... Test für den Waffenstillstand: Die Huthis und Krieg der Narrative im Jemen – Kann die Umbildung von Riad dem Jemen Frieden bringen? – Der Präsidialrat des Jemen könnte die Zukunft des Jemen gestalten – Frauen im Jemen, gefangen von Krieg und Missbrauch – 38 Houthi-Sicherheitskontrollpunkte verletzen die Bewegungsfreiheit – Wie die Inflation die Unterernährung im Jemen antreibt – Briefe der Angehörigen der Inhaftierten und gewaltsam Verschwundenen – und mehr
May 4, 2022: Yemen review, April 2022 – Yemen is heading towards a division – Yemen’s truce could be a step toward peace or a warriors’ respite – Truce Test: The Huthis and Yemen’s war of narratives – Can the Riyadh reshuffle bring peace to Yemen? – Yemen’s Presidential Council could shape Yemen’s future – Women in Yemen trapped by war, abuse – 38 Houthi security checkpoints violate freedom of movement – How inflation is driving malnutrition in Yemen –Letters of the relatives of the detained and forcibly disappeared – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-804b-yemen-war-mosaic-804b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp12b Sudan
cp13a Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage
cp13b Wirtschaft / Economy
cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism
cp15 Propaganda
cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
cp19 Sonstiges / Other
Klassifizierung / Classification
***
**
*
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
(* B H)
Film: Yemen is on the verge of humanitarian catastrophe
Yemen has been engulfed in a deadly civil war since 2015. The fighting between warring sides has pushed the country to the brink of famine. And now, with the war in Ukraine causing giant rises in food prices across the world, the western Asian country could be headed towards an outright humanitarian catastrophe.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QSeeuOjqQWo
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Yemen war: Facts, FAQs, and how to help
The humanitarian crisis in Yemen, caused by armed conflict ongoing since early 2015, is among the worst in the world — and has exacted a devastating toll on children. More than 10,200 children have been killed or injured in the war in Yemen, according to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).
More than 17.4 million Yemenis are food insecure, with that number projected to reach 19 million by the end of 2022. An estimated 2.2 million children under 5 are suffering from acute malnutrition, and of those, more than 500,000 face severe acute malnutrition, which can lead to death without life-saving aid.
Conflict has displaced more than 4 million people, of whom nearly 80% are children and women. Millions lack access to basic healthcare, clean water, and sanitation. Five million are said by the U.N. Refugee Agency to be one step away from famine conditions.
War and factionalism have reversed Yemen’s human development by more than 20 years. Yemen was already a poor country, with 47% of its population living in poverty in 2014, according to the U.N. Development Program. Now, an estimated 80% of the population lives below the poverty line.
https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/yemen-war-facts
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
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Changing of the Guard – The Yemen Review, April 2022
The surprise resignation of long-serving President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the appointment of a new Presidential Leadership Council heralded a busy month of political and economic developments in Yemen, as a UN-brokered Ramadan truce largely held across the country. Hadi ceded his powers to a council of prominent military figures led by former Interior Minister Rashad al-Alimi at talks in Riyadh, in a move nominally brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council. The handover was orchestrated by Saudi Arabia and the UAE with little to no consultation of Yemeni political figures. In the interim capital Aden, the council was sworn in before a rare meeting of Parliament while support was rapidly voiced by the UN Security Council and the United States. The Houthis have characterized the new council as illegitimate and contrived by foreigners; they had made similar criticisms of Hadi’s administration. The Saudis and UAE committed US$3 billion in new funding for the government, earmarked for development and assistance to the Central Bank in Aden; the news has already increased the value of the Yemeni riyal in government-held areas.
Though sporadic violence has continued, the military truce brokered by UN Special Envoy Hans Grunberg remained intact through the month of April. The resumption of flights from Sana’a International Airport, another component of the agreement, remained stalled, but the resumption of oil and gas imports via Hudaydah port has helped mitigate nationwide fuel shortages. There are fears that the Houthis may use the lull in violence to reinforce and re-maneuver their forces ahead of another assault on the oil-rich stronghold of Marib. And while the ascendance of the Presidential Leadership Council has been greeted with skeptical approval as an improvement over the Hadi presidency, there are concerns about the council’s ability to work together to meet the enormity of Yemen’s crises.
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/changing-of-the-guard-the-yemen-review-april-2022
Presidential Council Replaces Hadi
Developments in Government-Controlled Territory
In the early hours of April 7, President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi dismissed Vice President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and then signed over his executive authority to a Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). This transfer of power from Hadi to an eight-man body was announced from Riyadh, where Yemeni parties had gathered for consultations sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation Council.
The reformed leadership body brings together disparate factions within the anti-Houthi alliance. It is headed by Rashad al-Alimi, a former interior minister. The other seven members of the PLC are Marib Governor Sultan al-Aradah, Southern Transitional Council (STC) President Aiderous al-Zubaidi, National Resistance forces leader Tareq Saleh, Chief of Staff of the Presidential Office Abdullah al-Alimi, Hadramawt Governor Faraj al-Bahsani, Giants Brigades Commander Abdelrahman al-Muharrami (aka Abou Zaraa) and Member of Parliament Othman al-Mujali.
Developments in Houthi-Controlled Territory
Houthi Leaders Reject Formation of PLC
Houthi Policy Restricts Women’s Freedom of Movement
Houthi Leader Proposes Replacing Curriculum with Quran
Resumption of Commercial Flights From Sana’a Canceled Amid Passport Row – by Casey Coombs
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/changing-of-the-guard-the-yemen-review-april-2022/17707
Ramadan Truce Largely Holding
Truces of various forms have come and gone in Yemen before. They have rarely lasted or been respected by the parties to the conflict, and sometimes have ended before even having begun. However, when a two-month truce came into effect at 7 p.m. local time on April 2, announced by the UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg, there was a sense that this time might be different; that there was a willingness from all sides to stop the fighting, albeit temporarily.
In one sense, that may be true. The first week of April was the first time since the Saudi-led coalition intervened militarily in Yemen in March 2015 that a week went by without airstrikes. The same followed the next week, and the one after that. While the Houthis have accused the Saudis of violating the truce by carrying out cross-border shelling, drone and helicopter attacks, these incidents, which have not been independently verified, would have been relatively minor, resulting in few casualties.[1] It appears as though the Saudi air force is adhering to the truce.
The same cannot be said of the parties to the conflict on the ground, most notably the Houthi forces. Both the Houthis and Yemeni government forces have accused each other of hundreds of violations in areas across Yemen, including shelling, drone attacks and attacks on civilians. While some of the reports are most likely the result of an eagerness to demonstrate that the other side is violating the truce, or are limited individual actions, events in Marib appear to indicate that the Houthis are trying to take advantage of the lack of Saudi-led coalition airstrikes to obtain battlefield advantages, setting themselves up for any major resumption in fighting once the truce ends, or should it fail.
Yemeni government forces also accused the Houthis of multiple violations of the truce in Taiz, where residential areas such as the Bir Basha neighborhood of Taiz city were shelled – by Sanaa Center Staff
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/changing-of-the-guard-the-yemen-review-april-2022/17711
Saudi and Emirati Financial Support Buoys Yemeni Rial
On April 7, Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced US$1 billion each in new financial support for the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden, with Riyadh pledging a further US$1 billion to support development projects and fund fuel imports in government-held areas. The announcement was among the outcomes of the Riyadh consultations, and reaction in the Yemeni currency market was immediate and dramatic.
In Aden, where ‘new’ rials — issued by the CBY-Aden since 2017 — are predominately in circulation, wild swings in the exchange rate followed the announcement. Within the first day, the currency regained as much as 40 percent in value relative to the United States dollar before rapidly shedding much of these gains.
In Sana’a, where the Houthi authorities have enforced a strict ban on the circulation of new rials and heavily regulated the exchange rate for ‘old’ rials, the currency volatility was far less pronounced.
The rial’s rising value in April reflected that currency traders anticipate that the CBY-Aden will shortly regain the ability to make large interventions in the foreign currency market, which would ease downward pressure on the value of the rial.
Truce Eases Fuel Supply Crisis, Retail Prices Increase
Following the announcement, fuel became widely available again at official gas stations, with the Yemeni government confirming seven fuel ships offloaded at Hudaydah in April.
Despite the increased fuel supply, Houthi authorities in Sana’a upped the official price of gasoline 27.3 percent on April 10, from YR495 to YR630 per liter, while the same quantity on the black market was selling for YR850 (all prices in old rials).
By contrast, authorities in areas under the nominal control of the internationally recognized government moved to decrease the price of gasoline in April – by Sanaa Center Economic Unit
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/changing-of-the-guard-the-yemen-review-april-2022/17704
Death From Beneath: Landmines in Hudaydah
Frontlines finally shifted away from Yemen’s Red Sea city of Hudaydah late last year, but residents of the city’s sprawling eastern and southern outskirts remain surrounded by the thousands of landmines planted since mid-2017, which, according to ACLED data, have killed at least 832 people since then. During most of that time, only one road out of the city of roughly 700,000 was open, but when government-allied forces pulled back in November 2021, Houthi forces fanned out and reopened roads in areas that had been largely abandoned when the war closed in. More tragic explosions followed.
While total numbers are not known, either for Hudaydah governorate or nationally, more than 334,000 explosive devices have been cleared throughout Yemen since mid-2018, according to Project Masam, a Saudi-funded de-mining project.
Several residents of Hudaydah city, including in the heavily mined eastern and southern outskirts where so many industrial plants, family-owned plantations and animal farms shut down or moved during the fighting, spoke of watching the Houthis lay mines in and near their neighborhoods in recent years. “There are no warning signs,” said a 37-year-old resident of Al-Rabasa neighborhood, on the eastern edge of the city, adding that residents were only told to avoid certain areas.
From January 2021 to early April 2022, landmines planted by Houthi forces along with unexploded explosive ordnance had killed or wounded 363 civilians in a number of governorates, according to Yemeni Landmine Records – by Sam Ali
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/changing-of-the-guard-the-yemen-review-april-2022/17710
What the New Ruling Council Means for the South
Leaders of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) entered the Yemen peace consultations in Riyadh last month optimistic and prepared to effect a structural change in the Yemeni presidency.
But the outcome of the Riyadh talks came as a surprise, even to the STC, exceeding its hopes in significant ways, but also creating challenges.
Still, the STC was able to extract several significant gains in the government revamp. The southern issue has been recognized as an integral issue that must be on the table in future talks, in contrast to past negotiations in which it was postponed for discussion until an agreement on a transitional phase and inclusive political dialogue was reached. Secondly, the principle of north-south parity has been established within the presidency. Al-Zubaidi himself has been given a seat at the table and will have a say over issues concerning not just the south but the whole country. Finally, removing Hadi tilts the balance of power in favor of the south and the STC in particular, despite also empowering rival forces.
The first fruit reaped by the STC in Riyadh was the openness of influential southern leaders to engage in a dialogue that the STC called for in 2019. This leverage brings risks. The STC has been integrated into the structures of power, and it will need to moderate its behavior and language away from revolutionary mobilization for the goal of southern secession.
Such a taming of the STC would give rivals within the Hirak, such as the movement of prominent secessionist Hasan Ba’um, the opportunity to play the role of populist radical and make the demands for secession previously made by the STC. Other Hirak factions could then follow suit if dialogue with the STC – which is not currently on the table – fails to bring results.
The STC will now need to be more careful, however, about how its actions are received in Riyadh. It will take a huge risk if it uses these sudden, unexpected political gains to revert to its traditional policy of escalation on the ground and assuming sole military authority in the southern governorates.
In light of these dynamics, regional rivalry is likely to escalate between the southeastern and southwestern governorates. Currently lacking a strong political base, Al-Bahsani in Hadramawt and Abdullah al-Alimi in Shabwa can be expected to mobilize on the ground as a means to gain influence. Furthermore, various social groups in Hadramawt and Al-Mahra in Yemen’s far east will take the opportunity to extract concessions from the new presidency and the STC over regional identity and autonomy in coming dialogues to achieve a political resolution to the ongoing conflict – by Hussam Radman
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/changing-of-the-guard-the-yemen-review-april-2022/17713
Made in KSA: The Risks of an Imposed Presidential Council
Since President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi stepped aside in early April, the overwhelming consensus among Yemenis has been “good riddance.” Replacing Hadi with a presidential council was doubtless the best way forward, but the devil is in the details when it comes to political systems, and there are many devilish details lurking in Yemen’s newly appointed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). They will emerge as the council works out how it will operate and as its hastily thrown-together members decide to what extent they are willing to trust one another. The largest and most frustrating, however, is that the council was formulated by foreign parties without substantive Yemeni input. And because it was not created by Yemenis to represent Yemenis, its members — nearly all of them military leaders manufactured by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — do not owe their council positions or governing power to the will of the Yemeni people.
Another concerning aspect of the PLC is that it fails to address the fragmentation on the side of the internationally recognized government. The components of the council do not trust each other, and had not undertaken any prior negotiations among themselves or agreed to work together within this body. Any efforts to ease tensions and build a unified agenda will be undertaken after formation, which is a more complicated proposition. The only parties that members are committed to are the Saudis and the UAE, which disregarded the significance of the PLC members’ conflicting domestic agendas.
It could be argued that the current membership represents a great achievement, as it manages to bring these military powers together, limiting disputes among the anti-Houthi alliance and providing a united front. But such a rosy outlook is hostage to the trust among these groups, which does not yet exist. Furthemore, most of these military leaders are indebted to the Saudi-led coalition, created and fully funded by the UAE and/or Saudi Arabia. They would not have existed or survived if not for the coalition.
The PLC should have been composed of political parties with political identities, its members then directing military leaders. However, prominent party and independent leaders who could have brought political legitimacy and a civilian character to the PLC were pushed out of the direct decision-making cycle, becoming part of a 50-member advisory body.
