escalation of fighting in Yemen in recent weeks, particularly in Ma’rib, Shabwah and Al Bayda governorates, is having a devastating impact on civilians, who continue to bear the brunt of more than seven years of conflict in the country.
I am particularly concerned about the situation in Ma’rib Governorate’s Al Abdiyah District. The ongoing security situation has severely restricted movement in and out of the district for an estimated 35,000 people, including nearly 17,000 extremely vulnerable people who had found refuge there after fleeing the conflict in neighboring areas.
This untenable situation has severely limited the delivery of life-saving aid and prevented the sick and wounded from receiving urgently needed medical care, while the provision of basic commodities has become exceedingly difficult and dangerous.
I call on all parties involved in the fighting to agree now to a cessation of hostilities for Al Abdiyah District to allow for the safe passage of civilians and aid workers, and for the evacuation of all of those wounded in the fighting.
(* B H K)
Over 55,000 Displaced By Fighting For Yemen's Marib: UN
Tens of thousands of people have been displaced by fierce fighting in Yemen's Marib province this year, the UN's migration agency said Thursday, with figures surging as clashes intensified last month.
The battle for Marib city, the internationally-backed government's last northern stronghold, could change the course of a civil war that has forced millions of people to flee their homes over the course of its seven years.
"From January 1 to September 30, IOM recorded more than 55,000 people displaced in Marib governorate in the areas where our displacement tracking and rapid response teams have access," the International Organization for Migration told AFP.
Nearly 10,000 people were displaced last month alone –- the highest numbers in the province this year, the IOM said.
Marib had between 20,000 and 30,000 inhabitants before the war.
But its population ballooned to hundreds of thousands, as Yemenis fled frontline cities for its "relative stability" and the chance to maintain a livelihood, Ahmed Nagi of the Malcolm H Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, has told AFP.
But with about 139 refugee camps in the province, according to the government, hosting approximately 2.2 million people, the displaced civilians have become caught in the line of fire once again.
"Critical infrastructure such as bridges and roads have also been damaged and destroyed," the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said in a statement on Wednesday.
https://www.barrons.com/amp/news/over-55-000-displaced-by-fighting-for-yemen-s-marib-un-01634220009
(* B H)
Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, covering the period 5 - 14 October 2021
UNHCR issued its latest cash post-distribution monitoring report, analysing progress on key food consumption and other wellbeing indicators over a four-month period. Overall, the results reaffirm previous findings that regular and steady monthly cash assistance significantly supports families in meeting their immediate food needs, while reducing the risk of falling into hunger and minimizing their exposure to harmful coping mechanisms. Highlights include a drop in poor food consumption scores from 56% to 43%, and a positive increase in families not having to reduce the number of meals per day from 38% to 48%, among others. Detailed information can be found here. Since the beginning of the year, UNHCR has provided cash assistance to over one million displaced Yemenis (some 165,000 families), distributing more than USD 58 million.
As needs keep rising in Marib, UNHCR continues to distribute core relief items (CRIs) and emergency shelter kits to those forced to flee. Since the beginning of the year, UNHCR has distributed emergency shelter kits and CRIs to more than 15,000 families (some 90,000 individuals). In addition, over 10,000 individuals have received psychosocial support and close to 3,000 have been assisted with legal counselling.
Widespread flooding over recent months has affected more than 13,500 families across Yemen. Since late July 2021, torrential rains and widespread flooding have destroyed homes and caused widespread damage to infrastructure.
Distributions of education cash assistance for refugees began in Aden and Lahj governorates. The intervention targets a total of 4,628 primary and secondary school refugee students.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-unhcr-operational-update-covering-period-5-14-october-2021
(* B H)
IOM Yemen Situation Report, Aug., 2021
Hostilities continued to drive further displacement and exacerbate humanitarian needs. IOM’s DTM reported that between January and August 2021, nearly 52,000 people have experienced displacement at least once across 13 governorates. In August, more than 1,600 people were displaced mostly within Ma’rib and from the neighboring governorates of Al Jawf and Al Baydah. In Ma’rib Governorate, local authorities estimate there are one million internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in last-resort camps and urban settings. The dire living conditions have impacted host populations who have grappled with the effects of the economic situation and scarce resources, forcing more to rely on humanitarian assistance. Along with daily arrivals to already overcrowded sites, hazards such as fire, extreme weather, and COVID-19 pose compounded the humanitarian situation in Ma’rib. If these trends persist, the crisis will continue to worsen
Despite the ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis, migrants continue to arrive in Yemen, although in smaller numbers than before the COVID-19 pandemic.
