November 19, 2022: Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2021 – The Yemen Review, October 2022 – Yemen: War of “Pacification” and International Policing – America’s Autocratic Persian Gulf ‘Partners’ Are Actually Liabilities – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-831b-yemen-war-mosaic-831b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Aden-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Aden government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp8a Jamal Khashoggi
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp9b Beziehungen der USA zu Saudi-Arabien und den VAE / US-Saudi and UAE relations
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp11 Deutschland / Germany
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp12b Sudan
cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade
cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage
cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy
cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism
cp15 Propaganda
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
cp19 Sonstiges / Other
Klassifizierung / Classification
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*
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
(B H)
Medair: Warum arbeiten wir im Jemen?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X-YQJQjxGIM
(B H)
Film: Yemen – the worst humanitarian crisis in the world
https://eu.azcentral.com/embed/video/103183448/
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
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A Country Falling Apart: Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2021
Parties to the conflict in Yemen have continued to commit serious violations, undermining Yemenis ability to live, in blatant disregard of basic rules of international law and humanitarian standards. And while Yemenis were racing against time to overcome the plight of the war in 2021, the pace of hostilities escalated and violence expanded in the governorates, killing hundreds of civilians. The war has left poor conditions for the residents of those areas. This has caused the displacement of tens of thousands of them. The escalating violence has also caused widespread damage to vital infrastructure, including hospitals and service facilities.
In the body of this annual report, Mwatana for Human Rights provides an extensive review of particular violations that occurred and the overall human rights situation in Yemen during 2021. Mwatana, whose work covers most Yemeni governorates, has documented––through fact-finding, evidence examination, and detailed research––hundreds of incidents that violate international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). Some of these violations may amount to war crimes. The report presents some incidents as examples, shedding light on different types of abuses committed by the warring parties.
In order to draft this report, Mwatana for Human rights conducted investigative field research, including thorough investigations and direct inspections of the sites where attacks and incidents took place. Throughout 2021, Mwatana interviewed witnesses, relatives of victims, survivors, medical and human rights workers, and examined documents, evidence, photos, videos, and other physical evidence. During 2021, Mwatana documented (699) incidents, which killed (440) and injured (675) civilians, and include incidents of disappearance, detention, and torture of (494) civilian victims.
The incidents and patterns of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law included in this report represent examples of the most prominent ones documented by Mwatana during 2021. In no way do they represent all the incidents and patterns that occurred in Yemen that year. Mwatana continues to document violations and abuses that have occurred since the beginning of 2022.
https://mwatana.org/en/falling-apart/
Report in full: https://mwatana.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Annual-Report-2021-En.pdf
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Houthis Target Southern Ports – The Yemen Review, October 2022
The UN-backed truce between the Houthi movement and the internationally recognized government was allowed to expire on October 2. Efforts to secure its further extension failed following a last-minute demand by Houthi negotiators to add military and security personnel to a payroll of public sector employees. The breakdown of the talks was followed by mutual recriminations, even as Saudi Arabia and the Houthis exchanged delegations on October 14, ostensibly to visit prisoners of war and discuss an exchange.
Later in the month, the Houthis targeted two oil ports on Yemen’s southern coast with drones, striking the port of Nushayma in Shabwa on October 18-19 and the port of Al-Dabba in Hadramawt on October 21. The drone attacks followed warnings by senior Houthi official Mahdi al-Mashat that foreign energy companies were “looting Yemen’s sovereign wealth” and should cease operations. Though the facilities were undamaged, the attacks have disrupted exports as foreign ships stay away from Yemen’s coast. On October 31, Canadian oil producer Calvalley Petroleum Ltd. announced a suspension of oil production at Block 9 in Hadramawt due to the “current extremely challenging situation” and a lack of oil storage capacity.
In response to the Houthi drone attacks, the government’s National Defense Council officially designated the Houthi movement a terrorist organization on October 23. It is unclear what ramifications the designation will have, as the government currently lacks a mechanism with which to enforce compliance. Saudi Arabia has privately urged caution to prevent derailing ongoing peace talks.
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/october-2022
Politics & Diplomacy: Houthi Strikes Prompt Government Terrorism Designation
Overview
Direct Saudi-Houthi talks intensified in October, even while UN-backed efforts to reinstate and expand the truce that expired October 2 stalled and the Houthis and the Yemeni government escalated their words and actions. Riyadh and the Houthi authorities publicly exchanged delegations on October 12. While both sides portrayed these delegations as technical teams working toward a prisoner exchange, the Sana’a Center has learned that they were composed of more senior officials than publicly reported, including several members of Houthi leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi’s inner circle. The Saudis offered what was described as a comprehensive deal, one that would involve Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman receiving senior Houthi official Mahdi al-Mashat.
While Saudi Arabia appeared to pursue a more conciliatory approach in October, the Houthis followed the end of the six-month truce with threats culminating in drone strikes October 18-21 at the oil shipping ports of Nushayma and Al-Dabba. Though the facilities were undamaged, such port strikes could further impact oil exports — and the revenues they generate that the government relies on to function. This prompted the Yemeni government to adopt a harder line, with the government’s National Defense Council on October 23 officially designating the Houthi movement as a terrorist organization. Yemeni government officials emphasized they would work to minimize the designation’s economic impact on people living in Houthi-held areas. The government lacks mechanisms to enforce any sanctions accompanying it, but the designation could inadvertently further fragment the Yemeni state (see the Sana’a Center’s October editorial).
Although international actors visited various parties in the region, attempting to get a truce back on track, UN-backed negotiations appeared to stall, with Saudi and Houthi leaders refusing to engage in international mediation. On November 1, UN envoy Hans Grundberg departed Muscat, his talks with Houthi officials seemingly having made little progress.
Internally, the government and Saudi-led coalition sought to resolve differences at meetings in Riyadh, with Saudi Arabia displeased about the dissension within the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). Although rumors persisted of a potential cabinet reshuffle to better represent the makeup of the PLC, the only substantive government change in October was the formation of a new negotiating committee for peace talks with the Houthis, which included representatives from a wider range of parties, including the STC, Islah and the National Resistance forces. At the local level, while Shabwa Governor Awadh bin al-Wazir al-Awlaki made arrangements for a governorate-wide conference to ease tensions following Islah-STC clashes in August, dueling STC- and Islah-backed protests in Wadi Hadramawt escalated over the presence of the Islah-aligned forces in the 1st Military Region.
In Houthi-held areas, authorities arranged mass celebrations for the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday. Organized with a view to project unity and normalcy, authorities collected extra-legal taxes on businesses and forced citizens to participate in the events. Separately, multiple clashes were reported in Sana’a governorate during October, with Houthi-aligned forces storming Saref village to the east of the capital amid ongoing attempts to expropriate land in the area, and Houthi leaders clashing in personal dispute in Arhab district.
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/october-2022/19003
Military & Security: Houthis Attack Oil Ports
Overview
Houthi drone and missile strikes on government-controlled oil ports in mid-October marked the first significant post-truce military escalation, although neither the government nor the Houthis immediately launched major ground offensives. Fighting along frontlines nationwide after the truce ended October 2 occurred in southwestern Yemen, in Taiz, Lahj and Hudaydah governorates. In their troop movements and fortification of positions, both sides appeared to be preparing for the ground war to intensify. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, meanwhile, sent more weapons to their respective clients.
No casualties or damage were reported from the October 18-21 Houthi strikes on the Nushayma oil terminal and Al-Dabba port, but the prospect of further attacks in and outside Yemen paralyzed oil exports for more than three weeks, threatening government finances (see, The Economy & Finance, ‘Houthis’ Oil Port Attacks Threaten Government Finances’). The presidential palace in Aden is considered vulnerable to attack, even though the PLC remains largely absent; the UAE set up a radar system to detect drones around the palace complex before removing it a week later due to Saudi objections. Beyond Saudi energy and infrastructure, there are concerns among the coalition leadership about ensuring the smooth execution of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, taking place in Qatar in November and December and bringing global attention to the Gulf region.
In southern Yemen, counterterrorism operations against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continued throughout October in Abyan governorate, prompting IED attacks on STC forces in Shabwa that purportedly were carried out by AQAP militants chased out of Abyan. Further counterterrorism operations in Shabwa appeared imminent as part of the STC-led effort to root out AQAP militants.
Houthis Attack Oil Ports
After weeks of Houthi warnings against exporting oil from Yemen, the Houthis launched drone attacks October 18 and 19 on the Nushayma oil terminal at the port of Rudum, where the Tanzanian-flagged oil tanker Hana was docked. On October 21, two Houthi drones crashed into the Al-Dabba oil port in Shihr district as a Greek tanker was preparing to load a shipment of crude oil. While the government reported no injuries or damage, the tanker departed before taking on its intended cargo of 2 million barrels of oil. On October 25, local authorities closed the port of Mukalla after detecting Houthi drones. The port reopened days later for non-oil commercial activities. On October 26, Shabwa Defense forces shot down a Houthi drone near Ataq airport, which is known to host UAE and coalition forces. The Houthi attacks on the Nushayma and Al-Dabba oil terminals apparently aimed to pressure the government as UN mediation continues (see. Politics and Diplomacy, ‘Houthi Strikes Prompt Government Terrorism Designation, UN Condemnation’).
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/october-2022/19004
The Economy & Finance: Oil Port Attacks Threaten Government Finances
Overview
Houthi drone attacks on Nushayma and Al-Dabba oil terminals in the latter half of October paralyzed oil exports and threatened to undermine government finances. Although its effects were not felt in October, prolonged loss of oil revenue would cut the government off from by far its largest source of revenue, which would have widespread knock-on effects, including eroding the ability of the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden (CBY-Aden) to continue financing basic commodity imports, support the value of new rials and keep inflation subdued.
Representatives from the government-aligned Central Bank of Yemen in Aden (CBY-Aden) met with officials from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the US Federal Reserve in early October, with IMF officials praising recent CBY-Aden policies to stabilize the rial and predicting reduced inflation in late 2022. In Houthi-held areas, the Central Bank of Yemen in Sana’a (CBY-Sana’a) and other agencies continued efforts to digitize commerce and payment systems, as Houthi restrictions on rials printed by the CBY-Aden after 2017 have resulted in fewer and fewer circulating banknotes.
Despite the truce’s expiration on October 2, fuel ships reportedly continued to visit the Houthi-held port of Hudaydah. In government-controlled Aden, fuel shortages emerged in the first half of October, resulting in increased prices and electricity outages throughout the month. Although its effects were not apparent in October, the first shipment of the new Saudi fuel grant arrived October 26 in the city.
Houthis’ Oil Port Attacks Threaten Government Finances
The Houthi attacks at the port of Rudum in Shabwa governorate and the port of Shihr in Hadramawt aimed to pressure the government as UN mediation continues, including talks to address the four-years-worth of salary arrears owed to public employees in Houthi-controlled areas. Houthi demands have expanded to include the payment of salaries of military and security personnel in areas the group controls, however the government has refused to acquiesce. In 2014, before the Houthis took over Sana’a and much of northern Yemen, the salaries of military and security personnel constituted almost half of all salaries on the government payroll, with salaries overall making up roughly a third of total government spending. Were the Yemeni government to agree to pay all state salaries nationwide, it would quickly drain government finances while propelling a jump in economic activity in Houthi-controlled areas, which would allow the group to raise more revenue for itself through the ability to extract more taxes and levies.
Until the drone attacks, the government had been on track to continue the remarkable recovery of oil export revenue in recent years.
