... Internetzugang im Jemen – UN verschärft Waffenembargo gegen Huthis – und mehr
March 5, 2022: Yemen Annual Review 2021 – Western bias over Yemen: Racism and partisanship – UAE faces tough decisions after Houthi attacks – “Atlantic” interview with Saudi crown prince – Internet access in Yemen – UN tightens arms embargo against Houthis – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-792b-yemen-war-mosaic-792b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
cp1b: Am wichtigsten: UN erweitert Waffenemboargo gegen Huthis / Most important: UN tightens arms embargo against Houthis
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp8a Jamal Khashoggi
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp12b Sudan
cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade
cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage
cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy
cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism
cp15 Propaganda
cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
Klassifizierung / Classification
***
**
*
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
(* B K P)
Beyond Ukraine, a devastating war in Yemen not many are talking about
As the developed Europe’s Ukraine war catches global attention, war devastation in Yemen has enough for the world to wake up and prevent what is left of Yemen from perishing in bombing, hunger and disease.
(B H K P)
Yemen
War crimes and crimes against humanity are being committed in Yemen as pro-government forces and a regional military coalition fight against Houthi rebels who still control much of the country.
For seven years civilians in Yemen have suffered from ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Fighting between Houthi forces, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), and forces loyal to the internationally recognized government – as well as airstrikes by a Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE)-led international coalition – has resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians since March 2015. More than 19,000 civilians have been killed or maimed as a result of coalition airstrikes alone, including over 2,300 children. The conflict has displaced at least 4 million people and created the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.
https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/yemen/
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
(** B H K P)
The Graveyard of Hubris – Yemen Annual Review 2021
From Editorial: Delusions of Victory Laid to Rest
Through most of 2021, the armed Houthi movement appeared unstoppable. As their forces pushed relentlessly toward Marib city, the fall of the last government stronghold in the north began to seem inevitable. Rich in oil and gas, its loss would be a mortal blow to the spiraling economy and political legitimacy of the internationally recognized government. Along frontlines across the country, Houthi forces either held their ground or advanced, showing a cohesiveness, discipline and effectiveness unmatched by the motley array of armed groups opposing them. Houthi drones and ballistic missiles flew across the border into Saudi Arabia, and continued even in the face of retaliatory airstrikes, heightening the cost of conflict for the coalition.
Houthi military efforts were buttressed by developments behind the frontlines and beyond Yemen’s borders. A significant threat to the movement emerged and vanished without the Houthis even having to respond. The group was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in January 2021 as a swan song of the Trump administration in Washington, but the decision was rescinded less than a month later by newly inaugurated US President Joe Biden after the United Nations and aid organizations testified it would paralyze humanitarian operations. For Houthi leaders, it was an affirmation of their strategy of holding the wellbeing of the civilian population hostage, giving the international community the poisoned choice of abandoning people in need or propping up the Houthi state. The group has been able to marshal humanitarian assistance to underwrite economic activity in the areas it controls, helping to legitimate its rule and freeing up resources for its war effort. Houthi security forces have successfully suppressed dissent, and an ever-growing number of children and adults are indoctrinated into the group through the rewriting of school curricula and religious teachings at mosques. The economy remained relatively stable in Houthi-held areas, even as searing inflation took hold elsewhere in the country. Its apparent success has furthered the group’s zealotry and sense of impunity, both on display in September with the public executions of eight men and a minor in Sana’a. In sum, the Houthis’ theocratic state-building project continued to gain steam through 2021.
As the year wore on, non-Yemeni stakeholders appeared to abandon hope that Houthi leaders were serious about peace talks.
Executive Summary
Part I: The Year in Politics
Open warfare between the Yemeni government led by President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi and its new junior partner, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), largely quieted in 2021, but their relationship never evolved into a partnership of governance. The fallout from this divide — combined with distrust and hostility that weakened the Islah party, the other key partner within the Hadi government — contributed to the government’s inability to cohesively address a rapidly deteriorating economic situation. As the Yemeni rial plummeted in value throughout 2021, popular protests against rising fuel prices, electricity outages and unpaid salaries roiled southern and central Yemen (see: ‘Declining Currency, Living Standards Spur Unrest’).
In March, one protest, backed by the STC, led to the storming of Aden’s Ma’ashiq Palace, the seat of government. In Hadramawt, on March 30, security forces west of Mukalla city fired on demonstrators, killing one civilian, and leading to the declaration of a state of emergency by Hadramawt’s governor. Protests also occurred in Taiz, beginning in late May, against the local governor, and in mid-September large demonstrations broke out across southern Yemen.
Protesters did not spare the Hadi government’s smaller factions in areas where they dominated local authorities. While the STC painted itself as supportive of the protests, it also cracked down on some of them in Aden; the demonstrations of 2021 were largely a grassroots effort to express outrage at Yemen’s political elites, whatever party or movement they belonged to. Popular protests in Shabwa escalated dramatically against the pro-Islah local authority in the final months of the year; accusations of corruption and poor performance on the battlefield combined with the economic pressure. Ultimately, Hadi fired Shabwa’s pro-Islah governor, Mohammed bin Adio, on December 25. Awadh bin al-Wazir al-Awlaqi, a tribal leader and General People’s Congress member of parliament, replaced him. Al-Awlaqi had been living in the UAE before returning to Shabwa to lead the protest movement (see: ‘The Shabwa Protest Movement and Bin Adio’s Fall’). The turnover highlighted Islah’s diminishing status politically as well as militarily, and furthered the STC-UAE ascent.
The STC’s confidence grew through the year, in part owing to its ability to capitalize on the political and military misfortunes of the Islah party and the more active involvement of the UAE. The return to Aden in May of STC leader Aiderous al-Zubaidi showcased the group’s confidence in its position in the government’s interim capital, and the STC’s leadership was not willing to compromise with the government to implement the remaining provisions of the December 2019 Riyadh Agreement that gave them a formal share of power. Both the government and the STC have obstructed implementation of provisions such as the appointment of new governors for most southern governorates, the redeployment of the majority of government and STC armed forces away from Aden, and the incorporation of STC military and security units into the ministries of Defense and Interior (see: ‘Status Update: The Riyadh Agreement’).
The inclusion of STC members in the Yemeni cabinet was a provision of the Riyadh Agreement, which had been implemented in late 2020. Prime Minister Maeen Abdelmalek Saeed had declared three priorities at the start of the new administration: reform of the economy; an end to the deterioration of the currency; and a fight against corruption. However, the prime minister often worked from outside Aden during the cabinet’s first year and, even when based in Yemen, the government was largely ineffective (see: ‘A ‘Unity Cabinet’ with Myriad Problems, Minimal Presence’).
While Saeed has been largely unsuccessful in implementing policies that would solve some of the economic problems crippling Yemen, he has sought to establish some independence from President Hadi; there has been notable friction between the two, according to political insiders. Saeed represents a separate power center in the government, with his rise coming at the expense of Hadi and Islah. A large part of this has been thanks to Saeed’s own good relations with Saudi Arabia and UAE, the latter which he has visited, unlike Hadi.
Houthis Focus on Consolidating their Position as a Governing Authority
The Houthis have taken advantage of being relatively secure in the areas under their control to focus on entrenching their rule and with it a quasi-restoration of the Zaidi Imamate that ruled northern Yemen prior to 1962. The Houthis’ multi-pronged approach to this focused on education, persecution and the consolidation of power in the hands of Houthi loyalists (see: ‘Houthis Shore Up Mechanisms of State’).
Through the educational system they control in northern Yemen, the Houthis have been able to indoctrinate young people in their ideology. They have changed the curriculum to emphasize concepts such as “defending the homeland” and the history of Yemen’s Zaidi imams. Additionally, the movement has employed extra-curricular education programs to preach their ideology to children, and, as local human rights organizations have argued, to recruit fighters (see: ‘Educational Indoctrination and Child Recruitment‘).
Emboldened with their success on the frontlines through much of 2021, the Houthis were able to persecute rivals with impunity, even civilians of whom they disapproved. In February, a Yemeni model, Intisar al-Hammadi, was detained along with three other women. Ignoring the criticism this unleashed on social media and from human rights organizations, the Houthis sentenced the women in November to up to five years in prison for indecency. An even more chilling event took place in September, when eight men and a teenager were publicly executed in the center of Sana’a, after being found guilty by a Houthi court of their involvement in the April 2018 drone strike that killed then-president of the Houthis’ Supreme Political Council, Saleh al-Sammad. The men were tortured during their time in detention, and the teenager, Abdulaziz Ali al-Aswad, was partially paralyzed by the time of his execution (see: ‘Consolidating Power, Spreading Fear’).
