Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 802 - Yemen War Mosaic 802

Yemen Press Reader 802: 19. April 2022: Jüngste saudische Luftangriffe: Untersuchungen und Rechenschaftspflicht – Kann der neue Präsidialrat dazu beitragen, den Krieg im Jemen zu beenden? – Endlich etwas Bewegung im Jemen? – Wie US-Waffenverkäufe die humanitäre...

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... Wie US-Waffenverkäufe die humanitäre Krise im Jemen anheizen –Waffenstillstand im Jemen: Weniger Kämpfe, beide Seiten beschuldigen sich gegenseitig für Verstöße – und mehr

April 19, 2022: Latest Saudi air raids: Examinations and accountability – Will a new presidential council help end Yemen's war? – Finally, Some Movement in Yemen? – How U.S. arm sales fuel the humanitarian crisis in Yemen – Yemeni truce: Reduced fighting, both sides blame each other for violations – and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-802b-yemen-war-mosaic-802b

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp12b Sudan

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade

cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage

cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle

cp19 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification

***

**

*

(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

(** B K P)

Yemen: Latest Round of Saudi-UAE-Led Attacks Targets Civilians

Killings Apparently Unlawful, Any Future Peace Talks Should Prioritize Justice

The Saudi and UAE-led coalition carried out three attacks in Yemen in late January 2022 in apparent violation of the laws of war that resulted in at least 80 apparently civilian deaths, including three children, and 156 injuries, including two children, Mwatana for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch said today.

Following one of the strikes, where it appears to have used a Raytheon-made laser-guided missile kit on a detention facility in Saada, the Saudi and UAE-led coalition conducted an investigation that stated that the attack was on a military facility. However Mwatana for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch found no evidence to support that claim. Houthi forces guarding the facility also shot at detainees trying to flee, witnesses said, killing and injuring dozens. The coalition attacks were in apparent retaliation for Houthi attacks on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on January 17.

“After eight years of conflict that has turned life for Yemen’s civilians into a disaster zone, the situation only seems to get worse,” said Lama Fakih, executive Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “For UN-backed peace negotiations to be successful, the results need to be durable, which requires placing justice for past atrocities at the core of any peace agreement.”

The recent attacks underscore the urgent need to pursue accountability for human rights violations and war crimes in Yemen through prosecutions, Mwatana for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch said. A new international commission of inquiry is needed to replace the United Nations-mandated investigation shut down in October 2021.

Any upcoming negotiations and agreements should include the creation of a credible international mechanism to ensure accountability for abuses by all parties to the conflict and should avoid endorsing any amnesties for serious international crimes. Under United Nations policies, it cannot endorse peace agreements that promise amnesty for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or gross violations of human rights. Its peace negotiators and field office staff are required not to encourage or condone amnesties that prevent prosecution of those responsible for serious crimes. The mechanism created should provide a path toward prosecuting those responsible for laws-of-war violations and provide appropriate compensation to victims.

On January 21, coalition airstrikes targeted a Houthi-controlled detention facility in Saada governorate. A Yemeni journalist who visited the attack site showed Human Rights Watch a photograph of a remnant from one of the munitions used in the attack, which included markings indicating that it was manufactured by the US defense contractor Raytheon.

The Joint Incident Assessment Team (JIAT) established by the coalition to investigate violations said on February 8 that the strike in Saada targeted a “Special Security Camp … which is a legitimate military target” but evidence gathered by Human Rights Watch and Mwatana for Human Rights consistently reflected that the facility targeted was a detention center.

Following the airstrikes on the detention facility, according to witnesses, Houthi forces guarding it shot at detainees trying to flee from the site. Medical workers from the hospitals receiving casualties told Mwatana for Human Rights that they treated 162 injured people and received bodies of another 82 killed people. According to the medical workers, 16 of those killed and 35 of those injured had sustained gunshot wounds. A detainee who survived the attack and assisted in the rescue operation told Mwatana for Human Rights that three children were injured. The detainee stated that the detention facility had a section for child detainees.

Under international humanitarian law, or the laws of war, warring parties may target only military objectives. They must take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians, including by providing effective advance warnings of attacks. Deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian objects are prohibited. The laws of war also prohibit indiscriminate attacks, which include attacks that do not distinguish between civilians and military targets or do not target a military objective. Attacks in which the expected harm to civilians and civilian property is disproportionate to the anticipated military gain are also prohibited. Individuals who commit serious violations of the laws of war with criminal intent – that is, deliberately or recklessly– are responsible for war crimes.

The US, the UK, France, and others should suspend all weapon sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE until they not only curtail their unlawful airstrikes in Yemen but also credibly investigate alleged violations. Warring parties should refrain from using explosive munitions with wide-area effects in populated areas because they cause both immediate and long-term harm to the civilian population. Governments should also support a strong political declaration that addresses the harm that explosive weapons cause to civilians and commits states to avoid using those with wide-area effects in populated areas.

There is no international investigative body currently documenting human rights violations and unlawful attacks by parties to the conflict in Yemen. In October 2021, under heavy pressure from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the UN Human Rights Council narrowly voted to end the mandate of the UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen, shuttering the only international, independent body investigating abuses by all parties to the conflict in Yemen.

Coalition airstrikes increased after that, according to Yemen Data Project, a website publishing statistics on coalition airstrikes, with civilian casualties reaching their highest monthly rate in more than two years.

“Killing and wounding of civilians in such bloody attacks and the targeting the country’s vital infrastructure are a natural consequence of impunity for war crimes in Yemen,” said Radhya Al-Mutawakel, the chairperson of Mwatana for Human Rights. “UN member states can promote accountability by establishing a new international accountability investigative mechanism with a mandate to assess potential criminal responsibility.”

The Joint Incident Assessment Team, established by the coalition in 2016, has fallen short of international standards regarding transparency, impartiality, and independence, underscoring the need for an international investigative body to document human rights violations and unlawful attacks by parties to the conflict in Yemen.

Human Rights Watch and Mwatana for Human Rights found no evidence of a military target at or near the site of the strikes. An attack that is not directed at a specific military objective is unlawful. The coalition has not provided information that would justify the attack.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/18/yemen-latest-round-saudi-uae-led-attacks-targets-civilians = https://mwatana.org/en/latest-round/

(** B P)

Will a new presidential council help end Yemen's war?

Yemeni consultations in Riyadh are thought to have been arranged to provide legal cover for such a move.

However, what was noticeable was that the power transfer announcement happened prior to the planned conclusion of the Riyadh consultations, which was set for later on that day.

The declaration is purported to have left attendant advisors at the consultations in disarray and sparked fierce argument among those angered at the way in which Hadi's powers had been reduced.

Suspicions that a hidden agenda lay behind the move increased after Sheikh Sultan al-Arada, the governor of Marib province, was suddenly summoned to Riyadh. He had previously refused to participate in the consultations, justifying his refusal due to continuing Houthi threats on the outskirts of the oil-rich governorate.

Who is the council president and what are his powers?

The leadership of the PLC has been passed to Rashad al-Alimi, one of former president Hadi's most prominent political advisors since 2014.

Before that, al-Alimi was one was a well-known personality in the former regime, in which he held a variety of senior positions in the security and intelligence sectors between 2000 and 2011 when he survived a rocket attack on the presidential palace in Sanaa.

Al-Alimi continued to be active behind the scenes in the years that followed as a leading figure in the General People's Congress (GPC), affiliated with the recognised government, as well as being one of the instigators behind the establishment of the National Alliance of Yemeni Political Forces (NAYPF) – a bloc opposed to the Houthi coup.

In addition to his cordial relations with a wide array of internal political forces, al-Alimi has close ties to Saudi Arabia and the US. Just hours before his appointment, US Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking met with him to discuss the Riyadh consultations.

By ensuring that influential figures with close military links are included in the new council, the architects of the power shift hope to avoid a repeat of the fragility of Hadi's presidency. They also hope to shore up stability by granting the leader of the council absolute powers which council members cannot override (in which case he could be reduced to a figurehead).

As well as the general tasks entrusted to the PLC, from the political and military administration of the state, setting foreign policy, and facilitating the government's exercise of its powers, the decision grants the head of the council exclusive powers, including general command of the armed forces and "representation of the republic at home and abroad".

Likewise, the head of the council alone will possess exclusive powers to appoint provincial governors, managers of the security services, judges of the high court, and the governor of the central bank, after consultation with the prime minister, provided that the names are agreed by members of the PLC. Similarly, he will be responsible for appointing ambassadors and ratifying laws.

An equal divide between north and south

There appears an even split between council members from the north and south, with al-Alimi, Saleh, al-Arada and Megali hailing from north Yemen while Abdulrahman Abu Zara'a Al Muharrami, Aidrous al-Zubaidi, Faraj al-Bahsani and Abdullah al-Alimi Bawazeer come from the Southern provinces.

Council members from the south appear to have strong ties to the UAE.

In terms of political parties, the Islah party has secured two seats in the council through Bawazeer, who served as Director of the Office of the President (during Hadi's tenure), and the pro-Islah governor of Marib, Al-Arada.

However, integrating Yemen's political parties does not appear to have been the primary goal of those orchestrating the handover. Rather, the aim seems to be to forge an apparent consensus between the largest military forces on the ground, especially the Giant's Brigades, the STC, Saleh's forces and those of al-Bahsani, who oversees the Yemeni armed forces in the second military region and may take over command of the first military region.

Executive director of the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, Maged Al-Madhaji, thinks that it is not clear yet how this change will be reflected in the relationship with the Houthis, but a complete restructuring of the bloc fighting the group will certainly "be a source of anxiety for the Houthis".

Al-Madhaji adds: "Setting up this council opens up the opportunity either to begin an actual path to negotiations [with the Houthis] or to re-organise the battle against the Houthis militarily and politically.

"The decision will give impetus to either path, but it will take time before we see the results, because first we will see a transitional stage and witness resistance from some with vested interests who rose to influential positions around president Hadi and surrounded him in the last period".

Moreover, the Yemeni researcher believes that with Hadi's withdrawal and absolute powers being granted to the chair of the PLC, Yemenis are seeing a different political approach.

"The opportunities and scenarios this step could engender are numerous. One change could be in that the effective reintegration of the UAE and its allies into the Saudi fold could drive further movement and ease the severe tensions which exist on that front". – by Zakaria Alkamali

https://english.alaraby.co.uk/analysis/will-new-presidential-council-help-end-yemens-war

and

(** B P)

Finally, Some Movement in Yemen?

Seven Years Later: Is the War in Yemen Nearly Over?

