Verwendung von Geodaten und Modellierungen, um die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Konflikten aufzuzeigen – Polizeiarbeit in einem zersplitterten Staat – Landminen im Jemen – Südjemen: Militante greifen Sicherheitsposten an, 27 Tote – und mehr
September 11, 2022: Yemen Review, August 2022 – There is more to Yemen than terrorism and political violence - Huthis ‘suffocating’ women with requirement for male guardians - Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council fail to uphold peace - Using geospatial data and modeling to show the economic impact of conflict - Policing in a fragmented state – Landmines in Yemen – Southern Yemen: Militants attack security post, 27 killed – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-822b-yemen-war-mosaic-822b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Aden-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Aden government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp11 Deutschland / Germany
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp12b Sudan
cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade
cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage
cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy
cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism
cp15 Propaganda
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
cp19 Sonstiges / Other
Klassifizierung / Classification
***
**
*
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
(** B H K P)
There is more to Yemen than terrorism and political violence
In a new book, Helen Lackner argues that this perception has led to skewed aid along military lines —not the kind the country really needs.
Helen Lackner, a Research Associate at SOAS University of London and expert on Yemen, where she lived for more than fifteen years, presents in her latest book, Yemen: Poverty and Conflict, a succinct, 184-page account of Yemen’s modern history. Although the volume is conceived as an introductory work, Lackner offers analytical insights that will benefit readers who are already familiar with Yemen’s story.
The author describes how a single state structure was not established in Northern Yemen until the reigns of Imam Yahya and his son Ahmad in the mid-twentieth century.
Saleh’s machinations furthered an already existing problem: the world too frequently sees Yemen through a securitized and simplistic lens. As Lackner remarks, “Yemen is often mentioned as a hotbed of terrorism and the ancestral homeland of the most notorious jihadi, Usama bin Laden.”
This helps explain why, as the author ruefully observes, most of the “aid” Yemen traditionally received from the major world powers was focused on “security” and counterterrorism instead of the country’s very serious socioeconomic and environmental problems. As a result, “most support actually, if indirectly, contributed to the country’s instability and worsening poverty.”
The current conflict has only cemented these perceptions. Yemen was receiving small volumes of development aid in comparison with similarly poor countries before the civil war broke out in 2014. By now, humanitarian assistance has almost completely eclipsed any form of development aid. While humanitarian aid is crucial in saving lives, Lackner notes, “it is only through development funding that individuals, households and communities can liberate themselves from dependence and gradually recover their self-sufficiency.”
Moreover, even the humanitarian response to the Yemen crisis has been severely underfunded. In the March 2022 Yemen Pledging Conference, world leaders pledged only 30 percent of the total funds needed to avert a further deterioration in the country’s already desperate humanitarian situation, often described by the United Nations as the “world’s worst.” In the preceding years, the volume of funds for Yemen had already decreased.
Lackner’s Yemen: Poverty and Conflictpresents a useful description of Yemen’s international relations and the road to the current war. Nevertheless, her analytical skills are probably at their sharpest when she details the reasons why the war has continued to the present day, as well as in her presentation of the environmental challenges Yemen faces.
Regarding the first aspect, Lackner describes how a “new class of war profiteers on all sides” has vested interests in the conflict’s persistence. At the same time, traditional sources of income for young men have dried up, leaving enrollment in different armed groups as one of the few options to secure a salary. The international dimension is also essential to understanding the war’s continuation.
European countries have provided weapons and diplomatic support to the Saudi-led coalition while the United States has gone beyond this by assisting the coalition’s airstrikes in Yemen that have resulted in the death of at least 3,820 civilians and the injury of a further 3,000 according to the NGO Mwatana for Human Rights. Parallel to this, Iran has stepped up its limited weapons transfers to the Houthis in the course of the war – by Marc Martorel Junyent
(B K P)
Yemen
19,200+ civilians killed or maimed by coalition airstrikes since March 2015
War crimes and crimes against humanity are being committed in Yemen as pro-government forces and a regional military coalition fight against Houthi rebels who still control much of the country.
For the past seven years civilians in Yemen have suffered from recurrent war crimes and crimes against humanity. Fighting between Houthi forces, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and forces loyal to the internationally recognized government – as well as airstrikes by a Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE)-led international coalition – have resulted in the death of thousands of civilians since March 2015. More than 19,200 civilians have been killed or maimed as a result of coalition airstrikes alone, including over 2,300 children. The conflict has displaced at least 4 million people and created the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, with more than 23.4 million Yemenis in need humanitarian assistance and 19 million facing food insecurity.
https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/yemen/
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
Terrorangriff / Terrorist attack: Siehe / Look at cp14
(** B E H K P)
The Yemen Review, August 2022
Long-running tensions between the Islamist Islah party and UAE-backed groups in Shabwa erupted into open conflict in August, with the Giants Brigades and STC-aligned Shabwa Defense forces driving Islah-aligned military and security forces from the governorate. The expulsion of Islah from Shabwa and the STC’s subsequent takeover of much of neighboring Abyan governorate raised questions about the ability of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to resolve tensions between anti-Houthi parties and the nature of any future peace deal. Despite being extended on August 2, the UN-brokered truce between the government and the Houthi movement saw its first major violation later in the month when Houthi forces attempted to take control of the last major government-controlled road out of Taiz city, prompting widespread international condemnation and the government’s withdrawal from UN-facilitated talks in Amman.
Although the pledged Saudi-Emirati financial aid to the government remains stalled, the exchange rate in government-held territory has remained relatively stable, with the rial even appreciating somewhat following PLC head Rashad al-Alimi’s visits to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh in the middle of the month. Despite this, and news of the resumption of grain shipments from Ukraine under a UN-backed deal, issues remain around food price affordability and fuel availability.
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/august-2022
Politics & Diplomacy
Truce Extended, But Under Strain
On August 2, Yemen’s warring parties agreed to extend the country’s ongoing truce for an additional two months, until October 2. The deal came after intensive shuttle diplomacy by the UN and the US, and the arrival of an Omani delegation in Sana’a on July 31. UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg was unable to secure terms for a broader six-month truce deal, which included proposals to reopen roads in Al-Dhalea, Sa’ada, and Taiz; establish new mechanisms to pay public sector salaries in Houthi areas; expand destinations from Sana’a airport to include India, Cairo, Amman, and Doha; and create a new committee for dialogue and reconciliation. The expanded truce proposal was largely accepted by the government, but was rejected outright by Houthi authorities, although both parties agreed to work towards reaching an expanded truce agreement in the interim.
A major sticking point remains the payment of salaries, with Houthi authorities insisting on using a mechanism similar to the one employed in the 2018 Stockholm Agreement, in which both parties agreed to deposit revenues from the port of Hudaydah into an account at the local branch of the central bank under UN supervision. The Houthis later unilaterally accessed the Hudaydah funds, allegedly channeling the money for military purposes, and the salaries went unpaid. Houthi intransigence on the issue also appears to reflect a concern about popular unrest in light of general economic deterioration – authorities likely feel pressure to be seen fighting for peoples’ livelihoods, and the salary negotiations offer an opportunity to do so.
The truce came under increased strain at the end of the month after Houthi forces launched an attack near Taiz in an attempt to seize control of the last major government-controlled road out of the city. The attack took place on August 28-29, during meetings of the UN-backed Military Coordination and Taiz Road committees in Amman, and resulted in the government pulling out of the Military Coordination Committee on August 30 and prompted an uncharacteristically direct condemnation from UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg on August 31.
Developments in Government-Controlled Areas
PLC Cohesion Rattled Following Shabwa Crisis
Political Shakeup in Hadramawt
Developments in Houthi-Controlled Areas
Houthi Areas See Continued Tribal Unrest
Professor Imprisoned Over Salary Payment Demands
Russia Receives Houthi Representatives in Moscow
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/august-2022/18642
Military & Security
UAE- and STC-Affiliated Forces Win the Second Battle for Shabwa
The most prominent military developments in August concerned intra-PLC clashes in Shabwa governorate between Islah-aligned and UAE-backed forces. The roots of the Shabwa fighting extend back to late July, when clashes between Islah-aligned government security forces and the STC-aligned Shabwa Defense forces culminated in the July 19 assassination attempt of Islah-aligned commander Abdu Rabu Laakab, who the UAE viewed as the kingpin of opposition to their presence. As a result of the clashes,UAE-backed Governor Awadh Bin al-Wazir al-Awlaki suspended Laakab and commander of the Shabwa Defense forces Second Brigade, Wadji Baoum, with the PLC authorizing Bin al-Wazir to take action to stabilize the situation. On August 6, Awlaki officially replaced Laakab with Colonel Ahmed Nasser al-Ahwal, but the Special Security forces prevented Al-Ahwal from entering the group’s Martyrs’ Camp, west of Ataq, asserting that the governor had overstepped his authority and that such appointments could only be issued by Interior Minister Ibrahim Haidan, who countermanded Bin al-Wazir’s decision.
Large-scale clashes broke out in Ataq on August 8 after the killing of the commander of the Rapid Intervention forces of the pro-Islah Ataq Military Axis, Colonel Ahmed Lashqam Al-Barassi.
Pro-Islah elements of government forces in Marib mobilized independently and attempted to link up with Special Security forces in Ataq, but were repelled on August 8 and 10. After heavy fighting, Shabwa Defense forces took control of the Hunishan military camp, affiliated with the pro-Islah Ataq Military Axis, on August 8.
Attempting to resolve the crisis, the PLC held an emergency meeting to discuss security developments in Shabwa on August 8, hoping to stabilize the situation with new appointments to the leadership of military, police and security forces.
Despite these efforts, heavy clashes continued in Ataq city on August 9-10. Governor Awlaki addressed a statement to several governorate military and security leaders demanding they cease fighting and calling their participation a direct rebellion. The clashes quickly turned in Awlaki’s favor.
As of late August, fighting in Shabwa appeared to have subsided, although on August 27 security forces loyal to Governor Awlaki claimed to have thwarted an IED attack on the governor’s convoy on the road linking Ataq and the Nisab district. All told, the clashes in Shabwa claimed dozens of lives, although exact figures remain unclear.
Abyan
In addition to the clashes in Shabwa, moves by STC-aligned forces in neighboring Abyan governorate upended a long-running frontline in favor of the secessionist party.
Truce Violations
Despite the extension of the truce on August 2 and the ostensible continuation of its armistice component, low-level clashes and troop redeployments were recorded across multiple frontlines
Taiz
On August 28, the first major violation of the UN-brokered truce occurred in Al-Dhabab, on the outskirts of Taiz city, when Houthi forces launched an hours-long attack to seize control of the only major road connecting the city to the interim capital Aden
Hudaydah
Al-Dhalea
Fighting between Houthi forces and pro-government and Southern Resistance forces continued throughout August in Al-Dhalea
Landmines
Landmines remain a deadly problem in several areas
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/august-2022/18643
The Economy & Finance
WFP Secures Ukrainian Grain Shipment for Yemen
On August 23, the Yemeni government’s Minister of Industry and Trade Mohammed al-Ashwal stated that Yemen has stocks of wheat sufficient to cover approximately four months of consumption during a meeting with the Chamber of Commerce and commercial traders and importers in Aden. Al-Ashwal said that Yemen was establishing supply lines to import wheat from several countries, including Romania and France, and noted ongoing discussions to import wheat from Russia and Ukraine via Turkey. A document allegedly leaked from the Ministry of Trade and Industry on August 12 showed that Yemen had secured access to 176,000 tons of wheat, sufficient to address domestic needs for two and a half months, comprising 70,000 tons in current stocks plus 106,000 tons to be imported in August and September.
On August 30, the World Food Programme (WFP) announced that a WFP-chartered cargo ship carrying 37,000 metric tons wheat grain had departed a Ukrainian port bound for Yemen. The shipment will be milled into flour in Turkey before moving on, part of a July 22 agreement between Moscow and Kyiv, co-signed with the United Nations and Ankara, to resume grain shipments disrupted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Last year, Yemen imported 45 percent of its wheat from the two countries. The August 30 shipment is the second WFP food aid delivery to leave Ukraine since the Russian invasion in February.
In its Yemen Food Security Update for August, the WFP reported that food access for Yemenis remained highly constrained. The cost of the minimum food basket rose by 74 percent and 38 percent in government- and Houthi-controlled areas, respectively, over the past 12 months. Due to funding shortages, WFP has been forced to reduce its food rations for the fourth distribution cycle of 2022.
Government, UN, Seek to Reduce Import Costs
Petrol Prices and Diesel Shortages Ease in Houthi-Held Areas
Expected Rial Appreciation Dampens Bank Appetite for FX
Government Reports Revenue Growth in First Half of 2022
STC President Becomes Head of Government Resource and Revenue Committee
CBY-Aden Seeks Consolidation in the Money Exchange Industry
CBY-Sana’a Ups Capital and Ownership Criteria for Microfinance Banks
Government, Houthis Wrestle Over Telecommunications Sector
Houthi Authorities Increase School Fees
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/august-2022/18645
The Environment
Summer Flooding Affects Thousands
Flooding continued to devastate areas across Yemen in August, with at least 51,000 households reportedly affected since April 2022. In mid-August, a spokesperson from the Houthi Supreme Council for Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs announced that in the areas under their jurisdiction, 91 people had been killed and close to twenty-five thousand families affected by flooding and heavy rains over the past few days. One hundred and forty houses were completely destroyed and about 1,360 had their roofs collapse. The total number of affected houses is around 5,700.