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
Siehe / Look at cp1
(A P)
Jemen: Muslime feiern Geburtstag des Propheten Muhammad
Laut Al-Alam fand am Samstag in der jemenitischen Hauptstadt Sanaa eine Festveranstaltung zum Geburtstag des Propheten Muhammad (saw.) statt
Hunderte Muslime nahmen an der Feierlichkeit teil.
Am Montag wird auch eine große Festveranstaltung in Sanaa stattfinden.
https://iqna.ir/de/news/3004923/jemen-muslime-feiern-geburtstag-des-propheten-muhammad-saw
(A P)
Millions of Yemenis gather to celebrate birthday of Prophet Muhammad
Millions of Yemenis have taken part in mass rallies to commemorate the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) on Monday afternoon in the capital Sana’a and several other provinces.
The participants in the mass rally carried banners and leaflets expressing their immortal love and respect for the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).
They confirmed their adherence to the Prophet’s approach, teachings and examples set during his life.
https://en.ypagency.net/240941/
Films: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OLhOEqX3-ME
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yznIR5agjBg
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ai1GTxUgY7g
https://twitter.com/cXdMbp78iQ1PIpf/status/1449781970301603850
Photo: https://twitter.com/jqboZBAwVaNdwx5/status/1449894692825583616
https://twitter.com/3EmFD28kPd8NAbN/status/1450013899613429768
(A P)
Film: The sky of Hodeidah lights up with its sea to celebrate the birth of the Noble Prophet
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=emrGQti4Dcg
(A P)
Film: With unprecedented momentum, prophetic activities crowded in Hajjah Governorate
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VNoRA8kEunE
(A P)
Some posters hang up by Houthis today on their celebration of Prophet Mohammed's birthday. Left: National campaign for Holy Jihad; General Mobilization of (Houthi-controlled) DM. Right: Defending the best Prophet Moh, Islam,& Holy shrines, forward to training camps & frontlines. (photos)
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1450195880829718530
(A P)
Sayyid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi speaks on birthday of Prophet Muhammad
The Leader of the Yemeni Revolution, Sayyid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi has called on the Yemeni people to continue to confront the US-backed Saudi-led coalition which has being waging an aggression on Yemen for over six years, stressing that “achieving freedom and independence is a sacred Jihad and will never be compromised.”
“We must legitimately confront the aggression, up until the lifting of the siege, the ending of the aggression and occupation, and the handling of the files concerning prisoners and compensation for the damage,” Sayyid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi said in a televised speech to the Yemenis on the occasion of Mawlid al-Nabi al-Sharif, the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him).
In his speech, Sayyid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi condemned the so-called Abraham Accords, in which some Arab countries signed collaboration treaties with the Zionist entity.
“Using the name of the Prophet Ibrahim [Abraham] for their satanic alliances and normalisation is a great offense to the Prophet Ibrahim (Peace Be Upon Him).”
The Leader warned that any aggression by the Zionist entity on al-Quds [Jerusalem] would be a step to a regional war.”
and also https://en.ypagency.net/240966/ and https://en.ypagency.net/240934/
Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XDjTYa7PndE
(A P)
Public Prosecution release 761 prisoners on occasion of Prophet's birth anniversary
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3160808.htm
(A P)
Sanaa witnesses unprecedented preparations to celebrate Prophet’s birth anniversary
The capital Sanaa is witnessing unprecedented early preparations to receive the participants in the central celebration of the Prophet’s birth anniversary this year, which will be held in Al-Sabeen Square on Monday.