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/october-2022/19013
The Environment: Flooding Eases as Taiz Contends with Dengue Fever Outbreak
Flooding and flood-related displacement eased in October compared to previous months. However, authorities continued to battle a mosquito-spread dengue fever outbreak in Taiz governorate that has infected over 8,000 people and led to five deaths. Hospitals in Taiz governorate documented nearly 1,000 patients with the illness in October alone, according to medical workers and a source in the Taiz Health Office. Transmitted via mosquitoes, dengue fever causes flu-like symptoms, including fever, and in some cases can be fatal. On October 13, a health education official said that the number of infections has so far reached more than 8,400 in 2022, including 4,300 since mid-July, and caused five deaths. The outbreak has been exacerbated by the deterioration of the healthcare system, leaving local authorities struggling to contain it.
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/october-2022/19020
Editorial: Deescalate the Economic War
Without import financing, food prices would increase. The impact in government-held areas would be especially profound, as the value of new rials would dive again. The gradual recovery of oil and gas exports during the conflict has also allowed the government to resume some servicing of external debt obligations and begin restoring confidence among foreign creditors. The loss of natural resource revenues could erase this progress and increase the country’s exposure to external shocks and capital flight.
The seriousness of the port attacks was not lost on the government, which responded by designating the Houthis a terrorist organization. This may only make matters worse. There is still hope the designation will amount to no more than rhetoric, as the government has no mechanism with which to enforce it. The move has been met with silence and disinterest from regional and international actors. Saudi Arabia privately urged caution to prevent derailing ongoing peace talks, and the United States – which repealed its own terrorism designation in January 2021 – has made no public comment. But the Presidential Leadership Council appears to be moving ahead.
Attempting to enforce the edict in the current circumstances would play into the Houthis’ hands. It would be tantamount to completing the division of Yemen, undermining the government’s claim to represent the entire country and further establishing the Houthi authorities as an independent state actor. This is a project the Houthis themselves have sought to advance. The Houthi war on the oil and gas sector amounts to a war on Yemeni citizens, which will only bring more pain and suffering to people across the country. The situation will become critical if no agreement is reached within the next two months on the resumption of oil exports. The government also needs to shelve its rash decision to designate the Houthis as terrorists, which will only hinder any future negotiations to end the conflict. The matrix of social and economic bonds holding Yemeni society together has been worn thin. These crucial ties must not be targeted for political gain.
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/october-2022/19002
Commentary: The Saudi Overture to the Houthis
In the second week of October, the Saudi government made a bold proposal to the Houthis. They invited the nominal leader of the de facto authorities in Sana’a, Mahdi al-Mashat, President of the Supreme Political Council and Supreme Commander of the armed forces, to visit Riyadh, meet Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, and discuss a peace deal. This was the breakthrough that the Houthis have been working for since they overthrew the internationally recognized government in 2014. Direct talks with the Saudis would confer a degree of international legitimacy to the Houthi government, but they also represent a recognition of the legitimacy that the Houthi authorities themselves have established in eight years of consolidating their rule over most of Yemen’s population.
The Houthis have played their hand strategically. Unable to defeat their disparate enemies outright, they have been wise enough to wait, giving them the rope to hang themselves.
The Houthis leveraged their military successes into shrewd deal-making when the conditions were right.
Hopes that the Houthis will willingly join a national government are misplaced. The Houthis have shown no willingness to enter into a credible power sharing agreement.
When the Saudis invited Al-Mashat to Riyadh, the Houthis felt they were already well placed to extract concessions. Their response was conditional: that they would not engage in any talks with Saudi Arabia until it lifts all sanctions and pays the salaries of all civilian and military state employees, as per the 2014 payroll list, out of the oil and gas revenues controlled by the government and deposited in Al-Ahli Bank in Riyadh. While the government should fulfill the promise it made to pay salaries when it transferred the central bank from Sana’a to Aden, this is unlikely to be the end of Houthi pre-conditions for peace talks. The Houthis are negotiating from a position of strength
The Houthis believe that they have defeated the coalition of 17 states and their backers, including the US and the United Kingdom, by divine intervention.
If the Saudis make a unilateral deal with the Houthis, or force their Yemeni allies to sign a non-implementable power sharing agreement, that day will be the effective end of the Yemeni state. The immediate result will be a militant ideological force on the Saudi border, emboldened by their apparent victory and now short of an enemy. But in time, the economic situation will deteriorate and the Houthis’ control over the populace will start to crack, with chaotic and likely violent results. The day the Saudis sign a separate deal will complete a transition: they will no longer be the Houthis’ “Enemy from Heaven,” but their “Friend from Hell.” – by Abdulghani Al-Iryani
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/october-2022/18992
Commentary: The Mandatory Celebration of Hardship
However, under Houthi rule, celebrations of national events have been minimized in favor of marking important events in the history of the group. Special Houthi commemorations now include the anniversary of the takeover of Sana’a (September 21), and the anniversaries of the deaths of Houthi founder Hussein al-Houthi and his father, Badreddine al-Houthi. Religious occasions have taken on new importance, including sect-specific commemorations such as Ashoura, marking the killing of Hussein, grandson of the Prophet, and Eid al-Ghadir (Wilaya Day), when Shias mark the Prophet naming his cousin and son-in-law Ali as his successors. The number of annual Houthi-mandated commemorations in Yemen now exceeds 20, and the group spends lavishly on these new occasions.
Like any totalitarian regime seeking to reshape society, the Houthis use these celebrations to perpetuate their ideological message and demonstrate their authoritarian power. The end goal is an attempt to impose their religious and political ideology on the whole country. In their efforts, the Houthis martial every instrument of their power, including control over media, education, and state finances.
The lavish spending at these events flies in the face of the economic situation facing many Yemenis and the country at large. Extravagant decorations were on display during the recent celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, including a fireworks show in Sana’a that lasted almost 45 minutes, at a time when the group claims it is unable to pay the salaries of state employees or provide basic services to citizens.
Levies collected by Houthi officials have become one of the most prominent features of the group’s rule, with different justifications given throughout the year, including frequent celebrations. However, some of these funds go directly into the pockets of the officials themselves, who enjoy legal immunity, further impoverishing the population while Houthi loyalists amass more wealth.
The Houthis not only exacerbate and insult people’s poverty by spending lavishly on these celebrations; many are forced to attend and participate in such events. Authorities claim that participation is voluntary and that attendance reflects the magnitude of their popularity, but use various means to compel residents to turn up.
Based on accounts from residents of Sana’a, public events under the Houthis have taken a drastically different form than those during the tenure of longtime former president Ali Abdullah Saleh
The issue is not just the lavish spending or the imbalance of priorities in a country experiencing economic collapse – the political messages accompanying these celebrations are politically divisive. The Prophet’s birthday is no longer cast as a religious event but rather a political occasion to underscore the legitimacy of Houthi rule.
The problem of replacing national events with religious celebrations lies not just in their representation of religion as the only basis of legitimate governance. They undermine adherence to the concept of an inclusive national state. The Houthis’ attempt to transform Yemen into a homogenous society has alienated the overwhelming majority of Yemenis who remember the pre-Houthi era. They fear the impact on their children and future generations, and the transformation of the country into a place they do not recognize and where they can see no future – by Maysaa Shuja al-Deen
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/october-2022/18995
Commentary: Failed Truce Reflects Houthi Willingness to Leverage Gov’t Divisions, Global Needs
Locally, two factors stand out. First, the Houthis carried out three major military parades during the previous truce, signaling their willingness to escalate. They bet on the impotence of the internationally recognized government, given the division between its various parties and power imbalances. Second, the Houthis’ demands and catchphrases in the most recent negotiations shifted from a political underpinning of resisting foreign aggression to economic and legal demands that seek a share of oil revenue on the basis that they control two-thirds of the country’s population.
The Houthis calculate that a deepening of the West’s energy crisis as relations with Moscow worsen will prompt western nations to focus on finding an appropriate way to permanently end the war in Yemen and contribute to the stability of the whole region. The Houthis’ use of global energy shortages as a strategic bargaining card was apparent when local allegations surfaced in September, prior to the expiry of the truce, accusing the UAE of trying to sell Yemeni gas to Germany.
Internationally, failure to extend the truce also bears implications on regional rivalries and on any further talks aimed at restoring the truce itself.
Coming late to a truce is better than not coming at all. Favorable opportunities are being offered to Yemenis to solve their conflict, but fluid regional and international equations — especially those involving Riyadh and Tehran — mean further Houthi delays could have grave repercussions.
The Yemen crisis will likely be impacted soon by the Saudi-American diplomatic feud that followed the October 5 OPEC Plus decision to slash the rise in oil output. Past controversies between Washington and Riyadh, such as the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, human rights, the Yemen war, and, most recently, the oil crisis, may all be used to twist Riyadh’s arm. If the truce cannot be restored, the Houthis will intensify their words and actions, pushing Saudi Arabia to re-launch a military offensive in Yemen; this, in turn, will be met by US media pressure and a reluctance to supply Riyadh with military equipment.
Although many Yemenis consider dealing with the Houthis a waste of time, they also hold out hope for a truce that ultimately will end the war. That hope fades a little more each time the Houthis bargain to buy time, reorganize themselves and demand more concessions from the other side – by Omar Munassar
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/october-2022/18996
(** B P)
Yemen: War of Pacification and International Policing
The war in Yemen is as much a war of pacification by the United Kingdom and Empire as it is a war of the Saudi-led coalition. Wielding the gavel of legitimacy within international society, the world’s liberal authorities are allowed to instigate covert police operations in their perpetual fight against an elusive enemy, forever fuelling the machine of war and crushing any attempt at independence from the free-market globalist ideology.
As Yemen is thrust back into war following the break-down of an UN-backed ‘truce’—which, of course, despite being the case on paper, saw the continuation of violent attacks on Yemeni civilians regardless—we ought to remember whose war this is and indeed to what end it is being fought.
The United Kingdom’s role in the death of thousands of Yemenis has been portrayed at best, as negligible, and at worst, as necessary. When the aggression began, the former Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond said: ‘We’ll support the Saudis in every practical way short of engaging in combat’. Far from representing a mere advisor-like role, such support has proven to be the mainstay (alongside the US) of Saudi military might.
Beginning as an UN-mandated intervention in March 2015, the war entered its eighth year of continuous destruction. As a response to the overthrow of the ‘internationally recognised’ government of Mansur Hadi by the Ansar Allah coalition—often simplistically referred to as ‘Houthi rebels’—the Saudi Arabian-led coalition has turned the country into a living hell. According to the latest UNDP report, by the end of 2021, 377,000 people had died in Yemen from both direct and indirect causes. 60% of these deaths were reported from hunger, or preventable disease (instigated by the coalition’s blockade on imports), amongst other indirect causes, whilst 70% of deaths were children under the age of five.
Too often elided from the reporting on the war (what little of it there is at least) are the forces and influences more broadly at play. Typically boiled down by the think tank orthodoxy—who often control the parameters of discourse on today’s war—to a conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Iran-backed Houthi rebels fighting for regional hegemony.
Others have painted the conflict as a ‘civil war’, where the Houthis have wittingly opened a power vacuum for extremist groups to thrive in. Such narratives should not be read as a “faux-pas”, a slip in the reading of the region’s geopolitics—but instead as an ongoing and deliberate effort to subsume Yemen into the West’s insatiable War on Terror. To be aligned with an already certified international villain, Iran, whilst lacking the oversight of a so-called ‘legitimate’ president—and thus an inevitable breeding ground for AQAP and Daesh-Yemen—is the call of all calls for more arms sales and proper Western liberal intervention.