A large number of houses were either partially damaged or collapsed in different parts of Sana’a. In the Old City, heavy rain caused severe damage to the roofs of many houses, and residents feared their homes would collapse if the rains continued. On Tunis Street, in the south of Al-Thawra district in Amanat Al-‘Asimah, a house inhabited by four families collapsed. No injuries were reported, but the families were displaced and temporarily housed by the Houthi Zakat Authority. In Al-Sa’adi neighborhood in eastern Al-Safiyah district, heavy rains caused the partial collapse of a house inhabited by three tenant families.
In addition to the flooding, lightning strikes reportedly killed 13 and injured more than 25 in Houthi-held Hajjah and Amran governorates.
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/august-2022/18644
The Sana'a Center Editorial
Saving the Truce
There are still dynamics on both sides that could push for keeping the truce alive. Despite the hard line taken by the Houthi movement, they are under pressure to alleviate the economic deterioration within their territories, which risks stirring dissent among a population that appears ever less willing to accept that war means a duty to stay silent. In a sign of such tensions, Houthi leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi recently warned against protests and strikes over salaries and services in a televised speech. With fighting in the south exposing rifts within the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), its head Rashad al-Alimi is in desperate need of a win. If a win involves a prolonged peace that keeps Houthi drones and missiles out of Saudi airspace, then Alimi’s main external backer in Riyadh will want it too. In other words, there is an opening to nudge the parties toward cooperation rather than conflict.
It is possible to discern the outlines of a compromise. If Houthi authorities concede that roads must be reopened as part of the peace dividend for ordinary people that the truce has provided, then the government should prioritize agreement on demands regarding salaries. Those demands have centered on a mechanism similar to the one employed in the 2018 Stockholm Agreement, in which both parties agreed that revenues from the port of Hudaydah should be deposited into an account at the Central Bank of Yemen in Hudaydah under UN supervision.
If an agreement along these lines can be reached, it might not only save the truce – which, it cannot be overemphasized, is the priority for millions of Yemenis – but also create a model for resolving other issues currently preventing a wider settlement and set the country on the path forward. For one, it could strengthen the hand of moderates in Sana’a who would be able to point to the economic benefits of working things out rather than constant confrontation. It is obvious that the temptations on both sides to give up the grinding work of diplomacy are many, but we should not lose sight of the fact that the opportunity for a negotiated settlement remains very real. There is a nexus of internal factors and calculations that could, on the one hand, lead to the truce unraveling, or, on the other, through the right curation and guidance, further entrench it and guarantee a continuing peace. Now is not the time to lose focus.
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/august-2022/18659
Commentary
Avoiding the Fate of a Powerless President
Most importantly, this council lacks the legitimacy that was Hadi’s only leverage vis-à-vis the Saudi-led coalition, enabling him on occasion to engage in political maneuvers. Since this council was engineered by the two leading states of the coalition, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, keeping these countries pleased is essential for its members to keep their positions.
It wasn’t long before the muffled tensions between the PLC members began to surface, leading to the recent battle for control over the oil-rich Shabwa governorate between UAE-backed and Southern Transitional Council (STC)-aligned forces on the one hand and Islah-dominated army and security forces on the other. STC-aligned forces also control Aden, the interim capital where the PLC chairman and members are meant to reside. Word has it that the STC president Aiderous al-Zubaidi treats other PLC members as guests, but given that they are under the “protection” of his armed forces, hostages may be a more appropriate characterization.
In view of this, the PLC chairman faces two scenarios. One is that he functions as a figurehead leader, acting as a cover for the STC’s aim of extending its absolute authority over all of southern Yemen. This would be a similar situation to that of Hadi when he was in Sana’a at the mercy of Houthi militias. The outcome of this trajectory is already known. In less than four months, Hadi had to resign for fear of being removed or even assassinated.
The second possibility is for Alimi to impose authority and exercise his full powers as the chairman of the PLC. This is not an easy task and requires a great deal of patience, courage and political imagination, which may be lacking for someone who spent his entire career working as a technocrat in the shadows.
Alimi should be well aware that the PLC is an extension of the end of his predecessor’s era.
In view of the unprecedented exercise of government functions from abroad during the Hadi years, it is important for the PLC’s members to be present in Aden. But so far Alimi has spent most of his time visiting other countries, running the risk of repeating the fatal mistake of his predecessor. These long visits abroad give the impression that Alimi, like Hadi, is preoccupied with international recognition as his priority.
Alimi must earn legitimacy at the national level so that he has the authority needed for exercising his powers and avoids being a fig leaf for other players. This legitimacy can only be earned through fulfilling the minimum basic economic and service needs of the people. It is true that the council has been frustrated by the lack of any external financial support and the failure of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to fulfill their financial pledges. However, by rationalizing spending and using all sources of income available to the government, the council and its chairman have it in their power to improve conditions to some extent.
The disruption of state institutions in areas under the government’s control is a major problem that has led to the spread of more corruption and waste of the state’s limited resources.
Institutional work must be restored and unnecessary appointments must be stopped to reduce this wastage of resources and financial corruption plaguing a country reduced to dependence on foreign aid. Alimi must act as a leader and give priority to exercising his functions from Aden
If Alimi continues the practices of his predecessor and spends most of his time abroad relying on international recognition to remain in office, he should bear in mind that his fate could be even worse than simply becoming a powerless figurehead. His predecessor was forced out of his capital by the Houthis; if the STC eventually decides they no longer require Alimi’s cover, history could repeat itself´– by Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/august-2022/18646
(** B P)
Yemen: Huthis ‘suffocating’ women with requirement for male guardians
The Huthi de facto authorities must end their mahram (male guardian) requirement, which bans women from travelling without a male guardian or evidence of their written approval across governorates under Huthi control or to other areas of Yemen, Amnesty International said today.
Increasingly since April, tightened Huthi restrictions have hindered Yemeni women from carrying out their work, especially those who are required to travel. The restraints imposed by the mahram requirement also apply to Yemeni female humanitarian workers who have struggled to conduct fieldwork, thereby directly impacting access to aid for Yemenis in need and particularly for women and girls.
“The Huthi de facto authorities must immediately lift the mahram requirement. This restrictive rule constitutes a form of gender-based discrimination and entrenches the discrimination faced by women in Yemen on a daily basis. Yemeni women urgently need to be able to move around the country freely in order to work, to seek health care and to give or receive humanitarian aid,” said Diana Semaan, Acting Deputy Director of the Middle East and North Africa.
“The international community should pressure the Huthis to stop imposing mahram restrictions on women. Yemen is already facing a catastrophic humanitarian crisis, and there is now a very real risk that women and girls will stop receiving aid if women humanitarian workers continue to be banned from travelling without a male guardian.”
Under international humanitarian law, all parties to the armed conflict in Yemen, including the Huthis, must facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of impartial humanitarian assistance to civilians in need and ensure the freedom of movement of humanitarian relief personnel without discrimination. The mahram restriction is contrary to this obligation.
The mahram requirement, which is not part of Yemeni law is being enforced by the Huthis through verbal directives. Since April, the Huthi de facto authorities have increasingly insisted on the mahram requirement to restrict the movement of women across areas they control in northern Yemen, including Saada, Dhamar, Hodeidah and Hajjah governorates, and Sanaa.
Amnesty International interviewed five women activists and members of local organizations, all of whom were subjected to the mahram requirement when attempting to travel for work between April and August, and seven experts with knowledge of how mahram restrictions have impacted the delivery of humanitarian aid.
According to seven experts with knowledge of the humanitarian situation and a recent report on humanitarian access in Yemen by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the mahram requirement became prevalent across Huthi controlled areas in the second quarter of 2022, which made the travel of female national staff very challenging for all humanitarian agencies and led to the repeated cancellation of humanitarian aid deliveries.
The experts told Amnesty International that women aid workers who do not have a mahram for travel purposes are increasingly unable to carry out their work. This reality has particularly limited women and girls’ access to desperately needed aid and healthcare services that are only provided by female aid workers. They added that mahram restrictions could lead to women aid workers leaving their positions at humanitarian organizations and consequently struggling to support their families.
One expert told Amnesty International: “The mahram requirement impedes the ability of humanitarian organizations to access all parts of the community and country to deliver aid in a timely manner, and this affects all humanitarian programming, which requires female humanitarian workers to work closely with women and girls. If female staff can’t get access to different parts of the country, it not only stops them from being able to do their lifesaving work, but it negatively impacts the quality of the humanitarian response.”
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/yemen-huthis-suffocating-women-with-requirement-for-male-guardians/ = https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/yemen-huthis-suffocating-women-new-requirement-male-guardians
(** B P)
Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council fail to uphold peace
The PLC, considered to be the best bet to ensure the continuity of Yemen’s unity, has been unable the quell the outburst of fighting last month that has reached the highest levels since this past February.
The parties to Yemen’s fighting are the army’s Second Brigade, which adheres to the Yemeni Islah Party (Muslim Brotherhood), and forces affiliated with Shabwah Governor Awadh al-Awlaqi, which are loyal to the Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) forces and the Southern Giants Brigades, a pro-government Yemeni militia.
Victims; injuries; accusations of violating national sovereignty and of cooperating with Ansar Allah (the Houthi movement), the de facto authority in northern Yemen; insulting the symbols of Yemen’s unity; and dramatic changes in the agenda of recently appointed PLC Chairman Rashad al-Alimi – these are just some the challenges facing al-Alimi in steering the PLC out of the storm in which it was placed by members who are implementing the agenda of external parties.
Journalist and political analyst Saddam Muhammad told The Media Line: “The confrontations in Shabwah will not end yet, and the warring parties are still seeking to push toward this governorate,” said Muhammad. He described the fighting as a “bone-breaking phase” between the forces on the ground. “Even if the picture is not clear to many about the reality of events in the oil-rich Shabwah Governorate, the UAE has begun to draw its road map in Yemen,” he asserted.
“The UAE has begun, in many incidents, to transport and smuggle oil from the governorate [Shabwah] to unknown places,” Muhammad added. “Shabwah comes after Aden and Socotra on the list of the UAE’s interests. This is a governorate of great importance to the Emirates, and it is not easy for them to give up a governorate of such importance.”
His conclusion is the PLC has failed this time, and the recent fighting has created a rift between members of the PLC. “The events were a real test for the PLC in uniting the ranks and efforts aimed at confronting the Houthis, building the country, and ushering a phase of sustainable peace, but the PLC has failed its first test.”
The PLC cake
Imad Hassan, a member of the Second Brigade in Shabwah Governorate, spoke to the Media Line about the origin of the current crisis.
He argues that members of the internationally recognized government started splitting the cake among themselves, while the Islah Party controlled parts of the gas-rich governorate of Ma’rib and was trying to control the oil-rich governorate of Shabwah, through some of its loyal military leaders and the former governor of Shabwah.
“The STC, which sees the Muslim Brotherhood as an enemy on the ground, sensed the danger of the Islah Party controlling the governorate,” Hassan stated. Thanks to pressure from the UAE, the Saudi ally in the coalition, a governor who is loyal to the STC was instated, and thus a campaign began against the Muslim Brotherhood in the governorate.
“The Brotherhood will not leave the matter so easily,” Hassan asserted. “Heads are turned toward the east, specifically to Hadhramaut Governorate, which the Islah Party controls
“Even if the military confrontations calmed down, the confrontations between the parties to the conflict will continue and the pressure on the PLC will mount,” Hassan added. “The Islah Party threatened to withdraw from the PLC if such confrontations continue. The parties of the PLC are settling accounts and obtaining satisfying shares to secure the political future of Yemen.”
According to Mohammed Namish, a staff member in the Shabwah Governor’s Office, divisions continue within PLC over events in Shabwah, with “the sackings of security leaders, the bombings, and assassination attempts that took place [last] Thursday and Friday against leaders loyal to Governor Awadh al-Awlaqi. While this strife continues, its results are reflected on the citizens, who have become afraid to leave their homes and lead normal lives.”
The PLC is divided into several political components that differ in terms of ideologies and interests and is in a transitional stage that began in early April when former Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi abdicated power to it – by Mohammed Al-Hassani
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-716541
(** B E)
Yemen: Using geospatial data and modeling to show the economic impact of conflict
After eight years of military conflict, Yemen’s economy remains highly fragile. Humanitarian needs are increasing due to compounding crises, and the already dire socio-economic conditions are worsening due to poor institutional capacity, uncoordinated policy decisions, and the duality of administrative establishments
Yemen's GDP contracted by 47 percent in real terms, between 2011 and 2021. The UN estimates that over half of Yemenis suffer from food insecurity at crisis levels that require urgent action to avoid malnutrition or starvation, and more than half of the 233,000 deaths by the end of 2020 alone, were not directly caused by violence, but rather were the indirect result of a lack of food, healthcare, or infrastructure.
Glimmers of hope were recently provided by a UN-sponsored truce (extended since April 2022).
In this context, we decided to apply satellite-derived and geospatial data, statistical and machine-learning models to assess the economic and environmental effects of the conflict in Yemen. This work combines data from a wide range of sources, including satellite-derived data on land use, climate, nighttime light production, and population. Also used is World Food Program (WFP) data on commodity prices, territorial control information provided by the Crisis Group, and conflict event and fatality data from ACLED.
