... Der saudische Krieg gegen Jemens Gesundheitssektor tötet mehr Menschen als die Kugeln – Huthis schaffen die Grundlage für eine Theokratie im Jemen – Die Minderheit der Ismailiten zwischen Unterdrückung und Integration – Die Fehler und Misserfolge der internationalen humanitären Hilfe für den Jemen – Frauenrechte sind nicht verhandelbar – Ex-US-Offiziere als Militärberater in den Golfmonarchien – und mehr
October 23, 2022: Why a blanket solution will never work to bring sustainable peace to Yemen – The Houthis in Yemen at a time of international military interventionism – The Houthi Jihad Council: command and control in ‘the Other Hezbollah’ – The Saudi war on Yemen’s health sector is killing more people than the bullets – Houthis laying the foundation for a theocracy in Yemen – The Ismaili Minority: Between oppression and integration – The flaws and failures of international humanitarian aid to Yemen – Women’s rights are non-negotiable – Ex-US-Offiziere as military advisors on Gulf monarchies – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-828b-yemen-war-mosaic-828b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Aden-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Aden government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp11 Deutschland / Germany
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp12b Sudan
cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade
cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage
cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy
cp15 Propaganda
cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
cp19 Sonstiges / Other
Klassifizierung / Classification
***
**
*
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
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Yemen’s Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering
Yemen’s internal divisions and a Saudi-led military intervention have spawned an intractable political, military, and humanitarian crisis.
Summary
The eight-year-old conflict in Yemen is between the internationally recognized government, which is backed by a Saudi-led military coalition, and Houthi rebels supported by Iran.
The country’s humanitarian crisis is said to be among the worst in the world, due to widespread hunger, disease, and attacks on civilians.
Tensions eased and humanitarian conditions improved with a UN-mediated cease-fire in 2022, but the combatants failed to renew the deal after six months.
Introduction
Yemen, a small country on the Arabian Peninsula, has become the site of grievous civilian suffering amid an intractable civil war. Many analysts say the fighting, now seven years old, has turned into a proxy war: Iran-backed Houthi rebels, who overthrew the Yemeni government, are pitted against a multinational coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The involvement of other combatants, including militant Islamist groups and separatists backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has complicated the picture.
The conflict has displaced more than four million people and given rise to cholera outbreaks, medicine shortages, and threats of famine. The warring parties observed a monthslong cease-fire in 2022, raising hopes for a political solution to the conflict, but that October, they failed to extend the truce
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis
My remark: By US Concil on Foreign Relations, means: US official viewpont.
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
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Yemen: Arabia's Game of Thrones. Why a Blanket Solution Will Never Work to Bring Sustainable Peace to Yemen
Eight years in and the Yemeni conflict is more vicious than ever. Despite ongoing peace talks, the conflict within the country continues with consequences on local communities that are sending ordinary Yemenis into an unprecedented status of despair. Dr. Nadia Al-Sakkaf, Arabia Brain Trust's Director of Research, argues that a reframing of the conflict is urgently needed - one whose solution takes into account geopolitical and demographic factors at the local level rather than political interests and nostalgia for what Yemen used to be. Her article is the second segment of Unresolved Crises, Institut Montaigne's newly-launched series on overlooked conflicts.
The conflict in Yemen is a complex and multi-dimensional game of chess. Walk us through ongoing conflict dynamics and recent developments in 2022, eight years in.
In the last two decades, Yemen has undergone several internal conflicts. The most prominent ones were the Sa'ada wars between 2004 and 2010, the 2011 uprising, and the current conflict resulting from the Houthi/Saleh insurgents' coup d'état of 2014. The latter is the longest armed conflict the country ever witnessed in modern history because of its complex nature and the multitude of players involved.
Now eight years in, and despite several rounds of peace talks and three tracks of consultations, Yemen today is furthest from a real and sustainable peace deal than ever. The UN-brokered truce that started in April this year ended on October 2nd without much scope for further renewal because the Houthis didn’t deliver on their end of the truce deal.
Today, Yemen is considered the worst humanitarian crisis of the century, with around 23.7 million people in need of assistance, including almost 13 million children. Peace processes have faltered.
Before surrendering his powers as president earlier this year, former President Hadi was not able to unite the Yemeni non-Houthi leaders under his wing. If anything, his lack of leadership contributed to the divisions and mushrooming of new militia and warlords each seeking a piece of the cake. In April of 2022, Saudi Arabia took it upon itself - albeit undemocratically - to create a change in the Yemeni leadership and bring the most prominent non-Houthi factions together in what is known as the Presidential Leadership Council.
The complexity of the internal Yemeni dynamics and the lack of visible leadership among Yemenis are the two main reasons why the international community is not engaging sincerely in Yemen. This disinterest is even affecting the main advocate for the legitimate government, Saudi Arabia, which has been suffering from the whims of Yemeni leaders and their internal plotting on the legitimate government’s side. The UN Secretary-General’s envoy’s office is also seemingly flustered and has been unable to extract any compromises or signs of good intentions from the Houthis.
Yemen's complexity stems from the fact that it is composed of diverse communities each having its own particularities and interests. In that regard, as Yemenis, our sense of national identity is missing. Even in times of relative peace, the community is plagued by classism and discrimination based on geographic and tribal affiliations, such as North vs. South or Sa'ada vs. Sanaa. As such, Yemen as a country was never a truly united nation even during the unification in 1990 when the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in the north, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south, were united into a single state: the Republic of Yemen. This unity was perceived as being forced and was challenged heavily since the 1994 civil war.
This diversity and the geographic terrain with a scattered population has also made it ideal for militias and extremists such as Alqaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) branch to set up camp in 2009 in Yemen, especially in the sparsely populated southern regions. AQAP exploits Yemen's instability but it is also exploited by Yemeni leaders who use its existence to claim anti-terrorism support whether in the form of military support or funding for so-called anti-terrorism operations.
In the same sense, the power the leaders of the conflict accumulated, including the Houthis, is a direct result of the miscalculations, if not intentional actions, of the regional and international players. Saudi Arabia has continuously invested in tribal sheiks, supplying them with money and arms with very little accountability. Even the United States and the United Kingdom used the terrorism card to indirectly support and allow militia - including that of the Houthis - to freely operate in the country in the hopes of creating an internal struggle that would eventually wipe all out.
The problem with this logic is that violence breeds violence: a situation of instability means fertile ground for warlords and arms dealers to thrive, who were created because of the conflict, and the vicious cycle continues. Consequently, they will do everything they can so that peace in Yemen never happens.
Finally, a reason why this conflict is not of great interest to the world is oil, or rather the lack thereof.
The story of Yemen is like that of any conflict in the world, easy to start but very difficult to end.
Keeping in mind all of what has been mentioned above, the solution to Yemen is twofold. First, interest has to move from the capitals and the conflict zones to the many towns in the peripheries, parts where relative stability exists and that enjoy a relative power balance. Yemen was never one entity, and the solution to Yemen will never be a blanket solution.
And this brings us to the second part of the solution for peace in Yemen. In addition to a decentralized local approach, the political process has to include other stakeholders, especially women, as equal partners in the peacebuilding decision process. Research and experience have repeatedly proven that when women are part of the peace-building process, the peace agreements are more likely to succeed and will last longer.
We keep going around in circles in terms of Yemen's peace negotiations and keep repeating methods already employed. A new framing of the Yemeni problem is urgently needed. One that recognizes that there are many stakeholders to the issue, other than those with the guns, and one that considers the solution to Yemen through a decentralized lens rather than a "one-size-fits-all" approach. Yemen's civil society has been working on producing alternative roadmaps such as the Peace Track Initiative, which created a Feminist Roadmap for Peace. This map is a live document and is created through a consultative process, utilizing the expertise of both female and male Yemeni leaders.
The solution to Yemen's conflict has to come piece by piece and has to emerge from the ground up by empowering the local communities, especially women and youth, giving them something to care about rather than engage in the armed conflict in search of a source of income or empty ideology. So far the world has spent over USD $20 billion in humanitarian aid, yet Yemenis are now more desperate than ever. This approach has repeatedly proven to be ineffective. The international community should step away from the humanitarian-based blanket solution that engrains aid dependency to one that empowers the youth, men and women, and enables them to build their own futures – by Nadia Al-Sakkaf
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The Houthis in Yemen at a time of international military interventionism (T 1434)
Since 2015, Yemen has been experiencing a series of foreign military interventions, the Saudi-led coalition imposed a comprehensive land, sea and air blockade, resulting in US support for this campaign. Finally, the episode of Houthi attacks on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) during the year 2022, prompted the United States to deploy Raptor F-22s to counter rebel attacks. Therefore, is external interventionism in Yemen necessary as a defense strategy? What role does the United States play in the outcome of this politico-military crisis?
Operation Decisive Storm: The internationalization of the conflict
Saudi Arabia sees Iran as its main adversary in the region. Its strategists see in what they call the Shiite arc, made up of Iranian, Iraqi, Yemeni and Lebanese Shiites, a sort of Shiite encirclement of its Sunni territory, and above all an Iranian attempt to expand its influence in the Middle East. . To the tribal components is thus superimposed another regional confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the only state to support the Houthi rebellion. The Saudi kingdom has therefore entered the war because it no longer supports the growing influence of the Shiite giant in the region.
Yemen occupies a strategic position thanks to the port of Aden and its control over the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb – a gateway to the Red Sea through which most of the oil destined for the European market is routed through the canal . from Suez. One of the major repercussions of the conflict in Yemen on Saudi Arabia is the threat of blocking this strait. This is to be taken with the utmost seriousness as long as this sea route is busy, because its economic stakes are very high. Bab-el-Mandeb is indeed a very strategic passage for tankers transporting crude or refined oil because most oil exports from the Persian Gulf pass through this passage, which sees these ships loaded with millions of barrels of oil.
The controversial American support for Saudi Arabia
Critics of the US role in Yemen are based on the fact that arms sales to Saudi Arabia could harm American interests in the long term. Yemenis consider that the humanitarian disaster is caused by the United States, young Yemenis, especially, are becoming radicalized, joining Daesh and AQAP and committing themselves to fight the United States.
Since Iran directly threatens Saudi Arabia, the Saudis fear that Houthi rebels loyal to Iran will become further radicalized. They are increasingly asking for American help in order to reduce their influence to nothing. Indeed, they know that the intervention in Yemen is also part of the larger United States counter-terrorism strategy in the Middle East, which is to ensure that this country can no longer be used as a rear base for attacks against vital American interests.
Could there be another reason for the United States to support this campaign? The most plausible reason is the Iran nuclear deal
Attacks against the Emirates: the Americans deploy major means
Yemen's Houthi rebels are attacking the UAE sometime in 2022, with drones targeting oil installations near Abu Dhabi airport, a strategy explicitly modeled on that of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon between 1992 and 2000 (11) .