Governments can only operate at the speed of trust, and that trust must be found beyond the confines of individual PLC members’ relationships with their respective patrons if this presidential council is to perform, or even survive. The coalition has reinforced its hold on power in Yemen, with more direct authority than before. At this point, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have placed their trust in their allies and appointees on the council, and the GCC and international community have rallied behind them. But there is little trust among council members themselves, and little reason for Yemenis today to view the council as a representative executive body keen to serve their interests. Regardless of whether the expansion of the executive generates any tangible short- or medium-term improvements, its imposition by a foreign state undermines its capacity to provide long-term stability or prevent the fragmentation of the state. Yemen has been freed from Hadi but continues to have little control over its future, and Yemeni political leaders, shamefully, continue to allow Yemeni sovereignty to remain hostage to outside interference – by Osamah Al Rawhani
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/changing-of-the-guard-the-yemen-review-april-2022/17715
Taiz in Power
For the first time in Yemen’s modern history, the executive and legislative branches of the government are headed by figures hailing from the governorate of Taiz
This strong national representation for Taiz at this juncture has important implications given the governorate’s unique position in Yemen’s history. While Taiz is politically part of north Yemen, geographically and historically it has always been part of the south.
Taiz city became marginalized by northern tribal forces in the 1960s following the republican revolution.
During the early stages of the current war, the people of Taiz resisted Houthi forces’ attempts to take the city, confronting them with demonstrations. When the Saudi-led coalition intervened in March 2015, Taiz became a key battleground
Taiz governorate is now fractured by competing political forces and militias.
The current rise of Taiz is similar to the Hadrami situation, as it represents an unarmed cosmopolitan space that poses a threat to no one, deferring to the struggle for power between other forces. But will this rise in influence eventually lead the city to emerge as a cohesive armed force in itself?
The future of Taiz will be impacted by those figures who now hold office, especially the head of the new ruling council. Their actions could help alleviate the city’s division and suffering, or let it continue to fester. Among the worst choices these figures could make, especially Rashad al-Alimi, is to resort to a form of Taizi regionalism to protect their position. That path would risk creating new destructive dynamics in a divided city where numerous Yemeni forces have influence on the ground. Fortunately, the city’s history and culture suggest it would be difficult for any party to create the strident regionalist politics that exist elsewhere in Yemen – by Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/changing-of-the-guard-the-yemen-review-april-2022/17714
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"Jemen steuert auf eine Zweiteilung zu"
Matthias Leibbrand, der Chef der deutschen NGO Vision Hope, konnte nach acht Jahren Luftblockade und Krieg nun wieder in die jemenitische Hauptstadt Sanaa reisen.
Seine NGO arbeitet ununterbrochen seit vielen Jahren im Armenhaus Arabiens, wie der Jemen aufgrund seiner jämmerlichen Situation allseits genannt wird. Auch als der Bürgerkrieg in seiner schlimmsten Phase tobte, waren Leibbrands Mitarbeiter vor Ort und haben überall im Land Lebensmittel verteilt, Wasser beschafft, Brunnen gebohrt.
Wer nicht auf dem gefährlichen Landweg sein Leben riskieren wollte, blieb Sanaa über Jahre fern.
Umso überraschter ist der 54-Jährige aus dem südbadischen Emmendingen, als er in der Hauptstadt ankommt. "Ich bin durch Sanaa gegangen und war erstaunt, wie normal das Leben dort ist", erzählt er am Skype-Telefon. "Die Läden sind voll, das Warenangebot umfassend." Sanaa sei wesentlich moderner als vor acht Jahren. Der Norden insgesamt wirke stabiler, der Süden dagegen versinke im Chaos. "Man merkt sofort, dass es in dem Land keine einheitliche Führung gibt."
Die Situation am unteren Ende der Arabischen Halbinsel, Saudi-Arabiens Nachbar, ist verfahren.
Das Resultat gleicht einem Patt. Machten die Huthis Landgewinne, schlug die Koalition zurück und umgekehrt.
"Sanaa ist kaum beschädigt, die alten, pittoresken Häuser stehen wie eh und je", erzählt Matthias Leibbrand von seinem Spaziergang durch die Altstadt. Sanaa gehört zum Weltkulturerbe der Unesco.
In den Vierteln, in denen angegriffen wurde, investiere natürlich niemand. Doch 90 Prozent der Stadt seien sicher. Und dort werde überall gebaut, neue Bürohäuser hochgezogen, Einkaufstempel, Restaurants, berichtet Leibbrand.
Aus seiner Stimme klingt Verwunderung und Sympathie über das, was im Norden erreicht wurde. "Die Huthis beeindrucken mich", antwortet er offen. "Sie sind sehr organisiert, sehr strukturiert, es gibt kaum Sicherheitskontrollen in Sanaa, nur wenn du aus der Stadt rausfährst." Es gäbe eine starke Hand, die ganz streng regiere, aber die Sicherheit sei gewährleistet. "Es gibt keine Entführungen mehr, ein großes Thema früher." Er müsse es deutlich sagen: "Es gibt Kriegsgewinner und Kriegsverlierer."
Er selbst und seine Organisation zählen sich eindeutig zu den Kriegsgewinnern, sagt Leibbrand. 800 Jemeniten hätten bei ihm Arbeit gefunden in der Lebensmittelverteilung, Logistik, Administration. Vision Hope arbeitet überall im Land, auch in den gefährlichsten Regionen wie Marib im Osten, wo bis vor kurzem noch heftig gekämpft wurde. Und über 30 weitere deutsche NGOs tun dies auch. Damit stellt Deutschland das größte Kontingent an Hilfsorganisationen im Land, war und ist nach wie vor der größte und wichtigste Geldgeber.
Die Situation des Jemen ist und bleibt sehr kompliziert, auch wenn die jetzige Waffenruhe etwas Hoffnung bringt. Die Infrastruktur und die humanitäre Lage im Land sind nach sieben Jahren Stellvertreterkrieg zwischen Iran und Saudi-Arabien ausgesprochen schlecht.
Für Matthias Leibbrand sieht es ganz danach aus, dass der Zustand wiederhergestellt werde wie vor der Vereinigung des Südens und des Nordens, die im selben Jahr - 1990 - wie in Deutschland stattfand.
Ich denke, das ist eine Frage der Zeit", prophezeit Matthias Leibbrand, "als der Jemen vereinigt wurde, war der Süden bankrott."
Der Chef von Vision Hope sieht eine ähnliche Entwicklung jetzt. Bestes Beispiel sei die Währung: Während im Nordjemen 600 Rial für einen Dollar bezahlt werden müssen, kostet er im Süden 1.400 jemenitische Rial. Deshalb stelle der Süden gerade auf Dollar um, damit der Verfall der heimischen Währung nicht noch weiter voranschreitet. Im Süden werden Hilfsgüter künftig in Dollar bezahlt, im Norden in der Landeswährung. "Die Huthis werden die Kontrolle über den gesamten Nordjemen erreichen", ist sich Leibbrand sicher. Was aus dem Süden wird, darüber wagt er keine Prognose: "Ausgang offen."
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Yemen’s truce could be a step toward peace or a warriors’ respite - analysis
The country’s citizens believe the United Nations-brokered agreement came only to help the battling parties get their affairs in order.
Now halfway through the truce, no tangible steps have been announced to open the roads to Taiz city and end the Houthi siege there. As for Sanaa airport, flights are still suspended. Many violations and military skirmishes have emerged on the war’s fronts. The list of names of prisoners to be released, which was presented before the announcement of the ceasefire, has proved to be yet another card for exerting pressure and a false hope for thousands of families yearning to see their children.
Many obstacles hover over the implementation of the agreement, and many political analysts have declared that it was not binding on the warring parties and that the chances of its success are slim, adding that there are many violations that could lead to soon announcing its failure.
“It is not logical for a person to travel to Aden Governorate [in the south of Yemen] to obtain a passport and then return to Sanaa on a two-day trip by road,” journalist Samah Lotf told The Media Line, adding that “the United Nations failed to put in place a clear mechanism to implement the terms of the agreement.”
The UN could have, in coordination with the parties, set up an office at Sanaa airport to inspect and operate flights, he said.
“Sanaa airport is the lifeline for many Yemenis who want to get medical treatment, and many did not rejoice over the cease-fire of military operations to the extent that they rejoiced when it was announced that Sanaa International Airport will be reopened,” Lotf explained.
The terms of the cease-fire stipulate that two round-trip flights per week will be operated from Sanaa during the truce period, one each to Amman and Cairo, respectively, for a total of 14 flights.
Lotf says he considers the failure to operate flights a possible cause of the failure to implement many of the truce’s conditions, chief of which is reopening roads to Taiz Governorate and ending the siege imposed on Taiz city, the country’s third largest after Sanaa and Aden.
Along with dozens of violations and exchanges of fire between the DFA and the IRG on several fronts – in clear violation of the truce, many military forces in the multiparty civil war continue to mobilize additional fighters and prepare for renewed combat.
Political analyst Saddam Fateh described the issue as “dangerous.” This is because “this truce, which is the longest among all the previous truces, is the last chance for all parties to bring peace to Yemen,” he said.
All the parties are still treating the truce as a “warrior’s respite,” during which future military operations are prepared, Fateh says. He believes that the IRG should work to create conditions aimed at achieving peace, including releasing prisoners and the payment of salaries to public sector employees who reside in the DFA-controlled areas in the general state budget.
In return, the DFA should open roads and end the blockades they impose on many cities, contribute to the agreements for releasing the war prisoners, and participate in dialogue aimed at ending the conflict in Yemen, Fateh says.
The military violations and the exchange of fire in the governorates of Marib, Taiz and Al Bayda pose serious obstacles to the cease-fire, Fateh says.
Sanaa University academic Ammar Ali told The Media Line he views the UN-brokered cease-fire as a “failed truce” unable to meet the basic hopes of the average Yemeni.
“The warring parties have long used the war as an excuse for their mistakes. They failed to exploit the truce to offer a clearer picture about the situation to the citizens,” he said.
“There are thousands of [war] prisoners who are still dreaming of an opportunity to escape the sterile political fray. The ever-increasing cost of living, the nonpayment of [public sector] salaries and the deterioration of many [state] sectors remain the talk of the Yemeni street, which anticipates the truce’s failure more than its success,” Ali said – by Mohammed Al-Hassani
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-705624
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Truce Test: The Huthis and Yemen’s War of Narratives
Adversaries of Yemen’s Huthi rebels say they will never negotiate in good faith. Others think they might, given the right mix of incentives. With a nationwide truce in place, diplomats should give the latter hypothesis a shot.
Why does it matter? The Huthis remain an enigma to many outsiders but are instrumental to a negotiated solution. They have given few signs of late that they will make compromises necessary to end the war, but efforts to engage them stand a better chance than further isolation of convincing them to do so.
What should be done? Diplomats will need both carrots and sticks to bring the Huthis in from the cold. International stakeholders should establish a working group to make overtures to Sanaa and prepare for inclusive Yemeni-Yemeni talks to chart a way out of the conflict.
Executive Summary
A whirlwind of events has opened a small window of opportunity, if not for peace, then for a shift from violent competition to political negotiations in Yemen. This moment is a litmus test for two hypotheses about the Huthi rebels who have controlled Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, since 2014. The first, advanced by their rivals, holds that the group is an extremist organisation in thrall to Iran that is incapable of engaging in good faith, let alone making the compromises needed to end the war. The second posits that the Huthis (aka Ansar Allah), presented with the right mix of incentives and a realistic peace proposal, will come to the table, even if only to give themselves a reprieve from fighting and economic privation. In any case, the fact is that the war will not end without the Huthis’ acquiescence. With a nationwide truce in place, diplomats should reach out to the Huthis, seeking their approval of an extended truce and their participation in inclusive intra-Yemeni talks aimed at bringing seven years of terrible conflict to a close.
Hadi’s replacement, a presidential council consisting partly of prominent leaders involved in fighting the Huthis, along with political elites close to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, presented the Huthis with both confirmation of Saudi influence over the government and a more credible negotiating counterpart, as the UN sought to translate the truce into dialogue about ending the war. Days after the council’s appointment, the UN envoy, Hans Grundberg, travelled to Sanaa in an effort to extend the truce and lay the groundwork for political negotiations.
The Huthis’ rivals say they are a theocratic Iranian proxy that rules through fear and harbours expansionist ambitions. The Huthis paint themselves as revolutionaries and plucky underdogs in a Saudi-led war of aggression. They claim that they have been sincere in their efforts to end the war and have clearly stated their terms, but that until now their adversaries’ counter-proposals have been unrealistic.
Neither narrative provides a full picture of the Huthis or life in areas they control. The Huthis tell a story of a revolution with democratic intent thwarted by Saudi-led airstrikes and siege warfare. But the Yemen war is a civil war first and foremost. The Huthis neglect to mention that many Yemenis are not on their side and that those fighting them on the ground are resisting their rule rather than acting as guns for hire. For their part, the Huthis’ rivals say the group is hellbent on installing a caste-based theocratic order, pointing to Huthi attacks on populated areas and police state tactics as examples of their extremism. But they downplay the war’s human toll in Huthi-controlled areas and local leaders’ excesses in areas under the government’s nominal sway. Their backers, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, focus on Huthi cross-border attacks, demanding that the U.S. assist them in ending the Huthi (and, they say, Iranian) threat to the Gulf security. But they seek impunity for the carnage their own bombardment has caused.
Recent Huthi gains – and losses – on the ground, their latest attacks on the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the truce and the push for a political settlement have brought renewed urgency to questions about who the Huthis are, what they want and how to bring them to the negotiating table. For some, the answer is to isolate and pressure them militarily and economically. For others, it is to find the right incentives to bring them in from the cold, for example, by meeting longstanding Huthi demands to lift restrictions on the Red Sea port of Hodeida and reopen Sanaa International Airport to commercial flights.