The Houthis also began to install more of their loyalists, particularly those from Sa’ada, in high-ranking ministerial positions. The Houthis had previously allowed non-Houthis to assume figurehead positions with Houthi loyalists in behind the scenes positions, but this appears to be changing. While some details of tensions within the Houthi movement have emerged, the group appeared to still be fairly united in its goals, and the reality is that it long has been difficult to glean much in the way of reliable information on the leadership dynamics within the Houthi movement (see: ‘Houthi State-Building and the War Effort’).
Regional Actors’ Interests, Houthi Disinterest Complicate De-escalation
Anti-Houthi coalition members may all consider the Houthis to be their opponent, but it is hard to argue that they are on the same side. Throughout 2021, the UAE and Saudi Arabia appeared to be seeking to minimize the Saudi-led coalition’s role in the conflict, while protecting their own specific interests (see: ‘UAE Proxies Allow for Continued Influence’). The first controversy was over the island of Mayun (also known as Perim), in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, where UAE forces were present and an airbase was being built. Although the Saudi-led coalition publicly stated that positions in Mayun were being used to support anti-Houthi forces on the Red Sea coast, the UAE’s broader political and economic goals have seen it focus on situating bases along oil and commercial trade corridors. Its presence in Mayun as well as Socotra, where it also has a base, merely exacerbated concerns about the implications for Yemeni sovereignty.
Saudi Arabia, the senior partner in the regional military coalition, was looking for a way out of the war in Yemen throughout 2021 that would prioritize its national security interests, perhaps over the interests of the kingdom’s local allies. In March 2021, Riyadh presented a new peace proposal that involved the lifting of the Saudi-led coalition partial blockade of Hudaydah port, the reopening of Sana’a International Airport, and peace talks among the Yemeni parties involved in the conflict. It was quickly rejected by the Houthis, who insisted the proposal was “nothing new”, but discussions between the two sides continued for the rest of the year, aided by Omani mediation and parallel to Saudi Arabia’s own de-escalation talks with Iran (see: ‘Attempts at Saudi-Iranian Deescalation’).
Despite the talks, Saudi Arabia faced a succession of cross-border Houthi drone and missile attacks throughout the year, mainly targeting military and oil facilities, as well as airports. These strikes, combined with the Houthis’ persistent pressure on Marib, frustrated international actors, who lacked the leverage to interest the battle-confident Houthis in a cease-fire much less in laying groundwork for a peaceful settlement.
Reassessing Strategies: International Players Seek a New Direction
On the international front, both the United States and the United Nations altered course in Yemen in 2021. Newly elected US President Joe Biden promised early in 2021 a stronger US diplomatic role and support to UN cease-fire and peace negotiation efforts (see: ‘Yemen and the US Under the Biden Administration’). He quickly appointed a veteran State Department official, Timothy Lenderking, as US special envoy to Yemen and overturned a last-minute Trump administration designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), hoping to facilitate negotiations. By mid-year, however, the US was “beyond fed up” with Houthi intransigence and “horrified by the repeated attacks on Marib;” by early 2022, Biden was considering reimposing the FTO designation. At the UN, Martin Griffiths, the UN special envoy since February 2018, gave a final, futile push for his Joint Declaration initiative, which was intended to instill a cease-fire, improve the economic and humanitarian situation and provide a framework for peace talks. Griffiths then left the envoy post in mid-2021, taking up a new senior UN position as under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs, replacing Mark Lowcock (see: ‘Yemen and the UN: Dead Ends and Fresh Starts’).
The UN tapped Swedish career diplomat and European Union envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, in August to take over for Griffiths. Grundberg spent weeks meeting with local, regional and international actors before briefing the UN Security Council in December and sketching out his intended approach. Grundberg prioritized deescalation and, in a departure from his predecessor, economic relief; he also urged the warring parties to talk, even if they continued their battles on the ground. Although Grundberg met with many parties inside Yemen, including the Southern Transitional Council, Hadi government officials, military figures, civil society organizations and local government officials, he had not visited the Houthi leadership in Sana’a by the end of the year.
The UN humanitarian response in Yemen, meanwhile, scaled back programs, citing funding shortages as pledges failed to keep pace with recent past years. Donor skepticism combined with pandemic-related economic concerns to hit funding levels hard in 2020, when the UN received US$2 billion (59 percent of its appeal) and recovery was slow in 2021, when US$2.24 billion was received (58 percent of the requested amount). The shortfalls prompted cuts to food, health, clean water and other programs, and warnings of more to come (see: ‘UN Donor Conferences and Humanitarian Funding’).
Part II: Military Developments in Yemen
On Yemen’s battlefields, it is hard to argue that 2021 was anything other than a year of victories for the armed Houthi movement. In Marib, Houthi forces advanced on Marib city from the west and the south, taking control of the heartlands of the main government-allied tribes fighting them. In Al-Jawf, the Houthis pushed government forces almost entirely to the governorate’s eastern deserts, leaving only one base still precariously in the hands of government forces. In Taiz, a government offensive designed to take the pressure off forces defending Marib eventually led to a Houthi counterattack, in which the latter took back many of the areas lost. That scenario was repeated, to greater effect, in Al-Bayda, where government forces set out to capture a key city only to lose the entire governorate, positioning the Houthis well for some of their most dramatic advances on the ground in recent years (see: ‘How the Govt Offensive in Al-Bayda Backfired, Jeopardizing Marib’). Even in Shabwa, in Yemen’s south, the Houthis were able to seize three districts, their first victories in the hydrocarbon-rich governorate before being forced out at the turn of the new year.
The Houthis benefited throughout 2021 from their cohesiveness, their ability to continually send a greater number of fighters to the frontline and divisions among their opponents. A case in point is the battle for Marib (see: ‘The Road to Marib City’), the government’s main stronghold in northern Yemen, where tribal fighters supported by government troops struggled to keep Houthi forces at bay. A February offensive brought the Houthis to the Balaq mountains, the gateway to Marib city from the southwest, prompting a wave of displacement as families fled frontline areas (see: ‘Displacement: Fleeing the Frontlines, Often Not for the First Time’XXXX). While that offensive stopped there as a result of the excellent defensive position the Balaq mountains gave government defenders, the Houthis later found another route from which to push toward Marib city.
Southern Marib is the home of the Murad and Bani Abd tribes, the backbone of pro-government forces fighting in the governorate. However, after years of fighting, the deaths of hundreds of tribesmen, and complaints about the lack of salaries and effective support from the government and Saudi-led coalition, the tribal areas of Al-Abdiyah, Al-Jubah and Jabal Murad fell to the Houthis in quick succession in October 2021 (see: ‘The Southern Offensive’). The advance brought the Houthis within 15 kilometers of Marib city, as close as they would come in 2021 to conquering a city coveted as a game-changer before Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates shook up the anti-Houthi coalition’s military strategy.
Islah’s Fortunes Fade: Left Out of Marib, Marginalized in Taiz, Replaced in Shabwa
While gleaning information about the inner workings of the armed Houthi movement remained difficult as ever in 2021, it clearly maintained a broadly united force. Despite heavy casualties sustained throughout the year, the Houthis were able to recruit and send more fighters to the frontlines, including child soldiers (see: ‘Child Soldiers in Yemen’). In stark contrast to the Houthis’ united front, Yemen’s anti-Houthi forces were riven by divisions, the impact of which clearly was felt on the frontlines.
Supporters of the Islamist Islah party long have dominated government military forces in Marib, Taiz and Shabwa governorates. Opponents of Islah within the coalition, therefore, blamed the party for the poor performance of those military forces in 2021, accusing the group of focusing on its own goals rather than cooperating with others. For their part, pro-Islah media and political figures have accused the United Arab Emirates of undermining Yemen’s sovereignty and sowing division within the anti-Houthi coalition by backing paramilitary forces aligned with the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC). Saudi and Emirati priorities as well as the key regional powers’ distrust of some of their local partners on the ground also complicated the military campaign throughout the year.
Islah supporters maintained that the Saudi-led coalition did not properly back government forces fighting in Marib. Salary payments to government soldiers in Marib were notoriously late, and often not paid in full; whether the coalition was providing government forces in Marib the weapons they needed also was a point of contention. At the same time, offers by Tareq Saleh, the leader of the UAE-backed Joint Forces, to have his troops help fight the Houthis in Marib were rejected. In Taiz, when the pro-Islah Taiz Military Axis carried out an offensive against the Houthis in March, there was little support from the Joint Forces or the Saudi-led coalition. The coalition even refused to provide weapons to Islah-affiliated government forces lest those weapons be used in the future against Saleh, who maintains good relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi (see: ‘The Taiz Front’). It was little surprise, then, when a Joint Forces’ offensive against the Houthis in western Taiz later in the year received no support from the Taiz Military Axis.