After seven years of war in Yemen and more than 400,000 people killed, there are signs of dramatic developments that might lead to a turning point, with important implications for the region – and for Israel

Several developments might encourage an arrangement that could lead to a different dynamic in Yemen. Chief among them are the establishment of a presidential council, an overall ceasefire, and the partial lifting of the air and sea blockade imposed on Yemen by Saudi Arabia. The recent territorial losses recorded by the Houthis, which prompted heightened attacks on Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, helped push the parties to a ceasefire. However, experience teaches us that the chances of reaching a long-term political settlement are not good.

The moves toward reconciliation, however fragile, herald temporary calm after an escalation of warfare inside and outside Yemen – in Saudi Arabia and the UAE – and are even supported by Iran, the ally of the Houthis. This calm was preceded by fierce fighting around Mareb and Shabwah, both oil-rich cities, and UAE intervention of the changes in the internal balance of forces in Yemen, which led to Houthi attacks on Abu Dhabi and Dubai this past January.

However, the history of efforts to achieve reconciliation and truces with local and international mediation from the start of the war indicate that the chances of success of the current moves are not good. Moreover, it appears that the confidence-building measures and compromise proposals, such as an eased blockade and the prisoner exchanges, are neither new nor more far-reaching than past efforts. Examples can be found in the Saudi proposals to the Houthis a year ago and in the Stockholm agreement of 2018, which show that the road to a ceasefire in Yemen is paved with agreements and understandings that were not realized. Long before the outbreak of the war, Yemen was already the poorest Arab country and rated lowest on the index of vulnerable states, alongside Somalia. The war has only worsened its situation, and according to UN estimates, it is the site of the worst humanitarian disaster since the Second World War and has cost almost 400,000 lives, mostly children.

What has now led the parties to agree on a ceasefire under the current conditions? International criticism of the Saudi role in the humanitarian tragedy in Yemen has a decisive influence on its desire to end the war. This joins the increasing Houthi attacks on strategic targets in the kingdom, particularly given its difficulty of setting up an effective defense system against the rockets and UAVs. The Saudis have now agreed to most of the Houthi demands, above all the limited opening of the capital’s international airport and the eased movement of goods through the main lifeline, the Hudaydah port, both under Houthi control. Notwithstanding past and present Houthi demands for a full lifting of the blockade, it appears that the Houthis are accepting the Saudi concessions for now, and even participated in the first exchange of prisoners since the end of 2020. However, they claim they will not recognize the new presidential council as a legitimate body to conduct negotiations, a claim that was used against them by the Saudis since the Houthis took over the government in late 2014 and in early 2015.

Nevertheless, the readiness of the parties for a ceasefire is due to a combination of factors, including contacts between Tehran and Riyadh, their inability to reach a military resolution of the war, and the international criticism they have received for their part in creating the humanitarian disaster. The immediate cause was the defeat suffered by the Houthis to forces loyal to the UAE around Mareb, and the Houthi attacks on the Emirates and Saudi Arabia in recent months, which left their mark on both sides. In the absence of a military decision, the attractiveness of the diplomatic route grew stronger. It is also possible that increases in food prices due to the war in Ukraine, which hurt the Houthi-controlled population, forced them to accept the ceasefire.

Hadi’s resignation, the end of attacks by the Arab coalition, the relaxation of the blockade, and the promise of $3 billion of Gulf aid, are evidence of Saudi motivation to bring an end to the fighting. These developments, and above all the establishment of the council that unites most of the sources of power in Yemen, could bring the Houthis, who perceived their bargaining power as superior, back to the negotiating table. However, it is not impossible that they will exploit the ceasefire to build up their strength, and once it ends they will renew the attacks on oil-rich Mareb, unless a political solution is found to share the country’s resources. If the ceasefire collapses, members of the presidential council will be required to function as a war coalition. The Saudis hope that the political unification of anti-Houthis forces will give them their first advantage in the talks with the Houthis, and if the talks collapse, the unity will help their war effort against the Houthis. The council’s ability to engage the full cooperation among its members is a challenge in itself, since they represent a variety of factions that have in the past fought each other, and each has a different vision for the future of Yemen – by Yoel Guzansky and Inbal Nissim-Louvton

https://www.inss.org.il/publication/yemen-war/

(** B K P)

Capitalizing on Conflict: How U.S. arm sales fuel the humanitarian crisis in Yemen

U.S. weapons manufacturers fueling the crisis in Yemen spend big money on lobbying but make even more selling arms.

Over the last 20 years, defense companies and their affiliates have spent more than $2.6 billion on lobbying politicians and $300 million making contributions to support and influence their campaigns. Getting up to half of a Pentagon budget that is likely to top $800 billion next year makes it well worth the effort.

U.S. manufacturers make billions from federal government contracts supplying weapons to the world’s most expensive and well-armed military, and billions more selling arms abroad. Over the last five years, the U.S. accounted for 39% of global arms exports according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Of those exports, 43% went to the Middle East. The largest recipient, Saudi Arabia, received nearly a quarter of U.S. exports. Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are among the top 10 recipients, putting them on par with stalwart allies like Australia, the United Kingdom and Japan.

For years, the Saudi-led coalition has used those weapons in a catastrophic civil war in Yemen that is now in its eighth year. The resulting humanitarian crisis has claimed over a hundred thousand lives from military conflict, famine and disease.

U.S. arms sales end up in Yemen

In recent years, Saudi Arabia bought billions worth of Boeing made helicopters and Raytheon and Lockheed Martin manufactured missiles. In total, Saudi Arabia received $355 million in large U.S. arms between 2015 and 2018, according to the Security Assistance Monitor. Since then, the U.S. government signed off on an additional $4.5 billion in future sales, according to the Forum on the Arms Trade data collected from the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

There has been a pointed and bipartisan resistance to further sales, prompted initially by the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi while in Saudi custody at the country’s consulate in Turkey. Members of Congress are also increasinglyreluctant to allow U.S. approved bombs to be used in the ongoing humanitarian crisis zone of Yemen, with limited success.

Additionally in 2021, the U.S. began reshuffling resources, largely away from the Middle East, as part of a Biden administration pivot to focus on threats posed by Russia and China. While U.S. diplomats have indicated that ending the military and humanitarian crisis in Yemen is a top priority, little tangible pressure has been brought to bear.

Despite President Biden’s campaign promise to end support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen, his administration approved a $500 million contract for support of the helicopter fleet in September and a $650 million contract for air-to-air missiles in November. Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.) introduced a joint resolution to block the later sale, which was ultimately defeated.

Most recently, legislation to prevent the sales was introduced by a bipartisan group led by Sens. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), Mike Lee (R-Utah) and Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) as well as Reps. Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.), James McGovern (D-Mass.) and Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.). Concurrently, the Saudis are reportedly pushing for a resupply of Raytheon produced Patriot missiles after experiencing a substantial increase in drone attacks from Houthi rebels in recent months.

Lawmakers mounted another effort to limit U.S. resources for Saudi Arabia because of its involvement in Yemen in September 2021 by including a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act but it was stripped from the final version of the bill.

The UAE is another top consumer of U.S.-made arms — and a key ally on the Arabian peninsula. Between 2015 and 2018, the UAE bought $3.9 billion worth of weapons from the U.S. and made deals in the following two years for nearly $30 billion more.

A number of other countries participating in the Saudi-led military coalition buy substantial amounts of U.S produced arms.

None of these arms sales happen in a vacuum. Complex diplomatic and security considerations are crucially important decision-making factors when the Pentagon or State Department review and approve sales. But foreign arms sales are big business, and the major defense manufacturers pushing for them have developed a consistent and deep influence through money in politics.

The cozy relationship between top military officials, Congress and weapons manufacturers is the result of mutual benefit. About a third of the Pentagon budget, which is $740 billion for 2022, is dedicated to weapons procurement, research and development and tens of billions of arms sales are delivered abroad by U.S. manufacturers each year.

As the goals of the U.S. government and the arms industry align, the government’’s diplomatic and geopolitical aims are often served by arming allies. In the case of Saudi Arabia, U.S. political and economic goals are many, from the obvious oil supply to fighting terror to having a foothold both diplomatically and militarily in the region. Weapons manufacturers benefit from a robust trade in their products, and recipient countries meet their own security goals.

Lobbying by weapons manufacturers

Since the Yemen conflict started in 2015, weapons manufactured in the U.S. — largely bombs made by Raytheon, Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics — have been used in Yemen. Some of the weapons were sold to Saudi Arabia for “defensive” operations, which are not subject to the same restrictions on sales as offensive actions. Nevertheless, bombs and other weapons manufactured by U.S. companies have been reportedly used in incidents that killed civilians in Yemen even as they attended weddings or travelled to school. The Saudi government has undertaken an effort to convince U.S. policy makers that “support for Saudi arms sales is support for Saudi Arabia fighting its own battles in the region.”

Those three manufacturers together spent $40.9 million of the $117 million the defense sector poured into lobbying efforts during 2021. Boeing, with most of its revenue from manufacturing civilian aircraft, is also a major defense contractor. Some of its guidance systems have turned up in bomb strikes. Boeing spent $13.4 million on lobbying during that time.

Nearly two dozen registered lobbyists who lobbied the Pentagon or White House on behalf of Lockheed Martin, Raytheon or General Dynamics since the war began also have past employment with the same agencies they contacted for the defense giants.

Those connections go all the way to the top. Mark Esper, who served as Secretary of the Army and then Secretary of Defense under President Trump, spent the preceding seven years as a registered lobbyist for Raytheon.

Current Pentagon head Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken came to the Biden administration from investment firm Pine Island Capital Partners. The firm’s SEC filings promoted their “unusual access to information” and claimed to be “well-suited to take advantage of the current and future opportunities present in the aerospace, defense and government service industries.” Austin also sat on the board of Raytheon Technologies in 2020.

In 2021, another firm launched by Blinken and other individuals serving in the Biden administration, WestExec Advisors, announced a strategic partnership with Teneo — a global advisory firm that has made millions from Saudi Arabia and UAE interests – by Dan Auble

https://www.opensecrets.org/news/reports/capitalizing-on-conflict/yemen-case-study

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

(A H)

COVID-19 Movement Restrictions: Yemen Mobility Restriction Dashboard #35 (31 March 2022)

HIGHLIGHTS (From 1 to 31 March 2022)

34 new cases – 9 new deaths | source: WHO

Updates on numbers of new cases in areas controlled by the De Facto Authorities (DFA) based in Sana’a are not available.

5,354 non-Yemeni migrants arrived at the Yemeni southern governorates of Lahj and Shabwah and 7,607 Yemeni returnees arrived in Yemen from Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). (Please see March FMR report for more details).