As part of the truce both of these conditions have now been met, on paper and in a limited form: the agreement allows two flights per week to land in Sanaa and eases the embargo on fuel shipments arriving in Hodeida. Whether that is enough to get the Huthis to the table is about to be put to the test. But first, its terms must be honoured – at the time of writing, almost a month into the truce, wrangling over passport control had prevented the inaugural flights from arriving. The Huthis, for their part, also need to make compromises to sustain and expand the truce: they need to restore road access to the city of Taiz that they have besieged for the past seven years.
Whatever happens next, efforts to end the war must grapple with four main considerations related to the Huthis. The first is the fact that, until early 2022, they appeared to be winning the war for Yemen’s northern highlands and that they remain the dominant power in the country’s most populous areas, including Sanaa. The second is that the risk of more Huthi strikes on Saudi Arabia and the UAE – and the menace to maritime trade around Yemen – will remain constant as long as the war continues. The third is that, even if the war is a multi-sided struggle that can only be brought to a close through a wider peace process, it cannot end without an understanding between Saudi Arabia and the Huthis, with the former deeming intolerable a settlement that would leave the group in absolute control, closely aligned with Iran and armed with medium- and long-range weapons.
The fourth and final factor is that the Huthis’ domestic rivals reject the notion of living in a Huthi-dominated state and, in many cases, have vowed to fight on in the event of a settlement that does not address their fears. Even the most fervent of anti-Huthi Yemenis perceive that they may soon have no choice but to broker some kind of settlement with the Huthis that upholds the status quo, given that Riyadh is widely understood to be set on finding an exit from the conflict. Yet, absent a shift in Huthi military and political tactics, many in this camp predict, instead of a peace process, a prelude to a new phase of war in the event that some kind of interim settlement can be achieved.
An end to the war’s current phase could be in sight, in other words but not necessarily an end to Yemen’s civil strife. External actors will need to use both incentives and pressure to bring all parties to the bargaining table. But it is hard to see how the Huthis, in particular, can be convinced to negotiate without a permanent end to what they see as the Saudi-led siege of the areas they control. With these restrictions now temporarily lightened as part of the truce, mediators need to mount a diplomatic surge on Sanaa to ensure that the group feels heard, as well as to tell them what the outside world expects from them.
It is important to calibrate the aims of this effort carefully. Diplomats will need to be realistic about the limits of the Huthis’ capacity for compromise, particularly around power sharing and when it comes to their relationship with Iran. The immediate goal should not be a hastily assembled comprehensive deal and a rush to settling the war’s most divisive issues, regional and international security concerns. Rather, it should be to make the Huthis part of a Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue made up not just of regional players’ favourite politicians, but of the broad range of social constituencies who can build peace.
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CAN THE RIYADH RESHUFFLE BRING PEACE TO YEMEN?
These events represent a more significant political shift than the war in Yemen has seen in several years. The truce is the first nationwide ceasefire since 2016, and despite reports of Houthi-initiated fighting around Marib, it appears to be holding in the rest of the country. President Hadi, although only the head of the government of Yemen in name only, nonetheless remained an obstacle to peace. His replacement with a council of political and military figures who have significant influence on the ground indicates that the Saudi-led coalition is serious about changing the direction of the conflict.
Whether these events put Yemen on the path towards peace, though, remains an open question. If the truce does not last, the presidential council could become a war council, reinvigorating the military efforts of the anti-Houthi coalition. U.S. diplomats and the international community have an important role to play in preventing this. They should push for a more inclusive negotiating process that brings in women and Yemeni civil society actors while also putting pressure on U.S. partners to follow through in implementing the current truce.
Why Now?
After so many negotiations with so little to show for them, the truce and government shuffle took even longtime Yemen analysts by surprise. Why now, after more than seven years of fighting?
On the Saudi-led coalition’s side, both the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have increasingly recognized in recent years that they will not be able to secure anything resembling a military victory.
The shift in U.S. policy towards the Saudi-led coalition when President Biden came into office has also had an impact on pushing the coalition to negotiate an end to the war. While he may not have fulfilled his campaign promise to treat Saudi Arabia as an international “pariah,” Biden announced in the early months of his presidency that the United States would end “offensive” support to the Saudi-led coalition and support the U.N.-led negotiation track.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may also see wrapping up their involvement in Yemen as part of a broader effort to find a more “functional” working relationship with Iran as nuclear deal talks slowly progress. For its part, Iran welcomed the truce announcement.
The Houthis seemed poised to make significant strategic gains a year ago. Victory in their offensive on Marib, the last major government-held city in Yemen’s north, would have yielded the Houthis access to critical oil and gas infrastructure and given them an advantage going into negotiations. Instead, as their battlefield momentum has stalled, the benefits of continuing to fight instead of coming to the negotiating table have diminished. That said, some observers have argued that the Houthis are taking advantage of the truce to regroup and redeploy their forces. As Yemen analyst Nadwa al Dawsari recently tweeted: “Truce or not, Houthis won’t give up their plans to take Marib or ambition to control” the entire country.
Why Does the Truce Matter?
The terms of the truce show that both sides are willing to make compromises as part of the U.N.-led process — a willingness that has, until now, been in short supply.
Diplomats are hopeful that the truce will provide space for the parties to negotiate a more comprehensive peace agreement. This will be a much heavier lift than the truce itself, since it introduces a number of bigger issues, beginning with how the country will be governed and by whom. Still, the truce could be a first step in that direction.
Perhaps most importantly, the truce represents a reprieve for the Yemeni people.
Why the Presidential Council Matters
The government reshuffle is also potentially very significant for the peace process. President Hadi has long been an obstacle to negotiations.
But as his government’s corruption deepened and members of the anti-Houthi coalition ostensibly organized under the Yemeni government came to blows with each other, Hadi’s usefulness waned. While there is no clear constitutional mechanism for the transfer of power to a presidential council, Hadi’s departure has still been greeted with relief by many Yemenis.
The membership of the new presidential council is also significant, as it balances Saudi and U.A.E. loyalists and represents competing factions within the anti-Houthi alliance.
Saudi and Emirati leaders clearly hope that these leaders will be able to more effectively represent what’s happening on the ground than Hadi and enable the various factions to become more closely aligned.
What Should the United States Do?
The truce offers the United States and the international community a critical opportunity to double down on diplomacy in Yemen. The United States will need to continue to support the U.N.-led process to help ensure that the tenuous truce will not only continue to hold but will be renewed at the end of the two months – by Alexandra Stark
https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/can-the-riyadh-reshuffle-bring-peace-to-yemen/
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How the new presidential council could shape Yemen's future
Analysis: The recently formed council marks a renewed determination to bring an end to the prolonged civil war, but experiences from the past make it hard to predict whether peace will prevail.
The recent overhaul of presidential power and the ensuing influx of exiled Yemeni officials into Aden have set the stage for a new reality in Yemen.
The recent move is the latest attempt to end the eight-year conflict, raising Yemeni hopes that a war which has left millions in need of humanitarian assistance could finally end.
While the return of these officials to Yemen is a crucial development, it is hard to say whether fighting will break out again, prolonging the war, or if peace will prevail. However, indications from the past and present of the conflict can give some insight into what the future could look like for Yemen.
There are three possible scenarios for this war-ravaged nation in the months to come.
The first scenario is that the council will manage to work jointly and govern Houthi-free areas without any internal disputes between its members. On the first day of its formation, the new leadership articulated numerous political, economic, and military goals.
For these goals to be attained, the unity of the council members is vital. The level of agreement among the new leaders will be the nucleus of their success or failure in this interim phase.
The council's ability to unite the conflicting agendas will provide them with enormous political and military leverage. Indeed, unifying all the military and security units under the defence and internal affairs ministries will enable the council to turn its words into actions.
The second scenario is finding peace through direct talks with the Houthis or, alternatively, resorting once again to war. Indeed, the past two decades have provided a reliable but grim answer to the likelihood of the effectiveness of political dialogue in Yemen.
Houthis say any Yemeni official appointed by other countries does not represent the Yemeni people.
The Houthis' defiant stance may oblige the new leadership council to use military power. Consequently, the likelihood of a conflict is high. Al-Alimi, who is now the new president of Yemen, said in his speech on 20 April that the leadership council is committed to "ending the [Houthi] coup and the war." Apparently, ending the coup in Yemen cannot be achieved at the negotiating table, only on the battlefield.
The third possible outcome is the failure of the leadership council, which could slide into infighting. This concern is valid given the conflicting agendas held by leadership council members. Separatist voices and forces are quiet for now, but it is not clear how long their silence will last.
Aidarous Al-Zoubeidi, the head of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist body set up in 2017, was among the officials who took the ceremonial oath before the parliament on 20 January.
Therefore, secessionist aspirations should not be treated as merely a peripheral threat to the leadership council in the days to come. A political researcher in Aden, preferring to remain anonymous, told The New Arab that the southern separatists could be a genuine challenge for the leadership council.
https://english.alaraby.co.uk/analysis/how-new-presidential-council-could-shape-yemens-future
and
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Yemen’s Presidential Council Launches a New Era
Whether the truce holds or not, Yemen’s conflict is moving into a new phase, with its own troubling issues.
The stepping down of Yemen’s president, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and the formation of a presidential council mark a turning point in the conflict in Yemen. Hadi was an unpopular president, but nonetheless the Yemeni people received the news with great concern. Questions over the constitutionality and legitimacy of the presidential council immediately arose but were quickly overshadowed by considerations of whether it will improve the economic situation and basic services and end the 7-year war.
Problematic Formation
What is most concerning to many observers is that the decree did not set a specific term for this council; members’ terms only end with death, disability, or resignation. With an open term, the council could end up, over time, being a source of polarization and division. As the highest political authority in a state that is incredibly divided, the attempt to rule by collective long term could end up reinforcing rather than ameliorating the fractured realities in the country. There are also concerns that the success of this council relies too heavily on its members’ success in coordinating and balancing Yemen’s relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This is a problematic approach given the history of rivalry and competition among the groups inside Yemen that are allied with these two countries.
A Step Forward for the Houthis
There is no provision in the constitution for the establishment of such a presidential council, raising a number of questions about its legitimacy. The move to establish a presidential council also indirectly raises questions about Houthi obligations to respect prior political agreements, a concession that the Hadi government had insisted on as a prerequisite for negotiations.
In the decree forming the presidential council, the Houthis were mentioned by their name “Ansarallah.” They were not referred to as a rebel group or militia but as a party to be included in negotiations. With the establishment of the council, Hadi was removed from power, which was one of the Houthis’ demands. Furthermore, the formation of the council recognized the military powers produced by the war, which the Hadi government had refused to do, insisting they must disarm and withdraw from cities. This could pave the way for the Houthis to join the council, like any other armed group currently represented.
The council is a turning point in Yemen, ending the era after Yemen’s unification in 1990 when the recognized political parties served as the only legal forms of political participation. This council is the first political body to embody the drastic political and military changes that have resulted from the war: Political parties’ powers have faded, and religious-sectarian and regional armed groups have become increasingly dominant. The council’s establishment is also emblematic of regional powers’ influence on Yemen, which, in addition to hosting a toxic swirl of internal conflicts, has increasingly become the battlefield of others’ conflicts.
Recognizing the facts on the ground is always a good idea in addressing a conflict, even if it is not necessarily a step toward solving the sources of the conflict. It is at least a step toward explicitly – hopefully accurately – defining the conflict. However, while this formula may end the Saudi-led military intervention, it is unlikely to stabilize Yemen or bring peace anytime soon, as it does not address the regional and sectarian dimensions of the conflict.
Yemen’s local powers have lost a great deal of their autonomy, a reality that will make resolving the conflict difficult.
This council is another powerful manifestation of Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s desire to end their direct military involvement in Yemen. So, whether the truce holds or not, Yemen’s conflict is moving into a new phase, with its own troubling issues – by Maysaa Suja al-Deen
https://agsiw.org/yemens-presidential-council-launches-a-new-era/
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Women in Yemen trapped by war, abuse
Eight years have passed since the war in Yemen began, and women there continue to exist in dire situations in which they are faced not only with the hardships of displacement but also with threats, persecution, imprisonment and banishment from exercising their political rights.
A recent report by a Yemeni-based NGO revealed shocking numbers regarding the scale of abuses women in Yemen have faced since the beginning of the war.
SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties said in its report issued March 8 on International Women’s Day that more than 4,000 cases of abuses against women were recorded until the end of 2020, including murder, injury to the body, arbitrary arrest, forced disappearance, torture and prevention of movement.
The report also indicated that there are more than 900,000 displaced women in the camps of the Marib governorate as a result of the ongoing war in the country.
The Houthi movement has the highest rate of abuses against women with 70% of the cases, followed by Yemen government forces with 18%, the Southern Transitional Council with 5% and other parties with 7%. The violations varied between deliberate killings and severe injuries against female civilians and activists — acts that are tantamount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, according to the report.
Former Yemen Minister of Human Rights Houria Mashhour told Al-Monitor, “The war is a calamity for all people, affecting both men and women. But its impact on women is more severe. These usually lose their male relatives who perish in the conflict, and (the women then) become the sole breadwinner for their children and families, struggling to get work and the basic necessities of life such as water, food, medicine and other needs that have become scarce.”
“The war affects young women and men as well. The latter have to drop out of school to go to the battlefields. Also, women face health problems, especially mothers, in light of the deterioration of health services and the dispersal of families due to displacement or asylum,” she added.
Huda al-Sarari, head of the Aden-based Defense Foundation for Rights and Freedoms, told Al-Monitor, “Over the past few years of the war, women have faced gradual systematic practices to strip them of their rights amid the absence of laws, the disruption of state institutions and the militias’ control of most areas across the country, especially groups affiliated with the Houthis.”