What message are they sending through these actions? The Houthi Armed Forces are warning businesses and foreign citizens residing in UAE states that they will not hesitate to expand their targets to include larger sites and facilities in the coming period. The authorities imposed severe restrictions on the movement and use of drones after this attack, such as examining suspicious people inside the country and strict control of ports and borders, as well as banning the use of drones for any reason (12) .
Since the start of the war, the UAE has played an active role in Yem
To this effect, US Air Force F-22 Raptors arrived in the UAE after attacks by Houthi rebels from Yemen. The planes landed at Al Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi, which hosts some 2,000 US troops. These launched their Patriot interceptor missiles in response to Houthi attacks. This is the first time that American troops have fired this type of missile since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (13) .
US officials declined to specify the number of F-22s deployed and the number of airmen tasked with aviation support, citing operational security. The presence of the Raptors will bolster the already strong defenses of partner nations and signal to destabilizing forces that the United States and its allies are determined to make a strong presence in the region (14) .
Saudi Arabia's priority right now is to end this long-running conflict. Riyadh, which can no longer count on the long-term support of the United States, must propose a ceasefire and a return to dialogue with the Yemeni government and the rebels. External military interventionism has therefore shown its limits. Knowing also that Yemen is home to the most active and dangerous terrorist branch of Al-Qaeda , the United States has a strong interest in preventing this terrorist group from taking advantage of the power vacuum in Yemen to plot further attacks – by ferhat Laceb
Original site in French: https://www.defnat.com/e-RDN/vue-tribune.php?ctribune=1541
And a shorter survey: https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/29149/Riyadh-Must-End-Aggression-on-Yemen-Return-to-Dialogue-with-Sanaa%2C-French-Report
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The Houthi Jihad Council: Command and Control in ‘the Other Hezbollah’
[…] necessitate a fuller understanding of the Houthi political-military leadership, its core motivations, and the nature and extent of Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah influence within the movement. This study argues that the Houthi movement is now more centralized and cohesive than ever, in part due to close mentoring from Lebanese Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Houthi Jihad Council is emerging as a remarkable partner for Iran and the Houthi-Iran relationship and should no longer be viewed as a relationship of necessity, but rather a strong, deep-rooted alliance that is underpinned by tight ideological affinity and geopolitical alignment. The emergence of a ‘southern Hezbollah’ is arguably now a fact on the ground.
The IRGC Jihad Assistant and his Lebanese Hezbollah Deputy
It is no secret that the IRGC-QF (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force) and Lebanese Hezbollah supported Houthi territorial expansionism and military operations: In addition to U.N.bd and U.S.be statements to this effect, the IRGC-QF itself admits to its support.bf Alongside Abdalmalik, the IRGC-QF “Jihad Assistant” and his Lebanese Hezbollah deputy make up a triad at the heart of the Houthi war machine.94 IRGC-QF uses the same moniker—“Jihad Assistant”bg—in Iraq to describe its senior liaison officer with the top-tier Iraqi Shi`a terrorist group Kata’ib Hezbollah.95 Also similar to the Houthi case, the Jihad Assistant in Iraq has a Lebanese Hezbollah deputy, suggesting a kind of rough template in IRGC-QF interactions with partners and proxies.96 (In Lebanon, the Jihad Assistant is Lebanesebh and the title of the IRGC-QF senior advisor is unclear.) The key point is that the Jihad Assistant is always the senior military advisor to the leader,bi and in the case of Abdalmalik al-Huthi, this is an Iranian IRGC-QF officer with a Lebanese Hezbollah deputy.97
The exact nature of the relationship between Abdalmalik and the Jihad Assistant is obviously a well-guarded secret, but careful interviewing with persons at the edges of the Houthi security establishment can begin to build an intriguing picture.98
Overall, analysts might profitably reassess the longevity of Hezbollah military support to the Houthis, looking further back prior to 2010. Hezbollah itself has spoken of providing military advice to the Houthis as far back as 1992,bm but the major intensification might logically have occurred after the Hezbollah tactical victories over Israel in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war and the skyrocketing of Hezbollah’s regional reputation.112
Administration of the Houthi-controlled Military
When the September 21, 2014, Peace and National Partnership Agreement was signed on the day the Houthis seized Sana’a as a last ditch effort to save the post-Arab Spring peace process,115 the Houthis sought the integration of around 40,000 Houthi fighters into the state security forces, and the emplacement of a Houthi with familial links to the army, Zakaria al-Shami, as the deputy chief of staff of the Yemeni Ministry of Defense (MoD).116 After overrunning Sana’a in the coup of September 2014, the Houthis went further, directly controlling the MoD and MoI for the first time.bs In the latter, a slow-burning struggle for control of the police forces began between loyalists of Ali Abdallah Saleh, eventually ending with Saleh’s death at the hands of the Houthis in December 2017 and the appointment of Abdalkarim al-Houthi as Minister of Interior in 2019.117 In the MoD, the Houthis progressively co-opted Saleh-era generalsbt to serve alongside (and quickly under) senior Houthis.
previous scholarship was absolutely right to point to a lack of strong public evidence of Iranian mentorship in the Houthi movement,217 but this has been rendered moot by subsequent events and outpaced by the gradual release of materials on the growing role of the IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hezbollah during the years in which the Houthi movement became extraordinarily successful on the battlefield, namely from the fourth Sa’da war in 2007 to the present day.218 Badr al-Din, Husayn, and Abdalmalik, as well as many other Houthi commanders, drew heavily on the examples and the political and military models of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah.
Whenever and however the Houthi relationships started with IRGC-QF and Hezbollah, these relationships now appear to be exceedingly strong and stable.221 In the assessment of the authors, Iran sees the Houthis as a remarkable asset, on par with Lebanese Hezbollah, albeit at an earlier stage of development.du In the authors’ assessment, based on investigative work in both Iraq and Yemen, the Houthis are respected by IRGC-QF to a greater extent than Iraqi militias because the Houthis have proven themselves to be more capable, cohesive, and disciplined.222 The Jihad Assistant oversees a relationship with the Houthis that is reputedly warm, discreet, respectful, and highly valued by both sides.223 According to the authors’ collective research, Lebanese Hezbollah’s relations with the group appear similarly respectful, egalitarian, and brotherly, which (again) is often not the case between Lebanese and Iraqi groups.224dv Neither Iran nor Hezbollah appear to play in the internal politics of the Houthis to a measurable extent, in part because the movement—unlike Iraqi militias—has a unity and discipline that both Iran and Hezbollah appreciate in a partner.225
Iranian and Lebanese interaction with the Houthi leadership is so narrowly focused on Abdalmalik and the Jihad Council that it is, in the authors’ collective assessment, probably invisible to most Houthis and to Yemenis and the world at large.226 Though it is not possible to identify any Houthi command decisions in which IRGC-QF or Hezbollah forced the Houthis to decide differently than they might independently have, it is assessed as probable that Iran has built up sufficient goodwill and credit with the Houthi leadership that it can selectively call on the Houthis to serve Iranian interests in ways that may incur new costs or difficulties for the Houthis.227 If Abdalmalik and his inner circle decide to cede certain strategic decisions to Iran, almost no one would know it had happened and no one would be in a position to protest within the centralized totalitarian structure of today’s Houthi movement.
Therefore, even if the Houthi relationship with Iran and Hezbollah is not that of a proxy, this article argues that the connection is arguably that of a strong, deep-rooted alliance that is underpinned by tight ideological affinity and geopolitical alignment.228 This suggests that the relationship will only grow closer, regardless of whether fighting in Yemen waxes or wanes, and that the Houthis may play an integrated role in future Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah military campaigns.dw If a key Houthi supporter of close relations with Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah, such as Abdalmalik, were to die or be otherwise replaced, there is now a broad-based set of leaders whose whole ideological and political upbringing will predispose them to continue this beneficial and warm relationship – by Michael Knights, Adnan al-Gabarni, Casey Coombs
https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-houthi-jihad-council-command-and-control-in-the-other-hezbollah/
My remark: Interesting, but keep in mind that Michael Knights is a strictly anti-Houthi author, and US West Point obviously isn’t a neutral source.
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The Saudi war on Yemen’s health sector is killing more people than the bullets
Some 320,000 patients, 230,000 of whom with critical conditions requiring treatment outside Yemen, couldn’t travel due to the closure of Sana’a airport, said Anees Haza’, spokesperson of the Health Ministry in Sana’a in an interview. Of those patients, 45,000 have prematurely died, 30% of whom were children, he said. An August 2018 joint statement by CARE and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) said that there were more Saudi bombs dropped on the airport than passengers leaving for urgent medical treatment abroad. "An airport should be a safe and functioning piece of civilian infrastructure, allowing people to come and go freely," said Johan Mooij, Country Director for CARE in Yemen. "Instead, the airport in Sana'a has become a symbol of aggression and oppression for a very large population."
Before the war, some estimated 7000 Yemeni patients used to fly out of Sana’a airport for medical treatment not available in Yemen. "Millions of Yemenis now effectively live in an open prison between hostile borders and frontlines of war. As long as the airport is closed, so is the single safe route to lifesaving medical treatment,” said Mohamed Abdi, NRC’s country director in the statement. The road to the other two functioning airports, which are in the south under the control of the Saudi backed government, can be dangerous and take long travel times to get to, which can threaten the patients’ lives, an option the majority of them are reluctant to take.
But the Saudi ban on the airport was also followed by the suspension of monthly salaries for about one million public servants, 480,000 of whom work in the health sector.
The Saudi suspension of monthly salary also meant a cut to the operational costs of public services, including funds to some key health services. The National Oncology Centre (NOC) in Sana’a, which treats more than 60,000 patients, had its annual budget of $12 million stopped in 2016, leaving it dependent on very limited external support. “We try to do our best to keep functioning, but we don’t have enough medicines, and we have no choice but to watch our patients die due to lack of treatment,” said Ali al-Ashwal, then director of NOC. “Poor patients simply leave us and die at home because they cannot afford treatment,” said al-Ashwal.
As part of its war on the health system, the Saudi’s have also prevented the entry of some life-saving drugs and key medical equipment into Yemen, resulting in more suffering and deaths. Haza’, the health ministry spokesperson, said the coalition has prevented or made it difficult for the entry of the following drugs: 50% of cancer drugs; 65 types of surgery drugs; 31 types of resuscitation and anaesthesia drugs; 120 of chronic disease drugs; 65 for laboratory solutions and testing in addition to dialysis solutions. From 2017 to 2020, some estimated 2000 cancer patients died because they couldn’t receive their drugs, according to Haza’.
The Saudi coalition has made no secret of its war on the health sector as it has directly targeted health facilities and health care providers. Some 537 health facilities were bombed or targeted by Saudi backed forces across 14 provinces – by Ahmad Algohbary
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LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR A THEOCRACY IN YEMEN
The celebration of Prophet Mohammed’s birthday in Yemen had more to do with Houthi leaders than the prophet.