No IDP households (HH) reported COVID-19 as the reason of displacement.

So far, the total number of IDP HHs who have cited COVID-19 as the primary reason for displacement is 1,559 households.

The authorities of Al Wadeeah land border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia announced the lifting of COVID-19- travel restrictions

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/covid-19-movement-restrictions-yemen-mobility-restriction-dashboard-35-31-march-2022

cp2 Allgemein / General

(* A K P)

Interactive Map of Yemen War

https://yemen.liveuamap.com/

(* B H P)

Hält die Waffenruhe im Jemen?

Im Jemen macht sich durch die neue Waffenruhe Hoffnung auf Frieden breit. Doch dieser ist äußerst brüchig - und der Krieg in der Ukraine macht die ohnehin katastrophale humanitäre Lage noch schwieriger.

Der Grund für die nun vereinbarte zweimonatige Waffenruhe sei eine Pattsituation der Gegner, so Beobachter - weder für die Huthis noch für die Saudis ist offenbar ein Sieg in greifbarer Nähe.

Doch die Huthi Rebellen dämpften den Optimismus auf Frieden: Hadis Rücktritt sei eine Farce, sagte ein Sprecher der Rebellen. Frieden werde es erst geben, wenn die ausländischen Truppen abgezogen würden. Auch viele Bürger befürchten, dass es keinen politischen Neuanfang gibt.

Im Jemen herrscht die laut UN schlimmste humanitäre Krise der Welt: Täglich verhungern Kinder. Zu der angespannten politischen Lage im Land kommt ein weiteres Problem: Durch den Krieg in der Ukraine wird die Lebensmittelversorgung noch schwieriger.

"Wenn der Krieg zwischen Russland und der Ukraine so weitergeht, steigen die Weizenpreise hier noch mehr", so Ali Al-Kabous, ein jemenitischer Weizenhändler. "Und auch die Ölpreise steigen. Das wird eine weitere schwere Last für die Menschen."

Schon jetzt können sich viele Menschen die teuren Lebensmittel kaum noch leisten

Ob das angesichts von etwa 50 Kampffronten im Land überhaupt möglich sein könnte, ist unklar. Wichtig sei auch deshalb, dass die Waffenruhe weiter hält, so der UN-Sondergesandte Hans Grundberg.

Doch ein wirkliches Ende des Krieges - das ist im Jemen momentan nicht mehr als eine vorsichtige Hoffnung.

https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/afrika/jemen-waffenruhe-115.html

(* B K P)

Endlich Waffenruhe im Jemen: Ein Licht am Ende des Tunnels?

Die Waffenruhe bedeutet eine zumindest vorübergehende Entspannung.

Jetzt erlebte das Land erstmals seit sieben Jahren eine ganze Woche ohne Luftangriffe. Grund für die überraschende Feuerpause sei ein "schmerzhaftes Patt", sagt Experte Peter Salisbury von der Crisis Group. Weder für die vom Iran unterstützten Huthi-Rebellen noch für das von Saudi-Arabien angeführte Militärbündnis, das mit der Regierung gegen die Rebellen kämpft, sei ein entscheidender Sieg derzeit greifbar. "Beide Seiten haben das Gefühl, dass eine Pause ihnen grad mehr nutzt als eine Fortsetzung des Status quo."

Der Weg zu einem dauerhaften Waffenstillstand oder gar einem Frieden bleibt trotzdem sehr weit. Gut möglich, dass die Kämpfe wieder aufflammen, wenn im Hafen von Hudaida wie vereinbart einige Schiffe mit Treibstoff angelegt haben und einige kommerzielle Flüge aus Sanaa gestartet sind. Jetzt müsse das "einzigartige Potenzial" genutzt werden, sagt Grundberg, ehe er nach einem Besuch in Sanaa in einen weißen Jet mit der Aufschrift "United Nations" steigt. Seine größte Bewährungsprobe als Vermittler im Jemen steht erst noch bevor.

https://www.gmx.net/magazine/politik/endlich-waffenruhe-jemen-licht-tunnels-36787680 = https://de.qantara.de/content/endlich-waffenruhe-im-jemen-ein-licht-am-ende-des-tunnels

(* B K P)

A Ramadan truce in Yemen offers civilians respite, but no certainty

Recent steps, including the resignation of Yemen’s president, have raised cautious hopes for progress toward ending the civil war

Recent steps, including a truce between Yemen’s warring parties and the resignation of the country’s president, have raised cautious hopes for progress toward ending the country’s seven-year civil war — or, at least, providing some relief for Yemen’s civilians, caught in the grip of one of the world’s severest humanitarian crises.

But experts and officials say it is far too soon to call the measures a breakthrough. The truce has been shaky and has already led to worries that the Houthis will use it to redeploy troops for fresh offensives. The presidential council — an attempt to unify the anti-Houthi front — consists of individuals with broad and often clashing ideological views.

The pause in fighting could provide air to mediation efforts involving the United Nations and regional brokers, said Maysaa Shuja al-Deen, a senior researcher at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies. The alternative is a failed truce followed by a “military explosion,” she said.

Experts said a collision of factors — including battlefield dynamics and pressure from the international community, including the United States — may have made the time ripe for a pause in the war.

United States would no longer provide “offensive” weapons to Saudi Arabia, but has continued close cooperation with the Saudi military.

The latest truce has coincided with the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, as did other cease-fire attempts. But it also follows months of escalating violence in Yemen that sparked fear that the war was destabilizing the broader region, experts said.

With the Houthis blocked from capturing Marib, and their Persian Gulf adversaries reeling from the missile attacks, “everybody had a bit of leverage, and everybody had a reason to want a pause,” said Peter Salisbury, senior analyst for Yemen at the International Crisis Group.

The stalemate made it easier for the United Nations to secure a truce it had been seeking for more than two years, he said, and also allowed Saudi Arabia to act on a long-rumored plan to shove Hadi aside.

Shuja al-Deen, of the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, said the moves showed that “Saudi Arabia is now paving the way for the postwar period.”

“It’s trying to wrap up this file,” she said. “It realized that, militarily, it can’t make gains of any kind, at a time when the Yemeni war file has bled it economically and destroyed its reputation internationally.”

“The ball is in the Houthis’ court: They will decide if the war will stop or not,” she said, adding that the Houthis, despite performing some state duties, are still a militia, “and militias have nothing to lose.” Simply surviving as a group counted as a success.

In some ways, the council’s creation places the Houthis and the opposing power on equal footing. Both lack constitutional legitimacy, and both are now made up of military leaders and religious men.

“The postwar period, if the war ends, will be a period of political powers that forced their presence with weapons,” said Shuja al-Deen. That is not necessarily a formula for success. “Yemen is not going to be stable after the war,” she said.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/15/yemen-hadi-saudi-arabia-houthis-truce/

(* B K P)

What Will a New Presidential Council Mean for Yemen?

The success or failure of the post-Hadi political entity will ultimately depend on the council’s ability to find a president who enjoys the respect of all political factions.

In addition to announcing a ceasefire, a face-change in Yemen’s internationally recognized government was a necessary measure to demonstrate a post-Hadi path forward. Although the council is led by Rashad Muhammad al-Alimi, a stalwart of the Hadi government, there are four members of the eight-person council who mark a potential turning point for Yemeni political representation. Sultan Ali al-Aradah, the governor of Marib, has recently gained a great deal of public recognition for his leadership in the defense of the oil-rich, strategic city of Marib in the face of a continued Houthi offensive. The addition of Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, the leader of the STC and Hadi’s main rival for political power in southern Yemen, effectively merges Yemen’s government with the STC, a triumph for the failed Riyadh Agreement. Added for both family name recognition and as a testament to his military success is Tareq Saleh, a nephew of former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh who commands one of the most effective fighting forces in Yemen, consisting of remnants of his uncle’s republican army. Lastly, as a testament to the geographic inclusiveness of the council, Faraj Salmeen al-Bahsani, the governor of Yemen’s eastern Hadramawt region, was added to ensure that Hadrami’s autonomous tendencies do not further fracture the country. This means that the 50 percent of the presidential council that has joined the government in exile brings not only a great deal of popular support among Yemenis, but also essential on the ground legitimacy that was lacking under Hadi’s leadership.

Announcing the creation of a presidential council—essentially a conglomeration of anti-Houthi leadership from all sections of the country—does not presuppose the emergence of a representative and nationalist government. Each member of the council brings his own political agenda, which in many cases conflicts directly with one another. Yet there is historic precedence for the success of Yemeni presidential councils, especially in the aftermath of otherwise intractable civil wars.

Yemeni presidential councils have been important political bodies during transition periods, either following a coup or after the creation or unification of a new state. The current state of affairs in the Yemeni government certainly meets this criterion of either unifying the disparate factions in the country or creating a new governing body that could purport to represent Yemeni national interests in future negotiations with the Houthi leadership. Although the current presidential council appears representative of multiple geographies and political constituencies, there is no clear leadership, at least not on the level of Qadi Abdulrahman al-Iryani. The success or failure of the post-Hadi political entity will ultimately depend on the council’s ability to find a council president who enjoys the respect of all political factions, including the Houthi movement.

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-will-new-presidential-council-mean-yemen-201865

(? B K P)

Audio: The situation in Yemen

On today’s program, we welcome back Kamilia Al-Eriani, Yemeni activist and academic, to give us an update on the situation in Yemen

https://www.3cr.org.au/accentofwomen/episode/situation-yemen

(A P)

[Sanaa gov.] Fisheries Authority condemns kidnapping of fishermen by aggression

The Red Sea General Fisheries Authority condemned on Sunday the crime of kidnapping a number of fishermen by the forces of the Saudi-American aggression.

In a statement, the authority stated that the forces of aggression has kidnapped a number of fishermen and confiscated their boats while they were fishing in the Red Sea coast in Buhais area in Midi district of Hajjah province.

The statement considered the kidnapping a criminal and cowardly act against the fishermen.

https://www.saba.ye/en/news3183668.htm

and also https://en.ypagency.net/259139/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/04/17/yemeni-fishermen-abducted-by-saudi-invaders/

(* B P)

Yemen's new leaders say focused on peace path

Yemen's new leaders are "ready for war" should the latest push for peace with Huthi rebels fail, but a senior official told AFP they genuinely want the years-long conflict to end soon.

"Our first option is peace, but we are ready for war," Abdullah al-Alimi said late Saturday in his first interview since being named to an eight-member leadership council tasked with running the country after President Abedrabbo Mansour Hadi stepped down earlier this month.

"We believe the council is in a position, with the coalition support, to score a decisive military victory," Alimi told AFP in the Saudi capital.