The results highlight key economic differences in the territories controlled by the two main sides and reveal environmental factors that have influenced food prices. They also provide rare quantification of the expansion of qat plantations (Qat is a narcotic substance which is legal to grow and use in Yemen, and has significant implications on overall agricultural productivity).
Satellite data show a significant drop in nighttime light emission in 2015, which could indicate a decrease in economic productivity in Yemen at the start of the conflict.
To better understand the factors that have affected food commodity prices during the conflict, we modeled the evolution of food prices in 24 markets throughout Yemen and aggregate food prices into a “food basket price” of five major commodities, fashioned after the supplemental rations provided by the WFP.
This commodity price model captures a nationwide trend of price increases throughout the conflict, as well as more specific features such as a dramatic spike in prices in the second half of 2018 related to the conflict in the port of Hodeidah, located in western Yemen on the Red Sea coast, a critical entry point for food and aid. The case of Hodeidah is a powerful example of the potential for localized conflicts to have nationwide economic effects, as the conflict there drove up food prices about 40% across Yemen until a truce was negotiated in December 2018. The regression model also highlights the notably faster increase in prices in IRG territory compared to DFA territory since the start of 2020, reflecting diverging monetary policies.
The satellite-based analysis also focused on Qat. Qat has a strong cultural and historical component in Yemen, and its presence is documented as early as 1762.
When peace is achieved in Yemen, and hopefully soon, a serious post-conflict discussion will benefit in a big way from an accurate accounting of past socio-economic trends – by Naif Abu-Lohom and others
(** B P)
Policing in a Fragmented State
The collapse of police institutions
In the context of the war, the police sector collapsed in several Yemeni areas. As a consequence, the crime rate increased.
The situation was aggravated by informal armed groups, which not only disrupted police work but also took on functions of formal security actors.
Deteriorating security in the absence of police.
Data collected by the Yemen Polling Center in Taiz in 2017 demonstrates how the collapse of the security sector impacted the security perspectives of residents. In June 2017, three-quarters of Taiz residents described the security situation as being worse than in the previous year. Only approximately 5 per cent stated that it had improved.
With the absence of police, theft and burglary rates increased significantly. The police regularly deal with these types of small crimes.
When the police sector was being rebuilt after 2017, the rate for such crimes dropped. In a 2019 YPC nationwide poll, only 5 per cent of crimes reported involved theft. In contrast, data from 2017, collected at a time when the police were still mostly inactive, show that this rate was at 30 per cent.
A YPC poll conducted in 2019 in Taiz determined that only a quarter of the population viewed security as deteriorating, while 43 per cent found security to be improving. This is a noticeable increase of positive security perceptions when compared to the 2017 numbers. This is also related to the increase of police activity.
This demonstrates the effectiveness of police. In fact, Yemenis find that police are effective at addressing small and petty crimes that affect communities the most on a daily basis.
This is also confirmed by data collected by the 2019 YPC nationwide poll, as a majority of the respondents across Yemen found the police very or somewhat effective in addressing conflict and crime.
Violent crime remains high – a governorate level responsibility
However, violent crimes remain high. Police are unable to engage in crimes involving weapons.
Although the police sector was rebuilt, grave challenges to policing persist.
Chiefs of district police stations reported that the biggest challenges are the proliferation of arms among civilians and informal armed groups.
Because the police themselves lack arms and resources amid a lack of budgets, police are unable to interfere in violent crimes.
Other challenges include the consequences of the lack of funding.
Most police station buildings were damaged during the war. Today, some of these police stations operate from abandoned hotels and other private buildings. But many stations at the district level lack running water and electricity.
To overcome these challenges and to become an all-round security provider, police require support from the Yemeni government. What they need most is an operational budget, equipment, and better infrastructure.
Instead, the lack of resources creates space for non-state actors to perform as security actors.
This is not a new development. The Yemeni government never possessed a monopoly on the use of force. Security is not only provided by formal security institutions but also by those actors that are often made responsible for insecurity: non-state actors, such as armed tribes, militias, and other armed groups.
It is important to note, however, that Yemenis still prefer the police as a security provider.
The police, in contrast to informal actors, are viewed as a legitimate state institution. Moreover, a majority of police officers are employed from the communities. This local ownership further legitimizes the police within communities – by Mohamed Al-iriani
https://www.yemenpolicy.org/policing-in-a-fragmented-state-visual-story/
(** B K)
Landminen im Jemen: Jeder Schritt kann tödlich sein
Der Krieg im Jemen ist nicht vorbei, doch immerhin herrscht Waffenstillstand. Die Bevölkerung leidet derweil unter Landminen, die weite Teile des Landes unbegehbar gemacht haben. Hunderte Menschen wurden bereits getötet.
Dennoch müssen viele Menschen weiter um ihr Leben und ihre körperliche Unversehrtheit fürchten. Denn weite Teile des Jemen wurden im Zuge des Krieges regelrecht in ein Minenfeld verwandelt. In vielen Regionen müssen Jemeniten befürchten, auf eine der zahllosen im Land verteilten Landminen zu treten. Viele Menschen wurden auf diese Weise bereits getötet oder mussten sich als Folge einer Explosion Gliedmaßen amputieren lassen. Da die Explosivstoffe bislang kaum geräumt wurden, müssen viele Menschen noch über Jahre hinweg damit rechnen, ohne Vorwarnung auf eine der hinterhältigen Waffen zu treten.
Im Jemen haben sich in den vergangenen Jahren weite Gebiete in regelrechte Minenfelder verwandelt, insbesondere dort, wo sich feindliche Truppen unmittelbar gegenüberstanden. Diese Gebiete stellen für Zivilisten nach Unterbrechung der Kämpfe die größte Gefahr dar.
Der UN-Sondergesandte für den Jemen, Hans Grundberg, erklärte im Juli vor dem UN-Sicherheitsrat, seit Ende der Kämpfe seien zwei Drittel weniger Verletzte registriert worden. Stattdessen gingen nun aber zahlreiche Personenschäden auf Landminen und Blindgänger zurück, so der Diplomat
Bislang haben die jemenitischen Behörden noch keine Statistiken zu den Zahlen der von Landminen verletzten oder getöteten Personen veröffentlicht. Schätzungen gehen aber von einer hohen Zahl von Toten und Verletzten aus.
So erklärte Faris Al-Hamiri, Leiter der jemenitischen Beobachtungs- und Dokumentationsstelle für Minen und Blindgänger, gegenüber der DW, seine Organisation habe von Mitte 2019 bis Anfang August 2022 insgesamt 426 Todesopfer registriert, darunter mehr als 100 Kinder und 22 Frauen. Auch mehr als 560 Verletzte registriert, auch hier lag der Anteil von Kindern (216) und Frauen (48) hoch. Viele der Verletzten tragen dauerhafte Behinderungen davon.
Verschärft hat sich das Problem der Minen durch die starken Regenfälle und Überschwemmungen der vergangenen Wochen. Das Wasser hat nicht nur die Häuser insbesondere armer Jemeniten zerstört. Es hat zugleich Minen an bislang noch nicht kontaminierte Orte gespült.
Gezeichnet für immer
Nachdem er sein Haus im Gouvernement Hudaida im Westen des Landes Anfang 2018 aufgrund des Kriegeszusammen mit seiner Familie hatte verlassen müssen, kehrte Muhammad Zuhair vor einigen Monaten wieder dorthin zurück. Die Sicherheitsbedingungen in der Region hatten sich verbessert, ein ziviles Leben schien wieder möglich.
Doch auf dem Weg dorthin überfuhr der 45-jährige Familienvater kurz vor seinem Heimatdorf eine Mine, die an der Eingangsstraße zu seinem Dorf versteckt war. Mit schweren Verletzungen an den Füßen wurde er in eine Krankenstation gebracht. Als er nach der Operation wieder aufwachte, musste er feststellen, dass er nur noch ein Bein hatte. Das andere hatten die Ärzte ihm abgenommen, so Zuhair im DW-Gespräch – von Safia Mahdi
https://www.dw.com/de/landminen-im-jemen-jeder-schritt-kann-t%C3%B6dlich-sein/a-63046153
(** B K)
The Calamity of Landmines in Yemen
According to the Yemeni Observatory For Landmine Removal, an organization that documents mines, 370 civilians have been killed by landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and explosive ordnance laid by the Houthis from mid-2019 to May 2022. Additionally, over the past six years, The Yemeni Coalition for Monitoring Human Rights Violations has documented the deaths of more than 1,929 civilians, as well as the destruction and damage of more than 2,872 public and private facilities in a number of Yemeni governorates, as a result of the use of anti-personnel or anti-vehicle mines.
During the first phase of the United Nations Mine Action Service’s project, land survey and clearance operations were conducted in 21 governorates and 233 districts, and over 23 million square meters of land were cleared. The second phase began in October 2021 and is expected to run until the end of December 2026. Furthermore, the latest statistics of the Saudi “Masam” demining project, which was launched in 2018 with the aim of removing mines planted by the Houthis, indicate that the number of mines dismantled since the beginning of the project has reached 322,789. There are reports that Yemen needs roughly eight years to completely get rid of these mines,
Yemen has been plagued by landmines for decades as a result of repeated political and military conflicts that have provoked instability.
However, as the conflict between the Houthis and the Yemeni government escalated, mine laying dramatically increased, particularly in 2014 when the Houthis stormed Sanaa. From then until the recent announcement of a truce in April 2022, mines were laid in areas of engagement in multiple Yemeni governorates as well as in areas near the Red Sea. Unfortunately, because of the disorganized fashion in which mines were planted, removing them has become an extremely difficult endeavor. Yemen now tops the list of countries where internationally banned landmines prevail.
Landmines and explosives pose a direct threat to the lives of civilians, specifically children. According to figures verified by the United Nations, as of August 2021, nearly 10,000 children were either killed or injured as a result of the conflict in Yemen, and a large number of them were landmine victims. Human Rights Watch reports that Houthi mines continue to indiscriminately kill civilians and cause psychological and social trauma.
Since the beginning of the conflict, the Houthis have randomly laid mines in areas of engagement in Taiz, Saada, Hodeidah, Marib, Abyan, Lahj, Dhale’, Aljawf, Albayda, Sanaa, Shabwa, and other areas. A Yemeni de-mining official claims that the Houthis have laid two million mines throughout the country. Similarly, a New York Times report noted that “all or almost all of the land mines and other explosive devices buried in Yemen appear to have been planted by the Houthis,” and a publication from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy pointed to “the sheer scale of Houthi landmine use” and raised questions about “their source and supply [as] Yemen is not supposed to have domestic stockpiles of landmines.
Unfortunately, current local, regional, and international efforts are insufficient to eliminate the mine issue within a short period of time. As for the efforts of the Yemeni government, they are falling behind because of the fragility of the country’s institutions.
In short, landmines and IEDs scattered throughout the country will remain a formidable challenge in the post-war era, threatening the lives of Yemenis. This issue requires the urgent intervention of the UN’s Special Envoy for Yemen and his specialized team to address the dangers still present in areas of engagement – by Adel Dashela
https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/87802
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
(* B H)
Over 800 polio cases in Yemen's Houthi-held areas
The Yemeni northern Houthi-held areas saw increase in polio infections throughout the first eight month of 2022.
Over 800 Yemeni children caught polio in the last 8 months, Al-Arabiya said on Monday, quoting figures released by the Houthi-run ministry of health.
Until the 34th week of this year, 827 polio cases were recorded, it added, noting that under-three-year children make up 52 percent of the total infections.
183 cases infected with the modified (cVDPV2) virus were admitted to hospital during August, according to the ministry.
Yemen got rid of polio in 2006, and was recognized by WHO as a country free from the virus in 2009.
Last January, the Yemeni official government said polio cases reoccurred in the war-torn country, blaming the Houthi group for failing to cooperate properly in vaccination campaigns, despite the availability of vaccines.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-30825.html
(A H)
Five new COVID-19 cases reported, 11,931 in total
http://en.adenpress.news/news/35579
(B H)
The prevalence of onchocerciasis in Africa and Yemen, 2000–2018: a geospatial analysis
Onchocerciasis is a disease caused by infection with Onchocerca volvulus, which is transmitted to humans via the bite of several species of black fly, and is responsible for permanent blindness or vision loss, as well as severe skin disease. Predominantly endemic in parts of Africa and Yemen, preventive chemotherapy with mass drug administration of ivermectin is the primary intervention recommended for the elimination of its transmission.
https://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12916-022-02486-y
cp2 Allgemein / General
(* A K P)
Interactive Map of Yemen War
(B K P)
UN Helps US-Saudi Aggression Justifying Siege against Yemen
The US-Saudi coalition bet on the siege for eight years of its war on Yemen to achieve a political gain due to the disappointing results of its military forces on the ground.
At the beginning of this week, the aggression forces tightened their siege and prevented the entry of oil derivatives to the port of Hodeidah, in a clear repudiation of the terms of the recent temporary truce sponsored by the United Nations.
The US-Saudi aggression knows that seizing the fuel ships has catastrophic effects from double fines that deprive Yemenis of the advantages of low purchasing power. Yemen Petroleum Company announced days ago that the fines amounted to more than 11 million dollars for the detained ships, in addition to paralyzing and disrupting the work of sectors such as hospitals and electricity.
The coalition's failure to adhere to agreements is not the first time; Rather, after each round of negotiations, the coalition works to violate every truce, denouncing the UN’s silence regarding the humanitarian crimes committed against the Yemeni people.
https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/28298/UN-Helps-US-Saudi-Aggression-Justifying-Siege-against-Yemen
My remark: A Houthi view.
