Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 815 - Yemen War Mosaic 815

Yemen Press Reader 815: 15. Juli 2022: Jemen-Rückblick, Juni 2022 – Das Regierungssystem der Huthis – Ein Flug nach Sanaa – David Gressly über FSO Safer – Wie die Emirate im Südjemen foltern – Integration von Streitkräften und Milizen im Südjemen ...

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Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

... US-Betrug: Falscher Vorschlag für eine Dokumentation von Verstößen – und mehr

July 15, 2022: Yemen Review, June 2022 – The Houthi syste, of governance – A flight to Sanaa – David Gressly about FSO Safer – Torture by the Emirates in Southern Yemen – Integration of military forces and militia in Southern Yemen – US scam: Fake proposal to record abuses in Yemen – and more

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-815b-yemen-war-mosaic-815b

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp8a Jamal Khashoggi

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp12a Katar / Qatar

cp12b Sudan

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade

cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage

cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle

cp19 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification

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*

(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

(* B H K P)

Film: Krieg im Jemen

In dieser Ausgabe von alpha-nachgehakt: der Krieg im Jemen, u. a.

https://www.br.de/mediathek/video/alpha-nachgehakt-14072022-krieg-im-jemen-marsforschung-regionalflughaefen-windsurfen-av:61b0dc4d6108a40007a1c76a = https://www.ardmediathek.de/video/alpha-nachgehakt/krieg-im-jemen-oder-marsforschung-oder-regionalflughaefen-oder-windsurfen/ard-alpha/Y3JpZDovL2JyLmRlL3ZpZGVvL2NmYTg5MjIxLTk0NGUtNDhhMC1hZjk2LTA4M2NiNGUzYzRiZg

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Majority of Yemen’s population will face food insecurity. Here is why

The fundamental cause of famine in Yemen is war.

Experts believe that should Yemen not receive sufficient funding now then the whole country will fall into mass starvation.

Due to a budget constraint, the UN World Food Programme was obliged to lower the content of food parcels for eight million Yemenis at the start of 2022, with households getting only 50% of the WFP’s regular daily basic food basket. Now, a lack of financial aid is placing five million more Yemenis at risk of succumbing to famine-like conditions.

Back in 2018 – three years after the conflict began – Save the Children reported that nearly 85,000 children aged five or under had died as a result of severe starvation. No official statistics can be found since then but aid workers warn that thousands of people “could die” without support.

Today, severe hunger in Yemen is on the rise, particularly among infants and their mothers.

Without immediate assistance, at least 400,000 Yemeni children aged five or under could perish from hunger this year owing to the skyrocketing rates of acute malnutrition caused by war and the coronavirus epidemic.

https://www.developmentaid.org/news-stream/post/146228/starvation-in-yemen-its-causes-and-effects

(* B H K P)

Yemen: The Forgotten War’s Crimes Must Be Remembered

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine earlier this year, the topic of war crimes is once again being debated in mainstream media.

However, there is one place where horrible war crimes have been committed and the perpetrators are still facing no consequences: Yemen.

Background of War

What are war crimes?

Crimes of the GCC Coalition

It is important to note that all sides in the conflict in Yemen are guilty of human rights violations, but the focus will remain on the crimes committed by the Saudi-led GCC coalition. The Group of Independent Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen was set up in 2017 in order to monitor and report on the human rights situation. In 2018, they released an extensive report on the violations committed by all parties. It was found that there had been 16,706 direct civilian casualties, with coalition airstrikes being identified as the cause of most of these. These airstrikes hit residential areas, funerals, weddings, and even medical facilities. Médecins sans Frontières stated that they had shared the location of these bombed facilities with Saudi Arabia 12 times and ambulances were clearly marked. It was reported that the coalition failed to consult its no-strike list of more than 30,000 sites, resulting in thousands of unnecessary civilian casualties. These targets remained unchanged even after the coalition learned of the civilian suffering, and Saudi authorities have consistently refused to make their targeting process transparent. One of the most famous cases occurred in 2018, when a coalition airstrike struck a school bus, killing forty children. Human Rights Watch reported that this act would constitute a war crime.

Another unlawful act committed by the Saudi-led coalition is the deliberate obstruction of access to humanitarian relief. International law states that warring parties must allow safe and rapid passage for humanitarian aid to reach civilians in need. There have been numerous reports detailing how the coalition systematically denies boat passage containing food and medicine for arbitrary reasons, leaving civilians at risk of famine. It was also reported the coalition was guilty of arbitrary detention. People imprisoned were not informed of the charge, denied access to lawyers, and sometimes forcibly disappeared for months. While detained, prisoners were subjected to beatings, electrocution, drownings, and solitary confinement. The United Arab Emirates was found to be culpable for multiple violations in their detention centres. Prisoners reported UAE security personnel sexually abused and assaulted them repeatedly. The Security Belt Forces were found guilty of widespread sexual assault, limited not only to detainees but also including refugee women and children as well.

There were also reports of violation of the right to freedom of expression, as many who insulted the coalition ended up in prison.

Future for Yemen

https://www.adhrb.org/2022/07/yemen-the-forgotten-wars-crimes-must-be-remembered/

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

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Taiz Siege Continues as Talks Face Roadblocks – The Yemen Review, June 2022

A truce between the internationally recognized Yemeni government and the armed Houthi movement was extended on June 2 and has largely held, despite intermittent violence and unresolved issues from the original agreement. While the truce has succeeded in limiting violence and facilitated the reopening of Sana’a airport, negotiations over the besieged city of Taiz have devolved into recriminations, fueling concerns that the armed Houthi movement will renege on its commitment to reopen access to the city. UN-facilitated negotiations on lifting the blockade of major roads into the city continued into July.

Yemen’s economic performance over the month of June was characterized by familiar patterns of fuel shortages and renewed depreciation of the rial in government-held territory. The slide was halted by news of a further US$400 million in pledged Saudi financial support, announced as Presidential Leadership Council head Rashad al-Alami visited Riyadh. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have announced billions of dollars in economic support since the PLC took over executive responsibilities in early April, though it is unclear how much has been delivered as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are demanding institutional and governance reforms before allowing the Yemeni government to access most of these funds.

Renewed fuel shortages in the south precipitated familiar scenes of long lines at petrol stations. Anger over price hikes and power outages during the height of summer, combined with a perceived failure of the government to implement timely economic reforms, sparked demonstrations in Aden and other areas of southern Yemen. The demonstrations overshadowed Al-Alami’s otherwise fruitful tour of regional capitals, where he secured promises of various forms of support from Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar.

https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/june-2022

Politics & Diplomacy

PLC President Faces Aden Protests After Regional Tour

Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) secured regional pledges of support during a month-long tour of Gulf states and Egypt that began on June 6, but PLC head Rashad al-Alimi’s diplomatic successes were overshadowed by protests in southern areas. Demonstrations over fuel price hikes and deteriorating basic services shut down parts of Aden, where the Southern Transitional Council (STC) is the dominant power. A notable difference from similar protests in the past was that those in June lacked STC support. The group’s shift in position – and its growing vested interest in maintaining security in the interim capital – appears to have coincided with it becoming a key member of the PLC and working closely with Al-Alimi. The STC alignment with the PLC had its limits, however, with the former publicly accusing officials at the government-affiliated central bank in Aden of conspiring to move the institution to Houthi-controlled Sana’a (see, The Economy & Finance: ‘CBY-Aden Refutes STC Accusation of Planned Return to Sana’a‘), while the security situation in the southern city was further rattled by several assassinations and assassination attempts (see, Military & Security: ‘Journalist, Salafi Commander Killed in Separate Assassinations’).

Delegations of senior officials from the internationally recognized government led by Al-Alimi visited regional allies in Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt and Qatar in June, seeking to strengthen bilateral relations and secure support for the newly-formed executive body’s agenda, including economic, security and public service reforms.

Developments in Houthi-Controlled Territory

Houthis Seize Property of Deceased Political Opponents

Social Media Campaign Demands Journalist’s Release

International Developments

Yemeni Solutions Debated at First Yemen International Forum

Saudi Arabia, GCC Push for Houthi Terrorism Designation

Negotiations over Taiz Blockade Drag On As Houthis Reject UN Proposal

US Govt Watchdog Faults Oversight of Weapons Sold to Saudi, UAE

Biden Scheduled to Meet Saudi Crown Prince – by Casey Coombs

https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/june-2022/18142

Military & Security

Taiz Siege Continues as Talks Face Roadblocks – The Yemen Review, June 2022

A few hours before a 2-month-old truce was set to expire on June 2, the warring parties in Yemen agreed to extend it two more months, despite frustration over unfulfilled elements of the original agreement. While intermittent fighting has flared during the truce, the agreement brought a dramatic reduction in violence and casualties — and a taste of normalcy for much of the country.

Government officials and supporters said they had adhered to their side of the bargain by allowing flights to and from Sana’a airport. However, they expressed frustration that one of their main demands, the re-opening of all roads leading to the Houthi-blockaded city of Taiz, was still being negotiated well after the new truce took effect (see, Politics & Diplomacy: ‘Taiz Road Negotiations Drag On As Houthis Reject UN Proposal’). Whether the truce can ultimately be transformed into a lasting settlement remains to be seen.

If anything, there have been fears that the truce has been used by both the armed Houthi movement and the Yemeni government to prepare for another round of fighting. Troop movements have been reported across various frontlines, including in Marib and Taiz. This prompted US special envoy for Yemen, Tim Lenderking, to warn against new fighting in remarks on the sidelines of the June 17-19 Yemen International Forum in Stockholm, where he said that anyone who believed Yemen’s war could end militarily was “fundamentally mistaken.” Despite the truce, fighting was reported in various governorates, including Taiz and Marib, primarily between Houthi forces and the Yemeni government.

AP Reports Ongoing Child Soldier Recruitment

Journalist, Salafi Commander Killed in Separate Assassinations

AQAP Escalates Attacks, Prompting Military Response

Other Military & Security Developments in Brief

https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/june-2022/18143

Economy & Finance

Rial Depreciates Amid Delays in Pledged Saudi, Emirati Support

Rial Depreciates in Govt-Held Areas

New Yemeni rial banknotes witnessed cyclic volatility over the course of June, depreciating by 10 percent relative to the United States dollar. Printed since 2017 and circulating in government-controlled areas, new rials lost almost 13 percent of their value in the first half of the month alone, falling from YR1,020 per US$1 to a low of YR1,150 on June 15, later rebounding slightly to close the month at YR1,114 per US$1. The recovery followed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) head Rashad al-Alimi’s June 30 visit to Saudi Arabia, which saw Riyadh commit a further US$400 million in financial support to development projects and another US$200 million in oil derivative grants (see, ‘New Saudi Financial Support Announced’).

New Saudi Financial Support Announced

Fuel Crisis Returns: Prices Soar in Govt-Controlled Areas

Saudi and Emirati Financial Support Facing Delays

Battle Over Control of Telecom Companies

CBY-Aden Refutes STC Accusation of Planned Return to Sana’a

Houthis Look to Develop Stock Market with Iranian Expertise

Other Economic Developments in Brief – by Sanaa Center Economic Unit

https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/june-2022/18155

Entrenched Power: The Houthi System of Governance

Introduction

One of the challenges to ending the war in Yemen is the changing nature of the Yemeni state under Houthi rule. The Zaidi Shia movement has created facts on the ground that considerably complicate the work of bringing the various parties together in a new political arrangement. The de facto Houthi authority has effectively transformed the institutions of government in Sana’a as part of a project to build its own state.