Hadi said the council would be tasked with "negotiating with the Huthis for a permanent ceasefire".

"We hope the dire situation in Yemen will make people have a desire to leave personal and partisan interests behind in pursuit of peace," said Alimi, formerly Hadi's chief of staff.

He said council leaders are due to meet in the coming days with UN special envoy to Yemen Hans Grundberg, who last week visited Sanaa for the first time during his mandate and held talks with Huthi leaders.

After meeting Grundberg, the council will travel to Yemen to be sworn in, though Alimi refused to specify exactly where.

The new council has not yet decided how long it will give the Huthis to join talks, Alimi said.

Analysts note the Huthis have said peace will only come once foreign forces leave and some believe they are only really interested in talks with the Saudis.

"The Huthis don't see themselves in a conflict with Yemenis. The Huthis see themselves in a conflict with Saudi Arabia," said Fatima Abo Alasrar of the Middle East Institute in Washington.

If the push for peace goes nowhere, the newly-aligned anti-Huthi forces are positioned to pursue "a concerted multifront campaign" against the rebels, provided the council's diverse membership can hold together, said Peter Salisbury, senior Yemen analyst for the International Crisis Group.

"They (the leadership council) have the potential to more aggressively pursue peace and more aggressively pursue war, and the most likely outcome is they do a little bit of one and a little bit of the other," he said.

https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220417-yemen-s-new-leaders-say-focused-on-peace-path = https://www.rfi.fr/en/yemen-s-new-leaders-say-focused-on-peace-path

(? B K P)

„Die Saudis wissen nicht, wie sie diesen Krieg beenden sollen“

Im Gespräch erklärt der Islamwissenschaftler Guido Steinberg, warum der Iran kein Interesse an Frieden hat, warum große Teile der Bevölkerung hungern und weshalb eine Flucht nach Europa für einen Jemeniten nahezu unmöglich ist. (nur im Abo)

https://www.cicero.de/aussenpolitik/krieg-im-jemen-hunger-saudi-arabien-iran-huthi-rebellen-interview

(B H P)

Photo: This Tight ,dangerous road in this photo become the alternative road after siege of Taiz,which connects the north and the south of #Yemen,the only road linking #Taiz to #Aden.

https://twitter.com/shahrah_mahmoud/status/1515279116240670727

(* A P)

Yemen.. The opening of roads and crossings in Hodeidah and Taiz has begun

Local sources in Al-Hodeidah governorate confirmed that roads had begun between the governorate’s districts in implementation of the terms of the UN armistice agreement, while similar sources in Taiz expected arrangements to open the western crossing of the city, while Houthi militia violations of the truce continued.

And local sources in Al-Hodeidah governorate reported the start of paving the roads linking the governorate’s districts, in preparation for their opening in implementation of the UN armistice, noting that it was agreed to open the road linking the districts of Hays and Al-Jarrahi, south of Al-Hodeidah.

The sources confirmed that bulldozers have started work to remove the dirt piles and barriers and fill in the trenches that were dug on the road during the last period, in preparation for its opening, pointing out that the process takes three days.

In Taiz, local sources and others in the Roads Maintenance Fund stated that there are understandings to open the western crossing of the city, linking the area of ​​the ghee and soap factory, and the Bir Basha area, which is known as the “Ghorab” port, but work has not begun to remove the obstacles to vehicle traffic.

This coincides with the existence of agreements with the Houthi militia to complete the implementation of the terms of the armistice that began at the beginning of this month, including the part related to opening crossings and roads to civilians in all areas, including the besieged governorate of Taiz since 2015.

https://www.tellerreport.com/news/2022-04-15-yemen--the-opening-of-roads-and-crossings-in-hodeidah-and-taiz-has-begun.H1GvkDmPNq.html

(? B K P)

Bei Jemens Kriegsparteien wächst die Bereitschaft zum Kompromiss

In der Schlacht um die Stadt Marib haben alle Seiten erkennen müssen, dass sie den Krieg militärisch nicht entscheiden können. Der Abtritt von Präsident Hadi bringt nun neue Bewegung in den festgefahrenen Konflikt. [nur im Abo]

https://www.nzz.ch/international/jemen-konflikt-es-waechst-die-bereitschaft-zum-kompromiss-ld.1679473?reduced=true

(B K P)

Audio: The situation in Yemen

On today’s program, we welcome back Kamilia Al-Eriani, Yemeni activist and academic, to give us an update on the situation in Yemen.

https://www.ivoox.com/the-situation-in-yemen-audios-mp3_rf_85806458_1.html

(B K P)

Rethinking peacemaking in Yemen

The failure of the military solution in the past years guarantees that it is now time to find a political solution that may not favor every party's demands but will surely reduce the ongoing human suffering and put the country back on the right track to peace and stability.

For sure, establishing peace in Yemen is not going to be easy, but I believe that the formation of this council could be the first effective step to pushing all warring parties to sit for negotiations and reach an agreement to bring back stability and security to Yemen.

This council came to recognize the necessity to reactivate Yemen’s institutions and prevent the individual monopolization of power witnessed for the last 10 years, and the importance of instituting more collective decision-making in a body that represents Yemen’s major social and political groups.

Although the conflict in Yemen is described internationally as a “forgotten war,” I believe it has been forgotten by its own people, too. During the last 10 years, the warring parties increased escalations and put more obstacles on the road to peace by rejecting regional and international offers for settlement.

I believe that the formation of this council is a step that will help revive the political process in Yemen and move the country forward, saving it from the brink of famine and stopping the war.

While this new council is yet to prove its success, given the Houthis’ initial rejection to sit for negotiations, its priority must be ensuring good governance and fixing the country's devastated economy.

https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/rethinking-peacemaking-in-yemen

My remark: From Turkey, very much pro-Saudi.

(B K P)

Yemen Crisis

If the situation cannot be controlled, then there is a possibility of a sectarian revolution. The civil war and lawlessness could facilitate the terrorist attacks not only by AQAP but also by ISIS. The war could also stop the supply of world oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandab strait which controls access to the Suez Canal. This may lead to hike in oil prices across the globe if the supply routes are blocked or disturbed.

https://nation.com.pk/2022/04/18/yemen-crisis/

(* B K P)

Audio: The War We Can Stop: On the Seven-Year Conflict in Yemen

This Week on Radio Open Source with Christopher Lydon

We’re engulfed by war, rumors of war, videos of war, crimes of war—are we looking at “end times” approaching? Or just the dead end of the forever wars?

Our conversation this hour is about the seven-year war in Yemen. Our Yemeni guest sets it in the Ukraine context this way: “Yemen,” she says, “is the war we can stop.” It is called the worst humanitarian catastrophe on the planet, and still it gets scant news coverage. It is older than Ukraine’s war, vicious in its own way, an autocrat’s war much deadlier than Russia’s hammering of Ukraine, so far. The Yemen war, too, is a mismatch: Saudi oil wealth pounding the poorest nation in the Arab world, and using American planes dropping American bombs to do the pounding.

https://lithub.com/the-war-we-can-stop-on-the-seven-year-conflict-in-yemen/

(* B P)

Hopes for the truce in Yemen

The truce in Yemen is unlikely to stop the conflict between the Houthis and the Yemeni government, but it remains a turning point for a country ravaged by war.

Saudi Arabia has said that it intends to pull out of the war in Yemen yet remain involved in it politically. However, the fate of the UN-sponsored truce between Riyadh and the Houthi rebels in Yemen depends as much on internal dynamics as it does on regional powers, particularly Iran, which has facilitated it.

Nevertheless, the central conflict between the Houthis and the new Yemeni government appears likely to drag on.

The Yemeni National Dialogue sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and held in Riyadh from 29 March to 7 April produced three major outputs. First, the participants resolved to relinquish military solutions to the Yemeni crisis and prioritise political means, especially the UN-sponsored negotiating track with the Houthis.

Second, they stressed the need to accelerate the implementation of the provisions in the Riyadh Agreement between the Yemeni government and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in the framework of efforts to address the “Southern Cause” in Yemen and to combat corruption in the government.

Third, and most importantly, the conference resulted in an overhaul of the government in Yemen

Perhaps a more important aspect of the new authority is how it reflects a gradual reversion to the rules of power in Yemen. These were clearly articulated under the former regime of president Ali Abdullah Saleh, but they were later modified to suit developments.

The Saleh era’s tribal alliances have given way to an alliance of political forces. Even if this is still more in form than in substance, given the tribalisation of politics in Yemen, the transformation reflects how some political quarters have learned the lessons of the Yemeni conflict.

But it is still too soon to judge the durability of the alliance and Rashad Al-Alimi’s ability to manage it.

The second major factor at this crucial turning point in the Yemeni conflict is Saudi Arabia’s determination to disengage from the crisis militarily seven years after it launched the war to reinstate the government in Yemen on 25 March 2015. The Yemeni National Dialogue in Riyadh coincided with the UN-sponsored Muscat Process, which has succeeded in concluding a truce between the Houthi Movement and Saudi Arabia.

Whether or not this leads to a durable ceasefire agreement, it should be borne in mind that this is not a sign that an end to the war in Yemen is in sight. Instead, it signals an end to the Saudi involvement in that war. All the parties are aware of this, as is clear from developments on the battlefield.

The negotiating tracks that led to the current turning point reveal that a “deal-making” mindset continues to prevail over a “comprehensive solution” mentality among all the key stakeholders. In striking the deal with Riyadh, the Houthi leaders sought to save themselves from a popular uprising or “revolt of the hungry” that seemed imminent in the light of the deterioration in living standards and public services in the areas under Houthi control.

The movement may also take advantage of the respite from its confrontation with Riyadh to redirect its energies towards the domestic front and use its advantages to delineate spheres of influence between itself and the new government.

The same applies to the new presidential council. It may not be in its interests to reach a political settlement with the Houthis under the current balance of power, which generally favours the Houthis. However, if the council resolved to pursue a military course to alter that balance, it would have to contend with the problem of how to do that without a major part being played by the Saudi-led Coalition that has backed the government militarily until now.

It is to the council’s advantage that most of its members serve in political or military capaciti

If the Yemeni question has embarked on a new phase after having been significantly restructured, it is impossible to say whether this turning point can be translated into breakthroughs that will lead to a countrywide ceasefire and a comprehensive roadmap steering the country to stability and peace.

Perhaps what can be hoped for in the short to medium term is a partial breakthrough as a result of Riyadh’s ability to reposition itself in a way that enables it to help contain the conflict and subsidiary crises such as the Southern question.