Head of the Preparatory Committee for the celebration, Khaled Al-Madani, confirmed in a press statement on Saturday, that the preparations were early this year, pointing out that “more than 13,000 organizers are close to completing their work to receive the guests of the Messenger of Allah.”
http://en.ypagency.net/240740/
and more http://en.ypagency.net/240818/
(A P)
Organizing committee calls on Yemeni people to go out to mark Prophet’s birthday
http://en.ypagency.net/240658/
(A P)
Delegation from Najran [Southern Saudi Arabia] arrives in Sanaa
A delegation from Najran arrived at Sabeen square in the Yemeni capital Sanaa to participate in the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday.
Informed sources said a delegation from the Yam tribes in Najran arrived in the capital Sanaa to take part in celebrations on Monday at the Prophet’s birthday.
https://en.ypagency.net/240864/
Photos: https://twitter.com/BilalMusleh2/status/1449461485818744834
(A P)
Film: Houthi cleric: #Marib city will celebrate (Mawlid) with us. Mawlid is the anniversary of the Prophet Mohammed's birthday. Meaning they should have captured Marib city by the time they celebrate al-Mawlid, which is today October 18.
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1449946370706657282
(A P)
#Yemeni young boy Abdulbari al-Karmadi reportedly shot dead by #Houthi rebels in #Sanaa yesterday after refusing to put up decorations and images of the group leaders in his house on the occasion of Prophet Mohammed's birthday.
https://twitter.com/TheYemenMirror/status/1449850147941273607
(A P)
Houthis form a force to raise compulsory war funds
The Houthi militia have established a new force to collect compulsory funds from traders and street vendors in their areas of control to finance their never-ending wars in the country, local sources said.
The force named the Supply and Delivery Front will take the place of the militia's so-called "Security Supervisors" in extorting war contributions, traders and vendors said on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-51631
(A P)
Houthis blow up the house of Maj. Gen. Al-Shaddadi hours after blowing up the house of Maj. Gen. buheibeh/Yemeni Sport
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-51610
(A P)
Houthi who slaughtered his father was exacting revenge over his Sunni name, expert
The man who slaughtered his father in Yemen's northern Amran province on Wednesday was exacting revenge on his father for giving him a Sunni name in his childhood, an expert in the Shia Houthi militia's secret world said.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-51611
(A P)
Jemen: US-Forderung nach sicherem Durchgang in Marib enthüllt Absprachen mit IS und al-Qaida
Die jemenitische Widerstandsbewegung Ansarullah hat die Forderung des US-Außenministeriums, die Kämpfe in der ölreichen Provinz Marib des Landes einzustellen, mit der Begründung zurückgewiesen, dass die Absicht hinter der Forderung bösartig sei.
„Die Forderung der USA wird aufs Schärfste verurteilt. Es zeigt, dass die Amerikaner in enger Verbindung mit den al-Qaida- und IS-Kämpfern stehen, die im Bezirk al-Abdiyah in der Provinz Marib eine schwere Niederlage erlitten haben“, schrieb Mohammed Abdulsalam, Sprecher der Ansarullah, am Samstag in einer Reihe von Posts auf Twitter.
„Während die jemenitischen Streitkräfte sich den letzten Festungen der von Saudi-Arabien geführten Milizen sowie von IS- und al-Qaida-Aktivisten nähern, kritisieren es die Amerikaner und behaupten, sie streben nach Frieden. Dabei sind sie der wahre Feind von Frieden und Ruhe im Jemen und weltweit.“
(A P)
Yemen: US Call for Safe Passage in Ma’rib Exposes Collusion with Daesh, Al-Qaeda
Yemen’s Ansarullah resistance movement dismissed the US State Department’s call for a halt to fighting in the country’s oil-rich Ma’rib province, stating that the intention behind the request is an evil one.
“The US demand is roundly condemned. It exhibits Americans are in close connection with Al-Qaeda and Daesh (also known as ISIL or ISIS) militants, who suffered heavy defeat in the Al-Abdiyah district of Ma’rib province,” Mohammad Abdulsalam, Ansarullah’s spokesman, wrote in a series of posts on his Twitter page on Saturday night, presstv reported.