“The de-facto authorities have committed crimes and violations against women that have never occurred in the history of Yemeni conflicts, stripping women of their rights and committing transgressions with purely ideological motives,” she said. “Many women have been sacked from their jobs and were not allowed to take up jobs in certain professions. This is not to mention restrictions of their rights, freedoms and prohibition of travel except with a male companion."
Sarari added, “Women have been under close scrutiny when it comes to community activities. They are banned from gathering and marching to call for rights and freedoms. This is not to mention arrests and [forced] disappearances. Many women faced death sentences and life sentences in prison for their actions, judged as being immoral from a wrong and narrow religious perspective.”
“Women face great challenges in demanding justice in the absence of laws and the lack of legal protection. Meanwhile, women’s and human rights organizations have been preoccupied with humanitarian relief as the war is still ongoing, in which women continue to be the first victims through systematic attacks on their lives and physical safety in the absence of psychological support, laws to protect women in armed conflicts, and the lack of commitment by the warring parties to international human rights laws and absence of accountability in Yemen,” Sarari said.
In a report issued in December 2020, the Yemeni Network for Rights and Freedoms documented 4,282 cases of abuse against women in Yemen from Sept. 21, 2014 (the start of the war), to Oct. 25, 2020. This figure includes 1,456 deaths; 2,379 cases of injury as a result of artillery shelling, the explosion of mines and explosive devices, and sniping; and 447 cases of kidnapping, disappearance and torture – by Boshra Alhomaide
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/03/women-yemen-trapped-war-abuse
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SAM for Rights and Liberties Launches its Report on Barriers of Fear and Misleading Discourse
Revealing 38 Houthi security checkpoints that violate freedom of movement and concomitant violations
SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties revealed that (38) security barriers were established by the Houthis in seven governorates, which practice violations of the right to freedom of movement and detain citizens in their own prisons, as well as the attendant media disinformation and fabrication of charges, in addition to other violations such as disappearance and torture.
In its report entitled “Barriers of Fear and Misleading Discourse ", which it released today, and it comes as part of a project documenting restrictions on freedom of movement and mobility since October 2021 in seven governorates under the authority of Ansar Allah these governorates are Sana’a, Taiz, Marib, Al-Bayda, Saada, Ibb and Al-Hodeidah.
The report covers the practices committed from January 2015 to December 2021. The organization said that it investigated (52) incidents during the period from January 2015 to December 2021, the victims of which varied between educators, merchants, government employees, citizens, expatriates, media and human rights activists, politicians, sheikhs, and military as well as gender-based violation victims such as women and children.
Yasser Al-Mulaiki, the project manager, said that this report discloses the extent of violations that have restricted freedom of movement in Yemen, especially in the governorates under the control of Ansar Allah the Houthis. A group of researchers in seven Yemeni governorates worked on this report. And as much as it reflects the terror that strikes Yemeni citizens who move between security barriers, it deals with one of the most important issues of human rights that no one talks about in Yemen, which is a restriction of all other public and individual freedoms as no political, economic or social right can be enjoyed without the citizens having the right to movement and mobility.
The report, which is the result of an investigative reporting conducted by "SAM", focused on the restriction of freedom of movement at the security barriers practiced by the Houthi group, as well as on examples of these barriers and the violations accompanying the restriction of freedom of movement, most notably extrajudicial killings, detention, enforced disappearances, inhuman treatment, preventing the entry of vital supplies, and gender or sexual assaults. It also focused on the issue of establishing customs offices and looting money illegally using these offices, which was practiced in the governorates of Sana’a, Hodeidah, Ibb, Taiz, Saada, Al-Bayda, and Marib. During the investigation, information was monitored about incidents committed by the other parties to the war, which the organization stated it will document in future reports.
The organization investigated more than (52) incidents of restriction of the right to freedom of movement and the accompanying violations committed during the period from January 2015 to December 2021 and interviewed more than (117) victims and witnesses, including victims in the context of gender, whether women or those belonging to different social or political groups.
While the organization monitored (59) security checkpoints controlled by all parties across the Yemeni regions where restrictions on freedom of movement and other crimes were perpetrated, it also obtained data on (38) Houthi security checkpoints spread across seven governorates, which the report worked on and investigated (13) of these checkpoints and customs ports.
The report reviews the looting of funds by the customs offices established by the Houthi authorities, especially on traders, suppliers and workers in the trade sector. It highlights that these offices do not have legal legitimacy, and that they were established in violation of the financial and tax laws that placed customs ports at the first points of the land and sea borders of Yemen.
In all the incidents that SAM investigated, it did not find judicial orders to restrict freedom of movement against those who were subjected to these violations. But rather it was the result of security directives for the group or issued by leaders who have influence on these checkpoints, or they were practiced by armed men at security and military checkpoints with personal or revenge motives, or under the influence of the security concern that was fed by the media of the group to which they belong.
The report reviewed details of the practices of a number of well-known barriers and checkpoints, such as Al-Amira Point in Ibb Governorate, Al Marazem Point in Saada, and Abu Hashem Point in Rada’a, in addition to examples of the stories of victims from different groups who were subjected to detention, disappearance, torture, killing and extortion at a number of checkpoints in various areas.
Full report: https://samrl.org/pdf/en/BarriersofFearEN.pdf
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How Inflation is Driving a New Wave of Malnutrition in Yemen, Nigeria
On a recent Thursday, 25-year-old Somaya Almakhlafy fought back tears after her 8-month-old daughter Raseal was discharged from Al-Suwaidi Hospital in Taiz in southern Yemen. They have spent two weeks at the therapeutic nutrition department in the hospital, where the daughter is being treated for severe acute malnutrition.
“Baby milk is very expensive,” Almakhlafy says, wiping the tears streaming down her cheeks with the back of her hand. “Sometimes I resort to buying sheep powdered unpacked milk to silence her hunger. I have not even eaten well to breastfeed her.”
She fears that her daughter will relapse because she still cannot afford to give her nutritious food as they return home where she lives with her father and brother after divorcing her husband.
During the early months of her pregnancy, her brother’s income kept them afloat. At that time, Almakhlafy could afford to buy legumes and also made bread at home. But the food became unaffordable when the prices soared, causing her breast milk to suddenly stop.
As far back as 10 years ago, families in Yemen spent 45 per cent of their income on food, but the figure has doubled due to war and declining purchasing power of the local currency, according to a study published in 2019 by the Syrian Journal of Research.
3-year-old Saed Shaef, a construction worker from Jabal Habshi in Taiz in southern Yemen, with an average daily income of 7000 Rials (approximately $7), now finds it difficult to feed his family as the inflation has risen faster than his earning.
Now, a cartoon of infant milk now costs him about 70 per cent of his income, which he says was cheaper when his twins were conceived. As the twins Wesal and Lila are four months away from their second birthday, they are visibly malnourished.
Staple food in Yemen, like a bag of white flour (50 KG) was fluctuating around 15,000 Rials ($15) by the end of 2020 and currently it has reached 40,000 ($40) and fluctuating according to the exchange rate.
In Yemen, the situation is more critical, where Oxfam stated that two-thirds of Yemenis do not even know where their next meal would come from. Unlike the insecurity ravaging northeastern and northwestern Nigeria, a protracted conflict that started in 2015, combined with the recent surge in the country’s inflation rate, is pushing millions towards famine in Yemen.
38-year-old Aref Ali, a father of four girls, has reduced the quantity of wheat he purchases for his family by half due to cost. The price of 50kg of flour currently exceeds his monthly salary.
His family depends on his 30,000 Rials ($30) monthly income which he earns from volunteering to teach in one of the schools in Ghrafe community in Jabal Habashi village. Ali says his salary was enough to feed the family before the local currency lost much of its value.
“I could buy fruits almost on a daily basis,” Ali says. “Fish and chicken on the weekends, but our diet has now been severely affected in recent years. It reached its peak last year and most of what we eat now are cereals and bread.”
Ali’s youngest 1-year-old daughter Marasil has been the hardest hit in the family’s sudden food insecurity; she faces severe malnutrition that threatens her life.
“I have not been able to take Marasil to one of the specialized centers where they treat malnutrition in the city of Taiz,” Ali says.The high price of oil has led to the increased cost of transportation to reach there. It will cost me 50,000 Rials ($50) for round trips and the expenses that I will incur, which exceeds what I earn as salary.”
An economist, Hisham Al-Sarmi, says that the factors responsible for the soaring prices of goods and services in Yemen could be attributed to several factors, most notably the continuous fluctuations in the exchange rate of the Rials against foreign currencies and the high prices of oil derivatives that increase the costs of transporting goods.
According to Al-Sarmi, to control inflation, the government needs to stabilize the price of goods and support the central bank to control currency deterioration. “A number of provinces that distribute loaves of bread or food basket in addition to the humanitarian initiatives funded by the Yemeni communities in the diaspora also needs to be supported,” he adds – by Niyi Oyedeji and Sahar Mohammed
(** B P)
A letter to my detained father
A New Report Containing the Letters of the Relatives of the Detained and Forcibly Disappeared Individuals
Today, Tuesday, April 19, 2022, "SAM" Organization for Rights and Liberties issued a new report containing messages from the children and wives of detainees on the occasion of the blessed month of Ramadan.
SAM said that the aim of this report was to reveal the scale of psychological suffering and the increasing pain experienced by children and families, especially on special occasions such as Ramadan, due to the crime of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance.
The organization says in the introduction to the report that it: “Yearnings in letters sent by the families of the detainees are0 published in this report. Bone-chilling calls written in pain and tears.. Memories of what was once a festival of joy and happiness faded since the day many were detained and disappeared from their children and spouses.”
"SAM" calls on the parties to the conflict to fulfill their promises to release the detainees and return them to their families, so that a chapter of the suffering of some families, who have suffered for more than six years, can be ended.
https://samrl.org/l.php?l=e,10,A,c,1,76,79,4417,html
Report in full: https://samrl.org/pdf/en/TomyarrestedfatherEN.pdf
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Photo: Eid Mubarak Abdulrahman & my other forcibly disappeared friends. Taken but never forgotten. They depend on us fighting for them so not to become just another mural on a long wall in #Yemen. No sustainable peace or a stable democracy without freedom, justice and accountability.
https://twitter.com/omeisy/status/1521056556313460736
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
(* B H)
Number of Cholera Cases in Yemen Closes in on Half a Million
The World Health Organisation (WHO) has revealed that the number of cholera cases recorded in Yemen, since the 27th of April, is almost half a million.
According to the official WHO Twitter account, 496,000 suspected cholera cases have been recorded in Yemen, with 1,966 deaths.
The organisation went on to add that these cases had been recorded over a total of 22 different provinces across the country.
https://www.atheer.om/en/38984/number-cholera-cases-yemen-closes-half-million/
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Circulating vaccine derived polio virus type 1 outbreak, Saadah governorate, Yemen, 2020
From January to December 2020, a total of 114 cases of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) were reported from 87% (13/15) districts, and cVDPV1 was confirmed among 26% (30) AFP cases. 75% (21) were < 5 years, 73% (20) had zero doses of Oral Polio Vaccine (OPV). The first confirmed case (3%) was from Saadah city, with paralysis onset at the end of January 2020 followed by 5 cases (17%) in March from another four districts, 8 cases (27%) in April, and 13 (43%) up to December 2020 were from the same five districts in addition to 3 (10%) form three new districts. The lab confirmation was received after an average of 126 days (71–196) from sample collection. The isolates differ from the Sabin 1 type by 17- 30 VP1 nucleotides (nt) and were linked to VDPV1 with 13 (nt) divergence that isolated in July 2020 from stool specimens collected before one year from contacts of an inadequate AFP case reported from Sahar district.
The new emerging VDPV1 was retrospectively confirmed after one year of sample collection from Sahar district. Delayed lab confirmation, as well as the response and low immunization profile of children against polio, were the main predisposing factors for cVDPV1 outbreak. This outbreak highlights the need to maintain regular biweekly shipments to referral polio labs in the short-term, and the exploration of other options in the longer-term to enable the Yemen National Lab to fully process national samples itself.
https://bmcinfectdis.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12879-022-07397-0
(B H)
Zahl der Masern-Infektionen zu Jahresanfang um 80 Prozent angestiegen
Eine Ursache seien durch die Corona-Pandemie unterbrochene Impfkampagnen. Fehlende Impfungen bedrohten das Leben von Millionen von Kindern, warnten die UN-Organisationen.
In den ersten zwei Monaten dieses Jahres wurden demnach weltweit mehr als 17.300 Masernfälle registriert, deutlich mehr als die 9600 Fälle in den gleichen Monaten des Vorjahres.