That said, even the limited de-escalation made possible by the truce should not be underestimated as a critical turning point for a country that has been ravaged by seven years of war.

https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/50/1203/464544/AlAhram-Weekly/World/Hopes-for-the-truce-in-Yemen.aspx

(A P)

Generaldirektor der Weltgesundheitsorganisation kritisiert doppelte Standards

'Die ganze Aufmerksamkeit für die Ukraine ist natürlich wichtig, weil es die ganze Welt betrifft, aber nicht einmal ein Bruchteil davon wird Tigray, Jemen, Afghanistan, Syrien oder anderen gewidmet, nicht einmal ein Bruchteil', klagte er und hob hervor: Und ich muss ganz ehrlich sagen

Feindsender!

(* A P)

World treats crises affecting black, white lives unequally: WHO chief

The WHO chief said Wednesday that the world was treating humanitarian crises affecting black and white lives unequally, with only a "fraction" of the attention on Ukraine given elsewhere.

World Health Organization's director-general Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said the emergencies happening in other parts of the world were not being taken as seriously and hoped the international community "comes back to its senses".

"I don't know if the world really gives equal attention to black and white lives," Tedros told a news conference.

"The whole attention to Ukraine is very important of course, because it impacts the whole world.

"But even a fraction of it is not being given to Tigray, Yemen, Afghanistan and Syria and the rest. A fraction.

"I need to be blunt and honest that the world is not treating the human race the same way. Some are more equal than others. And when I say this, it pains me. Because I see it. Very difficult to accept but it's happening."

"I hope the world comes back to its senses and treats all human life equally," he said.

"What is happening in Ethiopia is a tragic situation. People are being burned alive... because of their ethnicity.... Without any crime.

"So we need to balance. We need to take every life seriously because every life is precious."

https://news.yahoo.com/world-treats-crises-affecting-black-143959153.html

(* B P)

Hope At Last For Yemen – OpEd

To be successful the new Council will need to set aside their differences and cooperate in the interests of the nation as a whole. It has clearly won the confidence of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the task of disbursing its windfall $3bn to best effect is likely to occupy a good deal of its time and attention.

As for the Houthis, they refused to attend the Riyadh talks that preceded the establishment of the presidential council, and have subsequently denounced it as a foreign and illegitimate imposition. This reaction is perhaps not unexpected, but the current two-month ceasefire is a reality, brought about by extensive Saudi-Houthi negotiation. If negotiations continue, the ceasefire could be extended into something approaching a truce.

What Yemen needs are elections, an inclusive government, and a new structure for the state. UN Resolution 2216 aims to establish democracy in a federally united Yemen. The Houthis must be given the opportunity to choose. Do they wish to remain an outlawed militia permanently, or would they prefer to become a legitimate political party, able to contest parliamentary and presidential elections and participate in government? The price would be serious engagement in negotiations aimed at a peaceful transition to a political solution for a united Yemen.

https://www.eurasiareview.com/15042022-hope-at-last-for-yemen-oped/

(A P)

Yemen’s rebels criticize new, US-led task force in Red Sea

Yemen’s Houthis criticized a new U.S.-led task force that will patrol the Red Sea following a series of attacks by the Iran-backed rebels in a waterway that’s essential to global trade.

Mohammed Abdul-Salam, the Houthis’ chief negotiator and spokesman, said late Friday that the U.S. move in the Red Sea, which comes amid a cease-fire in the country’s civil war, contradicts Washington’s claim of supporting the U.N.-brokered truce.

The task force “enshrines the aggression and blockade on Yemen,” he claimed on his Telegram social media account.

Another Houthi leader, Daifallah al-Shami, also criticized the U.S.-led task force, saying it sends negative signals and “gives a darker reading to the truce,” according to the rebels’ media office. He also did not elaborate.

https://apnews.com/article/business-middle-east-yemen-iran-red-sea-96db4ef5f3eb77eca03950832399b08f

(A P)

Ansarullah Spokesman: US move in Red Sea contradicts Washington’s claim of supporting truce

The head of the Yemeni National Delegation, Mohammed Abdulsalam has on Friday affirmed that the American move in the Red Sea contradicts Washington’s claim that it supports the truce.
“The US aims to perpetuate the state of aggression and siege against Yemen,” Mohammed Abdulsalam said in a tweet.

https://en.abna24.com/news//ansarullah-spokesman-us-move-in-red-sea-contradicts-washington%e2%80%99s-claim-of-supporting-truce_1248371.html

and also https://www.farsnews.ir/en/news/14010127000415/Ansarllah-US-Seeks-Prlng-Sae-f-Aggressin-Siege-Agains-Yemen

https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/25315/Abdulsalam-The-US-Aims-to-Perpetuate-State-of-Aggression%2C-Siege-Against-Yemen

https://en.ypagency.net/259069/

https://debriefer.net/en/news-29389.html

and

(A P)

US’s Move in the Red Sea Gives ‘Bleak Outlet” of UN-Sponsored Truce: [Sanaa] National Salvation Government Says

The National Salvation Government spokesman, confirmed that the US-Saudi aggression's negative handling of the UN-sponsored truce and the US’s move in the Red Sea give a “bleak outlet” of this truce.

Minster Daifallah Al-Shami wrote in a tweet, Friday, that "the field data and the negative interaction by the US-Saudi aggression with the truce, showing no signs of implementing until today, with the American move in the Red Sea gives a bleak outlet of this truce."

"Armed Forces are on standby, so either the US-Saudi coalition fulfills promises or they will discipline those who break their agreements,"he added.

https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/25317/US-s-Move-in-the-Red-Sea-Gives-%98Bleak-Outlet-%9D-of-UN-Sponsored-Truce

and also https://en.ypagency.net/259074/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/04/16/yemeni-spokesman-saudi-and-us-actions-give-a-bleak-prospect-for-future-of-the-ceasefire/

(A P)

Alejri: Withdrawal of Foreign Forces Would Expedite Political Settlement in Yemen

The withdrawal of foreign forces from Yemen would expedite the political settlement, just as the withdrawal of Egyptian forces in the 1960s accelerated the national reconciliation, AbdulMalik Alejri member of the [Sanaa gov.] National Delegation said.

Alejri wondered in his tweet on Thursday about the reason that might push Saudi-mercenaries for peace, as long as "the countries of aggression bear responsibility for the expenses of the war and the expenses of the mercenaries."

"If the mercenaries of aggression bear the responsibility and expenses, the option of war will not be profitable for them," he added.

https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/25309/Alejri-Withdrawal-of-Foreign-Forces-Would-Expedite-Political-Settlement-in-Yemen

and also https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/04/15/yemeni-diplomat-withdrawal-of-foreign-forces-would-speed-up-peace-process/

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

(* A P)

Aggression Coalition continues to detain fuel vessels, especially diesel

Spokesman for the Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) Essam al-Mutawakel confirmed Monday that the US-Saudi aggression coalition continued to detain fuel vessels, especially diesel, despite obtaining United Nations permits after inspection.

In a statement to Yemen News Agency (SABA), the spokesman stated that the aim of the aggression coalition to detain diesel vessels linked to service sectors such as health, water, electricity, and transportation of food commodities should remain high for citizens, especially during Ramadan.

The United Nations had not put an end to such piracy either before or during the announced armistice.

https://www.saba.ye/en/news3183744.htm

(A P)

[Riyadh/Aden gov.] Yemen foreign minister @BinmubarakAhmed: Based on its keenness 2 alleviate suffering of our people, GoY gave directives to technical authorities, since day one of #truce, to complete internal procedures to operate 2 flights a week to&from #Sanaa_Airport. Coordination has been made w/Egypt & Jordan to start the flights.

https://twitter.com/BinmubarakAhmed/status/1515055443911004175

My comment: ???

(* A P)

YPC: Coalition continues to detain three fuel ships

The Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) confirmed on Saturday that the US-Saudi-Emirati aggression coalition detained three oil derivatives ships.

The Saudi-led coalition still detaining three fuel ships despite obtaining UN permits,” Official spokesman for the Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) Issam Al-Mutawakel said in a statement carried out by Saba news agency.

“The detained ships carry 88,439 tons of gasoline and diesel,” he said

https://en.ypagency.net/259072/

(A P)

Yemeni Oil Company: Saudi-Led Coalition Seizes Yemen-Bound Fuel Ship Despite UN-Brokered Ceasefire

The Saudi-led coalition of war on Yemen has impounded another oil tanker carrying thousands of tons of fuel toward the war-ravaged country in violation of a two-month ceasefire brokered by the United Nations, according to the Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC).

Essam Al-Mutawakel, a spokesman for the YPC, said on Thursday that the coalition prevented the ship “Harvest” from entering the strategic Yemeni port city of Hudaydah amid a crippling fuel shortage in the country, presstv reported.

The Yemeni official added that the ship, carrying 29,976 tons of diesel fuel at the time, was seized despite having been inspected and cleared for a port call by the United Nations.

https://www.farsnews.ir/en/news/14010126000296/Yemeni-Oil-Cmpany-Sadi-Led-Caliin-Seizes-Yemen-Bnd-Fel-Ship-Despie-UN

and also https://en.mehrnews.com/news/185728/Saudi-led-coalition-seizes-another-Yemeni-fuel-tanker

https://www.saba.ye/en/news3183514.htm

(* B P)

UNVIM Situation Analysis - March 2022

Food and Fuel Discharged in March 2022

During the reporting month, there was a 6% increase in food discharged (324,026 t) compared to the 2021 monthly average (310,856 t) and a 10% increase compared to the monthly average since May 2016 (293,331 t).

During the reporting month, there was a 2% decrease in fuel discharged (43,767 t) compared to the 2021 monthly average (44,589 t) and a 66% decrease compared to the monthly average since May 2016 (128,544 t).

Food and Fuel Vessel Delays in March 2022

In March 2022, food vessels spent an average of 2.7 days in the CHA, 2.6 days in anchorage, and, 10.5 days at berth in March 2022. This compares to an average of 2.9 days in the CHA, 4.7 days in anchorage, and, 7.9 days at berth in March 2021. Food vessels therefore spent 7% and 44% less time in the CHA and in anchorage, and, 33% more time at berth compared to March 2021.

In March 2022, 21 food vessels proceeded from the CHA to the anchorage area, 17 berthed, and, 16 discharged their cargo and sailed.

In March 2022, the average time spent by fuel vessels in the CHA was 37.4 days, whereas it was 68.3 days on average in March 2021, or a 45% decrease year-on-year. In comparison to the 2021 monthly average of 73.3 days, the month of March 2022 saw a 49% decrease.