In late September, when Houthi forces crossed from Al-Bayda governorate into Shabwa, a stronghold of the Yemeni government in southern Yemen, Islah-aligned government forces soon withdrew. This allowed the Houthis to gain control of Ain, Bayhan and Usaylan districts in northwestern Shabwa, from where they were able to mount their second big push toward Marib city in 2021 (see: ‘The Bayhan Offensive and Its Aftermath’).
Islah’s quick retreat prompted accusations from its political opponents, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC), of a Houthi-Islah conspiracy. Shabwa governorate had seen confrontations between the Islah-affiliated local administration and STC supporters throughout 2021, despite the presence of pro-STC, UAE-backed Shabwani Elite forces being limited to the Balhaf LNG terminal and Al-Alam military camp. Shabwani Elite members were detained at several points in the year by local government forces, and the tension between the two sides culminated in a stand-off over Al-Alam after the UAE withdrew from the camp in October. Pro-government forces ultimately took Al-Alam by force on October 30 (see: ‘The Conflict in Shabwa’).
Despite that success against the STC, Islah’s power in Shabwa had been intrinsically weakened by the loss of northwestern Shabwa to the Houthis. It was units from the UAE-backed Giants Brigades, a constituent of the Joint Forces brought in from the Red Sea coast and backed by a coalition air campaign, that ultimately forced the Houthis out of Shabwa. By the time the dust had settled in January 2022, Islah had lost both political control and military dominance in Shabwa, and members of the disbanded Shabwani Elite were reactivated, reconstituted and rebranded as the Shabwani Defense forces.
Eyeing the Exits? Coalition Redeployments and the Hudaydah Withdrawal
The UAE withdrawal of its forces from Al-Alam camp and other positions in Shabwa came within weeks of Houthi forces entering the governorate’s northwestern districts. Saudi forces had already withdrawn from positions in Al-Mahra, Aden and Hadramawt governorates. Although the Saudi-led coalition described the troop movements as redeployments rather than withdrawals, they added to speculation that the coalition was preparing for an exit from Yemen (see: ‘Coalition Shifts’).
Another withdrawal — the coalition-backed Joint Forces’ unilateral retreat from large swathes of Hudaydah governorate, including Hudaydah city — also raised questions, even within the Joint Forces’ ranks (see: ‘The Hudaydah Front: Ceding Ground to the Houthis’). Regular bouts of fighting persisted even though there had been little movement on the frontlines in Hudaydah for much of 2021. It was, therefore, surprising when the Joint Forces unilaterally withdrew 90 kilometers south from Hudaydah city to Al-Khawkhah district. The Joint Forces’ leadership linked the decision to withdraw to the 2018 UN-brokered Stockholm Agreement, which ended a coalition offensive on Hudaydah city, explaining that any advance by the Joint Forces in Hudaydah city and its environs would lead to accusations that the forces were obstructing implementation of the deal. The fact that the withdrawal came three years after the agreement raised eyebrows, and the withdrawal was confused, with some fighters criticizing the decision to abandon territory they had fought to gain. The Joint Forces eventually established new positions in southern Hudaydah governorate and from there launched fresh offensives in southeastern Hudaydah and northwestern Taiz governorates. These petered out in December, however, as UAE-backed Giants Brigade units redeployed to Shabwa to counter the Houthi advance there.
If the UAE and Saudi Arabia had withdrawn their forces as steps toward extricating themselves from the Yemen War, leaving behind a multi-sided civil war, they were effectively pulled back in by the Houthi presence in Shabwa and threat to Marib. The final weeks of 2021 required hands-on strategic involvement of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, not to mention significant coalition air support, to execute an effective counterattack against the Houthis. The UAE itself, despite its announced military withdrawal from Yemen in 2020, exerted significant influence in 2021 that was arguably growing at the start of 2022. With the UAE-backed Giants Brigades leading the fight against the Houthis on the battlefield, it was clear that the pendulum had swung sharply away from Islah to UAE-supported forces in Shabwa. This was compounded by the quick and effective performance of the Giants Brigade forces in early January 2022; backed by coalition airstrikes, they were able to push the Houthis out of Shabwa in less than two weeks.
While Islah would argue that its allies within regular government forces would have had the same successes with the same coalition support, it appeared likely that Islah’s opponents would take charge in 2022 of the fight against the Houthis in Al-Bayda, and potentially in Marib. Whether the UAE would lend the same support as it did in Shabwa remained to be seen. The Houthis, their march on Marib having sustained a serious blow, were unhappy with the UAE’s reemergence on Yemen’s frontlines; they made that abundantly clear at the start of 2022 with a drone attack on Abu Dhabi International Airport that killed three people.
Part III: Economic Developments
Among the most important economic developments in 2021 was the dramatic deprecation of the Yemeni rial (YR) in government-controlled areas, followed by its just-as-dramatic recovery as the year ended. This caused rapid price spikes, declining living standards and civil unrest, particularly from August through November. A primary factor in the rial’s decline has been that the Yemeni government, facing massive budget shortfalls, has continued to monetize the public deficit by having the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden print new rials to cover recurrent expenses, largely public sector salaries. The increasing supply of domestic currency in government-held areas has been exacerbated by dwindling hard currency stocks. This comes in sharp contrast to northern areas where Houthi authorities have largely abdicated their responsibility for paying civil servant salaries while continually strengthening their revenue collection through customs, taxes and coercive fee collection. Controlling the majority of the Yemeni population and business centers, the Houthi authorities also benefit from the economic leverage of having most of the country’s current foreign currency inflows, in the form of remittances and humanitarian aid funds, arriving in areas the group controls. Other contributing factors behind the depreciation of the rial in government areas include the escalating struggle over monetary policy with the Houthi-controlled Central Bank of Yemen in Sana’a (CBY-Sana’a), and Houthi battlefield advances, which undermined faith that currency printed by the government-run Central Bank of Yemen in Aden (CBY-Aden) – which the Houthi authorities have banned – would maintain its value. The potential implementation of an electronic currency and e-payment ecosystem was increasingly contested, with Houthi authorities and CBY-Sana’a attempting to push forward a minimally regulated model that largely circumvents the formal banking sector, while the Yemeni government and the CBY-Aden sought to oppose these efforts, and adhere to the pre-conflict legal mandate for a highly regulated, bank-led system.
The tussle for economic preeminence between the warring sides continued across the various sectors in 2021. This included a struggle over fuel imports, with the Yemeni government significantly reducing clearances for commercial fuel shipments through the Houthi-controlled port of Hudaydah, redirecting them to its own ports where it could collect customs revenue. Traders quickly adapted their supply chains, trucking fuel overland to Houthi-controlled areas in sufficient quantities – based on import data and anecdotal evidence – to keep the overall supply of fuel stable in Houthi areas. However, Houthi market manipulation and a second layer of customs tariffs imposed at land crossings led to price spikes and fuel shortages in northern areas, which Houthi authorities then used to build international pressure against the government’s policies. Houthi authorities and the Yemeni government have also both raised their respective customs duties on many non-fuel commodities. Higher tariffs and higher fuel prices left millions of Yemenis facing prices for basic commodities they could ill afford.
Civil servants in Houthi-controlled areas saw only minimal salary payments in 2021. Most workers on the Yemeni government payroll, meanwhile, received their monthly salaries regularly, though their value was rapidly eroded throughout the year as the Yemeni rial depreciated in government-held areas. Exceptions to this were various military units in southern Yemen, mostly affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which have not seen regular salary payments since 2020 due to issues related to the stalled implementation of the Riyadh Agreement between the STC and Yemeni government. Other major economic developments also included the United States continuing to target the Houthi movement and affiliated actors with sanctions, and one of Yemen’s largest telecommunications operators, MTN Yemen, selling its shares to an Omani company suspected of being a Houthi front.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/16768
Editorial also at: https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/16922
(** B P)
Westliche Voreingenommenheit gegenüber dem Jemen: Rassismus und Parteinahme
Western biases against Yemen: Racism and partisanship
https://poorworld.net/Yemen/Western-bias.htm
(** B K P)
UAE Faces Tough Decisions After Houthi Attacks
The UAE faces difficult decisions after recent Houthi drone and missile attacks on Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and it is clear that no choice would be optimal.
The re-engagement of UAE-backed forces into the battle against the Houthis in Shabwa and Ma’rib has probably triggered the Houthis’ recent attacks on the UAE.
