... Diplomaten drängen auf Waffenstillstandsverlängerung – Die Kunst des Möglichen im Jemen – Niemand versucht, den Jemen wieder herzustellen, wie er einmal war – Rekrutierung von Kindern für den Krieg – Lecke Geistertanker: Verschmutzung im Hafen von Aden – Jemens antikes Erbe vom Krieg bedroht – und mehr
August 4, 2022: Yemen’s Truce extended for another two months – The Houthi view on renewing the truce – One sided and incomplete, Yemen’s truce faces implementation hurdles – Diplomats push for extension of truce – The art of the possible in Yemen – Nobody is trying to restore Yemen to what it once was – Children armed recruitment in Yemen – Leaking ghost tankers: Pollution in the port of Aden – Yemen’s ancient heritage threatrened by war – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-818b-yemen-war-mosaic-818b
Klassifizierung / Classification
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Aden-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Aden government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp8a Jamal Khashoggi
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp11 Deutschland / Germany
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp12b Sudan
cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade
cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage
cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy
cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism
cp15 Propaganda
cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
cp19 Sonstiges / Other
Klassifizierung / Classification
***
**
*
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
(** A P)
Waffenstillstand im Jemen um weitere zwei Monate verlängert
Am Dienstag gab der UN-Sonderbeauftragte für Jemen Hans Grundberg bekannt, dass der Waffenstillstand in dem Land um weitere zwei Monate bis zum 2. Oktober verlängert wurde.
Die Verlängerung beinhaltet eine Verpflichtung der Regierung und der Houthi-Rebellen, die Verhandlungen zu intensivieren, um so bald wie möglich ein erweitertes Abkommen zu erreichen.
Grundberg dankte der Führung beider Seiten für ihre Zustimmung zu der Verlängerung und für ihre fortgesetzten konstruktiven Bemühungen.
„Ich zähle auf die fortgesetzte Zusammenarbeit der Parteien, um alle Elemente des Waffenstillstands umzusetzen und Jemen auf den Weg zu einem dauerhaften Frieden zu bringen. Das jemenitische Volk verdient nicht weniger“, sagte er in einer Erklärung.
Grundberg hat den Parteien einen Vorschlag für ein erweitertes Abkommen vorgelegt und „substanzielle Kommentare“ von ihnen erhalten.
Der von den Vereinten Nationen vermittelte Waffenstillstand trat erstmals am 2. April für zunächst zwei Monate in Kraft. Er wurde im Juni um weitere zwei Monate verlängert. Dies markiert die längste Periode relativer Ruhe im Jemen seit mehr als sieben Jahren des Konflikts.
Zu den im vergangenen Monat gemeldeten Errungenschaften gehörten eine 60-prozentige Verringerung der zivilen Opfer und eine fast 50-prozentige Verringerung der Vertreibungen. Darüber hinaus sind 26 Treibstoffschiffe in Hudaydah eingelaufen, und es gab 36 Hin- und Rückflüge zwischen Sanaa und Jordaniens Hauptstadt Amman und Kairo, Ägypten.
Grundberg betonte, dass das Hauptziel des Waffenstillstands weiterhin darin bestehe, der Zivilbevölkerung konkrete Hilfe zu leisten und ein günstiges Umfeld für eine friedliche Beilegung des Konflikts durch einen umfassenden politischen Prozess zu schaffen.
https://unric.org/de/030822-jemen/
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PRESS STATEMENT BY UN SPECIAL ENVOY FOR YEMEN HANS GRUNDBERG ON A TWO-MONTH RENEWAL OF THE UN-MEDIATED TRUCE
I am pleased to announce that the parties have agreed to extend the truce, under the same terms, for an additional two months, from 2 August 2022 until 2 October 2022. This truce extension includes a commitment from the parties to intensify negotiations to reach an expanded truce agreement as soon as possible.
I wish to express my gratitude to the leaderships of the parties for agreeing to this truce extension and for their continued constructive engagements with me in implementing and seeking an expansion to the truce.
In order to consolidate the opportunity provided by the truce to pivot toward sustainable peace, I will also intensify my efforts with the parties to reach as soon as possible an expanded truce agreement. I have shared with the parties a proposal for an expanded truce agreement, and I have received from both sides substantive comments on this proposal.
The expanded truce proposal would provide for reaching an agreement on a transparent and effective disbursement mechanism for the regular payment of civil servant salaries and civilian pensions, the opening of roads in Taiz and other governorates, opening additional destinations to and from Sana’a International Airport, and providing fuel and its regular flow of fuel to the ports of Hudaydah. An expanded agreement would also provide an opportunity to negotiate a nationwide ceasefire, humanitarian and economic issues, and to prepare for the resumption of the Yemeni-led political process under UN auspices to reach a sustainable and just peace
The main objective of the current truce continues to be to provide tangible relief to civilians and to create a conducive environment for reaching a peaceful settlement to the conflict through a comprehensive political process.
In the coming weeks, I will intensify my engagements with the parties to ensure the full implementation of all the parties’ obligations in the truce. This should include the implementation of the full number and regularity of flights between the agreed destinations and Sana’a International Airport and the number of fuel ships entering Hudaydah port, as stipulated in the truce agreement. It is also important to make progress on opening roads in Taiz and other governorates to facilitate the freedom of movement of millions of Yemeni women, men and children, and of goods. The people of Taiz and across Yemen deserve for the truce to deliver for them in all its aspects.
I would like to reiterate my gratitude for the concerted support of the international community. I note in particular the support of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, as well as the members of the UN Security Council.
I count on the continued cooperation of the parties to meet their commitments and implement all elements of the truce and to negotiate in good faith to reach an expanded truce agreement, and to put Yemen on a path to sustainable peace. The Yemeni people deserve no less.
(** B P)
Prisoners of their Words: The Houthi View on Renewing the Truce
Ansar Allah, the armed Houthi movement, does not seem to mind extending the truce, but they fear the intentions of those who call for its renewal. In their world view, the US can only be up to no good in Yemen, so Washington’s repeated calls for a new truce are special cause for concern.
Their belief that the US and the West cannot possibly mean well has meant that, throughout the truce, the Houthis have not responded favorably to the UN Special Envoy’s de-escalation proposals.
But blame does not lie solely with Ansar Allah. UN Resolutions meant to ostracize the Houthis for derailing Yemen’s political process have isolated them from the rest of the world and created the conditions for them to hold on to their xenophobic narrative. Their diplomatic contacts are monopolized by their Negotiation Delegation, headed by Mohammed Abdel Salam and based in the Omani capital Muscat. This gives inordinate leverage to the viewpoints held by the delegation. It also denies other Houthi leaders the benefit of interacting with international diplomats and exchanging views that would give them a better understanding of the “other.” Houthi leaders have not responded well to repeated attempts by Western diplomats to start a dialogue, and have refused to participate in Track II meetings that would bring them into greater contact with other Yemenis, international diplomats and INGO workers. But there has also been little effort by INGOs to organize meetings and events in Sana’a.
The Houthis are prisoners of their own narrative. Their decisions and actions are determined by it, including their use of the truce to frantically recruit fighters and prepare for the next round of fighting. Other constituents of the Houthi-led coalition, such as the Sana’a-based faction of the General People’s Congress, as well as many elites based in the capital, do not subscribe to the same xenophobia. They point to the massive humanitarian response led by the West as proof that they are not Yemen’s enemies. However, these voices are not the decision-makers in Sana’a. The Houthi leadership’s narrative is detrimental to the hopes of Yemenis for peace but, ultimately, it is also detrimental to the chances of the group’s ability to remain relevant in the future – by Abdulghani Al-Iryani
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/18283
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One sided and incomplete, Yemen’s truce faces implementation hurdles as extension deadline nears
In short, there is strong external interest in extending the Yemeni truce given the scale of turmoil in the global arena. And yet credible progress remains lacking and should not be overestimated. The Yemeni government’s newly established Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which took over the powers of the former office of the president and is headed by long-serving statesman Dr. Rashad al-Alimi, made significant concessions to support the truce. However, the Houthis have failed to reciprocate. The original two-month truce called on all signatories to freeze military operations, permit the resumption of two weekly flights to and from Sanaa International Airport (SAH), allow the entry of 18 fuel shipments into Hodeida port, and recommence talks to open the roads in and to Taiz and other cities. Yet as of June 2, when the ceasefire deal was extended for another two months, progress was made on only the first three of those agreed-to points.
What has the truce accomplished?
Broadly, the immediate internal benefits of the truce included the ability of Yemenis to again fly from Sanaa, a significant reduction in civilian causalities and displacement, and a revival of direct communication between the Houthis and the Yemeni government. Nevertheless, the truce remains a work in progress — and progress made largely as a result of the government of Yemen’s and the Saudi coalition’s concessions, which have thus far been met with high levels of Houthi inflexibility in at least four key areas.
Progress on the reopening of roads in Taiz governorate may require negotiations to zoom out to encompass al-Dhale’a, Marib, Lajh, al-Bayda, Hodeida, and other Yemeni governorates as well. But to ensure a credible trust-building process, serious pressure must be applied on the Houthis to cooperate, especially given that their initial demands have been met to enter direct talks. For now, Yemenis face an absurd situation in which thousands can buy expensive airline tickets to fly to Amman, Cairo, or Sanaa, while the 3 million residents of Taiz governorate cannot purchase a bus ticket to travel 10 minutes from al-Hawban to Taiz city due to the ongoing Houthi siege.
Fourth, the relative calm in the military sphere does not necessarily mean that another escalation is not possible, nor has it prevented over a thousand ceasefire breaches, including small-scale offensives, mobilizations of forces, and the expansion of frontline trenches. Rather, the relative calm brought about by the four-month-long truce has meant that the breaches did not result in a significant change in territorial control or a major death toll from combat.
On the mobilization front, the Houthis have used the truce period to attract new military recruits and further indoctrinate Yemeni children in areas under their control through systematic radicalization programs known as “cultural” or “summer courses.”
The signs of a looming escalation in the coming months are clear and must not be overlooked. The Military Coordination Committee, which has met three times as of July and encompasses representatives of the Yemeni government, Saudi-led coalition, and the Houthis, will eventually need to expand its role beyond tactical de-escalation work.
Moving forward
Despite the quantifiable progress and benefits of the truce, forward momentum appears largely one-sided, with the Houthis again benefiting from the international pressure on the government of Yemen to hold to the ceasefire. Clearly, understanding the broader international attitude, and in light of the “long-stated goal” of Washington and Riyadh “to end the war in Yemen,” as expressed in the July 15 Jeddah Communique, the Houthis followed up on President Joe Biden’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia by publicly rejecting another extension of the truce. The move seems designed to secure further concessions in the back-channel talks happening in Muscat. Given the earlier progress made on reopening flights and fuel entry, headway on lifting the siege in Taiz will be a test not only for the international community but also for the Houthis regarding the compromises they could offer were comprehensive talks to resume tomorrow.
The extension of the truce as a temporary de-escalation measure cannot continue indefinitely. The truce should be a means to an end — that is, a comprehensive political settlement — not an end in itself. The warring parties, especially the Houthis, are preparing their ranks for further fighting. Any truce renewal must be tied to a broader political process and, most importantly, be accompanied by credible pressure from the international community on all actors benefiting from the goodwill of their counterparts. Were the Houthis to accept an extension of the current truce, regional actors might use this success as justification to reduce their military footprint in Yemen, while the international community seems to treat the Yemen peace process as a box-ticking exercise. One looming fear among many Yemenis is that, under such a situation, the cycle of violence would resume in a more internalized manner, especially along the Marib front – by Ibrahim Jalal
and
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Yemen: Diplomats push for extension of truce as deadline nears
Officials see window of opportunity to extend and deepen ceasefire, with signs of battle fatigue on both sides
Diplomats are shuttling between Middle Eastern capitals in a final push to extend and deepen a fragile truce in Yemen, before it expires on Tuesday.