(A P)
Yemen: NGOs call for release of three journalists held in Yemen
Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and two Yemeni NGOs – Marsadak and the Insaf Centre – call for the immediate release of three Yemeni journalists, each of whom is being held in one of three main warring regions in which Yemen is now divided. One was jailed last month, while the other two have been held for a year or more
The three journalists are Ahmed Maher, Jamil Al-Samet and Younis Abdulsalam. One is held by the government recognised by the international community, which is backed by the Saudi-led Arab coalition. One is held by the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is backed by the United Arab Emirates. And one is held by the Houthi rebels
https://ifex.org/yemen-ngos-call-for-release-of-three-journalists-held-in-yemen/
(B K pH)
Entesaf Org: Over 13,000 civilian casualties of Saudi-led aggression coalition on Yemen…
The casualties of the US-backed Saudi-led aggression coalition on Yemen, exceeded 13,384 dead and wounded, Entesaf Organization for Women and Child Rights announced on Thursday.
https://en.ypagency.net/271872/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/09/08/total-casualty-rate-of-saudi-led-war-on-yemen-exceeds-13000-dead-and-wounded/
(? B P)
The Houthis Are Gaming Yemen’s Cease-Fire [subscribers only]
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/yemen-war-cease-fire-houthis/
My remark: The author is a pro-Saudi propagandist.
(* B P)
Kein Frieden in Sicht
Jemen: Weiter Kämpfe im Süden des Landes. Waffenruhe laut Ansarollah nur mit Aufhebung der Blockade möglich
Auf mehr als zwölf Milliarden 318 Millionen und 628.000 US-Dollar belaufen sich die Verluste aus der vor acht Jahren von der Kriegskoalition verhängten Blockade gegen den Jemen. Das gab das Verkehrsministerium der Ansarollah (»Huthis«) am Dienstag bekannt. Insbesondere die Beschlagnahmung von mit Treibstoff beladenen Transportschiffen habe die Verluste im Transportsektor stark erhöht und das Leiden der jemenitischen Zivilbevölkerung verschärft. Der Sprecher der Yemen Oil Company erklärte am selben Tag, trotz der seit April geltenden Waffenruhe verletze die Militärkoalition, die von Saudi-Arabien und den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten angeführt wird, weiter deren Bedingungen und halte aktuell zwölf Schiffe mit Treibstoff fest.
Schwere Vorwürfe richtete Verkehrsminister Abd Al-Wahab Al-Durra auch an die Vereinten Nationen: Diese seien an der Umleitung von Schiffen in die Gewalt der Kriegskoalition beteiligt und kämen ihrer Verpflichtung, zerstörte Kräne im Hafen von Hodeida zu ersetzen, nicht nach. Zudem setzten sie sich nicht nachdrücklich genug für die vollständige Wiedereröffnung des Flughafens in Sanaa und des Hafens von Hodeida ein.
Die den Norden des Jemen kontrollierenden Ansarollah betonen regelmäßig, dass sie Verstöße gegen die der Waffenruhe zugrundeliegenden Vereinbarungen nicht akzeptieren und einer erneuten Verlängerung nur zustimmen würden, wenn sich die Kriegskoalition endlich an diese halte. Dieser werfen sie unter anderem mehr als 25.000 Verletzungen der Waffenruhe vor.
Von Frieden ist trotz der brüchigen Waffenruhe auch der Süden des Landes weit entfernt.
Schon in den vergangenen Wochen ist es im Südjemen mehrfach auch zu Kämpfen zwischen nominell verbündeten, seit Jahren aber durch widerstreitende Interessen gespaltenen Kräften der »Anti-Huthi-Koalition« gekommen.
Unterdessen steht das Land trotz der Waffenruhe vor einem wirtschaftlichen Kollaps, die Landeswährung befindet sich in freiem Fall. Die meisten Jemeniten können sich nicht einmal einen Laib Brot am Tag leisten, mehr als 23 Millionen sind auf humanitäre Hilfe angewiesen.
https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/434191.vergessener-krieg-kein-frieden-in-sicht.html
(* B P)
Mustafa Numan: "Yemen will never be united again"
INTERVIEW
The former Yemeni deputy foreign minister speaks about the fragility of the truce, whose delivery in Riyadh he attended
Against all odds, the truce between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis is on its way to its sixth month. His delivery in Riyadh was attended by the former Yemeni Deputy Foreign Minister, Mustafa Numan, who, however, intimates to La Vanguardia the difficulty of a political compromise that consolidates peace.
- Define the ceasefire.
- It's a truce between the Houthis and the Saudis. Spot. Although the Emirates coordinate with Saudi Arabia, not in this case.
- How has a tribal militia been able to resist against two armies so well armed?
- The problem with Saudi Arabia is that it hardly has any allies on the ground. And these, without Saudi air cover, can do nothing. They control the city of Marib, with its wells and refinery, and little else. What happens is that Riyadh has lost the desire to continue with this war, which is so damaging to its image and its finances.
- Boards?
- The Saudis know that there is no military solution and that they cannot win with an air campaign alone, without putting troops. Within a few weeks they said, "we have achieved 95% of our goals." But it was actually 20%. They caused so much destruction that many Yemenis turned against them. The Saudis have done the opposite of the Iranians, who by investing very little money have achieved great influence.
(A P)
On the walls of the #Marib stadium, drawings campaigning for the end of the war, describing the brutality of the Houthis or calling for women's rights (images)
https://twitter.com/MllerQuentin/status/1567438150472957952
(* B P)
What is behind coalition’s military arrangements towards Yemen?
the series of meetings led by the head of the European Union delegation, Gabriel Munoaira Viñales, and ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of 17 European countries, to the government loyal to the “coalition”, during the past two days, did not come out with positive results that would revive the peace process.
The president of the “presidential council” loyal to the “coalition”, Rashad Al-Alimi, ignored the response to the European delegation’s demands regarding the detention of fuel ships and preventing their access to the port of Hodeida, and contented himself with talking about the risks and threats resulting from the military parade that the coastal city witnessed last week, considering the Sanaa parade with missiles and naval mines threatens the security of the Red Sea and international navigation.
Al-Alimi did not show any willingness to push the peace path forward, but rather talked about the three peace references represented in the Gulf Initiative and the “Peace and Partnership Agreement” signed between the Yemeni parties in late 2014, and International Resolution 2216, which legitimized the aggression against Yemen and placed the country under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
In an interview with the Lebanese “Al-Akhbar” newspaper, Yemeni political sources believe that Al-Alimi’s position “is an escape from the implementation of the entitlements of the armistice, and an indication that the Saudi-Emirati aggression coalition wants to return to the option of war,” especially since what was reported by the official “Saba” agency in its version of the pro-Riyadh government, about the meeting, has nothing to do with peace.
What reinforces these indications is that the “coalition” began arrangements of a military nature more than a week ago
https://en.ypagency.net/271793/
My remark: A Houthi viewpoint.
(A P)
[Sanaa gov.] Fisheries Ministry condemns kidnapping of 3 fishermen by aggression mercenaries
The ministry indicated in a statement received by the Yemeni News Agency (Saba) that the aggression mercenaries kidnapped three fishermen from Buhais area in Midi district of Hajjah province, while they were fishing in Yemeni territorial waters.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3201743.htm
and also https://en.ypagency.net/271808/
(* B P)
UN warnen vor Ölpest im Roten Meer
Seit Jahren dümpelt ein rostender Öltanker vor der Küste des Jemen. Jederzeit könnte er explodieren. Das Öl muss dringend abgepumpt werden. Dass nichts passiert, liegt Aktivisten zufolge auch an Deutschland.
Dort liegt die "FSO Safer" vor Anker: 1976 gebaut, 260 Meter lang. Seit 1987 wird der rötlich-rostige Megatanker als schwimmender Speicher genutzt. Er hat 180 Millionen Liter Rohöl geladen - eine hochexplosive Fracht. Seit dem Beginn des Bürgerkriegs im Jemen wurde die "Safer" nicht mehr gewartet.
Am Bug sind Lecks sichtbar. Viele Ventile und Leitungen sind marode, Maschinen defekt. Gas kann aus dem Rumpf nicht mehr abgepumpt werden. "Das Öl könnte jederzeit explodieren", warnt David Gressly, UN-Koordinator für den Jemen. Anderenfalls zerbreche das Schiff einfach. Alle Experten seien sich einig, dass das Schiff im letzten Stadium vor dem Zerfall sei. Und das ausgerechnet vor den Herbststürmen im Roten Meer: "Die Stürme nehmen von Oktober bis Dezember zu. In der Zeit ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit am höchsten, dass das Schiff auseinanderbricht."
Die Folgen wären für die gesamte Region katastrophal. Nicht nur Fischgründe im Roten Meer würden auf Jahrzehnte zerstört. Zweihunderttausend Fischer hätten damit keine Lebensgrundlage mehr. Das Wasser zu reinigen, würde nach UN-Schätzungen 20 Milliarden Euro kosten - Geld, das bei humanitärer Hilfe fehlen würde.
Auch der Hafen von Hodeida wäre blockiert - die Lebensader des Jemen, über die Hilfsgüter, Treibstoff, Medikamente für die notleidende Bevölkerung des Jemen geliefert werden.
Was zu tun ist, um die Katastrophe abzuwenden, ist bekannt. Die Vereinten Nationen haben im März einen ausgeklügelten Plan entwickelt, um das Öl auf ein anderes Schiff abzupumpen und sicher zu lagern. Die Notoperation würde etwa 80 Millionen Euro kosten. Bei einer Geberkonferenz im Mai, an der auch das Auswärtige Amt teilnahm, wurden 70 Millionen Euro zugesagt. Lediglich zehn Millionen fehlen.
David Gressly macht Druck: "Sie müssen jetzt liefern! Wir können ohne das Geld nicht loslegen." Etliche Länder hätten Geld zugesagt, aber noch nichts ausgezahlt.
https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/asien/rotes-meer-oeltanker-101.html
Filme: https://www.swr.de/swr2/wissen/oeltanker-vor-der-kueste-des-jemen-ist-tickende-zeitbombe-100.html
https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video-1084207.html = https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EobxvjExy1Y
und
(* B P)
Jemen: Rostender Öltanker als ökologische Zeitbombe
Im Roten Meer droht ein veralteter jemenitischer Tanker mit Millionen Liter Öl auseinanderzubrechen. Die UN versuchen die drohende Katastrophe abzuwenden, stoßen aber auf ökonomische und politische Schwierigkeiten.
Die Gefahr ist absehbar: Rund sechs Kilometer vor der jemenitischen Küste liegt der havarierte Öltanker 'FSO Safer' vor Anker. Ungeachtet seines maroden Zustands wird er als Erdölspeicher genutzt. Dabei könnte das 2015 aufgegebene Schiff jeden Moment auseinanderbrechen oder explodieren. Dann würden die darin gelagerten rund 1,1 Millionen Barrel Rohöl ins Rote Meer fließen - die vierfache Menge dessen, was 1989 bei der Exxon-Valdez-Ölkatastrophe in der Nähe von Alaska auslief.
Bräche das Schiff auseinander, würde das auslaufende Öl Korallenriffe und andere Meereslebewesen im Roten Meer zerstören, Hunderttausende von Arbeitsplätzen in der Fischerei-Industrie gefährden und den Jemen von der Versorgung mit Nahrungsmitteln und Treibstoff abschneiden, warnen die Vereinten Nationen und andere Organisationen.
Noch ist es aber möglich, die drohende Katastrophe zu verhindern, und zwar mit überschaubaren technischen Mitteln. So ließe sich Öl für rund 80 Millionen Dollar (80,8 Millionen Euro) innerhalb von vier bis fünf Monaten von der 'FSO Safer' auf ein Zwischenlagerschiff laden. Sobald ein funktionstüchtiges Lagerschiff gefunden ist, könnte das Öl auf dieses verladen und dann abtransportiert werden.
Die 'FSO Safer' (FSO steht für "Floating Storage and Offloading Unit", auf Deutsch "Schwimmende Lager- und Entladeeinheit") könnte dann als Schiffsschrott verkauft werden. Der Erlös könnte zumindest einen Teil der auf rund 144 Millionen Dollar geschätzten Gesamtkosten der Operation decken.
Doch in der Praxis ist das Problem komplizierter: So ist weder die Finanzierung der ersten Phase abgeschlossen, noch bestehen verlässliche politische Vereinbarungen für den weiteren Transport des Öls. Zwar bemühen sich die Vereinten Nationen um eine Lösung. Bislang haben sie allerdings erst 70 Millionen Dollar an Beiträgen aus verschiedenen Ländern, so etwa Saudi-Arabien und Deutschland, aufgebracht.
and English version:
(* B P)
Yemen: Rusty oil ship in the Red Sea threatens an ecological catastrophe
The Red Sea is under imminent threat of a massive oil spill from an aged Yemeni tanker. The UN's plans to avert the disaster have stalled for lack of funding.
The derelict oil tanker FSO Safer, moored some five miles (6 kilometers) off the Yemeni coast in the Red Sea and used as an oil storage facility, is a floating environmental catastrophe waiting to happen.
The vessel, which could break apart or explode at any moment, holds 1.1 million barrels of crude oil.
