... Einschränkung der humanitären Hilfe in Nordjemen – Neue innere Grenzen im Jemen – Diskriminierung von Frauen – Heuschrecken und Jemenkrieg – und mehr
Feb. 11, 2020: Yemen needs peace – The victim of an US drone strike – The UN panel’s report – Living conditions and humanitarian aid – Limitation of humanitarian aid for Northern Yemen – New internal borders within Yemen – Discrimination of women – Locusts and the Yemen War – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-623b-yemen-war-mosaic-623b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1b Am wichtigsten: Kampf um Hodeidah / Most important: Hodeidah battle
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Wachsende Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Mounting tensions at the Gulf
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp12a Katar-Krise / Qatar crisis
cp12b Sudan
cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms Trade
cp13b Wirtschaft / Economy
cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism
cp15 Propaganda
cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Sonstiges / Other
Klassifizierung / Classification
***
**
*
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:
Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-einfuehrende-artikel-u-ueberblicke
Neue Artikel / New articles
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BBC overview article: Yemen crisis: Why is there a war?
Yemen, one of the Arab world's poorest countries, has been devastated by a civil war. Here we explain what is fuelling the fighting, and who is involved.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
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Yemen: Order of Battle Trumps Peace
After a lull in the fighting, roughly from September to December 2019, violence has resumed actively across Yemen with bold—if futile—attacks on several fronts.
These developments are a huge disappointment to peace advocates and mediators, especially after what had seemed like positive steps toward ending the war.
The Stalemate
The adage that truth is the first casualty in war is certainly borne out in the Yemen conflict. Each side exonerates itself and lays full responsibility for the war at the feet of its opponents. There is surely enough blame to go around.
Five years on, neither the Hadi government nor the Houthi insurgents have accomplished their original goals. Presuming they both realize this and are now ready to change course, a peace plan that meets their minimal requirements and not their highest ambitions could and should be put together as quickly as possible. Yemen is currently not only a failed state but, more ominously, a nation that has sunk into poverty, disease, and starvation.
International peace plans have failed because they have not grappled with the big picture, spending much time on truces and confidence building measures such as the Stockholm-Hodeida agreement and prisoner exchanges which, though crucial on a humanitarian level, do not treat the root causes of the war. The antagonists themselves have also failed thus far to present realistic and detailed roadmaps toward a comprehensive peace.
By contrast, the national dialogue conference (NDC), concluded in January 2014, used too wide a lens. It addressed such questions as democracy, the rule of law, and the status of women and civil society groups but it failed to secure an agreement on the status of the northern and southern regions.
A Roadmap
In a no-victor, no-vanquished scenario, each side to the conflict must refrain from demanding total surrender of the other. One side cannot win in negotiations what it could not achieve in war; a compromise that satisfies the core needs of each side can and must be achieved. It is possible to halt the human suffering and rebuild trust, based on assuring the basic security needs of all concerned.
A comprehensive peace plan must begin with a general cease-fire agreement between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi/Ansar Allah leadership, the two main combatants with enough control over other forces on the ground to be able to drag them along to a peace agreement. This could begin with stopping the air war, with a cessation of bombardment by the Arab coalition in exchange for a Houthi agreement to cease lobbing rockets and flying drones across the northern border.
A cessation of the air war should make it safer for forces on the ground to silence their guns on the various fronts.
The main Yemeni protagonists are fighting for self-government and for a fair share of the country’s resources. A sharing arrangement is not hard to reach and most of its elements were already put in place in the Peace and Partnership Agreement of 2014. The problem is that this agreement, which broke down soon after it was signed, left the finer details—such as the specific needs of both the northern and southern regions—to be mediated by President Hadi. The parties to the agreement need to get back to the negotiating table and, this time, to sign on the dotted line only after all have stated and agreed on all demands.
The ongoing military clashes in Yemen cannot advance the interests of the warring parties. The balance of forces simply does not allow for total victory by either side to the conflict.
The Yemeni population will not be able to sustain itself if this conflict continues much longer. The victors, if any, will find themselves with pyrrhic victories and a diminishing and devastated population over which to rule – by Nabeel A. Khoury
http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/yemen-order-of-battle-trumps-peace/
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A survivor speaks
And what you can do to make a difference in the age of drone warfare
We talked to Makbhout Adhban, an on-the-ground investigator for the charity Reprieve in Yemen, where civil war has raged for nearly five years, and where al-Qaeda and the Islamic State continue to operate.