In the past week, UN special envoy Hans Grundberg has travelled between the Yemeni port city of Aden, Oman and Riyadh for talks with Yemen’s internationally recognised government and Houthi negotiators. This week, Tim Lenderking, the US Special Envoy for Yemen, is visiting both Riyadh and Amman.
Efforts to broker a deal come at a critical time for Yemen, where the truce in its civil war - which was first announced in April and extended for two months in June - has brought much-needed respite from fighting that has claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people.
“We are at a phase now where the truce is becoming more of a commitment for both sides,” a western official with direct knowledge of the talks told Middle East Eye, on the condition of anonymity. “It’s going to be hard for either to walk away.”
“The truce benefits the Houthis right now because the Marib battle exhausted them,” Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen, a senior researcher at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, told MEE.
Meanwhile, Riyadh has been searching for an exit from the war. In April, Yemen’s Saudi-backed president, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, long seen as an obstacle to peace talks, resigned. He was replaced by an eight-member presidential council, which Riyadh urged to negotiate with the Houthis.
“Yemen is a headache for Saudi Arabia. They just want to freeze the fighting and stop cross-border attacks,” Deen said, referring to the Houthis' missile and drone strikes on the kingdom.
Shifting priorities on both sides of the conflict, even if for the short term, have led diplomats to believe they have a window of opportunity as they push for an extension of the truce from two months to six.
“Right now at least, the whole region is singing the same song. They want the truce,” the western official said.
A number of obstacles could still derail talks. One of the main issues has been the Houthis’ refusal to reopen roads to the besieged city of Taiz, in southwestern Yemen, officials and analysts say.
“The government feels they have given a lot of concessions and not gotten much in return,” a second western official familiar with the government’s thinking told MEE.
Analysts say the Houthis are negotiating from a position where they believe they have the upper hand on the battlefield.
"The Houthis still harbour military aspirations, while the Saudis and Emiratis no longer have the military appetite to continue the fight, and the Houthis are well aware of that,” Mohammed al-Basha, a senior Arabian peninsula analyst at the Navanti Group, told MEE. “Yemen has entered the stalemate phase of no peace and no war,” Basha adds.
Diplomats are also trying to strike an agreement between the two sides on the payment of salaries to civil servants, to which the Houthis have asked the government to contribute in the areas they control. The potential compromise, officials tell MEE, would be to link the payment of salaries in Houthi-controlled territory with the government’s call for more transparency on the tax revenue the rebels collect at Hodeidah port.
However, burden-sharing agreements a
A number of obstacles could still derail talks. One of the main issues has been the Houthis’ refusal to reopen roads to the besieged city of Taiz, in southwestern Yemen, officials and analysts say.
“The government feels they have given a lot of concessions and not gotten much in return,” a second western official familiar with the government’s thinking told MEE.
Analysts say the Houthis are negotiating from a position where they believe they have the upper hand on the battlefield.
"The Houthis still harbour military aspirations, while the Saudis and Emiratis no longer have the military appetite to continue the fight, and the Houthis are well aware of that,” Mohammed al-Basha, a senior Arabian peninsula analyst at the Navanti Group, told MEE. “Yemen has entered the stalemate phase of no peace and no war,” Basha adds.
Diplomats are also trying to strike an agreement between the two sides on the payment of salaries to civil servants, to which the Houthis have asked the government to contribute in the areas they control. The potential compromise, officials tell MEE, would be to link the payment of salaries in Houthi-controlled territory with the government’s call for more transparency on the tax revenue the rebels collect at Hodeidah port.
However, burden-sharing agreements are complicated, because Yemen’s financial system is divided, with a central bank in Sanaa and one in Aden each printing its own currency.
“The goal is to reach in principle agreements which can be deepened and worked out technically during the next truce,” the western official told MEE.
An agreement could also be reached on expanding flights from Sanaa. While flights to Amman have resumed, Egypt has allowed only one flight to Cairo and is requesting more security checks at the airport. A list of additional destinations is being floated, which officials tell MEE contains cities in the region currently reachable from Aden airport.
Even if the two sides reach an agreement extending the truce, few predict a breakthrough on a political settlement any time soon.
“The truce has developed confidence-building measures between actors that will probably never be able to reconcile,” Raiman al-Hamdani of the Yemen Policy Center, told MEE.
The UN says each side continues to send reinforcements to the front lines. Just last month the UK intercepted what it said was a shipment of Iranian missiles in the Gulf of Oman likely destined for Yemen.
If Saudi Arabia steps back from the conflict, Yemen would still be left with a disparate mix of armed rivals, including within the coalition. Groups like the secessionist Southern Transitional Council have fought both the Houthis and the government. Al-Qaeda has also stepped up its operations in south Yemen.
“There could be a long-term truce on cross-border attacks on the Saudis, but within Yemen we still have a long way to go,” Hamdani added. – by Sean Mathews
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/diplomats-push-extension-yemen-truce-deadline-nears
(** B P)
The Art of the Possible in Yemen
If the United States wants to avoid a disaster scenario in Yemen, it should shift its focus from the failed attempt to resurrect a single Yemeni state to laying the groundwork for a divided Yemen.
The Yemeni state, as has been clear for some time, is broken – irreparably and irrevocably broken.
Yemen cannot be put back together again, not by the United Nations, the United States, or any of Yemen’s various armed groups. Country experts and administration officials largely accept this, but U.S. policy does not.
Instead, the United States is using its limited diplomatic resources to pursue the unrealistic goal of reuniting the country at the expense of what is actually possible in Yemen. This is foolish because, as a policy approach, it is guaranteed to fail. And it is dangerous because what is possible now may not be in two or three years.
Yemen’s future, broadly speaking, will take one of three different paths: the dream scenario, the division scenario, or the disaster scenario.
In the dream scenario, the war ends, and Yemen is reconstituted as a single state. The Houthis, who currently hold much of the northern Yemeni highlands, are one political actor in the reconstituted state but not the only political actor.
In the division scenario, the current split between Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and non-Houthi parts of the country is formalized, and Yemen separates into a North and South. In many ways, Yemen already functions as two separate countries. Thanks to a shortsighted and reactionary decision by then-President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi in 2016 to move Yemen’s central bank from Sanaa to Aden, the bank split into a Houthi-controlled version and a government-controlled one, neither of which functioned effectively.
Not surprisingly, the presence of two central banks led to the formation of two separate economies.
There are also governmental differences. Years of de facto control in Sanaa have allowed the Houthis to restructure and reorganize government ministries and agencies in areas under their control. Unwinding these changes will, in many cases, prove impossible, at least in the short term.
As distasteful as the division scenario is to many, both Yemenis and outsiders, who do not want to see the Houthis rewarded for the group’s aggression, it is the least bad of all the options.
The worst case for Yemen, the United States, and the world is the disaster scenario. In this possible future, Yemen fractures into violent statelets that are held by whatever warlord is strongest at any given moment. In such a world, Yemen’s various armed groups are constantly struggling to seize and hold as much territory as possible, which opens up space for Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to rebound, sparks massive movements of internally displaced people and refugees, and endangers global shipping lanes through the Red Sea. This is a future to be avoided at all costs.
Given the risks associated with the disaster scenario as well as the inability of the administration of President Joseph R. Biden Jr. over the past two years to create any leverage with the Houthis or bring about comprehensive peace, the United States cannot continue with business as usual and hope that Yemen somehow is put back together again.
While the current truce that had been set to expire August 2 is expected to be extended, it is unlikely to blossom into full peace. The Houthis aren’t about to negotiate themselves out of power in Sanaa. Saudi Arabia and its local allies aren’t able to militarily defeat them. And the United States isn’t going to get involved on the ground to tip the balance. That means the war is likely to drag on, destroying more lives and creating an even worse humanitarian situation, particularly as global food prices continue to rise.
The longer the war lasts the greater the risk that the anti-Houthi coalition will, once again, fragment and devolve into infighting.
If the United States wants to avoid the disaster scenario in Yemen, it should shift its focus from the failed attempt to resurrect a single Yemeni state to laying the groundwork for a divided Yemen. This isn’t desirable, but, unlike the dream scenario, it is achievable.
This approach is not without risks. First, moving toward partition in Yemen may accelerate the collapse of the Presidential Leadership Council, undermining the coalition of forces that are currently opposing the Houthis. Such a collapse could also provide an opening to the Houthis to fully seize Marib, which the group has been attempting to take since early 2020.
Second, any shift in official U.S. policy away from supporting a unified Yemen will likely anger large numbers of Yemenis, including those in northern Yemen, who fear unchecked Houthi rule.
Diplomatically and rhetorically, it would be safer and easier for the United States to continue to do what it has been doing for the past several years: sell some weapons (offensive or defensive) to the Saudis, make some noise about unity, and watch from the sidelines as one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises continues unchecked. But at some point in the near future the gap between the reality on the ground and U.S. policy will become so great that the United States will have little choice but to abandon the dream scenario of a reunified Yemen. If the United States waits too long, it won’t even have the option of pursuing partition – instead it will be stuck with the disaster scenario – by Gregory D. Johnsen
https://agsiw.org/the-art-of-the-possible-in-yemen/
(** B H K P)
THE LEADERS WHO ASPIRE ONLY TO HOLD ON TO POWER
Nobody is trying to restore Yemen to what it once was.
No one involved in Yemen’s war, at any level, has any significant aspiration for the country. Hopes—to the extent that any exist—are limited to improving the odds of surviving. In Yemen, in Saudi Arabia and the UAE (the dominant powers in non-Houthi areas), in the United States, there is no discussion of how to rebuild Yemen, let alone how to make it thrive as it once did. The grandiose ambitions of the war’s major players were dashed long ago, and yet the conflict still grinds on, leaving a country ruined. The war has created its own logic and its own momentum.
The Yemeni government’s poverty has made it dependent on handouts from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In return, it has ceded no small amount of sovereignty. Ships hoping to dock at Aden’s harbor must first undergo inspection by the Saudi-led Coalition, primarily by passing through the Saudi city of Jeddah, and the decision to grant a foreign journalist like me a visa had to be approved by officials in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
Yemenis deeply resent this dependency. “This is bullshit,” one fellow passenger yelled as our wait dragged on. “Someone call [Saudi Crown Prince] Mohammed bin Salman!”
The country’s horizons were not always so limited. Some Adenis still remember when the city was the Dubai of its era, prospering from its global commercial links in the dying days of the British empire.
Nobody is trying to restore Aden to what it once was. Yemen’s leaders aspire only to hold on to power so that they can wring the few remaining dollars out of state coffers. The wealthy Gulf states involved in Yemen’s war seem only to want the government to limp along ineffectually until they can extricate themselves from the conflict. And the United States’ primary concerns are counterterrorism and the maintenance of its security relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
There was a time when Saudi leaders imagined that they would swoop in as Yemen’s savior. Mohammed bin Salman launched Riyadh’s military campaign against the Houthis a mere two months after he was appointed defense minister, and the 2015 intervention became integral to the young prince’s rise to power.
The current diplomatic goal is to freeze the conflict in place, in the hope that this will open the door to broader political negotiations.
For many people whom I spoke with in Yemen, however, that risks simply freezing their lives in an impossible situation.
Eight years into this conflict, any hope of a decisive victory has vanished. Many Adenis I interviewed have grown cynical about the point of this seemingly pointless war: It only continues, they say, to justify a small elite’s grip on power and continued looting of state coffers.
I have been covering and studying this war—first from Beirut, then from Riyadh, and now from Washington, D.C.—since its inception and, frankly, that explanation is as good as any. The Gulf Arab states have abandoned the pretense that they will deal a death blow to Iranian expansionism; MBS has secured his position in the Saudi hierarchy; the Houthis’ boasts that they would win a swift victory over their foes have been proved false. What better reasoning can I put forward than that proffered to me by those Adenis?