Besonders stark von Masern betroffen waren in den vergangenen zwölf Monaten Somalia, der Jemen, Afghanistan, Nigeria und Äthiopien.
cp2 Allgemein / General
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Interactive Map of Yemen War
(A H)
Film: The face of Aden, Yemen
The streets of Aden, Yemen during Ramadan (Eid al-fitr)
Here we take you through the streets of Aden, Yemen. During Ramadan or Eid al-fitr, the streets come alive.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o5Wb1kTCYgk
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Truce unlikely to end Yemen war
Saudi Arabia is looking for a way to end the disastrous, protracted war it has been fighting in Yemen for the last seven years. A surge in fighting has given way to an uneasy two-month truce (from 1 April) brokered by the United Nations. [Overview]
https://www.workersliberty.org/story/2022-05-03/truce-unlikely-end-yemen-war
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Yemen's Dilemma of Forces and the Design of Many Security-Political Scenarios
One of the security issues in the Middle East in this respect is the Yemen crisis, which may expand the security of the crisis to other regions. Thus, as an aggressive player and regional authority, the Islamic Republic of Iran has tried to pursue a protection and defense approach to the nation-to-state of Yemen in order to preserve its internal stability from the eruption of the crisis in Yemen. The aim of the debate on the Islamic Republic of Iran's activities was therefore on topics such as attempts to sustain the axis of resistance, to retain its theological and regional power, as well as Yemen's geopolitical stability. At the same time, the key premise of the present analysis is that, on the basis of which foreign policy strategy can be evaluated, the positions of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the crisis in Yemen? The following theory is put forward in order to provide a reasonable answer to this question: the Islamic Republic of Iran has taken a security approach to this situation, recognising Yemen's strategic role in regional equations and strengthening its security factor in the region.
https://zenodo.org/record/6511174#.YnC4ctpByUk
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Roundtable: The Age of Armed Groups
Nadwa Al-Dawsari: In many international contexts, it’s crucial to keep in mind that the dominant perspective on armed groups is that of Western organizations. Yemen provides an instructive example of Western interpretative frames on armed groups and the issue of conflict. The vast majority of research on Yemen’s war—including in-depth studies—fails to take into account the perspectives of non-hegemonic factors in armed group proliferation. In other words, Western analysis focuses primarily on the factors with which it is already familiar—mainly the small number of governments on whose actions it always tends to focus. In conversations about ending the conflict, the failure to step outside a Western framework of definitional consideration is striking. It directly impacts the possibilities for conflict resolution. The case of Yemen stands as a reminder that, in examination of global armed group dynamics, we cannot afford to take definitional criteria for granted.
We also face a methodological challenge when we try to assess the extent of foreign influence or support for militias in different contexts. It is difficult to gauge the comparative successes or failures of foreign influence campaigns. But the role of particular typologies of influence can be useful to compare across regions. Compare what Iran has done with the Houthis versus what the Saudis and Emiratis have done with their proxies in Yemen. They’re all proxies, in some sort of manner, because they’re dependent. However, the mode of Iran’s support for the Houthis has been very effective.
Fluidity of group roles vis-à-vis local constituencies over time is a critical factor in assessing the behavior of armed groups. In the case of Yemen, a broad range of nonstate actors exist, and the boundaries that define roles shift over time. In some cases, armed groups may function as an extension of the state. In other cases, armed groups that operate as proxies may function as if they are the state, as their funders request. However, should a legitimate state come into power, the same groups might well become absorbed into the apparatus of official governance.
The circumstances of foreign conflict can also open up opportunities for outside intervention, in keeping with other states’ geopolitical objectives. For example, the Emirates oppose the Yemeni government, and likely created proxy groups to eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood in opposition to the Emirati state. The Emirates benefits from a policy of controlled chaos as a way to prevent the emergence of a strong Yemeni state with a unified chain of command.
https://tcf.org/content/report/roundtable-the-age-of-armed-groups/
and
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How Much Control Do International Sponsors Have Over Militias?
What can we learn about militias in general from a close examination of patron–client relationships in some of the deeply studied cases in the Middle East?
Nadwa Al-Dawsari: Reports on armed groups in Yemen are often simplistic. All the groups are presented as proxies of regional actors. In some cases, it is assumed that they fight for money. While there is some truth to these ideas, the reality is much more complicated. All armed groups in Yemen have agency, and it is incorrect to assume they are mere proxies who are controlled by outside actors.
The Houthis have emerged as the most solid armed group, particularly in terms of discipline, military strategy, and messaging. The groups that are backed by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are fragmented. Iran’s approach with the Houthis has proven to be more effective and successful than that of the Saudis or Emiratis. But it is also important to recognize that the Houthis’ success is the result of decades of slow and consistent investment in them by Iran. Commanders from Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and advisers from Hezbollah are on the ground helping the Houthis with military strategizing and offensive operations. Iran has provided the Houthis with weapons manufacturing technology and ballistic missiles. Additionally, the Houthis have inherited state structures and large amounts of weapons they took from the Yemeni government military in 2014, including those provided by the United States to Saleh.
On the other hand, the Saudi- and Emirati-backed forces are almost completely reliant on their sponsors’ support. They don’t have sophisticated weapons like the Houthis do. The Saudi-led coalition relies mainly on airstrikes
The Houthis are not Iran’s puppets—Iran does not control the Houthis, as some political actors and analysts perceive. While the relationship is solid and both share a political and religious ideology and are committed to fulfilling Iran’s expansionist agenda, the Houthis have a level of autonomy from Iran that none of the Saudi- and Emirati-backed forces have. The Saudi-led coalition does not have a clear vision or strategy in Yemen, and that is why its military operations have almost always been reactive, especially over the past three years. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates have divergent agendas that manifest themselves in internal divisions and even conflict between the armed groups they support. The Emirates’ main goal has been to undermine Islah, the Yemeni Islamist party that is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Iran treated the Houthis as allies and empowered them, while the Saudi-led coalition treated its allies as subordinates and, as a result, disempowered them. There is a sense of fatigue among anti-Houthi forces because of the lack of consistency in the coalition’s support. A recurring pattern is that the coalition provides support for a military offensive against the Houthis and, as Houthi forces collapse, the coalition stops the support, leaving the forces they backed exposed and vulnerable.
The Saudi-led coalition has control over the forces they back because they are the only source of support for these groups. In other words, it is not a partnership. This arrangement is hardly sustainable or effective.
It would be naive to think that any outside force can fully control armed groups. They might have temporary control when interests align. But the conflict in Yemen is very fluid and, historically, alliances shift. My concern with the armed groups is that, in time, they will be too fragmented. Then, you will have a country run by many armed groups competing and fighting each other—further localizing the conflict.
https://tcf.org/content/commentary/much-control-international-sponsors-militias/
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Yemen - FSO Safer: Overview impact assessment, 26 April 2022
THE RISK FROM FSO SAFER
FSO Safer is a vessel that was used to store and export oil from Yemen’s inland oil fields around Marib. In 2015, the vessel fell under the control of the DFA. It has since been neglected.
The coastlines of Yemen’s Red Sea and of neighbouring countries are at risk of an environmental disaster that could happen any day with substantial humanitarian and economic impacts. With the passage of time, the possibility increases of an immense oil leakage from or an explosion of the FSO Safer, which is anchored in the Red Sea 60km north of Al Hodeidah port. If disaster strikes, the vessel could release four times the amount of crude oil spilled in the Exxon Valdez catastrophe of 1989, which majorly affected the environment, people, and their livelihoods in surrounding areas (UNEP 16/07/2020).
The lack of maintenance of the FSO Safer – with its estimated cargo of 1.148 million barrels of Marib light crude oil – makes two scenarios increasingly likely:
Oil spill: corrosion and a lack of maintenance of the vessel for an extended period could lead to some of the oil leaking into the sea. Any leak in the engine room and water uncontrollably flowing in could destabilise and potentially sink the entire structure, likely causing a severe oil spill (Green Bee Insights 06/06/2021).
An explosion and fire on board the unit: this scenario could result from the accidental ignition of gas that has accumulated in cargo tanks and consecutive leakage of most or all of the oil into the sea (UNEP 16/07/2020).
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-fso-safer-overview-impact-assessment-26-april-2022
and in full: https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20220428_acaps_yemen_fso_safer_impact_assessment_0.pdf
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Ukraine-Krieg verschärft die Lage
Der bisherige katholische "Arabien-Bischof" Paul Hinder hat davor gewarnt, dass der Krieg in der Ukraine die humanitäre Krise und den Hunger im Jemen verschärfen könnte. In dem südarabischen Kriegsland leiden Millionen Menschen.
Das betonte Hinder in einem Interview des Nachrichtenportals Vaticannews (Montag). Ein "andauernder Krieg in der Ukraine" gefährde die Produktion weltweit, so der Bischof mit Blick auf die Versorgung der Notleidenden. Hinder warnte zudem vor einem Profitstreben bei Waffenlieferungen, die den Krieg verlängerten.
https://www.domradio.de/artikel/bischof-hinder-warnt-vor-hungerkrise-im-jemen
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Hinder über Jemen: „30 Millionen Menschen leiden an Notlage“
In einem ausführlichen Interview mit Radio Vatikan hat der bisherige Arabien-Bischof Paul Hinder davor gewarnt, dass der Krieg in der Ukraine die schwere humanitäre Krise und den Hunger im Jemen verschärfen könnte.
Bischof Paul Hinder warnt im Gespräch mit uns davor, von Waffenproduktion zu profitieren und erinnert daran, dass ein „andauernder Krieg in der Ukraine die gesamte Produktion“ weltweit gefährden kann. Der Schweizer Bischof war mehr als ein Jahrzehnt lang als Apostolischer Vikar für Südarabien tätig. Er sagt, dass die humanitäre Notlage im Jemen 30 Millionen Menschen leiden lässt. Der Kapuziner, der in den vergangenen Monaten auch Apostolischer Administrator von Nordarabien war, ist überzeugt, dass Profit aus der Waffenproduktion das Feuer weiter anfacht. Außerdem beklagt er, dass der Krieg im Jemen oft in Vergessenheit gerät, weil andere Konflikte den Herzen vieler Menschen und auch den Medien näher seien:
„Ich denke, das hat zum Teil mit der Häufung von Informationen im weiteren Sinne zu tun. Manche Menschen sind es einfach leid, immer die gleichen Nachrichten zu hören.
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Bishop Hinder: ‘Situation for 30 million in Yemen is critical’
In a wide-ranging interview with Vatican News, Bishop Paul Hinder, who until Sunday served as Apostolic Vicar of Southern Arabia, warns that the war in Ukraine may compound the grave humanitarian crisis and famine in Yemen, while cautioning against profiting from arms’ production.
Bishop Paul Hinder: Nobody knows exactly what the real situation is in the country. There is reliable information only about some parts whereas the situation remains critical for the major part of the population regarding health, food and the hundreds of thousands, if not millions of internally displaced people. I hope the present truce will be the beginning of serious negotiations. I get the impression that the parties are a bit tired of the war and have come to the insight that the war cannot be won on the battlefield. Even the ongoing negotiations do not immediately resolve the critical issues of healthcare and nourishment. In addition, there remains to be considered how to reconcile the different factions within the country. There are also pockets which could at any time resume opening fire.
Q: Many interests are fuelling this war. The international community is silent about Yemen. The Pope has made appeals. Why isn't it in the media? Why is it being forgotten by the world? From an international perspective, what can be done other than providing humanitarian aid?
I think this has partly to do with the inflation of information in a broader sense. Certain people are simply tired of hearing the same news always. At the international level, Yemen has been discussed within the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, but relatively little has happened. Even the UN Special Mission has done its best, but at the very end, there was little result. Who is ultimately responsible is very difficult to say. Of course, there are different parties involved in the conflict: there is Saudi Arabia with its allies. There's Iran
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Motion Graphics:| The [Aden gov.] National Committee @NCIAVHR_Yemen documented during April 2022 violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in #Yemen.
https://twitter.com/abduhothifi/status/1520565091220996096
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Jemen hofft auf Fortsetzung der Feuerpause
Der Ramadan brachte dem Jemen eine stabile Waffenruhe, Hilfsorganisationen konnten mehr Menschen mit Nahrungsmitteln erreichen. Nun geht der Fastenmonat zu Ende - und das Land hofft auf eine Fortsetzung der Feuerpause.
Hilfsorganisationen melden: Seit Beginn der Waffenruhe im Jemen vor rund einem Monat konnten wieder deutlich mehr Menschen mit Hilfsgütern erreicht werden als während der Kämpfe. Zwei Drittel der Bevölkerung sind von internationaler Hilfe abhängig, immer noch verhungern täglich Kinder oder bleiben für ihr Leben lang behindert - als Folge von Unterernährung. Die Vereinten Nationen bezeichnen die Krise im Jemen als größte humanitäre Katastrophe weltweit.
Die Waffenruhe sei ein echter Hoffnungsschimmer, sagt Richard Ragan vom UN-Welternährungsprogramm: "Wir hatten vor Beginn der Waffenruhe eine sehr schwierige Situation. Jetzt sind wir voller Hoffnung, dass die Waffenruhe vielleicht sogar verlängert wird. Das ist eine der größten Chancen für das Land seit Jahren."
Endlich erreichten Hilfsorganisationen die Menschen wieder: "Wir sind hier jetzt im achten Bürgerkriegsjahr und allein unser Welternährungsprogamm ist für 15 Millionen Menschen ausgelegt - das ist die Hälfte der Bevölkerung. Sie alle leben buchstäblich von der Hand in den Mund. Wir erleben hier eine der größten Hilfsaktionen, die das Welternährungsprogramm jemals hatte.“
Die große Hoffnung ist jetzt, dass die Waffenruhe auch nach Ende des Fastenmonats Ramadan weiter hält - und möglicherweise sogar verlängert wird. "Aber wir dürfen die Herausforderungen nicht aus dem Blick verlieren", sagt der UN-Sondergesandte für den Jemen, Hans Grundberg. "Wir sind von der Zustimmung der Kriegsparteien abhängig, was eine weitere Durchsetzung der Waffenruhe betrifft. Positiver Dialog ist der Schlüssel in diesem Bereich."
https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/asien/jemen-waffenruhe-ramadan-101.html
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Krieg in Europa – vom Globalen Süden her gedacht
In der öffentlichen Kommunikation erscheint er als große Ausnahme: ein großer Krieg in Europa, erstmals seit 1945. Angesichts der Kriege um die Auflösung Jugoslawiens während der 1990er Jahre (einschließlich des NATO-Bombardements und der ersten deutschen Kriegsbeteiligung seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg unter einer rot-grünen Regierung) und des fortwährenden Kriegs der Türkei gegen die kurdische Bevölkerung ist dies nicht ganz zutreffend. Dennoch verweist die jetzt viel berufene „Zeitenwende“ auf die Notwendigkeit und Herausforderung, das globale Gewaltregime neu zu reflektieren.