The group has deployed sectarian doctrine, built a large army and created an extensive network of supra-governmental supervisors, widening the gap between society and rulers. It is hard to imagine this vast political and economic network voluntarily dismantling to share power with other Yemeni factions.

Although the group calls itself Ansar Allah, meaning the Partisans of God, most Yemenis view it as a family enterprise based on the teachings of Badreddine al-Houthi (d. 2010) and other Zaidi religious scholars, that was built up by Al-Houthi’s sons and seeks to revive the Zaidi imamate that was politically dominant in North Yemen for almost three centuries until 1962. This paper examines the Houthi movement’s aims and origin as well as the structure of the Sana’a-based Yemeni state in its hands since 2014. It also seeks to inform discussions on issues and challenges that would be involved in attempting to incorporate elements of this structure into a post-settlement system of governance.

Keeping It in the Family

The Houthi governing structure is led from the top by Abdelmalek al-Houthi, who has absolute authority as a Hashemite Zaidi leader considered to possess charismatic power as a descendent of the Prophet. The influence and authority of any Houthi figure is defined not by his title or role but his proximity to Abdelmalek, who lives in a secret location and is described in Houthi media as “leader of the revolution” (qa’id al-thawra).

Although Abdelmalek al-Houthi occupies this unchallenged position as the movement’s leader, only a limited group of people have access to him. He sits at the center of two networks. The first is composed of those who were loyal to the Houthi family and Abdelmalek personally during the Sa’ada Wars. Abdelmalek refers to these people, who are mostly from Sa’ada governorate, as mujahideen (“fighters for God”). Many of them are Hashemites. The second comprises the extensive social networks established by the other sons of Badreddine in the 1990s.

Families with marital relationships with the Houthi family are important in forming the main supervisors.

Houthis outside this ruling circle who raise objections to this form of governance appear to have been silenced. Mohammed Abdelazim al-Houthi, a cousin of Badreddine, largely disappeared from public view in 2018 after he is believed to have indicated his opposition to Abdelmalek’s leadership, though he was shown this year in a photograph that accompanied a news report in Houthi-run media.

Government by Supervisor

The Houthis established a supervisory system involving a network of loyal individuals as a parallel system to the official institutions of the state. Houthi supervisors have been dispersed throughout state institutions since the group seized control of Sana’a in September 2014, and it is these supervisors, not the official government office holders, who hold power in their various fields.

There is a general supervisor in every governorate, and below him primary supervisors in districts, villages and areas. According to their specialization, dozens or hundreds of supervisors work below every general supervisor. This first level of supervisors – the general supervisors – is directly chosen by Abdelmalek al-Houthi and operates under the authority of the revolutionary committee (al-lajna al-thawriyya), headed by Mohammed al-Houthi.

This parallel system first began in Sa’ada governorate when Houthi forces took it over in March 2011 during the popular uprising against Saleh.

The Houthi holding real authority can be the first person in the ministry, such as Education Minister Yahya al-Houthi, or the second-in-command, such as Hussein al-Ezzi, a deputy to foreign minister Hisham Sharaf. Keeping people like Sharaf in place presents a technocratic façade for the real power – the supervisor who is a Houthi loyalist with little or no experience in the specific field.

Supervisor Functions

Each governorate has a general supervisor, and below every general supervisor there are dozens or sometimes hundreds of minor supervisors, who are divided into five categories.

This highly centralized system reflects the Houthi notion of power as emanating from a figure who does not in theory need to build ties to diverse local communities since he is invested with divine authority. But this approach risks failing to address the variety of needs of different elements of Yemen’s complex society and could end up provoking a counter-reaction if those outside the Houthi nexus of power feel deprived of food, medicine and various forms of social mobility. The ideology also risks clashing with family and tribal traditions and other pre-existing social bonds, particularly through its use of violence. This raises the possibility of a backlash against authoritarian rule, not least in a highly armed society such as Yemen.

Houthi Economics

More than half of the Yemeni population live in Houthi-controlled areas that suffer from a lack of revenue-generating natural resources. Yet Houthi taxes collected in these regions, estimated to be US$1.8 billion a year, are, according to a Yemeni economic expert, equal to the annual tax revenue during the last years of the Saleh regime. Saleh, of course, controlled the entire country as opposed to only one part of it.

The economic expert, who spoke on condition of anonymity, noted that the Houthis have been highly focused on taxes as a key revenue source. Banks and big companies have been required to reveal their tax accounts since their first year of operation, often long before the Houthi movement took over, and then been obliged to make up for any taxes they did not pay during the Saleh years.

The Islamic zakat has become a mandatory tax rather than a voluntary religious duty. The Houthi government makes sure to collect the tax during the month of Ramadan since the fear of government reprisals during this most-profitable period of the year means business owners are loath to argue about payment. For this reason, zakat gathered in Ramadan has been a source of tension between the authorities and chambers of commerce.

The Houthi administration has in effect applied a new standard of tax efficiency at the same time as introducing a double-taxation system. The taxes extracted from the private sector in particular have helped make up for the partial salary cut for public servants after the central bank moved in 2016 to Aden under internationally recognized government control.

The Houthi government has also been inventive in collecting money for a roster of popular state-backed commemorations such as the Prophet’s birthday, the launch of the coalition military campaign, Ashoura, which marks the martyrdom of the Prophet’s grandson Hussein, Jerusalem Day as well as impromptu fundraising in support of political causes. As a whole, this system of levies works like a machine, functioning year-round and including everyone, from the rich and powerful to street vendors and small farmers.

At the same time, the Houthi government has often neglected or been late in paying salaries and maintaining public services.

These activities have been enabled by a culture of corruption and absence of accountability, especially for Houthi supervisors, due to snuffing out the space for political activity and open media that had existed, albeit imperfectly, during previous decades. In short, the Houthi economy has contributed to rising poverty, creating a wealthy class of war profiteers and widening the gap between rich and poor – factors that played a part in stoking the popular uprising against Saleh’s regime.

Post-War Scenarios

The movement has long lost the elan of a populist movement fighting corruption that it had when it first seized power. The regional and sectarian nature of the group places severe limits on the ability of other areas of Yemen to accept its rule, even among communities that also reject Saudi-UAE military and political intervention. War has tightened the Houthi grip on society, enabled the group to develop a particular ideological culture that runs counter to Yemen’s traditions, and created a class of war profiteers to boot.

Corruption and ill-gotten gains were the main reason for popular resentment against Saleh and his successor, Hadi. When the war is over, the Houthis will face new challenges. There will be no more pretexts for corruption, bad governance, brutal oppression and multiple taxation. All these phenomena have created a vast chasm between government and society, and a silent anger against them that they will be wise to fear – by Maysaa Shuja al-Deen

https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/june-2022/18144

Flight 649: On Board Yemenia’s Return to Sana’a

Civilian Travel in Wartime: A Journey through Hell

According to Al-Naami, about 80 percent of Yemenia pilots and their families live in Sana’a, but with Sana’a airport closed, they were forced to travel by road back and forth to Aden or Sayoun to carry out their flight duties. With the war, checkpoints and closed roads, this journey had often been hellish, and periodically impossible, at times forcing pilots close to their 100 hours per month maximum flying hours as they covered for colleagues who couldn’t make it for their shifts.

Before the war, there were 39 land, air and sea ports connecting Yemen with the outside world, according to Naser Shuraif, Vice Minister of Transportation. Most of them subsequently closed. Until the day of Flight 649, Yemenia had only four airplanes serving its entire population of 30 million people. Sana’a airport and Al-Rayyan in Mukalla, Hadramawt, which is under UAE control, have been closed to commercial flights throughout those years. The airports in Hudaydah and Taiz, two cities crushed by fighting and siege, also stopped running. All this generated a general sense of injustice among Yemenis that local and international parties were out to humiliate them and isolate them from the rest of the world.

Before the war, one could buy a plane ticket from Sana’a to Cairo or Amman for US$300. Today, the taxi fare alone from Sana’a to Aden airport is US$400, meaning for residents of northern Yemen in particular, leaving Yemen had become an expense only the upper class could afford. Patients with critical medical conditions often sell what they have or borrow beyond their means to travel abroad to seek treatment. Amman and Cairo have been the traditional destinations, particularly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq put Baghdad out of bounds.

The closure of Sana’a airport worsened people’s suffering in other ways. For Yemenis, particularly the majority who live in the north, the pain begins with having to travel 24 hours to Sayoun airport in Hadramawt or between 12 and 18 hours to Aden airport. With the usual routes closed, the journey involves passing through various broken, unpaved and unlit sections of road, leading to accidents that have claimed the lives of entire families. To make matters worse, there is the proliferation of security checkpoints where people are abducted on the basis of political or other affiliation, or kidnapped for extortion, as well as the proliferation of militias, battlefronts and landmines. Regardless of age or health condition, travelers also are subject to humiliating inspections, while restrictions are imposed on women’s movement through the obligation to travel with a male guardian, or mahram.

Just the thought of having to pass through the Houthi-controlled security checkpoint “Abu Hashim’s” in Al-Bayda, or the Islah-affiliated security checkpoint at Al-Falaj in Marib, or any point between Ibb and Al-Dhalea controlled by the Southern Transitional Council, is enough to make anyone planning to travel from Sana’a think twice about making the journey at all, even if it was to save their lives.

Getting a passport has also become a trial. Someone residing in Houthi-controlled areas is obliged to get their passport issued from areas under the control of the internationally recognized government. This forces people to move and bear much higher costs than the normal passport fee — that is if the authorities do not run short on passport books as they have in the past. One of the passengers on Flight 649 paid 900 Saudi riyals to obtain a passport through connections, rather than wait for weeks in Aden – by Farea Al-Muslimi

https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/june-2022/18145

Q&A with David Gressly about the FSO Safer

David Gressly, the United Nations Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, joined the Sana’a Center Media Call on June 13, fielding questions from journalists and researchers about the two-stage, $144 million UN plan hoped to head off a Red Sea environmental catastrophe. Gressly, in a conversation facilitated by Sana’a Center Chief Economics Editor Spencer Osberg, spoke about phase 1 of the plan, which involves transferring more than a million barrels of oil from the FSO Safer to a new, temporary vessel to avert the possibility of the dilapidated floating storage facility failing.

Gressly said political obstacles have eased for now, and the four-month operation, which also involves cleaning and scrapping the Safer, can begin as soon as US$80 million is raised to cover the first stage; the UN had commitments for about US$60 million by the time Gressly discussed the project, and he was reaching out to countries, negotiating with private donors and even crowdfunding to raise the rest. Thorny issues surrounding sale of the oil, which have derailed previous efforts to resolve the crisis, will be dealt with after a replacement vessel is in place.

Gressly: And that’s really why I want to highlight that aspect today. We made an appeal in the Netherlands back in May, where we raised about US$33 million of the US$80 million needed to start this operation to do the emergency phase. And we need the additional US$64 million approximately to complete the second stage. So we get the US$33 million plus the roughly US$5-6 million that we already had in hand. So we’re roughly in the US$40 million range. … Most recently, both the USA as well as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have pledged an additional US$10 million each, which gets us approximately to the $60 million threshold of the initial US$80 million that we need to raise to start the operation. We have discussions with other donors for the second stage well underway, so we’re optimistic that we’ll raise the funding for both stages in an appropriate time.

So, for the operational plan, we have about a US$20 million gap, and we really need to raise that as soon as possible. We’re still in a good period for the operation, but by the time we get to October and November, the environment to carry out the operation becomes more difficult. But more importantly, it’s because of the nature of the winds and currents. It increases the chances that this vessel, which is old and decaying, will break up. That would be the highest time of risk, in fact. … And that’s why we’re calling on the public to help us cross the finish line to get that first US$80 million in place. So US$20 million is really not much when you look at the overall cost that this catastrophe would have if indeed there were a spill. The estimates that we’ve received on the cleanup alone would be US$20 billion.