Last year, retired Brigadier General Naji al-Arabi found himself leading a group of angry protesters massed outside Aden’s presidential palace. Inside, Yemeni leaders were meeting. As the protesters approached, the soldiers at the gate fired warning shots to disperse the crowd. The demonstrators, many of them military veterans like Arabi, didn’t back down: They surged forward toward the entrance, and after a brief scuffle the guards stepped aside and allowed them to enter the palace.
“We didn’t know the government was having an emergency meeting,” Arabi told me. “We just heard the helicopters flying away.”
The Yemeni government fled shortly after the palace gates were breached. The protesters soon departed peacefully, returning to a nearby mosque to read their list of demands, calling on the government to improve the dismal living conditions in the city. It made little difference: An atmosphere of imminent collapse and simmering revolt still hangs over Aden.
Arabi, a blunt man who wears a perpetually exasperated expression, joined the army in 1978.
Arabi has eight children who depend on his pension for their survival. Some of his sons now chop wood to make ends meet during the long stretches when the money does not arrive. Many well-trained military officers have similarly been forced to scratch out a living by whatever means necessary. “You can find a fighter pilot watching over sheep, or selling newspapers or cigarettes,” Arabi said.
In addition to pressuring the government and its foreign patrons, the protest movement is a way for officers like Arabi to maintain some influence over the thousands of desperate ex-soldiers abandoned by the Yemeni state. Arabi fears that, without any way of supporting themselves, some of his former comrades could drift into Islamist militancy or work for criminal gangs to earn a living. In fact, he believes that the government is hoping they do, as it would then have a pretext to crack down violently on the protest movement.
“We think the government is trying to repress us so that people will use their weapons to sabotage and to steal,” he said. “They are trying to create new front lines to keep the war going, to feed on it.”
The movement has sputtered in recent months, however, as its members grow further impoverished. Arabi admitted that it has become difficult to persuade veterans to bear the costs of leaving their home in the countryside to travel to Aden for protests.
Arabi and his fellow soldiers will not be the last victims of Yemen’s collapse. Spend any time at all in Aden, and you will find a whole new generation furious at the impossibility of building a life here: There are the medical students without textbooks or functional internet, the psychiatrist specializing in conflict trauma who had his desk taken away by university administrators, and the government official who works from home because heavily armed men occupy his office. The list goes on.
If you listen to diplomats, this moment constitutes a hopeful one for Yemen. The truce is for the most part holding, in no small part because of coordination between U.S. and Saudi diplomats.
For residents of Aden, however, international diplomacy often seems divorced from the daily struggles of life. So much has already been lost. What remains feels ephemeral. And there is only one employer that is always hiring.
Standing in the courtyard of the University of Aden, I asked a medical student what would happen if he couldn’t find work after graduation. “There’s always the war,” he said. “You can make 1,000 Saudi rials [$266] each month as a fighter.”
In Aden, your salary and savings can shrink to nothing; your physical security can be threatened at a whim; even electricity is fleeting. But the front line is a constant, fixed reality, and it’s not going anywhere – by David Kenner
(** B H K P)
Factors influencing children armed recruitment in Yemen
Abstract
The phenomenon of child recruitment is an alarming issue all over the world in general and in Yemeni society in particular. As a result, this research article attempts to investigate the most effective factors that stand behind the armed recruitment of Yemeni children in the current war across the country. The research design is quantitative in nature and it is based on a questionnaire which has been designed and used as the main tool of data collection. The sample consists of 55 respondents who are intellectuals, activists and politicians as a convenient sampling. The SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) has been adopted to analyze the collected data via Google forms and e-mail. The overall results and findings have shown that the educational-oriented factors represent the most effective factors among the other factors that have a significant influence on children recruitment in Yemen war with a mean of (3.64) and S.D.D (0.41). Also, the second most important factor is the economy-oriented problems that have affected the whole country with a mean of (3.57) and S.D.D (0.43). However, the least effective factor among the others was the social factor with a mean of (3.30) and S.D.SD (0.49). The findings of this study imply that the absence and care of education has to a large extent paved the way to engage and recruit children in wars. Nonetheless, the economic and financial situation of people has undoubtedly helped in engaging young children in wars to get their living. Urgent solutions and remedies are highly needed and strongly recommended in education and economy fields to avoid and reduce the armed recruitment of children in the ongoing war in Yemen.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2022.2108137
(** B P)
Leaking Ghost Tankers: Pollution in the Port of Aden
Decaying oil tankers at the coasts of Yemen pose serious risks to the environment and the people depending on it, reminding us starkly how conflicts can bring serious pollution risks. New open source research by PAX reveals multiple oil spills from rusty ships that have been polluting the coastal areas around the Port of Aden. If no action is taken by the authorities to remove these ships, it is only a matter of time before a new disaster will unfold.
Yet over the course of the last years, smaller incidents around oil tankers in Yemen’s ports, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden have been mounting as well. Ranging from direct attacks on oil tankers to abandoned ships sinking and fires at port refineries, the conflict continues to create serious local pollution problems. The reality of these pollution perils became clear in early July, when PAX detected a large oil spill coming from one of the abandoned oil tankers in the Port of Aden, which continued for weeks. Yemeni journalists started asking questions and posted photos and videos of the oil slicks, calling for accountability of the owners to deal with these problems, and for the relevant government agencies to clean-up the oil spills. This new open-source investigation by PAX is a stark reminder of how conflicts can bring serious pollution risks, impacting eco-systems, livelihoods and potentially humanitarian aid.
Our findings below show that there are many smaller decaying tankers at risk of sinking. This is already posing serious problems for Yemen’s coastal fishing communities. Also, mounting risks of incidents with rusting oil tankers could seriously jeopardize the import of much needed humanitarian goods and hamper reconstruction efforts.
Fleet of Sinking Ghost Tankers
The Port of Aden is littered with decommissioned vessels, including those mooring in the bay and others, which have already sunk and rest on the bottom. Fuel tankers (off)load their cargo at the Oil Harbour, located at the west side of the Port, near the Aden Refinery company. Prior to the conflict, over 12 million metric tons of crude and refined oil products were handled annually through the five berths at the oil harbour, according to the Yemen Gulf of Aden Ports Corporation. A large portion of the oil transport in Yemen is conducted by the Alessi Group, run by the wealthy businessman Ahmad Saleh Al Essi. He makes millions importing oil and other goods, and his name is linked to a range of incidents discussed below.
The local authorities in Aden have struggled to regulate and monitor the oil industry in the port due to capacity issues related to the war. The Port of Aden is a pivotal area as it is the largest gateway to import food, humanitarian aid and reconstruction materials for the war-torn country. The city also hosts the Aden Oil Refinery, where concerns over leakages and spills around the oil industry has been a historical problem, as noted in a 2003 governmental assessment around pollution from mooring ships and oil infrastructure. The report outlined numerous incidents and the oil refinery was also flagged in 2006 as the biggest producing source of hazardous waste.
The July Spill Disaster
The latest large scale environmental incident started to develop on July 2, 2022. Satellite images from the commercial provider Planet show a small leak, possibly bilge water. The spill can be seen coming from the hull of a tanker north in the bay, which fits the measurements of an oil tanker. We have identified it as the SICHEM FENOL, which is roughly 107 metres long. The slick from the stern of the ship was also visible in days following July 2, but seemed to disappear after that. According the local port authorities, this ship still contains between 30 and 35 tons of heavy fuel oil, and any incident is expected to affect the local marine environment.
Then, a second huge spill occurred on July 5, coming from another ship, with a 14 kilometre long oil slick forming in and around the port of Aden, as seen on Planet imagery. The spill stretched all the way south outside the port to the northern and western coastal areas inside the harbour. The images show a mix of heavy oil and a light oil sheen on the surface of water, amidst over a dozen other ships mooring in the Port of Aden. The spill ranged from the west around the offloading station near the refinery to the beaches on the southwest, as well as part of the spill floating to the northwest following the current.
Optical satellite imagery from the European Space Agency’s Sentinel-2 from the next day, July 6, show how the spill concentrated in the middle of the bay in the Port of Aden, forming a huge oil slick of at least 2.5 km2, visualized in the image below (colour adjusted from the original colour for clarity), with a sliver of oil seen coming from an oil tanker that later was identified as the PEARL OF ATHENA, being the source of the spill.
Through the weeks that followed, the oil slicks continued to spread in the port from the leaking tanker for weeks, with the largest spill seen on a satellite image dated July 23, 2022, which still showed an oil sheen spreading around the bay in the Port of Aden. After that date, no oil is visible around the PEARL OF ATHENA.
The need for prevention and restoration
To ensure that environmental damage caused by decaying tankers in the Port of Aden are prevented, a large-scale operation to remove all these oil tankers is of urgent priority. The ongoing war continues to pose serious humanitarian and environmental risks to a population struggling daily with the destruction brought upon the country. These wider secondary impacts of the conflict need to be addressed with urgency, particularly the failing environmental governance to address issues around the oil industry and shipping. Thus far, the international community has failed to pick up the bill to effectively prevent a major environmental disaster with the FSO SAFER, despite the UN starting a public campaign to raise $20 million dollar to prevent a serious disaster posed by the tanker. Meanwhile, western countries continue to allow for billions in weapons sales to the countries bombing Yemen.
The remaining tankers in the Port of Aden continue to pose a risk of sinking, which would likely lead to further environmental pollution with effects on coastal areas.
https://paxforpeace.nl/news/overview/leaking-ghost-tankers-pollution-in-the-port-of-adens
and main points in thread: https://twitter.com/wammezz/status/1554127754236493824
(** B C K)
Ancient caravan kingdoms are threatened in Yemen’s civil war
Their storied legacy—including temples built by the queen of Sheba—is entwined with the fate of modern Yemenis.
Yemen’s current war runs parallel to, and in some places directly over, the treasures of its past. Its ancient kingdoms—Saba, Qataban, Main, Hadramawt, Himyar, Awsan—are the genesis of the Arabian Peninsula’s civilization. From feats of hydraulic engineering to meticulous inscriptions, this history tells of a merchant people and a sophisticated, settled civilization far removed from the long-held stereotypes of desert-wandering Arabs dominant in 19th- and 20th-century Western popular culture and its depictions of the region.
All sides have shown little regard for the 30 million civilians at their mercy, and the threats to Yemenis and the dangers to their heritage go hand in hand.
Museums have been leveled by air strikes; hundreds of distinctive, centuries-old, multigenerational family homes destroyed; pre-Islamic temples bombed; and Sufi religious shrines razed by militants.
In the face of the devastation, a small but dedicated network of Yemeni historians, archaeologists, and others passionate about the country’s past are pursuing their own quietly determined mission to preserve Yemen’s antiquities—ancestral artifacts that are locked in the nation’s museums, hidden in warehouses, and still buried safely beneath the sand. Mindful of the priorities of their fellow citizens and the millions of people displaced by the conflict, they focus their endeavors on future preservation for present-day Yemenis who have a more pressing concern: survival in the midst of war.
The conflict’s most active front line is of greatest concern for the civilians it threatens, and the damage already done to Yemen’s cultural legacy demonstrates that those fighting this war have no hesitation in turning esteemed heritage sites into battlefields. In May 2015 a coalition air strike hit one of the sluice gates of the Great Dam of Marib, tearing through its remaining tower. A cascade of rubble is left in its place.
The past 15 years of archaeological neglect, however, has also been a blessing for the exposed antiquities of Marib’s sanctuaries: In the Awwam Temple, more than six feet of sand has reburied critical areas of the sacred precinct. “It’s better that everything is under the ground. The sand is safety,” ruefully concludes Sadeq al Salwi, the Marib director for the General Organization of Antiquities and Museums (GOAM), a Yemeni government agency.