Watching the Iran-backed Houthis’ celebration of Prophet Mohammed’s birthday earlier this month has been discomforting for many Yemenis who cannot reconcile their image of Yemen before the war to what it has now become. However, it was not the celebration that caused concern, but the way it was conducted, which obscured a cult-like political agenda in a religious ceremony meant to revere the Houthi leaders more so than the prophet himself.
The event, also known as al-Mawlid, was nothing short of spectacular. Aerial footage and cell phone videos projected views of the crowds that were tantamount to images of pilgrims to Mecca, if not for the green robes and colors they dawned. Thousands of Yemenis assembled in Sabeen Square to watch the sermon of Abdulmalek al-Houthi, the group’s supreme leader, as they yelled in unison: “Death to America” and other anti-Semitic slogans the leadership dictated. Roads leading up to the square were entirely blocked as they filled up with tens of thousands of people.
Locally, the event and new rituals provide the Houthis with the prospects to further sculpt their narrow ideological framework and enable them to deepen their control. For their followers, this framework exalts the prophet and his descendants, giving them an impeachable and untouchable image that cannot be doubted or questioned. For the outside world, the ceremony is intended to showcase the uniformity of the movement, its powerful reach, and mass appeal. In reality, however, this greenwashing is a testament to the Houthis’ coercive power and the helplessness of civilians who must show blind loyalty and obedience to the militia.
In the weeks leading up to the Mawlid, Houthis organized several campaigns to collect donations from individuals to help cover the costs of the festivities in all areas under their control. Although Abdelmalek al-Houthi stated that contributions are voluntary, no person asked is willing to risk refusing, as noncompliance with the Houthis’ wishes has serious consequences varying from fines to imprisonment. This is particularly disturbing given the multitude of deteriorating humanitarian and economic conditions of Yemenis under Houthis’ control.
BUILDING THE IMAGE OF A NEW THEOCRACY
The Houthis’ ideological fixation with the prophet is core to their belief and internal justification of their rise to power.
However, the Houthis’ adoption of Iran’s teachings is now overpowering Yemen’s traditional Zaydi practice, which doesn’t sit well with many Yemenis, including Zaydi scholars.
Houthis’ use of religion — or sectarianism — as propaganda is vital in attaining their political aims and a central component of the group’s “image-building.” The leadership thereby projects an image of their movement as pious, righteous, and militarily omnipotent to achieve its objectives and justify its involvement and continuation of the war. Through opportunities like al-Mawlid, the Houthis can explain the rationale of their takeover of Yemen in 2014, justifying their involvement in this conflict to protect Yemen from the interests of foreign actors and the “corruption” of Yemen’s government. Their narrative deepens phobias among community members and increases their sense of isolation from the outside world. In general, Houthis are attempting to establish a sense of national identity for Yemenis that centers around the survival of the political echelons of their leadership.
A TROUBLING CHANGE
These changes that the Iran-backed Houthis are imposing on the Yemeni society are truly harmful because they are engineered to drive the idea that only a divine-imposed entity can govern. This idea should belong in fiction and not in the real world. Should a negotiation on a political settlement be considered in the future, the Houthis’ concept will stand in the way of its implementation because a fair and effective political settlement is incompatible with their dogma – by Fatima Abo Alasrar
https://inkstickmedia.com/laying-the-foundation-for-a-theocracy-in-yemen/
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The Ismaili Minority: Between Oppression and Integration
Executive Summary
Ismailis are the second biggest Shia community worldwide after the Twelver Shia, but while in Yemen they are outnumbered by both Sunnis and Zaidi Shia they have deep historical roots in the country going back over 1,000 years. Living mainly in the northern Haraz mountains and Aden in the south, Yemen’s Ismaili minority hails from the Tayyibi Musta?li branch of Yemen and India, which is outnumbered globally by the more numerous Nizari Ismailis. Both branches of Ismailism have their origin in disputes over leadership and doctrine during the Fatimid caliphate that ruled from Egypt between 969 and 1171 CE.
Although Ismailis in Yemen flourished during the Fatimid era, they later suffered heavily during the Zaidi Imamate. The 1962 republican revolution was a turning point for Ismailis in the north, ending persecution but not the negative stereotypes surrounding them in Yemeni society. Today they are on good terms with the Houthi authorities in Sana’a but the situation is markedly different in Aden, where many Ismailis of Yemeni origin returned from India to settle during the era of the British colony (1839-1967).
When war erupted in 2015, Salafi groups – whose influence had grown in Yemen since the 1990s – accused the Ismailis of siding with the Houthis as fellow Shia Muslims. After Houthi forces were expelled from Aden, Salafis began to target the Shia community, including Ismailis, destroying a mosque and causing Ismailis to move to other neighborhoods or quit Aden altogether. Despite this, Ismailis are active today in the Yemeni economy, mostly working in the private sector. They have led an initiative to replace qat plantations with coffee, a project that has made great progress in Haraz.
This paper outlines the history of the Ismaili community and its current problems to make a series of recommendations aimed at reintegrating them into society. State education should highlight their distinctive contributions to Yemen’s history, culture and economy in an effort to combat historical prejudice and stereotypes. Legal measures could be taken to prevent hate speech and incitement, and Ismailis should be given access to sealed religious manuscripts held at the Great Mosque in Sana’a. The internationally recognized government – which is based in Aden – must guarantee their safety, allowing Ismailis to return to their communities and rebuild their mosques. Finally, the government and its international supporters should view the Ismaili question as a model for the broader issue of how minorities are treated in Yemen when the current conflict is resolved – by Maysaa Shuja al-Deen and Salah Ali Salah
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/18910
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The Flaws and Failures of International Humanitarian Aid to Yemen
In a July 2022 report on the UN’s humanitarian response to the crisis in Yemen, the UN Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group concluded that “the quality of humanitarian aid in many areas was unacceptably low,” and that affected populations repeatedly said that “they did not know how to access aid, or how to get on the ‘lists’ that led to assistance.” Yemenis from all walks of life have indeed been highly critical of how international humanitarian assistance has been undertaken in Yemen. In fact, a social media campaign using the hashtag #WhereIsTheMoney has been expressing Yemenis’ frustration over the failures in implementing international humanitarian aid, questioning the quality of said aid, and demanding transparency from the UN and other international agencies regarding the methods and process for spending funds.
Moreover, a growing number of Yemen experts have for some time been sounding the alarm about the failures of the international humanitarian response in the country. Yemeni American historian Asher Orkaby, Yemeni investigative journalist Ali Salem, this author, and the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies have all published striking critiques of the international humanitarian aid system in Yemen, and the Sana’a Center also briefed the UN Security Council about the same matter.
Problems in humanitarian aid to Yemen include a weak strategy that focuses on short-term solutions, counterproductive stances of neutrality and impartiality, reluctance to speak out against warring parties’ abuse of aid and humanitarian workers, and a lack of sufficient inclusion of Yemeni professionals.
All of this criticism indicates that there are serious problems that the international humanitarian community needs to address in order to truly relieve human suffering in Yemen. Problems include a weak strategy that focuses on short-term solutions, counterproductive stances of neutrality and impartiality, reluctance to speak out against warring parties’ abuse of aid and humanitarian workers, and a lack of sufficient inclusion of Yemeni professionals. To address these problems, it is absolutely imperative that international organizations work to stamp out corruption, to reevaluate their strategies and practices, and to involve local partners and experts to a greater degree. Only by making these changes and by focusing on long-term solutions will these organizations be able to contribute to permanently resolving the humanitarian situation in Yemen.
Weak Strategy
Most international humanitarian and human rights groups working on issues related to Yemen know what they want to do, but fail to fully understand potential side effects of their work. That is to say that they are aware of their work mandate and strategy, but lack the ability to carry them out effectively without creating disadvantages for the Yemeni population.
These organizations’ strategies tend to focus on implementing their own agendas, which typically have a temporary, short-term impact, and which mainly aim to satisfy donors and meet their expectations. But for many Yemenis these strategies are irrelevant, do not address the roots of the problem, and fail to provide long-term solutions to persistent issues.
A prime example of weak humanitarian aid strategy is the World Food Program’s (WFP) practices in Yemen. In September 2022, the WFP’s country director said about the organization’s work there that it was “able to keep people from starving—to keep famine at bay.” Keeping famine “at bay,” however, is a short-term solution, one that eventually creates a situation of foreign aid dependency. When the WFP won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2020, many Yemenis were shocked, especially given the WFP’s flawed work in the country. Again and again, the WFP has been accused of letting food rot in local warehouses and of sending rotten food to Yemen, and possibly even doing so deliberately. It is possible that the tragic results of the WFP’s food assistance program are due to the extremely difficult logistics of operating in Yemen. This, however, highlights another problem: the neutrality principle.
As the conflict has continued, more armed militia groups have emerged and the war economy has flourished. In this context, international humanitarian organizations’ position of neutrality has translated into a tragic silence on armed groups’ abusive practices against humanitarian work and their obstruction of humanitarian assistance. Numerous media reports have shed light on abuses committed by the country’s warring parties against humanitarian aid.
International organizations’ weak strategies perhaps stem from a fear of losing funding, from a commitment to doing work by the book as their donors would like them to do, or from certain elements of orientalism. Unfortunately, satisfying donors comes as a top priority on their agenda. The social media pages of many international humanitarian groups working in Yemen contain many posts thanking specific donors for their funding, as if part of their work is to respond to donors’ need for recognition.
Submission to Warlords
Because the majority of Yemen’s population lives in areas controlled by the Houthi armed group, the majority of humanitarian work in the country is done in those areas. After Houthi leaders realized that international aid could be a powerful tool, they created in 2019 a Houthi-owned humanitarian body called the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation (SCMCHA). This author asked numerous civil society actors and groups, including local humanitarian aid workers, about their thoughts on SCMCHA. Almost all of those questioned had the same response: SCMCHA’s main purpose is to deliver intelligence to senior Houthi officials about independent local humanitarian aid groups, to impose hundreds of restrictions on local and international aid organizations, and to tax or otherwise deduct money from international humanitarian aid funding. SCMCHA holds a monopoly over all Yemeni humanitarian aid work in areas under Houthi control, which means that any civil society groups trying to undertake aid work must abide by Houthi authorities’ rules and requirements, and must submit to total supervision.
However, Houthi authorities have found another method to make money off of humanitarian aid, namely by charging Yemenis themselves. During the month of Ramadan in 2022, for instance, Houthi authorities issued an order that has largely gone unmentioned outside of the country, and that stated that no one was allowed to donate food or aid outside of the group’s control or supervision, and that doing so required a license. Because international humanitarian aid groups attempt to uphold impartiality in their work, they are very often submissive to the Houthis’ orders, which allows Houthi authorities to benefit from the aid that is meant for individuals and local organizations.