Under the explicitly authoritarian and repressive rule of MBS, the Saudi Crown Prince and de facto sovereign, the Kingdom’s role in the region, and in the war itself, is only made legitimate for as long as it is congruent with the interests of British and American capital.
Britain’s export-oriented security strategy has sought to empower KSA as a pillar of regional order, whilst their covert military units illustrate a habitual attempt at international policing. The war in Yemen has been banalised in its reduction to routine police action, whilst simultaneously absolutised in its characterisation as the existential threat of the ‘Iran-backed Houthi rebels’.
Why Yemen?
According to its NSS, the UK must position itself so as to ensure ‘the sea lanes stay open and the arteries of global commerce remain ‘free-flowing’’. It must therefore be positioned in the Gulf so that key trade routes—namely, the Suez Canal (including the Bab al-Mandab, through which nine percent of the world’s seaborne-traded crude oil and refined petroleum passes)—are not obstructed.
The threat of a ‘rogue state’ on the border of KSA that faces the Bab al-Mandab, directly challenges the UK’s (and US’s) capitalist interests. But Yemen is clearly not a stranger to the tentacles of Western neo-imperialist exploitation.
Empire’s international financial institutions have attempted to shape Yemen’s economy around free markets, austerity, and urbanisation since the end of the last Imam in North Yemen in 1962. Much of the country’s economic development can be seen as a constant battle between the Bretton Woods Institutions and the recalcitrance of Yemenis to modernise according to IMF and World Bank conditions, culminating in social and political mobilisations that rejected an externally imposed ‘development’ into the global (‘free world’) economy.
From what was an independent, rural, and predominantly agrarian-based society, Yemen’s traditional values and practices have not been easily subdued by Western capitalist power.
In his astoundingly comprehensive book titled Destroying Yemen, What Chaos in Arabia Tells Us about the World, Isa Blumi points out that the economic development plans laid out by the multitude of aid groups pushed the use of ‘American labour-saving technology, pesticides and fertilizers’. This allowed for the previously rural villagers to instead constitute a city-based labour force for sweatshops and oil projects that contribute productively to the global market.
Lackner shows us that its subsequent lack of self-sufficiency and poverty is strongly illustrated through the prioritisation of a neoliberal agenda by external financiers that sought to preserve the country’s limited water supplies for the ‘development of high-value export crops at the expense of local food security and the living conditions of the majority.
The water crisis described here, far from emerging naturally out of a lack of resources for the population, is clearly a direct result of appropriating farmers’ lands, and their subsequent use as cash-crops.
According to Kamilia Al-Eriani, seeing the country as a cause of worry, has, historically, perpetuated the ‘domination of regional and international powers over Yemen at the expense of democracy and national unity’. Not only democracy and national unity but also the economic wellbeing of the country itself, which is the one thing ‘modernisation theory’ claims to resolve.
In fact, the overwhelming assistance received by Yemen from the international aid industry, as James Ferguson shows in other ‘developing’ countries, subjected the majority of the population to greater poverty, debt, and dependence. The only beneficiaries of such negotiations have been the organisations themselves, Yemen’s president and his allies, and foreign investors who are able to exploit Yemen’s resources – by Leon Carvallo
https://www.pressenza.com/2022/11/yemen-war-of-pacification-and-international-policing/
(** B P)
America’s Autocratic Persian Gulf ‘Partners’ Are Actually Liabilities
The two instances are among the latest examples of why the United States must reassess these relationships. Both highlight decades of failed U.S. Middle East policy rooted in support for autocrats who repeatedly pursue policies contrary to not only American but universal values and interests.
American support for Middle East autocrats is objectionable from both moral and strategic perspectives. Washington’s Middle East partners are some of the worst human rights abusers in the world.
President Joe Biden’s overtures to these states have not resulted in any concrete movement on human rights. In fact, the opposite appears to be true: since his visit to Saudi Arabia in July, both the Saudi and Emirati governments have been emboldened.
US Strategic Interests
The argument typically proffered in defense of the U.S. relationship with these rights abusers is that the ties advance U.S. strategic interests, such as hosting American military units, including missile defense systems; cooperation against terrorism; and containing Iran. To the contrary, however, Saudi Arabia and the UAE actually destabilize the region and repeatedly pursue policies that are fundamentally at odds with American strategic interests. If U.S. interests are to be broadly conceived as the security and prosperity of the American people and its allies, how do these actors advance either? Genuine American interests in the Middle East – promoting regional stability, combatting terrorism, and guaranteeing the free flow of oil – are consistently undermined through the policies adopted by these and other U.S. “partners,” who continue to destabilize the region, fuel the grievances that lead to extremism, and weaponize oil in the pursuit of narrow regime interests.
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East must be oriented toward establishing real and sustainable regional stability, not the false mirage presented by authoritarians and upheld only through fierce repression. Autocracies are inherently unstable due to the illegitimate nature of their rule, with no legitimate elections or freedoms. The authoritarian governments in the Middle East manipulate resources and institutions to further the interests of a narrow elite, rather than advancing the welfare of citizens.
Undermining US Democracy and Security
Additionally, support for these actors has started to undermine democracy and security at home in the United States, with a staggering number of illegal hacking attempts and influence campaigns.
These autocrats are strategic liabilities for the United States, not strategic assets. The Biden administration should seize on the opportunity offered by recent legislation in the U.S. Congress to halt arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE and remove U.S. military personnel from these countries.
Of course, such a strategy reorientation will be complex and take time to put the pieces in place carefully, to avoid backfiring against the lives of those who challenge these authoritarian rulers. But the goal should be to end American complicity in their actions while helping the people of the Middle East strive toward a brighter future.
Support for autocratic actors who are only able to remain in power via fierce repression and selective cooptation is a recipe for instability. Any meaningful relationships and U.S. engagement in the Middle East should be based on more than transactional deals and arms sales; it should be based on a framework that reflects democratic values and strategic interests. In order to do so, it is necessary to end the false notion that allegedly “progressive,” or “reform-minded” Middle East autocrats – as both Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed and the UAE’s Sheikh Mohammed are regularly portrayed – represent a genuine solution to the region’s problems when in fact they are the problem – by Jon Hoffman and Abdullah Alaoudh
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
(B H)
DRC and Yemen confirm more polio cases
Yemen reported four more cVDPV2 cases from three locations, putting its total at 154 this year.
https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2022/11/drc-and-yemen-confirm-more-polio-cases
(* B H P)
Press conference on aggression effects is in spreading epidemics reveals death of 260,000 cases
The Ministry of Public Health and Population and the local authority in Hodeida province organized a press conference on the effects of the US-Saudi-Emirati aggression on the spread of malaria and dengue fever epidemics in Yemen and the Tihama coast.
At the conference, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Health for the Primary Care Sector, Dr. Muhammad Al-Mansour, referred to the efforts of the Ministry and its office in the provincein combating epidemics and diseases in which aggression had the greatest role in spreading them.
He pointed to the plans and programs of the Ministry of Health implemented to combat malaria and epidemics since the beginning of the season in light of the scarcity of capabilities. He indicates that the continuation of the aggression and blockade on Yemen contributed to the spread of epidemics and diseases and increased the incidence of them significantly, especially after the activities, programs and plans of the national program to combat malaria during the past years faltered. , as a result of scarcity of capabilities.
He stated that the faltering of the activities and plans of the malaria control program led to an increase in malaria cases from 513,000 in 2015 to 1,100,000 in 2019, especially after the disease spread to new areas in a number of districts of Hodeida and Hajjah due to the displacement of citizens.
Al-Mansour confirmed that dozens of outbreaks of dengue and chikungunya fever were recorded, which started from the Al-Jarrahi Directorate in Al-Hodeida, and spread to Hajjah province, and the number of infections exceeded 100,000 cases by the end of 2019.
He also indicated that the number of deaths due to malaria and dengue fever reached more than 260,000 cases from 2015 AD until the end of 2019 AD, despite the efforts made to combat epidemics.
Al-Mansour touched on the direct and indirect causes that led to the outbreak of epidemics, including aggression and blockade, and the halting of the operational budgets of the health sector, which contributed to the cessation of disease control activities, as well as the interruption of the “malaria-free Arabian Peninsula” grant, which is estimated at about $38 million during the period 2014-2020. In addition to the damage suffered by the infrastructure of the anti-malaria program as a result of being targeted by the aggression warplanes.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3211474.htm
https://en.ypagency.net/278680/
(* A H)
Taiz sees renewed dengue outbreak, 8500 cases registered
The Yemeni southwestern governorate of Taiz is witnessing a renewed outbreak of dengue fever, medical sources said Tuesday.
In the last 48 hours two child brothers died of the pandemic that had its dire impact in the near past, according to the sources.
Dengue fever claimed the life of Marwa Ala'a al-Zaghrouri last night, the sources added, one day after her brother Mohamed died of the same virus.
According to official figures released by Taiz, the heavily-populated governorate registered 8,500 dengue cases, including 10 deaths, since the beginning for this year, 2022.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-31704.html
and
(* A H)
At least 78 people die of dengue fever outbreak in occupied Taiz
At least 78 people, including children, have died in the outbreak of dengue related illness in the city center of Taiz for the last 24 hours, medical sources at Al-Thawra Hospital said.
The sources indicated that the 6-year-old girl, Marwa Alaa Abdo Ali, died 24 hours after the death of her brother, “Mohamed” 9, after contracting dengue fever, while the mother of the two children is still in intensive care.
In a related context, statistics issued by the Health Office of the “coalition-backed government” at the end of last October stated that there have been 10,000 cases of dengue fever since the beginning of this year, of which 13 people have died.
On last October 4, deputy director of the Health Education and Information Office, Tayseer Al-Sami’i, affiliated with the government, loyal to the Saudi-led coalition, revealed that 2,325 cases of dengue were detected during the month of September.
cp2 Allgemein / General
(* A K P)
Interactive Map of Yemen War
(B P)
Verschobene Kräfteverhältnisse
Bedingungen für Waffenruhe: Position der Ansarollah in Jemen hat sich in vergangenen Jahren gestärkt
Verschobene Kräfteverhältnisse
Bedingungen für Waffenruhe: Position der Ansarollah in Jemen hat sich in vergangenen Jahren gestärkt
Bis heute drängt der UN-Sondergesandte für den Jemen, Hans Grundberg, westliche Regierungen und die von Teilen der »internationalen Gemeinschaft« anerkannte, demokratisch aber nicht legitimierte »Regierung« in Aden auf eine Verlängerung bzw. Erneuerung der Feuerpause, die am 2. Oktober auslief. Den Ansarollah wird vorgeworfen, unerfüllbare Bedingungen für ihre Fortsetzung gestellt zu haben. Dabei sind nicht nur die vollständige Aufhebung einer völkerrechtswidrigen Blockade, die täglich Menschenleben kostet, und die Zahlung der Gehälter von Staatsbediensteten fraglos legitime Anliegen. Auch deutet das Beharren der im Westen als Huthi titulierten Kämpfer auf in den vergangenen Jahren erheblich zu ihren Gunsten verschobene Kräfteverhältnisse im Land hin.
Der Präsidialrat in Aden, der im April die Befugnisse des ehemaligen »Präsidenten« Abed Rabbo Mansur Hadi übernommen hat, ist schwach und mit bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen auch unter der »Anti-Huthi-Allianz [nur im Abo]
(A P)
6 sailors returned days after being abducted by aggression mercenaries off Medi
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3211609.htm
(B P)
“We were electrocuted and our heads were shaved during the severe cold days. we were tortured in the Chinese way, which is putting ice drops on the head until we are paralyzed. After this torture session, the detainee would be brought back unconscious. All this pain and oppression requires accountability for those who tortured us and those who ordered them to torture us.”