At Timna, the damage to the country’s cultural heritage is revealed at its destructive worst. During our walk through the city’s remains, the ground bleeds 2,000-year-old pottery sherds and more recent additions: spent shells from AK-47s and tanks, and the brassy hulls of 50-caliber machine-gun bullets. Empty ammunition boxes litter foxholes dug down into the ruins of Timna’s main temple dedicated to Athtar, a god of thunder known to be vengeful. The Houthis utilized the tactical benefit of the raised ground Timna was built on, turning it into a military position and inevitably drawing the bombs of Saudi and Emirati fighter jets.
The heart of the Athtar Temple has been torn open, hemorrhaging gray, blue, and red hues of stone that set Timna apart from the yellow Jurassic limestone of Marib. A 33-foot-wide, 10-foot-deep crater is all that’s left to see on the sanctuary’s eastern flank. The gaping hole from the coalition air strike dwarfs two young children skipping over boulders thrown by the bombing’s explosive force.
Timna’s unfinished, bombed-out shell of a museum is one of three such institutions in the governorate under the care of Khyran al Zubaidi, the director of GOAM’s Shabwah branch. There is also one in Bayhan, shuttered for 25 years, and another in Ataq, the provincial capital of Shabwah. The government allocation for the three museums is just 16,000 Yemeni riyals (less than $20) a month – by Iona Craig, photos by Moises Saman
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
(A H)
28 new coronavirus cases reported, 16 in Aden
28 new confirmed cases of COVID-19 have been reported over the past days, Yemen's supreme national emergency committee for coronavirus said in a statement on its Twitter account.
The cases were recorded in the governorates of Aden (16), al-Dhale (5), Taiz (4), Lahj (2), and Hadramout (1).
The committee also reported the death of two coronavirus patients in Taiz and the recovery of four others in Hadramout.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/35404
cp2 Allgemein / General
(* A K P)
Interactive Map of Yemen War
(* A P)
Three Yemeni citizens killed by Saudi Border Guards gunfire
The Saudi army has recently committed another disgraceful crime, by executing three Yemeni men who tried to cross the Saudi border in search of a livelihood.
Head of the Hana Aden Center for Studies, Anis Mansour, affirmed that the Saudi border guards executed three young men from Bayda, who were on their way to Saudi Arabia to seek a living.
“They were arrested by the border guards in the Al-Raqaw area, and they were shot dead in front of the people and the rest of the Yemenis were asked to take the bodies back to Yemen,” he added.
https://en.ypagency.net/268245/ and https://en.ypagency.net/268183/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/08/03/three-yemenis-murdered-by-saudi-forces-in-border-region/
and https://twitter.com/anesmansory/status/1554694076733218816
(* B P)
An Oil-Spill Disaster is Looming in Yemen, and the World Can’t Afford to Wait
The FSO Safer is a ticking time bomb. The U.N. has a plan to address the issue of the decaying oil tanker, but it must be resolved now before it becomes an environmental tragedy.
Moored off the coast of Yemen on the Red Sea is a rapidly decaying oil tanker – the FSO Safer – loaded with more than 1.1 million barrels of crude oil, which could explode at any moment. This floating supertanker has been left unmaintained since 2015 due to the Houthis’ refusal to grant the United Nations access to the Safer. But now the U.N. has a plan, and this issue must be resolved before it becomes an environmental tragedy.
In March, the Houthis signed an agreement, consenting – at least on paper – to allow the U.N. to execute a plan for the Safer. Overall, the plan would cost $144 million, but the first emergency phase would require about $80 million. The emergency phase would eliminate the threat by moving the oil from the rotting ship to a new vessel, until a replacement vessel is ordered.
Otherwise, the clean-up expense of a potential oil spill is estimated at more than $20 billion, though the real cost is immeasurable. If the Safer leaks or explodes, it could cause one of the biggest oil spills the world has ever seen. It would cause immense detriment to the environment – affecting precious biodiversity, damaging marine life, mangroves, and the longest continuous coral reefs on the planet, considered one of the largest refuges from climate change.
Moreover, it would harm international trade and shipping, negatively affecting the port of Hodeidah – the main seaport for humanitarian assistance delivery into Yemen – and the Bab el-Mandeb strait – one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. An oil spill from the Safer would make the Ever Given incident in 2021, when the giant container ship ran aground and blocked the Suez Canal, pale in comparison in terms of its disruption to global shipping.
So far, the U.N. has received pledges totaling around $62 million from the United States, Saudi Arabia, the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Qatar, Sweden, Norway, Finland, France, Switzerland, and Luxembourg. For this plan to work, it needs to start as soon as possible, certainly before the seasonal change to maritime currents on the Red Sea, as anticipated later in the year.
Why has an issue this big not been addressed before?
https://agsiw.org/an-oil-spill-disaster-is-looming-in-yemen-and-the-world-cant-afford-to-wait/
(* B P)
Fear and anxiety for civilians as Yemen truce set to expire
The conflict-ravaged country awaits two scenarios: a new cycle of war or an extended cessation of hostilities.
Fear, anxiety, confusion – these are the most common sentiments expressed by civilians in war-ravaged Yemen as a four-month truce is slated to expire on Tuesday.
“The ceasefire expiry is a rebirth of multiple ordeals,” said Saleh Ahmed, a 50-year-old resident in the capital, Sanaa, who, like others, fears a descent into a new cycle of war.
“Fighting will erupt, roads will be blocked, fuel will be expensive, the price of basic goods will jump, and civilian deaths will mount,” he said. “These troubles make life bitter and unbearable.”
Ahmed, a minibus driver, described the truce as the “good days”.
“Before the ceasefire, I used to spend hours and hours waiting at the gas stations to fill up my vehicle with petrol. Today, I can fill it anywhere at any time I want. I can work and make money to provide for my family. With the truce, my situation has been better.”
Fatima Amri, a 24-year-old university student in the Houthi-held Sanaa, said a failure to extend the truce would be a disappointing setback to diplomacy and an assault on human rights in Yemen.
“If war resumes, we will instantly lose many rights, including the freedom of movement. The conflict made the country like a jail. The truce helped partially open that jail. It will be shut again once the ceasefire breaks down,” Amri told Al Jazeera.
Political analysts also hailed the truce as a diplomatic success but cautioned that the roots of the conflict have not been fully addressed.
“Without disarming all militias in Yemen and restoring the legitimate authority, any truce extension or agreement will not serve the national interest of the country in the long-term,” Adel Dashela, a Yemeni political researcher and author, told Al Jazeera.
The truce, according to Dashela, could be counterproductive if it were to perpetuate the status quo of a de facto divided Yemen: the Houthis in the north and the government and its local allies in the south.
“Yemeni civilians have been glad that the truce reduced violence. But a ceasefire minus a definite peace plan is an incomplete solution, and the roots of war will keep alive.”
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/1/fear-anxiety-for-civilians-as-yemen-truce-set-to-expire
(* B H K P)
Sanaa: Cost of living has increased over 90% due to Saudi-led war
Sanaa government said that the Saudi-led coalition’s broad restrictions are worsening the country’s humanitarian catastrophe.
During a joint press conference with the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Acting Minister of Human Rights in the Sanaa government, Ali Al-Dailami, stressed that "the international community has entered a dangerous phase of deliberate politicization of Yemen's catastrophic humanitarian situation as a result of the Saudi-led aggression and blockade."
"As a result of a serious deterioration in real disposable income, the siege of the aggression caused the suspension of salaries of more than one and a quarter million government employees, amounting to approximately 74 billion riyals per month, and the cost of living increased by more than 90 percent than it was before the aggression."
Al-Dailami explained that the salaries of more than 1.25 million public sector employees have been suspended due to the Saudi-led coalition. “Simultaneously, the cost of living increased over 90% than it was before”, he tersely stated.
He went on to say that "the Saudi-led blockade and aggression prevented over 40,000 fishermen from fishing in the Red Sea coast not to mention that the number of fishermen killed is estimated to be over 500, and over 1,000 fishermen arrested."
The Saudi-led coalition affected over 92% of Yemeni families that do not have adequate resources to obtain basic needs, Al-Dailami said.
Al-Dailami highlighted that “the number of malnourished people increased dramatically during the years of aggression, including one million and two hundred thousand women, half of whom are pregnant."
He also added that "half of Yemen's children under the age of five are at risk of acute malnutrition after the number of infected children reached nearly 2.3 million."
In the same context, the air blockade has caused 25 airlines to cease operations as per the acting Minister of Human Rights.
(A K P)
66 fishermen detained by Eritrean authorities arrive in Hodeida
66 fishermen who were detained by the Eritrean authorities, arrived on Sunday at the fishing port of Hodeida city.
The Eritrean authorities have arrested the fishermen in the Yemeni territorial waters of the Red Sea.
Director of Ports and Fish Landing Centers at the General Authority for Fisheries in the Red Sea Aziz Al-Otaini said that the authorities in Hodeida have given financial aid to the fishermen, who returned to their villages and areas.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3196893.htm
and also https://en.ypagency.net/267949/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/08/01/sixty-six-yemeni-fishermen-released-from-eritrean-captivity-return-to-hodeidah/
(* B E P)
No Truce Until Salaries Are Paid
The cutting of the salaries of more than one million employees throughout the republic was an orchestrated and deliberately aggressive crime committed by the countries of the Saudi-led coalition.
The aim was to bring the Yemenis to their knees and subject them to poverty and starvation. It is a heinous crime by the standards of every charter and code of laws because it is an act of genocide, commonly recognized as a disgraceful act.
This conspiracy and act of piracy, which targets the Central Bank of Yemen and started with the fugitive “President” Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi’s decision to transfer the bank’s operations and management headquarters to Aden in September 2016, has left Yemenis without salaries since that date and the Yemeni nation without a monetary institution. This crime has doubled the suffering of every Yemeni without exception, because it’s social and economic effects are far reaching.
Before that, the Central Bank of Yemen in the capital Sana’a had routinely paid the salaries of all government employees, reaching people in every Yemeni province without interruption. Even many companions of Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, Hadi and senior mercenaries were getting paid via the bank in Sana’a.
The central bank had been working effectively in providing its financial services at the national level, paying the salaries of 1.2 million Yemeni public servants, protecting the value of the national currency in front of foreign currencies, covering the import bill in foreign currencies as well as paying foreign debts and maintaining the confidence of global financial institutions, until the Saudi coalition and its mercenaries carried out this heinous crime and targeted the central bank, the result of which being that Yemenis lost their salaries, lost their bank, and lost the foundations of their economic stability.
The mercenary Hadi had pledged (on behalf of the coalition), to pay the salaries of government employees in all provinces, but they have not paid a single salary since they committed this heinous act.
https://en.ypagency.net/267812/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/07/30/no-truce-until-salaries-are-paid/
My comment: ??? The Sanaa government has its own central bank, the Sanaa government raises taxes. Why they wait for the Aden government to pay these salaries? They should do it themselves.
(A K P)
IOM reveals crimes committed by Saudi forces on northern border with Yemen
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) on Saturday revealed the crimes of killing migrants at the hands of the Saudi border guards, north of Yemeni Saada province.
In a brief report, on the Twitter platform, the organization said that it had verified 9 separate incidents led to the killing of 189 migrants and the serious injury of 535 others at the Yemeni-Saudi border with the northern Yemeni province of Saada.
https://en.ypagency.net/267772/
(A P)
Film: A message from [Aden gov.] Ambassador Al-Hadhrami, Ambassador of Yemen to the United States, about the decaying oil tanker issue #FSOSafer and the need to address it before it’s too late.
https://twitter.com/YemenEmbassy_DC/status/1552776467699965955
(A K pH)
[Sanaa gov.] Center for Mine Action: UN Confirms US-Saudi Aggression's Prevention of Mine Detectors Entry
The Executive Center for Mine Action confirmed the arrival of a UN memorandum to the center, confirming that the US-Saudi aggression is preventing the entry of mine detectors.