Excluding Potential Local Partners
All of these problems could be mitigated or fully solved if more Yemeni voices were involved, and if the advice these potential local partners have to give was heard. International organizations must include more Yemeni humanitarian aid workers in the efforts in Yemen.
International humanitarian organizations in Yemen need to play a positive role and to remain open to learning from local partners, to listening to Yemenis’ demands, and to paying attention to Yemen experts when they warn about the damage the international humanitarian aid system intentionally or unintentionally creates – by Afrah Nasser
https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-flaws-and-failures-of-international-humanitarian-aid-to-yemen/
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Women’s Rights are Non-Negotiable
Houthi restrictions on women’s rights have become increasingly oppressive in recent months. Retrograde efforts to control women are ever more common, most conspicuously through the procedure of requiring the approval of a male guardian, or mahram, for all manner of activities. The mahram can be any male member of the family, including the father, husband, brother, or even a young son. Yemenia Airways has started to request not only a letter of approval from a guardian for women to book outbound flights, with a stamp of approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but for a mahram to physically accompany them on the plane. This includes Yemeni women working for international organizations, who have been prevented from traveling outside their home governorates and so find themselves shut out of valuable training programs or unable to perform their jobs. Even in urban Sana’a, women are sometimes prevented from leaving their homes in the evening, and women drivers are harassed at checkpoints with threats to revoke their licenses. Houthi authorities have used the institutional levers of state to systematically oppress women and violate their basic human rights. It is high time that the international community uses what leverage it possesses, including within the ongoing truce negotiations, to force the issue onto the table.
The Houthis are consummating an ideological agenda that has been some three decades in the making. During the 1990s, when Islamist movements were ascendant throughout the region, founder of the Houthi movement Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi talked openly of replicating not Iran’s Islamic republic, but the antediluvian world of the Taliban’s Afghanistan. According to its particular vision, the Houthi movement would create a Zaidi Shia theocratic order, with a return to premodern values in the name of Islamic authenticity. The Afghan analogy is not spurious – mahram rules under the current Taliban regime are similar to those applied in Houthi-controlled Yemen. The Houthi heartland of Sa’ada in the far north has been a testing ground for this religious regime for over a decade, policed in part by its all-female security apparatus, known as the Zainabiyyat. With the entrenching of Houthi control over large swathes of the country since 2014, the draconian tentacles of its ideology have had ample time to spread.
The Houthi project has accelerated during the recent six-month truce. While numerous international actors took advantage of the de-escalation to engage with Sana’a, there has been a deafening silence from the international community on the unfolding plans to instrumentalize, discipline, and control women. This approach myopically ignores critical developments in the emancipation and widening role of women in Yemeni society that have transpired in recent decades.
While there is still considerable ground to cover in granting universal freedoms in the various political, economic, and social spheres of modern life, since the 1960s women’s status in Yemen has gradually improved in line with regional trends, with more women registering to vote and women in government acquiring ministerial portfolios. Most political parties now recognize the need for proactive measures to ensure women’s representation; the UN-led National Dialogue Conference of 2013-14 sought to formalize women’s representation with a 30 percent quota in elected bodies and government institutions. The Houthi takeover of Sana’a in 2014 and the ensuing war disrupted that progress, but did not deter the struggle for women’s participation.
While the Houthi movement is hardly alone in targeting women in its ideological program, the general trend regionally and internationally is toward broadening women’s rights. Since the 1990s, neighboring countries have ditched bans on driving, eased dress codes, and ended some of the more coercive aspects of their mahram systems.
Policymakers who are committed to broadening women’s rights should consider a key driver of improving their material and social position: integrating women into economic development. Yemen is suffering severe economic deterioration nationwide, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine and its impact on supply chains and energy markets – conditions that pressured political leaders to first implement the truce. But though Yemen still has one of the lowest female labor participation rates in the world, the war years have removed barriers to women into the workplace, including private businesses and the retail sector. Some women working for civil society organizations rent homes on their own, as their families’ primary earners.
The progress made on women’s rights must not be abandoned, but it cannot survive if not defended at every level of engagement. Women’s civic rights must be included in all further negotiations over the truce and its de-escalation measures. The international community must accept nothing less than the enshrinement of women’s pre- and post-war gains and consider every path to achieve this. The scope of the Houthi threat to women cannot be ignored: it is nothing short of an organized plan to coerce half of Yemeni society into rigidly circumscribed roles that run counter to the ideals of the republic and internationally established norms. This plan is already being enacted, and if nothing is done now conditions will only worsen. Women are already strikingly absent from the peace process. Without immediate action, they will become absent from Yemeni political and professional society. It is time for a new approach – by Sanaa Center
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/september-2022/18922
and some photos from the past:
Women in Sana'a wearing Setarah & Maghmog in 1930s: https://twitter.com/yemeniwomenar/status/1477577305337782275
Female teachers of the al‑Ḥurriyya school (Al a'bus- Taiz) in the 1970s
https://twitter.com/yemeniwomenar/status/1476791443792539661
Yemeni women dancing 1977: https://twitter.com/A_Ghabri/status/1302960761082437632
1986 : countryside of Yemen, a young woman fetching water: https://twitter.com/A_Ghabri/status/1496554703265665030
(** B P)
Ex-US-Offiziere helfen bei Aufrüstung am Golf
Wenn Militärs bei den US-Streitkräften aufhören, haben sie Anrecht auf eine Pension. Das Wissen hochrangiger Offiziere ist aber auch im Ausland äußerst wertvoll. Dies lassen sie sich hervorragend bezahlen. Von wem, das interessiert die US-Behörden nur bedingt.
Die US-Regierung ließ sich vor Gericht zerren, weil sie die Daten nicht preisgeben wollte. Doch die Justiz entschied: Die Behörden müssen der Öffentlichkeit die Daten darüber zur Verfügung stellen, in welche Jobs das US-Außenministerium ehemalige Angehörige des US-Militärs nach ihrem Dienst in den Vereinigten Staaten hat wechseln lassen. Eine Auswertung der "Washington Post" zeigt: Die USA exportieren mit ihren Veteranen militärisches Knowhow im großen Stil. Das Außenministerium genehmigt solche Tätigkeiten offenbar ohne viel Federlesen.
Den juristisch freigekämpften Dokumenten zufolge sind seit 2015 mehr als 500 ehemalige Militärangehörige der USA, darunter eine große Anzahl Generäle und Admirale, vor allem in den Dienst autoritärer Regime im Nahen Osten gewechselt. Dort arbeiten sie als Berater oder Angestellte für die Regierungen und werden für ihr Insiderwissen und ihre politischen Kontakte fürstlich entlohnt. Die meisten sind als zivile Angestellte für Saudi-Arabien, die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate (VAE) und andere Golfmonarchien tätig, um deren militärische Schlafkraft zu erhöhen.
Die Bezahlung liegt im sechs- bis siebenstelligen Dollarbereich, es flossen also viele Millionen. Viel mehr, als ein Offizier zuvor bei den US-Streitkräften verdienen kann. Sie kassieren das Geld zusätzlich zu ihrer Militärpension aus Washington. Das US-Außenministerium muss die Tätigkeiten genehmigen, ebenso das US-Militär. Allerdings gibt es für einen Verstoß gegen die Genehmigungspflicht keine Strafen, außer die Pension zu kürzen.
Die juristische Auseinandersetzung um die Details der Anstellungen ist ein Indiz dafür, dass auch die Behörden die neuen Jobs für problematisch halten könnten, selbst wenn sie nicht entsprechend entschieden. Laut "Washington Post" wurden die Anfragen größtenteils einfach durchgewinkt, nur fünf Prozent nicht genehmigt.
Allein 15 frühere US-Generäle und Admirale waren seit 2015 für das saudische Verteidigungsministerium und damit letztlich für den faktischen Herrscher, Kronprinzen Mohammad bin Salman, tätig.
https://amp.n-tv.de/politik/Ex-US-Offiziere-helfen-bei-Aufruestung-am-Golf-article23662215.html
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KEY FINDINGS FROM THE POST’S SERIES ON VETERANS’ LUCRATIVE FOREIGN JOBS
U.S. government lawyers fought to keep records of foreign work by military retirees secret
The Post sued the armed forces and the State Department to obtain the records on foreign jobs sought by military personnel, including the type of work, compensation and countries involved. So far, The Post has obtained more than 4,000 pages of documents, including case files for about 450 retired soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines.
The government had resisted releasing the records under the Freedom of Information Act, arguing that disclosure was not in the public interest and violated the privacy of military personnel. After a two-year legal battle, U.S. District Judge Amit P. Mehta ruled in September that the government’s arguments were “unconvincing.”
“The public has a right to know if high-ranking military leaders are taking advantage of their stations — or might be perceived to be doing so — to create employment opportunities with foreign governments in retirement,” Mehta wrote.
Hundreds of retired U.S. military personnel have taken foreign jobs
More than 500 retired U.S. military personnel — including scores of generals and admirals — have taken jobs as contractors and consultants for foreign governments since 2015, cashing in on their military expertise and political clout.
Most have worked as civilian contractors for Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Persian Gulf monarchies, playing a critical, though largely invisible, role in upgrading their militaries.
Foreign governments pay handsomely for U.S. military talent, with salary and benefit packages reaching six and sometimes seven figures — far more than what most American service members earn while on active duty.
Retired generals and admirals command the most money, but former enlisted personnel can also collect hefty foreign paychecks on top of their U.S. military pensions, records show.
Most are hired by countries known for human rights abuses, political repression
Fifteen retired U.S. generals and admirals have worked as paid consultants for the Saudi Defense Ministry and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
The UAE is the most popular foreign job market
Over the past seven years, 280 retired U.S. service members have worked as military contractors and consultants for the United Arab Emirates, more than for any other country by far.
The Emiratis have relied on U.S. military contractors and advisers to build what many experts regard as the strongest military in the Arab world. But the UAE has used its armed forces to intervene in civil wars in Yemen and Libya, worsening the humanitarian crises in both countries.
The Emiratis pay well for U.S. help. A
Requests to work for foreign governments are largely rubber-stamped
Retired troops seeking foreign work must first obtain approval from their branch of the armed forces and the State Department. The Post found these requests are largely rubber-stamped: Of more than 500 submitted since 2015, about 95 percent were granted.
The Post also identified scores of retirees on LinkedIn who say they have taken military contracting jobs in the Persian Gulf, but for whom there is no record of federal approval. There is no criminal penalty for violating the law. Enforcement is almost nonexistent.