The disruption to international shipping would have a major cost as well.

https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/june-2022/18146

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Joint Submission on the United Arab Emirates to the 74st Session of the UN Committee Against Torture

This submission focuses on the failure of the UAE to implement the Convention in the context of its military intervention, as a leading member of the Saudi-led Coalition in the Yemeni armed conflict. The submission is based on information collected by Mwatana’s field researchers and legal support lawyers in Yemen between 2015 and 2022. Mwatana’s researchers use rigorous and peer-reviewed investigation methods to investigate alleged incidents. They interview former victims, family members, and witnesses; and collect supporting documents that relate to victims or witness accounts. All cases documented by Mwatana’s field researchers and legal support lawyers are reviewed and cross-checked by Mwatana’s central research team. In addition to the field researchers and field lawyers, Mwatana’s central research and legal support teams also conducts periodic field visits to different governorates to further investigate particular cases. Mwatana chooses cases to investigate based on the existence of civilian harm and regardless of the party that conducted the attack. Mwatana selected 38 sample incidents of detention-related torture and ill-treatment cases that have a nexus to the armed conflict in Yemen, perpetrated by the UAE and/or UAE-backed forces. The real names of victims, witnesses or their families are not included in the submission to uphold their confidentiality, and to ensure their safety and security. Rather, pseudonyms are provided.

In addition, the submission draws from secondary sources, including United Nations reports of the UNSC Panel of Experts on Yemen (“PoE”) and the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on the situation of human rights in Yemen (“GEE”), among other bodies, along with other reports published by independent non-governmental organizations, such as Mwatana for Human Rights, Amnesty international (“AI”) and Human Rights Watch (“HRW”).

https://mwatana.org/en/74st-session/

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Force Integration in a Post-Hybrid Landscape

After years of war, Yemen lives a watershed moment. Since April 2022, a national truce mediated by the United Nations (UN) is in effect and an inclusive, although politically fragmented, leadership structure, the Presidential Leadership Council, has replaced the interim president. Under the auspices of the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, a military coordination committee between warring parties has been convened for the technical implementation of the truce. This joint coordination room also facilitates communication and confidence-building. Moreover, the Presidential Leadership Council established a 59-member Joint Military Committee to restructure and unify the armed and security forces belonging to the "anti-Houthi camp", as well as intelligence units.

Against this backdrop, time is ripe to reassess options for armed groups’ integration in the security sector, combining research analysis and policy analysis.

In Yemen, the establishment of the Presidential Leadership Council in April 2022 has formalized the country’s post-hybrid reality. When both officials and "rebels" become members of the same institution, as in the case of the new Presidential Leadership Council, “armies” and “militias”, “state” and “counterstate” governance can’t be categorized as opposite poles of an imaginary continuum any longer. For this reason, the hybrid model – that has been key to understand the complex forms of security delivery that emerged after 2011 – reveals now its limits, as the reality changes on the ground. The boundaries between formal and informal forces, previously challenged and waned by hybridization, tend to extinguish. The game-changer now is the top-down political recognition provided by weakened recognized institutions, through formal co-optation, to the “hybrid sovereignties” who de facto rule the territory. From one hand, regular security forces and recognized institutions coopt non-state forces and would-be institutional entities (ex. the Southern Transitional Council, STC), maximizing amalgamation, but without real integration. On the other, most of the non-state forces and would-be institutional entities are now part of regular security forces and recognized institutions, thus acquiring a legal status which reinforces their legitimacy. But the gradual recognition of armed groups and self-proclaimed entities, while prolonged conflict and multiple power centres continue to erode institutional sovereignty, forges a new reality which overcomes hybridity. Who is a “formal” actor and who is an “informal” player in Yemen today? Does these labels still matter when it comes to designing locally-oriented pathways of integration?

In the Presidential Leadership Council, the leaders of the most powerful armed groups, with varied degrees of hybridization with regular forces, now sit side-by-side (except for the Houthis) with people from internationally recognized institutions. For instance, Aydarous Al Zubaidi, the President of the STC, a self-proclaimed entity with affiliated armed groups claiming for the autonomy/independence of Southern regions, is a member of the Council. However, the STC is formally part of the recognized government based in Aden since late 2019, as part of the “Riyadh Agreement”.

Moreover, coalition-building attempts between armed groups, as well as effective integration by recognized institutions, have substantially failed so far, due to power rivalries and different agendas. For instance, two leaders of the West Coast Forces, the National Resistance Forces’ head Tareq Saleh and the Giants Brigades’ commander Abu Zaara, are both on the board of the Council, despite being formally part of the joint Saleh-led military umbrella.

This also has implications for the armed groups’ integration into the security sector. Generally, the regular security sector is considered substantially different from the groups aspiring to integration. However, this isn’t the case in post-hybrid landscapes as Yemen. So, what about armed groups’ integration in a post-hybrid setting, especially if a shared centre of institutional power is still missing? Integration can’t follow fixed packages; however, a national horizon is needed to limit further fragmentation and support national unity. Integration should move instead along three axes: it should be locally-oriented and task-oriented, including steps for incremental implementation.

This paper provides "work in progress" stabilisation options, thus focusing on a specific side of Security Sector Reform/Governance (SSR/G) and, yes, it offers integration packages. However, these are flexible, adjustable during implementation and develop from two perspectives of centre-periphery relations that also leave room for incremental choices. The paper elaborates integration options into existing agencies: the police forces and the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG). It also provides integration options into new, purpose-built agencies: the Yemen Regional Guard (YRG) and the Yemen National Guard (YNG), both developing within the horizon of a federal united Yemen, as per the 2014 National Dialogue Conference (NDC) outcome document. Throughout the paper, "Guard" refer to both the YRG and the YNG.[1]

The Yemen Regional Guard (YRG) policy option portrays a context of marked decentralisation in centre-periphery relations, with many powers assigned to governorates and local authorities. This option mirrors the current state of art on the ground, in which a de facto federalisation of the country has been achieved, although ungoverned through institutional means. The YRG option would institutionalise this reality, with many powers devolved from national institutions to governorates and local authorities.

The Yemen National Guard (YNG) policy option depicts a context of limited decentralisation in centre-peripheries relations, with some powers devolved from national institutions to governorates and local authorities.

With regard to sequencing, the YRG option can be calibrated and adjusted depending on the evolution of the political-institutional context, thus confirming or reducing the practical translation on the ground of the federal principle. In this way, the YNG policy option can be considered an alternative option to the YRG to build a less decentralised Yemen. But the YNG option could be also considered the "phase two" of the YRG, in case a national-level political agreement is finally achieved – by Eleonora Ardemagni

https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/integrating-yemens-armed-groups-pathways-decentralisation-35732

(** B P)

US looking at new international body to record rights abuses in Yemen

Rights activist say move is akin to asking Vladimir Putin to investigate Russian war crimes in Ukraine

The Biden administration is exploring the creation of a new international committee to document and report on human rights violations in Yemen, months after a Saudi lobbying campaign quashed an independent United Nations investigation into possible war crimes.

The revelation comes on the eve of a tour of the Middle East by Joe Biden that will include a visit to Israel and – controversially – Saudi Arabia, where the US president has said his aim is to strengthen the “strategic partnership” while also “holding true to fundamental American values”.

Abdulrasheed al-Faqih, a prominent Yemeni human rights defender who is visiting the US, told the Guardian in an interview that he had discussed Washington’s plan to create a new “international mechanism” to investigate war crimes at a recent meeting at the US state department.

Faqih said the administration’s proposed plan to “replace” the independent UN body that had been investigating possible war crimes was deeply flawed. The state department, he said, was considering including representatives from Yemen’s presidential leadership council, which has close ties to Riyadh, as a “partner” in the new international mechanism.

“They are working on a very, very bad mechanism that can replace the [UN body],” he said. “First of all, the starting point is that the mandate is weak, and second, it is not independent at all.”

Faqih said if the administration pursues the proposal it would be akin to asking Vladimir Putin to investigate Russian war crimes in Ukraine.

Two others familiar with the preliminary discussions, who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the issue, said they were also aware of efforts by the administration to reach out to NGOs to discuss the plans.

Al-Faqih is co-founder and executive director of Mwatana for Human Rights, a group that monitors and documents war crimes, arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances and restrictions on the press. The group’s field researchers have compiled extensive evidence of Saudi’s previous bombing campaigns in Yemen, and contributed to a 288-page report in 2019 by the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN), which found that the Saudi attacks appeared to violate international humanitarian law by “targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure”.

A spokesperson for the US state department declined to answer specific questions about Faqih’s concerns. In a statement, a the spokesperson said it had been “deeply disappointed” by the “termination” of the UN Group of Eminent Experts (GEE) at the UN’s Human Rights Council in Geneva last October.

The work of the GEE – a group of three independent experts who were appointed by the Office of the UN high commission for human rights in 2017 to investigate human rights abuses committed in the Yemen war – came to an abrupt halt last October, after the members of the Human Rights Council voted to end the investigation following a campaign by Saudi Arabia.

The Biden administration’s own record of examining human rights abuses in Yemen has come under scrutiny. A congressional watchdog said in a report released last month that the US government had not fully investigated its own role in perpetuating human rights abuses in Yemen – by Stephanie Kirchgaessner

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/12/us-may-create-new-body-to-record-human-rights-abuses-in-yemen

and also, shorter: https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/us-looks-set-body-record-rights-abuses-yemen

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-plan-yemeni-rights-group-include-saudi-backed-government

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

(A H)

Sixteen COVID-19 cases reported in Aden, Lahj, Hadramout

Yemen's supreme national emergency committee for coronavirus reported Thursday sixteen new confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the governorates of Aden (six), Lahj (three) and Hadramout (seven).
In its statement, the committee also said that no new cases of COVID-19 nor deaths have been recorded.

http://en.adenpress.news/news/35330

and also https://en-smanews.org/south-arabia/16-new-cases-of-corona-virus-without-deaths/

cp2 Allgemein / General

(* A K P)

Interactive Map of Yemen War

https://yemen.liveuamap.com/

(A P)

Photo, publ. on July 8: Tired after 12 hours of traveling in one city through the rugged mountains, he threw his body on the side of the road to rest his body, which could no longer bear all this suffering. Today's photo from #Al-Aqrud, the only road today to the city of Taiz, which is besieged by the Houthis..

https://twitter.com/maheralabssi/status/1545468234165620737

(A P)

Fishermen arrive to Hodeidah After being held in Saudi Prisons

Twelve Fishermen who have been detained in Saudi prisons for about 45 days arrived at the fishing port in the city of Hodeidah on evening Monday.

https://www.saba.ye/en/news3194550.htm

and also https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/27062/12-Fishermen-Return-to-Hodeidah-After-Being-Held-in-Saudi-Prisons

(* B K P)

The Urgency of Reparations for Civilians in Yemen

For years, civilians in Yemen have been calling on states to take steps to uphold the international rules regulating warfare, including by facilitating remedy when those rules are egregiously violated. For other conflicts, such as the war in Syria, the U.N. Human Rights Council and the U.N. General Assembly created international investigative mechanisms to lay the groundwork for accountability. States should urgently work together to create such a mechanism for Yemen.