The head of the center, Brigadier Ali Safra told Almasirah, Friday, that the number of victims of mines and cluster bombs since the beginning of the truce is 255, including 84 children.
He pointed out that the cluster bombs dropped by the US-Saudi warplanes are scattered in civilian facilities, and this has raised the number of victims, holding the United Nations responsible for the continued casualties due to the remnants of the aggression, including mines and cluster bombs.
https://en.ypagency.net/267707/
cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade
(A P)
Aggression seizes gasoline ship after extending truce
The YPC's official spokesman Issam Al-Mutawakil said in a new violation of the truce in its first days after the last extension, and following the commitment of the UN envoy to remove obstacles and fully fulfill the terms of the agreement to ensure the regular flow of fuel to the port of Hodeida in the future, the aggression seized the gasoline ship (C-Heart).
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3197341.htm
(A P)
Yemeni Airlines flight arrives in Sana'a Airport, another departs
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3197275.htm
and also https://en.ypagency.net/268195/
(A P)
[Sanaa gov.] Minister of Health Demands Complete Opening of Sana’a Int.l Airport
(A P)
YPC: All fuel vessels seized since armistice announcement
The Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) confirmed that all fuel vessels have been subjected to piracy and detention by the US-Saudi aggression coalition, since armistice announcement.
In a statement to SABA, YPC stated that the detention of vessels for varying periods of time, a total of more than 261 days, despite their inspection and obtaining entry permits issued by the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), caused several stifling supply crises in diesel in particular, during the months of June and July.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3197151.htm
(A P)
Aggression continues to violate armistice by seizing gasoline ship "Hari Prakash"
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3197121.htm
(A P)
Four oil tankers arrive in Hodeida
Other four oil tankers have arrived at the Houthi-held port of Hodeida, spokesman for the Sana'a-based Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) said Saturday, three days before the UN-brokered truce's expiration.
Three of the tankers brought diesel and the fourth was lauded with petrol, Esam al-Mutawakil added in a tweet.
These vessels were released by the Saudi-led coalition after 38 days of detention, he said, noting that a fifth ship is still detained in Jizan port despite the UN clearance.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-30378.html
(A P)
Yemeni Airlines flight arrives in Sana'a Airport, another departs
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3197009.htm
and also https://en.ypagency.net/268009/
(B H P)
Film: Only in #Yemen ambulances need urgent rescue with fuel; a Yemeni life cannot be saved without an ambulance. The US blockade and piracy on fuel ships are the reason behind this agony!
https://twitter.com/GhalebM0nz1i7/status/1554192014849236992
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
(A H)
SFD Yemen: #HumanCapital in Nid Khurim village is enhanced as the Almajd School is completely built and equipped. We expect enrolment to rise from 580 to 820 students with the improvement of learning environment (12 new classrooms + 6 toilets + facilities) #Hajjah
https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1554941226683621380
(* B H)
Yemen: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis - January - December 2022 (Published on August 3, 2022
Food insecurity and malnutrition in Yemen have deteriorated further in 2022 compared to 2021, driven mainly by the consequences of the protracted conflict.
Approximately 2.2 million children aged 6 to 59 months are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition over the course of the year, including 538,000 facing severe acute malnutrition. An additional 1.3 million cases of pregnant and lactating women are also projected over the year. At the same time, a total of 17.4 million people or 54 percent of the population faced high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) from January to May 2022, with 31,000 people classified in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), 5.6 million (18 percent) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 11.7 million people (37 percent) in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). Between June and December 2022, the number of people likely to experience high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) is estimated to increase to 19 million (60 percent of the total population). Out of these, 11.7 million people are estimated to be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), 7.1 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), and the number of those in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) will likely increase to 161,000.
The area-level classification is also expected to deteriorate dramatically in the projection period for both acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition. A significant number of districts are expected to move to higher IPC Phases as humanitarian food assistance levels are expected to decrease substantially, and food prices will continue on an upward trajectory. Similarly, conflict is expected to continue and escalate in certain areas, per the assumptions laid out for Jun-Dec 2022. During the projection period, 86 districts were classified in high acute food insecurity, of which 82 shifted from IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) to IPC AFI Phase 4 (Emergency). Overall, during the current analysis, the 151 districts classified in IPC AFI Phase 4 (Emergency) increased to 233 districts in the projection period. Similarly, for acute malnutrition, 70 districts’ classification shifts from IPC AMN Phase 3 (Serious) to IPC AMN Phase 4 (Critical), making up 108 districts, and 66 districts move from Alert (IPC Phase 2) to Serious (IPC Phase 3), making up 193 districts, while two districts in Hajjah governorate were not classified due to inadequate information.
The most vulnerable districts are in Hajjah and Al Hudaydah, where food insecurity and acute malnutrition converge to extremely high levels.
(B H)
UNOCHA: Yemen: Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP) 2022 - Funding Status (3 August 2022)
(B H)
UNICEF Ma’rib Response Humanitarian Action Update, June 2022, Issue Number 7
UNICEF, in coordination with partners, continues to provide critical health, nutrition, water sanitation and hygiene (WASH), education (through formal and non-formal learning opportunities) and psychological and physical wellbeing services to internally displaced and host community children and their families. UNICEF complements all interventions with social and behaviour change activities.
(B H)
Child Protection AoR People Reached By Governorate as end of June 2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/child-protection-aor-people-reached-governorate-end-june-2022
by district: https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/child-protection-aor-sub-people-reached-district-end-june-2022
(B H)
Continuing to improve access to essential water and sanitation services in Yemen
The World Bank’s International Development Association approved an additional $150 million grant to support the second phase of the Yemen Emergency Human Capital Project.
The project is implemented by UNICEF, the World Health Organization and UNOPS, in collaboration with local stakeholders.
With $30 million from the overall funding, UNOPS will provide vital water and sanitation services to 1.3 million Yemenis. Following 7 years of armed conflict, around 17 million people currently lack access to safe water and sanitation across the country.
Increasing access to quality water supply and functional sanitation systems is critical to improving the lives of Yemeni people across the country.
Over the next two years, UNOPS will rehabilitate water and sanitation networks, waste water pump stations and water wellfields. UNOPS will also help secure water and sanitation facilities with sustainable energy sources by installing photovoltaic solar power units. Equipment and supplies will also be provided to three laboratories to enhance the monitoring of quality drinking water.
(B H)
UNICEF Yemen Country Office Humanitarian Situation Report (Reporting Period: 1– 30 April 2022)
Situation in Numbers
(OCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview)
11.3 million children in need of humanitarian assistance
20.7 million people in need
1.8 million children internally displaced (IDPs)
Highlights
• 19.5 million or 61 per cent of Yemenis have no access to safe water and 11.4 million people or 42 per cent of the population have no adequate sanitation (Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment, March 2022). In April, to address the urgent needs of the affected population, UNICEF provided fuel to 37 Local Water and Sanitation Corporations (LWSCs) in 17 governorates to sustain the supply of safe water supply to 2.48 million people.
• UNICEF, along with UNFPA and WFP, continues to reach displaced populations affected by conflict with first line response packages.
(* B H)
Fighting a Silent Killer: Malnutrition in Yemen
7,500 cartons of ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF) have been provided along with routine medication, benefiting 7,500 children under five years old in Hajjah Governorate
UNICEF has partnered with the Red Crescent Society to support Al-Dhaher Health Center, in Hajjah Governorate, north-western part of Yemen. Thanks to the support from the United Nations Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 7,500 cartons of ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF) have been provided along with routine medication such as amoxicillin and deworming tablets, benefiting 7,500 children under five years old in the governorate.
Case Worker Wafa Hussain screens children – from newborns to five-year-olds – for moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) and approves emergency cases for the Red Crescent Society in Hajjah governorate. The clinic receives up to 300 visitors per month, and it is the only centre in the area that provides malnutrition screening.
“Some children present many complications, including anemia, pneumonia, severe diarrhea, and very high temperatures. Our role is to screen them, assess their needs, admit them as necessary, and treat them until they recover”, she explains.
UNICEF procures ready-to-use therapeutic food such as Plumpy Nut, soya for pregnant and lactating women, and essential drugs for children with severe acute malnutrition. In addition, UNICEF supports field workers with nutritional staples, vaccines, reproductive health supplies, and covers some financial costs. (photos9
https://www.unicef.org/yemen/stories/fighting-silent-killer-malnutrition-yemen
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Yemen Price Bulletin, July 2022
Wheat flour is the staple food for most households in Yemen; sorghum and rice are most often consumed as a substitute. Households are heavily dependent on imported wheat supplies reaching the regional trading centers of Sana’a City, Al Hudaydah City, and Aden City—critical markets that supply other urban and rural districts. Aden City, located in a trade deficit zone, is the reference market for the southern region and the largest wholesale market with significant storage capacity. Al Hudaydah is an important assembly, wholesale, and retail market in the most populous region in the country where most households aredependent on markets for staple foods. Sana’a city serves as awholesale and retail market for households in northern and central Yemen, and Sayoun serves as a reference market for the east. Wheat grain and flour prices are susceptible to the exchange rate of the Yemeni Rial (YER) and US Dollar (USD). There are currently two exchange rates split by monetary governance between the Sana’abased authorities (SBA) and the internationally recognized government (IRG).
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-price-bulletin-july-2022
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Yemen WASH Cluster - Humanitarian Dashboard (January - May 2022)
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-wash-cluster-humanitarian-dashboard-january-may-2022
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Yemen: Rapid Response Mechanism-First Line Response RRM Floods Monthly Report, July 2022
Yemen: Rapid Response Mechanism-First Line Response RRM Monthly Report, July 2022
Yemen: Rapid Response Mechanism-First Line Response RRM Cumulative Report, Jan - July 2022
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Case Study: Delivering integrated services for gender-based violence, and sexual reproductive health and rights to conflict-affected communities in Yemen- Taiz Gov. Al Taziyah district (Alaghwal) 2019-2020
According to a recent report by Amnesty International, Yemen is a country ranked last in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap index for 13 consecutive years; women have been suffering from deeply entrenched gender inequality rooted in a patriarchal society with rigid gender roles. While the conflict in Yemen has had a horrific impact on all civilians generally, women and girls have been disproportionately affected. Negative gender stereotypes and patriarchal attitudes, a discriminatory legal system, and economic inequality have compounded women’s vulnerability to violence. The fighting has left the country’s people struggling with a dire economic crisis, damaged infrastructure and collapsed services. But in addition, women have had to contend with limited mobility due to cultural gender norms. Also, since they are responsible for providing food and care in their homes, they have had to struggle with the challenges of limited (or lack of) access to food, water, sanitation and health care services – which has seen a steady deterioration as the conflict continues.
“According to Borgen Magazine, Thirty-five percent of Yemeni women have experienced physical or sexual assault. These high rates of sexual and physical violence are a result of damaging gender roles embedded within Yemini society. In Yemen, women are forced to wear niqabs, subject to child marriage, honor killings victims and face divorce shame.
Child marriages and divorce shame are particularly concerning in contexts where abuse is present. With child marriages, girls are young, vulnerable and subservient when sent off into marriage, increasing the likelihood of domestic violence and sexual assault by their partner. Furthermore, divorce shame prevents women from escaping abusive relationships due to social ostracization. As horrifying as abuse is in any context, Yemeni women have no authority to report the crimes with both formal and informal legal systems discriminating against women.
Another consequence of structural gender inequality in Yemen is inadequate health care for girls and women.
Yemeni girls and women struggle for adequate health care due to disproportionate impoverishment, a lack of health education and underrepresentation in politics.”