There is little doubt that the fall of the oil-rich province of Ma’rib, the Yemeni government’s last standing territory under interim President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, would lead to the complete collapse of the already weakened Hadi administration.
Meanwhile, the Giants Brigades have been generally seen as the best trained military unit within the coalition block. Its withdrawal to southern Yemen would cause serious cracks in the already fragile coalition, weakening Marib’s front lines.
According to Susanne Dahlgren, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and lecturer at Finland-based Tampere University, the Giants Brigades should not be seen as an Emirati force inside Yemen, but rather as a force that it has trained and equipped in its partnership with elements of the Southern independence force, notably the STC. “Accusing [the Giants Brigades of being] an Emirati proxy shows ignorance of Yemeni politics,” Dahlgren told Inside Arabia.
Alex Almeida, Head Security Analyst at the Horizon Client Access, a leading risk advisory firm, told Inside Arabia that the key point to underline here is that “there’s no appetite in Abu Dhabi for re-engaging militarily in Yemen, and their support for the recent counteroffensive in Shabwah was limited to political backing for the Giants, tactical coordination, and probably some logistical support.” Almeida believes that the UAE’s involvement mostly concluded after the offensive retook the northern Shabwah districts.
As for Abdul-Ghani Al-Iryani, a Senior Researcher at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, the Houthis and the UAE both got themselves into a confrontation neither of them wanted. “The UAE miscalculated the Houthi response to the Giants incursion into northern territories, and the Houthis underestimated the international response to its attack on UAE territory, which they meant to be a signal as indicated by the choice of their targets,” he told Inside Arabia.
Al-Iryani says that both are probably looking for a way out of this conflict through third-party mediation. And while the Giants have declared they are withdrawing some of their units from the North, the Houthis are calling for the militia’s full disengagement with the UAE.
Almeida believes that Abu Dhabi will continue to provide political backing for the Giants and will work to rebuild Shabwah’s UAE-backed provincial security forces, which were dismantled by the Hadi government following the UAE drawdown in 2019.
Still, Abu Dhabi should be careful not to fall into the Houthi trap, Dahlgren noted. She sees the attacks on the UAE as a Houthi provocation, aimed at gaining global media attention and proving its steadfastness against what many Yemenis view as the enemy. This way, the Houthis build an international reputation as a far more important player than it actually is. According to Dahlgren, “the end of the war would be a catastrophe for the Houthis; it is a war cabinet [that] only can rule on the pretext of the war.”
Nevertheless, the UAE is faced with tough decision-making, and many observers wonder how they will respond to the latest attack. If they continue to support the Giants’ efforts in Marib, they may become a regular Houthi target. As a business and tourist hub, this would have incalculable repercussions on the Emirati tourism industry with the ongoing Dubai Expo being no exception.
On the other hand, disengagement may impact their relations with their coalition partner – Saudi Arabia – and make them appear weak to the Houthis, as well as Iran.
In Al-Iryani’s opinion, the UAE will probably reduce its involvement in Yemen, which will irritate Saudi Arabia. But the special relationship between Mohammed bin Salman and Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan will prevent serious deterioration in their relations. He also thinks that the UAE agenda of controlling the south and breaking the Yemeni state apart will make the Houthis the dominant force in the rest of Yemen, a scenario that worries Saudi Arabia.
However, Almeida observes that the kingdom has moved closer to the UAE’s view on the military value of a non-Islah, non-Hadi government, and tribal and local forces. But the fact is that this isn’t a coalition war anymore – it’s a Saudi war (that Riyadh is also desperate to get out of) with Abu Dhabi helping out here and there.
Al-Iryani does not expect the UAE to resume airstrikes or reinsert major combat forces in Yemen. Instead, Abu Dhabi will avoid being involved in Marib, which has always been Saudi turf. “Although the UAE has to respond to attacks on its soil – hence the recent airstrikes on Houthi missile launch sites,” he explains that “these attacks will likely only reinforce the perception in Abu Dhabi that it isn’t worth being drawn back into the Yemen mess, particularly as it runs counter to the post-2019 realignment of Emirati regional policy, where the focus is on diplomacy, soft power, and domestic economic reforms.”.
Finally, the UAE is emphatically uninterested in any escalation with Iran – by Stasa Salacanin
https://insidearabia.com/uae-faces-tough-decisions-after-houthi-attacks/
(** B P)
ABSOLUTE POWER
His father’s eventual death will leave him as the absolute monarch of the birthplace of Islam and the owner of the world’s largest accessible oil reserves. He will also be the leader of one of America’s closest allies and the source of many of its headaches.
I’ve been traveling to Saudi Arabia over the past three years, trying to understand if the crown prince is a killer, a reformer, or both—and if both, whether he can be one without the other.
Even MBS’s critics concede that he has roused the country from an economic and social slumber. In 2016, he unveiled a plan, known as Vision 2030, to convert Saudi Arabia from—allow me to be blunt—one of the world’s weirdest countries into a place that could plausibly be called normal. It is now open to visitors and investment, and lets its citizens partake in ordinary acts of recreation and even certain vices. The crown prince has legalized cinemas and concerts, and invited notably raw hip-hop artists to perform. He has allowed women to drive and to dress as freely as they can in dens of sin like Dubai and Bahrain. He has curtailed the role of reactionary clergy and all but abolished the religious police. He has explored relations with Israel.
He has also created a climate of fear unprecedented in Saudi history. Saudi Arabia has never been a free country. But even the most oppressive of MBS’s predecessors, his uncle King Faisal, never presided over an atmosphere like that of the present day, when it is widely believed that you place yourself in danger if you criticize the ruler or pay even a mild compliment to his enemies. MBS’s critics—not regicidal zealots or al‑Qaeda sympathizers, just ordinary people with independent thoughts about his reforms—have gone into exile. Some fear that if he keeps getting his way, the modernized Saudi Arabia will oppress in ways the old Saudi Arabia never imagined. Khalid al-Jabri, the exiled son of one of MBS’s most prominent critics, warned me that worse was yet to come: “When he’s King Mohammed, Crown Prince MBS is going to be remembered as an angel.”
For about two years, MBS hid from public view, as if hoping the Khashoggi murder would be forgotten. It hasn’t been. But the crown prince still wants to convince the world that he is saving his country, not holding it hostage—which is why he met twice in recent months with me and the editor in chief of this magazine, Jeffrey Goldberg.
During our Riyadh encounter, Jeff asked MBS if he was capable of handling criticism. “Thank you very much for this question,” the prince said. “If I couldn’t, I would not be sitting with you today listening to that question.”
“I’d be in the Ritz-Carlton,” Jeff suggested.
“Well,” he said, “at least it’s a five-star hotel.”
Difficult questions caused the crown prince to move about jumpily, his voice vibrating at a higher frequency. Every minute or two he performed a complex motor tic: a quick backward tilt of the head, followed by a gulp, like a pelican downing a fish. He complained that he had endured injustice, and he evinced a level of victimhood and grandiosity unusual even by the standards of Middle Eastern rulers.
When we asked if he had ordered the killing of Khashoggi, he said it was “obvious” that he had not. “It hurt me a lot,” he said. “It hurt me and it hurt Saudi Arabia, from a feelings perspective.”
“From a feelings perspective?”
“I understand the anger, especially among journalists. I respect their feelings. But we also have feelings here, pain here.”
MBS is correct when he suggests that the Biden administration’s posture toward him is basically recriminatory. Stop bombing civilians in Yemen. Stop jailing and dismembering dissidents. The U.S. might, on the margins, be able to persuade MBS to use a softer touch—but only by first persuading him that he will be rewarded for his good behavior. And no persuasion will be possible at all without acknowledging that the game of thrones has concluded and he has won.
Comment: The Atlantic interviewed MBS as if he is not fighting in Yemen for seven years and counting; No question raised about Yemen in the interview, why? Dozens of Saudis've been killed in Yemen & others ended up as prisoners including pilots. MBS is the prince who forget his fighters.
https://twitter.com/Naseh_Shaker/status/1499448936775487490
(** B E P)
Internet Access in Yemen Should Be an Opportunity for Cooperation, not a Target
Internet connectivity should be treated as a basic human right. Yemen urgently needs functional Internet for a variety of reasons, including facilitating humanitarian assistance and supporting economic recovery when the war ends.
Despite the fact that just 27 percent of Yemenis have internet connection, it is frequently a target of military operations by both parties to the conflict. In late January, most of Yemen was engulfed in an internet blackout after Saudi-led coalition air strikes hit a telecommunications center in the port city of Hodeida. There were likewise reports of a strike on a telecommunications center in Sana’a on February 14, sparking further outages.