Offensichtlich sind Kriege in anderen Weltregionen als im größten Teil Europas, in Nordamerika, in Ostasien und Ozeanien während der vergangenen Jahrzehnte in viel stärkerem Maße Normalität gewesen, als dies im öffentlichen Bewusstsein zumal in Deutschland ernsthaft wahrgenommen wurde. Oder sie wurden zwar wahrgenommen, aber ein Krieg im vermeintlich zivilisierten Europa wird gänzlich anders bewertet: eben nicht als Normalität, sondern als „Zeitenwende“. Ein Ausdruck dieses Umstandes ist aktuell das anhaltende, deutliche Ungleichgewicht zwischen der Wahrnehmung der Schrecken des Krieges in der Ukraine einerseits, im Jemen andererseits. Die Lieferung auch deutscher Waffen an Parteien in diesem Krieg, zumal an Saudi-Arabien oder auch Ägypten unterstreicht dies.
Ein weiterer besorgniserregender Aspekt ist das offene racial profiling durch ukrainische, polnische und deutsche Behörden im Umgang mit Kriegsflüchtlingen aus der Ukraine. Dass Menschen die Flucht aus einem Kriegsgebiet entlang rassistischer Einteilungen ermöglicht, erschwert oder verunmöglicht wird, verursacht mehr als einen bitteren Beigeschmack in der derzeit viel beschworenen Solidarität in Europa. Die Ungleichheit, mit der Geflüchtete konfrontiert werden, zeigt sich am anhaltenden mörderischen Regime im Mittelmeer und sinnbildlich an der Willkommenskultur gegenüber weißen Ukrainer*innen in Polen einerseits, der im Bau befindlichen Mauer an der Grenze Polens zu Belarus andererseits.
Neben der Beschreibung der Zusammenhänge und dem Bemühen, sie zu systematisieren und zu verstehen, stellt uns der Umschlag in der öffentlichen Diskussion in Deutschland hin zu einer positiven Besetzung der Militarisierung von Politik, kommuniziert als „Zeitenwende,“ auch vor die Notwendigkeit grundlegender Überlegungen zu Krieg und Frieden.
Die katastrophale Zuspitzung im Osten Europas stellt gewiss diese Debatten auf den Prüfstand, diese können jedoch auch umgekehrt zu einer Einordnung helfen, die eurozentrisches Denken konterkariert, also auch fragt, was so anders ist an dieser jetzt in Europa virulenten Situation gegenüber den andauernden Kriegen im Globalen Süden. Die viel unmittelbarere Gefahr eines alle vernichtenden Atomkrieges ist zweifellos ein eklatanter und bedenkenswerter Unterschied gegenüber den zahlreichen „Stellvertreterkriegen“ der Vergangenheit.
https://www.hsozkult.de/event/id/event-117609
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Can Yemen’s Fragile Ceasefire Hold?
The problem for the Saudis is that neither Hadi nor the PLC has ever had any meaningful base of support inside Yemen. All of the Saudi-supported “leaders” are little more than puppets. And most Yemenis do not want to be ruled by foreign puppets—especially when the puppeteers have killed more than 375,000 Yemenis in their war of terror against the civilian population.
Will the Saudis and their new figurehead, PLC chairman Rashid al-Alimi, abide by the terms of the two-month ceasefire and let it blossom into permanent peace? Alas, it seems the answer is no. Though the UN-brokered truce is supposed to end the Saudi blockade of Yemen, the Saudis have continued to block ships from entering Hodeidah and to obstruct flights to and from Sanaa Airport.
If the Saudis continue to flout their commitments under the two-month truce, which expires at the end of May, and the war flares up again, they are unlikely to turn things around on the battlefield.
So why have the Gulf despots and their western backers been reluctant to admit defeat? One reason is Yemen’s immense strategic significance. It dominates the Bab al-Mandab strait controlling access to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean, and shares a 1300-km border with key oil producer Saudi Arabia.
Another, less-obvious reason is that Ansarullah is not just a local liberation movement. Their slogan “Death to America. Death to Israel. Curse on the zionists. Victory for Islam” exemplifies the Yemeni commitment to think globally while acting locally.
Obviously, the Saudis and Emiratis would be well-advised to cut their losses and withdraw.
The current two-month truce would be a good time for the Gulf oil sheikhs to reassess their position and start coming to terms with an impending post-American Muslim East. The sheikhs should be working towards establishing cordial relations with their more independent neighbors, including Ansarullah-led Yemen. The best way to do that would be to comply with the truce’s provisions and completely end the blockade, renounce the war, apologize for past war crimes, and atone by providing humanitarian aid.
By charting such a course, the Gulf sheikhs might survive in an ever-more-independent region. If they continue to fight the imperialists’ wars even as those imperialists withdraw, the Arab oil royals will be digging their own graves.
https://www.icit-digital.org/articles/can-yemen-s-fragile-ceasefire-hold
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Will the ceasefire in Yemen hold?
The new ceasefire is giving hope for peace in Yemen. But this is extremely fragile – and the war in Ukraine is making the already catastrophic humanitarian situation even more difficult.
https://www.nationalturk.com/en/will-the-ceasefire-in-yemen-hold/
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Audio: Don’t Forget Yemen
The war in Yemen has entered its eighth year. Earlier this month, a two-month truce was declared. What does this mean for the Yemeni people? What is the role of the U.S. in this ongoing crisis?
Today, we return our attention to the situation in Yemen with Kawthar Abdullah from the Yemeni Alliance Committee and Fatima Abo Alsrar from the Middle East Institute.
https://www.wortfm.org/war-in-yemen-2022/
My remark: Obviuously quite biased.
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Audio: A spark of light in the dark: Yemen's Civil War spies a chance for peace
This week on The New Arab Voice, we examine the recent developments in the war in Yemen.
We explore if these two events could pave the way for peace in Yemen. Can the internationally recognised government form a unified military front? Are the Houthis using the pause to regroup and prepare for another offensive? Why do Saudi Arabia and the UAE want to exit the conflict? And, if a peace settlement can be reached, will the desperate population be provided with much needed aid.
Featuring interviews with Abdulghani Al-Iryani (@AbdulGhani1959), a senior researcher at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies (@SanaaCenter).
https://english.alaraby.co.uk/analysis/spark-light-dark
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In Yemen’s Taiz, hope and disappointment one month into ceasefire
‘I feel like the war has pushed us back centuries.’
This month, for the first time ever, I have been able to leave my house for work without worrying if I will ever see my son again.
Yemen has been devastated by seven years of war. As an aid worker who lives and works in Taiz, a mostly besieged city in the southwest of Yemen, I’ve become used to death and fear. My son, now three years old, was born into this conflict; he has never known anything other than the constant sounds of shelling.
So you can imagine the relief and hope I felt when a two-month truce was announced, starting in April with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
We truly need this break. The humanitarian situation here in Taiz is horrific; it’s even worse than what you see in the news.
While other parts of the country have had some occasional relief from the violence and daily hardships the war has caused, here in Taiz we have seen almost continuous indiscriminate bombing.
To add to that, around two million people live in parts of Taiz encircled by the warring parties, with Houthi rebels (officially called Ansar Allah) controlling most of the city from the north, and various forces allied with Yemen’s government in the rest.
As a result, the province’s main roads are almost impassable, leading to critical shortages of food and medicine. It’s so hard to get in – and out – that the prices of basics like milk and bread have shot up over the past few years. At the same time, our money is worth less.
A month in, the truce has changed some things. In other parts of Yemen, there has been less fighting and more access for aid groups. But in Taiz, it has mostly been disappointing.
There are still clashes here and, while the shelling has mostly stopped, some bombs continue to hit residential neighbourhoods. And the part of the ceasefire people in Taiz are all hoping and praying for is the one element of the agreement between warring parties you don’t hear about (maybe because previous attempts to even talk about this part of the conflict have failed before): planned negotiations to open our roads, and end the siege.
Closed roads and darkness
The war has destroyed hospitals, schools, and entire neighbourhoods. The hospitals that do remain open are overwhelmed. Patients who need urgent care must be sent elsewhere.
That on its own can be a death sentence. Before the war, it only took 10 minutes to drive to the eastern part of Taiz and get on the way to the southern city of Aden, which has functioning hospitals. Now it takes six hours on dangerous, narrow mountain paths. Road accidents are common.
Many patients are sent north to Sana’a, a journey that used to take five hours and now takes 15. I’ve had to make this trip twice. The first was when my son was only one. He is autistic, but I didn’t know that then. I just knew he wasn’t interacting with me, and we had to take our chances on the winding roads.
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2022/04/28/Yemen-Taiz-ceasefire
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War-weary Yemenis aspire for peace
As April 29 marks the World Wish Day, many Yemenis say their main wish is to see peace restored to Yemen
Bekil El-Dulai, a chief financial officer, said the life of Yemenis will greatly improve if peace and security are restored to the country.
“With an established peace in the country, the war will eventually end, prices will fall, and there will be more opportunities for work, investment, freedom and a decent life for everyone,” he said.
Mohammed El-Ghouly, a university student, opines that restoring state institutions is vital to bring stability to Yemen.
“Without effective governmental institutions, the country may turn into a militia state,” he said.
“Strong state institutions would pave the way for a permanent ceasefire and lasting peace, and eliminating the humanitarian crisis that killed many Yemenis for years,” he added.
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/war-weary-yemenis-aspire-for-peace/2575964
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The Joint Forces Command of the Coalition: A Saudi Humanitarian Initiative Will Release (163) Houthi Detainees Who Had Been Involved in Hostilities Against the Kingdom
A statement by the Official Spokesperson of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen Brigadier General Turki Al-Malki
“The Joint Forces Command of the Coalition will release (163) Houthi detainees who had participated in hostilities against the Kingdom as a humanitarian initiative in extension to previous ones, and support of all the endeavors and efforts to bring about peace and end the Yemeni conflict, in addition to supporting UN efforts to stabilize the current ceasefire, and create conducive efforts for dialogue between Yemeni parties. Additionally, this humanitarian initiative aims to aid in ending the PoW, Detainee and Martyr case in accordance to Islamic principles, inherent Arab values as well as the International Humanitarian Law in the third Geneva Convention provisions that were stalled ever since 2018 in the Stockholm Agreement.
The Joint Forces Command of the Coalition has begun the process of releasing the (163) detainees in coordination with the ICRC in order for them to be transported the Yemeni Capital Sana’a.
https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2349609
and media report with some background: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/28/yemen-saudi-arabia-to-release-163-houthi-prisoners
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CODING RELIGIOUS REPRESSION AND DISORDER: OUTCOMES AND CRITICAL REFLECTIONS FROM THE ACLED-RELIGION PILOT PROJECT
Between January 2021 and March 2022, the ACLED-Religion pilot project collected and published real-time data on religious repression and disorder in seven countries in the Middle East and North Africa: Iraq, Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Yemen, Bahrain, and Iran. ACLED-Religion also published historical back-coding data for 2020.
Between January 2020 and March 2022, ACLED-Religion records over 6,800 religious disorder events, mostly concentrated in four countries: Iraq (3,228 events, 47%), Palestine (1,363 events, 20%), Yemen (1,134 events, 17%), and Egypt (737 events, 11%) (see graph below). In each of these countries, the acts of a few religion-based actors drove the most significant religious disorder trends: in Iraq and Egypt, the vast majority of disorder events involved interactions between government forces and the Islamic State; in Palestine, most events involved Israeli settlers and Palestinian rioters; and, in Yemen, most disorder events involved Islah and Houthi forces targeting civilians.
In Yemen, ACLED-Religion records over 1,100 repression events (14% of total events) between January 2020 and March 2022, 90% of which occurred in Houthi-controlled areas. Houthi repression mainly involved imposition events and the suppression of religious belief and practice for sectarian reasons. Houthi forces suppressed Sunni-leaning rituals, particularly during Ramadan 2021. Later that year, they targeted Salafi mosques and proselytizing movements. Imposition events included moral policing, imposition of Houthi ideology on the religious and educational sectors, and exaction of religious taxes. Non-Muslim religious minorities, which make up less than 1% of the population in Yemen, were disproportionately targeted by the Houthis (for more on this topic, see this ACLED-Religion infographic). In Hadi and Southern Transitional Council (STC)-controlled areas, ACLED-Religion captures pandemic-related suppression of religious practice in 2020, and continuous suppression of alcohol consumption and production throughout the whole period of the pilot project.
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A Typical Day during Ramadan in Yemen
Similar to other families, there is fasting, eating the traditional Yemeni food, reading the Quran and spending treasured time together with the family and friends.
Enjoy this photo storytelling article and spend some time with this family in Yemen.
https://www.wildcat.arizona.edu/article/2022/04/aljisr-ramadan-yemen
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Former Hadi government minister: Saudi Arabia seeks to divide Yemen
A former minister in the Saudi-backed exiled Hadi government said that Saudi Arabia has started working on its plan to divide Yemen through the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council, under the cover of its presence in the Riyadh Presidential Council.
“Saudi Arabia, having turned against Hadi and established an unconstitutional presidential council of militia leaders, and through the statements of its ambassador Mohammed al-Jaber has officially also abandoned commitment to stand with the unity of Yemen,” former minister al-Jabwani said in a tweet.
“Al-Jaber’s statements that secession is a Yemeni option reflects Saudi Arabia’s new policy,” he added. “This is a green light to start the partition scheme.”
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Britannica: Transfer of power to Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi
https://www.britannica.com/place/Yemen/Humanitarian-crisis
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Remembering the 1994 Yemeni Civil War
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI Yemen was divided with the north and south forming separate countries
On 22 May 1990 the unification of Yemen took place with a merger between the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). This happened after years of internal conflict.
The union ended more than 150 years of separation for the Yemeni people, whose land had once been divided between the British and the Ottoman Empires in the mid-19th century. After the Ottomans left at the end of the First World War in 1918, North Yemen gained independence and was ruled by Zaydi imams until the 1962 army-led coup led to a republic.