A concrete consequence of poor female health care in Yemen is a radically high maternal mortality rate (MMR), with 43.2 per 1,000 live births. This rate, among other health factors, resulted in the 2018 HDI ranking Yemen as 177th in the world. Additionally, 18.5% of women suffer from female genital mutilation in Yemen. This procedure is immensely damaging, resulting in lifelong nerve damage and pain. Therefore, not only do women struggle to have access to health care, but the care they do receive is often detrimental to their overall health.
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Assessment of the non-communicable diseases kit for humanitarian emergencies in Yemen and Libya
Emergency health kits are a vital way of providing essential medicines and supplies to health clinics during humanitarian crises. The WHO non-communicable diseases (NDCs) kit was developed 5 years ago, recognising the increasing challenge of providing continuity of care and secondary prevention of NCDs and exacerbations, in such settings. Monitoring and evaluation of emergency health kits is an important process to ensure the contents are fit for purpose and to assess usability and utility. However, there are also challenges and limitations in collecting the relevant data to do so.
This Practice paper provides a summary of the key methodologies, findings and limitations of NCD kit assessments conducted in Libya and Yemen. Methodologies included a combination of semistructured interviews, surveys with healthcare workers, NCD knowledge tests and quantifying the remaining contents.
The kit was able to support the vital delivery of NCD patient care in some complex humanitarian settings and was appreciated by health facilities. However, there were also some challenges affecting kit use.
https://gh.bmj.com/content/7/Suppl_5/e006621?rss=1
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Commercial wheat imports from India key supply line for Yemen: UN official
Commercial wheat imports from India have emerged as a key supply line for Yemen in the wake of the Ukraine war, the UN deputy relief chief said, as New Delhi stressed the need to ensure the civilian nature of the ports in the Hudaydah governorate from the food security perspective.
Joint Secretary (UNP) in the Ministry of External Affairs Prakash Gupta told the UN Security Council briefing on Yemen on Monday that in order to mitigate the supply changes in the global commodity markets and their adverse impact on food security, India has been providing financial assistance as well as supplying food grains to countries in need.
“India has exported more than 2,50,000 tons of wheat to Yemen, in the last three months, he said.
In her remarks to the council, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator Joyce Msuya acknowledged the wheat shipments from India providing a key supply line for Yemen, particularly in the wake of the Ukraine war.
We are also encouraged by recent positive exchanges between the governments of Yemen and India on facilitating wheat exports from India. Commercial wheat imports from
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Qatar Charity distributes medical supplies to health centres in Yemen
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Yemen: Nutrition Cluster Achievements Snapshot (January-April 2022)
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-nutrition-cluster-achievements-snapshot-january-april-2022
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Yemen Emergency Dashboard, July 2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-emergency-dashboard-july-2022
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Yemen: Floods 2021 - Final Report, DREF Operation no. MDRYE010
Following a rainy season that was delayed in Yemen, many governorates experienced rains of varying intensity accompanied by thunderstorms since July 2021. In August, YRCS branches reported that heavy rainfall and associated flooding had impacted up to 31,300 households with loss of life and property across the country. Floods affected 18 out of 22 governorates of Yemen with most affected being Dhamar, Amran, Al Mahwit, Marib, Ibb, Sana’a City, Sana’a, Hajjah, Al Hodeidah, Al Jawf, Al Bayda, and Al Dhale, extending also to Lahj, Shabwah, Al Mahrah, Raymah, Socotra, and Hadramout governorates.
Shelter, household items, food assistance, clean water, and health and care services were identified as the immediate needs.
Currently, Yemen is one of ICRC’s priority operations globally and is engaged across different governorates, especially those in the frontline, and with a focus on humanitarian interventions in Health, Restoring Family Links, Economic Security, Water and Habitat, Protection, and dead body management.
During 2021, ICRC supported YRCS with 7,000 food rations and 3,000 essential household items (EHI) kits. This helped YRCS to respond to emergencies in a timely and efficient manner, particularly in the areas where they are leading. In the case of joint activities, ICRC provided assistance directly to the beneficiaries in close collaboration with YRCS. ICRC supported YRCS with 2,800 food rations and 3,000 essential household items kits during the first half of the year and 2,250 in the third quarter in the North and South of the country.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-floods-2021-final-report-dref-operation-no-mdrye010
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
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UNHCR Yemen 2021 Year-End Report
Yemen continued to be primarily a displacement and an acute protection crisis. While diplomatic efforts for negotiated solutions were mired down in mistrust and factionalism, it is estimated that some 286,000 Yemenis were newly displaced in 2021, particularly as the conflict re-ignited in areas such as Marib, Al Hudaydah, Taizz, and Shabwah. A newly uprooted population added to the millions of IDPs already in protracted displacement. In 2021, the overall IDP population in Yemen reached record levels of 4.3 million, confirming Yemen is amongst the largest internal displacement crisis due to conflict worldwide. While return trends were not properly tracked, durable solutions to displacement, notably voluntary return, continued to face critical obstacles linked to insecurity, lack of services and livelihood opportunities, and sustainability.
Yemen remained a transit country for populations from the East and Horn of Africa. While in 2021, arrivals further declined from pre-COVID-19 due to mobility restrictions (some 27,600 arrivals compared to preconflict trends of 130,000/year), the presence of foreigners was increasingly perceived by the authorities an intolerable burden. Violations of the human rights of migrants were on the rise, combined with a shrinking asylum space for the 102,082 refugees and asylum-seekers.
The protection situation for millions of civilians remained severe.
https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/2964
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Yemen: Sanaa Floods - Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA), DREF n° MDRYE011
On Saturday,23 July 2022, in Sana'a governorate, heavy rains led to floods causing extensive damage to public infrastructure, shelters for displaced people and other private property. 3 people died and 2 people were injured due to the heavy rain that led to the collapse of their house which consist of three floors and 3 families. the heavy rains affected 56 families in Al-Khamis camp, 137 families at IDPs camp in Al-Hasaba, 116 families at Aser camp in addition to 63 families at Al-Tahreer Square. In Saada Governorate,299 families were affected by heavy rains, and approximately 50 families of them were affected by heavy rains in the districts of Saada, Sahara, and Majaz.
Based on YRCS and shelter cluster flood tracking and identification to date, the breakdown of people in need by governorate since June is shown in the below table:
Of the total number of people affected, an estimated 17,000 across affected IDP sites have suffered total damage to tents and other belongings. Floods and storms have caused the total or partial destruction of tents, loss of personal belongings, food and essential household items, and damage to water tanks and sewage networks. Urgent needs include shelter and essential household items (such as tarpaulins and tents), food and clean water, reparation of sewage networks, health services and medicines, and protection assistance.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-sanaa-floods-emergency-plan-action-epoa-dref-ndeg-mdrye011
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IOM Yemen: Rapid Displacement Tracking - Yemen IDP Dashboard Reporting Period: 24 to 30 July 2022
From 1 January to 30 July 2022, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 7,583 households (HH) (45,498 Individuals) who experienced displacement at least once.
Between 24 and 30 July 2022, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 211 households (1,266 individuals) displaced at least once. The majority of people moved into/within the following governorates and districts:
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QUARTERLY MIGRATION OVERVIEW APRIL – JUNE 2022
In the second quarter of 2022, migrants in Yemen continued to face dire situations along the journey to neighbouring Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and, to a lesser degree, Oman. Between April and June 2022, over 11,000 migrants arrived to Yemen via treacherous boat journeys from Djibouti and Somalia. Many become trapped in the hands of smugglers, exploited until they have nothing with nowhere to turn. IOM in Yemen estimates that over 43,000 migrants are stranded in various regions throughout the country.
The grave reality migrants face in the country continues to be underlined by severe human rights violations, with several incidents reported during the second quarter. IOM verified nine separate incidents resulting in the deaths of 189 migrants and injuries of 353 migrants in the northern area of Sa’dah governorate bordering KSA. However, these numbers are likely to be significantly higher. These killings and injuries are largely the result of shootings, mortar attacks and artillery fire.
In addition to these incidents, migrants continue to be subjected to abduction, extortion, violence, abuse and exploitation – including forced labour, prostitution and transfer – often at the hands of powerful and ruthless smuggling networks. In Sa’dah, migrants are reportedly detained and then transported to Sana’a, from where they are eventually forced to move south and cross active front lines in Ta’iz. Although IOM is unable to confirm, new information has indicated that a rising number of migrants have been forcibly transferred from the north to the south of Yemen every week – leading to an increased number of stranded migrants in the south.
In Sana’a, IOM continues to receive pleas for assistance from extremely vulnerable migrants, notably survivors of gender-based violence and unaccompanied children who are stranded and awaiting the opportunity to return to their countries of origin.
IOM delivered return assistance to migrants throughout April and May through the Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR) programme, supporting 1,032 migrants to depart on seven flights since 12 May.
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“I Lost My Ability to Walk But Regained Hope”
“Three years ago, I left Ethiopia after hearing about a ‘broker’ who was willing to facilitate my trip to Yemen,” he recalls. “I was told that there are job opportunities waiting for me and others who joined the journey. I sold what I could, borrowed money from people I know, and eventually had ETB 15,000 (around USD 280), enough to pay the broker.”
He packed his bag and set off.
“It was my first time to see the vast ocean. I didn’t know how to swim. When we reached Yemen, I was just happy to survive, but that happiness was short-lived as I was detained immediately by the broker. He asked me to pay more in exchange for my freedom,” Abi shares.
Since he didn’t have anyone to turn to and ask for the additional money, Abi was released and taken to work on a khat farm.
Tens of thousands of Ethiopian men, women, and unaccompanied children like Abi fall victims to “brokers” or human traffickers.
They leave the country for Yemen and the Gulf states in search of work to escape poverty, the effects of climate change, and conflict. They take dangerous journeys through the “Eastern Route”, the main migration route linking the Horn of Africa to Gulf countries, by land and sea.
Unfortunately, many do not make it to their destinations and die along the way.
For those who are lucky enough to survive the journey and find work like Abi, they end up in deplorable working conditions with little pay, far from what was promised to them.
Ethiopia acts both as an origin and transit state, and with of Ethiopians leaving the country annually, the country remains at the centre of irregular migration. At the core of this irregular migration is an organized network of criminal actors working across the region and in destination states.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) encourages Member States and key actors to engage in eliminating trafficking.
https://medium.com/@UNmigration/i-lost-my-ability-to-walk-but-regained-hope-70e12c302542
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Film: Last year, Sumeya left her home in Ethiopia and took the journey to Yemen. She was repeatedly exploited by traffickers. Now, she and thousands of other migrants in Yemen wish to go back home to their families. IOM urgently needs more funding to help people return home.
https://twitter.com/UNmigration/status/1552957103140003846
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The truce in Yemen: opportunities and challenges for IDPs
A four month nationwide truce in Yemen has provided much needed relief to people across the country and opened a rare window of opportunity for millions of internally displaced people (IDPs) and those at risk of displacement. It has reduced the number of people fleeing the conflict and improved the humanitarian situation. It is, however, a fragile truce. Prospects for further extensions and sustainable peace are uncertain. Violations have been recorded and humanitarian needs remain alarmingly high. Policymakers and humanitarian organisations should push for another extension beyond early August and, more importantly, intensify efforts to bring about a permanent resolution to Yemen’s conflict and displacement crisis.
FEWER DISPLACEMENTS AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
After months of intense fighting inside Yemen and cross-border attacks by Ansar Allah in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, a two month truce was negotiated and entered into force on 2 April. It was extended for two months on 2 June, the day it had been due to expire. It has led to a reduction in fighting, displacement and civilian casualties, and the humanitarian situation in the country has improved. Fuel ships have also been able to dock in Al Hudaydah and Sanaa airport has reopened.
Around 232,000 displacements were recorded across the country between January and June 2022, of which 153,000 took place between January to March, and 79,000 between April and June. This means the truce led to a quarterly reduction of almost 50 per cent. The number of displacements is, however, still high.
OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The truce has raised hopes of an end to the conflict across Yemen and helped to alleviate some of the population’s suffering. It will, however, expire on 2 August unless it is extended or the peace process otherwise revitalised, creating uncertainty over the next steps and the longer-term future.
There are many challenges left to address.
The international community should push for another extension of the ceasefire in order to further alleviate the population’s suffering and prevent more internal displacement.
Donors must increase their funding of the humanitarian response.
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UNHCR Yemen: Protection Monitoring Assessments by District - Jan 2022 - Jun 2022
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-protection-monitoring-assessments-district-jan-2022-jun-2022
UNHCR Yemen: IDP Protection Monitoring Update (1 Jan 2022 - 30 Jun 2022)
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
Siehe / Look at cp1
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Blast kills 5 engineers at Houthi missile factory in Yemen
The engineers, some of them foreigners, were assembling missiles when the explosion happened
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2132946/middle-east
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The Houthi militia storm a mosque in Ibb and loot its contents/Multiple websites
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-58111
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Houthis begin to take personal guns away from the public in the militia's areas of control/Sawt Al-Watan
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-58111
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Houthis killed 33 civilians during the past four months of supposed truce in Dhale'a province in south Yemen/Alsahwa Net
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-58111
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Houthis persistently recruit new forces despite truce
The Houthi group on Sunday declared the recruitment of thousands of fighters to reinforce fighting with the Yemeni government troops, despite the presumed truce.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-30394.html
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The wife of Adel Al-Beidhani a hostage in the terrorist Houthi militia's captivity says, "My husband is going to die as a result of deteriorating health conditions while they [the world] is watching."/Mandab Press
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-58081
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Houthis booby trap Sana'a neighborhoods with landmine depots & workshops
Houthis have set up more than 30 arms depots in Sana'a and workshops to manufacture landmines, explosives and to assemble armed drones in the neighborhoods of Sana'a city/Multiple websites
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-58081
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[Aden] Yemeni gov't calls for transparent probe in Sana'a blast
The Yemeni UN-recognized government calls on the UN to conduct a transparent probe into a blast seen by the Houthi-held capital of Sana'a and to take decisive stance to prevent Houthi misuse of the truce in mobilization, the information minister tweeted on Sunday.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-30377.html
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Army Spokesman: Yemeni Forces Ready to Fight Back If Saudi Arabia Wants to Continue War
The spokesman for Yemen’s Armed Forces warned the Saudi-led coalition that Yemeni forces are ready to fight if the war coalition decides to continue its aggression against the impoverished Arab country.
"If the Saudi aggressor coalition wants peace, the negotiating delegation has given more than enough [concessions] and if it wants war, we are ready for it," Lebanon-based Al-Mayadeen television quoted Brigadier General Yahya Saree as saying on Sunday.
The remarks come as a delegation from Oman is in Yemen to discuss the extension of a ceasefire between Yemen's National Salvation Government and the Saudi-led coalition in the country.
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A new JUL 31 Houthi video shows a graduation ceremony for Houthi fighters from the Central Military District. Houthi snipers can be seen carrying 6 Iranian AM-50 AMRs, 2 Russian OSV-96 AMRs, SVD/Type-79 DMRs, Romanian PSL DMRs, & other rifles in an unspecified area in #Yemen. (photos)
https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz__/status/1553767398427197441
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Five Houthi experts have been killed while assembling a missile in Sana'a, sources said today/Multiple websites
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-58061
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The [Aden] Yemeni government accuses Houthis of planning to destroy Al-Saleh Mosque, [one of the largest in the Middle East region]/Bawabati
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-58061
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Houthi measure deprives thousands of children of education
Tens of thousands of children in Yemen will not be able to enroll in schools this year, due to the Houthis imposing tuition fees in public schools of up to 800 percent, to join the two million children who do not enroll in education annually as a result of the eight-year conflict and poverty, according to local and international reports. The population stops sending their children to schools, and in the best cases they send males rather than females, while there are about 1.7 million children living in refugee camps and 80 percent of them do not go to school for various reasons.
The decision issued by the Houthi Ministry of Education shocked the society, 80% of which live on aid, because it stipulates the imposition of tuition fees in all public schools of 8,300 riyals for each student instead of 1,000 riyals during the past year, in an unprecedented step in the history of Yemen. Which will lead, according to educational sources, to the reluctance of many families from sending their children to schools, and a large part of the affluent will be victims of this decision after they were forced to enter their children in public schools to escape the exorbitant education fees in private schools.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/35407
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The first military #AnsarAllah #Houthi parade showcasing rockets, ATGMs, sniper rifles, and drones in the 4th MRC which encompasses the frontlines in #Taiz #Yemen.
https://twitter.com/BashaReport/status/1554243395740176384
Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I_4FjbeQsoo
Also from Sana'a today. Probably the largest military parade since the war began.
https://twitter.com/Aldanimarki/status/1553839919197560833
More pictures. Yemen's Missile Forces on parade for the first time in the country's history. The missile forces was established as a distinct army branch during the war.
https://twitter.com/Aldanimarki/status/1553840902971482113
https://twitter.com/HamzahAlmotaa/status/1553817890759102465
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SPC extends terms of President Al-Mashat for 3 presidential terms
The Supreme Political Council (SPC), in its meeting on Sunday, approved the extension of the terms of the council’s President Mahdi Al-Mashat and his deputy for three terms, starting from August 24,2022, and ending on August 24, 2023.
https://en.ypagency.net/267876/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/07/31/presidential-term-of-mahdi-al-mashat-officially-extended-2/
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Hostage dies days after release from Houthi imprisonment and torture
Young man Yaseen Sadeq died in Ibb province on Thursday, days after his release from a Houthi terrorists-run jail where he endured months of severe torture and developed diseases like stomach cancer. Scores of people have died days upon release from Houthi jails as the terrorist militia intensify their torture ahead of release./Multiple sources
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-58032
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New Book: The Huthi Movement in Yemen
Ideology, Ambition and Security in the Arab Gulf
The Huthi rebels in Yemen are a resistance movement going back decades. Their coup against Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi in 2015 - and the subsequent Yemeni civil war and the intervention of the Arab coalition in support of Hadi - has brought absolute devastation to the country. But who are the Huthis and how can we understand the group away from armed conflict and war? What has motivated their social movement to fundamentally re-shape Yemen, and what are the group's local and regional ambitions?
This book provides the first comprehensive critical analysis dedicated to the Huthis. Across four parts and 17 chapters, the book examines how the movement is challenging traditional religious authority, re-shaping tribal values and roles in Yemen, constructing new collective memories and identities, and infusing Yemen's mediascape with their ideological creed. In examining the movement's specific ways of thinking and beliefs, the book also highlights its foreign policy within a regional policy of resistance to the United States, and it points towards what its impact on both Yemen and the security of the Arab Gulf region will be. The book brings together the leading experts on Yemen from diverse disciplines to provide readers with a nuanced and multi-layered approach to understanding the Huthi movement.
https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/huthi-movement-in-yemen-9780755644285/#
Remark: Reminder that Abdullah Hamidaddin is a Houthi sympathizer and grandson of Imam Yahya Hamidaddin's son Saif al-Islam.
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1553233160854540288
My comment: It’s published in the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies Series belonging to a Saudi foundation (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%B6nig-Faisal-Zentrum_f%C3%BCr_Forschung_und_Islamische_Studien ).
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Yemenis laud Nasrallah’s choice to side with them rather than being a 'mediator'
Residents of Sanaa say Nasrallah is the leader that is "frightening Israel", expressing loyalty to him and readiness to fight "Israel" on his side.
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Amnesty International: Yemen: Detained journalist denied urgent health care must be released
Responding to the news that Tawfiq al-Mansouri, one of four journalists detained since 2015 and sentenced to death in April 2020 by the Huthi de facto authorities, is being denied health care despite suffering from serious health conditions, Diana Semaan, Amnesty International’s Acting Deputy Director for the Middle East and North Africa, said:
“The Huthi de facto authorities’ denial of urgent medical treatment for Tawfiq al-Mansouri is a callous act of cruelty that violates the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment. Amid appalling detention conditions, he has suffered chronic illnesses including diabetes, kidney failure, asthma, and heart problems.
“Tawfiq al-Mansouri should never have been detained in the first place, let alone sentenced to death. The Huthis must immediately grant him access to the health care that he so urgently requires.
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The Houthi Groups Abduction of more than 60 Girls is Disgraceful and Requires Urgent Action to Reveal their Fate and Release Them
SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties stated that armed forces affiliated with the Houthi group kidnapped about 60 girls in less than a month in Hajjah Governorate and placed them in the central prison in the governorate without knowing other details. The organization stressed that this incident is disgraceful and unacceptable and violates the rules of protection guaranteed by international law to individuals in general and women in particular.
https://samrl.org/l.php?l=e,10,A,c,1,74,77,4515,html
cp6 Südjemen und Aden-Regierung / Southern Yemen and Aden government
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Clashes break out between coalition factions in Taiz
https://en.ypagency.net/268271/
(A T)
Military commander affiliated with Islah party killed in Marib
https://en.ypagency.net/268159/
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Yemen’s PLC Shows Commitment to Rebuilding State, Institutional Reform
Well-informed Yemeni sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that discussions are underway for the PLC issuing more decisions as part of reform aimed at reinstating structural legitimacy of civil and military institutions.
According to sources, the cabinet reshuffle was preceded by the formation of the joint security and military committee.
The newly formed committee is currently working to restructure military and security forces and unify their leadership under the ministries of defense and security.
The PLC has also discussed a proposal to form a higher committee for sovereign and local revenues, and another for development and reconstruction projects, sources added.
A direction towards forming supervisory and technical committees reflects the PLC’s ambitions for administrative and financial reforms as it seeks to fulfill its local and international obligations.
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FORCE INTEGRATION IN A POST-HYBRID LANDSCAPE
After years of war, Yemen is living through a watershed moment. Since April 2022, a national truce mediated by the United Nations is in effect and an inclusive, although politically fragmented, leadership structure, the Presidential Leadership Council, has replaced the interim president. A military coordination committee between warring parties has been convened for the technical implementation of the truce, which also facilitates communication and confidence-building. Moreover, the Presidential Leadership Council has established a 59-member Joint Military Committee to restructure and unify the armed and security forces belonging to the ‘anti-Houthi camp’, as well as intelligence units. Against this backdrop, Eleonora Ardemagni argues that time is ripe to reassess options for armed groups’ integration in the security sector.
The game-changer now is the top–down political acknowledgement provided by weakened but still recognized institutions, through formal co-optation, to the ‘hybrid sovereignties’ who de facto rule the territory. On the one hand, regular security forces and recognized institutions co-opt non-state forces and would-be institutional entities (e.g. the Southern Transitional Council, STC), maximizing amalgamation, but without real integration. On the other, most of the non-state forces and would-be institutional entities are now part of regular security forces and recognized institutions, thus acquiring a legal status which reinforces their legitimacy. But the gradual recognition of armed groups and self-proclaimed entities, while prolonged conflict and multiple power centres continue to erode institutional sovereignty, forges a new reality which overcomes hybridity. Who is a ‘formal’ actor and who is an ‘informal’ player in Yemen today? Do these labels still matter when it comes to designing locally oriented pathways of integration?
RIVALS AROUND THE SAME SECURITY TABLE
In the Presidential Leadership Council, the leaders of the most powerful armed groups, with varied degrees of hybridization with regular forces, now sit side-by-side (except for the Houthis) with people from internationally recognized institutions.
Moreover, coalition-building attempts between armed groups, as well as effective integration by recognized institutions, have substantially failed so far, due to power rivalries and different agendas.
This also has implications for the armed groups’ integration into the security sector.