Two (02) fuel vessels were permitted from the CHA to anchorage, two (02) berthed, and three (03) discharged their cargo and sailed during the reporting month.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unvim-situation-analysis-march-2022

and also https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unvim-operational-snapshot-march-2022

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

(* A H)

Health Minister: No patient has traveled through Sanaa airport since start of UN truce

Minister of Public Health and Population in the Sanaa government, Dr. Taha Al-Mutawakel, said on Monday there is no a single patient has traveled via Sanaa International Airport despite the passage of two weeks of the UN-declared armistice.

The Health Minister added that is because “the Saudi-led coalition continues to delay the opening of Sanaa International Airport.”

During a meeting to review the strategic directions of the health sector and evaluate hospitals for the year 2021, Dr. Al-Mutawakel affirmed that the coalition continues to detain diesel-loaded ships, which exacerbate the suffering in hospitals and health centers.

He indicated that 525 hospitals and health centers were directly destroyed during the years of war and siege.

“Through the siege, the coalition aimed to disrupt the provision of medical services in hospitals and medical centers that remained operating under war conditions,” the health minister said.

He explained that 98% of the quality devices of the medical sector in Yemen have exceeded their lifespan, and a number of them are out of readiness, and that 7000 Yemeni consultants are working in the diaspora, compared to 3,000 who have remained in the country, which has increased pressures on the medical sector.

https://en.ypagency.net/259256/

(* B H)

Es droht eine Katastrophe: Wie sich der Ukraine-Krieg auf den Welthunger auswirkt

Die Not weltweit war noch nie so gross wie heute. Klimaschocks, Konflikte, Covid-19 und eskalierende Nahrungsmittelpreise haben Millionen Menschen an den Rand einer Hungersnot gebracht. Der Krieg in der Ukraine hat diese dramatische Lage nun noch verschlimmert.

Ein Versorgungschock mit verheerenden Auswirkungen

Russland und die Ukraine gehören zu den fünf grössten Exporteuren vieler Nahrungsmittel, darunter Mais, Gerste und Sonnenblumenöl. Damit zählen sie zu den Kornkammern Europas. Auf beiden Seiten entfallen zwölf Prozent des gesamten Kalorienhandels der Welt. Nun hat der Einmarsch Russlands in die Ukraine die Produktion und den Export von ukrainischen Lebensmitteln faktisch zum Erliegen gebrach

Dieser Versorgungsschock hat zu einem unmittelbaren Anstieg der Weltmarktpreise für Lebensmittel geführt: Nur eine Woche nach der Invasion war der globale Index der Getreidepreise im Vergleich zu den Preisen zu Beginn des Jahres um 22 Prozentpunkte gestiegen, während beispielsweise die Weizenpreise um 47und die Getreidepreise um 26 Prozent zulegten und damit ein Niveau erreichten, das seit 2008 nicht mehr beobachtet wurde. Auch der Preis für Düngemittel – wo Russland zusammen mit Weissrussland zu den weltweit grössten Exporteuren gehört – ist um 40 Prozent gestiegen.

In einer zunehmend instabilen Welt, die immer noch mit den Folgen der Covid-19-Pandemie zu kämpfen hat, während sich die Klimakrise weiter beschleunigt und die Lebensmittelpreise bereits auf Rekordniveau sind, könnten aufgrund der Ukraine-Krise nun bis zu 47 Millionen Menschen zusätzlich in die Hungersnot getrieben werden.

Am stärksten gefährdet sind zum einen Menschen, die in Ländern leben, die von Lebensmittelimporten aus der Ukraine und Russland abhängig sind.

Jemen
Im vom über achtjährigen Bürgerkrieg betroffenen Jemen machen Weizen und Getreide mehr als die Hälfte der Kalorienzufuhr einer Familie aus. Der langjährige Konflikt liess die Wirtschaft im Jemen weiter zusammenbrechen. Abwertung des Jemen-Rial führte zu einem Anstieg der Lebenshaltungskosten um 36 bis 45 Prozent. Knapp 500 000 Kinder unter fünf Jahren leiden bereits unter schwerer akuter Mangelernährung. Ein Drittel des Weizens kommt aus Russland und der Ukraine.

https://www.unicef.ch/de/aktuell/blog/2022-04-17/folgen-ukraine-krieg-welthunger

(* B H P)

Yemen in the shadow of Russia’s war on Ukraine

This tragedy is likely to worsen as a result of the war Russia unleashed against Ukraine. Both countries together account for 30-40 percent of Yemen’s wheat imports. For Yemen which imports 95 percent of its overall needs, this will mean higher prices for grains, especially wheat, but also fuel and fertilizers. Food prices in Yemen had already doubled in 2021 and according to the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC), they increased by 150 percent since the onset of the war in Ukraine. With the Black Sea effectively choked off and most Black Sea wheat going to the Middle East, the hike in wheat prices will also have an impact on regional stability.

The war in Ukraine also means that donor funds will become scarcer even as donor focus on Yemen was already weakening. Germany, for example, will be spending more on defense and Ukrainian refugees and less on aid elsewhere.

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2022/04/18/yemen-in-the-shadow-of-russias-war-on-ukraine/

(B H)

Yemen Women Protection AoR Services, Jan - Mar 2022

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-women-protection-aor-services-jan-mar-2022

Yemen Women Protection AoR Services, Mar 2022

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-women-protection-aor-services-mar-2022

(* B H)

WFP Yemen Country Brief, March 2022

Operational Updates

Under the general food assistance (GFA) programme, WFP is targeting 13.3 million people for general food assistance (GFA) in March: Approximately 9.7 million people with in-kind food assistance, 2.3 million people with commodity vouchers and 1.3 million people with cash assistance. Of the targeted GFA beneficiaries, eight million continue to receive reducedrations due to funding shortages.

USD 1.3 billion was pledgedtowards the inter-agency response in Yemen at the high-level pledging eventon the humanitarian crisis in Yemen held in Geneva on 16 March. The pledged amount is down almost USD 400 million from the USD 1.67 billion pledged at the March 2021 Pledging Event.

According to the WFP Yemen March Food Security Update(covering the month of February), key food security indicators remained critical in February, with nearly half of Yemeni households (44 percent nationwide) continuing to report inadequate food consumption, significantly above the “very high” threshold of 40 percent. Food affordability worsened month-on-month, even before the impacts of the Ukraine crisis have been recorded by WFP food security monitoring.

The WFP Yemen 2021 Annual Country Reportwas released on 31 March. Overall, WFP transferred 1.2 million metric tonnes (mt) of food and USD 369.3 million in cash and vouchers to 15.5 million people across its activities in Yemen in 2021 and remained WFP’s largest single-country operation.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/wfp-yemen-country-brief-march-2022

(* B H)

WFP Annual Country Report 2021

While WFP saw significant operational and programmatic achievements over the course of the year, the underlying contextual drivers of food insecurity worsened notably, threatening efforts towards the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2 (Zero Hunger) in Yemen. In tandem with severe currency depreciation, food prices soared, pushing an adequate diet out of reach for a growing segment of the population.

Faced with a challenging operating environment, efforts to preserve donor confidence in WFP’s ability to deliver a principled response to the people most in need saw marked progress, with a significant increase in confirmed contributions as compared to 2020. This enabled WFP to scale up the provision of assistance in the most vulnerable areas, including areas where pockets of populations had been projected to be facing famine-like conditions (IPC Phase 5) [1].

Overall, WFP assisted 15.5 million girls and boys, women and men across its activities in Yemen in 2021 and remained WFP’s largest operation worldwide. This includes 3.4 million internally displaced persons and, overall, women and girls represented half of those assisted by WFP. The total number of people assisted in Yemen in 2021 marks a 5 percent increase from 2020, supported by generous contributions. WFP had by June 2021 resumed monthly assistance to 10 million people in nine governorates facing the highest food insecurity levels. However, progress remained fragile, and by the end of the year, funding shortfalls had forced WFP to reduce the assistance provided to millions of people in a bid to avoid the interruption of assistance to those most in need.

As in previous years, WFP’s provision of life-saving unconditional resource transfers (as general food assistance, GFA) comprised the largest element of WFP’s programme of work in Yemen in 2021. In parallel, WFP continued efforts to expand complementary activities that support the varied needs of the different segments of the Yemeni population. WFP significantly expanded the scale and reach of its school feeding programme, maintained its large-scale nutrition programmes, and worked to focus its resilience and livelihoods programme on interventions that rehabilitate and build assets that support sustainable food systems. WFP also significantly expanded the use of cash-based transfers (CBT), increasing the number of CBT beneficiaries in the GFA programme by close to 40 percent from 2020, despite delays encountered in the ongoing beneficiary targeting and biometric registration exercise.

https://www.wfp.org/operations/annual-country-report/?operation_id=YE01&year=2021#/23449

(B E P)

ONew World Bank Group Country Engagement Note to Support the People of Yemen and Preserve the Institutions that Serve Them

The World Bank Group’s Board of Executive Directors today endorsed a new two-year Country Engagement Note (CEN) for Yemen. The World Bank Group’s overarching goal is to support the people of Yemen and preserve the institutions that serve them. The WBG will stay engaged in Yemen across multiple possible scenarios, with a focus on: (i) basic service delivery and human capital; and (ii) food security, resilience, and livelihood opportunities. At the heart of the humanitarian-development nexus, institutional preservation will remain a fundamental objective of the IDA program across the two tracks.

“Our $2.8bn program reflects the World Bank’s investment in preserving Yemen’s development assets, and our hope for a better future for a generation of young Yemenis who have grown up in the shadow of war but will play a key role in the recovery” said Tania Meyer, Country Manager for Yemen. “By increasing our support at this critical juncture, we are affirming our unwavering commitment to th

https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/04/14/new-world-bank-group-country-engagement-note-to-support-the-people-of-yemen-and-preserve-the-institutions-that-serve-the

(B H P)

#BreakTheBias

I believe we can make this hashtag more operative in two simple approaches to jump start change; first, make space for high school student’s to debate and reflect on ethical issues around major social problems. This would help in their development. Secondly, in the work place we can raise awareness to employees about bias, discrimination, and typical stereotypes by hosting webinars, seminars, and taking the matter seriously.