That's equivalent to 48 million gallons (218 million liters) of oil or four times the amount that was spilled in the Exxon Valdez oil disaster near Alaska in 1989.
A oil spill from the FSO Safer would destroy coral reefs and other sea life in the Red Sea, jeopardize hundreds of thousands of jobs in the fishing industry, and cut Yemen off from supplies of food and fuel, the United Nations and other organizations have warned.
However, it is possible to prevent what the US Special Envoy for Yemen, Tim Lenderking, calls a "looming disaster."
Technically, the solution is straightforward: For an initial cost of $80 million (€80.8 million), the oil could be transferred over the course of four to five months from the FSO Safer to a temporary vessel.
Once a long-term storage vessel is found, the oil could be transferred again.
As for the FSO Safer (FSO stands for floating storage and offloading unit), the tanker could be sold as scrap metal to offset some of the operation's total cost, estimated at around $144 million.
The problem is that neither the funding for the first stage is completed, nor are reliable political agreements in place for the oil transfer to take place.
So far, the United Nations, with the support of The Netherlands and US Envoy Lenderking, has drummed up $70 million in contributions from various countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Germany.
and
(* B P)
UN Continues Collect Funds Exploiting Risk of Oil Tanker, Safer
This is not the first time that the Safer issue has suddenly emerged, and the imperatives of curbing its danger have been exaggerated, pretending to be a priority for the United Nations.
Since 2015, the US-Saudi aggression has worked hard to turn the ship into a political card, starting with the withdrawal of most of its crew members, with the exception of only seven, then imposing the ban on diesel fuel designated for the ship from reaching it in 2016 to stopping its main operating boilers.
The deliberate damage to the tanker continued. It turned towards turning the tank into a political pressure card on the Sana’a government by stirring international public opinion.
The evidence is that these steps were followed by the pro-aggression government’s start of a campaign of intimidation of a net threat to the Red Sea and international navigation, followed by warnings and statements by the US, UK, Saudi, UAE and others, in a path that analysts considered as arguments through which these parties are trying to disavow in advance the responsibility for any leakage or explosion that may happen to the floating tank.
These warnings and auctions were associated with the coalition’s refusal to allow the necessary technical repairs to the ship, as well as its refusal to unload it on the pretext that the money that will return from selling the quantities of oil will go to the Central Bank in Sana’a. It also prevented the arrival of any derivatives that would operate the boilers and equipment.
The Ministry of Oil and Minerals in the Sana’a government demanded in May 2019 the United Nations and international organizations to allow the sale of the crude oil contained in the ship Safer, and to benefit from the revenue in establishing alternative oil tanks, but this was rejected.
However, at the same time, the US and UK accused the Sana'a government of preventing maintenance of the ship or access to it.
After a series of urgent demands by the Sana’a government to the United Nations and the international community that SAFER should be repaired, or to convince the coalition to allow diesel and maintenance teams to access the ship, the assessment and maintenance agreement was signed between the United Nations and the Sana’a government in November 2020.
The most dangerous thing in the Safer issue is not exploiting it as an economic war card used by the coalition and the government loyal to it, but rather by turning that danger made by the coalition into an international pretext to mobilize international support and doing nothing more.
The most serious fear of wasting time without reaching the reservoir and avoiding its danger, is that with the failure of the pledges and the incompleteness of the internationally required amount, the ready amount of $60 million will go into operational expenses unrelated to the mission, which Sanaa warned of in more than one place.
My remark: A Houthi viewpoint.
(A P)
Canada contributing $2.5 million to UN-coordinated salvage operation of the FSO Safer
(* B K P)
International Accountability Critical to Achieving Justice for Victims and Promoting Lasting Peace in Yemen
As civil society organizations from Yemen and around the world we urge United Nations (UN) member states to work toward the establishment of an independent international criminally focused investigative mechanism on Yemen in the coming period, including at the upcoming 51st Session of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC).
While a Yemen truce hangs in the balance, little to no progress has been made by parties to the conflict to address ongoing and widespread violations and abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law or remedy the harms they have inflicted on civilians throughout the conflict. The humanitarian situation in Yemen remains desperate, and, in recent weeks, armed clashes have once again increased. Civilians continue to fall victim to shelling, drone strikes and other attacks. These factors attest to the urgent and critical need to reinvigorate international accountability efforts on Yemen through the establishment of an independent international investigation.
As highlighted by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “We know that lasting peace is interlinked with justice, development and respect for human rights.” Unfortunately, justice, truth and reparation for human rights abuses were overlooked by the international community after mass pro-democracy protests in Yemen toppled the government of the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011. Between 2011-2014, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) political initiative for Yemen, as endorsed by the UN Security Council, prioritized implementing a quick transition of power at the expense of ensuring accountability, establishing the rule of law and addressing the government’s long record of human rights violations. The immunity afforded to former President Saleh and others only entrenched a culture of impunity that likely played a key role in the renewal of armed conflict and the commission of widespread human rights abuses and war crimes within the country. Almost ten years later the international community is in danger of repeating the same mistake.
For years Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen, the Ansar Allah (Houthi) armed group, and other warring parties have caused, and continue to cause, massive civilian harm and suffering in Yemen, carry out frequent and serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, and have failed to conduct credible investigations, provide reparations, or ensure justice for victims. In the last month, attacks against civilians and other related violence have resulted in 232 civilian casualties including 57 children. The last week of July witnessed the highest increase of child casualties in one week since early 2020.
Before its untimely dissolution in 2021, the UN Group of Eminent Experts (GEE), established by the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in 2017, recommended that UN member states refer the situation in Yemen to the International Criminal Court (ICC), support the establishment of a criminal-accountability-focused investigative mechanism, and stressed the need to realize victims’ right to reparation. In late 2021, HRC members narrowly rejected the resolution that would have renewed the GEE’s mandate after Saudi Arabia, backed by the UAE, lobbied HRC members to vote against its renewal.
The international community should not stand by and allow that vote to be the last word on accountability efforts for large scale human rights abuses and war crimes in Yemen.
The international community must not repeat the mistakes of the past and side-line international accountability efforts now. Continued impunity will only increase the likelihood that more children will starve, more rights defenders and journalists will be imprisoned or executed, more homes and schools will be bombed, and the cycle of violence and suffering will continue.
In this context, an international independent criminal accountability mechanism for Yemen can play a critical role to deter violence, protect civilians and promote a genuine and lasting peace. In December 2021, nearly 90 civil society organizations called on member states of the UN to move quickly and establish such a mechanism in order to investigate and publicly report on the most serious violations and abuses of international law committed in Yemen. Such a body should collect and preserve evidence, prepare files for possible future criminal prosecutions, and identify victims and document harms for possible future reparation claims.
(* B K P)
How can Riyadh read Iranian-inked Houthi threat message 'Second Warning'
The Iranian-backed Houthi group on Thursday, 1 September, introduced a new set of missiles and other advanced weapons at its largest parade since the breakout of Yemen's 8-year-old war. By the parade of its Houthi arms, Tehran tried to send a strongly-worded threat message to many parties, mainly Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors, saying "we're here".
This threat message, according to observers, cannot be read away from developments in the nuclear talks between western countries and Iran that presses for the optimum gains, mostly in terms of lifting the economic sanctions and allowing for oil export resumption.
The arms – displayed by the Houthis at the show of strength in Hodeida port city on Red Sea – included a collection of newly-introduced surface-to-sea ballistic missiles and a large variety of fatal naval mines.
"The Houthi group and Iranian supporters carefully chose Hodeida city, as a place near Bab al-Mandeb to conduct the 'Second Warning' military parade in this given time, in order to convey an obvious threat message to rivals," political and military experts told Debriefer separately.
Proud of strength and capacities obtained by his group, the Houthi leader did not conceal a warning tune that came this time clearer and stronger in his speech aired by Houthi media on Thursday, in coincidence with the parade.
Having started in this phase of the truce, these military reviews are aimed to send a message to greedy enemies, Abdul Malik al-Houthi said in his speech.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-30800.html
(* B E K)
Over $12.3 B losses in transport sectors due to aggression, siege
[Sanaa gov.] Deputy Prime Minister for National Vision Affairs Mahmoud al-Junaid stressed on Tuesday the importance of the pivotal and vital role of the transport sector in its various fields in developing the national economy and moving the wheel of development.
During a press conference held by the Ministry of Transport in Sana'a, al-Junaid pointed out to the destruction that the ministry and its affiliated sectors were subjected to by the US-Saudi-Emirati aggression coalition to disrupt the vital role of this sector and the air, land and sea navigation services it provides at the local and international levels.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3201654.htm
and also https://en.ypagency.net/271732/
(A P)
Jabal: Arab and international airline companies request to operate flights through Sanaa airport
Raed Jabal, the Deputy Chairman of the Civil Aviation and Meteorology Authority (CAMA), has revealed that the authority has received many requests from Arab and foreign airlines to resume their flights to and from Sanaa International Airport since the beginning of the truce, stressing the continuation of the siege obstructed the arrival of those companies as a result.
“Any new extension of the truce must be one of its priorities to open Sanaa International Airport to all companies wishing to land at the airport,” Jabal told Yemen News Agency (Saba) on Friday.
He affirmed that that Sanaa International Airport is ready to receive new flights in accordance with international requirements and conditions and the Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
https://en.ypagency.net/271301/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/09/03/many-airlines-interested-in-resuming-flights-to-sanaa-aviation-board-says/
(A P)
Djibouti-Sana'a flights deferred to indefinite date
The Djibouti Airlines' flights between Sana'a City and Djibouti have been delayed until indefinite date, the Houthi-run civil aviation authority said late on Wednesday.
The authority was requested by the Djibouti Airlines to postpone its flights to the Yemeni Houthi-held capital until indefinite date, the authority said in a release, without further details.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-30778.html
(* B K P)
How can Riyadh read Iranian-inked Houthi threat message 'Second Warning'
The Iranian-backed Houthi group on Thursday, 1 September, introduced a new set of missiles and other advanced weapons at its largest parade since the breakout of Yemen's 8-year-old war. By the parade of its Houthi arms, Tehran tried to send a strongly-worded threat message to many parties, mainly Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors, saying "we're here".
This threat message, according to observers, cannot be read away from developments in the nuclear talks between western countries and Iran that presses for the optimum gains, mostly in terms of lifting the economic sanctions and allowing for oil export resumption.
The arms – displayed by the Houthis at the show of strength in Hodeida port city on Red Sea – included a collection of newly-introduced surface-to-sea ballistic missiles and a large variety of fatal naval mines.
"The Houthi group and Iranian supporters carefully chose Hodeida city, as a place near Bab al-Mandeb to conduct the 'Second Warning' military parade in this given time, in order to convey an obvious threat message to rivals," political and military experts told Debriefer separately.
Proud of strength and capacities obtained by his group, the Houthi leader did not conceal a warning tune that came this time clearer and stronger in his speech aired by Houthi media on Thursday, in coincidence with the parade.
Having started in this phase of the truce, these military reviews are aimed to send a message to greedy enemies, Abdul Malik al-Houthi said in his speech.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-30800.html
(B P)
South Yemen’s Independence Struggle, Generations of Resistance by Anne-Linda Amira Augustin & South Yemen: Gateway to the world? by Abdul Galil Shaif
These two books are by South Yemenis who are committed to returning Yemen to the two states existing prior to unification in 1990. Both authors have strong European connections and their books have emerged, in part at least, from PhD theses. However, they are extremely different in scope, approach and style; the first retains an academic and analytical approach focused on the struggle of southerners for independence in the last decade; the second is a personal southern militant account of politics throughout Yemen since the People’s Democratic of Republic (PDRY) period. One interesting comparative aspect is the fact that these books represent the views of authors from generations decades apart.
https://journals.openedition.org/cy/8383
cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade
(A P)
YPC calls for quick release of seized fuel vessels
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3201957.htm
YPC calls for ending distillation policy in releasing fuel vessels
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3202068.htm
(A P)
Secret of coalition’s acquiescence to Sanaa regarding fuel ships disclosed
The British ambassador, Richard Oppenheim, on Saturday revealed the secret of the Saudi-led coalition’s approval of the entry of fuel ships to the port of Hodeida.
Commenting on the coalition allowing fuel ships to in a tweet on Twitter, Oppenheim stated that the reason was due to fears of the Houthis’ reaction, noting that their actions “would have caused a disaster,” referring to their planning to target strategic facilities.
The coalition’s move came a few days after Sanaa threatened to respond if the fuel ships were not brought in.
https://en.ypagency.net/272050/
(A P)
UNVIM Operational Analysis - August 2022
Food and Fuel Discharged in August 2022
There was a 25% decrease in food discharged (231,856 t) in August 2022 compared to the 2021 monthly average (310,856 t) and a 21% decrease compared to the monthly average since May 2016 (294,751 t).
There was a 445% increase in fuel discharged (242,994 t) in August 2022 compared to the 2021 monthly average (44,589 t) and an 83% increase compared to the monthly average since May 2016 (133,554 t).
Food and Fuel Vessel Delays in August 2022
In August 2022, food vessels spent an average of 2.7 days in the Coalition holding area (CHA), 2.4 days in anchorage, and 10.9 days at berth. This compares to an average of four (04) days in the CHA, 4.8 days in anchorage, and 10.9 days at berth in August 2021. Food vessels therefore spent 11%, 50% and 20% less time in the CHA, anchorage and at berth, respectively, compared to August 2021.