STABILISATION OPTIONS FOR INTEGRATED, REGIONALLY BASED SECURITY
My policy paper ‘Integrating Yemen’s Armed Groups: Pathways of Decentralisation’ provides ‘work in progress’ stabilisation options, thus focusing on a specific side of security sector reform/governance (SSR/G) while also offering integration packages. However, these are flexible, adjustable during implementation and developing from two perspectives of centre–periphery relations that also leave room for incremental choices. The paper elaborates on integration options into existing agencies: the police forces and the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG). It also provides integration options into new, purpose-built agencies: the Yemen Regional Guard (YRG) and the Yemen National Guard (YNG), both developing within the vision of a united and federal Yemen, as per the 2014 National Dialogue Conference outcome document.
The YRG policy option portrays a context of marked decentralisation in centre–periphery relations, with many powers assigned to governorates and local authorities. This option mirrors the current state on the ground, in which a de facto federalisation of the country has been achieved, although ungoverned through institutional means. The YRG option would institutionalise this reality, with many powers devolved from national institutions to governorates and local authorities. The YNG policy option depicts a context of limited decentralisation in centre–periphery relations, with some powers devolved from national institutions to governorates and local authorities.
With regard to sequencing, the YRG option can be calibrated and adjusted depending on the evolution of the political-institutional context, thus confirming or reducing the practical translation on the ground of the federal principle. In this way, the YNG policy option can be considered an alternative option to the YRG to build a less decentralised Yemen. But the YNG option could be also considered the ‘phase two’ of the YRG, in case a national-level political agreement is finally achieved.
This article is a slightly revised extract of the author’s Policy Brief ‘Integrating Yemen’s Armed Groups: Pathways of Decentralisation’, published by the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), July 2022.
https://www.yemenpolicy.org/force-integration-in-a-post-hybrid-landscape/
(* A K P)
Video + photos.. #Emirati military developments on the islands of #Mayon and #Zuqar newspaper revealed Emirati military developments in the strategic Yemeni islands in the Red Sea. On Monday, the newspaper published a special investigation, supported by satellite images, revealing many military developments on the islands of #Miyun and #Zuqar. The pictures attached to an illustrative video showed the presence of two military airports for helicopters on Zuqar Island, consisting of eight airfields, in addition to the presence of helicopters at the two airports, maintenance workshops and other newly developed buildings. The photos also showed #Emirati military developments on the strategic island of Mayon, including a military airport and new buildings and hangars, in addition to the development of a number of naval tongues. These #Emirati developments come in light of the coalition forces’ militarization of all strategic Yemeni ports, islands and coasts, and their transformation into intelligence centers with #Israeli-#American participation, with the aim of exploiting their wealth and controlling international shipping routes.
https://twitter.com/GhalebM0nz1i7/status/1554590330934247424
(A P)
Aden witnesses protests, heavy gunfire in front of Ma’ashiq Palace
The port city of Aden, southern Yemen, witnessed on Tuesday massive protests of teachers and military personnel in front of Ma’ashiq Palace, headquarter of the Riyadh-formed Presidential Council and the government loyal to Saudi-led coalition.
Local sources reported that the guard of the palace fired heavily in the air to disperse a protest demonstration of teachers demanding the payment of their salaries, coinciding with the entry of a local official to the palace.
https://en.ypagency.net/268091/
(A T)
Security official injured in Abyan assassination attempt
https://en.ypagency.net/268083/
and also http://en.adenpress.news/news/35420
(A P)
Citizens denounce the rise of “levies” checkpoints in Abyan
https://en.ypagency.net/268058/
(A T)
Gunmen assassinate GPC’s leading member in Marib
https://en.ypagency.net/268117/ and https://en.ypagency.net/268071/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/08/02/prominent-politician-of-general-peoples-congress-assassinated-in-marib/
(A P)
Tensions are rising between pro-government forces and the separatist "Shabwa Defense" forces in the province of Shabwa which until recently was a safe oasis in war-torn Yemen/Multiple sources.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-58081
(A P)
3 citizens killed, 4 others inured due to armed clashes in Hadramout
Three citizens were killed on Monday and four others injured due to armed clashes erupted between tribesmen in Hadramout province, east of Yemen.
Local sources reported that the confrontations broke out between the tribesmen due to disagreements, pointing out that the tribesmen included elements loyal to UAE-backed militias in the area.
https://en.ypagency.net/267958/
(A T)
Bomb attack targets UAE-backed “Shabwa defense” forces in Shabwa
https://en.ypagency.net/267969/
and also http://en.adenpress.news/news/35417
(A K P)
Official: army ready for war if Houthis don't adhere to UN-brokered deals
The chief of operations at Yemen's Ministry of Defence Brig. Gen Khalid Al-Ashwal said on Sunday the government forces are well-prepared for war if the Houthi group does not stick to UN-sponsored peace deals and truces.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-30382.html
(A P)
Yemen swears in new governors for Hadhramout, Socotra
Yemen's internationally recognised government swore in new governors for Hadhramout and Socotra, state media said on Monday, in a move political sources said was aimed at bolstering unity among an anti-Houthi alliance led by Saudi Arabia.
Mabkhoot bin Mubarak bin Madhi was named governor of the oil-producing Hadhramout region in the south, and Raafat Ali Ibrahim was appointed governor of Socotra island in the Arabian Sea.
https://uk.news.yahoo.com/yemen-swears-governors-hadhramout-socotra-104659307.html
and
(A P)
Republican decree to appoint Mabkhout Yaslam governor of #Hadramout.
Newl-appointed governor Yaslam is a GPC MP and leader from #Hadramout.
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1553804354490171392
referring to http://sabanew.net/story/ar/88584
(A P)
ٌSTC-affiliated Rafat al-Athqali appointed governor of #Yemen's #Socotra.
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1553840186815021059
(A P)
2 youths killed in armed attack in Lahj
The sources indicated that a number of militants believed to be from UAE-backed Southern Transitional elements, attacked a farm belongs to a citizen in Sabir area, which resulted in death of two recruits.
https://en.ypagency.net/267867/
(A P)
Film: Citizens doubt new ministers can improve security or services
Yemenis response to the ministerial amendments issued by the Presidential Council is split between those who are hopeful that the new government would work to resolve issues of electricity and water, supply oil derivatives, pay salaries regularly and improve living conditions exacerbated by the economic crisis in the country, and those who are pessimistic and believe the economic situation will remain the same regardless.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NVq5odc7kJ8
(* A P)
STC reiterates efforts to separate south from north Yemen
Yemen's Southern Transitional Council (STC) on Saturday reiterated efforts to separate from north Yemen.
At a meeting chaired by its chairman Eidroos al-Zobaidi in Aden, the Emirati-backed STC chairmanship board listened to a report on a set of understandings reached by the "Southern National Dialogue" team at meetings with southern national figures abroad, the STC website said.
The report also included "plans and mechanisms the team will follow to start the second stage of dialogue with southern national figures, so as to unite visions and boost joint national work reflecting southern unified ranks able to achieve southern people and restore their independent state and to contribute to the building of its institutions," it added.
Zobaidi, also a member in the Yemeni Leadership Council, highlighted the need for southern-southern dialogue as a human value, cultural phenomenon and successful political approach to reaching a code of ethics representing the southern unified ranks and collective will, according to the STC website.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-30371.html
(A P)
What is Behind the Increased Terror Attacks in Southern Yemen
The free movement of AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) and the increase in its activity in the southern provinces, especially in Shabwah, comes after the fall of the political and military cover of the Islah Party (Muslim Brotherhood branch in Yemen). The Islah Party no longer monopolizes the internationally recognized Yemeni government. That is why their military wing in Yemen (al-Qaeda) tries to muddle the situation and attack their original adversary, the southern military and security forces. Thus, we now witness terrorist operations in Shabwah and Abyan. We will see an upsurge in these terrorist operations in the coming days after the Muslim Brotherhood lost its absolute grip on the Yemeni government.
In light of these terrorist attacks in Shabwah and Abyan, we recall the series of terrorist operations that affected Aden after the dismissal of the Islah Party Governor, Nayef al-Bakri, and after pro-South Yemen independence leaders were given political and security roles instead of members of the Al-Islah Party (Muslim Brotherhood affiliate in Yemen).
http://en.adenpress.news/art/110
My remark: By a STC separatist news site, blaming STC’s enemy Islah Party.
(A P)
Dozens of Mahra tribesmen pour into Al-Ghaydah city
Dozens of tribesmen people poured into the city of Al-Ghaydah, the provincial capital of Mahrah, eastern Yemen.
According to local reports, sheikhs and sons of Mahra tribes came from all directorates came to the city of Al-Ghaydah, in solidarity and stand by the chairman of sit-in committee, Sheikh Ali Salem al-Harizi, after storming his house on Thursday by militias of the Saudi-led coalition forces.
They stressed that the tribes announced their rejection and condemnation of the incursion, declaring readiness to defend their land and expel the American, British occupiers and their tools ( Saudis and Emiratis,) as well as their militias they brought from Dhalea and Yafea to the province, during the past years.
https://en.ypagency.net/267723/
(A P)
Al-Sabiha tribes threaten with confronting coalition forces near Bab al-Mandab
Al-Sabiha tribes on Saturday called for all their sons to gather tomorrow, Sunday, to the Ras Al-Ara area, west of the southern Lahj province, in rejection of the extremist groups funded by the Saudi-led coalition.
The Al-Sabiha tribes confirmed that the tribal mobilization comes as a rejection of the camps that include thousands of extremist Salafist groups under the so-called “Al-Yemen Al-Saeed Brigades”, and the marginalization that affected the sons of Al-Sabiha over the past years.
The tribes accused the leadership of the coalition of creating problems between the sons of Al-Sabiha through the racial and regional distribution of brigades.
They threatened with confronting these brigades, cutting off the coastal road in front of the coalition forces, and purging their areas of coalition forces “at any cost.”
https://en.ypagency.net/267800/
(A P)
Vereinten Nationen: Wir fordern die VAE auf, die von ihren Streitkräften im Jemen praktizierte Folter einzustellen
Das Menschenrechtsbüro der Vereinten Nationen forderte die VAE auf, die von ihren Streitkräften im Jemen praktizierte Folter einzustellen.
Der Ausschuss der Vereinten Nationen gegen Folter sagte in einem gestern Abend veröffentlichten Bericht: „Trotz der Informationen, die dem Ausschuss über den Abzug der Streitkräfte der VAE aus dem Hoheitsgebiet des Jemen im Jahr 2019 zur Verfügung gestellt wurden, ist er besorgt über Berichte über schwere Menschenrechtsverletzungen, die von begangen wurden die regulären Streitkräfte.“ Die VAE und Regierungsakteure, deren Handlungen den VAE zuzurechnen sind, befinden sich in Haftanstalten unter der Gerichtsbarkeit der VAE.“
Der Bericht bezog sich auf „Haftanstalten wie den Al-Rayyan International Airport, das Seven Octobe Prison, das Al-Jalaa Camp, die Waddah Hall und das ehemalige Militärhauptquartier der VAE im Jemen“.
https://www.saba.ye/de/news3196715.htm
(A P)
UN committee expresses concern over UAE torture of Yemenis
The United Nations Committee Against Torture has voiced concern over the torture and ill-treatment of Yemenis by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) armed forces, state security agencies, and on-state armed groups, calling for a "viable pathway” through which victims can seek justice.
The committee made the remarks during its concluding session on Friday, as it highlighted UAE’s involvement in the ongoing Saudi-led war on Yemen.
It also assigned special responsibility to investigators and prosecutors that work with crimes of torture and abuse, calling for a viable pathway for victims to seek justice, redress and rehabilitation.
https://parstoday.com/en/news/west_asia-i180630-un_committee_expresses_concern_over_uae_torture_of_yemenis = https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/un-committee-expresses-concern-over-uae-torture-of-yemenis
and also https://en.ypagency.net/267748/
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp7 – cp19
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-818b-yemen-war-mosaic-818b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-817-yemen-war-mosaic-817
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-817 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-817:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
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