Reparations for civilian harm in Yemen should be a key priority for states going forward. The international community should call on specific warring parties in Yemen, including Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., the internationally-recognized government of Yemen, and the Ansar Allah (Houthi) armed group, to meet their reparations obligations to civilians in Yemen. In the meantime, states should support investigations into and documentation of civilian harm at the individual and community-level, consultations with civilian victims, community groups, and civil society, and research and high-level discussions of possible modalities of reparations for Yemen, including the potential of an international reparations mechanism.

Failing to ensure reparations for civilian harm in Yemen is choosing to impose the war’s costs on those who had no say in the decision to go to war and played no role in the fighting. Yemen’s future can and should be determined by Yemenis themselves. But in order to have a meaningful say in that future, states seeking to support Yemen’s peacemakers, rather than its war-mongers, should advocate for reparations for civilians harmed by all parties to the conflict.

https://www.justsecurity.org/82270/the-urgency-of-reparations-for-civilians-in-yemen/

(* B P)

Murder, mayhem and manipulation: The brutal methods used to silence independent journalism in Yemen

Since the outbreak of the Yemeni war, journalism has become increasingly dangerous. Subject to targeted killings, sedition and extortion, journalists face a host of professional landmines in their bid to tell the truth.

Haideri's murder was a reminder that journalism here is a dangerous field, especially for those who are independent, committed to media ethics, and loyal to the truth. The plight of the media in Yemen began in 2011 when the popular uprising broke out. During that year alone, five journalists were killed.

After the breakout of the 2015 civil war between the Iran-backed Houthis and the UN-recognized government, the media climate grew worse. Since then, violence against independent media has neither plummeted nor stopped. The longer the conflict continues, the riskier the journalism profession becomes.

The conflict parties are increasingly hostile to independent media. They only appreciate the press if it polishes their images or defames opponents. For the warring sides, a simple rule is used to gauge the loyalty of journalists: If you are not on my side, you are against me.

Since late last year, three journalists, including Haidari, have been killed in cruel ways, demonstrating the extent of antagonism the perpetrators have towards journalism.

The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate (YJS) published a report in May which states 49 Yemeni media members have been murdered since 2011. With Haidari's murder this month, the total becomes 50.

In 2020, four journalists were sentenced to death by the Houthi group in Sanaa.

From 2015 to December 2021, the YJS documented 1400 violations against the media in Yemen. The violations include kidnapping, murder, prosecution, beating, imprisonment, denying salaries, confiscating properties, death threats and shutting down media outlets.

While all breaches against journalists are inhumane and unjustified, murder is the peak of brutality.

Yemen ranked 169 on the Press Freedom Index in 2021. The Houthi group, government authorities, southern separatists or Al-Qaeda operatives have oppressed the media in this country.

https://english.alaraby.co.uk/features/brutal-methods-used-silence-journalists-yemen

(* B H P)

Help Yemen's Children End Civil War

Now it's your turn to help Yemen's children and end a brutal civil war. You can write to your elected officials, urging them to encourage a peace treaty between Yemen's combatants. In Yemen, children have died from bombs and also starvation because of the seven-year conflict with the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthi rebels.

The one current ray of hope in Yemen is a truce that continues to hold, vastly reducing the violence.

Save the Children recently spoke with Yemeni children who want the fragile truce agreement to lead to lasting peace. The kids shared their ideas.

Save the Children interviewed 20 Yemeni kids, including Ammar and Maya, who came up with their principles of peace for Yemen. They want the truce to continue and be the first step toward a lasting peace treaty. They want road blockages to end and people allowed to move freely about the country. The children want mines and other bombs removed from Yemen and want to be part of all future peace talks.

It's also urgent that we help feed Yemenis.

https://www.newsweek.com/help-yemens-children-end-civil-war-opinion-1722724

(* B P)

Ölpest droht – doch die Schweiz geizt

Lesezeit: 1 Minute

Die Uno sammelt Geld, um eine gewaltige Ölkatastrophe vor der Küste des Jemen zu verhindern.

Es ist eine Katastrophe mit Ansage: Vor der Küste des Jemen am Horn von Afrika droht der Öltanker FSO Safer auseinanderzubrechen. Das Schiff ist seit 2015 verlassen, hat aber immer noch 140'000 Tonnen Rohöl an Bord.
Nun warnt die Uno mit drastischen Worten vor einer Havarie: Der Tanker könne jederzeit auseinanderbrechen oder explodieren. Die Kosten, um die Küste zu säubern, würden rund 20 Milliarden Dollar betragen, schreibt die Weltorganisation. Im ohnehin von einem Bürgerkrieg gebeutelten Land würden Hunderttausende Arbeitsplätze in der Fischindustrie verloren gehen.

Mitte Mai hat deshalb die Uno zu einer Geberkonferenz eingeladen, um 80 Millionen Dollar für die Bergung des Rohöls aufzutreiben.

https://www.beobachter.ch/politik/drohende-olpest-vor-jemen-eu-lander-helfen-die-schweiz-geizt-391228

(* B P)

World looks away as oil disaster looms off Yemen’s coast

Time is running out to prevent what Yemen envoy Tim Lenderking warns will be a "massive oil spill the likes of which the world has not seen."

Off the coast of Yemen lies an aging oil tanker that could rupture at any moment. Experts say it’s not a matter of if but when the FSO Safer leaks more than one million barrels of light crude oil into the sea — four times the amount spilled in the Exxon Valdez disaster of 1989.

Environmental groups warn that one of the worst man-made environmental crises in history is imminent. But few governments are willing to open their wallets to prevent it.

The Houthis haven’t performed maintenance on the Safer since they seized it from the state-run oil company in 2015. The decaying ship is now beyond repair.

A spill would have a devastating impact on Yemen, already the Arab world’s poorest country. The leaked oil would wipe out fisheries and force the closure of the nearby Hodeidah and Saleef ports, which are used to deliver essential food, fuel and medicine to a population largely dependent on humanitarian aid.

https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/07/world-looks-away-oil-disaster-looms-yemens-coast

and

(* B H P)

How to Solve the Mideast’s Easiest Problem

The United Nations needs a paltry $20 million to head off what could be the world’s biggest and most devastating oil spill.

Everywhere US President Joe Biden has gone in the Middle East this week, he has confronted critical yet near-insoluble challenges, from forging peace between Israel and the Palestinians to thwarting Iran’s nuclear brinkmanship. That’s all the more reason for the US and its partners to hurry up and fix the easiest problem they face

Less than five nautical miles off the coast of war-torn Yemen sits a rusting oil tanker named the Safer (pronounced “saffer”). After plying the seas for six years, the ship was converted in 1987 into a floating storage-and-offloading facility — cheaper than an onshore terminal — linked by pipeline to the Yemeni oilfields in Marib. Since 2015, operations have been disrupted by the country’s civil war. A skeleton crew maintains the ship, which is steadily corroding and could break apart at any moment. A system meant to pump inert gas into the tanks to prevent an explosion hasn’t worked since 2017.

The Safer holds more than a million barrels of crude oil, four times as much as spilled from the Exxon Valdez in 1989. If it sinks, the consequences could be devastating. A spill would wipe out livelihoods for coastal fishing communities and could disrupt crucial desalination plants along the Red Sea coast.

Just under $80 million is needed to launch the first phase of the operation. Donors, including the US and Saudi Arabia, have collectively pledged only $60 million. Wealthy Gulf nations such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have contributed nothing; neither have big Asian countries such as China and Japan. A month-old UN crowdfunding appeal has brought in a paltry $125,000.

There is little time to waste.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-07-15/fso-safer-yemen-oil-tanker-accident-would-be-a-preventable-nightmare

(B H P)

In Yemen, a truce brings fragile hope

A truce between the Houthis, who control much of northern Yemen, and the exiled Saudi-backed government in the south has surprised many Yemen observers, Devex Managing Editor Anna Gawel writes.

There is a “palpable sense of relief” throughout the country, Renata Rendon, the Yemen advocacy director for the Norwegian Refugee Council, says. Yemenis no longer have to worry about hearing airstrikes, says Rendon, who is based in the Houthi-controlled capital of Sanaa.

However, the U.N.’s $4.3 billion appeal for humanitarian aid to Yemen is just over 25% funded, and many Yemenis still face daily challenges that make their lives difficult, according to Philippe Duamelle, UNICEF’s representative to Yemen.

“As someone who has been living in Yemen for almost two years now, I can tell you we feel the difference,” he tells Devex. “However, the fundamentals have not changed. Access to health care, access to water, access to basic services haven't changed.”

https://www.devex.com/news/devex-newswire-in-yemen-a-truce-brings-fragile-hope-103599

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

(A P)

Petroleumsgesellschaft gibt Zahl der Treibstoffschiffe bekannt, die während des Waffenstillstands einlaufen durften

Die jemenitische Petroleumsgesellschaft (YPC) enthüllte die Anzahl der Treibstoffschiffe, denen die Aggressionskoalition erlaubte, den Hafen von Hodeidah zu erreichen, die Dauer ihrer Inhaftierung und die Geldstrafen, die während des angekündigten Waffenstillstands und seiner zweimonatigen Waffenruhe Verlängerung für den Zeitraum 2. April bis 14. Juli verhängt wurden.

Die Petroleumsgesellschaft erklärte in einer bei der jemenitischen Nachrichtenagentur (Saba) eingegangenen Erklärung, dass vereinbart worden sei, nach Verlängerung des angekündigten Waffenstillstands um zwei Monate, 18 Treibstoffschiffe während des Zeitraums (2 von 18 Schiffen sollen nur sieben Schiffe in den Hafen von Hodeidah einlaufen.

Sie bestätigte, dass die Aggressionskoalition derzeit drei Schiffe zurüclhalte: "Sundus"-Benzin, "In Victus"-Benzin und "Lady Sarah"-Gas.

https://www.saba.ye/de/news3194706.htm

and English version:

(A P)

YPC reveals number of fuel ships allowed to enter during armistice

The Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) revealed in a statement that the number of fuel ships allowed by the aggression coalition to reach Hodeida port, the period of detention and the fines incurred during the announced truce and its extension for 2 months from April 2 to July 14.
The company explained in a statement received by Yemeni News Agency (Saba) that it was agreed, after extending the announced truce for 2 months, to enter 18 fuel ships during the period (June 2 - August 2), but the aggression coalition allowed only 7 ships to enter Hodeida port out of 18 boats.
The company also confirmed in its statment that the number of ships currently held by the aggression coalition is 3: "Sundus" gasoline, "In Victus" gasoline, and "Lady Sarah" gas.

https://www.saba.ye/en/news3194738.htm

and also https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/27100/YPC-Number-of-Fuel-Tankers-Received-During-Truce%2C-39%25-of-Agreed%C2%A0

(A P)

CAMA: 6 round flights from Sana'a to Amman scheduled for July

The Civil Aviation and Meteorology Authority (CAMA) confirmed the scheduling of 6 round trip flights during July from Sana'a International Airport to Queen Alia Airport in Jordan.
The Authority said that scheduling the flights comes within the framework of the Authority's keenness to facilitate the booking process for the people wishing to travel, especially students and expatriates abroad.

https://www.saba.ye/en/news3194551.htm

(A P)

YPC: Coalition seizes new gasoline ship

The company’s official spokesman, Issam Al-Mutawakel, said in a statement that “Coinciding with the release of the diesel ship ‘Princess Khadija’, the US-led aggression coalition continues to violate the armistice and seize the gasoline ship ‘Ann Victus’.”