In August 2022, eight (08) food vessels proceeded from the CHA to anchorage, eight (08) berthed, and 10 discharged their cargo and sailed.
In August 2022, the average time spent by fuel vessels in the CHA was 8.2 days, whereas it was 82.2 days on average in August 2021, or a 90% decrease year-on-year. In comparison to the 2021 monthly average of 73.3 days, the month of August 2022 saw an 89% decrease.
Four (04) fuel vessels were permitted from the CHA to anchorage, six (06) berthed, and nine (09) discharged their cargo and sailed during the reporting month.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unvim-operational-analysis-august-2022
UNVIM Situation Report - August 2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unvim-situation-report-august-2022
(A P)
Oil ships enter Hodeida port after being seized by coalition
About 4 oil ships arrived on Friday at Hodeida port after being seized by the Saudi-led coalition.
“Thanks to Allah and then the leadership, the first 4 ships of the fuel ships, which were seized by the US-backed Saudi aggression, arrived at the port of Hodeida,” the spokesman for the oil company in Sanaa, Essam Al-Mutawakel, said on Twitter.
https://en.ypagency.net/271977/
and also https://debriefer.net/en/news-30878.html
and
(A P)
The Aggression Forces Release 4 Oil Ships ,But Still Seize 5 Ships
https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/546590
and
(A P)
[Sanaa gov.] Oil Minister reassures citizens of breakthrough of fuel crisis
The Minister of Oil and Minerals, Ahmed Abdullah Daris, on Saturday reassured the citizens of the breakthrough of the fuel crisis after the entry of a number of oil derivatives ships to the port of Hodeida.
The oil minister called, in a statement, on the United Nations to quickly release the remaining seized fuel ships, and not to be held them in the future.
https://en.ypagency.net/272073/
(A P)
Houthis create false excuses to double Yemeni sufferings, blackmail int'l community President Alimi
The [Aden] Yemeni government has taken no new measures regarding oil tankers bound to the Houthi-held port of Hodeida, President of the Leadership Council said Wednesday, as Sana'a and other northern provinces witness shortage in fuel supplies.
At his meeting with the UN special envoy for Yemen, President Rashad al-Alimi denied claims recently made by the Houthi group that some oil tankers had been seized and denied access to Hodeida port.
The government is determined to give the Houthi group no chance to blackmail the international community, the Yemeni leader told Hans Grundberg, according to the Aden-based Saba.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-30861.html
and
(A P)
Riyadh welcomes Yemeni government approval of fuel ships to enter Hodeidah
Saudi Arabia's Foreign Ministry on Friday welcomed the statement issued by the legitimate Yemeni government on the exceptional approval of allowing fuel ships to enter into Hodeidah port provided that legal measures will be completed in line with a UN mechanism.
My comment: Why the Aden government still is given any influence on this matter?
(A P)
Aggression coalition seizes new fuel ship
The aggression coalition, led by America and with the participation of the United Nations," continues to violate the temporary truce, by seizing the diesel ship “Daytona” despite being inspected and obtaining entry permits from the United Nations.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3201846.htm
(A P)
US-led aggression coalition seizes two new petrol ships
The Yemeni Petroleum Company on Tuesday said that the US-Saudi aggression coalition seized two petrol ships despite being inspected and obtaining entry permits from the United Nations.
The company's spokesman Issam Al-Mutawakel told the Yemeni News Agency (Saba) that the US-led aggression coalition, in partnership with the United Nations, continues to violate the temporary truce by seizing the two petrol ships "Super Emerald and Ocean Automen", which have
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3201639.htm
(A P)
YPC: Aggression coalition seizes new diesel ship
The Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) said on Monday that the US-Saudi aggression coalition seized a new diesel ship, bringing the number of held fuel ships to 10.
official spokesman for the company Issam Al-Mutawakel told the Yemeni News Agency (Saba) that the aggression coalition, led by the USA and in partnership with the United Nations, continues to violate the truce and is holding the diesel ship "Princess Halima" and forcing it to head to the detention area off the coast of Jizan despite being inspected and granted an entry permit.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3201473.htm
and also https://en.ypagency.net/271555/
(B P)
$11 million fines for delaying fuel vessels seized by the aggression during the armistice period
The Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) reiterated the continuation of the US-led aggression coalition in piracy on all fuel ships, without exception, and their detention since the temporary truce announcement.
The company stated in a statement issued by it, received by the Yemeni News Agency (Saba), that the fuel ships are still being held by the aggression coalition for varying periods, a total of 314 days since the announcement of the temporary armistice agreement, in addition to the delay period in Djibouti for a total period of more than 152 days, pending Inspection and obtaining entry permits to Hodeida ports from the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism.
The company stressed in its statment that during the temporary truce period (April-September), only 33 fuel vessels out of 54 vessels reached Hodeida ports, of which only 4 were released on August 2, at the end of the first extension period of the temporary truce.
According to the statement, no fuel vessel was released during the second extension of the temporary truce.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3201142.htm
(A P)
YPC: Aggression coalition seized 4 fuel vessels
The Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) reported on Thursday that the US-Saudi aggression has seized 4 fuel vessels, in a new violation of the temporary armistice.
The aggression coalition seized 2 diesel ships and 2 gasoline ships, bringing the number of the seized ships to 9, said Esam al-Mutawakil, the company's official spokesman.
He stressed that all the detained ships were cleared by the United Nations.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3201005.htm
and also https://debriefer.net/en/news-30786.html
(A P)
UN involved in seizing oil tankers: Sana'a YPC
The United Nations has colluded with the Saudi-led coalition in breaking the UN-brokered truce, and effectively participated in seizing the oil tankers, the Houthi-run Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) said Friday.
The Arab coalition persistently practiced piracy against, and seized all oil tankers since the truce started, apart from the delay in Djibouti waiting for UN inspection and clearance, the YPC added in a statement carried by the Sana'a-based Saba.
Out of 54, 33 oil tankers only arrived at Hodeida port, including 4 vessels that were released on 2 August, at the end of the truce's first extension, the statement read.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-30798.html
and also https://en.ypagency.net/271351/
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
(* B H)
Floods in Yemen upend lives for tens of thousands already fleeing brutal conflict
Since April, flash floods have ravaged critical infrastructure including roads, water sources and health-care centres. Of the over 300,000 people estimated to be affected by the emergency, over half of them are women and girls, many of whom have already been displaced multiple times and are in a vulnerable physical and psychological state.
To reach those displaced by the flooding, UNFPA is leading a humanitarian multi-agency Rapid Response Mechanism, together with UNICEF and WFP. Teams are distributing kits containing women’s clothing and essential hygiene items such as soap and sanitary pads, along with jerry cans and ready-to-eat food. Each kit is designed to cover a family's basic necessities for five to seven days and help alleviate their ordeal.
The UNFPA-led Rapid Response Mechanism has been activated in 16 flood-affected governorates and more than 100 districts across Yemen. Since mid-July, over 50,000 people have been reached with distributions thanks to financial contributions by the European Union, USAID and the Yemen Humanitarian Fund, and thousands have been referred on to health and protection services.
But a severe funding shortfall means even essential programmes have been scaled back, endangering the lives especially of pregnant women, newborns and gender-based violence survivors, as services are cut and care staff can’t reach those in urgent need of support. As of September 2022, UNFPA had received only one-third of the $100 million required to ensure reproductive health and protection assistance to millions of women and girls in Yemen.
(B H K)
Film: This is how people of #Yemen suffering to reach their villages because the main roads have been cut by warriors, imaginable how could anyone reach hospital if his wife about to give birth or if his little kid needs emergency treatment !!
https://twitter.com/MohammedHojily/status/1567897508063461376
(A H P)
Kuwaiti-funded water project launched in Yemen
http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=3052629&language=en#
(B H)
Danish Refugee Council: Children in Yemen Are Victims of the Adults’ War
Every day in war-torn Yemen, children are killed or seriously injured by stray bullets, shrapnel or land mines. We're trying to help as many as we can. Little Lamees had the shrapnel removed from his leg - but not everyone is so lucky.
Every day, mothers and fathers in Yemen live with the fear that their children will be seriously injured, either by the stray bullets of civil war or by shrapnel and buried mines. And with good reason: Every month, children are killed by active warfare. More are seriously wounded.
With donated funds, our local staff managed to cover the operation and the subsequent hospital treatment. So now Lamees can run and play with her two siblings again.
Still, the family had to pay a heavy price. Wisam was sacked because he had to look after Lamees while she was in hospital.
(B H)
Yemeni Development Network for NGOs (YDN) Monthly Bulletin, April, May & June 2022
(AB H)
Yemen: Education Cluster Coverage and GAP Analysis (as of July 2022)
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-education-cluster-coverage-and-gap-analysis-july-2022
Yemen: Increased Inclusive Classroom Capacity (as of July 2022)
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-increased-inclusive-classroom-capacity-july-2022
Yemen: Education Cluster School Learning Materials (as of July 2022)
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-education-cluster-school-learning-materials-july-2022
(B H)
Rights Group Warns 2.5mln Children, 1.5mln Mothers Suffer from Malnutrition in Yemen
In a statement on Thursday, cited by Yemen’s Arabic-language Al-Masirah television network, the Yemen-based Entesaf Organization for Women and Child Rights said more than 2.3 million children under the age of five as well as 1.5 million pregnant and lactating mothers suffer from malnutrition.
According to the report, acute malnutrition is threatening the lives of some 632,000 children across Yemen.
(A B H)
USAID: Yemen: USG Response to the Complex Emergency (Last Updated 09/09/22)
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-usg-response-complex-emergency-last-updated-090922
Yemen - Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #11, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022
A WFP-chartered vessel transporting 37,000 MT of USAID/BHA- and Howard G. Buffett Foundation funded wheat grain destined for Yemen departed Ukraine on August 30, amid worsening food security conditions across Yemen.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-complex-emergency-fact-sheet-11-fiscal-year-fy-2022
(A H)
USAID supports lifesaving interventions for women and girls in Yemen with a US$7 million grant to UNFPA
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance announced a contribution of US$7 million to UNFPA, the United Nations Population Fund, to provide emergency relief and life-saving reproductive health and protection services to nearly half a million vulnerable women and girls in Yemen.
https://yemen.unfpa.org/en/news/usaid-grants-7-million-lifesaving-interventions-yemen
(* B E H)
Film: War, withdrawal of government subsidies devastate agriculture
Farmland in Lahij, one of the most important agricultural governorates in southern Yemen, has declined significantly in comparison with years before the outbreak of the war in 2015. According to statistics issued by the Ministry of Agriculture in 2018, the area of arable land in the governorate had amounted to 26,390 hectares with about 55,570 farmers. Now the Al-Hussaini farms in Lahj, which were known for their cultivation of bananas, fruits, and vegetables have turned into barren areas. Farmers told A24 that the underlying causes of land degradation were war induced population flight , high diesel prices for running irrigation systems, and the government removing all subsidies for farmers.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c4gnsppjnXI
(B H)
Yemen: Data in Emergencies Monitoring (DIEM-Monitoring) brief, round 4 - Results and recommendations - August 2022
Households were surveyed across all 22 governorates of Yemen.
A survey targeting 2 420 households was initially designed with 110 households targeted in each of the 22 governorates. The sample was representative of the population of Yemen and of the governorates (Admin 1) with a 95 percent confidence level and a 6 percent margin of error. A total of 2 452 households were interviewed during this fourth round of data collection, 66 percent of which were engaged in agricultural activities (crop, livestock and both), and 2 percent of which were engaged in fish production and sales in the 12 months preceding the survey. This fourth-round survey was the first to be representative at both the national and governorate level in Yemen.
https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc1897en
(B H)
Serving as a CHV Transforms a Young Yemeni Woman
Our community health volunteers use their access and local knowledge to help us mobilize residents and protect them from public health risks
Our community health volunteers (CHVs) in Yemen contribute immensely to the humanitarian care we provide to tens of thousands of Yemenis each year whose lives have been turned upside down by war and displacement. The volunteers’ ability to use their access and local knowledge to help us mobilize residents in efforts to protect them from public health risks—whether they live in centuries old urban neighborhoods, remote villages or temporary displacement camps—make them the backbone of our water, sanitation and hygiene programs. This is especially important in Yemen, which in recent years has suffered major outbreaks of communicable disease, including cholera and diphtheria.
I’ve also learned that those who serve as CHVs often find that the experience helps them as well. The story of a shy young woman named Rezk Allah, whom we selected twice to volunteer for us in her hometown of Ibb, stands as an example of just how life-changing the work can be for the volunteers themselves.
https://internationalmedicalcorps.org/story/yemen-blog-chv/
(A H)
MONA Relief: Today, on International Day of Charity, we would like to thank everyone who supports our work and makes it possible for us to save lives of our people in #Yemen Pictures taken today during providing IDPs meals & clean water in Sana'a by @monarelief (photos)
https://twitter.com/Fatikr/status/1566798937025028100
(B H)
Film: Yemen – Brutal jobs landscape forces college graduates into menial work
Unemployment among young people in Aden has risen at an alarming rate due to the ongoing war in Yemen; obtaining a university degree is no longer an advantage for having a decent job. Grarduate Abdo Naji Qassem told A24 that instead of finding meaningful work after university he is selling eggs and potatoes on the streets of Aden. This led many to work in jobs different from their majors at low wages to make money, which created a gap between the outputs of universities and the needs of the labor market and led to frustration among young people that many decided not to pursue their degrees.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SI6fzFt_Mgk
(B E H)
Global wheat supply dynamics and their impact
Import data and anecdotal evidence from sources in Yemen monitoring local market dynamics indicate that there are sufficient wheat supplies in the country. Wheat is readily available for purchase. The problem is affordability.