Kidnapped Abd al-Malik Ahmad al-Sabai
https://www.facebook.com/abducteesmothers/posts/1204519096402442/?comment_id=1204523689735316 = https://twitter.com/abducteesmother/status/1592780951410573314
(* B K P)
Die Realität der saudisch-emiratischen Ambitionen im Jemen
Die Ziele von Saudi-Arabien und den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten wurden in ihrem Krieg gegen den Jemen offengelegt.
Und ihre wahren Ambitionen traten an die Oberfläche, und dies wurde deutlich, als Saudi-Arabien mit seinen Streitkräften in die Provinzen Hadramawt und Al-Mahra vorrückte, zwei Gouvernements weit entfernt vom Jemen Schauplätze von Konflikten und militärischen Auseinandersetzungen und ihr Fokus auf die Inseln, Küsten und östlichen Provinzen.
Heute sieht Saudi-Arabien im kriegszerrütteten Jemen und ist die Hauptpartei in der Aggression gegen ihn eine günstige Gelegenheit, eine Pipeline zu bauen, um saudisches Rohöl durch jemenitisches Territorium zu transportieren, was das Hauptziel ist, für das die Aggressionsländer geführt haben von Saudi-Arabien, intervenierte mit Unterstützung der Vereinigten Staaten und Großbritanniens, aber aufgrund der Länge des Krieges enthüllte Saudi-Arabien und die VAE drückten ihre wahren Ambitionen im Jemen aus, die sich in der Kontrolle der strategischen jemenitischen Häfen und Inseln manifestierten Quellen des Ölreichtums und halten sie direkt oder durch ihnen loyale Milizen unter ihrer Kontrolle.
Die Länge des Jemen-Krieges, die heute sieben Jahre überschritten hat, wird aufgrund des versteckten Konflikts zwischen den Saudis und den Emiraten über ihre Interessen im Jemen wahrscheinlich endlos andauern.
https://www.saba.ye/de/news3210908.htm
(* B K P)
The Reality of Saudi-UAE Aspirations
The objectives of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in their war on Yemen have been exposed, and their real obstacles have emerged to the surface, as evidenced by Saudi Arabia's going to the provinces of Hadramawt and Mahra with its military forces, they are provinces far from conflict and military confrontations, focusing on islands, coasts and eastern provinces.
Today, Saudi Arabia sees war-torn Yemen, the main party in its aggression, as a favourable opportunity to stretch a pipeline to transport Saudi crude oil through Yemeni territory, the main objective for which the countries of aggression led by Saudi Arabia intervened with the support of a British American, but because of the length of time of the war, Saudi Arabia and the UAE revealed their true aspirations in Yemen, this was reflected in the control of Yemen's strategic ports and islands and the sources of oil wealth and keeping them under their control directly or through militias loyal to them.
The length of time of Yemen's war, which has exceeded seven years, is a candidate to continue indefinitely due to the hidden Saudi-UAE conflict on their interests in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have taken the Yemeni war as a justification for intervening in Yemen to achieve their interests and aspirations in Yemeni territory.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are messing with the southern and eastern provinces and Yemen's islands, perhaps the most prominent manifestation of this absurdity is the demographic changes in Yemen's islands such as the deportation of residents and the bringing of people from other provinces, loyal to the occupation, as well as military establishments such as the construction of naval airports and bases with the assistance of Israeli, American and British military experts, as well as the systematic dredging of the environmental component, especially in the Socotra archipelago, and the temptation and intimidation of indigenous peoples to force them to accept the occupation, and firmly suppress any anti-occupation movements.
The nature of UAE's foreign policy is noteworthy; It wants to present itself as a regional State with international weight, But what this State does not want to understand is that it does not possess the necessary elements and qualifications to do so either geographically, demographically, militarily not industrially, not even historically
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3210977.htm
(A K P)
HUTHIS IM JEMEN VERSTÄRKEN DRUCK MIT ÖLHAFEN
Die jemenitische Houthi-Gruppe erhöht den Druck für wirtschaftliche Gewinne in UN-geführten Gesprächen über ein erweitertes Waffenstillstandsabkommen mit Angriffen auf Ölhäfen in von der Regierung gehaltenen Gebieten, von denen Beamte sagen, dass sie den Rohölexport gestört und die Staatseinnahmen erstickt haben.
Das jemenitische Außenministerium sagte in einer Erklärung, dass die Houthis am Mittwoch einen Drohnenangriff auf den südlichen Hafen von Qena in Shabwa gestartet hätten. Der Militärsprecher der Gruppe sagte auf Twitter, dass die Operation "einen Versuch vereitelt habe, jemenitisches Öl zu plündern", indem sie ein Schiff am Andocken gehindert habe.
Eine gemeinsame Erklärung der Botschafter der USA, des Vereinigten Königreichs und Frankreichs forderte die Houthis am Donnerstag auf, solche Angriffe sofort einzustellen, und sagte, „Wirtschaftskriege werden den Konflikt und die humanitäre Krise im Jemen nur verschärfen“.
https://www.eurisles.org/de/jemen-houthis-erh%C3%B6hen-druck-mit-%C3%B6lanschluss
and English version:
(A K P)
Yemen's Houthis seek to extract gains in truce talks from oil port attacks
Yemen's Houthi group is piling on pressure to extract economic gains in UN-led talks for an extended truce deal by attacking oil ports in government-held areas, which officials say have disrupted crude exports, choking state revenues.
Yemen's foreign ministry said in a statement that the Houthis launched a drone attack on the southern Qena port in Shabwa on Wednesday. The group's military spokesman said on Twitter that the operation "foiled an attempt to loot" Yemen's oil by preventing a vessel from docking.
A joint statement by the US, British and French ambassadors on Thursday called on the Houthis to immediately cease such attacks, saying "economic warfare will only exacerbate the conflict and humanitarian crisis" in Yemen.
https://thearabweekly.com/yemens-houthis-seek-extract-gains-truce-talks-oil-port-attacks
(A P)
Statement on the Houthi attack targeting Qena port in Shabwah province on 9 November 2022
The Delegation of the European Union together with the diplomatic missions of the EU member states accredited to Yemen, issues the following statement
We strongly condemn the November 9 Houthi attack targeting Qena commercial port in the southern Yemeni province of Shabwah, when an oil tanker was offloading fuel, which reportedly caused injuries among the crew. The UNSC, which embodies the international community on matters of peace and security, labelled the previous attack on 21/10 a terrorist attack.
Houthi repeated attacks on international shipping are an affront to core principles of the Law of the Sea. The Houthis demonstrate once again their failure to prioritize the Yemeni people. Economic warfare will only exacerbate the humanitarian crisis.
The Houthis must stop such attacks, respect their obligations under international law and cooperate fully with UN-led efforts to renew the truce and reach a political settlement to the conflict in Yemen.
My comment: The EU’s main point is Europe’s oil supply.
and
(A P)
P3 Joint Statement on the Qena Port Attack
We, the ambassadors of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, strongly condemn the November 9 Houthi terrorist attack targeting an oil tanker while it was docked at Yemen’s Qena port. By launching yet another assault on international shipping and the flow of fundamental necessities, the Houthis have once again demonstrated their abject failure to prioritize the Yemeni people. Attempting to deprive millions of Yemenis from accessing basic goods through economic warfare will only exacerbate the conflict and humanitarian crisis. We reiterate our call for the Houthis to immediately cease such attacks, respect their obligations under international law, and cooperate fully with UN-led efforts to establish long-term peace and stability for all Yemenis.
https://ye.usembassy.gov/p3-joint-statement-on-the-qena-port-attack/
My comment: The three greatest arms suppliers to this war... united in hypocrisy. The main interest is oil supply for the West.
and
(A P)
Al-Bukhaiti: Statement of America, Britain and France reveals their role in looting Yemen’s wealth
Member of Ansarullah’s Political Bureau and governor of Dhamar province, Muhammad al-Bukhaiti, said that the statement issued by America, Britain and France condemning the warning operation carried out by Sanaa forces at the oil port of Qana, in Shabwa province, to prevent the looting of Yemeni oil reveals the malignant role of those countries in the siege of Yemen and the looting of its wealth.
https://en.ypagency.net/278104/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/11/11/ansarullah-us-british-and-french-statements-on-qana-operation-show-their-malignant-roles-against-yemen/
and
(A P)
Al-Ajri: Western statements on Yemen are an attempt to push for escalation and a return to war
Member of the national negotiating delegation, Abdul-Malik al-Ajri, confirmed on Friday evening that the Western statements on Yemen are an attempt to push for escalation and a return to war.
In a statement to Al-Masirah TV, al-Ajri said the statements of the US, France and Britain towards the operations of the armed forces lacked any political value.
Al-Ajri pointed out that when events are contrary to Western interests, they remember international law and the safety of sea lanes, but when they are in line with their interests, they forget this tone.
The West is preventing the entry of health and medical materials into Yemen in a precedent not seen in wars throughout history, he said, adding that the United Nations has lost its real influence in achieving peace and has become part of the tools of conflict management.
https://en.ypagency.net/278135/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/11/12/yemeni-diplomat-west-keeps-pushing-for-escalation-of-war/
and
(A P)
Al-Ezzi: Position of Tripartite Statement of US-Saudi Aggression is Illogical
Deputy Foreign Minister Hussein Al-Ezzi affirmed that the statement of America, France and Britain condemned our protection of the wealth of our people instead of condemning their theft, which is an illogical position.
'"The US-British-French statement is not surprising as it came from countries implicated in all the war crimes, sieges and destruction that have affected Yemeni People," he said.
"Sana'a will continue to protect the people's wealth and will not stop until all looting and theft stops forever," he added.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-31660.html
and
(A P)
UNSC’s Statement Against Sana’a Reflects UNSC Approval for Looting Yemen's Oil: Officials
Officials and representatives of the Yemeni political forces considered that the Security Council continues to ignite the war fire instead of finding the way to peace in Yemen.
The Security Council has stood since Operation Al-Dhaba against the foundations and principles for which it was established to protect peoples, including the theft of their wealth by the occupying powers.
The Yemeni Armed Forces carried out two warning operations against oil ships in Qena port and earlier on Dhabba port, when the ships ignored Sana’a’s warnings and entered the Dabba oil port in Hadramout to loot about two million barrels of crude oil.
(A P)
Abductees Mothers Association Meets Accept International Delegations to Review the Conditions of Abductees and Detainees.
http://ama-ye.org/index.php?no=1942&ln=En
(A P)
[Sanaa gov.] Local authority in Hajjah condemns aggression's abduction of 6 fishermen from Medi
The local authority in Hajjah province condemned on Thursday the abduction of six fishermen by aggression forces from the Medi district.
In their statement, the provincial authority considered abduction of fishermen from beaches of Bahees in Medi in the course of their hunting an offence added to the crimes of US-Saudi coalition aggression against Yemen on land and human beings.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3210650.htm
and also https://en.ypagency.net/278132/
cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade
(* B P)
Vor dem Kollaps
Jemen: Keine politische Lösung während Waffenruhe. Hungerkrise durch andauernde Blockade weiter verschärft
Die von Saudi-Arabien und den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) angeführte Kriegskoalition hat ihre See-, Land- und Luftblockade des Jemen erneut verstärkt. Das erklärten die Ansarollah (»Huthis«) vor wenigen Tagen. Demnach hätten saudische Streitkräfte mit Unterstützung des US-Militärs in der vergangenen Woche vier Schiffe mit für den wichtigsten Hafen des Landes in Hodeida bestimmten Gütern gestoppt, darunter Tanker mit Petroleum und Diesel. Alle Schiffe seien zuvor mittels des von den Vereinten Nationen eingerichteten Überprüfungsmechanismus in Dschibuti als unbedenklich eingestuft worden. Durch diesen »Akt der Piraterie« werde das Leiden der jemenitischen Bevölkerung weiter erhöht, so die Ansarollah.