Abdulmalik al-Erji, a Houthi political representative, claimed that the sector is being deliberately targeted as part of a strategy of economic warfare because it is a source of revenue for the rebel movement. If true, this targeting would be a violation of rules of war, such as the Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention against attacking civilian objects. The coalition has stated that the Sana’a strike was instead targeting a drone system, and no explanation has been given for the Hodeida strike. However, the Houthis are not innocent in terms of internet weaponization either. They were responsible for the destruction of two land links to Saudi Arabia via Haradh and Alab during the early years of the conflict, and in July 2018, the Houthis damaged the vital FALCON internet cable while digging military fortifications around Hodeida. I
As Yemen faces an extreme humanitarian crisis—five million people on the brink of famine and continued daily casualties from the war—it is vitally important to depoliticize the telecoms sector and make rapid progress in expanding affordable access to facilitate humanitarian assistance, economic activity, and normal civilian life.
During these blackouts, Yemenis lost access to online businesses, news, education, and social networks, as well as remittances from relatives abroad. These are perhaps the most concerning losses, as many Yemeni families depend remittances on for their survival, representing about a quarter of total GDP.
Unless concrete action is taken, the most recent instance will probably not be the last. Yemen is vulnerable because almost all of its internet connectivity comes from a single ageing subsea cable, FALCON, which comes on shore in Hodeida. Beyond that, there is currently only a narrow link to Djibouti that serves Aden along with rare and expensive satellite access.
Even when there are no disruptions, Yemen remains at the bottom of the global rankings for connectivity—meaning low bandwidth, high latency, and some of the most costly access in the world. Because Yemen lacks internet exchange points and data centers to process requests locally, almost all internet traffic must be routed internationally. This means that Yemenis accessing a site like YouTube fetch data from the U.S. rather than from domestic servers, slowing the speed of the connection significantly. Reliance on routing traffic through the international internet network likewise adds to the pressure on the country’s limited international bandwidth, which is less than a tenth of the global average per capita.
Barely half of the population is connected to mobile networks, with only 2 percent of the population with fixed broadband access.
The poor telecoms service in Yemen is largely due to the failures of successive governments, compounded by the war which has been ongoing since 2014.
Good internet communication is a prerequisite to a robust economy. The COVID pandemic has both highlighted the importance of being connected and showcased the serious socio-political, economic, and even health-related consequences resulting from global disparities in connectivity.
The good news is that there are opportunities for improving internet access in Yemen, but these require political will and serious investment. There is a subsea cable, AAE-1, that has been connected to Aden since 2017, but it was never activated due to disagreements between the warring parties.
Internet and telecommunication connectivity should be a priority for the peace process. Internet connectivity is a basic human right and an enabler of economic activity and governance. Improving access would be a win-win for all Yemenis and an opportunity for cooperation and confidence building between the warring sides. It is time this sector receives the attention it deserves before Yemenis are plunged even further into darkness – by Nadia al-Sakkaf and Justin Alexander
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
(A H)
March 3: One new case of COVID-19 reported, 11,772 in total
In its statement, the committee affirmed that no recoveries nor deaths have been recorded
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34620
(A H)
March 2: No new cases of COVID-19 nor deaths, three recoveries reported
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34611
(A H)
Feb. 27: Nine new COVID-19 cases reported, 11,769 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the death of one coronavirus patient and the recovery of one patient.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34594
(* B H)
GPEI Statement on the cVDPV Outbreaks in the Northern Governorates in Yemen
Yemen is currently experiencing twin outbreaks of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 1 and type 2 (cVDPV1 and cVDPV2). Both strains of poliovirus emerge in populations with low immunity and both can result in lifelong paralysis and even death.
Since 2019, 35 and 14 children have been paralysed by cVDPV1 and cVDPV2 respectively, three of the cVDPV2 cases confirmed in the past 10 days alone. The cVDPV2 outbreak, in particular, is ongoing and expanding and has already spread to other countries in WHO’s Eastern Mediterranean Region and UNICEF’s Middle East and North Africa Region. At its fourth meeting on 9 February 2022, the Eastern Mediterranean Ministerial Regional Subcommittee on Polio Eradication and Outbreaks issued a statement, expressing deep concern around these expanding outbreaks and requesting all authorities in Yemen to facilitate resumption of house-to-house vaccination campaigns in all areas.
The GPEI partners – WHO, Rotary International, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, UNICEF, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Gavi – are committed to providing support to all stakeholders in Yemen for responding to the polio outbreaks including in conducting polio vaccination campaigns that can reach all vulnerable children.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/gpei-statement-cvdpv-outbreaks-northern-governorates-yemen
My comment: A swamp of Bill Gates’ corruption.
cp1b Am wichtigsten: UN erweitert Waffenemboargo gegen Huthis / Most important: UN tightens arms embargo against Houthis
(** A K P)
UN-Sicherheitsrat weitet Waffenembargo gegen Rebellen aus
Gegen alle jemenitischen Huthi-Rebellen besteht nun ein Waffenembargo. Es gab keine Gegenstimmen für die UN-Resolution.
Der UN-Sicherheitsrat hat ein Waffenembargo gegen die Huthi-Rebellen im Jemen verhängt. Die Mitglieder des Gremiums erklärten, die Rebellen seien für Angriffe auf Zivilisten, die Handelsschifffahrt im Roten Meer sowie auf Saudi-Arabien und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate verantwortlich. Der Weltsicherheitsrat hat bereits Sanktionen gegen Huthi-Anführer und ranghohe Beamte verhängt. Mit der jüngsten Resolution wurde das Waffenembargo auf alle Huthis ausgedehnt.
Das Embargo wurde mit elf zu null Stimmen verabschiedet. Irland, Norwegen, Brasilien und Mexiko enthielten sich der Stimme, weil sie negative Auswirkungen auf die Menschen im ärmsten Land der arabischen Welt befürchteten.
In der von Großbritannien ausgearbeiteten Resolution hieß es, die vom Iran unterstützten Huthis verfolgten eine Politik der sexuellen Gewalt und Unterdrückung gegen politisch aktive und berufstätige Frauen, rekrutierten Kinder für ihren Kampf und setzten wahllos Landminen und improvisierte Sprengkörper ein. Außerdem behinderten sie Hilfslieferungen für die Menschen im Jemen.
Peter Salisbury, leitender Analyst der International Crisis Group für den Jemen, schrieb auf Twitter, der Jemen sei zum Teil eines Kuhhandels im Sicherheitsrat geworden. Russland stimmte für die Resolution, nachdem sich die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate am Freitag bei der Abstimmung im Sicherheitsrat über eine Resolution, die die russische Invasion in der Ukraine verurteilt hätte, der Stimme enthalten hatten. Das sei im Rat als Gegengeschäft wahrgenommen worden, schrieb Salisbury.
Die UN-Botschafterin der Emirate, Lana Nusseibeh, begrüßte das Waffenembargo gegen die Huthis. Sie bezeichnete die Rebellen als Terrorgruppe, die für abscheuliche Angriffe verantwortlich sei. Die Resolution werde die militärischen Fähigkeiten der Huthis einschränken und dazu beitragen, die Eskalation im Jemen und in der Region zu stoppen, sagte sie.
https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2022-03/jemen-un-sicherheitsrat-waffenembargo-huthi-rebellen
Mein Kommentar: Eine solche Resolution ist vollkommen einseitig. Das wäre so, als würde die UN jetzt die Ukraine mit einem totalen waffenembargo belegen.
(** A P)
Einseitige Politik
UN-Sicherheitsrat nennt Jemens Ansarollah »terroristische Vereinigung« und weitet Waffenembargo aus. Sorge vor humanitären Konsequenzen
Die Resolution 2624 erneuert auch bereits bestehende, durch Resolution 2140 aus dem Jahr 2014 verhängte Maßnahmen wie Einreiseverbote und das Einfrieren von Vermögen bis zum 28. Februar 2023.
Die Mitglieder des UN-Sicherheitsrats verlängerten auch das Mandat des UN-Expertengremiums für den Jemen bis zum 28. März 2023. Das Waffenembargo, das Verbot technischer Unterstützung sowie das Verbot, militärische Kräfte unter dem Kommando der Ansarollah zu trainieren, richten sich fortan gegen die gesamte Organisation. Resolution 2216 aus dem Jahr 2015 hatte lediglich der Führungsriege und ranghohen Beamten gegolten.