“As Yemeni forces are closing in on last bastions of Saudi-led militia forces as well as Daesh and Al-Qaeda operatives, Americans are crying foul and claiming they seek peace. This is while they are the enemy of peace and tranquility in Yemen and worldwide,” Abdulsalam added.
(A P)
Jemens Ansarullah: Von den USA geschaffene Terroristen verüben Anschläge in Afghanistan, Libanon und Syrien
(A P)
Yemen’s Ansarullah: US-Created Terrorists Carry Out Attacks in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Syria
(A P)
Mohammed Abdulsalam: Those who actually want to offer aid to Yemen can already do so
(A P)
Prime Minister reveals US offer to Sanaa
Prime Minister, Dr. Abdulaziz Saleh bin Habtoor said the Americans’ insistence on swapping the humanitarian file for military issues was aimed at pushing Sanaa to surrender even as formality.
During an interview with Almasirah TV, The prime minister revealed an American offer to Sanaa in the third year of aggression to surrender even in symbolic form, then everything will be solved and the mercenaries return as ordinary citizens or even to prisons.
Regarding the British presence in Mahrah, the prime minister said that the British presence is concentrated in Mahrah in favor of the Saudi Interest in extending the oil pipeline project, in addition to trying to reach the western border of Amman and work to separate it from Yemen.
Bin Habtoor pointed out that the UAE is a very cheap tool used by the Americans and the British, and it is trying to be a country outside the region because of the large amount of money it has accumulated.
http://en.ypagency.net/240569/
(A P)
Houthis committed 2100 abuses against civilians in villages of Al-Hayma north of Taiz province in north of Taiz governorate in the period 6 January – 7 March 2021, the NGO Human Rights and Information Training Center unveiled in a press conference on Wednesday/Yeni Yemen
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-51588
(A P)
In Fardhat Nehm, somewhere between Sana'a and Marib, Houthis prepare a surprise awaiting deserters from the (anti-government) warfronts. The militia's 'Preventive Security Apparatus' checkpoint arrests and physically eliminates them/Almashehad Alyemeni.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-51588
(A P)
Houthis detain journalist Youness Abdelsalam in Yemen since August
The Ansar Allah group, known as the Houthis, must release journalist Youness Abdelsalam immediately and stop abducting and threatening members of the press, the Committee to Protect Journalists said today.
Houthi forces detained Abdelsalam in the capital Sanaa in central Yemen on August 4 and have been holding him since at the Security and Intelligence Agency in the city, according to his brother, Sultan Abdelsalam and the journalist’s lawyer, Abdel Majeed Farea Sabra
https://cpj.org/2021/10/houthis-detain-journalist-youness-abdelsalam-in-yemen-since-august/amp/ = https://republicanyemen.net/archives/29357
(A P)
18 captives from liberated areas of Shabwa, Marib released in Dhamar
18 captives from Shabwa and Marib provinces were released in Dhamar province on Thursday against the backdrop of recent confrontations in the liberated districts in the two provinces.
The release comes in implementation of the directives of the Revolution Leader, Sayyed Abdulmalik Badr al-Din al-Houthi
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3160133.htm
(A P)
Muslim world needs to return to values promoted by Holy Prophet: Yemeni official
A senior Yemeni official underlined that what the Muslim world needs the most today is returning to the values and concepts promoted by the Holy Prophet (PBUH).
Speaking Wednesday night at an event held to mark the anniversary of Yemen’s liberation from British colonialism, President of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council Mahdi al-Mashat added that it is very important in the current conditions as the Muslim Ummah (community) is facing wars, acts of terrorism and extremism.
Now that the enemies of Islam (are smearing the Islamic Ummah by creating and supporting terrorist groups), “it is our urgent need to counter them with the introduction of the Seerah of the Holy Prophet (PBUH),” he stated.