Political rivalry between Saleh and Beidh revolved around their unwillingness to commit fully to power-sharing. Each man saw himself as the more formidable and capable leader of a united land. There were also underlying southern grievances about economic and political marginalisation by the government based in Sanaa in the north.
The situation deteriorated with a series of tit-for-tat assassinations targeting politicians, which also prompted Beidh to step down and relocate to the former southern capital of Aden from where he challenged the north. Attempts to salvage the political unity and stability of the country included talks that resulted in the signing of an accord in Jordan on 20 February 1994. However, this was unable to prevent the outbreak of civil war a matter of weeks later.
The northern and southern armies had not been integrated fully. They fought sporadic skirmishes in the same week that the accord was signed, and again in early spring. However, full-scale civil war broke out on 4 May. The next day, as the fighting escalated, Saleh's forces crossed the demarcation line in pursuit of the southern army heading for Aden.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220504-remembering-the-1994-yemeni-civil-war/
cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade
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YGC: aggression continues to seize domestic gas vessel
The Yemen Gas Company confirmed on Tuesday that the US-Saudi aggression continued to detain the ship (Eugenia) that carrying more than eight thousand and 258 tons of domestic gas on board.
YGC official spokesman, Ali Messar said that the aggression has detained the ship since last April 27, ignoring the announced truce and the United Nations entry permit to the port of Hodeida.
Messar pointed out that the continued detention of the gas ship will lead to supply bottlenecks.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3185571.htm
https://en.ypagency.net/260010/
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The first month of the humanitarian #truce in #Yemen announced by the United Nations has ended, and Sana'a International Airport is still closed to all Yemenis. What is the role of the United Nations??
https://twitter.com/GhalebM0nz1i7/status/1520479494594826240
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After being detained for 23 days& incurring delay fines exceeding 305 million riyals,the coalition of aggression released the diesel ambulance "Daytona" in conjunction with its detention of the gas ship "Eugenia Gas" despite its inspection &obtaining UN permits & in clear
https://twitter.com/PeaceForYemen7/status/1520264282016997381
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Houthis say Arab coalition released new oil tanker
The Saudi-led coalition on Thursday released an oil tanker detained since last week, the Houthi-run Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) said in a press release.
The Arab coalition allowed access to 'Imperious' vessel with diesel onboard, the Sana'a-based YPC said on Thursday.
The 30,899 tons of diesel brought by the oil tanker is meant for use by service sectors, according to the release.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-29484.html
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Entesaf Organization For Women And Child Rights Regarding Violations Of The Truce By The Countries Of The Aggression Coalition, Not Allowing The Oil Derivatives To Entering , And Opening Sana’a International Airport
Entesaf Organization for Women and Children’s Rights condemns the continued violations of the aggression coalition’s commitments agreed in the armistice, which provides for allowing entry of oil derivatives and opening Sana’a International Airport.
The coalition of aggression is preventing oil derivatives ships from reaching the port of Hodeidah and detaining them at sea despite obtaining the necessary permits from the United Nations and preventing the opening of the airport and the arrival of civilian flights to and from Sana’a International Airport, as it negatively affected life in all service and vital fields and increased The deteriorating situation of the health sector, which led to the suspension of most of its services as a result of the lack of oil derivatives, and the lives of tens of thousands of patients at risk and threatened with death, especially patients with kidney failure, cancer, heart, intensive care and other critical diseases, who are still waiting for the opening of Sana’a International Airport.
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
Siehe / Look at cp1
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UN Volunteers provide critical healthcare in times of crisis in Yemen
UN Volunteer health professionals have been providing much-needed critical healthcare for UN operations in Yemen in times of crisis. Since 2020, the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme has deployed 60 UN Volunteer doctors, nurses and other medical providers, almost all of whom are nationals, in UN Clinics administered by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in seven locations in Yemen.
National UN Volunteers have been playing a key role in providing healthcare to over 6,000 UN staff and their eligible dependents. They carry out daily walk-in consultations, emergency care, inpatient care, follow up of cases and healthcare promotional activities, with proper guidance from international UN Volunteers and senior medical staff, as stipulated in the UN Clinic Standard Operating Procedures.
In addition, they contribute to health consultations, workshops on universal precautions and COVID-19 awareness activities, in cooperation with relevant governmental health departments. The country-wide deployment of these UN Volunteers was meant to keep up with the needs on the ground, and to facilitate the wide international humanitarian response to the crisis in Yemen.
Humanitarian and relief activities are implemented by international and national staff who, in turn, rely on a robust healthcare system to keep them well in the field. Thus, the deployment of UN Volunteer medical workers enables the work of many others. — Abdullah Al Duraibi, UNV Country Coordinator in Yemen.
https://yemen.un.org/en/180212-un-volunteers-provide-critical-healthcare-times-crisis-yemen
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Audio: Building Bridges: Eight years into the Yemen conflict
After being a part of "Al Jisr – The Bridge" collaborative project for the last half year, Jelena Lukic interviewed two students and a mother of two about the difficult living conditions in Yemen over the last eight years. Here are their accounts.
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Yemen Emergency Dashboard, March 2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-emergency-dashboard-march-2022
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Film (nur mit Anmeldung): Jemen: «Ich bin viel mehr als das, was mir passiert ist.» Ahmed, 11 Jahre
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IS THERE A HUMANITARIAN WAR ON YEMEN NEXT TO THE MILITARY WAR?… THE HUMANITARIAN ACTION GROUP FOR YEMEN IS EXAMPLE
There is no doubt that there is great difficulty in delivering humanitarian needs to the Yemeni people, especially food and medical supplies, which made Yemen a country in which famines and epidemics spread, especially cholera, until the Yemeni situation reached the description of the worst humanitarian disaster on the planet, according to the United Nations description of the Yemeni situation for several For years, however, we have not seen a serious move by the Security Council or the international community to change this unfortunate situation.
There are many humanitarian attempts to mitigate the effects of the war on the Yemeni people, as well as many initiatives issued by international figures and international organizations, but they did not succeed in saving the Yemeni people from the clutches of hunger and epidemics, and among these attempts is the Humanitarian Action Group for Yemen, which was launched by international law expert Mahmoud Refaat in 2019 .
The group aims to work with international organizations and the international humanitarian community organizations to deliver food and medicine to the Yemeni people, but this group has not yet succeeded in achieving its goals, due to the intransigence of the warring states in Yemen, which have become clear that they are using civilians as a single weapon, tools of war, by starving them, besieging them and preventing them from medicine as well as medical equipment, i.e. in short, basic humanitarian needs.
The failure of the Humanitarian Action Group for Yemen is a blatant example of violating international law and at the same time a model of disinterest in the lives of millions of civilians who suffer from famine and epidemics due to the war imposed on Yemen.
Here comes the question about the legal responsibility and before it the moral responsibility for the use of civilians as a weapon in wars. The most important question remains, who is the party that can achieve justice and stop violations against civilians?
The logical answer to this question may be the Security Council as well as the International Criminal Court, but the practical application over the course of 7 years and more clearly showed the silence of the concerned international organizations, deliberately, and their abandonment of their moral and humanitarian role, in addition to their breach of their legal duty and responsibilities for which it was established.
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WFP Yemen Situation Report #3, March 2022
WFP data show that inadequate food consumption increased significantly in Yemen in March, reaching the highest level seen since February 2018. Food prices also increased notably, with the cost of the minimum food basket reaching an all-time high in March.
The fuel crisis worsened in March, severely delaying deliveries of WFP food and nutrition commodities.
Yemen’s warring parties in late March announced the temporary cessation of hostilities. On 01 April, UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg announced that the parties had agreed to a two-month truce.
SITUATION UPDATE
Food Security Situation:
According to the latest WFP Food Security Update, the nationwide prevalence of inadequate food consumption increased significantly in March 2022, reaching the highest levels seen since February 2018: Half of all surveyed Yemeni households (50 percent) reported inadequate food consumption in March, an increase of six percentage points from February, and above the “very high” threshold of 40 percent.
In areas under the Sana’a-based authorities the percentage of the population reporting inadequate food consumption reached 50 percent in March, (up from 43 percent in February). In areas under the internationally recognized Government of Yemen (IRG), the percentage reached 49 percent (up from 47 percent in February).
Food prices also increased significantly in March: Food affordability, as measured by the average cost of the minimum food basket, worsened overall, reaching an all-time high in March 2022.
Fuel Situation:
The ongoing fuel crisis continued to worsen across the country in March, significantly impacting WFP operations. While the fuel shortages are most acute in areas under the Sana’a-based authorities, fuel shortages are also being reported from areas under the IRG.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/wfp-yemen-situation-report-3-march-2022
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UNICEF Ma’rib Response Humanitarian Action Update, March 2022, Issue Number 4
Key Achievements
WASH 88,942 people accessed safe water for drinking, cooking and personal hygiene. 120,348 people reached with critical water, sanitation and hygiene supplies and services and also reached with messages on appropriate hygiene practices.
Health
375,616 children under 10 years vaccinated against polio. 3,750 people vaccinated against COVID-19. 8,837 children vaccinated against measles. 29,133 children and women accessed primary health care in UNICEF-supported facilities.
Nutrition
1,151 children under 5 with Severe and Moderate Acute Malnutrition accessed curative services.
Child Protection
13,783 vulnerable children provided with critical child protection services.
Education
1,290 children accessed formal education, including early learning.
Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) 71,372 vulnerable displaced people received RRM Kits containing food, family basic hygiene kits and female dignity kits.
Situation Update
Between 1 January and 26 March 2022, a total of 5,640 people [940 Households (HHs)] have been displaced within or to Ma’rib governorate due to activ
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No 566
“Die Verschärfung der humanitären Krise im Jemen ist eine Realität, die wir dringend angehen müssen, sagte David Gressly, der humanitäre Koordinator für den Jemen. Die Zahlen in diesem Jahr sind gigantisch. Über 23 Millionen Menschen – oder fast drei Viertel der jemenitischen Bevölkerung – brauchen jetzt Hilfe. Das ist ein Zuwachs von fast drei Millionen Menschen ab 2021. Schon jetzt sind fast 13 Millionen Menschen von akuter Not betroffen. Die Eskalation des Konflikts im vergangenen Jahr führte zu unsäglichem Leid und weiteren Störungen der öffentlichen Dienste, wodurch der humanitäre Bedarf weiter stieg, heißt es in einer Pressemitteilung, die vom Team des UN-Büros für humanitäre Angelegenheiten (OCHA) im Jemen herausgegeben wurde. Eine zusammenbrechende Wirtschaft, ein weiteres Resultat des siebenjährigen Krieges, hat die Anfälligkeit der Ärmsten verschärft, wobei in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahres 2022 eine Rekordzahl von 19 Millionen Menschen voraussichtlich Nahrungsmittelhilfe benötigen wird. Es gibt schätzungsweise 161.000, die dem extremsten Hunger ausgesetzt sind, sagt OCHA. Kinder leiden weiterhin schrecklich, wobei 2,2 Millionen akut unterernährt sind, darunter mehr als eine halbe Million in schwerem Ausmaß. Der eingeschränkte Zugang zu kritischen Diensten verschlechtert weiterhin die Bedingungen der am stärksten gefährdeten Gruppen, darunter Frauen und Kinder.”
https://www.maskenfall.de/?p=14736
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UN humanitarians say $4.3 billion is needed to halt ‘worsening’ Yemen crisis
The UN’s Humanitarian Country Team in Yemen on Saturday, released its Response Plan (HRP) for this year, seeking nearly $4.3 billion to reverse a steady deterioration across the country, the grinding war there continues, despite a current pause in fighting.
The plan targets 17.3 million out of the staggering 23.4 million people in need of lifesaving humanitarian assistance and protection services across the war-ravaged Arab nation, as the first nationwide truce in six years, coinciding with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, continues to broadly hold.
“The worsening humanitarian crisis in Yemen is a reality that we need to urgently address,” said David Gressly, the Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen.
“The numbers this year are staggering. Over 23 million people – or almost three-quarters of Yemen’s population – now need assistance. That is an increase of almost three million people from 2021. Nearly 13 million people are already facing acute levels of need.”
Escalating conflict last year, resulted in untold suffering and further disruption of public services, pushing humanitarian needs higher, said a press release issued by the UN humanitarian affairs office (OCHA) team in Yemen.
A collapsing economy, another product of the seven-year war, has exacerbated vulnerabilities for the poorest, with a record 19 million people are projected to require food assistance in the second half of 2022.
There are an estimated 161,000 who face “the most extreme hunger”, says OCHA. “Children continue to suffer horribly”, with 2.2 million acutely malnourished, including more than half a million at severe levels. Limited access to critical services continues to worsen the conditions of the most vulnerable groups, including women and children.
https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1117332
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Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2022
More than 23.4 million people - almost three-quarters of the population- need humanitarian assistance and protection in 2022; an increase of 13 per cent from what was already a frightening figure in 2021.
Prolonged conflict and the use of the economy as a tool of war have taken a devastating toll on Yemenis. A record 19 million people now need of food assistance. Extreme hunger looms for 161,000 people by the end of 2022. Children continue to stand front and center in this conflict as some 2.2 million are acutely malnourished, including nearly more than half a million children severely so. Their predicament is grim, as limited access to critical services continues to worsen the conditions of the most vulnerable groups, mostly women and children.
Based on three nationwide needs assessments reflecting the most pressing needs across sectors, the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) sets out three strategic objectives: to reduce morbidity and mortality; improve living standards and resilience; and prevent, mitigate and respond to protection risks faced by crisis-affected people, with an increased focus on multi-sector challenges. Recognizing that vulnerable groups and displaced populations are disproportionately affected by the crisis, this response plan puts their needs front and centre. To enhance accountability to affected people, management objectives have been introduced into the response plan to ensure effective implementation of strategic objectives. Some 200 frontline humanitarian organizations will implement activities under these objectives and enhanced partnership with the Government of Yemen and the Ansar Allah authorities will be essential.