Hintergrund der Entscheidung sind – so das höchste UN-Gremium – Menschenrechtsverletzungen, Angriffe auf Zivilisten, auf Saudi-Arabien und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate (VAE) sowie auf zivile Infrastruktur durch die Ansarollah. Die seit fast sieben Jahren anhaltenden Zerstörungen durch die von Riad und die VAE angeführte Kriegskoalition, deren Angriffe tagtäglich Todesopfer unter der Zivilbevölkerung fordern, sowie die Blockade des Landes, die eine der größten humanitären Krisen weltweit verursacht hat, sind hingegen offenbar keine Sanktionen wert.
Damit steht Resolution 2624 in einer Linie mit der bisherigen Politik des UN-Sicherheitsrats: Schon im April 2015, kurz nach Beginn des Angriffskriegs, verhängte er mit Resolution 2216 ein Waffenembargo nur gegen die Ansarollah. Damit machte er sich letztlich die Kriegsziele Riads, die neben der Reinstallation des demokratisch nicht mehr legitimierten »Präsidenten« Abed Rabbo Mansur Hadi die Wiederherstellung jahrzehntelanger Kontrolle des Nachbarlandes in seinem »Hinterhof« umfassen, zu eigen. Aus Protest gegen die Einseitigkeit der Resolution reichte der damalige UN-Sondergesandte für den Jemen, Jamal Benomar, seinen Rücktritt ein.
Wie bereits 2015 stimmte am Montag auch die russische Delegation zu. Dem vorausgegangen war offensichtlich ein »Deal« mit den VAE, die sich im Gegenzug bei den Resolutionen zum Ukraine-Krieg enthielten. Die Repräsentanten Mexikos und Norwegens meldeten Bedenken an, weil die Ansarollah in der von den VAE und Großbritannien eingebrachten Resolution als »terroristische Vereinigung« bezeichnet werden, obwohl dafür keine klare Definition in der UN-Charta existiere.
Die erstmalige Bezeichnung der Ansarollah als »terroristisch« setzt tatsächlich einen gefährlichen Präzedenzfall.
https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/421772.weiterer-kriegsschauplatz-einseitige-politik.html
(** A K P)
UN slaps expanded arms embargo on Yemen’s Houthi rebels
The U.N. Security Council voted Monday to impose an expanded arms embargo on Yemen’s Houthi rebels, saying they have threatened the peace, security and stability of the war-torn country.
Council members said the rebels are responsible for attacking civilians, commercial shipping in the Red Sea, and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The Security Council had already imposed an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo against Houthi leaders and top officials, but this resolution dramatically expands the arms embargo to include all Houthis.
The British-drafted resolution said the Iran-backed Houthis “implemented a policy of sexual violence and repression against politically active and professional women, engaged in the recruitment and use of children,” indiscriminately used land mines and improvised explosive devices and obstructed humanitarian aid to Yemenis.
Monday’s vote was 11-0, with Ireland, Norway, Brazil and Mexico abstaining amid concerns about the negative impact on the humanitarian situation in the Arab world’s poorest nation and the risk of undermining a fragile political process.
Peter Salisbury, the International Crisis Group’s senior analyst for Yemen, tweeted that Yemen has been “the site of some of the first post-Russia/Ukraine horse trading at the Security Council” since Russia’s invasion of its neighbor last week.
Russia voted in favor of the resolution after the UAE abstained on Friday’s vote in the Security Council on a resolution that would have condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, “in what was perceived at council as a quid pro quo,” Salisbury said.
UAE Ambassador Lana Nusseibeh welcomed the arms embargo on the Houthis, calling it a “terrorist group” responsible for “flagrant violations and heinous attacks.”
“This resolution will curtail the military capabilities of the Houthis and push toward stopping their escalation in Yemen and the region,” she said. “It will also prevent their hostile activities against civilian vessels and threats to shipping lines and international trade ... (and) stop the suffering of Yemeni civilians and those affected in neighboring countries by their terrorist acts.”
Nusseibeh called on the Houthis to stop their cross-border attacks and return to serious political negotiations, stressing that there is no military solution to the war in Yemen.
Ireland’s deputy U.N. ambassador, Jim Kelly, said his government abstained because it remains concerned that designating all Houthis “may result in unintended negative humanitarian and political consequences.” It is also concerned the resolution’s description of “terrorist attacks” by the Houthis “may have unintended negative consequences for the millions of Yemeni people living under Houthi control,” he said.
The resolution calls on all countries “to increase efforts to combat the smuggling of weapons and components via land and sea routes, to ensure implementation of the targeted arms embargo.”
It “strongly condemns the cross-border attacks by the Houthi terrorist group, including attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates striking civilians and civilian infrastructure, and demanding the immediate cessation of such attacks.”
The resolution says there is no military solution to the current conflict and that the only viable path forward is “dialogue and reconciliation among the multiple and varied parties.”
It extends the mandate of the U.N. panel of experts monitoring implementation of the sanctions until March 28, 2023 – by Edith M. Lederer
My comment: Such a resolution is totally one-sided. This would be the same as to impose a total arms embargo on Ukraine right now.
(** A K P)
UN Security Council extends Yemen arms embargo to all Houthis
Resolution proposed by UAE comes amid a string of recent attacks on Gulf countries claimed by the Yemeni rebel group.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has extended an arms embargo to all Houthi rebels, as the Yemeni group faces increased international pressure after a string of recent attacks on Gulf countries.
Monday’s resolution, proposed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and adopted with 11 votes in favour and four abstentions, extends an embargo that until now targeted some Houthi leaders to the entire rebel group.
The Emirati mission to the UN welcomed the result of the vote, saying the resolution would “curtail the military capabilities of the Houthis & push toward stopping their escalation in Yemen & the region”.
Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, head of the Houthi supreme revolutionary committee, criticised the UNSC decision for ignoring “crimes” by the coalition and said in a Twitter post that any arms embargo that does not apply to the alliance “had no value”.
Russia, which is close to Iran, on Monday voted in favour of the UNSC resolution, which states that the Houthi rebels in their entirety will now be subject to an arms embargo first declared in 2015 on some of their leaders.
Diplomats, speaking to the AFP news agency on condition of anonymity, said Russia’s position suggests a deal was cut between Moscow and Abu Dhabi for the latter to abstain in upcoming UN votes on the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The UAE on Friday abstained from a vote on a UNSC draft resolution that would have deplored Russia’s attack on Ukraine, which to date has killed more than 350 civilians, according to the Ukrainian ministry of health.
Peter Salisbury, a senior Yemen analyst at the International Crisis Group, said the UNSC vote comes amid a push by the UAE for a “more aggressive stance” against the Houthis in light of the group’s recent attacks.
But he said on Twitter that the “group-wide arms embargo doesn’t change much in practice as already applied as if to whole group”.
Monday’s UNSC resolution described the Houthis as a “terrorist group”.
It said the council “strongly condemns the cross-border attacks by the Houthi terrorist group, including attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates striking civilians and civilian infrastructure, and demanding the immediate cessation of such attacks”.
Norway said it chose to abstain from the UNSC vote because it was “worried that using such terminology, absent a clear definition, may have [a] negative impact on UN efforts to facilitate a political solution in Yemen”.
“Norway is also worried about unintended humanitarian consequences of this new language and that it could negatively affect UN efforts to address large-scale humanitarian needs throughout Yemen,” the Norwegian mission to the UN said in a statement.
(** A K P)
U.N. arms embargo imposed on Yemen’s Houthis amid vote questions
Both the UAE and Russia denied a deal was made on voting.
Some frustrated U.N. diplomats accused the UAE of winning Russia’s support by abstaining on Security Council votes on Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine on Friday and Sunday. The UAE had previously voted in favor of a council meeting on Jan. 31 to discuss Russia’s buildup of troops on the Ukraine border.
“The UAE has taken a very transactional approach,” said a senior European diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. “There’s a lot of disappointment out there … hopefully, they will now come back to a more principled approach.”
A spokesperson for the UAE mission to the United Nations said the UAE “does not engage in vote trading at the U.N. Security Council.”
Russia’s U.N. Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia scoffed on Sunday when asked if Russia had given its support for blacklisting the Houthis in exchange for the UAE’s abstention.
“We do not anything in exchange like some of our colleagues in Security Council, who besides exchange — without any shame — twist arms of our Security Council members and the members of General Assembly to do or to vote the way they want, including methods which are not diplomatic,” he said.