Al-Mashat hailed the Yemeni nation for holding glorious ceremonies to celebrate the birth anniversary of the Prophet (PBUH) in recent days and congratulated Muslim and Arab nations on the auspicious occasion.
He also referred to the Saudi-led coalition’s years-long aggression on Yemen, saying Sana’a has always sought peace provided that the aggression ends.
Sana’a is at the forefront of fighting terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and Daesh and defending the security and interests of the Yemeni nation, he went on to say.
and
(A P)
President Al-Mashat confirms continuation of liberation battle until restoring full sovereignty of Yemen
https://en.ypagency.net/240460/
President Al-Mashat confirms Sanaa’s readiness for comprehensive peace
https://en.ypagency.net/240440/
My comment: Both claims together – this cannot work.
(A P)
Video of a #Houthi supervisor attacked a #Yemeni woman yesterday in al-Waha souq nearby Sheraton Bridge, the capital Sana’a, according to Yemeni activists. The supervisor ordered his guards to shut down her boutique, her main and only source of livelihood.
https://twitter.com/TheYemenMirror/status/1448492891152785409
cp6 Südjemen und Hadi-Regierung / Southern Yemen and Hadi-government
Siehe / Look at cp1
(A P)
Yemen .. The rights demand to classify “Al-Houthi” as a terrorist group
Today, Monday, Yemeni organizations operating in Marib Governorate called on the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council and the United States of America to include the Houthi coup militia among terrorist groups as a worthy classification due to the their crimes against civilians amounting to war crimes.
https://asumetech.com/yemen-the-rights-demand-to-classify-al-houthi-as-a-terrorist-group/
(A P)
Residents of Hadhramaut defy Saudi occupation and celebrate birthday of Prophet Muhammad
Thousands of people in the occupied province of Hadhramaut have on Monday taken to the streets of al-Mukalla city to celebrate Mawlid al-Nabi al-Sharif, the birthday of Prophet Muhammad.
The people of province celebrated the Prophet’s birthday in the midst of a wide popular presence, despite Saudi occupation and control over most of the Yemeni southern provinces, and despite ongoing Saudi attempts to prevent the celebration of the occasion.
Film: https://twitter.com/zero_hour2020/status/1449792415632662533
(A E P)
Lamlas bans foreign currency leases
Governor of Aden, Ahmed Hamed Lamlas issued a resolution imposing a ban on buying , selling and renting of residential and commercial properties in foreign currency.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33915
(A P)
Inhabitants of occupied Yemeni province of Lahj hold mass rallies against Saudi occupation
Lahj province in southern Yemen has been hit by mass protests against the deteriorating living conditions due to the collapse of currency value and the rise in prices.
According to a local source, protesters blocked main roads by setting fire to tires in al-Anad, where smoke covered the sky of the city, while shops in al-Houta closed their doors,
(A P)
Dozens rally to protest against Hadi gov’t in Taiz
Dozens of residents of Haifan district of Taiz province held on Sunday a protest rally to denounce the suspension of their share of domestic gas by Saudi-exiled Hadi government.
The protesters, in the rally, raised slogans and banners calling for the Yemeni Gas Company in Taiz to release the district’s share of the gas substance, which it suspended for a half months.
http://en.ypagency.net/240848/
and
(A P)
Angry protests in Lahj over economic breakdown
Dozens of angry protesters set rubber tires on fire and blocked main roads of al-Anad city in Lahj's Tuban district on Sunday, to express their anger over the unsupportable situation they are living through amid rapid rise in food prices.
The protestors demanded the departure of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked local authorities from the province, accusing them of deliberately practicing policies to starve the simple citizens and exacerbate the already alarming humanitarian situation.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33914
(A P)
UAE-backed mercenaries enforce separatist anthem in southern Yemeni schools
Ahmed al-Daoudi, Director General of Mansoura district in the occupied Aden province, has issued a new decision for the directorate’s schools.
Amongst the new curriculum decisions, is the directive to sing the so-called “southern anthem” in the schools of Mansoura directorate, starting Monday, in an apparent attempt to further encourage Southern Yemeni separatism.