Ihren Angabe zufolge ließ die Kriegskoalition während der sechsmonatigen, am 2. Oktober ausgelaufenen Waffenruhe nur 33 von 54 Schiffen mit Ziel Hodeida passieren, obwohl eine Erleichterung von Einfuhren fundamentaler Bestandteil der Vereinbarungen über die Feuerpause war. Laut einer Erklärung des Gesundheitsministeriums der Ansarollah-Regierung der »Nationalen Rettung« in Sanaa droht ein nie dagewesener Mangel an Medikamenten. Die erneute Schließung des Flughafens in Sanaa, der während der Waffenruhe bedingt geöffnet worden war, verschärft die Krise in dem Land, das schon vor dem Krieg zu 90 Prozent auf den Import von Nahrungsmitteln und Medikamenten angewiesen war, zusätzlich. Das Land steht vor dem wirtschaftlichen Kollaps.
Zwar ist es im Oktober zu keiner erheblichen Eskalation der Gewalt gekommen. Ganz geschwiegen aber haben die Waffen ohnehin nie.
Die Blockade, die maßgeblich mitverantwortlich für die bislang mehr als 400.000 Opfer des Jemen-Kriegs ist, wurde jüngst auch von der NGO »Weltorganisation gegen Folter« als Kriegsverbrechen und Folter bezeichnet.
Infolge der weltweit wegen des Ukraine-Kriegs, vor allem aber wegen der Sanktionen gegen Russland gestiegenen Preise für Weizen, Pflanzenöl und Düngemittel warnen Hilfsorganisationen und die UNO eindringlich vor einer Verschärfung der Hungerkrise und der Gefahr einer Hungersnot.
https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/439050.krieg-im-jemen-vor-dem-kollaps.html
(A P)
US-Saudi aggression coalition sizes diesel ship
YPC Official spokesman Issam al-Mutawakil said that the aggression coalition seized the diesel ship "Al-Safa", despite its humanitarian nature and being subject to inspection in Djibouti.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3211449.htm
and also https://en.ypagency.net/278610/
(A)
Sana'a airport receives night flight after six years
https://debriefer.net/en/news-31686.html
(A P)
Aggression coalition detains gasoline ship: YPC
Issam Al-Mutawakel spokesperson told SABA that the US-Saudi aggression coalition detained the gasoline vessel "Red Ruby"(PA) on Monday despite its inspection in Djibouti.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3211166.htm
(A P)
Fuel Imports to Houthi-Controlled Areas Increase by 500%
The United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) said Friday that fuel imports to Houthi-controlled ports increased by 500 percent during October.
The UN data came to contradict false reports published by militia leaders who claim that fuel prices are increasing in their controlled areas because the Arab coalition to support legitimacy is holding fuel ships.
In its monthly operational analysis, UNVIM also said food discharged in October 2022 increased by 13 percent compared to the 2021 monthly average.
This comes as Houthis continue to reject extending the UN-sponsored truce for the second month in a row.
“There was a 500 percent increase in fuel discharged in October 2022 (267,359 t) compared to the 2021 monthly average (44,589 t) and a 94 percent increase compared to the monthly average since May 2016 (137,754 t),” UNVIM said in its analysis.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/36880
(A P)
YPC: aggression coalition seizes 2 diesel vessels
YPC spokesman Issam al-Mutawakil said that the US-Saudi aggression is still practicing piracy on humanitarian fuel vessels, as it detained the 2 diesel vessels "Foss Energy" and "Princess Halima" despite being subjected to forced inspection in Djibouti.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3210644.htm
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
(B H)
Film: The rehabilitaion of child soldiers
https://eu.theadvertiser.com/embed/video/38764649/
(B H)
Film: You spread warmth in Yemen last winter
Thanks to everyone who spread warmth in Yemen last winter. As regular sub-zero temperatures put thousands of malnourished families at risk, you provided winter kits, including warm blankets and mattresses for adults and children, and winter kits for those affected by blindness. This winter, vulnerable families in Yemen will need our help once more. Winter kills. To help ensure no one is left behind, please donate to our Winter Emergency Appeal.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JpiYNa02eCM
(B H)
FIVE WAYS TO AID THE PEOPLE OF YEMEN
https://themuslimvibe.com/community/charity/five-ways-to-aid-the-people-of-yemen
(B H)
Yemen, education system at risk due to conflict
Since 2015, many students have given up studies at school and university. With Lavazza Foundation, we give university scholarships to students in socio-economically disadvantaged circumstances
Talking about Yemen means considering economic, political, food, and social crises and insecurity. It is the most serious humanitarian crisis in the world. The numbers are dramatic: out of a population of 30.4 million, about 24 million, or 80 percent of the population, need humanitarian assistance or protection, and of these, more than half are minors. More than 2 million children are severely malnourished. The situation is exacerbated by widespread violence, the collapse of public institutions, and targeted attacks civilians and infrastructure that have not spared schools and universities.
Yemen’s education system has been severely damaged since the conflict began in 2015. The country’s continued economic decline and the government’s inability to support the education sector have resulted in the Ministry of Higher Education in North Yemen significantly increasing tuition fees (by about 33 percent). This has severely impacted many Yemeni students who are no longer able to pay fees or meet daily expenses. The cost of education continues to deny access to tertiary education. Therefore, although it has been possible to return to universities since 2016, there are many students who have been unable to resume their studies.
In this difficult context, INTERSOS’ commitment is to offer a response to these needs. With the support of the Lavazza Foundation, through the Scholarships for the Education of Young Yemenis project, we guarantee access to university education for young Yemeni students
https://www.intersos.org/en/yemen-education-system-at-risk-due-to-conflict/
(B H)
Der Jemen steht vor schlimmster humanitärer Katastrophe
Der Außenminister der nationalen Heilsregierung des Jemen warnte davor, dass das Land vor der schlimmsten humanitären Katastrophe stehe, die durch die ausländischen Aggressionen verursacht wurde.
Laut dem Bericht der Nachrichtenagentur IRNA von Mittwoch sagte der jemenitische Außenminister Hisham Sharaf Abdullah bei einem Treffen mit Peter James Hawkins, dem neuen Repräsentanten der UN-Kinderschutzorganisation UNICEF in Sanaa: "Der Jemen steht vor der schlimmsten humanitären Katastrophe, die durch die Angriffe der Aggressor-Koalition gegen den Jemen verursacht wurde."
Abdullah fügte hinzu: "Kinder und Frauen sind am stärksten von den Angriffen und der Blockade betroffen, die die Aggressoren gegen den Jemen verhängt haben."
(* B H)
Yemen: Conflict and climate crises push farmers to the breaking point
With three out of four Yemenis relying on agriculture and livestock for their survival, the climate crisis is pushing communities already reeling from almost eight years of conflict to the breaking point. Yemeni farmers have seen their livelihoods destroyed by extreme drought, devastating flooding and grinding conflict, making it harder for them to make ends meet.
Flooding in recent months has had a devastating impact on the agricultural sector, destroying crops and moving explosive remnants of war to agricultural areas. With Yemen facing a devastating food security crisis, this will only further exacerbate an already alarming situation. Today approximately 19 million people in Yemen are unable to meet their daily food needs countrywide, compared to 16.2 million last year. That’s about 63% of the total population, up from 53% last year.
The climate crisis and conflict are also forcing more families to abandon their homes. Over 3.3 million people in Yemen are estimated to be displaced from their homes today. It is not uncommon for people to flee their homes seeking safety from conflict to then leave again because the ground cannot be farmed. In some areas, unexploded ordnances lurk in what should be farmland, making it dangerous for people to tend to their land. Water scarcity across Yemen, exacerbated by the protracted conflict and several years of droughts, has limited access to safe water for 17.8 million people. As a result, an increasing number of farmers are being forced to abandon their profession.
The ICRC works in close collaboration with Yemen Red Crescent Society to support the most vulnerable rural communities to sustain their livelihoods.
Yemen, like many conflict-affected countries, is disproportionately impacted by climate change. The ICRC is calling for greater support to help people cope with and adapt to climate change in countries like Yemen.
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-conflict-and-climate-crises-push-farmers-breaking-point
(B H)
Challenging Malnutrition When Widespread Hunger Prevails in Yemen
With funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, Global Communities designed the YEFA III program to help children like Mohammed and his family receive food and nutrition support as well as hygiene education to reduce hunger and illness.
In line with Global Communities’ approach to emergency response, YEFA programming started with a focus on the distribution of food baskets to vulnerable households through a voucher process. The program then evolved and expanded to integrate nutrition sessions for targeted households to address widespread malnutrition issues. Phase three of YEFA expanded further in scope to provide a referral mechanism for severe acute malnutrition and moderate acute malnutrition cases like Mohammed’s.
Under YEFA III, nearly 40 volunteers trained in community health and nutrition (CHNVs) helped promote wellness and healthy eating in the community while also screening children under five and pregnant and lactating women for malnutrition.
From July 2021-May 2022, the YEFA III program increased food security, improved dietary diversity and reduced acute malnutrition for 5,596 households and 39,174 Yemenis through emergency food assistance. In addition, a total of 646 households benefited from screening for severe acute malnutrition (SAM) and moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) as well as NFI/WASH kits and chlorine tablets.
(B H)
UNICEF Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report, 31 July 2022
Highlights
In July, 4,347 children with severe acute malnutrition (SAM) were identified and admitted to outpatient treatment programmes (OTPs). A cumulative total of 3,204,069 children under 5 years were screened for malnutrition since the beginning of the year.
UNICEF procured 492,486 doses of DTP-HepB-Hib (Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis, Hepatitis B and Haemophilus Influenza) and 750,000 doses of Tetanus (Td) vaccines for the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MoPHP) in Aden for routine immunization services.
An estimated 86,000 people were impacted by heavy rainfall and associated flooding across Yemen, with over 2,515 households displaced across affected districts. UNICEF responded through rapid response mechanisms, replacing/repair of temporary learning spaces and latrines and with the provision of hygiene kits.
The current funding gap for UNICEF is $ 342.8 million, which is 71 per cent of the total amount required to continue providing humanitarian assistance in Yemen.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unicef-yemen-humanitarian-situation-report-31-july-2022
(B H)
RDP: Yemen: Monthly Situation Report (October 2022)
Nutrition
Providing MAM treatment to children U5 and PLW in Sama & As Silw districts of Taizz Governorate.
Reducing acute malnutrition through blanket supplementary feeding program in 3 districts of Dhamar, Taizz and Hajjah governorates.
Health
Reducing morbidity and mortality rates caused by malnutrition and prevalence of diseases in four HFs by providing an integrated package of life-saving, preventative and enhanced quality health and nutrition services in Sirwah and Harib Al Qaramish districts of Marib governorate.
Food Security & Livelihood
Providing food rations to 53,405 individuals to reduce the severely food insecurity crisis in Al Malagim, Wald Rabi, and As Sawadiya districts of Al-Bayda gov.
3,484 individuals of IDPs & host community received the sixth & last round of cash/voucher assistance in 8 sub-districts of As Sawadiya district, Al Bayda governorate.