The Defense Department can withhold retirement pay from those who ignore the rules. But the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, which administers military payrolls, has docked the pensions of “fewer than five” people – by Craig Whitlock and Nate Jones
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/veterans-foreign-jobs-foia-takeaways/
and for this subject, from Austarlia: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-14/australian-army-veterans-advising-foreign-army-accused-war-crime/10611142
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
(A H)
More than 8000 cases of infection with dengue fever have been recorded in Taiz since the beginning of 2020, an official at the Health Ministry has said/Yemen Monitor
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-61228
cp2 Allgemein / General
(* A K P)
Interactive Map of Yemen War
(* B H K P)
INSIDE YEMEN'S SWELLING ENERGY CRISIS
The Saudi led-coalition blocked the entry of oil tankers into Yemen's Hodeidah port, breaching its commitments under the UN-brokered truce.
On 3 September, the Yemen Petroleum Company in Sana'a issued an official statement saying it will activate an emergency plan in response to the shortage of fuels resulting from the continued blockade of ships near the Saudi coast.
According to Essam Al- Motwake, spokesperson of the Yemen Petroleum Company, the holding of 16 fuel ships for more than 17 days by the Saudis cost the Company more than USD $11 million. The internationally-recognised Yemeni government denied Houthi claims and accused the rebels of exploiting the crisis to sell fuel in a parallel (black) market.
The Saudi coalition finally allowed the passage of eight oil tankers into Hodeidah port but seized the rest.
The incident exacerbated the mounting humanitarian crisis in Yemen by causing the prices of electricity, transportation and foodstuff to soar and bringing economic activity to a halt.
The crisis also affected the country's struggling health sector: some private medical centres have suspended their operations due to the shortage of oil, depriving many Yemeni patients from access to medical treatment.
The majority of Yemen’s supply of electric energy is derived from fuels and gas, including 684 megawatts from diesel, 495 megawatts from steam power and 340 megawatts from natural gas, according to reports from the Ministry of electricity and energy.
The ministry was slated to make improvements in the gas-operated plant in the Marib governorate - which supplied roughly 40 percent of the country's energy needs - and increase its generating capacity to 400 megawatts starting 2012. But the project failed following the eruption of the revolution in 2011.
Now, as oil and gas production in Yemen screeched into a halt with the onset of the war, the Marib plant is out of commission.
As a result, more than half of Yemeni citizens have no access to electricity, particularly in rural areas of the country. The majority of those are farm workers who depend on electricity to irrigate their fields. Many of them used to rely on diesel to run their water pumps, but the price for 20 liters of diesel had gone up from USD $4 in 2015 to $35.
https://www.fairplanet.org/story/inside-yemens-swelling-energy-crisis/
(A P)
Abductees’ Mothers Association Demands the Unconditional Release of their Sons and Justice for them
In sync with the advocacy campaign launched by Abductees’ Mothers Association entitled (Justice for Abductees), Abductees’ Mothers Associations held a vigil this morning, Thursday, in the city of Taiz.
The mothers demanded at their vigil the unconditional release of "526" kidnapped and disappeared by the Houthi group, including four journalists facing the death penalty. They also demanded the unconditional release of “18” kidnapped and disappeared by the security services of the legitimate government, “118” other abductees by the Security Belt in Aden, and “7” abductees by the Joint Forces on the West Coast.
The statement stressed the need to end the impunity of the perpetrators of kidnapping, arrest, disappearance and torture against civilians and to bring them to a fair trial as the continued kidnappings and arrests is a direct result of the lack of accountability and punishment of the perpetrators.
http://ama-ye.org/index.php?no=1936&ln=En
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Sole Survivor Sporadic Tales
Never in my life have I seen such a sad face
Among Yemeni stories, on the verge of war and its sad margins, many are standing on the dividing line between death and life. Here, you have no clue how to convey condolence for the loss of those who were with them or how survival in such circumstances can be considered good luck.
In the last stories that I met, Abdo Ali (23 years), always begins his narration with “I was with them…” before he starts to tell, “I was with them in the same car. We were laughing and talking about the war and the severe fuel crisis. We passed by our village, which I love, and I decided to end my trip and get out of the car.”
Only five minutes after Abdo got out of his brother’s car a mine planted by the Ansar Allah group “Houthis” exploded in Hodeidah city, killing five people at once; Abdo’s brother and four of his nephews. Abdo did say goodbye as they agreed to meet soon within a few hours.
Whenever someone asks him to tell what happened, he raises and lowers his head, as if embarrassed of his survival, and repeats from time to time, “I was with them… and when I got back to them, they were flesh hanging over electric wires.”
In the first stories I came across, I met Ashwaq Abdullah (28 years), a mother of four children (Salem, Osama, Khaled, Jamal). On August 18, 2015, death chose them all at once by a Saudi / UAE-led coalition bomb that ruined their home and its peace while they were watching cartoons and were possibly laughing or arguing over the change of channel.
Death picked everyone in the house except for Ashwaq. Her four children, mother-in-law, sister, and niece were all snatched away in an instant, leaving her as a cut-and-burned tree. I have never seen a face so sad as that of Ashwaq, and the sadness I felt when I imagined myself in her shoes will stay with me forever.
The kids pass away without saying goodbye and she was not able to see them for the last time.
I also know Bashir, a young kid with a cascade of tragic stories. This year he will be ten years old. When I knew him, on November 7, 2017, he was only five, in a bleak intensive care unit.
https://mwatana.org/en/sole-survivor/
(A P)
Saudi Arabia Renews Call for Classifying Houthi Militias as Terrorists, Drying up Their Funding Sources
Saudi Arabia has renewed its call for the international community to label Houthi militias in Yemen as a terrorist group and dry up their funding sources. During a session in Jeddah, the Saudi Cabinet reiterated the Kingdom's continued support for international peacemaking efforts in Yemen.
King Salman bin Abdulaziz chaired the Cabinet's session at Al-Salam Palace on Tuesday afternoon.
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Yemen Socio-Economic Update, Issue 72 - May 2022
In This Edition
Governance and Institutional Recovery Priorities
Human Capital Recovery Priorities
Reconstruction of the Infrastructure (Physical Capital Recovery Priorities)
Economic Recovery Key Drivers
Introduction
Economic recovery, reconstruction and sustainable development has been an important and indispensable process, especially in the cusp of severe economic conditions, the challenges posed by the crisis and extremely complicated and difficult contexts that the country have been through over the past eight years, where significant development and economic gains have been reversed as the war and conflict held back the development drive in its entirety. Consequently, the future focus on economic recovery and promoting its resilience, reconstructing the social and economic infrastructure affected by the war and conflict remain a top priority so to be able to re-engineer the economic and national institutions based on the principles of good governance.
Although humanitarian needs remain vital to Yemen in these hard times, but achieving greater economic recovery to stand to future shocks cannot be accomplished without long-term planning and integrated development initiatives, which requires levelling the playing field for a better future by linking between humanitarian action, development and peace in all interventions, together with assistance to build a stronger and more sustainable future for Yemen.
Rebuilding the economy, reconstruction and empowering people to achieve sensible livelihoods is a basic first step towards recovering and rebuilding the state and society, and that promoting the correlation between humanitarian action, development and peace in all interventions as part of a long-term sustainable framework where direct, rapid and sustainable development investment is guaranteed.
Given the importance of economic recovery, reconstruction and peace-building, this issue of YSEU Bulletin will address four key themes including: priority institutional development, governance and peace building, the reconstruction process/the physical capital (rebuilding the infrastructure), the human and social capital (education and health sectors’ recovery) as the basic support elements for economic recovery, which represent drivers of growth and development (agricultural investment, oil and gas, private sector and financial inclusion). It worth to be mentioned here that the following YSEU Bulletin will, therefore, be a complementary to this issue, and is going to address in detail the financing of development in all its aspects.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-socio-economic-update-issue-72-may-2022-enar
(B P)
Film: World Movement for Democracy's Untold Stories: Yemen (Teaser)
Young people in Yemen use creative tools to build a peaceful and democratic society in their countries.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5JJQWAjj3UM
(* B P)
The Failure of Diplomacy in Yemen
The collapse of a six-month truce bodes ill for an already battered country.
In early October, a United Nations-brokered truce in Yemen that had held for six months, having been extended twice, collapsed when the two main warring sides, the Houthis and the Yemeni government, failed to agree on conditions for another extension. Diwan interviewed Ahmed Nagi, whose research as a nonresident scholar at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut focuses on Yemen, about the reasons for the truce’s demise and the possible ramifications for the war-torn country and its neighbors.
Michael Young: Why did the parties to the truce fail to renew it?
Ahmed Nagi: We should ask the question the other way around. Why did the parties to the conflict, following seven years of fighting, accept the truce in the first place? To answer this question is to unpack the real incentives of the warring groups. Basically, the truce came about not because they suddenly felt a pang of conscience, decided to stop fighting, and turned their attention to tackling Yemen’s humanitarian catastrophe. They had an entirely different reason to agree to the truce: fatigue.
This fatigue stemmed from the longstanding stalemate in both Ma’rib and Shabwa between the Iran-backed Ansar Allah (commonly known as the Houthis) on one side and, on the other, various forces loyal to the Yemeni government and supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Additionally, Saudi Arabia and the UAE felt threatened by the Houthis’ increasing attacks on oil facilities in Saudi and Emirati territory. This made them amenable to a truce.
During the truce, the Houthis regrouped, recruited more fighters, and reinforced their positions on all frontlines. They came to feel that they had significantly enhanced their military preparedness, and even held a series of military parades to demonstrate their increased power. On the other side, however, the situation was different. Saudi Arabia and the UAE managed to bring together several anti-Houthi factions under a newly formed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) that they hoped would govern Yemen. With time, however, some of these groups began fighting each other. In Shabwa, heavy clashes took place between PLC factions backed by Saudi Arabia and those supported by the UAE.
Aware of all this, the Houthis raised their ceiling during negotiations over the truce’s renewal, setting new conditions. These conditions included the PLC committing to pay the salaries of military personnel and civil servants living in areas under Houthi control, the full reopening of Sanaa airport, which is currently operating in a limited capacity, and the lifting of restrictions over shipments entering Hodeida. (The Saudi-led Arab military coalition, which intervened in Yemen in 2015, has imposed a blockade on the country, meaning that even though Sanaa airport and Hodeida seaport are under Houthi control, their operations have been severely affected.) At the same time, the Houthis continued to refuse to open roads into and out of Taiz, something they were supposed to do following the very first signing of the truce in April. The Houthis’ negotiation strategy had become to demand more and cede less.
MY: What does the collapse of the truce mean for the role of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen?
AN: The truce was highly important to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For six months, the Houthis halted cross-border attacks against the two countries. The end of the truce will bring back a state of insecurity to the region. But this does not necessarily mean a return to all-out armed conflict.