Al-Mutawakel indicated that the coalition forcibly took the gasoline ship off Jizan, despite it has been inspected and obtained entry permits from the United Nations

https://en.ypagency.net/266259/

and also https://www.saba.ye/en/news3194624.htm

(A P)

YPC: Aggression coalition seizes new fuel ship

The company's spokesman Issam Al-Mutawakel said in a statement to Saba that the aggression coalition has released the diesel ship "Princess Khadijah" and at the same time seized the gasoline ship "Ann Fectos". He pointed out that the US-Saudi aggression forcibly took the ship off the coast of Jizan,

https://www.saba.ye/en/news3194549.htm

and also https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/27061/US-Saudi-Aggression-Detains-New-Oil-Tanker%C2%A0

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

(B H)

Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the Yemen Crisis

The inter-agency humanitarian evaluation (IAHE) of Yemen covered one of the largest and most significant humanitarian responses by Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) partners. The evaluation finds that despite multiple political, bureaucratic and geographical challenges, the humanitarian response in Yemen scaled up impressively, and slowed the collapse of basic services. In so doing, lives were saved and suffering alleviated. In particular, cholera was contained, the food security situation slightly improved and levels of acute malnutrition declined. However, despite these considerable achievements, the collective operation struggled to ensure: quality aid provision, proper oversight, robust data collection and analysis, balance among long- and short-term competing priorities, and the preservation of humanitarian principles against the backdrop of a bitter war.

The report formulates twelve recommendations to address these challenges in Yemen and future humanitarian responses.

https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/inter-agency-humaniatrian-evaluations-steering-group/inter-agency-humanitarian-evaluation-iahe-yemen-crisis

(B H)

Yemen Humanitarian Update - Issue 6/ June 2022

HIGHLIGHTS

Heavy rains and flooding affect 6,800 households in Yemen P 03

Women pay the price as reproductive health funding dries up P 04

A political resolution is a durable solution to the humanitarian crisis P 05

Crowdfunding campaign to kick start the FSO Safer initial emergency operation P 06

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-update-issue-6-june-2022

(B E H)

Audio: Yemen is on the brink of famine, and the food emergency has been made worse by conflicts, climate change, the pandemic & other factors. The private sector has stepped in to help

https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1163702271143656

(* B H)

“We don’t say no to anyone” - Health care for everyone

Fatima and her mother live in a camp with approximately 5,500 other people, most of whom are women and children. Medair visits the camp regularly with a ‘health caravan’ to ensure that people can receive medical care and treatment for malnutrition.

Dr Rabea is working on one of two busy health caravans. “We don’t just care about the primary health care, but also about providing nutritional treatment for malnourished children,” she says. “Our goal is to make the people as healthy as possible during these hard times. We don’t say no to anyone.”

Medair’s mobile clinics provide malnutrition treatment for children under five years of age. Those who have medical complications are referred to general hospitals for specialized care. In the first two months of working in Lahj, nearly 2,500 people visited the mobile caravans. Besides health and nutrition services, Medair provides water, hygiene, and sanitation facilities in Lahj camps. This has included the construction or rehabilitation of latrines, waste pits, and safe drinking water points.

Afaf Abdullah is one of the health care workers in the caravans. She has been displaced from her home herself and is now committed to helping in the camps. “It’s a place where people can feel safe and relaxed because they feel appreciated. We are like them. We have suffered and been displaced during the conflict. I am going to give my best and let them feel seen and let them know they are not alone. I hope that soon the conflict will end, and people will return to their houses and remember us in a good way.”

“The caravans play an important role in facilitating the delivery of health and nutrition services for people in the camps. The caravans are a private place for treatment, especially for women and children. We are seeing an increasing number of women coming to caravans,” says Dr. Wafa, Medair’s Health and Nutrition Officer.

https://www.medair.org/stories/we-dont-say-no-to-anyone-health-care-for-everyone/

and

(* B H)

Car of Hope: A day in the life of Yemen’s travelling health clinic

Taking on dangerous routes, this vehicle brings a team of skilled medics and supplies to hard-to-reach areas that have no other access to healthcare.

Here’s how a day looks for the team behind the wheel.

After a satisfying day’s work treating patients, the team packs up the van and begins the three-hour journey back to the medical centre.

Dr. Fadhel has led the team for five years and comes from a remote mountain village himself. “I’m happy to serve all these people,” he says, “because I know how valuable the services we provide to them are – that’s why I’m actively doing my work with happiness to this day.”

It’s a long, dangerous commute, but the Car of Hope never stops and the team will be back on the road the following day.

The IRC’s mobile medical clinics deliver lifesaving care to families in some of the hardest-to-reach places in Yemen, protecting precious milestones for children and their parents. Will you help us keep a van fully stocked and on the road serving families for two months?

What’s more, if you contribute today, your gift will be tripled – matched once by the UK government, and once by a private IRC donor. This means your generosity will go three times as far in helping families in Yemen. (photos)

https://www.rescue-uk.org/article/car-hope-day-life-yemens-travelling-health-clinic

(* B H)

Welthungerhilfe verzeichnet schwere Rückschläge im Kampf gegen den Hunger+

Die Klimakrise, bewaffnete Konflikte und die Corona-Pandemie haben die Ernährungslage im globalen Süden im vergangenen Jahr nach Angaben der Welthungerhilfe dramatisch verschlechtert. Der Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine habe die Situation durch steigende Nahrungsmittelpreise in den vergangenen Monaten noch einmal erheblich verschärft, erklärte die Organisation in ihrem am Dienstag veröffentlichten Jahresbericht 2021. Die Zahl der akut von Hunger bedrohten Menschen steigt demnach seit Monaten an und es kommt zu ersten Hungersnöten in Afrika.

Dem Bericht zufolge waren die Nahrungsmittelpreise durch "multiple Krisen" im Jahr 2021 bereits um 28 Prozent angestiegen - der Krieg in der Ukraine habe die Preise noch einmal deutlich ansteigen lassen. "Millionen Menschen stehen am Rande einer Hungersnot, denn die Familien haben keinerlei Ressourcen mehr", erklärte Welthungerhilfe-Generalsekretär Mathias Mogge. "Die gestiegenen Preise treffen diejenigen am härtesten, die ohnehin zu den Ärmsten gehören."

Aktuell hungern dem Bericht zufolge weltweit etwa 811 Millionen Menschen. Besonders dramatisch ist die Lage demnach im Jemen, in Afghanistan und im Südsudan - aber auch in Madagaskar und den Ländern Ostafrikas, wo die Auswirkungen der Klimakrise heftige Dürren auslösen.

https://www.stern.de/news/welthungerhilfe-verzeichnet-schwere-rueckschlaege-im-kampf-gegen-den-hunger-32531728.html

(* B H)

Red Cross issues Yemen warning

The International Committee of the Red Cross has issued a warning over the devastating impacts the lack of humanitarian funding is having on the war-ravaged Arab country in particular women and girls.

There is concern among many rights activists that the Ukraine conflict may be undermining efforts to save millions of people who have endured violence in Yemen and a 20-year U.S. occupation in Afghanistan that ended last summer but triggered another humanitarian crisis in West Asia.

The Red Cross expressed deep concern that after eight years of armed conflict in Yemen, violence along with economic hardship and worsening health services and health infrastructure are increasingly keeping women and girls from being able to access the essential healthcare they need.

It says as the funding shortages are forcing aid groups to scale down humanitarian help, the plight of Yemen’s women and girls will only grow worse.

https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/474574/Red-Cross-issues-Yemen-warning

and

(B H)

Aid group says Yemeni children still dying of hunger

A truce that went into effect in April in war-torn Yemen has not improved humanitarian conditions in the country and the Russia-Ukraine war is causing children to die of hunger, the regional director of a prominent aid group said Friday.

In an interview with The Associated Press in Beirut a week after visiting Yemen, Hossam Elsharkawi said the war in Ukraine has lead higher on fuel, wheat and food prices.

“Price hikes are unbearable. The situation in Yemen was already catastrophic before Ukraine, now it’s a hundred times worse,” said Elsharkawi, of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. “Children are dying in Yemen. They’re not just suffering, they’re dying from hunger.”

He added that the “worse than catastrophic” conditions in Yemen requires his organization to increase “efforts in our humanitarian work.”

Elsharkawi said polluted water is a key problem in recent weeks.

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-middle-east-lebanon-beirut-4925cc3c194ebc4117ba1edf1eae45cf

(B H)

Kinderehen nehmen unter Mädchen und Jungen im Jemen über den siebenjährigen Krieg zu

Fatimah Alis Vater sie vom Schulbesuch abhielt, zog sie sich zurück.

Im Alter von 13 Jahren heiratete er sie 2019 mit einem ihr unbekannten 17-jährigen Mann. Ein Familienmitglied im Gespräch mit TheAktuelleNews unter der Bedingung der Anonymität aus dem Dorf Dar Al-Sha’ab in der südwestlichen Region Ibb im Jemen sagte, sie könne die Lasten der Ehe nicht tragen.

Sie fand das Leben in einem überfüllten Haus mit einer großen Großfamilie unerträglich. Auch die Arbeitslosigkeit ihres Mannes und ihre schlechte finanzielle Situation halfen nich

https://www.theaktuellenews.com/nachrichten/kinderehen-nehmen-unter-maedchen-und-jungen-im-jemen-ueber-den-siebenjaehrigen-krieg-zu/

(* B H)

‘My brother married me off for the money’: Child marriage rises in Yemen during war

More than 4 million Yemeni girls are child brides as first tradition and now war makes the practice more common

When Fatimah Ali’s father stopped her from attending school she became withdrawn.

Aged 13, he married her to a 17-year-old man unknown to her, in 2019. A family member speaking to The Independent on condition of anonymity from Dar Al-Sha’ab village in Yemen’s southwestern Ibb region, said she could not shoulder the burdens of marriage.

She found living in a crowded house with a large extended family unbearable. Her husband’s unemployment and their poor financial situation did not help either [subscribers only]

https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/world/child-marriage-saudi-yemen-war-b2110922.html

(* B H)

Yemen: Violence Against Health Care in Conflict 2021

OVERVIEW

The Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition (SHCC) identified 20 incidents of violence against or obstruction of health care in Yemen in 2021, a marked decrease from 2020, when 81 incidents were documented.

Seven health facilities were damaged or destroyed by explosive weapons use and six health workers were injured in these incidents.

This factsheet is based on the dataset 2021 SHCC Yemen Health Data, which is available for download on the Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX).

Half of all documented incidents of violence against health care in Yemen in 2021 reported the use of explosive weapons. Both Saudi-led coalition forces and non-state armed groups, including Houthi rebels, have been named as perpetrators of these incidents.

Incidents were documented in nine of Yemen’s 21 governorates and were most frequent in Amanat Al Asimah governorate, in which the capital, Sana’a, constitutes a separate administrative district. This is a marked change from 2020, when most incidents were reported in Taizz and Al Hudaydah governorates.

As in previous years, incidents continued to be reported in Marib governorate where heavy fighting between Yemeni government forces and the Houthiled armed group continued. Gunmen stormed hospitals on at least six occasions in 2021. At least two health workers were shot and killed and another injured in these armed raids.

In 2021 air and drone strikes, missiles, and hand grenades damaged at least seven hospitals and two ambulances, killing one health worker and injuring two others. These incidents increased in the last four months of 2021, when Saudi-led coalition air strikes in Amanat Al Asimah governorate damaged three health facilities.6 Coalition air strikes also damaged two hospitals, one in Amanat Al Asimah in April and the other in Saada in May.