A Security Council diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, accused the UAE of making a “deal with the devil” to secure Russia’s support. “UAE’s two abstentions on Ukraine bought the Russian yes vote,” the diplomat said – by Michelle Nichols
https://www.reuters.com/article/yemen-security-un-int/u-n-arms-embargo-imposed-on-yemens-houthis-amid-vote-questions-idUSKBN2KX1WU = https://www.metro.us/u-n-arms-embargo-imposed/
and also https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/28/ukraine-russia-war-spills-over-yemen-uae/
and the official UN report, with statements of the envoys: https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14810.doc.htm
and UN announcement: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/02/yemen-sanctions-resolution.php
and UAE welcomes resolution: https://www.khaleejtimes.com/government/%e2%80%8fuae-welcomes-un-resolution-to-label-houthi-militia-as-terrorist-group
(** B P)
UAE’s victory over Houthis at the UN is a grave loss for Yemen
What does Abu Dhabi get out of designating their enemies ‘terrorists’? The ability to prolong the war and the suffering indefinitely.
The latest resolution reinforced the provisions of the outdated UNSCR 2216 that has defined the UN approach to Yemen since 2015. There has been a desperate need for the Security Council to update the terms of the resolution, but once again they were content to maintain the failed status quo. UNSCR 2216 has long been seen as an obstacle to peace in Yemen, because it gives all parties to the conflict strong incentives to continue fighting.
The Houthis are never going to accept terms that require them to give up all power and disarm before there is a political settlement, and the Saudi coalition and the Hadi government can hide behind the resolution’s unrealistic requirements to keep the war going. As Bruce Riedel concluded last year, “As long as UNSCR 2216 remains the basis for negotiations, the Houthis will refuse to engage.”
The one-sided condemnations contained in the latest resolution compound the errors of the original. While the resolution condemns “heinous terrorist attacks” on the UAE and Saudi Arabia, there is predictably no mention of the many attacks on civilians carried out by Saudi coalition aircraft. The Houthis have engaged in attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, as the resolution says, but the Saudi coalition has been doing the same thing for the duration of the war. There is an annex to the new resolution that describes the Houthis’ crimes, but it doesn’t include any references to the thousands of civilians killed by Saudi coalition airstrikes using weapons provided by the U.S. and other Western governments.
There is unlikely to be any diplomatic progress towards ending the war when the Security Council refuses to hold Saudi coalition governments responsible for their atrocities against Yemeni civilians.
Broadening the arms embargo will have little effect on the Houthis’ ability to wage war, since the embargo was already applied to the entire group in practice, but it could make it more difficult to alleviate the suffering of the Yemeni people. The embargo is the Saudi coalition’s fig leaf for maintaining its killing blockade that allows them to strangle Yemen’s civilian population under the color of international authority. The people of Yemen continue to endure terrible deprivation as a result of the war and blockade.
The language referring to the Houthis as a terrorist group is apparently not binding on member states, but it was a symbolic win for the lobbying efforts of the UAE, whose government has likewise been pressing the Biden administration to redesignate the Houthis as a foreign terrorist designation in the wake of drone and missile attacks on Abu Dhabi. There is a danger that the UAE could use the language of the new resolution to press the U.S. to designate the group and sanction them accordingly.
Russia had previously been reluctant to apply the terrorist label to the Houthis, but the UAE gained Russian support for the new language about the Houthis by abstaining on the resolution condemning the invasion of Ukraine. The UAE later voted against Russia on Wednesday’s General Assembly resolution “deploring” Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
Despite the Biden administration’s decision to rush additional U.S. forces to the UAE to protect against further Houthi attacks, the UAE incredibly claims to have felt “abandoned” by Washington after the strikes on Abu Dhabi. Even though the invasion of Ukraine was a much more significant event that required a swift response at the UN, the UAE thinks that the much smaller attacks on their territory that came as a result of their intervention in Yemen deserved comparable treatment. The remarkable thing here is that the UAE imagines that they are in the same position in Ukraine instead of being the aggressor against Yemen that they are.
This should be a lesson to the Biden administration that the UAE, like other regional clients, will never be satisfied with any level of U.S. support and protection.
The Biden administration would be wise to ignore the UAE’s demands to designate the Houthis, and it should realize that the UAE takes U.S. backing too much for granted. The recent deployment of jets and ships to the UAE is a misuse of limited resources, and it puts U.S. personnel at risk in support of an indefensible war. The U.S. should withdraw those forces as soon as possible and let the UAE contemplate what real abandonment might look like – by Daniel Larison
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/03/04/uaes-victory-over-houthis-at-the-un-is-a-grave-loss-for-yemen/ = https://english.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/uaes-un-victory-over-houthis-grave-loss-yemen
(* B P)
Ending War in Yemen Requires Talk, Not Labels
Designating the Houthis as terrorists will serve only to confirm their existing biases. [paywalled]
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/01/yemen-war-terrorism-un-houthi-uae-russia/
(* A B P)
Security Council loses balance, imposes options of anger on Yemeni people
It is not Resolution 2624 itself, but rather the direction of the UN Security Council that angers the people of Yemen.
On the verge of the eighth year of the war, the Yemenis tried to deliver their message to the world. They spoke and found no one to listen. They crossed in sign language after the tongue became impotent, but the world pretended to be blind.
The people of Yemen have no choice but to use the language of deterrence so that the Security Council can understand that it is committing grave mistakes against this people through collusion with Washington to kill Yemenis.
Although the Resolution 2624 forbidding the export of arms does not bring anything new to the besieged country, the insistence of the Security Council to turn into a tool that meets the requests of the Saudi-led coalition countries is enough to awaken the fires of hatred in the hearts of Yemenis to avenge the killing machines in the Saudi and Emirati regimes.
The reason for igniting this hatred over future generations was the Security Council’s lack of balance.
The people of Yemen do not have to turn the Security Council’s compass back in the right direction. Rather, the Council had to abide by the tasks for which it was established by maintaining security and peace among the members of the international community.
But if the council will turn into a tool in the hands of a state like the UAE, this calls for correcting the imbalance with all possible means available, including shooting using missiles.
The Security Council took an important part of its precious time, in light of the world’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war, in order to discuss the concerns of the UAE, without bothering to ask, where are the arms import contracts for the Houthis?
The resolution ignored the recommendations issued by the United Nations’ international and regional expert group to stop arms exports from the United States, Britain and France to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and ignored the demands of international human rights organizations to prevent the supply of arms to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi due to the war crimes committed against civilians in Yemen.
https://en.ypagency.net/255089/
My remark: A Houthi viewpoint.
And also:
(* B P)
Security Council Abdicates Its Responsibility Towards the Yemeni People
It is not within the powers of the UN Security Council to impose its agenda and political choices on the Yemeni people. The Security Council deals with two standards in its work, and this method of work has made it lose its credibility when considering many other international issues.
It has become clear that the Security Council is no longer impartial and does not look at the issues objectively. It did not investigate the justice nature of those issues because it was simply controlled by the international colonial powers and its decisions were taken in their favor.
The United Nations is subjected to political blackmail by the colonial powers. Regarding the Yemeni issue, its recent decision came to legitimize the siege imposed by the US-Saudi aggression.
The decision mentioned the embargo on the supply of arms to Yemen, but in fact the decision has another dimension, which is the continued imposition of the US-Saudi siege on the Yemeni people, as it is known since 2015.
US-Saudi and its allies deploy naval forces near Yemeni (regional) waters, with the approval of the Security Council is under flimsy justifications, claiming to prevent the arrival of weapons in Yemen, however, what is happening is that the blockade has prevented food, medicine and fuel.
Is there justice by the Council from the suffering of 30 million Yemeni citizens from the unjust siege that has been imposed on Yemeni land, sea and air, leaving the fate of every Yemeni people unknown.
What is certain is that the world is in dire need of a new multilateral world order whose performance is fair, impartial and objective when considering international issues.
(* A P)
[Sanaa gov.] FM: UAE uses its membership to impose its positions in Security Council
Foreign Minister Hisham Sharaf on Wednesday condemned the provocative style and new language contained in the Security Council’s Resolution No. 2624 of 2022.
“Instead of the Security Council’s decision being procedural, as it was in previous years, but it, thanks to the temporary membership in the Security Council of one of the aggressor countries, turned into a resolution that serves the interests of the coalition countries under the umbrella of the Council,” Sharaf said in a statement.
The Foreign Minister considered this decision a precedent in the history of the UN Security Council. “It is shameful and ironic that one of the aggressors against Yemen has adopted the issuance of a new sanctions resolution on Yemen.”
The Security Council turned from its entrusted role in maintaining international peace and security to serve those whose suspicious and criminal role the whole world knows in destroying Yemen and causing millions of Yemenis to suffer during the past seven years, he added.
Sharaf explained that the paragraphs of the Council’s recent resolution on the situation in Yemen are a clear violation of the purposes of the United Nations Charter, which affirms the natural right of peoples to self-defense.