International wheat prices started decreasing at the end of June 2022 and decreased further after the signing of a grain export agreement between Russia and Ukraine on 22 July. The reduction in international wheat prices is expected to result in increased imports to Yemen in the coming months, as traders look to take advantage. Wheat imports to the ports of Aden and Mukalla (Southern ports) controlled by the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG) had already increased in July compared to the previous two months. Overall, the monthly average between March–July 2022 was 5% above average for the Red Sea ports (Al Hodeidah and Saleef) and 16% lower for the Southern ports.
Given increased global competition over wheat imports and the challenges that Yemeni importers have been facing even before the war in Ukraine (including financial and logistical constraints), the international community needs to provide additional support to Yemen to prevent the food security situation in the country from deteriorating further.
(B H)
Yemen Humanitarian Update - Issue 8/ August 2022
HIGHLIGHTS
An unstable economy worsens an already alarming food insecurity situation
Aid agencies continue to deliver
Critical health care programme faces closure
Empowering displaced families via cash assistance
In Yemen, humanitarian workers save lives every day
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-update-issue-8-august-2022
(B H)
Map: Yemen: Access Constraints as of 31 August 2022
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-access-constraints-31-august-2022
(A H)
In partnership with UNHCR and HUMAN ACCESS, Bazara’ah Mother and Child Camp was concluded in Aden
Bazara’ah Mother and Child Camp this year targeted 100 women and 100 children from refugees, asylum seekers, and the local community, at the UNHCR Health Centre in Al-Basatin area, Dar Sa’ad District, Aden Governorate.
https://humanaccess.org/m/news/bazara%E2%80%99ah-mother-and-child-camp-was-concluded-in-aden
(A H)
Delivery of economic empowerment grants to 28 beneficiary women
HUMAN ACCESS, in Seiyun, Hadhramaut Governorate, distributed economic empowerment grants to 28 beneficiary women.
https://humanaccess.org/m/news/delivery-of-economic-empowerment-grants-to-28-beneficiary-women
(A H)
Concluding Surgery Camp for ocular patients by targeting more than 80 patients
The Surgery Camp for Ocular Patients, established by HUMAN ACCESS and funded by Sadaka Organization, was concluded in Taiz Governorate by targeting more than 80 patients over two weeks, in partnership with Al-Ta’awun Hospital.
(A H)
Providing medical supplies to the Health Center in Shaheer, Maternity and Childhood Center in Mayfa’a
Under the project “Reproductive Health Support Services”, implemented by HUMAN ACCESS and funded by United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in Hadhramaut Governorate, Health Center in Shaheer and the Maternity and Childhood Center in Mayfa’a were provided with medicines and medical supplies, including tools and supplies designated for obstetric and emergency awards, family planning methods, free emergency medicines, and lab materials.
(A H)
Al-Ghaydah Central Hospital was provided with medicines and medical supplies
As part of the UNFPA -supported Reproductive Health Services Support Project, Al-Ghaydah Central Hospital in Al-Mahra Governorate has been provided with medicines and medical supplies mainly to the Department of Reproductive Health.
(A H)
Funded by iHH Foundation, inaugurating the largest Educational Compound in Taiz Governorate
(B H)
Yemen: Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP) 2022 - Funding Status (01 September 2022)
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
(* B H)
Floods in Yemen upend lives for tens of thousands already fleeing brutal conflict
Since April, flash floods have ravaged critical infrastructure including roads, water sources and health-care centres. Of the over 300,000 people estimated to be affected by the emergency, over half of them are women and girls, many of whom have already been displaced multiple times and are in a vulnerable physical and psychological state.
To reach those displaced by the flooding, UNFPA is leading a humanitarian multi-agency Rapid Response Mechanism, together with UNICEF and WFP. Teams are distributing kits containing women's clothing and essential hygiene items such as soap and sanitary pads, along with jerry cans and ready-to-eat food. Each kit is designed to cover a family's basic necessities for five to seven days and help alleviate their ordeal.
After almost eight years of conflict and with rising climate disasters, a staggering 23 million people in Yemen need immediate humanitarian assistance. Millions have lost their homes, the economy has collapsed and the health system is barely functioning.
Of the 4.3 million people displaced within Yemen, more than three-quarters are women and children. Some 1.3 million women are currently pregnant, of whom nearly 200,000 are at risk of developing life-threatening complications yet have only precarious -- if any -- access to reproductive health services.
The UNFPA-led Rapid Response Mechanism has been activated in 16 flood-affected governorates and more than 100 districts across Yemen. Since mid-July, over 50,000 people have been reached with distributions thanks to financial contributions by the European Union, USAID and the Yemen Humanitarian Fund, and thousands have been referred on to health and protection services.
But a severe funding shortfall means even essential programmes have been scaled back, endangering the lives especially of pregnant women, newborns and gender-based violence survivors, as services are cut and care staff can't reach those in urgent need of support. As of September 2022, UNFPA had received only one-third of the $100 million required to ensure reproductive health and protection assistance to millions of women and girls in Yemen.
https://www.unfpa.org/news/floods-yemen-upend-lives-tens-thousands-already-fleeing-brutal-conflict
(A H)
Film: Mona Relief team participates IDPs the celebration ofInternational Day of the Charity in Sana'a
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OOx1RjrtVFU
(A H)
Huge fire breaks out in displaced camp in Marib
A huge fire broke out on Monday in one of the camps for displaced people south of the city of Marib.
According to a brief statement issued by the executive unit of the administration of displaced persons camps of coalition government in the province, a fire broke out in the shelter of the displaced Saddam Hussein Mohammed Abdullah Al-Sharafi, in the seventh sector of the camp of Al-jafina.
According to the statement, the fire caused destruction of all belongings of the displaced family of furniture, bedding and kitchen utensils.
https://en.ypagency.net/271566/
(A H)
Urgent assistance alleviates the suffering of IDPs and those affected by the torrential rains in Marib
Partnering with Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), HUMAN ACCESS provided food assistance to the flood-affected needy and IDP households, in Al Jufainah Camp in Marib Governorate.
Food baskets were distributed to 405 households
(B H)
Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, covering the period from 05 August to 19 August 2022
UNHCR and partners continue to address the needs of displaced families affected by heavy rains and sandstorms. During the reporting period, UNHCR's partners assessed more than 9,222 displaced families in several IDP sites 3,232 HH in Sana'a, 695 HH in Ibb, 3,052 HH in AlHoudaydah, 945 HH in Saada and 1,298 HH in Marib.
(B H)
Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, covering the period from 28 July to 4 August 2022
As heavy rains, floodings and sandstorms continue, UNHCR and partners are assessing the affected households and coordinating to provide an adequate response throughout the country. 1,881 displaced families in several IDP sites in Dhamar and Albayda governorates were assessed, and 21 shelters were found fully damaged. In Marib, over 730 shelters were either totally or partially affected. In Sa’ada province, 200 households in six hosting sites were referred to IOM and partners for a coordinated response through the distribution of Emergency Shelter Kits. In Sana’a Governorate, the 2,279 affected households.
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
Siehe / Look at cp1
(A P)
Spokesman of Yemen’s Ansarullah thanks Iran’s political, humanitarian assistance for Yemen
(* B P)
Return of fuel crisis to Sanaa threatens efforts of extending the truce
President Mahdi Al-Mashat will consult with members of the Supreme Political Council on taking "an appropriate decision if fuel ships will not be released by the Saudi coalition."
"The United Nations is happy watching Yemenis suffering even during its sponsored ceasefire that claims it alleviated our sufferings," said Saleh, 39.
"The UN is in cahoots with Saudi Arabia," he noted. "Saudi Arabia destroyed Yemen and caused the world's worst humanitarian catastrophe."
The Yemen Petroleum Company in Sanaa activated September 4 "an emergency system" as a need to manage the remaining fuel stock after the Saudi coalition prevented the entry of fuel ships into Hodeidah port since August 2.
The company accused the Saudi-led coalition of detaining 10 fuel ships since the start of the second extension of the UN-brokered truce that went into effect on August 2. It confirmed that no fuel ship has entered since that date.
The company said the detention has cost it $11 million as delay penalties for the ships' owners, a thing that is going to raise the price of fuel for the Yemeni people.
(A P)
The Houthi militia arrest dozens of truck drivers over refusing to pay nefarious taxes./Ayn Almahrah
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-58661
(A P)
As soon as the season for a nefarious tax ends, the Houthi militia launch another season, making the entire year a season of continuous extortion of money under varying banners. Collecting of nefarious taxes has extended to people's private homes IN Sana'a now as neighborhood chieftains there distribute envelops to every household to ask them to donate for the Prophet's Birth celebrations/ Islah Net.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-58661
(A K)
Ministry of Interior Unveils Yemeni-Made Bass 2 Armored Vehicle
The Yemeni Ministry of Interior unveiled Friday, the entry of the Bass 2 armored vehicle into service in security missions, revealing some details about its latest technical equipment.
and also https://en.ypagency.net/271998/
Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GzTxvz_EfAI&t=3s
(A P)
Criminal Court begins trial of accused of kidnapping, killing Judge Humran
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3201824.htm
Remark: Among the general principles of judicial ethics are independence, impartiality and equality, but these were not found in the judiciary, which was clearly biased towards the victim judge by not referring to the motives of the crime that the perpetrator stated in his confession broadcast by the security media, which is the judge’s disavowal to pay the perpetrator’s money.
https://twitter.com/Naseh_Shaker/status/1568678451619721216
(* B E P)
Unabhängigkeit durch Selbstversorgung
Jemen: Ansarollah versuchen, heimische Landwirtschaft zu stärken. So soll auch Einfluss Riads minimiert werden
»Eine Hand zum Schutz und eine zum Bauen« – das ist das Motto der 2019 von den Ansarollah (»Huthis«) veröffentlichten »Nationalen Vision für einen modernen jemenitischen Staat«, dem De-facto-Manifest der Organisation. Wie auch in anderen Verlautbarungen der Führungsriege wird darin die Stärkung der jemenitischen Landwirtschaft zum zentralen Ziel erklärt. So soll die Abhängigkeit von humanitärer Hilfe und internationalen Geldgebern wie der Weltbank verringert und langfristig beendet werden. Vor allem aber soll verhindert werden, dass der Jemen ein weiteres Mal in den Würgegriff seines großen Nachbarn Saudi-Arabien gerät und von Riad als dessen »Hinterhof« behandelt wird.
Zwar war die jemenitische Landwirtschaft – bis die saudische Kriegskoalition Anbauflächen in Brachland verwandelte, Wasserpumpen und Generatoren zerstörte und sich die Preise für Lebensmittel, aber auch für Saatgut, Treibstoff und Düngemittel stark verteuerten – einer der profitabelsten Sektoren […]
(A K P)
Al-Shami: Preparing the Yemeni Army to have a role in Palestine
Information Minister of the Yemeni National Salvation Government Daifallah Al-Shami stresses that any attack against Yemen will be met with a response.
In an interview with Al Mayadeen, Information Minister of the Yemeni National Salvation Government Daifallah Al-Shami confirmed that calling the military parade "The Promise of the Hereafter" confirms "Yemen's connection with Palestine."
Al-Shami said, "We are preparing our Yemeni army and people to have a role in the nation's issues, especially in the liberation of Palestine," adding that "Yemen is not a country that can be subject to normalization with Israel."
Regarding the selection of the city of Al-Hudaydah as a site for the military parade, Al-Shami said, "it is a message to the forces of aggression that the efforts to destroy Yemen have failed."
Al-Shami stressed that Yemen will respond to any aggression, saying, "if any attack on Yemen from any side whatsoever occurs, it is our legitimate right to respond, and we have the ability to do so."
(A P)
Head of National Delegation: Yemen adopts fighting arrogance led by US and Israel, refuse to normalize with Israeli enemy
and https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/28244/Abdulsalam-Yemen-Refuses-to-Normalize-with-Israeli-Enemy
(A P)
Houthi gunmen broke into Al-Shaab Public School in Ibb Governorate and beat teacher Salah Al-Majidi in front his students Firthermore, they made one of the students slap him in the face in front of his classmates
https://twitter.com/RiyadhAldubai/status/1567466078481039360
(A E P)
Foreign Ministry warns against concluding any agreements or oil projects in occupied territories
An official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said: "The ministry has sent letters to all foreign ministries of the member states of the United Nations, confirming that any agreements or projects undertaken by the countries of aggression or the government loyal to it are null and void, and have no legal status."
The official added that "the illegality of agreement lies in the fact that the Republic of Yemen has been subjected to military aggression and a comprehensive siege since March 26, 2015".
The official pointed out that the messages confirmed that "some of the actions taken by the oil companies that fall within the scope of the Republic of Yemen are in violation of the laws, which will compel the National Salvation Government to take all legal measures, whether at the present time or in the post-aggression stage."
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3201749.htm
(A P)
Parliament condemns crimes of torture of prisoners in aggression's jails
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3201767.htm
My comment: This is odd. Care for torture in Sanaa gov. prisons first, others second.