Houthi, Saudi-led coalition, Yemeni National Resistance, and Al Islah forces were all named as perpetrators of violence against or obstruction of health care in Yemen in 2021.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-violence-against-health-care-conflict-2021

Full document: https://insecurityinsight.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/2021-Yemen-SHCC-Factsheet.pdf

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

(A H)

Floods have submerged Al-Rumaylah Displacement Camp in Marib province. Hundreds of displaced families living in the camp are now without shelter and food. Every year refugee camps in Marib are flooded. The authorities wait for disasters and then appeal for foreign aid.

https://twitter.com/FuadRajeh/status/1547493621481480195

(B H)

IOM Yemen: Rapid Displacement Tracking - Yemen IDP Dashboard Reporting Period: 3 to 9 July 2022

Between 3 and 9 July 2022, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 74 households (444 individuals)2 who experienced displacement at least once. Safety and security concerns as a result of the conict were the main reason for displacement, accounting for 84 per cent (62HHs) of the total, followed by economic reasons related to conict, accounting for 16 per cent (12 HHs). Between 8 January and 9 July 2022, IOM Yemen DTM tracked a cumulative 6,330 households (37,980 individuals) that experienced displacement at least once. Since the beginning of the year, the number of tracked new instances of displacement has been declining steadily.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-rapid-displacement-tracking-yemen-idp-dashboard-reporting-period-3-9-july-2022

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

Siehe / Look at cp1

(* B P)

Iran Supports Houthi Control over Yemen Telecommunications Sector

Key Takeaway: Iran may be providing technical assistance to strengthen the Houthi movement’s ability to gather intelligence and suppress dissent. A Yemeni nongovernmental organization (NGO) reported that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have sent logistical and technical support to Yemen to help the Houthis exploit their control over domestic telecommunications infrastructure. This support will help the Houthis suppress domestic dissent and solidify their control over northern Yemen.

The Houthi movement is likely acquiring new systems to increase its ability to surveil private communications. TeleYemen, a telecommunications company likely controlled by the Houthis, may have begun using a “bandwidth management system” in 2021. Such a system would allow the Houthis to control information and monitor private communications, according to the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen. TeleYemen has defended this purchase, claiming the bandwidth management system merely filter content that violates “the law and Islamic doctrine.” The source of this bandwidth management system is unclear. The Yemeni government has intercepted other smuggled telecommunications equipment crossing the Yemeni-Omani border—a known transit route for Iranian weapons bound for the Houthis.

Iran is likely helping the Houthis use telecommunications data to surveil and control Yemenis. Yemeni NGO Regain Yemen *reported that Iranian intelligence organizations and companies and Lebanese Hezbollah are providing logistical and technical expertise to the Houthi movement to “exploit [telecommunications]” for intelligence as part of an “intelligence investment partnership.”

Tehran’s support for Houthi social control efforts is part of a larger effort to secure regional allies from internal instability. The Iranian regime built an adaptive and sophisticated police and surveillance state domestically and now exports its social control capabilities to friendly states to help them suppress dissent.

The Houthis will use greater surveillance and control of the Yemeni population to consolidate their position in northern Yemen, cementing an Iranian partner along the Red Sea and Saudi Arabia’s southern border.

The Houthis will use enhanced surveillance and censorship capabilities to crack down on internal opposition more effectively – by Brian Carter

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-supports-houthi-control-over-yemen-telecommunications-sector

(A P)

Yemeni relief worker dies at Houthi jail in Hodeida

A Yemeni humanitarian worker has died at a clandestine jail run by the Iranian-backed Houthi group in Hodeida, where his health worsened following five years of brutal torture, Yemeni sources said Tuesday.
Yasser Mohamed Ali Jonaid died at prison in Zabid, a district in the western governorate, but the Houthi group transported his body to hospital in Sana'a City, the sources added.
Jonaid was arrested on 20 February 2017 by the group from his house in Khokha, another district in Hodeida, and was detained in a secret jail, a source close to his family said then.

https://debriefer.net/en/news-30182.html

and also https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-57821

(A P)

The Houthis through the militia's "Religious Endowments Department" begin to force 60 traders out of their business stores in Old Sana'a under the pretext those are endowed properties, whist the militia's aim is to turn Old Sana'a city to an old sectarian canton./Yemeni Sport.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-57821

(* B P)

Who are Yemen's Houthis?

The Houthis took over the Yemeni capital Sanaa in September 2014 and seized control over much of north Yemen by 2016. Yemeni officials and Sunni states have repeatedly alleged that Iran and its proxy Hezbollah have provided arms, training, and financial support to the Houthis. But Iranian and Hezbollah officials have denied or downplayed the claims.

What are the Houthis' political views?

The Houthis do not promote a coherent ideology, and their political platform is vague and contradictory. The original Houthi insurgents desired to imitate Hezbollah, to have power without actually ruling. “The Houthis have always been on the outside. They've been a militia group that's now starting to dabble in politics,” Yemen expert Gregory Johnsen, who studied and lived in the country for years, told NPR’s “Fresh Air” in April 2015. “And they don't really know how to rule.”

The Houthi emblem only offers a broad view of the group’s views. It is made of up entirely of the following phrases, “God is great, Death to America, death to Israel, damnation to the Jews, victory to Islam.” But the Houthis’ Hezbollah-like denunciation of the United States and Israel often seems “largely for show,” according to Les Campbell at the National Democratic Institute. Their ties to former president Saleh threaten to expose the group as “just another group sharing in the spoils of corruption.”

The Houthis’ Zaydi roots do not necessarily dictate their approach to politics. Their leaders have claimed they are not attempting to revive the Zaydi imamate, but rather to seek greater political inclusion. Since 2011, they have used nationalist and populist language in their messaging rather than framing themselves as a strictly Zaydi movement. And they have cultivated a range of Sunni political allies.

The Houthis participated in the U.N.-sponsored National Dialogue Conference from 2013 to 2014. While they did not reject the reform agenda in principle, the Houthis opposed proposals to convert Yemen into a six-region federalist state. The proposal would link Saada with Sanaa, but the Houthis want Saada to be its own autonomous region.

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis

(A P)

Cartoon: Journalism in areas under the control of #Houthis.

https://twitter.com/RepYemenEnglish/status/1547252946135547904

(* B H P)

Aid distribution impeded in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen: UN

Impediments to aid distribution prevalent in areas controlled by the Houthis, paired with funding shortages, may increase famine in Yemen.

International agencies faced a slew of bureaucratic impediments as they attempted to distribute aid in Yemen this year, with the greatest number of restrictions occurring in areas controlled by the Iran-backed Houthis.

In a quarterly report published June 20, the United Nations (UN) Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Yemen says 89% of incidents restricting the movement of goods and aid occurred in Houthi-controlled areas.

The distribution of humanitarian aid in Yemen remains a challenge because of bureaucratic impediments, it said, noting that obstacles imposed by the Houthis, paired with funding shortages, may result in increasing the level of famine.

Aid operations continue to be difficult in Saada and Hajjah provinces, OCHA said, as protection and gender-related programmes are prohibited.

During the first quarter of 2022, humanitarian partners reported 701 delivery-related incidents in 100 districts in 21 provinces in Yemen, affecting 5.6 million people, the report said.

More than 60% of the reported delivery-related incidents in this time period involved bureaucratic impediments resulting in restrictions on the movement of aid organisations' staff and goods within Yemen, it added.

The impediments include denied travel permits, delays, cancellation of missions and travel activities, and the requirement that female employees be accompanied by a male relative in the field.

"Agencies continued to face serious obstacles in delivering principled humanitarian assistance," OCHA said in its annual report for 2021.

"These obstacles persisted across the country, but they remained the most severe in areas controlled by the Houthi de facto authorities."

Impeding aid distribution

This is not the first time the Houthis have impeded the operations of international aid organisations, economist Faris al-Najjar told Al-Mashareq, accusing the Iran-backed group of plundering and looting aid.

Yemeni Deputy Minister of Legal Affairs and Human Rights Nabil Abdul Hafeez accused the Houthis' Aid Co-ordination Council of interfering with the food distribution lists.

The council interferes with the aid process both directly and indirectly, he explained, by requiring that certain names be added to distribution lists as a condition for allowing aid to reach the public.

The council also stipulates that international aid organisations must employ Houthi-affiliated individuals or companies to monitor aid work, he said.

According to the former employee of a relief organisation in Sanaa, who asked that her name not be used, the Houthis' Aid Co-ordination Council required that she be accompanied by a close male relative for aid activities in rural Sanaa.

The WFP has explicitly accused two Houthi leaders of interfering in aid operations, Abdul Hafeez said.

Economist Abdul Aziz Thabet said the Houthis have created a civilian apparatus to organise the distribution of aid, adding families of their own loyalists, their own recruits and even "ghosts" to the list of recipients.

Adding the names of fighters killed on the battlefront to the list enables the group to claim additional benefits to which it is not entitled.

The council also forcibly prioritises areas loyal to the Houthis, such as Saada, for receiving aid, he said.

https://almashareq.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_am/features/2022/07/13/feature-03

(A P)

In spite of the judicial decision to resume its broadcast, police and forces of operations of the #Houthi-held Ministry of Information stormed the office of Sawt Al-Yemen FM in #Sanaa #Yemen, according to its director Mujali Alsamadi. (photos9

https://twitter.com/osamahfakih/status/1546481021809561600

cp6 Südjemen und Aden-Regierung / Southern Yemen and Aden government

Siehe / Look at cp1

(A P)

One person was killed and another injured in an armed conflict in the district of Tor Al Baha, Lahj Governorate, southern #Yemen

https://twitter.com/GhalebM0nz1i7/status/1547626946757943298

(A P)

#Marib An explosive device exploded in Sa'ila Al-Wadi, injuring 4 citizens and causing damage to a number of cars.

https://twitter.com/GhalebM0nz1i7/status/1547652947151974401

(A T)

Gunmen-assassinate-a-citizen-in-tarim

https://en-smanews.org/south-arabia/gunmen-assassinate-a-citizen-in-tarim/

(A K P)

The Yemeni army welcomes being removed from the UN list of child rights violators/Multiple websites

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-57821

(A P)

Dozens of NGOs call on Washington to re-designate Houthis as a terror group

Dozens of local Yemeni, regional and international NGOs have demanded the US to re-designate Houthis as a terrorist group.

https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-57822

(A P)

[Separatist STC “president”] Al-Zubaidi Praises UAE President’s Speech

http://en.adenpress.news/news/35329

My comment: It’s “His Master’s Voice”, so what?

And

(A P)

[STC] President-al-zubaidi-highlights-vital-importance-of-distinct-mutual-relations-and-strategic-partnership-with-uae-both-government-and-people

https://en-smanews.org/south-arabia/president-al-zubaidi-highlights-vital-importance-of-distinct-mutual-relations-and-strategic-partnership-with-uae-both-government-and-people/

(A P)

Yemenis optimistic about Biden's visit to Middle East

Yemen's foreign minister said he hoped US President Joe Biden's ongoing Middle East visit could lead to the "resolving" of the long-running war in Yemen.

According to the Saudi Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak said that the president's visit to Saudi Arabia on Friday was "an opportunity to achieve regional and international consensus" that could lead to an end to the conflict.

He described Yemeni-American cooperation as "strategic" and said it went beyond combatting terrorism to backing Yemeni institutions, providing humanitarian aid, and supporting the Yemeni people in various crises and stages.

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-sisi-teacher-scolded-arabic-press-review

(A P)

Al-Alimi leaves for Saudi Arabia

Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad Al-Alimi left Aden heading to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to hold high-level talks on the sidelines of the Arab-American Summit, to be hosted in Jeddah next Saturday, in the presence of the American president, leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Egypt and Jordan, the Yemeni news agency Saba reported on Thursday.