For one thing, the Houthis do not seem interested in a significant escalation, only in continuing to pressure the other side to accept their demands, if necessary through small-scale military operations here and there. Secondly, both Saudi Arabia and UAE are changing their strategy—disengaging from Yemeni politics and counting more on the local proxies they have built up over the past seven years. Even if the conflict erupts again, it is unlikely that the Saudis and the Emiratis will engage with the Houthis directly, as they are keen to avoid any cross-border military response from the group.
https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/88180 = https://middleeasttransparent.com/en/the-failure-of-diplomacy-in-yemen/
(B P)
Wikipedia: Shura Council (Yemen)
The Shura Council or Consultative Council (Majlis ash-Shūrā) is the upper house of the parliament of Yemen,[1] with the lower house being the House of Representatives.[2] Unlike the House it does not take on a legislative role,[3] instead primarily being charged with an advisory role to the president. Per the constitution it has 111 members who are appointed by the president.[2][4][a] There currently exist two Shura Councils as a result of the civil war, one in Sanaa aligned with the Houthis, and one aligned with the Presidential Leadership Council in Aden.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shura_Council_(Yemen)
cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade
(A P)
Sanaa calls UN to quickly release gas vessel held by coalition
The Yemeni Gas Company (YGC) on Saturday called on the United Nations to pressure the Saudi-led coalition to stop the detention of domestic gas vessels.
https://en.ypagency.net/276061/
(A P)
Aggression Coalition detains diesel ship "Oscar"
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3208092.htm
and also https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/29168/YPC-US-Saudi-Aggression-Seizes-New-Diesel-Ship
(A P)
Aggression coalition detains new fuel vessel: YPC
the company explained that the US Saudi-led aggression coalition had detained the "Lady Sarah" gas vessel. It was denied access to the port of Hodeida despite its inspection in Djibouti and obtained the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism's (UNIVM) permits.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3207985.htm
and also https://en.ypagency.net/275951/
(A P)
Aggression coalition seizes gasoline ship "Imperius"
YPC company spokesman Issam Al-Mutawakil said the aggression coalition continues its piracy by detaining the gasoline vessel "Imperius"despite its inspection and obtaining entry permits from the United Nations.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3207572.htm
and also https://en.ypagency.net/275596/
(B P)
YPC: The United Nations Is Participating In Siege Against Yemen
Employees of Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) on Friday continued their sit-in for the 127th day in a row in front of the United Nations Office in the capital Sana’a confirming that the United Nations is involved in the siege of Yemen.
YPC’s spokesman Ameen al-Shabati confirmed that the United Nations is implicated in the siege of the Yemeni people by turning a blind eye to the continued abusive practices of the coalition of aggression by seizing oil vessels and obstructing their arrival at Hodeidah port.
https://www.yamanyoon.com/?p=157410&lang=en
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
Siehe / Look at cp1
(A H)
Yemen Friends. Video von unserem Hilfsaktionsprojekt im Oktoper 2022 im Jemen
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRLCPJH0kIk
(A H)
I feel that my dream to build my first school funded by @monarelief will come true. Our project to build a primary school in Sana'a is in progress. Thanks a lot to you all guys for making this happen. (photos)
https://twitter.com/Fatikr/status/1583967913370824704
(B H)
Film: Adequate Housing project in Yemen
This project is implemented by UN-Habitat, with the support of the Saudi Development and Reconstruction Program for Yemen and AlWaleed Philanthropies
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kfCT6goy2aY
(B H)
Film: Disinclination to study due to war and economic repercussions
Yemeni universities are witnessing a noticeable decline in the turnout of students in undergraduate education in Yemen, as the number of people enrolling in public and private universities continues to decrease annually. Ongoing war has had a significant impact on the number of students enrolling in universities, which has become almost impossible for many Yemeni youth due to high university expenses. Deteriorating living conditions have led to the disinclination of young people to pursue undergraduate education, as they are forced to join the workforce to support themselves and their families. The war led to the disinclination to continue studies among school students as well, in addition to the deterioration of the educational system in general in Yemen.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CTpzxua7aOA
(B H)
Yemen Emergency Dashboard, October 2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-emergency-dashboard-october-2022
(B H)
WFP Yemen Situation Report #9, September 2022
Highlights
According to the latest WFP data, the inadequate food consumption rate decreased slightly in Yemen in September after increasing for four consecutive months.
WFP in September resumed school feeding across Yemen, assisting close to 680,000 children in 1,400 schools.
WFP and partners continued in September to respond to the needs of flood-affected people across Yemen.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/wfp-yemen-situation-report-9-september-2022
(* B H)
Key Message Update: With needs high after August floods, funding shortages limit food and health interventions
Key Messages
Amid current reductions in humanitarian food assistance, households face significant difficulty purchasing sufficient food to fulfill their kilocalorie needs due to the impact of above-average food prices on household purchasing power. Millions of poor households are likely experiencing food consumption gaps. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are likely widespread, and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are currently expected in Hajjah, Marib, Lahj, and Abyan during the agricultural off-season. By November, seasonal improvements in access to food and income from the main harvest and slight increases in humanitarian assistance rations will likely improve area-level outcomes to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) in Hajjah, Lahj, and Abyan. However, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist in Marib given the large population of displaced households with high dependence on assistance.
In July and August 2022, around 7.3 million and 3.0 million people, respectively, were assisted with general food assistance (GFA) by WFP as part of the fourth distribution cycle. In mid-September, WFP announced a slight increase in ration size for the fifth distribution cycle.[1]With this, most beneficiaries will receive rations equivalent to around 65 percent of one month's energy requirements per distribution, compared to less than 50 percent in the previous cycle. Beneficiaries will also continue to be reached on a less-than-monthly basis (about once every six weeks) such that assistance rations will support around 40 percent of households' monthly energy requirements, on average, compared to around 30 percent in the previous cycle. Beyond this, in some areas, beneficiaries will be expected to share any assistance received. According to key informants, the fifth distribution cycle has started in some areas as of late September.
Funding shortfalls have put more crucial humanitarian interventions at risk of either reduction or closure. As of late September, the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster of the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan was only 49 percent funded, and the Nutrition, Health, and WASH clusters were 32, 64, and 23 percent funded, respectively.
(B H)
Yemen: Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP) 2022 - Funding Status (19 October 2022)
(B H)
Yemen: Agrometeorological update - October Issue (Ref: #26) | 01 - 30 September 2022
HIGHLIGHTS
Rainfall decline is expected to continue except across northern Taizz and western Ibb where forecasts favour heavy downpours
The application of pesticides and fertilizers across northern Taizz and western Ibb is, therefore, discouraged during heavy downpours as they will likely be washed away
Other parts of the country will remain generally dry; the planting of rainfed seedlings is, therefore, discouraged unless supplemented by irrigation
Farmers are encouraged to intensify the scouting of Armyworms and desert locusts
Notwithstanding the decrease in rainfall, soil moisture levels were still sufficient to support vegetation growth. In fact, the Agricultural Stress Index (ASI), a widely used indicator of the likelihood of drought conditions across cropped areas showed exceptionally good performance throughout the month. The frequent rainfall experienced in the previous months encouraged the lush growth of greenery which unfortunately led to a spike in the number of Fall and African Armyworms (Section II).
(* B H K)
Children starve as Yemen teeters on a return to fighting
Hunger has long threatened the lives of hundreds of thousands of Yemen’s children. Now, the war between the country’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels and a Saudi-led coalition is threatening to escalate after months of a tenuous truce. Yemenis, and international assistance groups, worry that the situation will get even worse.
In the city of Hodeida, with a population of roughly 3 million, al-Thawra Hospital receives 2,500 patients daily, including “super-malnourished” children, said Joyce Msuya, U.N. assistant secretary-general for humanitarian affairs. She visited the facility this month.
Around 2.2 million Yemeni children under the age of 5 are hungry. More than half a million are severely malnourished. Some 1.3 million pregnant or breastfeeding women had severe malnutrition this year, the United Nations says.
“This is one of the saddest visits I’ve ever done in my professional life,” Msuya said in a video released by the U.N. “There are immense needs. Half of Yemeni hospitals are not functioning, or they are completely destroyed by the war. We need more support to save lives in Yemen, children, women and men.”
The war in Ukraine is exacerbating the situation.
The Yemeni diet depends heavily on wheat. Ukraine supplied Yemen with 40% of its grain, until Russia’s invasion cut the flow.
Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bB0E1hrSS0g
(B H)
Film: Rainwater Harvesting in Yemen: A Durable Solution for Water Scarcity
In Yemen, a World Bank water scarcity project supported the construction of 1,279 public and 30,686 household rainwater harvesting reservoirs and cisterns across the country, providing nearly 900K cubic meters of clean water. It has helped to ease the struggle of many families.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j_FF1BfSZgA
(B H)
Film: Nothilfe Jemen
Im Jemen herrscht seit Jahren eine der größten humanitären Krisen. Rund 80% der Bevölkerung sind auf Hilfe von außen angewiesen.
Am härtesten trifft es jedoch die aller Kleinsten. Babys und Kinder, so unschuldig und leider auch so hilflos, sind von der drohenden Hungersnot am schlimmsten betroffen. Viele Kinder sind unterernährt und schweben dadurch kontinuierlich in Lebensgefahr. Aus diesem Grund verteilen wir im Jemen nicht nur Lebensmittelpakete, sondern auch stetig Babynahrung, um die Kleinen etwas aufzupäppeln. Spende jetzt und reich den Kleinsten eine Hand in dieser schweren Krise, denn sie hoffen auf Eure Hilfe!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zwM_G2CGk3g
(* B H)
The rehabilitation of a road saves lives and improves the economy
More than 1,200people are living in Deir al-Buhairy village Deir al-Buhai in the sub-district of Ad-Dumaina – Al Marawi'ah district of Al Hodaydah governorate in almost complete isolation from the outside world due to the rough road leading to the village. The village residents are forced to carry their patients or dead bodies on a piece of board on their shoulders for more than 500 meters to reach the medical centers or hospital. The situation become worst during the rainy seasons where the road is completely cut off.
In addition to the interruption in the road and the suffering it causes to the people, there are also other issues such as the formation of potholes and swamps, which are foci and a suitable environment for the reproduction of insects and cause many diseases and epidemics. This exposes people's lives to many diseases and exacerbates their problems.
These rains also cause great damage to the road ,they lead to collapses to the body and sides of the road, the water gathers in the potholes, and the floor of the road becomes loose ,unleveled and slippery, which makes it difficult to walk or move vehicles on, sometimes the road is interrupted by floods and the formation of soft mud, where those floods sweep away large parts of the road, making it impossible to use that road or pass on it, and thus difficult for residents to reach their villages and homes.
In the health aspect, the population and residents suffer significantly, when the people are exposed to any kind of diseases, as a result of the inability to reach the far away facilities and health centers, and on the serious cases in emergencies, some of these cases are exposed to complications and some of them dies.
In the education aspect, there is inability for students and teachers to reach schools and educational facilities, which are located at very long distances.
In the economic side, vehicles suffer damage and material losses. Farmers have also been exposed to losses and to the corruption of their products because of the inability to access the markets and this negatively affects the living situation of these families, in addition to the difficulty of food access to markets or to the residents in the villages, which further exacerbates the problem of family’s food security.