(A P)
Yesterday, Qais Naji (the left), Houthi director of Dhawran district, Dhamar governorate, was killed during infighting with another Houthi leader "Abu Rashad" (the right). Three others were injured too.
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1567284138398433288
(A H P)
The Ministry of Education in #Sana'a claimed that the so-called community contribution fees are voluntary, not mandatory. The Sadaq platform verified the matter - on the ground - and it was found that the fees are not voluntary, but rather mandatory. in the link below; We give examples of some of the schools we were able to visit (document in Arabic)
https://twitter.com/SidqYem/status/1566048954625712128
With community contribution fees, male/female students pay the transportation allowance to the laboratory, and the amounts of school cultural events that honor death are deducted every morning. Fees are compulsory and families have to choose between their children to continue their education, and you can imagine the extent of the disaster for families with at least 4 children!
https://twitter.com/HanaShowafi/status/1566337730363154433
(A E P)
Back to fuel queuing and daily schedule of available stations. 40 liters is allowed per car, only every 6 days! This is impacting everyone, prices are high already! I don't understand why millions of people have to endure this for years, silently (document in Arabic)
https://twitter.com/HanaShowafi/status/1566155983264661505
The “blockade” was just an excuse for fuel shortage. Houthis create a fuel crisis to force people to buy from their black market. After all, they are preparing for the next phase of the war & that requires $$$$$$$
https://twitter.com/Ndawsari/status/1566324295109935105
(A P)
For Houthi sympathizers, you accept that your children chant Houthi slogan (God is the Greatest, death to America, death to Israel, Cures on the Jews, Victory to Islam) at schools everyday? (document in Arabic)
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1567661977052352514
(A P)
Houthis sack a high school female student for refusing to chant the terrorist militia's "death rally cry during the morning assembly./Multiple websites.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-58593
(A P)
15 deceived soldiers [defectors], leaders return home
The National Center for Returnees received on Sunday 15 soldiers and leaders who were fighting against Yemen's sovereignty.
Deputy Foreign Minister Hussein al-Ezzi welcomed the returnees
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3201379.htm
(A K P)
Verteidigungsminister: Jemen wird Feinde überwältigen, wenn saudisch-geführte Koalition Waffenstillstand nicht einhält
(A K P)
Yemen to Overwhelm Enemies if Saudi-Led Coalition Fails to Hold on to Truce
The Yemeni defense minister says his country is fully prepared for an all-out war with the Saudi-led coalition, warning the invading countries that they would be bewildered by the advanced capabilities of the Yemeni armed forces if they continue the war.
Major General Mohammad al-Atifi made the remarks during a Monday meeting with Mahdi al-Mashat, head of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council, Yemeni media outlets reported.
(* B K P)
Military Parade of Yemen's Army, Messages to US-Saudi Aggression
The military parade organized by the Sana’a forces in the city of Hodeidah was not an ordinary one. Rather, it came loaded with messages and indications, both after merging the “popular Committees” with the army, or in terms of equipment in light of the discovery of new military capabilities that were not previously available to the Yemeni forces.
It is certain that this offer, with its strategic location, special timing and qualitative events, will have an impact on the Saudi-Emirati alliance and its sponsors, and even with Israel.
Contrary to what the Saudi-Emirati alliance expected, Sanaa's forces did not relent during the humanitarian truce, which was extended three times and entered its sixth month. Rather, these forces were able, during the mentioned period, to develop their skills and enhance their defensive capabilities with modern weapons that were lacking in the past years.
This was clearly evident in the successive military parades organized by the Ministry of Defense in the Salvation Government, the military leaders in the central region
However, the last show in the city of Hodeidah, which is considered the largest since the start of the war, seemed different and loaded with multiple messages to the "coalition" and its international sponsors, as well as the Israeli enemy.
More than 25,000 soldiers and officers from the Fifth Military region, the Navy, the Victory Brigades, the Air Force and the Air Defense participated in it, to confirm their full readiness for any potential confrontation on the coast of Hodeidah or the rest of the areas of the west coast, which were restored late last year.
In addition to the large number of participants, the show had multiple military connotations, as it took place in a strategic city on the Red Sea, and during which it revealed a leap in the military capabilities of Sanaa, at a time when the "coalition" failed to integrate the militias loyal to it in the southern governorates.
(A K P)
Sanaa forces reveal specifications of missiles recently displayed in Hodeida
https://en.ypagency.net/271486/
(A P)
National Resilience Program Completes Efforts of 7 Years of Confronting US-Saudi Aggression
Prime Minister of the National Salvation Government Abdulaziz bin Habtoor said on Sunday that the National Resilience Program completes the efforts of seven years of confrontation with the US-Saudi aggression.
He explained that the Army's military parades did not come out of nowhere and were a manifestation of the revolutionary leadership's efforts to build, develop and modernize.
Bin Habtoor warned of the plans to divide Yemen, pointing that unity for Yemen is a title for national dignity.
(A K P)
Advanced Naval Missiles Unveiled During “The Promise of the Hereafter” Military Parade
The Yemeni Armed Forces have revealed advanced naval missiles capable of hitting any point in the sea from any region in Yemen’s geography, manufactured by Yemeni expertise.
During the military parade “The Promise of the Hereafter”, the Yemeni Naval Force unveils a new locally-made land-to-sea missile, Falaq 1, that can reach any point in the sea from any Yemeni governorate.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3201309.htm
Photos: https://en.ypagency.net/271234/
(A P)
Film: Leader_of_Revolution_Warns_US_Saudi_Aggression_Not_to_pass_Truce
(A P)
Film: Sayyed Abdulmalik Stresses Quest to Maintain Internal Stability
(A P)
Mahdi al-Mashat: niemand fähig, Einheit in Jemen zu unterminieren
Auf einer Zeremonie am Sonntag sagte Mahdi al-Mashat, dass die jemenitische Armee darauf gefasst sei, allen Problemen und Schwierigkeiten entgegenzutreten, um das Land zu verteidigen.
https://iqna.ir/de/news/3006812/mahdi-al-mashat-niemand-f%C3%A4hig-einheit-in-jemen-zu-unterminieren
(A P)
Film: Leader of Revolution [wrong: president] Warns US-Saudi Aggression Not to pass Truce Opportunity, Advises Yemenis to Raise Level of Readiness
(A P)
Leader revolution confirms continuing to work on building Yemeni army, military capabilities
Revolution leader Sayyed Abdul al-Houthi has renewed the call for the aggression to seize the opportunity of the truce to stop the aggression completely and to end the siege Yemen and occupation.
At the huge ceremony of the military parade of the Fifth Military region, that includes Victory Brigades, Naval Forces, Coastal Defense, Air Force and Air Defense today in Hodeida province, the Leader said "The Promise of the Hereafter Show", that the aggression countries must absorb the lessons that have been demonstrated during the eight years that show conclusively the impossibility of occupation of Yemen, the control and humilitation of its people".
Al-Houthi added: "In this parade , e confirm that the Yemeni army has reached in its steadfastness and sacrifices, building its military capabilities and developing its combat skills in its various regions sent important messages that the enemies' efforts to destroy the capabilities and steadfastness of the Yemeni army have failed."
He continued, "Today, the Yemeni army is stronger than ever
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3201126.htm
https://debriefer.net/en/news-30785.html
Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AloHYeXI-rU = https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oBlHU08pNKk
(A P)
Jemens Ansarullah-Führer: Die Bestrebungen der Feinde verwandeln sich in Illusionen
Der Leiter der Volkswiderstandsbewegung Ansarullah im Jemen gab an, die Feinde seien bei ihrem Versuch, das Land zu besetzen, gescheitert.
„Die Bestrebungen der Feinde, unser Land zu besetzen und unser Volk zu kontrollieren, verwandeln sich in Trugbilder und Enttäuschungen …“, sagte Abdul-Malik al-Houthi während einer Rede am Donnerstag, berichtete der libanesische Fernsehsender al-Mayadeen.
„Der Feind ist heute in echten Schwierigkeiten, da unser Volk loyal und entschlossen zu seiner Armee steht, um zu verhindern, dass der Feind unser Land besetzt“, fügte er hinzu.
(A P)
Top Yemeni judge abducted, killed in Sanaa
Judge abducted by unidentified gunmen in Sanaa
A prominent Yemeni judge was killed on Thursday, one day after being kidnapped in the rebel-held capital Sanaa.
Muhammad Hamran, a member of the Supreme Court, Yemen’s highest judicial authority, was abducted by unidentified gunmen outside his house in Sanaa on Wednesday. Local media later said the judge was killed.
In a statement, Yemeni Information Minister Moammar Al-Eryani blamed a Houthi-affiliated armed group for Hamran’s abduction and killing.
The killing “came after a systematic campaign of incitement against Hamran by Houthi-run media,” Al-Eryani said.
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/top-yemeni-judge-abducted-killed-in-sanaa/2674725
and
(A P)
Ministry of Interior reveals details on crime of kidnapping, murdering Judge Mohammed Humran
“Security forces raided the kidnappers’ hideout, and found the body of Judge Mohammed Humran lying on the ground with multiple gunshot wounds. He had been shot in the head. The security forces were able to arrest the defendants who were in the house,” he said in a statement.
The spokesman pointed out that the defendants kidnapped Judge Humran after he left his house in the neighborhood of Al-Asbahi, took him to a house in the Hadda area, and killed him when the security forces arrived and besieged the house.
Al-Ajri said: “By collecting inferences and confessions of the defendants, the crime occurred as a result of previous disputes land and private disputes between the defendants and Judge Mohammed Humran.”
He added that “the police handed over the arrested defendants to the prosecution to start investigating them, and then refer them to trial, as a warning to others who might harm the security and stability of the country.”
https://en.ypagency.net/271308/
and
(A P)
Supreme Judicial Council condemns kidnapping, assassination of Supreme Court member
The Supreme Judicial Council on Thursday strongly condemned and denounced the crime of kidnapping and murdering the member of the Supreme Court, Judge Mohammed Ahmed Humran.
https://en.ypagency.net/271160/
and
(A P)
Daughter of judge Humran: "While I and my family are still horrified by the murder of my father … the murderer (Houthi figure) Mohammed Al-Emad is still bragging of his grisly crime)./Yemeni Sport website
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-58549
and
(A P)
Sanaa courts in rare protest after killing of senior judge
Courts in Houthi-held Sanaa were paralyzed on Saturday as Yemen’s judges went on strike in an attempt to force the Iran-backed militia to charge those involved in the killing of a senior judge last week, residents said.
Khaled Al-Kamal, a Sanaa-based lawyer who visited three courts on Saturday, told Arab News that they were empty as judges and administrative workers refused to work in a rare protest against the killing, as well as low and unpaid salaries and meddling by powerful Houthi figures.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/35577
(A P)
Racism and hatred: Houthis kill a marginalized [black of African origin] Yemeni man as he sought to have his dead relative buried in a cemetery belong to the terror group in Sana'a./Sawt Al-Watan
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-58522
(A P)
A brainwashed Houthi militant has killed his youngest brother in Amran norther governorate, a year after he killed his eldest brother/Multiple websites
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-58522
(B P)
Yemeni organization.. How did organizations in Yemen turn into revenue funds to support the Houthis?
Since the first moment of its control over the capital, Sanaa, in September 2014, the Houthi militia has been seeking to dominate all state institutions, including local and international civil society organizations. This Iranian militia was working on blackmailing the organizations and refusing to renew their work permits except after implementing the militia’s conditions, which require that the organizations’ projects be harnessed for the benefit of their militia work, whether they were individuals or institutions.
The editor surveyed the views of some civil work leaders in Sana’a, who confirmed that their role in Houthi-controlled areas has become limited to issuing statements of support, denunciation, demand or asking for assistance in accordance with the Houthi militia’s directives that obligate them to do so, as well as forcing them to adopt sectarian positions that are completely incompatible with the values of civil and humanitarian work.
They emphasized that the militia is now blackmailing organizations on every sectarian and religious occasion that they celebrate throughout the year, forcing these organizations and institutions to fund these events, depriving organizations that refuse to do so from obtaining projects from donors at times, as well as refusing to renew their permits at other times, not to mention having to hundreds of civil institutions have been closed due to the lack of support, and as a result, only Houthi institutions are working and with funding from international organizations.
Not to mention the Houthi coup militia forcing merchants who were spending part of their zakat estimated at 25% in favor of humanitarian work, according to Zakat Law No. 2 of 1999, which stipulated that “a person who gives Zakat, whether natural or legal, has the right to distribute 25% of his total Zakat on the poor and needy.
Instead, the militia forced the merchants to hand over the full zakat to them
Observers believe that the UN organizations operating in Sanaa are being pressured by the Houthi militia to transmit misleading information, calling on the organizations to move their offices to the interim capital of Aden and work with impartiality and professionalism, noting at the same time that some UN reports did not mention the coup of the Iranian-backed Houthi militia against the authorities, controlling the capital Sana'a, looting billions of dollars and committing massacres against civilians.
The above reveals the practices carried out by the Houthi militia in blackmailing international organizations in exchange for the silence of the international organizations regarding these Houthi practices, which are now raising signs of doubt regarding these positions compromising Houthi practices, and the question is: Is UN silence considered an inability in confronting the militia’s tyranny or complicity with it?
https://alislah-ye.net/news_details.php?sid=9445
My remark: By Islah Party; biased.
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp6 – cp19
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-822b-yemen-war-mosaic-822b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-821-yemen-war-mosaic-821
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-821 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-821:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
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