Al-Alimi's visit includes important discussions on the Yemeni situation, and the opportunities to extend the existing truce and build on it to achieve peace and stability in the country in accordance with national and regional references and relevant international resolutions.

http://en.adenpress.news/news/35328

and

(A P)

Rashad al-Alimi will meet with Biden during his visit to Saudi Arabia

The head of the Presidential Leadership Council, which has held the presidency of Yemen's internationally recognised government since April, Rashad al-Alimi, will meet with US President Joe Biden on Saturday during his visit to Saudi Arabia, Yemeni officials said today.Al Alimi, who heads the executive body to which former President Abdo Rabu Mansur Hadi delegated his powers three months ago, left Aden, the interim capital of Yemen's legitimate government, on Thursday for Saudi Arabia for "high-level talks" with Biden in Jeddah, Yemen's official Saba news agency said.

https://atalayar.com/en/content/rashad-al-alimi-will-meet-biden-during-his-visit-saudi-arabia

and also https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3758961/head-yemeni-leadership-council-jeddah-amid-reports-upcoming-meeting-biden

(A P)

Aden: Armed clashes inside the central market in Sheikh Othman, which led to the death of a person Clashes are still going on despite the security belt's attempts to encircle the place

https://twitter.com/GhalebM0nz1i7/status/1547346597222162432

(A P)

Security forces at Qena resort in Shabwah prevent visitors from entering

https://en.ypagency.net/266282/

(A P)

Saudi ambassador to Yemen plotting to replace collaborator army leadership with protégés

A former official in the government loyal to the Saudi-led coalition revealed on Tuesday that the Saudi ambassador to Yemen, Muhammad al-Jaber, is seeking to oust the defence minister and chief of staff of the puppet regime in Aden, and to replace them with others close to him.

Yemeni journalist and former media advisor to the Hadi puppet “government” embassy in Riyadh, Anis Mansour, said in a series of tweets that “The directives of the Saudi ambassador, al-Jaber, are to appoint Mohsen al-Daari as Defense Minister and Hashim al-Ahmar as Chief of General Staff.”

https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/07/13/saudi-ambassador-to-yemen-plotting-to-replace-collaborator-army-leadership-with-proteges/

(A P)

Military officer loyal to Tariq Saleh killed in Taiz

https://en.ypagency.net/266287/

(A P T)

Yemeni security forces capture Qaeda senior militant

https://debriefer.net/en/news-30183.html

and by STC media: https://en-smanews.org/south-arabia/hadramout-security-arrests-a-prominent-leader-of-al-qaeda/

while the Houthi side tells a somewhat different story: https://en.ypagency.net/266247/

and also https://twitter.com/GhalebM0nz1i7/status/1546598849262882816

(A P)

Drunks of STC militia cause terror on coast of Aden

Clashes erupted Tuesday between drunks from the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC)’s militia and others on the coast of the city of Aden, which is under the control of the Saudi-led coalition.

https://en.ypagency.net/266256/

(A T)

Top military commander shot dead in eastern Yemen

Belkhir Banseb of the 2nd Military Zone came under fire from unidentified gunmen in the city of Hadhramaut late Sunday, Anadolu Agency reported.

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220711-top-military-commander-shot-dead-in-eastern-yemen/

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

(B P)

Can Yemen hope for a lasting peace?

The only thing that is really blocking for the moment are the negotiations for the opening of the access roads to the city of Taiz. But according to the Americans, these blockages can also be overcome at the cost of reciprocal concessions.

All this is an encouraging sign for the international community. But seen from inside Yemen itself, the situation is not so positive. To begin with, the Houthis are certainly not launching any more attacks against the Saudi neighbor, but, within the borders, they continue to violate the ceasefire (subscribers only]

https://time.news/can-yemen-hope-for-a-lasting-peace/

(* A P)

[Sanaa gov.] National Military Committee Announces Unilateral Opening of Road in Taiz

The National Military Committee announced Thursday the unilateral and final opening of the Highway crossing and road in Taiz.

Brigadier General Shukri Noaman said that all the obstacles remnants from the war in checkpoints have been removed from the road as a first stage, waiting for the completion of the opening of the road from the other side.

Brigadier-General Nouman clarified that the fifty-sixty road was opened as a humanitarian, not a military road and for the civilians.

He stated that the committee has explicit directives from the leadership of the revolution to open a number of other roads to the city of Taiz, stressing that they will be opened as soon as they are established.

He said: We are waiting for positive responses from the other side, according to the promises of the mediators, to complete opening and securing the road from their areas of control.

Brigadier General Nouman stressed the need to remove the militarization of roads of all Taiz completely, expressing the committee's readiness to receive representatives of the other side for discussion and consensus.

https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/27084/National-Military-Committee-Announces-Unilateral-Opening-of-Road-in-Taiz

(A P)

[Sanaa] Supreme Political Council Member: No Trust in Americans, They Are Liars About Peace in Yemen

The member of the Supreme Political Council confirmed that Sana'a showed its sincere approach to peace and its patience over the Saudi-backed party's violations of the terms of the UN-sponsored truce.

Muhammad Al-Nuaimi told Almasirah Thursday: “The Americans want to get out of the effects of the Ukrainian crisis.” Regarding peace and truce in Yemen, he added, “ no trust in the Americans and they are liars about peace in Yemen, and whoever trusts them is an idiot."

He continued by saying: "Through the truce, we wanted to try the peace if it existed somewhere, and unfortunately we found nothing but falsehood and deception."

https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/27085/Supreme-Political-Council-Member-No-Trust-in-Americans%2C-They-Are-Liars-About-Peace-in-Yemen

(A P)

Al-Murtadha Reveals Saudi Role in Prisoners' Exchange Failure Before Eid Al-Adhha

Head of the [Sanaa gov.] Prisoners' Affairs Committee, Abdulqader Al-Murtadha, revealed the Saudi role in thwarting prisoner exchange deals ahead of the blessed Eid Al-Adha.

"The Saudi regime has thwarted about 10 local exchange deals that would have taken place before the blessed Eid al-Adha," Al-Murtadha stated to Almasirah on Wednesday.

He stated that progress in the negotiations to complete the exchange deal signed last March is still less than 50 per cent, explaining that the mercenaries of the aggression in Marib constitute the major obstacle in completing the deal and have not submitted their statements until now.

https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/27082/Al-Murtadha-Reveals-Saudi-Role-in-Prisoners-Exchange-Failure-Before-Eid-Al-Adhha

(* A P)

Will Grundberg Succeed at Extending Yemen's Truce without Opening Crossings?

About two weeks before the end of the first extension of the fragile Yemeni truce, legitimate pro-government circles are frustrated by the failure to open the crossings between the contact lines and to end the siege around the city of Taiz, as UN Envoy Hans Grundberg has so far been unable to persuade the Houthi militias to agree to his proposal.

While Yemen’s Presidential Command Council faces popular pressures that may prevent it from agreeing to extend the truce for a second time after Aug.2, Grundberg is counting on European and American support to the extension, even if he did not reach an agreement with the Houthis over ending the siege of Taiz.

Grundberg did not hide his disappointment, too, at the Houthis’ rejection of his updated proposal to open crossings. However, he believes that the existing truce, especially with regard to the cease-fire, should not be neglected, in order to launch simultaneous discussions on security and economic files, as he stated in his last briefing to the Security Council.

Several politicians, who spoke with Asharq Al-Awsat, believe that a new truce extension will be approved, but stress that the priority will be on ending the seven-year siege imposed on Taiz, before engaging in any discussions on other files.

https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3757511/will-grundberg-succeed-extending-yemens-truce-without-opening-crossings

(A P)

Abdulsalam: Coalition’s treatment of UN-sponsored truce is still below the required level

The Head of [Sanaa gov.] National Delegation, Mohammed Abdulsalam has on Wednesday criticized the Saudi-led coalition’s treatment of UN-sponsored truce and the ongoing violations in Yemen.

“The US-Saudi aggression treatment of UN-sponsored truce is still below the required level,” Mohammed Abdulsalam said in a tweet.

He added, “The US-Saudi aggression does not fulfill truce, deliberately delay. It is not acceptable by our people.”

https://en.ypagency.net/266298/

(* A P)

UN extends mission helping implement Yemen port cease-fire

The U.N. Security Council voted unanimously Wednesday to extend the mandate of the U.N. mission helping to implement a December 2018 cease-fire agreement between Yemen’s government and Houthi rebels. The deal calls for the withdrawal of fighters from the key port of Hodeida, two smaller ports in the province and Hodeida city.

The U.N.-brokered agreement, reached in Stockholm, was vague on who would run the port of Hodeida after the withdrawals. The resolution extends the mandate of the U.N. mission, known as UNMHA, until July 14, 2023.

The resolution highlighted an “ongoing Houthi hindrance” to the U.N. mission’s freedom of movement and patrols.

The Security Council, however, welcomed a two-month truce between the internationally recognized government and the Iran-backed Houthis that took effect April 2. It was extended for an additional two months on June 2.

https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-united-nations-yemen-houthis-fa6db6863c6ae57135e0d62e929b3d11

and also https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/un-security-council-unanimously-extends-yemen-mission-for-1-year/2636416

and US SC resolution: https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14968.doc.htm

(* B P)

Briefing to the United Nations Security Council by the Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg, 11 July 2022

With the deadline for the truce extension a mere three weeks away, I want to take this opportunity to 1) highlight what has been achieved in the three and a half months of the truce, 2) discuss some of the obstacles we have faced in implementation and how we are working to overcome them, and 3) outline a way forward that includes extending, consolidating, and expanding the truce so that we increase the benefits to Yemen's population and move toward a political settlement.

To date, the truce has been holding for over three months.

We continue to receive reports from both sides about alleged incidents inside Yemen, including direct and indirect fire, drone attacks, reconnaissance overflights, and the establishment of new fortifications and trenches. The parties are also allegedly sending reinforcements to main frontlines, including in Ma'rib, Hudaydah, and Taiz. As you are aware, my Office is supporting the parties in establishing channels of communication to help them manage such alleged incidents in a peaceful manner.

The renewal of the truce on 2 June has allowed the continued flow of fuel into Hudaydah port. Since the truce renewal, seven fuel ships carrying nearly 200 thousand metric tons of various fuel products have been cleared to enter Hudaydah port. High fuel prices have chipped away at the benefit for Yemeni citizens. But there is no doubt that without the imports facilitated by the truce this situation would be far worse.

The efforts to enhance the freedom of movement for men and women inside Yemen as well as into and outside of Yemen must continue.

Let me now turn to Taiz and the issue of freedom of movement inside the country. It was my sincere belief that by this time in the truce, the parties would have reached an agreement to open roads in Taiz and other governorates. It is regrettable for all of us, but mostly for the men and women of Taiz, that many of the roads there remain closed for the seventh year in a row.

Since my last briefing, I have continued to engage the parties, including in Amman and during my recent visits to Riyadh and Muscat, on viable proposals to immediately open roads in Taiz and other governorates. I also continue to draw on the expertise of local mediators and civil society representatives.

I would like to take this opportunity to revisit the terms of truce where the parties committed to meet to agree on road openings. In the days preceding Eid Al Adha, we have seen different sides announce unilateral action to open roads. While unilateral action could be a step in the right direction, agreement from both sides is important because road openings require coordination and ongoing communication to ensure that roads are opened safely and sustainably for civilian passage. The United Nations-facilitated process provides a platform to come to a sustainable, negotiated agreement on road openings.

In the last weeks, we have seen worrisome escalatory rhetoric by the parties questioning the benefits of the truce -- a dangerous move that I ask both sides to refrain from. Let us be clear, the alternative to the truce is a return to hostilities and likely an intensified phase of conflict with all of its predictable consequences for Yemeni civilians and regional security.