The memorandum stated that the reading of the Southern National Anthem must happen daily in all public and private schools during the morning assembly
and also https://en.ypagency.net/240889/
(A P)
Yemeni Shura Speaker Praises Saudi Arabia's Efforts to Reach Riyadh Agreement
https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2295926
(A T)
Large-scale terror attacks foiled in Hadramout
after arresting a cell of five terrorists led by a high-ranking member of al Qaeda
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33910
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33910
(A P)
Shatara: Consensus on restoring Southern State ends inter-disputes
The current consensus on restoring the state settles inter-Southern disputes, the member of the Presidency of the Southern Transitional Council, Vice-President of the National Assembly for Financial Control and Inspection, Lufti Shatara affirmed in his tweet on Friday.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33905
My comment: Consensus? LOL.
(A P)
Saudi troops force leader in Shabwanian elite to resign
The Saudi troops leadership forced a commander in UAE-backed Shabwanian elite forces to resign from his position.
The commander in 6th brigade, Ali Omar Bafadhil admitted in his resignation that coalition leadership put him before two choices, either separate his relationship with the southern transitional council and the southern case or submit his resignation, indicating that indicated that he preferred the last option.
http://en.ypagency.net/240544/
(A T)
2 citizens killed, another injured by armed gang fires in Aden
http://en.ypagency.net/240548/
(A T)
Two killed by gang fire in downtown Taiz
http://en.ypagency.net/240577/
(* A P)
38 Yemeni MPs want Stockholm agreement scrapped
Thirty-eight Yemeni lawmakers urged President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi on Thursday to scrap the Stockholm Agreement.
The MPs in a statement asked Hadi to direct the army to “liberate” what is remaining of the coastal city of Hodeidah and “to move all the military garrisons in the rest of the provinces toward liberating the capital Sana'a."
The MPs said the move is a result of the Houthi militia's repudiation of all commitments to the agreement and its continued bombing of cities and residential neighborhoods in Hodeidah, Marib, Al-Dhali', Shabwah, Taiz, Al-Bayda and other cities.
“There is no option to deal with the intransigence of the Houthi militia other than putting to an end its hopeless coup by (pursuing) a military resolution and restoring the state,” according to the statement.
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/38-yemeni-mps-want-stockholm-agreement-scrapped/2392400
and also https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-51589
(A P)
Yemeni gov't calls for UN decisive steps to lift Abdia siege
The Yemeni official government on Tuesday called on the United Nations and Security Council to take decisive, urgent measures in order to lift siege imposed by the Iranian-backed Houthi group on al-Abdia district in the northeastern governorate of Marib.
Since 21 September, the Houthis have been tightly besieging Abdia, worsening the humanitarian situation, the Yemeni representative to the UN told the Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, and the UNSC.
In Abdia, 5,300 families (or 35,000 civilians) are denied access to food, water, medicines and baby milk, leading to the death of 3 civilians at least so far, Abdullah al-Sa'adi added in behalf of his government.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27337.html
(A T)
Death toll as result of armed clashes in Taiz rises to 3
According to local sources, unknown gunmen on a motorcycle opened fire towards a member of the so-called 145th Brigade of the Saudi-backed Islah militia, Hussam Al-Mikhlafi, killing him along with two passers-by and wounding his brother in al-Tahrir area.
http://en.ypagency.net/240619/
(A P)
Demonstrations in Taiz call on governor to resign
Hundreds of the city’s residents called for on Friday in a protest rally Taiz governor, Nabil Shamsan, appointed by the Saudi-exiled Hadi government, to resign.
In the rally, the protesters protested against the deterioration of the local currency and the rise in prices food and oil derivatives.
http://en.ypagency.net/240632/
(A P)
Yemeni President: Peace efforts illusion prevents no killing, destruction
Al-Abdia and its 35,000 population have been under siege for three weeks denied access to food and medicines amid international silence, the Yemeni UN-recognized President said Wednesday.