One thing I realized in the Yemeni educational system is that it never really discusses ethical issues. I think this goes against education as a whole

I might have gotten ahead of myself, but Yemen is in need for a change. This change can only happen if we are willing enough to make an effort. I truly believe that through the two approaches discussed we can make a difference to our community and from there we can make practical steps to progress.

https://medium.com/@fatimawqaid/breakthebias-in-yemen-e22a3b6efc0a

(A H)

ICRC: Over 20 million Yemenis need humanitarian assistance

Over 20 million people in Yemen don't have enough food to eat, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said in a brief statement on Saturday.
"Even as global attention shifts, the world must not abandon the long-suffering Yemeni people." the statement added.

http://en.adenpress.news/news/34903

(B P)

USAID: Yemen - Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #6, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-complex-emergency-fact-sheet-6-fiscal-year-fy-2022

Yemen ‑ USG Response to the Complex Emergency (Last Updated 04/15/22)

https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-usg-response-complex-emergency-last-updated-041522

(A H P)

As Part of New Food Plan, India to Feed Millions in 4 Nations; Move to Push Diplomatic Outreach

India is planning to provide wheat and rice as “gifts” to Yemen, Ethiopia, Syria and Afghanistan, from its overflowing granaries through the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP), two officials familiar with the matter told News18. The gesture would not only further India’s diplomatic outreach, but the proposed scheme would also save the storage and transportation costs of excess foodgrains in state-owned granaries, the officials further said.

The plans are to export foodgrains to these four countries from the central pool stock, which is managed by the Food Corporation of India (FCI). The FCI procures around 35% wheat produced in India for the central pool stock.

https://www.news18.com/news/india/as-part-of-new-food-scheme-india-plans-to-feed-millions-in-4-countries-move-to-push-diplomatic-outreach-4938812.html

(B H)

War in Ukraine makes Yemen's humanitarian crisis even worse

Even before Russia's invasion in Ukraine began to have ripple effects worldwide, Yemen was considered home to the "world's worst humanitarian crisis."

Today, as the war in Ukraine pushes global food and fuel prices to new highs, and the world mobilizes to aid Ukrainian refugees, humanitarian groups warn that the yearslong crisis in Yemen only stands to get much worse.

https://www.axios.com/yemen-ukraine-war-effects-humanitarian-crisis-12031408-6168-4a0a-958b-d2260bd665c5.html

(B H)

WHO provides aid to fight child malnutrition in Yemen

The World Health Organization (WHO) on Thursday announced the start of providing needed aid and medical intervention to around 18,000 Yemeni children suffering illnesses and malnutrition, Anadolu Agency reports.

In a statement, WHO said the aid intervention, which is carried out in eight hospitals over a period of nine months, is implemented with support of the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center.

"WHO will support the pediatric units of these hospitals with essential medicines and equipment, training of health workers, and 192 PED/SAM kits for treating childhood illnesses, including severe acute malnutrition with medical complications," it said.

In February, the UN said around 50% of Yemeni children under five are facing the danger of acute malnutrition and half a million children under five are facing the risk of starvation.

"This is a life-saving intervention for thousands of children, to strengthen nutrition into child health," said WHO representative in Yemen, Adham Rashad Abdel-Moneim.

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220415-who-provides-aid-to-fight-child-malnutrition-in-yemen/

(* B H)

Yemen in crisis

It’s impossible to survive when your water is unclean, when you can’t afford food, sick and can’t get healthcare. From just £15, you can transform a life in Yemen, reaping the multiplied blessings of Ramadan.

Reap the multiplied blessings of the holy month by saving lives in Yemen.

£100 – Provide 100 babies with access to the neonatal new rehabilitated care unit within its first six months.

£75 – provide iftar to a fasting family-of-seven in Yemen for a month – a total of 210 meals.

£35 – Provide a vulnerable Yemeni woman with early cancer detection through bone or tissue biopsies.

£15 – provide coffee tree seeds, fertilizer, pipes, a water tank and other farming equipment to a family in Yemen.

£25 – Provide a vulnerable Yemeni woman or girl with intensive care treatment.

£30 – Provide a vulnerable Yemeni person with physiotherapy treatment by helping us to provide equipment to a physiotherapy centre.

https://humanappeal.org.uk/appeals/yemen-emergency-appeal

(A H P)

Ramadan in Yemen: Humanitarian initiatives to support poor people in Sanaa

Loaf of Bread Initiative was launched in Yemen under the slogan of the Quranic verse "giving food in a day of hunger,” targeting 160,000 families per day.

“This is a great initiative from Al-Zakat Authority," Al-Ahdel explained. “The initiative is a simple message for each citizen to pay the Zakat to this Authority that is supporting citizens in pain."

Fathers and children receive plastic bags of bread depending on the number of each member of a family.

Several humanitarian groups in the capital Sanaa launched a new initiative, on the first day of fasting, to support poor families during Ramadan.

The General Al-Zakat Authority, in partnership with the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Capital Municipality, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the private sector, launched last Wednesday, a humanitarian campaign titled "The Loaf of Bread Initiative".

https://english.almayadeen.net/articles/feature/ramadan-in-yemen:-humanitarian-initiatives-to-support-poor-p

(A H)

Ghaleb Alsudmy: Thanks to Allah & generous support of our Muslim brothers & sisters from Netherlands, On 11 Ramadan We distributed 68 food aid to poor families & displaced, Allah reward you all goodness & paradise inshaAllah. help to feed poor (film, photos), #donate http://gogetfunding.com/food-and-medicine-for-yemen…

https://twitter.com/ghalebalsudmy/status/1514777861499998216

https://twitter.com/ghalebalsudmy/status/1514774390491078656

(A H)

UNO stellt 100 Millionen Dollar für Hunger-Bekämpfung bereit

Die UNO stellt 100 Millionen Dollar (91,93 Mio. Euro) für den Kampf gegen die wegen des Ukraine-Kriegs drohende Verschärfung der Hungersnot im Jemen und in mehreren afrikanischen Ländern bereit. "Die Auswirkungen des Konflikts in der Ukraine drohen Millionen von Menschen noch näher an den Hungertod zu treiben", erklärte die UNO am Donnerstag.

Von der Gesamtsumme gehen 14 Millionen nach Somalia, zwölf Millionen nach Äthiopien, vier Millionen nach Kenia, 20 Millionen in den Sudan, 15 Millionen in den Südsudan, 15 Millionen nach Nigeria und 20 Millionen in den Jemen. Mit dem Geld sollen UNO-Hilfsorganisationen Lebensmittel und andere dringend benötigte Güter kaufen.

https://www.sn.at/panorama/international/uno-stellt-100-millionen-dollar-fuer-hunger-bekaempfung-bereit-119936503 = https://www.krone.at/2682687

(A H)

World Vision Yemen Response Situation Report: April 2021 - February 2022

World Vision has now concluded its 2nd phase of programming in Yemen (April 2021 - February 2022) with our implementing partner Medair. This follows the successful Phase 1 implementation (November 2019 - July 2020) with the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA). The aim of the partnering response in Phase 2 was to improve the health care and nutrition of acutely vulnerable people through targeted emergency aid in Lahj governorate, in southern Yemen. In addition to the successful partnerships with Medair and previously with ADRA, World Vision worked throughout Phases 1 and 2 in cooperation with Response Innovation Lab on public health messaging.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/world-vision-yemen-response-situation-report-april-2021-february-2022

(A H)

WFP: Yemen sliding to edge of abyss due to lack of funding

The United Nations World Food Program (WFP) warned yesterday that Yemen is sliding to the brink of famine due to lack of funding for the 2022 humanitarian response plan.

The UN body said on Twitter that as many as 19 million Yemenis will not have enough food to eat.

"In Yemen, food assistance has kept famine at bay, but dwindling funds threaten to push millions of families over the edge. The world must act now before we reach the point of no return," it added.

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220414-wfp-yemen-sliding-to-edge-of-abyss-due-to-lack-of-funding/

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

(* B H)

The Evolution of Yemeni Migration to Djibouti

Introduction

In the early 20th century Djibouti was a French colony, separated from Yemen by the 32-kilometer Bab al-Mandeb Strait. When the colony needed labor for economic development and the construction of a new port in Djibouti city, they called on Yemeni builders, farmers and sailors. Most workers came from the Tihama region on Yemen’s Red Sea Coast, while the majority of Yemeni merchants trading in Djibouti were from Al-Hujariah, a mountainous region of central Yemen in modern-day Taiz governorate. Today, those who stayed and integrated into society are often referred to as the “Arabs of Djibouti.” Others, mostly merchants from Taiz city and nearby Al-Turbah left their families in Yemen and have maintained a lifestyle of circular mobility.

Many Yemeni refugees who have sought shelter in Djibouti since 2015 had existing links with family or acquaintances already living there. Historically, Yemeni-Djibouti migration has been a form of “chain migration,” a process by which the act of migrating creates social capital, and friends and relatives play a major role for those who follow in their footsteps.[1] Migrant flows are also deeply intertwined with the relationship and level of interdependence between the departure and arrival territories. Yemenis arriving in Djibouti as refugees of war differ significantly from those who came during earlier waves of chain migration: refugees are granted special legal status and typically have fewer material resources or opportunities to integrate socially and professionally. This leads them to have lower social standing, and many are spatially confined to a refugee camp. By granting certain legal freedoms to refugees, the Djiboutian government has attempted to provide them with some means of social mobility, but overall, these policies have failed to address the deeper roots of the problem. For many refugees, the main barrier to socio-economic integration is their exclusion from the established communities of Yemeni migrants and merchants already present in Djibouti.

For 50 years, Djibouti has been a crossroads between Africa and the Middle East, and migrants have both transited and settled there. Following its independence in 1977, Djibouti became a hub for Somali, Ethiopian and Afar Eritrean migrants. Many remained in the small country of 989,115,[2] which faces high rates of poverty[3] and unemployment.[4] The ongoing Yemeni war has prompted a further influx: 19,641 refugees and 11,153 asylum seekers have arrived in the country at the beginning of 2019.[5]

This policy brief aims to trace the evolution of pre-and post-2015 Yemeni migration to Djibouti and its consequences on migrants’ legal rights and socio-economic integration. Fieldwork was carried out in commercial areas of Djibouti city and in the Markazi camp located near Obock, on the north coast of Djibouti. Additionally, a six-month ethnographic qualitative investigation was undertaken in Djibouti between 2019 and 2021. About fifty interviews were conducted with Yemeni men and women, their families and aid organization representatives. A brief profile of the interviewees mentioned in the paper is provided in Appendix A. Open-source intelligence and qualitative and quantitative methods were also employed to understand how Yemeni refugees access services and derive their livelihoods. Data collected during fieldwork gives a picture of Yemenis’ integration into economic and social life. Data was collected during interviews and formal and informal interactions with refugees and administration staff at the Markazi camp. In the field, direct and indirect techniques of observation were utilized by researchers to conduct their analysis.