Education
RDP has supported Ali Az Zailai School with educational materials, two-month incentives for volunteer teachers, and 175 students with backpacks in Habeel Salman area, Sabir Al-Mawadim district of Taizz governorate.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-monthly-situation-report-october-2022
(B H)
Yemen - High levels of food insecurity (DG ECHO, DG ECHO Partners, IPC) (ECHO Daily Flash of 17 November 2022)
On 16 November, an Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) projection update for the period October – December 2022 was published for Yemen. The new figures indicate that nearly 17 million people are experiencing high level acute food insecurity (IPC phase 3+), including 6.1 million in IPC 4. More than 53% of the population is expected to be acutely food insecure.
This update indicates a slight improvement in the food security situation compared with the previous projection (June to December 2022), where over 19 million people were estimated to be highly food insecure, including over 160,000 classified in IPC Phase 5. This change is a temporary reprieve and contingent on sustained support which is required to completely reverse famine risks that are persistent in Yemen.
Yemen remains one of the most food insecure countries in the world
(B H)
War, high oil prices exacerbate struggle of taxi owners in Taiz
The number of taxis on the Yemeni streets of Taiz has decreased dramatically due to the eight-year civil war and high fuel prices. Commuters tend to use motorbikes to get around due to their lower costs compared to taxis as well as the ease of moving between streets, especially during crowded times.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xoNTgmVxjLQ
(* B H)
Yemen: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot | October - December 2022
Overview
The IPC AFI updated analysis conducted in September 2022 indicates that approximately 17 million people, or over half of the population in Yemen, will likely experience high levels of Acute Food Insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between October and December 2022. The primary concern is the 6.1 million people classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency).
While this analysis update shows that IPC Phase 5 Catastrophe has been prevented, close monitoring remains essential. Overall, 184 of the 331 analyzed districts are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), and 140 districts in IPC Phase 3 (crises). Only seven districts are classified in IPC Phase 2 (Stress).
This analysis update indicates similarly high levels of food insecurity compared to the first half of the year (January-May 2022); however, the update shows an improvement in the food security outlook compared with the projection June-December 2022 from the previous IPC analysis conducted in February 2022. In particular, the update indicates a decrease by 2 million people in IPC Phase3 or above (7 percent of the population), and by 1.2million people (4%) in IPC Phase 4 or above. As anticipated, the update also indicates the absence of people in IPC Phase 5 (catastrophe) in the last quarter of 2022. The 161,000 people previously classified in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in the June-December projection period are estimated to have now shifted to the lower phases.
The number of districts classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) has also decreased from 233 districts (projection Jun-Dec 2022 from the February analysis) to 184.
(B H)
Yemen: Conflict and climate crises push farmers to the breaking point
With three out of four Yemenis relying on agriculture and livestock for their survival, the climate crisis is pushing communities already reeling from almost eight years of conflict to the breaking point. Yemeni farmers have seen their livelihoods destroyed by extreme drought, devastating flooding and grinding conflict, making it harder for them to make ends meet.
Flooding in recent months has had a devastating impact on the agricultural sector, destroying crops and moving explosive remnants of war to agricultural areas. With Yemen facing a devastating food security crisis, this will only further exacerbate an already alarming situation. Today approximately 19 million people in Yemen are unable to meet their daily food needs countrywide, compared to 16.2 million last year. That’s about 63% of the total population, up from 53% last year.
The climate crisis and conflict are also forcing more families to abandon their homes. Over 3.3 million people in Yemen are estimated to be displaced from their homes today. It is not uncommon for people to flee their homes seeking safety from conflict to then leave again because the ground cannot be farmed.
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-conflict-and-climate-crises-push-farmers-breaking-point
(B H)
Yemen: Humanitarian Response Snapshot (September 2022)
By the end of September, the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), seeking $4.27 billion to assist 17.9 million people, was only 47.5 per cent funded, forcing aid organizations to reduce or close critical assistance programmes.
However, aid agencies continued to provide life-saving assistance. In the first nine months of 2022, 191 humanitarian organizations continued to deliver aid to an average of 10.5 million people per month. While the number of people reached with assistance per sector/cluster remained low, partners continued to provide support to millions of people
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-response-snapshot-september-2022
(B H)
Yemen: Protection Monitoring Assessments by District - Jan 2022 - Nov 2022
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-protection-monitoring-assessments-district-jan-2022-nov-2022
(* B H)
Yemen Humanitarian Update - Issue 10/ October 2022
Explosive remnants of war leading cause of civilian casualties
Without continued commitment from donors, millions of people will go hungry: ASG Joyce Msuya
Aid agencies urge conflict parties to heed calls for truce extension
Displaced people urgently need winter support
Voluntary Humanitarian Return Movements for Ethiopian migrants re-start in Sana'a
EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR LEADING CAUSE OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
Explosive remnants of war are increasingly posing a grave risk to civilians across Yemen, emerging as the leading conflict-related cause of civilian casualties post-truce. Since the start of the nationwide truce on 2 April 2022, the number of civilian casualties related to explosive remnants of war (ERW) and landmines has increased by approximately 20 per cent compared to the six months prior, according to open-source reporting.
Between April and September 2022, landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) reportedly caused about 300 civilian casualties, including 95 deaths and 248 injuries.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-update-issue-10-october-2022
(B P)
Yemen: Organization Monthly Presence September 2022
In September 2022, 123 aid organizations implemented Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) activities in all of Yemen’s 333 districts. Nine UN agencies implemented response activities in 333 districts, while 72 national NGOs were active in 300 districts, and 42 international NGOs in 238 districts.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-organization-monthly-presence-september-2022
(B H P)
USAID: Yemen: USG Response to the Complex Emergency (Last Updated 11/15/22)
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-usg-response-complex-emergency-last-updated-111522
Yemen - Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-complex-emergency-fact-sheet-1-fiscal-year-fy-2023
(* B H)
Yemen 2021 Agrometeorological summary (November 2022)
Aside from conflicts, climate variations together with management decisions are by far the major influencers on agricultural production among farming communities in Yemen. Weather and climate variations influence other environmental variables such as soil productivity, migratory pests, and the development of allergic respiratory diseases in farming communities. It therefore follows that the application of weather and climate knowledge to the management of the agricultural sector is indispensable.
As such, agricultural management decisions backed by a reliable climate information infrastructure can enhance production. This is especially true considering that types of crops grown, animals reared, agricultural technology used, and government guidance instituted can all be determined to some extent by agrometeorological conditions.
In light of climate change, it is estimated that 20 – 80% of inter-annual agricultural yield variations among small-scale farmers around the world are caused by meteorological variations1,2 , with other factors such as post-harvest losses occupying a much lesser percentage. Many attribution studies have documented that climate change has altered the likelihood and intensity of extreme weather events thus, making farming communities more susceptible to the ravages of extreme meteorological events.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-2021-agrometeorological-summary-november-2022
(B H)
Film: “In one day, we skip two meals…”
https://eu.hometownlife.com/embed/video/34507883/
(B H)
Quality of health care in Yemen: a matter of life and death
Over the past five years, WHO and the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MoPHP) have worked together with the World Bank’s International Development Association to prevent the collapse of Yemen’s health system.
More than 70 hospitals have received needed commodities to keep serving communities even during times of intense conflict. Key support provided includes fuel, oxygen, water, medicines, consumables, equipment and training. Now, under the Emergency Human Capital Project (EHCP), key action areas include sustaining support to hospitals and zeroing-in to improve the quality of care that patients receive.
https://www.emro.who.int/yemen/news/quality-of-health-care-in-yemen-a-matter-of-life-and-death.html
(B H)
UNICEF Ma'rib Humanitarian Action Update - September 2022
Key Achievements WASH
192,465 people accessed safe water for drinking, cooking and personal hygiene.
401,022 people reached with critical water, sanitation and hygiene supplies and services and with messages on appropriate hygiene practices.
Health
509,806 children under 10 vaccinated against polio.
184,676 children vaccinated against measles.
152,466 children and women accessed primary health care in UNICEF-supported facilities.
Nutrition
7,974 children under five with Severe and Moderate Acute Malnutrition received curative services.
Child Protection
74,336 vulnerable children reached with mental health and psychosocial support services (MHPSS).
Education
14,079 children accessed formal/non-formal education activities.
Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM)
97,573 vulnerable displaced people received RRM Kits containing food, family basic hygiene kits and female dignity kits.
Social and Behaviour Change (SBC)
594,587 people participated in engagement actions for social and behavioural change including COVID-19 RCCE and C19 vaccination campaigns.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unicef-marib-humanitarian-action-update-september-2022
(B H)
Yemen: Child Protection - Area of Responsibility-Strategy 2022-2024
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-child-protection-area-responsibility-strategy-2022-2024
Yemen: Increased Inclusive Classroom Capacity (as of Sep 2022)
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-increased-inclusive-classroom-capacity-sep-2022
Yemen: Education Cluster School Learning Materials (as of Sep 2022)
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-education-cluster-school-learning-materials-sep-2022
(B H)
Yemen: Nutrition Cluster Monthly Update (Sep. 2022)
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-nutrition-cluster-monthly-update-sep-2022
(B H)
Medicines supply program launches distress call to save patients in Yemen
The medicines supply program in Sanaa on Sunday launched a distress appeal to provide life-saving medicines to nearly 170,000 people in Yemen.
The program said in a press conference held today that the continuation of the war and the siege on the people of Yemen threatens to stop the supply of life-saving medicines to more than 170,000 vulnerable patients.
The program demanded that Sanaa airport and Hodeida port be opened for the arrival of medicines without restrictions and allowing the entry of pharmaceutical aid without conditions or detention, calling UN and international organizations to cooperate effectively with the program, and to provide life-saving medicines.
https://en.ypagency.net/278183/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/11/12/medicine-agency-launches-distress-call-for-urgent-medication-for-170-000-patients/
(B E H)
In Yemen, farmers choose narcotic over other crops, exacerbating climate woes
Farmers are draining groundwater around Yemen's capital and removing soil to cultivate the narcotic green leaf qat that dominates life in the country, threatening to exhaust precious resources in the climate-vulnerable nation.
Chewing qat is a national pastime and demand is one of the few certainties in a nation torn apart by a seven-year war that has wrecked the economy and caused a dire humanitarian crisis and left millions facing hunger.
Qat can earn three times the revenue of any other crop but the steady cash flow comes at a heavy price. The bitter-tasting plant requires deep-well irrigation and disproportionate use of water, exacerbating Yemen's water scarcity problem.
The conflict has destroyed water infrastructure, leaving millions of people without safe water to drink or grow crops. The traditional terraced farming system, used as a source of food and livelihood in the arid and mountainous Arabian Peninsula nation, has been neglected.
Farmers in Al-Haweri and Bait al-Dhafif, villages outside the capital Sanaa, where fruits and grains were cultivated, now plant qat on new terraces built from soil dug from fields below, leaving a wasteland of huge pits behind.
Amid the uncertainties of war, cultivating qat has advantages, taking just a few months to reach harvest. Fruit trees take three to five years. And a qat crop is harvested several times a year, while fruits are harvested only one time per year.
But climate change is making Yemen's rainfall less reliable, the World Bank said in August.
https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/yemen-farmers-choose-narcotic-over-other-crops-exacerbating-climate-woes-2022-11-10/ = https://www.yahoo.com/news/yemen-farmers-choose-narcotic-over-112101590.html
Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=97TWUjeUHZQ = https://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/national/narcotic-crops-are-worsening-yemens-climate-woe/video/08cd8ee9d121dd5f933de89337edd9a0
(B H)
Yemen: Health Cluster Bulletin, July & August 2022
HIGHLIGHTS
A total of 2883 Health Facilities (15 Governorate Hospitals, 134 District Hospitals, 60 General Hospitals, 22 Specialized Hospitals, 738 Health Centers and 1913 Health Units) are being supported by Health Cluster Partners.