Building Foundation for Development (BFD) and the World Food Programme (WFP) intervened in this area through the Food Assistance for Assets (FFA), where the road was rehabilitated, well-leveled and paved with stones and cement, and during the rehabilitation of the asset engineering considerations were taken, where the road floor was made solid, level and the rainwater is drained by tendencies.
The rehabilitation of this road has eliminated all problems associated with the road suffered by the inhabitants of this village,
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/rehabilitation-road-saves-lives-and-improves-economy
(B H)
Yemen- Gender Based Violence AOR Response analysis (Sep 2022)
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-gender-based-violence-aor-response-analysis-sep-2022
Yemen- Gender Based Violence AOR Response analysis (Jan - Sep 2022)
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-gender-based-violence-aor-response-analysis-jan-sep-2022
Yemen- Gender Based Violence AOR Response analysis (Aug 2022)
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-gender-based-violence-aor-response-analysis-aug-2022
Yemen- Gender Based Violence AOR Response analysis (Jan - Aug 2022)
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-gender-based-violence-aor-response-analysis-jan-aug-2022
(* A H)
Film: Child leukemia patients die in Yemen after expired doses
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pOnGVSzNjaE
(* B H)
Yemen: Investigation required regarding deaths of children who received expired drug
The World Health Organisation must launch an urgent investigation into the deaths of at least 18 children at a hospital in Sanaa, Yemen, who were given what appears to be an expired drug, Euro-Med Rights Monitor said in a statement.
The Ministry of Health and Population in Sanaa is controlled by the Houthi group "Ansar Allah", and is unlikely to conduct a transparent and independent investigation and hold those responsible accountable for distributing expired methotrexate---a drug used to suppress immunity---to Sanaa hospitals, and injecting doses into dozens of cancer-stricken children in the Al Kuwait Hospital. Because of this, it is imperative that the World Health Organisation investigate the incident.
At the same time that Yemeni medical and media agencies announced the deaths of the 18 children, approximately 30 other children who received the same dose suffered from complications, and are still being treated in intensive care units at several Sanaa hospitals. "These patients were given expired chemical doses that could have been smuggled or improperly stored", said Muhammed al-Khawlani, a relative of Ismail al-Khawlani, 12, who died as a result of an expired dose.
"More than 17 children were fighting for their lives shortly after receiving the dose. The majority of them died, including my cousin Ismail Muhammad al-Khawlani, while other children are still suffering", al-Khawlani added.
The Ministry of Health and Population announced on Thursday that at least 10 blood cancer patients died as a result of "bacterial contamination in medicine packages" that were "smuggled to a private pharmacy and did not pass the procedures of the Supreme Board of Drugs and Medical Appliances or the tenders of the National Oncology Centre".
Even if the drug did not pass competent authorities before being used in hospitals, the incident clearly reflects a blatant disregard for Yemeni lives and demonstrates that the Ministry of Health and Population does not bear its responsibility as the body responsible for the health and safety of patients in Sanaa hospitals. In no way can hospitals justify administering medication that has not been previously and properly examined and verified.
Euro-Med Monitor expressed grave concern that more doses of expired medicine may still be available in Sanaa hospitals and health centres
and
(* A H P)
Health Ministry holds press conference on death of several of children with leukemia
The Ministry of Public Health and Population on Monday held in the capital Sanaa a press conference to inform the public of the details and latest developments in the case of the death of several of children with leukemia.
At the conference, Head of the Medical Council, Dr. Mujahid Ma’sar, indicated that as soon as he received the notification of this incident, the Minister of Health formed an investigation committee from the concerned authorities, which began to carry out its work.
Dr. Ma’sar explained that 29 cases received a dose of a smuggled drug, 10 of which did not experience complications, while 19 cases experienced complications, of which 10 children died and one case is intensive care room, and the condition of the rest improved. He indicated that two cases were also discovered that had drug complications in Hadramout province, one of which is in intensive care.
He pointed out that the committee investigated and sent the samples of medicines that were used to patients, which were purchased from a pharmacy, for examination in the laboratory of the Supreme Authority for Medicines and in a number of private hospitals and central health laboratories, and it was proven that the medicines batch was contaminated with deadly bacteria, which led to severe meningitis in children.
Dr. Ma’sar affirmed that the investigations have been completed and the case file has been referred to the Public Prosecutor.
He called on the United Nations to quickly open Sanaa International Airport and Yemeni ports in order to control and speed up the entry of medicines into the country to avoid such disasters and limit the entry of smuggled medicines to Yemen.
https://en.ypagency.net/275604/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/10/17/yemeni-health-ministry-holds-press-conference-on-recent-series-of-leukaemia-deaths/
and also https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/558728
https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/558735
and
(A H P)
Houthis shift blame on Coalition for leukemia child deaths
The Saudi-led Coalition is to blame for the death of ten leukemia-stricken children after receiving contaminated medicine in a Sana'a-based hospital, the Houthi prime minister said on Monday.
The main reason for this "dire tragedy" is the "blockade imposed on our people for 8 years," the Abdul-Aziz Bin Habtoor added in remarks to media during his visit to leukemia center.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-31370.html
(B H)
Film: Yemeni farmers getting hope through development during conflict
Sustainable farming can be for Yemen too. In this USAID funded project 681 farmers are now living a decent life
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f9jqJoJb5N8
(* B H)
Reduction in fighting has not alleviated Yemen’s humanitarian crisis
A recent reduction in the intensity of the fighting in Yemen, a country embroiled in a bloody armed conflict for more than seven years, does not imply a reduction in the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis there, Euro-Med Monitor said in a statement released in conjunction with World Food Day.
As a result of the conflict, Yemen's population is still struggling more than ever to obtain basic food. Food insecurity affects approximately 19 million Yemenis--over 61% of the total population. Euro-Med Monitor's Chief Media Officer Nour Olwan said: "It is unfortunate that, at a time when Yemen's humanitarian needs are increasing, the United Nations has received only about a third of the funding needed to support humanitarian operations and programmes this year, forcing it to reduce food rations and close some programmes that [previously] benefited millions of Yemenis.
"Although violence has largely stopped over the past six months, according to a truce agreement that expired at the beginning of this month with no agreement to extend it until today, the improvement in the humanitarian situation was only a drop in the ocean of complex crises, as it was limited and confined to specific areas and did not address all aspects of Yemenis' suffering", Olwan added.
According to World Food Programme statistics, the majority of Yemen's population requires humanitarian aid, with 20.7 million people in need of assistance---roughly 66% of the total population. Nearly 1.3 million pregnant or breastfeeding women and 2.2 million children under the age of five require treatment for acute malnutrition.
Yemen ranked 183 out of 191 on the United Nations Development Programme's 2021/2022 Human Development Index. The index used to measure human development is based on several factors, including an individual's purchasing power, which has declined significantly in Yemen in recent years due to the conflict's direct and indirect effects.
The COVID-19 crisis combined with the war in Ukraine has resulted in a serious global increase in the prices of basic commodities and fuel, particularly in poor countries such as Yemen---which imports approximately 95% of its needs---as food prices rose by more than 150% following the start of the war. Furthermore, it is feared that the escalation of the war in Ukraine will result in an irregular supply of wheat, as Yemen imports approximately 45% of its wheat from Ukraine and Russia, and its stockpile is only sufficient for several more months.
There is an urgent need to redirect humanitarian funding to operations in Yemen, as similar interventions needed in Ukraine should not jeopardise donor countries' commitments to easing the Yemeni humanitarian crisis, which is exacerbated by the continuation of both conflicts. Last month, Euro-Med Monitor called on European Member States to stop exporting arms to conflict parties in Yemen and refrain from contributing in any way to the prolongation of the conflict, in order to end the humanitarian crisis that millions of Yemenis are facing.
Euro-Med Monitor reiterates that the only way to end the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is for all parties to the conflict to agree to end all manifestations of it, and address its root causes in a manner that will lead to political stability, economic growth, and ultimately improve the population's living conditions.
(A H P)
FAO Yemen Marks World Food Day with Pledge to Support Efficient, Inclusive, Resilient and Sustainable Agrifood Systems
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Yemen today joined the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Fisheries (MAIF) in celebrating the World Food Day at an event held in Aden.
The event is one in a series with others scheduled for Sana'a, Taiz and Mukalla within the coming few days. This year's World Food Day is celebrated under the theme: Leave No One Behind and today's event bore testimony to this as it was attended by various people including staff from FAO and MIAF, farmers, pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, beekeepers and fisher folks.
(B H)
Yemen: Governorates Humanitarian Presence (3W) - July 2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-abyan-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-aden-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-aden-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-amran-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-amran-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-al-bayda-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-al-bayda-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-ad-dali-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-ad-dali-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-ad-dalilahj-governorates-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-dhamar-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-dhamar-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-hadramawt-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-hajjah-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-hajjah-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-al-hodeidah-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-ibb-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-al-jawf-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-lahj-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-al-maharah-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-al-mahwit-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-al-mahwit-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-marib-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-marib-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-raymah-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-raymah-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-sadah-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-sanaa-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-sanaa-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-sanaa-city-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-sanaa-city-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-shabwah-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-socotra-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-taiz-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-al-makha-sub-hub-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-al-makha-sub-hub-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-turbah-sub-hub-humanitarian-presence-3w-august-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-turbah-sub-hub-humanitarian-presence-3w-july-2022
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
(B H)
Film: Lack of aid exacerbates suffering of displaced persons in Rabat camp
Thousands of displaced persons in Rabat camp in Lahij governorate in southern Yemen, struggle with food insecurity. Displaced persons told A24 that living conditions are deteriorating in Rabat camp, demanding real support from international and humanitarian organizations. UN organization reported in a statement that one out of every eight Yemenis is displaced, and that about 172,000 people have been displaced recently, most of them within Marib governorate, which hosts 55% of the total number of internally displaced persons, along with Hajjah, Hudaydah and Taiz governorates.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Od3ABBlxQ4
(* B H)
UNFPA Response in Yemen Situation Report Issue #3 (July - September 2022)
HIGHLIGHTS: JULY - SEPTEMBER
The humanitarian situation remains alarming in Yemen with a staggering 23.4 million people — almost three quarters of the population — requiring some form of humanitarian assistance in 2022.
Heavy rains triggered extensive flooding across 18 governorates and 175 districts of Yemen from July to September 2022, affecting some 200,000 people, mainly those internally displaced, living in hosting sites and settlements.
The aid operation in Yemen remains severely underfunded. By the end of September, the 2022 Yemen HRP has secured only US$2.03 billion or 47.5 per cent of the required $4.27 billion to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance and protection services to 17.9 million people, forcing aid agencies to reduce assistance and close programmes.