Peace process kills with Houthi hands and the unlimited Iranian support, while the whole world stays still, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi added in his speech on the 58th anniversary of 14 October Revolution
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27338.html
(A P)
Shatara: 'The South is made for all the Southerners'
The Member of the Presidency of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), Vice-President of the National Assembly for Financial Control and Inspection, Lufti Shatara urged the Southerners to read their own history in order to learn from the past experiences and from the mistakes made.
Shatara said in his tweet that "From the revolution of Oct 14, 1963 and following decades, we must learn from each of those stages, from the great sacrifices and gross errors."
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33897
(A P)
Officials-in-aden-the-capital-express-concern-about-the-danger-of-yemeni-displacement-in-the-south
(* A P)
Yemen: Southern Transitional Council is responsible for forced displacements in Aden
The Southern Transitional Council (STC) forcibly displacing residents in the Jabal al-Faris neighborhood of Crater city in the Aden governorate, southern Yemen, is a matter of great concern, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor said in a statement.
Euro-Med Monitor received information that STC forces had set dozens of houses on fire in the Jabal al-Faras neighborhood after displacing their residents by force of arms.
Residents of the neighborhood told the Euro-Med Monitor team that on October 12, the STC forces ordered dozens of families to evacuate their homes and leave the area to transform it into a military site. At the same time, they demolished a number of houses sheltering local residents after forcing them out, the residents said.
A large number of the displaced residing in the neighborhood came from the areas of Taiz, Hodeidah, Tihama, and Mocha, where the battles forced them to flee, and after an arduous journey, they ended up renting or owning homes in the Jabal Al-Faras. Now, they are facing an unknown fate after the decision to displace them.
Activist, Abdel-Fattah Saleh, a resident of Crater, told Euro-Med Monitor that “after the STC forces regained control over the neighborhoods of Crater, citizens from Jabal al-Faras were ordered to evacuate their homes and leave the Aden Governorate, while they demolished some wooden and simple houses that had been inhabited by some residents to spread fear in the hearts of the population.”
“Some of the displaced people whose simple homes were demolished are now living in the streets, while others were forced to leave their homes and go to neighboring areas, fearful of the threats they received in case they refuse to comply with the order,” he said.
The STC forces have carried out raids and arrest operations since October 9 in the neighborhoods of Crater,
https://euromedmonitor.org/en/article/4667/Yemen:-Southern-Transitional-Council-is-responsible-for-forced-displacements-in-Aden = https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO2110/S00174/southern-transitional-council-is-responsible-for-forced-displacements-in-aden-yemen.htm
and
(* A P)
STC carries out mass arrests in Aden
Around 400 civilians, including children, have been arbitrarily arrested by the Southern Transitional Council in connection with violnce in Yemen's interim capital Aden, the Abductees' Mothers Association said on on Tuesday.
The mass arrests were made this past week following clashes between groups to the UAE-backed council in the district of Crater, it said, holding the Security Belt Forces fully responsible for the safety of the arrested.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27324.html
and
(* A P)
STC militias expels dozens of families from their homes in Aden
Dozens of families demonstrated Wednesday against the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC)’s militias in the port city of Aden, southern Yemen, after they were expelled from their homes in Crater area.
The demonstrators confirmed that the STC militia had destroyed some houses, stormed the doors of some of them, and forced their residents out into the open (photos)
https://en.ypagency.net/240443/
and
(* A P)
STC militias burn citizens homes after displacing them in Aden
The UAE-backed southern transitional council militias burned on Sunday a number of citizens homes in Jabal al-Furs area of Crater district in occupied Aden province.
Local sources said that the southern militiamen forced 200 families to leave their homes over the past days in Jabal al-Furs and al-Bumis areas then they burned their homes today.
https://en.ypagency.net/240857/
and
(A P)
Mass protest against forces home evictions by UAE-backed troops in Aden
(A K P)
Coalition forces block road linking Marib with Bayda
http://en.ypagency.net/240426/
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp7 – cp19
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-765b-yemen-war-mosaic-765b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-764-yemen-war-mosaic-764
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-764 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-764:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
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