The first section of this paper describes the different migration patterns of Yemenis to Djibouti from the beginning of the 20th century. The second section examines the legal status of Yemeni migrants. It also describes the reception policies implemented by Djibouti in various political contexts during its history. The third section focuses on a comparison between the socio-economic integration of Yemeni merchants in the capital city and Yemeni refugees registered in the coastal town of Obock. Finally, recommendations are presented to policy-makers in the Djiboutian government for legislation on access to rights and the harmonization of legal statuses, and to organizations for projects that can contribute to the socio-economic integration of refugees and fill current gaps in the response.

https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/17445

(A H)

Polnischer Schlepper mit 54 Migranten in Niederösterreich gefasst

In einem Sattelschlepper auf einem Parkplatz in der Nähe von Pressbaum wurden 54 Migranten aus Syrien, Palästina, dem Jemen, Afghanistan und der Türkei aufgegriffen. Der polnische Lenker (46) hatte sie aus Serbien nach Österreich gebracht und das durch die Sonne aufgeheizte Fahrzeug einfach abgestellt.

https://exxpress.at/polnischer-schlepper-mit-54-migranten-in-niederoesterreich-gefasst/

(* B H)

Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, covering the period from 5 to 12 April 2022

Key Figures:

23.4 million people in need

Over 4.3 million internally displaced

Up to 1.6 million displaced Yemenis living across 2,300 hosting sites

29,760 individuals (4,960 families) newly displaced in 2022

Children and women represent up to 79 per cent of the total IDP population

82,868 refugees

12,947 asylum-seekers

Funding:

USD 291.3 M required for 2022 operations

IDP Response

UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, visited Sana’a for the first time since his appointment last year. The SE arrived in Sana’a on 11 April with the aim of engaging the DFA on implementing and strengthening the recent truce agreement. UNHCR continues supporting extremely vulnerable displaced individuals in lifethreatening situations through emergency cash assistance. During the reporting period, UNHCR assisted 32 individuals in Ibb and Sa’ada at critical protection risk with emergency cash assistance (ECA), ECA represents an exceptional emergency measure implemented by UNHCR through its partners to provide one-off cash assistance to address an immediate life-threatening situation. ECA targets mainly individuals in life-threatening medical conditions, with immediate impact on families’ capacities to access basic needs; victims of international humanitarian law violations; loss or serious damage to shelter caused by conflict-related incidents; families at imminent risk of eviction or evicted; single women HH with no other forms of family or community support, to mitigate immediate and acute protection risks such as being unable to meet their immediate basic needs and resorting to harmful coping mechanisms.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-unhcr-operational-update-covering-period-5-12-april-2022

(A H)

#Yemen: this malnourished young refugee stranded on Belarus-Poland border has not eaten for 4 days. His name is Mohsen Al-Sak'a. Another refugee with him said in a video circulated on social media platforms that Belarusian forces had beat Al-Sak'a, and now his left leg is hurt. (photo)

https://twitter.com/FuadRajeh/status/1514813220854263812

Film: https://twitter.com/AzalALSalafi/status/1514669479359389696 = https://twitter.com/SYI_YEMEN/status/1514981157376602113

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

(A P)

The Houthi militia force traders in Al-Kaeda area in Ibb to donate publicly to finance its anti-government war. The traders drop cash bundles onto a tarp spread along the street, made so public to entice others to pay. See picture from Saturday /Multiple websites.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-55628

(A P)

High tensions among rival Houthi factions in Sana'a as Mohammed Ali Houthi sends military pickups to besiege house of another Houthi figure Ahmed Hamed/Multiple websites

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-55628

(A H P)

Locals in Sana’a r reporting that in some neighbourhoods Houthis hv banned ppl from providing food rations to their neighbours without a permit. This is appalling, their total control of relief is not only causing families to starve it’s a tool for forced child &male recruitment

https://twitter.com/mabaabbad/status/1515625284946567168

(* B P)

Yemen’s Houthis Went From Ragtag Militia to Force Threatening Gulf Powers

Iran’s cultivation of the Houthis over the years of war in Yemen has armed them with missiles and drones, endangering Washington’s partners and Tehran’s rivals, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

But during the civil war that has shattered Yemen in the years since, the group has gone through a remarkable transformation. It now rules a repressive proto-state in northern Yemen and wields a vast arsenal that includes an array of cruise and ballistic missiles and kamikaze boats.

The Houthis also assemble their own long-range drones, which have extended their reach across the Arabian Peninsula and amplified threats to the Persian Gulf powerhouses Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both partners of the United States and leaders of the coalition that has waged war against the Houthis since 2015.

The swift expansion of the Houthis’ abilities is largely thanks to covert military aid from Iran, according to American and Middle Eastern officials and analysts.

Seeking new ways to menace Saudi Arabia, its regional nemesis, Iran has integrated the Houthis into its network of militias and built up the Houthis’ ability to subvert their wealthy neighbors’ defenses with relatively cheap weapons. And many of those weapons are now built in Yemen, the Arab world’s poorest country.

“What we are seeing in Yemen is technology being the great equalizer,” said Abdulghani Al-Iryani, a senior researcher at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies. Summarizing the Houthi mind-set, he said, “Your F-15 that costs millions of dollars means nothing because I have my drone that cost a few thousand dollars that will do just as much damage.”

The rise of the Houthis as a force capable of striking far beyond Yemen’s borders has helped drive a broader political realignment taking hold in the Middle East, which led a few Arab countries to establish diplomatic relations with Israel in 2020 and others to move toward covert military and intelligence cooperation to counter Iran.

The Houthis’ advancing military technology has added new urgency to Saudi efforts to end the war seven years after intervening. But those advances may also have made the Houthis less interested in ending it.

“If the war stops, the Houthis will have to govern, and they don’t want to govern — to provide services and share power,” said Nadwa Al-Dawsari, a Yemen analyst at the Middle East Institute. “The Houthis thrive in war, not peace.”

In a speech last month marking the seventh anniversary of the Saudi-led intervention, the Houthi leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, said the Saudi-led blockade of their territory and airstrikes on their bases and storehouses had pushed the group toward domestic weapons manufacturing. The group’s goal, he said, was to be able to strike any target, including in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates or the Arabian Sea.

“We have worked to reach the level of launching from anywhere we want, even to the sea,” Mr. al-Houthi said. “We are very keen on that, to strike from any governorate to any point in the sea.”

In the territory they control, the Houthis have set up a repressive police state aimed at squashing any threat to their control and routing all resources to their war machine.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/17/world/middleeast/yemen-houthis-gulf.html = https://www.anandmarket.in/yemens-houthis-went-from-ragtag-militia-to-force-threatening-gulf-powers/

My comment: A US-centered view, overestimating Iran.

Comment: An article overloaded with propaganda you can read only in Saudi state-owned medias

https://twitter.com/Naseh_Shaker/status/1515795420609400836

(A P)

Jemen: Huthis Verhindern Tarawih-Gebete

Laut den Nachrichten in Jemens offizieller Nachrichtenagentur SABA [Aden] verurteilte Informationsminister Mohammed al-Iryani [Riyadh/Aden-Reg.] die Praktiken zur Verhinderung von Tarawih-Gebeten in Gebieten unter der Kontrolle von Houthi-Milizen.

Iryani wies darauf hin, dass die Houthi-Milizen das Gebet des Gebets verhinderten, indem sie die Iman-Moschee in der Hauptstadt Sana’a überfielen, und sagte: „Die Houthi-Milizen versuchen, ihre aus dem Iran importierten sektiererischen Ideologien mit Waffengewalt durchzusetzen , auf die Regionen unter ihrer Kontrolle.“

https://technisch24.com/leben/jemen-huthis-verhindern-tarawih-gebete/

(A P)

During the past days, the Houthi group prevented a number of residents from performing prayers in several mosques in the capital, Sanaa, without any necessity. It is unacceptable to restrict the population's practice of religious rites, and the de facto authority must immediately withdraw all practices that undermine the freedom of religion or belief.

https://twitter.com/EuroMedYemen/status/1515600335431208960

(A P)

Locals in Sana’a r reporting that in some neighbourhoods Houthis hv banned ppl from providing food rations to their neighbours without a permit. This is appalling, their total control of relief is not only causing families to starve it’s a tool for forced child &male recruitment

https://twitter.com/mabaabbad/status/1515625284946567168

(A P)

Houthi leader Hussein al-Azi says God has sent Abdulmalek al-Houthi as a messenger to the believers, reciting unto them the Verses, purifying them, and instructing them the Quran and Wisdom.

https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1515383048166158342

(A P)

The Houthi militia's intelligence agencies have created new ways for gathering information about the residents of Sana'a/News Yemen

People of Sana'a take to the streets and chant: Leave Houthis"/Newsline

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-55609

(A P)

The Yemeni Organisation for Media Personnel says Houthis have been holding a female journalist (Nadia Moqbel) a hostage for two weeks./Bawabati

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-55609

(A P)

Man dies of torture in Houthi jail

Rami Hassan Mohammed Ghazi, a 24-year-old from Alshajaah village in north Yemen's Hajjah died of horrific torture in a jail in the province on Tuesday after three months of detention in the Houthi militia's "Preventive Security Apparatus" jail, it has been reported./Multiple news websites

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-55609

and also https://republicanyemen.net/archives/31001

(A P)

Eleventh Ramadan Lecture Presented by Al-Sayyid Abdul Malik Badruddin Al-Houthi, 1443 A.H.

https://www.saba.ye/en/news3183479.htm

12.: https://www.saba.ye/en/news3183655.htm

13.: https://www.saba.ye/en/news3183513.htm

(A P)

Ok, from now on, #Yemeni women living under Houthi control will no longer be able to travel alone without guardian's permission, according to this consent form distributed by Houthis to all transport companies. (document9

https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1514794717514371076

Comment: A mix of Taliban & North Korea is the system that Houthis are building in #Yemen

https://twitter.com/Ndawsari/status/1514972160170807300

(A P)

President Al-Mashat urges on building human being, achieving high-end model of state

President of the Supreme Political Council, Mahdi Al-Mashat, on Wednesday said that the state's orientations for this year focus on building the human being and achieving a free and independent state that represents the high-end model of the state.

https://www.saba.ye/en/news3183301.htm

and also https://en.ypagency.net/258977/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/04/14/president-of-yemen-mahdi-al-mashat-focus-on-free-and-independent-yemen/

My comment: ???? The Sanaa government regime is far away from that.

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp6 – cp19

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-802b-yemen-war-mosaic-802b

Vorige / Previous:

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-801-yemen-war-mosaic-801

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-801 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-801:

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm

http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/

http://www.yemenwar.info/

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

http://yemendataproject.org/data/

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

https://yemen.bellingcat.com/

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

https://yemeniarchive.org/en

Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
Geschrieben von

Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
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Dietrich Klose

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