In turn, UNFPA has had to suspend the coverage of operational costs of reproductive health services – including allowances for health workers – in 130 health facilities, leaving 1.5 million women and girls, including 30,000 facing risks of complications during pregnancy and delivery, with no access to these essential services
Despite funding shortages, since January 2022, UNFPA's response has reached more than 2 million individuals
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unfpa-response-yemen-situation-report-issue-3-july-september-2022
(B H)
IOM Yemen: Rapid Displacement Tracking - Yemen IDP Dashboard Reporting Period: 09 - 15 October 2022
IOM Yemen DTM’s Rapid Displacement Tracking (RDT) tool collects data on estimated numbers of households forced to flee on a daily basis from their locations of origin or displacement, allowing for regular reporting of new displacements in terms of estimated numbers, geography, and needs. It also tracks returnees who returned to their location of origin.
From 1 January to 15 October 2022, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 9,124 households (HH) (54,744 Individuals) who experienced displacement at least once.
Between 9 and 15 October 2022, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 55 households (330 individuals) displaced at least once. The majority of people moved into/within the following governorates and districts:
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
Siehe / Look at cp1
(A P)
Houthi militia escalate aggression against tribesmen in Sana'a and Amran
The Houthi militia have escalated their aggression against tribal leaders and ordinary tribesmen in the outskirts of Sana'a and the nearby Amran province in a campaign to usurp their properties and humiliate oppositionists. The militia have assassinated and wounded many tribesmen and sent convoys of armored vehicles to storm villages and kidnap dozens others in Saref Bani Hosheish outside Sana'a and elsewhere. Videos making the rounds on social media show the militants raiding villages and assaulting everyone including women/Multiple websites
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-61302
(A P)
A Houthi gang loots a plot of land owned by children of a deceased man in downtown Sana'a/Al-Rashad Press
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-61302
(A P)
Houthi corruption of school curricula with sectarian ideology incurs broad fury in Yemen amidst warnings of booby-trapping the brains of young generations/Alsahwa
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-61302
(A P)
Sanaa threatens oil companies that plunder Yemen’s wealth with painful strikes
The Sanaa government’s spokesman and Minister of Information, Dhaif Allah Al-Shami, on Saturday said that “the warning messages would be followed by painful blows if the oil companies responded to the American and European pressures.”
Al-Shami added, in an interview with Al-Mayadeen TV: “If the ship returns, the response will not be limited to warning strikes, but may develop into direct strikes that paralyze the ships’ movement.”
He confirmed that the messages of Sanaa government had reached the concerned companies, and that the countries that own these ships transporting Yemeni oil took the warnings seriously.
https://en.ypagency.net/276115/
and
(* A K P)
Sanaa renews call for local, foreign companies to stop looting oil wealth
The Supreme Economic Committee renewed its call on local and foreign companies to comply with the decision to prevent the looting of sovereign wealth, while all Yemeni people are deprived from it.
The committee said in a statement, “Based on the directive of the president Mahdi Al-Mashat, on October 1, 2022, which stipulated the prevention of looting of Yemen’s sovereign wealth. So, any crude oil export operations have become within the ban and every party, entity and country should deal seriously with these warnings”.
Regarding the oil tanker (NESSOS KEA), which was prevented from looting an oil shipment, it explained that “ it was carrying the flag of the Marshall Islands and set off from a South Korean port heading towards the port of Al-Daba in Hadramout Governorate. It was scheduled to loot nearly two million barrels of crude oil, with an estimated value of $186 million.”
The statement confirmed that the Supreme Economic Committee had taken all legal measures through the competent authorities, to address the tanker (NESSOS KEA) and its related companies, for the decision to prevent the looting of the sovereign wealth, before the tanker arrived in Yemeni territorial waters.
It pointed out that the concerned authorities had written to the tanker and sent it three messages in a row, on the 18th, 20th and 21st of this October, but the tanker ignored those messages.
The statement pointed out that after making all necessary legal procedures, and after the tanker (NESSOS KEA) violated Yemeni territorial waters, and attempted to violate the decision to prevent the looting of the Yemeni sovereign wealth; This was raised to the leadership of the Armed Forces, which is responsible for protecting national sovereignty and preserving wealth.
https://en.ypagency.net/275994/
(A P)
Military experts: Sanaa’s warning strike aims to stop looting Yemeni wealth
Military experts on Saturday commented on the warning strike carried out by the Sanaa forces on Friday to stop the looting of Yemeni wealth.
Yemeni military expert, Brigadier General Abed al-Thawr, revealed that the ship that was targeted by Sanaa forces at Al-Dhaba port had previously been warned through official channels.
Brig. Gen. al-Thawr confirmed in a press statement that the ship, despite its warning, entered with local guarantees from the authorities loyal to Saudi-led coalition in Hadramout province, so it was necessary to deal with it in another way and a warning strike was given to it.
https://en.ypagency.net/276111/
and
(A P)
Al-Bukhaiti: Targeting of oil tankers will continue until coalition stops looting Yemen’s wealth
Member of the Political Bureau of Ansarullah –Governor of Dhamar province, Mohammed Al- Bukhaiti, on Saturday said that the operations of targeting oil tankers will continue until the Saudi-led coalition stops looting Yemen’s wealth.
In a series of tweets on “Twitter” Al-Bukhaiti explained that Sanaa’s warning message targeted the oil tanker, which was intending to loot Yemen’s oil, not the oil port of Al-Dhaba.
On the international condemnations, he said: “The Yemenis will put the international condemnations that allow the looting of their wealth under their feet, as they did with Security Council resolutions, and they will continue to defend themselves.”
https://en.ypagency.net/276107/
and
(A P)
FM: Sanaa’s warning to foreign companies against looting Yemeni oil does not contradict with efforts to end war
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Sanaa, Hisham Sharaf, confirmed on Saturday that the Sanaa’s warning to foreign companies operating in Yemen of the continued looting of the Yemeni oil, does not contradict in any way with the efforts to end the war.
The minister said in a news statement that the warning message was only a first step that would be escalated, noting that the Yemeni national leadership will not stand idly by in the face of continuined looting oil wealth of the Yemeni people.
https://en.ypagency.net/276044/
(A P)
Film: Academics resist eviction from their lodgings at #Sanaa University in Houthi-controlled capital
"Kill me, execute me, but don't take me out of my house." The academic at Sana’a University, Alaa Al-Asbahi, begged the security forces and the Houthi elements not to remove her and her colleagues from their apartments after the court ruled that they should not be expelled.
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1583394743580778502
(A P)
Secretary of Supreme Economic: Tanker that was allowed to transport fuel shipment to power station arrived Aden
The media secretary of the Supreme Economic Committee, Ibrahim Al-Saraji, said that fuel tanker (Hana), which was allowed to transport a fuel shipment from Shabwa province, has arrived Aden province.
Al-Saraji explained, in an exclusive statement to the Yemeni News Agency (Saba), that fuel tanker (HANA) arrived in Aden province, carrying approximately 200,000 barrels of oil
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3207934.htm
My comment: The Sanaa government neither controls Shabwah nor Aden. Such an “allowance” is a joke.
and
(A P)
Houthis vow anew to target oil tankers
The Houthi group on Tuesday vowed again to target oil tankers in the Red Sea.
Chairman of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat, gave orders to "exempt the HANA ship (currently transporting fuel from Bier Ali port in Shabwa) from the decision preventing the looting of sovereign wealth," Houthi economic committee said.
The tanker was exempted because its oil cargo heading for Aden to feed power plant with fuel, the committee added in a statement, which means other vessels would be targeted.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-31396.html
(A P)
Sayyed Abdulmalik: US-Saudi Aggression Wanted to Disrupt Government Operations
The Leader of the Revolution Sayyed Abdulmalik Al-Houthi said that the goal of the aggression in bombing government buildings is to "to disrupt the operations of the state and disable it so that chaos would take place."
This came in a speech, Tuesday, during the government’s inauguration of the joint work between state agencies and the components of society.
Sayyed Abdulmalik added, "As a result of the hostile targeting of government institutions, there has been a great lack of attendance among the people," calling to compensate for the previous shortfall, and the intense presence in state institutions during periods of truce and activating attendance in society.
Sayyed Abdulmalik also stressed the importance of completing community transactions, as it is one of the basic and simple responsibilities at the same time. Sayyed Abdulmalik also stressed the importance of wheat cultivation, saying, "We must prepare for the wheat growing season, and everyone knows the international developments that have affected the economic aspect."
He pointed out that reliance on imports from abroad is a serious problem
and also https://en.ypagency.net/275706/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/10/18/sayyid-abdul-malik-al-houthi-calls-for-improvement-in-work-of-all-government-agencies/
Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6lU7DTC_deM = https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjjhPuyubko
(A P)
Information Minister: US Pushing Saudi, Emirati Regimes Towards Escalation
The US is pushing the Saudi and Emirati regimes towards escalation and the continuation of the aggression against Yemen, Information Minister Daifallah Al-Shami said on Monday.
(A P)
Houthi militants storm more than 20 houses in Sana'a
The Houthi militia have stormed more than 20 houses to kidnap and kill men and terrorize women and children in Saref, a Sana'a outskirt, since last Thursday.
The terrorist militia are seeking to usurp the citizen's properties especially lands and to do so are encircling the area with dozens of patrol cars and armored vehicles with a cover from drones. The mlitia have so far killed two men and a tribal chieftain and wounded and kidnapped dozens others. /Multiple websites
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-61228
(A)
A bigoted Houthi militant assassinated a young man (Ayman Al-Olofi) in Sana'a today to demonstrate revenge over the history of the young man's grandfather as a freedom fighter against the Houthi's theocratic ancestors who ruled Yemen before 1962. The Houthi militant Abdulkarim Almarani shot Ayman al-Olofi dead and wounded two others. The crime comes hours after the assassination of Dirhem Al-Hakimi an activist supporting the 1962 revolution against theocracy/Multiple websites
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-61228
and
(A)
Interior ministry arrests al-Marrani hours after committing crime
The Ministry of Interior on Monday confirmed the arrest of Abdulkarim al-Marrani who killed young man Ayman Ol-Olofi hours after committing crime.
Interior official spokesman Brig. Gen. Abdulkhaleq al-Ajri said the police managed to arrest al-Marrani, 28, who killed Al-Olofi,18.
Al-Ajri added that al-Marrani shot dead al-Olofi after a verbal argument on the road, indicating that al-Marrani also injured two other people.
Brig. Gen. al-Ajri noted that the capital Sana'a and the free provinces experience security and stability and not as the trumpets and media of the aggression promote it.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3207621.htm
(B H)
“Ahmed Al-Shattaf” is an abductee who lost his eyesight while the prison he was jailed at was hit by the coalition airstrikes. He has never given up hope for justice (photos)
https://twitter.com/abducteesmother/status/1582407594635059200
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp6 – cp19
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-828b-yemen-war-mosaic-828b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-827-yemen-war-mosaic-827
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-827 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-827:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
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