During the reporting period of July and August 2022, Health Cluster conducted a total of 17 Health Cluster coordination meetings at the National, AoR, and Hub levels (Aden, Al Hudaydah, Ibb/Taizz, Sa’dah, Sana’a, Marib,
Hadramout, and West Coast).
Health Cluster conducted and attended over 53 technical meetings
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-health-cluster-bulletin-july-august-2022
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
(B H)
ACTED Helps IDPs Develop New Livelihoods in Yemen
In coordination with the Yemen Displacement Response (YDR) consortium, ACTED is implementing activities in IDP hosting sites to respond to displacement-related needs. ACTED is engaged in a full range of Camp Coordination & Camp Management activities under this Yemen Humanitarian Fund (YHF) supported project. One of the activities carried out aims at increasing IDP resilience and helping them develop sustainable livelihoods in Al Dhalee and Aden, Yemen.
Under this project, ACTED has conducted several community-based projects, which respond to the needs identified by the displaced populations themselves.
The trainings teach IDPs the basics of running a small business and develop their hard skills for their respective trades. These livelihoods can provide income, develop the communities, build networks among vulnerable communities, and reestablish positive coping mechanisms. The livelihoods training activities targeted eighty families residing in five camps under this YHF-funded project.
https://www.acted.org/en/acted-helps-idps-develop-new-livelihoods-in-yemen/
(B H)
IOM Yemen - Ma'rib Response update (October 2022)
SITUATION OVERVIEW
In October 2022, IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) reported the new displacement of 153 households (HHs) or almost 1,000 individuals in Ma’rib governorate, predominantly to Ma’rib City. The number of displaced households has decreased in recent months (in September, 195 HHs were displaced) in part due to the limited hostilities in the Ma’rib.
The majority of these displacements came from outside of Ma’rib itself, from Hodeidah, Shabwah, and Sana’a governorates.
Newly displaced households reported that they were displaced mainly for conflict/security (54%) and economic reasons (46%). IOM also found that several IDPs moved to host community areas due to the damage to displacement sites caused by rain, flood and storms. A total of 2,529 HHs or around 15,174 have been displaced in Ma’rib in 2022.
Based on an intention survey, IOM’s DTM found that approximately three out of four people displaced across 23 displacement sites in Yemen’s conflict affected Ma’rib report having no intention to return home. Fears of insecurity and a lack of opportunities to earn an income were the main reasons internally displaced persons (IDPs) reportedly have no intention of returning. Among the remaining 21 per cent of respondents, only three per cent report an intention to return while the rest were indecisive or intended to settle elsewhere.
The primary needs for displaced households include shelter (40%), financial Assistance (30%), food (10%), livelihoods (9%) and NFIs (8%).
As many households now live in protracted displacement in overcrowded sites with sparce coverage of humanitarian assistance, IOM continued to witness and respond to the site risks and threats.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-marib-response-update-october-2022
(B H)
‘No Place to Go’: The Struggles of a Yemeni Family Seeking Refuge in India
The absence of a refugee law and bureaucratic red tape have left Samah Ameen's family helpless more than a year after they arrived in the country.
On September 23, 2021, Samah Ameen (40), her husband and three children arrived in India after fleeing the Yemen civil war with the hope of a better future. But more than a year later, they continue to struggle as they haven’t been recognised as refugees in India.
https://thewire.in/rights/yemen-family-refugees-india-struggles
(B H)
UNHCR Yemen: IDPs Protection Monitoring Update (1 Jan 2022 - 31 Oct 2022)
(* B H)
Return Remains Distant Hope for Displaced in Ma’rib While Needs Continue to Climb
Approximately three out of four people displaced across 23 displacement sites in Yemen’s conflict-affected Ma’rib report having no intention to return home, according to the results of a survey recently publishedby the International Organization for Migration’s Displacement Tracking Matrix.
Despite the relative stability that came during the recent six-month truce in Yemen, IOM has encountered very few households who intend to leave the areas they have settled in after becoming displaced.
Fears of insecurity and a lack of opportunities to earn an income were the main reasons 79 per cent of internally displaced persons (IDPs) surveyed have no intention of returning. Among the remaining 21 per cent of respondents, only three per cent reported an intention to return while the rest were indecisive or intended to settle elsewhere.
In the six months since the announcement of the truce in early April, in areas where IOM’s displacement tracking activities are ongoing, the monthly rate of displacement decreased by 76 per cent compared to the six months prior, while the number of civilians killed or injured by fighting reduced by 54 per cent, according to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, David Gressly.
More than 60 per cent of those who intend to remain in Ma’rib’s displacement sites reported that a lack of access to basic services will be their greatest challenge while avoiding eviction remains another key concern.
Most of the 2,227 households surveyed in September have been displaced for the last three years. The survey did not reach those currently displaced in host communities.
IOM’s camp coordination and camp management (CCCM) teams alleviate these hardships by coordinating essential humanitarian services across dozens of sites to ensure that IDPs’ basic needs are met and by identifying and maintaining suitable sites where they can remain.
As the UN agency with the largest presence in Ma’rib, IOM not only provides crucial health care and humanitarian aid but also implements development and peacebuilding activities that address longstanding needs of communities affected by protracted displacement.
Nonetheless, funding shortfalls threaten the impact of IOM’s interventions. As of mid-November, IOM’s 2022 humanitarian appeal is only 53 per cent funded.
The Organization recently had no choice but to reduce the presence of its CCCM and health teams
https://yemen.iom.int/news/return-remains-distant-hope-displaced-marib-while-needs-continue-climb
(B H)
IOM DTM: Ma'rib IDP Intention Survey Data Collection: 7 to 30 September 2022
IOM DTM conducted an intention survey in 22 displacement sites in Ma’rib City District and one site in Ma’rib District of Ma’rib Governorate between 7 and 30 September 2022.
However, despite half a year of truce, IOM encountered very few households that intended to leave the assessed displacement sites. There are a total of 61 displacement sites in Ma’rib City District and 198 in Ma’rib Governorate as a whole according to the Yemen Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster.
The sample of 2,227 interviewed households represents 11 per cent of the assessed sites total in household population numbers (21,014 HHs) with 14,784 individuals in the assessed households, the average household size was 6.6 individuals.
Site population sizes average around 450 households per assessed site with the exception of Al Jufainah, which currently houses 11,200 families. DTM assessed an average of 12 per cent of each site’s population with a minimum of 40 households, the largest being Al Jufainah where DTM interviewed 1,126 households.
(A H P)
Yemen, Ethiopia discuss voluntary repatriation of 1500 migrants
A Yemeni-Ethiopian meeting on Thursday discussed voluntary return of 1,500 illegal migrants currently living in the Yemeni northeastern governorate of Marib.
Marib local authority, led by Deputy Governor Abd Rabbu Miftah, and Ethiopian delegation hold the meeting in Marib, in the presence of International Organization for Migration (IOM) officials, the Aden-based Saba said.
The meeting discussed coordination to smoothen the second phase of voluntary repatriation of Ethiopian illegal migrants from Marib.
"In this phase, the IOM plans to repatriate 1,500 migrants who confirmed their desire to return voluntarily," Saba added, as return flights are expected to start on 22 November.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-31659.html
(* A H P)
Afrikanische Migranten werden von saudi-arabischen Grenzschutzbeamten getötet
Jemenitische Quellen berichteten am Samstagabend, dass der Grenzschutz Saudi-Arabiens Dutzende afrikanische Migranten an der Grenze zwischen diesem Land und dem Jemen getötet habe.
Dieses jemenitische Netzwerk erhielt Bilder, die Dutzende von afrikanischen Migranten zeigen, die von saudischen Grenzschutzbeamten getötet wurden, und zeigen auch, dass saudische Grenzschutzbeamte Dutzenden von äthiopischen Migranten Handschellen anlegten.
Al-Masira hat Bilder veröffentlicht, die die Existenz eines Massengrabs mit den Leichen Dutzender Afrikaner zeigen, die von saudischen Grenzsoldaten getötet wurden.
Afrikanische Überlebende des Massakers bestätigten, dass saudische Soldaten Dutzende von äthiopischen Migranten absichtlich durch Stromschläge töteten, nachdem sie sie in einem Raum versammelt hatten.
(* A H P)
In video: Terrifying scenes show Saudi army’s crimes against African immigrants
Al Masirah TV broadcasted on Saturday terrifying scenes showing mass massacres committed by Saudi border guards against African migrants on the border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
The scenes displayed a number of the bodies of African migrants who were killed by the Saudi border guards, along with pictures of a mass grave containing dozens of African victims.
The scenes showed also that the Saudi border guards handcuffed dozens of Ethiopian immigrants, believed to be moments before they were killed, according to Al Masirah.
“The Saudi border guards kill nearly five migrants daily on the border and injure many of them,” Al-Masira TV quoted several Ethiopian immigrants as saying.
A number of African survivors of the massacres said: “The Saudi soldiers deliberately electrocuted a room after collecting dozens of Ethiopian immigrants in it.”
Ethiopian migrants added to the TV that: “The Saudi border guards shoot directly and often use mortars to eliminate gatherings of migrants.”
https://en.ypagency.net/278167/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/11/12/newly-released-footage-shows-horrifying-massacres-of-african-migrants-by-saudi-invaders/
and also https://www.saba.ye/en/news3211032.htm
https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/29616/Saudi-Regime-Targets-African-Migrants-at-Its-Borders (with photos)
and
(A P)
Eyewitness recounts details of massacre committed by Saudi forces against Yemeni migrants
The former leader of the so-called “Southern Resistance” residing in Turkey, Adel al-Hassani, published a video that included confessions of a survivor of a massacre committed by the Saudi army against Yemeni migrants in the border areas.
Ahmed Al-Dhafri from Bayda province said that on July 30, he and a group of 14 young people headed to the Saudi border until they reached the Hattat area with the aim of entering Saudi territory in search of job opportunities.
“They were arrested by the Saudi border guards. They blindfolded their eyes and put them on the ground. Then the Saudi border guards selected four of the youths and killed them by firing at them. While other the border guards pointed their guns at the rest,” Al-Dhafari confirmed.
https://en.ypagency.net/278333/
(A H)
Unknown fire devours 60 tents for displaced in Al-Khokha
A massive fire broke out on Saturday in Al-Jisha camp in Al-Khokha district, which is under the control of the coalition, south of Hodeidah governorate, leaving heavy damage.
According to human rights sources, the fire that broke out in AL-Jisha camp for poor families south of Al-Khokha, devoured about 60 “nest” tents, some of which are made of wood and grass residues inhabited by Tihama’s sons, who were expelled by the coalition forces from their areas and converted into military barracks, during the past years.
https://en.ypagency.net/278192/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/11/12/heavy-fire-destroys-invasion-coalition-camp-in-al-khokha/
and also http://en.adenpress.news/news/36882
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/fire-guts-refugee-tents-in-yemen-s-hudaydah/2736345
Photos: https://twitter.com/ycmhrv/status/1591482695456288768
and
(A H P)
Local Authority in Al-Khoukha Condemns Burning of Displaced Camps by US-Saudi Mercenaries
In a statement, the local authorities also denounced the spreading vice and moral corruption by organizations, explaining that IDPs camps are subjected to systematic and repeated targeting every day by mercenaries and organizations.
It held the US-Saudi aggression, the United Nations and international organizations in Al-Khoukha responsible for what the displaced people were being exposed to.