The Foreign Minister stressed that “the targeting of the military and vital facilities belonging to the Saudi-Emirati aggression countries by Sanaa forces is a natural response to the war crimes and genocide committed by those countries in Yemen since March 26, 2015.”
He expressed his surprise at the double standards of the Security Council Resolution No. 2624 in describing self-defense operations as terrorist attacks, affirming that this measure came as a result of the UAE’s non-permanent membership in the Security Council, which it began using to impose its positions.
Sharaf called on the UN Security Council to review its real role in maintaining global peace and security, and not representing the interests of the powerful and rich countries, and to continue supporting efforts to reach a just, peaceful political settlement that addresses the repercussions of the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen caused by the operations of the aggression coalition.
https://en.ypagency.net/255037/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/03/02/yemeni-minister-of-foreign-affairs-issues-scathing-condemnation-of-un-security-council-hypocrisy/
and also https://debriefer.net/en/news-28952.html
(* A P)
Ansarullah official: UN arms embargo on Yemen neglects Saudi massacres
Yemeni officials denounced a recent vote by United Nations Security Council [UNSC] to expand a targeted UN arms embargo on several leaders of the popular Ansarullah resistance movement to the whole group.
In comments following the resolution, head of Yemen's Supreme Revolutionary Committee Mohammed Ali al-Houthi criticized in a post on his Twitter account the decision for ignoring the “crimes” committed by the Saudi-led coalition, stressing that any arms embargo that does not apply to the Western-backed alliance “had no value.”
If the goal is to secure justice, the deliberate targeting of Yemen by the US-Saudi-Emirati aggressor coalition and its war crimes should have been the reason for a ban on weapons, al-Houthi said.
He also noted that after selling arms to Gulf countries, the Americans, the British, etc. test the effectiveness of their weaponry by killing Yemeni children.
They, the Ansarullah official added, deprive Palestinians of access to weapons while giving them to the Tel Aviv regime that commits war crimes.
“Yemen now has a new weapon that it did not have before. Thank God, it is the jihad [endeavor for the sake of God] of the brave Yemenis, who have achieved it, as well as the defeat of the American-British-Saudi-UAE coalition and its military allies.”
Similarly, Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a member of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council, said the UNSC’s decision to extend the arms embargo imposed on Yemen and deprive it of its right to self-defense indicates that the world needs a new order based on justice.
“We tell the countries that voted in favor of the resolution that you and your oppressive decisions are under our feet because we rely only on God,” he asserted.
https://www.farsnews.ir/en/news/14001210000430/Yemeni-Officials-Censre-UN-Arms-Embarg-n-Ansarllah = https://en.abna24.com/news//ansarullah-official-un-arms-embargo-on-yemen-neglects-saudi-massacres_1235015.html
(A P)
Al-Ajri: The Security Council and UN sell positions to those who pay
Abdul-Malik al-Ajri, member of the [Sanaa gov.] national negotiation delegation of Yemen has said that “the decision to ban weapons contradicts the UN Envoy’s claim of launching peace processes and dialogue in Yemen.”
Al-Ajri stressed that “these resolutions prove that the Security Council and the UN bodies are nothing more than companies to serve the US and Western interests.”
“The United Nations has this decision that is obstructing the peace process and is throwing peace efforts into the wind,” he said.
“The Security Council and the United Nations sell their positions to those who pay, and they do not care about either peace nor global security.”
“The humanitarian file in Yemen is in a catastrophic situation, both before and after this decision,” he said.
https://en.ypagency.net/254956/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/03/01/yemeni-diplomat-un-bodies-are-serving-us-interests/
(A P)
Al-Bukhiti sends fiery message to the States that vote for UNSC resolution
A senior leader in Ansarullah’s Political Bureau, Mohammed al-Bukhiti has sent a fiery message to countries that voted on a Security Council resolution extending Yemen’s arms embargo.
“The Security Council’s decision to extend Yemen’s denial of arms purchases and the denial of the right to self-defense by agreement between America, Britain and France with Russia and China reveals that the world is till need for a new world order,” al-Bukhiti said, adding that “the new world order must be based on justice.”
“You and your decisions are under our feet,” he said, stressing that the Yemeni people trust on Allah almighty.
https://en.ypagency.net/254867/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/03/01/ansarullah-condemns-un-security-council-decision-to-extend-arms-embargo-on-yemen/
(* A P)
Iran: UN-Sicherheitsrat-Resolution zum Jemen hat negative Folgen für Friedensprozess
Das iranische Außenministerium erklärte, dass die neueste Resolution des UN-Sicherheitsrates zur Krise im Jemen negative Folgen für den Friedensprozess habe und die Positionen der Konfliktparteien weiter voneinander distanzieren werde.
Am Dienstag sagte der Sprecher des iranischen Außenministeriums auf die Verlängerung des Waffenembargos gegen die Ansarullah-Bewegung im Jemen durch den UN-Sicherheitsrat: „Leider ist diese Resolution und die darin angewendete Wortwahl von den politischen Erwägungen und der Lobbyarbeit der Aggressor-Koalitionsländer beeinflusst und wurde trotz bestehender Bemühungen zur Wiederaufnahme des politischen Prozesses ergriffen.
Said Khatibzadeh betonte: „Seit Beginn des Krieges im Jemen hat die voreingenommene und unrealistische Sicht auf den Jemen, angeführt von den Hauptbefürwortern der Invasion im Jemen im UN-Sicherheitsrat, nicht nur keine Auswirkungen auf die Verringerung der Krise gehabt, sondern sie ist auch ein Faktor bei der Aufrechterhaltung der schlimmsten humanitären Katastrophe des Jahrhunderts."
Khatibzadeh fügte hinzu, dass infolge der Ignorierung der Verbrechen der saudisch geführten Angreifer-Koalition und der Abkehr des UN-Sicherheitsrates von seiner eigentlichen Pflicht während der sieben Jahre des brutalen Krieges gegen den Jemen, sowie wegen systematischer und schwerer Verletzungen des humanitären Völkerrechts, der Tötung von Zivilisten, der großflächigen Zerstörung der zivilen Infrastruktur und der illegalen Blockade von Häfen und Flughäfen, im Schatten des Schweigens der internationalen Gemeinschaft und mit der Fortsetzung dieses Ansatzes, die Aussicht auf einen dauerhaften und gerechten Frieden noch schwieriger und komplexer geworden sei.
(* A P)
UN Security Council resolution on Yemen taints peace, Tehran says
Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesperson has slammed the latest renewal of an arms embargo against Yemen's popular Houthi resistance movement, which has been defending the nation against a Saudi-led assault since March 2015.
Saeed Khatibzadeh said on Tuesday that the UN Security Council resolution on the Yemen issue, as well as the language employed in it, will have a detrimental impact on the peace process and strengthen the position of the armed rivals.
The resolution “bears negative repercussions in the path towards peace,” he added.
The resolution, Khatibzadeh added, has been adopted in line with “the political considerations and lobbying of members of the aggressor coalition.”
As a result, it contradicts efforts to revive the political process by further isolating the conflicting parties' stances, according to the official.
Khatibzadeh lambasted the Security Council for “distancing itself from its inherent duties” in Yemen from the start of the Saudi-led war and for turning a blind eye to the aggressors' atrocities.
This, he noted, has contributed to “systematic and serious violations of the international humanitarian laws, massacre of civilians, extensive destruction of civilian infrastructure, and illegal embargo of [Yemen’s] ports and airports,” amid international silence.
Such an approach further complicates the prospect of achieving a “fair” and “lasting” peace, Khatibzadeh added.
https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/470659/UN-Security-Council-resolution-on-Yemen-taints-peace-Tehran
and also https://en.mehrnews.com/news/184422/UNSC-resolution-has-negative-impact-on-Yemeni-peace-process
https://www.farsnews.ir/en/news/14001211000346/Iran-Slams-UNSC%E2%80%99s-Reslin-agains-Ansarllah
(A P)
Saudi Arabia’s cabinet welcomes UN resolution labeling Houthis as terrorists
Saudi Arabia’s cabinet has welcomed the UN Security Council’s resolution labeling the Iran-backed Houthi militia as a terrorist group and extending an arms embargo to all of Yemen’s Houthis, state news agency (SPA) reported on Tuesday.
“[We] hope this resolution will put an end to the [Houthis’] terrorist practices and their supporters,” the cabinet said.
(A P)
STC welcomes UN arms embargo on Houthis
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34606
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp2 – cp19
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-792b-yemen-war-mosaic-792b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-791-yemen-war-mosaic-791
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-791 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-791:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