This brings me to the way forward. Three and a half months into the truce, we still find ourselves immersed in the details of the truce implementation. This is important. But it has meant we have not been able to invest as much in the task of consolidating and expanding the truce in order to deliver more benefits to the population and set Yemen on the path toward a durable political settlement. In my discussions with the parties, they have emphasized the importance of building on the truce to achieve a wider array of economic and security priorities, and to not lose the opportunity for peace that it provides. Many of those priorities that the parties raised have also been highlighted by the diverse groups of Yemeni men and women that my Office had been consulting since March to inform our multi-track process. In the coming weeks, I will continue to explore with the parties the possibility of a longer extension and an expanded truce agreement. This would provide time and the opportunity to start serious discussions on the economy and security tracks, to start addressing priority issues such as revenues as well as the payment of salaries, and to begin the process of moving toward a ceasefire. I ask the parties to engage with me on these issues with a sense of urgency and flexibility. The participation of broad array of Yemeni stakeholders, including women, youth, and civil society remains a priority of mine to ensure that the political settlement is sustainable and meets the legitimate aspirations and demands of Yemeni men and women.

https://osesgy.unmissions.org/briefing-united-nations-security-council-special-envoy-yemen-hans-grundberg-5

Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xK9XI91Y8bc

And a UN report of the whole session, with all briefings and delegates’ statements: https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14964.doc.htm

And shorter UN report: https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1122302

and media report: https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-united-nations-yemen-civil-wars-df016f40aadca405d797ea6a4cb955cf

and

(* B H P)

Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Ms. Joyce Msuya, Remarks to the UN Security Council on Yemen, 11 July 2022

Yemen’s humanitarian catastrophe is about to get much worse.

The truce represents a landmark step forward. And we hope a solution can be found quickly to re-open roads around Taiz, as the Special Envoy has just outlined.

But the truce alone will not be enough to stop what we fear is coming.

Humanitarian needs across the country – including risk of famine in some areas – could rise sharply in the coming weeks and months.

The international community must act quickly and decisively to stop this.

In our briefing a few weeks ago, we warned about rising needs due to economic problems, a worsening environment for aid workers and a collapse in humanitarian funding.

Let us review where these issues stand.

First, the economy and rising needs. Last month, we called for action to protect Yemen’s economy from domestic challenges and from the impact of the war in Ukraine. This remains urgent.

The exchange rate, which is a key factor in how much food people can afford to eat, is still collapsing. It’s now trading at about 1,120 rial to the dollar in Aden.

Most of the currency’s gains since the truce have now been wiped out. That means many more families are going hungry again.

The Ukraine war is also threatening the supply chains that bring in Yemen’s food – nearly 90 per cent of which must be imported. Last year, just under half of all wheat came from Russia and Ukraine.

My second point, Madam President, is that aid work is becoming more difficult and more dangerous, which we also warned about last month. Unfortunately, providing life-saving assistance remains challenging.

Intimidation and incitement against aid agencies have continued across Yemen. This is being fuelled by misinformation amplified through social media, messaging apps and in some public forums.

In Houthi-held areas, staff movements have also become more difficult in recent weeks due to bureaucratic impediments for Yemeni aid workers travelling abroad for professional reasons. Houthi authorities are also increasingly enforcing restrictions that curb women’s full participation in humanitarian action – both as aid workers and as aid recipients.

And, eight months after repeatedly promising their quick release, security officials in Sana’a continue to detain two United Nations staff members – a violation of UN privileges and immunities.

Meanwhile, the insecurity we warned about in Government-held areas has also persisted. Since our last briefing, there have been five more carjackings of aid agency vehicles – or more than one every week. That brings the total to 18 carjackings since the beginning of the year.

There has also been no progress in efforts to free the five UN staff who were kidnapped five months ago in Abyan.

But the biggest problem we have right now, Madam President, is funding – which is my third point. The Yemen response plan has so far received just over $1.1 billion – or 27 per cent of what it needs. This is the sharpest year-on-year decrease of any UN-coordinated plan in the world.

We know budgets are tight, and we deeply appreciate everyone’s contributions. But we also have a responsibility to say clearly: aid agencies are dangerously under-resourced for what we fear is coming.

Hunger is worse than ever, and yet the World Food Programme was forced to cut rations for millions of people several weeks ago due to funding gaps. That was the second major food cut in just six months.

Across all sectors, similar cuts are sadly costing lives.

Beyond the response plan, funds for other urgent priorities are also lacking. The UN plan to resolve the threat from the SAFER oil tanker, for example, is still struggling to fill an immediate $20 million shortfall.

The UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism, created in 2016 to facilitate commercial imports to Yemen, is also running out of money. As of now, it will shut down in September, casting even more uncertainty onto already battered supply chains for food, fuel and other essential goods. It needs $3.5 million to cover operations from September until the end of the year.

This Mechanism is a key partner in the Security Council’s commitment to facilitating commercial imports to Yemen.

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/assistant-secretary-general-humanitarian-affairs-and-deputy-emergency-relief-coordinator-ms-joyce-msuya-remarks-un-security-council-yemen-11-july-2022

Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hhxcQPvTPGE

and

(* B H P)

Commercial wheat imports from India key supply line for Yemen: UN official

Commercial wheat imports from India have emerged as a key supply line for Yemen in the wake of the Ukraine war, the UN deputy relief chief said, as New Delhi stressed the need to ensure the civilian nature of the ports in the Hudaydah governorate from the food security perspective.

Joint Secretary (UNP) in the Ministry of External Affairs Prakash Gupta told the UN Security Council briefing on Yemen on Monday that in order to mitigate the supply changes in the global commodity markets and their adverse impact on food security, India has been providing financial assistance as well as supplying food grains to countries in need.

"India has exported more than 2,50,000 tons of wheat to Yemen, in the last three months, he said.

Gupta thanked Msuya for acknowledging India's contribution of providing wheat to Yemen in her briefing to the council. He further stressed it is also important to ensure the civilian nature of the ports in the Hudaydah governorate from the food security perspective, as these ports remain the main gateway for flow of food and other essential commodities into Yemen.

In this regard, India supports a more effective mandate for the UN Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement, which will enable the Mission to undertake monitoring missions to these ports and report on their possible use for military purposes, he added.

https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/commercial-wheat-imports-from-india-key-supply-line-for-yemen-un-official-122071200128_1.html = https://www.firstpost.com/world/commercial-wheat-imports-from-india-key-supply-line-for-yemen-says-top-un-official-10898601.html

Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FMKPh4SGy4

and

(A P)

UK, US, China remarks:

https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/positive-momentum-towards-peace-and-stability-in-yemen

https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-yemen-11/

https://english.news.cn/20220712/a1dffe6ff6de493b85c061723b2cf1a5/c.html

and

(A P)

[Sanaa gov.] Yemeni Officials Condemn UN Envoy Briefing: UN Partner in Yemenis Suffering

The director of Sana'a International Airport, Khaled Al-Shayef, stated to Almasirah that the UN luvvie (envoy) did not mention in his briefing the failure of flights to Cairo or the reasons for that. He pointed out that the briefing of the UN luvvie was not the truth and was polishing the role of the UN envoy.

For his part, Minister of State in the Salvation government, Abdulaziz Al-Bukair, assured Almasirah that what Yemenis have been suffering from since the beginning of the aggression is the lack of impartiality of the United Nations.

"The United Nations is a partner in the suffering of the Yemeni people by covering the crimes of aggression and the continuation of the siege," Al-Bukair said, adding that the UN luvvie ignored looting wealth by the coalition of aggression and cutting the salaries of state workers.

https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/27063/Yemeni-Officials-Condemn-UN-Envoy-Briefing-UN-Partner-in-Yemenis-Suffering%C2%A0

and

(A P)

Film: #Yemen's [Sanaa gov.] Politicians Resent, Astonish by UN Envoy Briefing Before Security Council

https://twitter.com/GhalebM0nz1i7/status/1547239591224164353

and

(A P)

UN trying to cover up Saudi crimes in Yemen’s Saada

A Yemeni website considered the recent statements raised by the UN envoy for Yemen Affairs as an attempt to cover up the recent crimes committed by Saudi aggressor coalition in northern Yemen.

Concurrent with the crimes committed by the Saudi-led coalition in "Saada" province in northern Yemen, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Affairs Hans Grundberg claimed in his report to the UN Security Council that the number of Yemeni civilian victims has decreased during the UN-brokered ceasefire period.

In response to these statements, the Yemeni Website wrote that Grundberg’s remarks have opened up accusations against United Nations' attempts to cover up the Saudi-led coalition's crimes.

https://en.mehrnews.com/news/188996/UN-trying-to-cover-up-Saudi-crimes-in-Yemen-s-Saada

(A P)

Film: The UN 'Luvvie' Envoy Resumes Activities to Extend Truce 'from #Riyadh'

https://twitter.com/GhalebM0nz1i7/status/1547238522683260929

My remark: The Houthi viewpoint.

(A P)

Film: #Sanaa's Initiative to Open Roads in #Taiz Faces Intransigence of US-Saudi Aggression, Its tools

https://twitter.com/GhalebM0nz1i7/status/1547237221727625218

(* B P)

As a reminder, I left off in my last thread explaining with this image that the city of Taiz (with over a million inhabitants) has 3 main entrances from the east, north, and north-west. The eastern entrance (leading to/from Hawban area) is further divided to 4 sub-routes.

I also explained in my previous thread that in addition to blocking the entrances to the city, AA [Sanaa gov.] forces are also blocking the main road connecting Taiz south to the port city of Aden, and the other main road connecting Taiz west to Hodeidah port and Mokha port.

Since the beginning of the negotiations and throughout its multiple rounds, AA have insisted on their initial and only offer of opening three roads: 1- Karish-Al-Rahida road on the main highway connecting Sana'a-Thamar-Ibb-Taiz-Aden (Yellow circle below).

The Sarmain-Abaar-Salah minor sub-road entering the city from the south (Yellow circle below).

The 60st-50st-Air Defence Camp-Madinat AlNoor route shown in the yellow circle below. This includes a section (in purple) connecting 60st to 50st that is currently non-existent and is being paved/created by AA.

The [Aden] government on the other hand have made it clear that all MAIN entrance roads to the city must be opened, and they are willing to make any necessary arrangements to address any security concerns.

The envoy's multiple proposals so far have focused on a multi-phased approach, with the condition of opening at least 1 main entrance to the city in the first phase. Successive proposals have included different options for the one main entrance to be opened.

While the government has publicly accepted the envoy's proposal in June, AA have publicly rejected it. The envoy submitted an updated proposal to the parties on 3rd July, and he has announced today to the UNSC that AA again rejected it.

The government side will not accept an agreement that does not at least open one main entrance. AA continue to refuse opening a main entrance to the city despite all the grassroots and international pressure on them for almost 2 months now to honour their truce commitments.

Where does this lead to next? The next 3 weeks will be telling, but one thing is for sure: failing to achieve progress on Taiz will continue to threaten the entire truce, or at a minimum prevent the ability to expand the truce into a more sustainable political process.

https://twitter.com/ymnraf/status/1546538185144078344

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp8 – cp19

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-815b-yemen-war-mosaic-815b

Vorige / Previous:

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-814-yemen-war-mosaic-814

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-814 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-814:

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm

http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/

http://www.yemenwar.info/

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

http://yemendataproject.org/data/

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

https://yemen.bellingcat.com/

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

https://yemeniarchive.org/en

Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
Geschrieben von

Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt

Dietrich Klose

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