There are a lot of competing crises for the world’s attention. Yemenis, especially the most vulnerable, count on continued support at this crucial moment.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-response-plan-2022
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WEP: Millionen Tonnen Getreide in Ukraine blockiert
Der Krieg in der Ukraine hat auch Auswirkung auf die weltweite Versorgung mit Getreide. Laut dem Welternährungsprogramm, liegen mehrere Millionen Tonnen in Häfen und auf Schiffen, die aber nicht das Land verlassen können.
„Derzeit sitzen knapp 4,5 Millionen Tonnen Getreide in ukrainischen Häfen und auf Schiffen fest und können nicht genutzt werden“, sagte der Direktor des Welternährungsprogramms der Vereinten Nationen (WFP) in Deutschland, Martin Frick, der Deutschen Presse-Agentur. Probleme bei der Ausfuhr der Lebensmittel gibt es derzeit unter anderem, weil Häfen und Seewege im Zuge des russischen Angriffskriegs gegen die Ukraine blockiert sind.
https://www.op-online.de/politik/wep-millionen-tonnen-getreide-in-ukraine-blockiert-zr-91513537.html
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Die Knappheit beim Weizen trifft die Ärmsten der Armen
Der Krieg in der Ukraine hat zu einer Explosion der Getreidepreise geführt. Das trifft vor allem Länder wie Jemen, die schon jetzt Nahrungsmittelhilfe brauchen.
Von den hohen Getreidepreisen auf dem Weltmarkt sind Länder wie Somalia, Ägypten und Sudan besonders betroffen. Dort decken die Ukraine und Russland mehr als 70 Prozent der Weizenimporte ab. Die gegenwärtige Versorgungskrise trifft auch Staaten wie Tunesien, Libanon, Libyen, Äthiopien, Afghanistan, Bangladesch oder Pakistan.
Besonders dramatisch ist die Lage im Jemen. In dem Land, in dem seit Jahren ein Bürgerkrieg herrscht, war bereits vor dem Beginn des Krieges in der Ukraine mehr als die Hälfte der Bevölkerung vom Hunger bedroht. Die aktuelle Versorgungskrise führt nach den Worten der FAO-Ökonomin Tothova vermehrt dazu, dass es für immer mehr Familien im Jemen um das blanke Überleben geht. Kinder können nicht mehr zum Unterricht gehen, weil nun das gesamte Haushaltsgeld für Nahrungsmittel gebraucht wird.
https://www.higgs.ch/die-welt-kann-sich-keinen-weiteren-konflikt-leisten/50291/
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Navigating Complex Challenges to Support Yemenis in Times of Compounded Crises and Renewed Hope
World Bank Country Manager for Yemen, Tania Meyer discusses the main aspects of the new Country Engagement Note for Yemen.
Tania Meyer: The World Bank has scaled up its support to Yemen throughout the conflict. We have sought to be flexible and proactive in many ways. Rather than waiting for the fighting to end, we have supported the Yemeni people through a large country-wide, grant-based program which has complemented humanitarian efforts and helped preserve livelihoods, basic service delivery and institutions. Between 2017 and 2021, the World Bank disbursed a total of US$2.1 billion, a five-fold increase compared to the previous 5-year period. Our teams have also worked to establish the analytical foundation for policies that could drive the country’s recovery and reconstruction. For example, through our Dynamic Needs Assessment series, we estimate that in some sectors, such as housing and health, up to 40 percent of the country’s infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed.
The World Bank Group’s overarching goal is to support the people of Yemen and preserve the institutions that serve them, with a focus on: (i) basic service delivery and human capital; and (ii) food security, resilience, and livelihood opportunities. At the heart of the humanitarian-development nexus, institutional preservation will remain a fundamental objective of the IDA program across the two tracks.
We are particularly concerned about impact of the war in Ukraine at a time when food insecurity was already deteriorating rapidly
The security situation in Yemen has required us to be very agile and we are working with trusted partners on the ground to deliver much-needed assistance. We are using all the tools at our disposal to ensure that valuable development assistance is directed to its intended beneficiaries.
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Fatima’s Story..
Fatima Mohammed , who lives in Al-Harazah area, has an unusual story to tell. Grief, sadness, tears are the three words she lives with. Her husband keeps bitterly taunting her about her father and brother (who are blind and disabled) for living with them.
Her husband says he is unable to provide for himself in the first place, how on earth can he provide for her father and brother who has no other place to live except in his house.
The wretched family lives a miserable life in a house not prepared for a decent living. When rain falls, the zinc roof starts leaking on the heads of the dwellers.
Fatima often cries when her husband starts yelling at her and swearing in front of her father and brother. “I feel ashamed when my father and brother hear those bad venomous words of my husband,” said Fatima, “I wish I can do something to help my husband and make him feel I am worthy useful to the family.”
Fatima was extremely happy when she received the Ramadan food basket
https://hfyemen.org/fatimas-story/
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Audio: Jemen: Hilfsorganisationen ziehen erste positive Bilanz der Waffenruhe
https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/jemen-hilfsorganisationen-ziehen-erste-positive-bilanz-der-waffenruhe-dlf-bc572842-100.html = https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/audio/audio-133349.html = https://www.podcast.de/episode/593460190/jemen-hilfsorganisationen-ziehen-erste-positive-bilanz-der-waffenruhe
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@monarelief's team distributing now food aid supplies at Hamdan IDP hosting sites in Sana'a governorate. Our distribution was funded by @monareliefye's fundraising campaign in Patreon along with other donors. (photos)
https://twitter.com/Fatikr/status/1519964271597260800
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LIVING THROUGH YEMEN’S WAR: NADA’S STORY
Action Against Hunger’s Communications Officer in Yemen, Nada al-Saqaf, shares her story of what life has been in Yemen, before and during the seven-year conflict.
They didn’t want to live in a village, it was just temporary until they could find a decent place to live in the capital city, Aden. When I was eight, we moved there. I was so excited for school – and I was good at it. I met three friends who are still my best friends today.
Life was good – it had a smooth rhythm. After school, I would take my brother and my scooter to play in the neighbourhood before going home to do my homework.
Then the war began.
Everyone around us was escaping the city, but we couldn’t. The airport was closed and the only way to flee was by road. It would’ve been too difficult for my little brother, who was ill and had a disability. My mum said we will be strong together and we will survive.
It’s hard to describe what it’s like to live in a war. There were food shortages. The air was filled with booming and shooting all the time. We felt airplane attacks that rocked the whole building and heard the sound of our neighbours’ children crying in fear.
There is so much disappointment and despair. My favourite restaurant, my hang out spots with my friends, my beloved school – they are all ashes now. My childhood friends joined the army and many have died. My beautiful village is burning and the gardens are deserts. I used to draw and read a lot, but I stopped. I felt like I had to erase my beautiful memories and they were replaced with emptiness, fear and depression.
You never know if it will ever end. You a
Living in Yemen means you worry about everything – from electricity to water to gas to money. Nothing around you is stable. You forget your dreams because real life is so harsh. You can barely make it through the week without getting insane. Every day, living requires so much mental strength.
I wonder: what will I teach my child about this country? How will I make them feel proud that they are Yemeni when all that surrounds them is destruction?
But nothing stays the same forever and I still hope that something will change for the better. I don’t know how or when, but I know that I will do all I can – with all I have – to serve people in need and to stay positive and hopeful.
https://actionagainsthunger.ca/yemen-war/
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Film: Portret van Ahmed in Jemen
Education is more than just learning. It offers children in need safety. Due to violence in his village, Ahmed fled to this school. The bombed-out walls offer him some protection: thanks to emergency education, Ahmed has a safe place to learn and play again
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=46CJaw8ijBw
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The two photos were taken from the same place of the village of Al-Dajjaj, Bani Al-Qadami, Bani Al-Awam District, #Hajjah province. The time difference between the two seasons is just 2 months. unfortunately, Poor rainfall threatens #Food security in #Yemen
https://twitter.com/KawkabAlwaday/status/1519681311165853700
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UNFPA Response in Yemen Situation Report Issue #1 (Jan - Mar 2022)
A new IPC food security analysis found deteriorating levels of food security across Yemen. Conflict remains the primary underlying driver of hunger in Yemen.
The economic crisis – a by-product of conflict– and the currency depreciation have pushed food prices to their highest levels since 2015. The war in Ukraine is likely to lead to significant import shocks, further driving food prices. An estimated 19 million people requiring food assistance in 2022. Among them an estimated 1.3 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are projected to experience acute malnutrition sometime in the course of 2022. They risk giving birth to newborns with severe stunted growth, and nursing malnourished infants, as a result of rising food insecurity.
The aid operation in Yemen remains severely underfunded.
Since the beginning of the year, lack of funding has forced UNFPA to scale back lifesaving reproductive health and protection interventions across the country, placing the lives of thousands of women and girls in grave danger. For instance, in the first quarter of the year, some 40,000 women lost access to protection services.
To keep reaching the most vulnerable women and girls, UNFPA requires US$100 million in 2022. To date, only 13 percent of this funding appeal has been received.
From January to March 2022, UNFPA's response reached more than 700,000 individuals with life-saving reproductive health services, protection information and services and emergency relief, with support to 98 health facilities, 35 safe spaces, 7 shelters and eight specialized mental health centres.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unfpa-response-yemen-situation-report-issue-1-jan-mar-2022
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Film: FAO in Yemen, fighting against Fall Armyworm
Yemen was the first country in the Arab region to be affected by the Fall armyworm (FAW), an insect that feeds on leaves and stems on more than 80 crop species. The damage caused by FAW often resembles a drought, causing significant crop losses.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L7R2RB4wE1k
Report: http://en.adenpress.news/news/34963
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Turkish humanitarian groups provide food aid to families in Yemen
Aid distributed in provinces of Marib, Hadramaut, Al Hudaydah, Taizz and Shabwa, says Yemeni Human Access
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War in Ukraine shocks global food supply, putting lives at risk
The consequences of war in Ukraine are rippling ever outward, thousands of miles and continents away from air raid sirens and military gunfire have become part of the daily soundtrack.
Of 52 countries likely to see a rise in food insecurity in the next six months
This year, approximately 19 million people (59 per cent of the population) -- an estimated 1.3 million pregnant and lactating women are already acutely malnourished -- will be in need of food assistance.
An uncertain future
At 16, Thekra Obied was one more mouth to feed in her impoverished family, so they married her off to Ahmed, a wood collector 15 years older. At 19, she became pregnant with their first child, but they could barely afford food on Ahmed's salary of less than $5 a month in a conflict-ridden country with rampant unemployment.
"It became harder to secure food since household staples continued to double in price," Ahmed explained. "I can't sleep, wondering, 'Is my family going to perish because of lack of food?'"
For the entire nine months of her pregnancy, Ms. Obied ate only tomatoes and potatoes, leading to anaemia and acute malnutrition. By the time she was ready to give birth, she weighed 40 kilograms (about 88 pounds).
By the time Ms. Obied went into labour a few weeks early, she was fainting constantly. She was also too weak to bear the pain of labour contractions. Transportation to Bani Al Shamakh Hospital 30 kilometres away cost $66 they had to borrow from a neighbour. "When Thekra entered, I was afraid -- she was exhausted, weak, and in critical condition," said Arzaq, a midwife.
Ms. Obied herself was "was certain that I would not live. On the way to the hospital, I stopped sensing myself. I only heard the echo of my husband's voice."
The emergency obstetric team immediately got to work, discovering the umbilical cord was wrapped around the neck of the baby, whose heartbeat was slowing down. "Thekra went through a difficult labor,"
https://www.unfpa.org/news/war-ukraine-shocks-global-food-supply-putting-lives-risk
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Women and girls, agents and victims in the humanitarian crisis in Yemen
Women and girls confronting the crisis
Households headed by women are generally more vulnerable to food insecurity and face greater difficulties in accessing humanitarian assistance, particularly outside their communities. They have become much more vulnerable as safeguards protecting them from violence have been weakened by the seven years of conflict.
Swiss NGO Medair's work furthering access to safe water for mountain communities
Access to safe drinking water is a growing problem for many people in the highland communities of Yemen. Like the city of Dahle in Al-Dhale'e Governorate, their only source of water has been unsafe for over 15 years. And the situation has certainly not improved since the crisis began in 2015.
Fluoride levels ten to fifteen times higher than the safe limit have been detected. Families have only two options: to spend a large part of their income to bring in safe clean water from distant villages or to drink the local water and risk getting an illness. For the vast majority, who are unemployed, only the second option is feasible.
https://www.eda.admin.ch/deza/en/home/sdc/aktuell/newsuebersicht/2022/03/geberkonferenz-jemen.html
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
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IOM Yemen Crisis Response Plan 2022
In 2022, IOM in Yemen will continue to respond to the severe and growing humanitarian crisis, one of the largest in the world, through the provision of lifesaving multisectoral humanitarian assistance in areas of the highest need where the Organization has access. In addition, IOM seeks to tackle the pre-existing drivers of fragility and improve access to durable assistance, both of which will reduce beneficiaries’ reliance on humanitarian aid and support them to transition from emergency to recovery conditions. In conjunction with a frontline response, IOM supports the restoration of household and public infrastructure to enhance communities’ self-sufficiency and promote local ownership of the communities’ recovery efforts.
Yemen continues to face one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises with almost 66 per cent of the population in need of assistance.
https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/yemen-crisis-response-plan-2022/year/2022
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The [Aden] Yemeni government has warned the UNHCR against sharing collected information on IDPs in Marib with Houthisover fears the terrorist militia will be able to identify and do harm to their relatives living in the militia's areas of control./Bawabati
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-55758
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp5 – cp19
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-804b-yemen-war-mosaic-804b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-803-yemen-war-mosaic-803
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-803 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-803:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
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