The local authority in Al-Khoukha confirmed its full readiness to receive the displaced from these areas, provide them with all necessary care, protect them from exploitation and alleviate their suffering.
and also https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/565939
and
(A H P)
Houthis call for int'l probe into IDP camp fire west Yemen
The Iranian-backed Houthi group on Tuesday called on representatives of international agencies active in Yemen to probe the fire recently seen by internally displaced persons camp in the Yemeni western governorate of Hodeida.
Supporters of the Yemeni government set fire to al-Jasha IDP camp in Khokha district, south Hodeida, the Houthi human rights ministry said in a statement.
This "terrorist coward act comes as part of a series of crimes, violations and carnages systematically committed by the Coalition and its tools against the Yemeni people," according to the statement carried by the Sana'a-based Saba.
"We call on representatives of the international organizations in Yemen, particularly the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and UNHCR, to visit the scene and investigate the crime," it added.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-31714.html
(* B H)
“I displaced dreaming of settling down”
Displaced Escaping War to Encounter Hell
Abyan Governorate witnesses extremely horrible humanitarian conditions especially with the spread of weapons and armed men as well as extremist armed groups accompanied by the absence of the role of the local authority and the insecurity phenomena. Such phenomena include shooting incidents that resulted in casualties affected by the direct and random indiscriminate shooting as well as the frequent incidents of military vehicles that run over civilians.
Mohammed Shawqi (13yr) is one of the victims of the live bullet in Zinjibar city. Mohammed’s family is one of the displaced families who moved to Abyan from Tabishah village in Jabal Sabir near Taiz city. In 2017, Mohammed and his family were displaced from their village after a large part of their house was destroyed due to mortar shelling launched by Ansar Allah armed group (the Houthis). The displaced family consists of seven people including the father, the mother, and five children, four males and one female. The eldest son is Ahmed (15yr), and the youngest is Rabie (1yr and a half) was born in displacement. The victim Mohammed (13yr) is the second child.
Mohammed’ father, Shawqi (44yr) who works as a tiler says: “I fled my house in Taiz governorate because of the war. We were living in fear and terror. I displaced to Abyan governorate for my family be safe, dreaming of settling down with my children.”
He added: “I settled in Al-Emarat neighborhood in Zinjibar and started searching for work. I took my children to school, but after a while, I couldn’t afford to pay for their education, the rent, the cost of living, and electricity and water bills. The financial situation got worse due to the price hike.
Ahmed and Mohammed both dropped out of school and started working. Ahmed was in the 7th Grade and his brother Mohammed was in the 5th Grade when they dropped out of school. Ahmed worked with his father and Mohammed found a job in a furniture store in Zinjibar market receiving 1500 YR a day (less than one dollar). Things started to somehow stabilize for the family. However, the unstable security situation made their search for a stable life almost impossible.
As the head of the household puts it: “We would hear the sounds of gunfire to the extent that the city has become more hell than the place we were displaced from. Despite this, Mohammed carried on working in the furniture store. Since he was the only child working in the store, his co-workers would often send him to buy food for them from the nearby restaurant.
https://mwatana.org/en/encounter-hell/
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
(A P)
Yemeni gov't says Houthis forcibly displaced villagers in Jawf
The Houthi group has forcibly displaced Thu Mohamed Tribe's villagers in Jawf, the Yemeni official human right office in the northern governorate said on Tuesday.
The Houthis attacked many houses and displaced tens of families by force, under baseless pretexts related to tribal disputes with Sufian Tribe, the office added in a statement carried by the Aden-based Saba.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-31715.html
(* B P)
Rights org says Houthi terrorists kidnapped nearly 17 thousand civilians in eight years
Houthi terrorists kidnapped nearly 17 thousand civilians in Yemen in a period of eight years, a human rights organization has said.
The Yemeni Network for Rights and Freedoms said the Shia militants kidnapped 16800 civilians in the period from September 2014 to August 2022.
The sectarian subject hostages to psychological and physical torture until death.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-61634
My remark: This is a strictly anti-Houthi organization.
(A P)
Parliament Condemns US-French Suspicious Moves in Southern, Eastern Yemen
and also https://en.ypagency.net/278571/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/11/16/yemeni-parliament-condemns-us-and-french-meddling-in-southern-and-eastern-regions/
(A P)
Yemen's Ibb Suffers from Bread Shortage
Residents in Ibb governorate, southwest Yemen, suffer from bread shortage after the Houthi militia shut down 18 bakeries to blackmail their owners.
Local sources in Ibb reported that militia targeted, since last Wednesday, bakeries in at least three districts, claiming that they violated measures, prices, and instructions.
The sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the bakeries' extortion campaigns are supervised by Houthi commander Qasim al-Masawi, appointed deputy governor.
Within two days, 18 bakeries were shut down in Ibb countryside, Az-Zahhar, and al-Mashnah, while the recently-formed collection committees targeted the remaining bakeries.
According to the sources, the Houthi militia in Ibb reopened some bakeries a few hours later after their owners paid sums of money.
https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3987871/yemens-ibb-suffers-bread-shortage
(B P)
Iranian Narcotics… Another Facet of Houthis’ War against Yemenis
Six weeks after the US Navy intercepted an Iranian drug smuggling ship off the coast of Oman, the Yemeni Navy seized another Iranian vessel loaded with narcotics off the coast of Socotra Island.
The shipment is believed to have been bound for Houthi militias in Yemen.
Similar arrests this year and in previous years suggest that Iranian-Houthi investment in drugs is only growing, especially that the ship seized by the Yemeni forces was transporting a significant quantity of illicit drugs.
In September, the US Central Command seized an Iranian ship carrying drugs worth around $20 million during a patrol in the Gulf of Oman.
A judicial source in the Houthi-run capital, Sanaa, revealed that the number of drug-related cases have declined in areas run by militias despite an increase in the illicit trade over the past few years.
The source, who requested anonymity, suggested that the decrease in prosecution is related to Houthis themselves facilitating drug smuggling and trade. The Iran-backed group is likely benefiting from narcotics being run in Yemen.
Many dealers and users are released before being referred to prosecution, a fact which suggests Houthis are concluding suspicious deals with drug lords, the source told Asharq Al-Awsat.
New types of narcotics are spread in Houthi-controlled areas and are now sold in the markets openly.
Yemenis accuse Houthis of selling and promoting drugs to benefit from their financial revenues on the one hand, and to corrupt the generations of society on the other hand.
My comment: As claimed by a Saudi news site. The Houthi side often reports that narcotics are destroyed.
(A P)
"To all those who criticize the (Houthi) code of conduct: your problem is with God & his instruction, not with Ansar Allah; Houthi leader & minister of Info Dhaif Allah al-Shami. The Houthis recently hv introduced a new extremist version of public service code of conduct (document in Arabic in image)
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1591548862472519681
(* B P)
Houthis commit 1444 violations against women
The Yemeni Network for Rights and Freedoms revealed that 1444 cases of violations were committed by the Houthi female terrorists known as the Zainabiyat Brigades during the period from December 2017 until the end of October of this year 2022 AD.
The network said in a report it documented violations by the "Zeinabiyat" including the arbitrary arrest and detention of women, looting, sexual assault, beatings, torture, facilitating rape in secret detention centers, and the prosecution of a number of female activists. Yemeni women, and the assault on women sit-ins in some provinces controlled by the terrorist Houthi militia.
The Zaynabiyat who deploy at checkpoints at the entrances and exits of some cities also undertake the dirty mission of forcible recruitment of school and university girls.
The report said that the Houthi militia assigned many tasks to the Zainabiyat Brigades, most notably focused on incitement, indoctrination and sectarian education by giving lectures, lessons and courses to groups of women and girls in every district, and neighborhood in the governorates it controls, whether in mosques or in the homes of citizens and public halls such as schools and gatherings to promote the group’s ideology.
The report revealed that the "Zeinabiyat" is a highly trained group of women to carry out the incursions and arrests of women activists, and to break up demonstrations and vigils, in addition to other special tasks, such as spying and inciting opponents, monitoring opinions and prosecuting activists in private sessions and workplaces..emphasizing that this formation "Zeinabiyat" has today become an intelligence agency directed towards women, specializing in the dirty tasks of the Houthis.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/36876
(A P)
[Aden] Yemeni gov't: Houthis sectarianize State reproduce Iranian revolution
The occupational Code of Conduct, which the Houthi group plans to apply in areas under its control, is a collective punishment against hundreds of thousands of civil servants, Yemen's information minister said Tuesday, as the group "sectarianizes the State and reproduces the Iranian revolution."
By this code, the Houthis aim to force public employees to choose going to their ideological courses and calls for obligatory recruitment and sectarian activities or dismissal from civil service, Moammar al-Eryani added.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-31647.html
(A P)
Warning US-Saudi Aggression Against Naval Confrontation, General Al-Hakim: Armed Forces Messages Are Serious
The head of the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Authority, Major General Abdullah Al-Hakim, confirmed that the warning messages of the Armed Forces are not fleeting, but rather a serious warning and the expected naval confrontation may be one of the fiercest battles with the US-Saudi aggression.
and also https://en.ypagency.net/278016/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/11/11/yemeni-military-intelligence-head-warns-that-serious-deterrence-strikes-will-continue/
https://debriefer.net/en/news-31658.html
(B P)
Jemen wehrt den sanften Krieg durch Massenhochzeiten ab
Unsere islamische Religion ruft dazu auf, ihre Säulen und Lehren wiederzubeleben und die Schwachen, die Armen und die Bedürftigen als Priorität zu betrachten, um die man sich kümmern und die man berücksichtigen sollte.
Basierend auf dieser Priorität und im Hinblick auf das Jugendsegment war es notwendig, geeignete Behandlungen und Lösungen zu entwickeln, die darin bestehen, die „Vollendung der halben Religion“ durch die Einrichtung von Kollektivhochzeiten zu erleichtern, die darauf abzielen, junge Menschen zu immunisieren und sie von den damit verbundenen Gefahren fernzuhalten in sanften Kriegs- und Aggressionsverschwörungen, die Verkörperung der Lehren des Islam zur Erleichterung der Ehe, die Reduzierung der Mitgift und die Verkörperung der Hauptziele dieses lobenswerten Trends.
Die Immunisierung junger Männer und Mädchen ist ein soziales und humanitäres Problem
https://www.saba.ye/de/news3211067.htm
Mein Kommentar: ?????????????????
(A P)
A Mass Wedding For 430 Grooms And Brides From The Governorates Of Al-Bayda And Abyan
https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/565665
(A P)
Mass wedding held for 660 grooms, brides in Sa'ada
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3210614.htm
and also https://en.ypagency.net/278041/
Films: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gWjwIEvM3Fs
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C9AYwnC78iY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_NOPnOlaiIQ
(A P)
Yemen: The Houthis consider visit of US Ambassador to Hadhramaut an act of aggression
On Wednesday, the Houthi Movement in Yemen condemned the visit of the US Ambassador to Yemen to the Hadhramaut Governorate in the eastern part of the country, stressing that it was an "act of aggression targeting Yemen's security and unity".
The political office of the Houthi Movement said in a statement, "We strongly condemn the visit of the American Ambassador to Hadhramaut Governorate, and we consider it an act of aggression that falls within the aggressive agenda that targets Yemen's security, stability and unity."
The statement added that "a country like the US, which funds and supports the attack against Yemen, can never think of the interest of the Yemeni people," stressing that "the Yemeni people strongly reject any American activity towards Yemen, whether declared or undeclared," according to Al-Mayadeen channel.
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp6 – cp19
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-831b-yemen-war-mosaic-831b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-830-yemen-war-mosaic-830
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-830 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-830:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
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