Adhban painted a harrowing picture of Yemen in the time of Trump: a country at the whim of a US drone campaign which seems to have become increasingly careless about its targets.
“The drone strikes are no longer limited to certain areas that used to be hit during the Obama era,” Adhban told us. “There is a clear disregard of the rules of engagement, for example, when it comes to strikes in residential neighbourhoods.”
In the early afternoon of 29 March 2018, a little over a year into Trump’s first term, Adel Al-Manthari, then a 51-year-old civil servant, was behind the wheel of his Toyota Land Cruiser. He was driving four family members to the al-Sawma’ah district in southern Yemen.
Here, in Adel’s words, is what happened next.
On the day of the strike we were finalising a deal to sell a piece of land, which required a number of people from my family to be present because they all had shares in it. I was asked to drive four people from my family to pick up an elder in al-Sawma’ah to witness the sale of the land. I remember hearing the plane before we left our house, but the areas within the al-Sawma’ah district are used to hearing drones overhead buzzing all the time, day and night.
We headed towards the market for food and some drinks. When we were almost a kilometre away from the al-Sawma’ah district I felt the car was drifting. I was losing control. The car was moving to the left and I was trying to steer it back to the right. The car drifted almost 150-200 metres until it landed on the wheels.
I don’t remember hearing the strike or feeling the missile. But I started to feel heat in the car, which began burning from the bottom. Then the fire reached the sides and I started to feel burning in my feet. I remember feeling a lot of pain and not knowing what was happening. I kept repeating my prayers thinking that I was going to die. I looked around and I saw people rushing towards us trying to save us. As they came close they moved away due to the fire.
I looked up at the roof and saw an opening, and then I looked to the back and saw another hole, and felt I needed to stand up to get out of the car. I was able to push half of me outside the car and look beneath me. I saw that Salem was dead and his head was lying near the front seat. I looked at the back seat where Abdullah had been decapitated and his body cut in half. I turned to see the others and Mohammed’s legs had been cut off [and he had died]. Finally I saw Nasser, who was screaming with me: “Please help us.”
I was finally able to push myself outside the car and move myself a couple of metres away. A Hyundai car approached and two individuals came out and started running towards me to help. They carried me to their car and I told them: “There are still four inside”. They said: “We will try to get them out of the car but we need to take you to the hospital.”
They took me to al-Sawma’ah hospital where I got my initial treatment. After a while I heard the voice of Nasser screaming from a nearby room. He was first transferred to al-Bayda’s main hospital and then to Sana’a, the Yemeni capital, but unfortunately he died there after 15 days.
I have burns all down the left side of my body and my feet. I can’t walk anymore. I had six surgeries on my left arm and broke a bone on my back. I can’t move my fingers now. I cannot walk or move without the help of my children or the people around me. It is such a terrible feeling to see your children looking at you while you are on your bed hoping that they will see you walk again. My children have lost all hope in life. They always saw me as a shield who could protect the family from everything. They always ask: “Who did this to us?” They have stopped going to school because they are next to me most of the time and they have lost their social life with their friends. I always took good care of my family.
I stayed at the hospital in Aden between the end of March and August, and I lost a lot of my savings. Then I had to travel to Egypt and started taking loans from friends and family. I still have to go back to Egypt to continue my medication, but the cost is very high and I haven’t paid the people I borrowed money from the first time. I haven’t received any help from the Yemeni government or the US government and no one has contacted me to offer any help with the medication cost.
I have no idea why we were targeted. The US administration hasn’t provided any answers. I am the sole survivor of this strike but no one from the US side has contacted me or even attempted to reach out through mediators. The US administration insists that it only targets terrorists and so we have to ask: “Why did they target us?” We are people who love life and would like to see our children provided for, received a good education, go to college, and be successful in life like any American citizen. We do not want anything more.
https://members.tortoisemedia.com/2020/02/07/drone-interview/content.html
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UN Panel Highlights Command-and-Control Issues in Yemen
The latest Panel of Experts report shines a much-needed light on operational control issues that will likely complicate postwar efforts to unify the country’s sundry armed forces.
THE GOVERNMENT’S CONTROL ISSUES
The report spends considerable space deconstructing the various armed groups within the coalition meant to support the legitimacy of Hadi’s internationally recognized government. It concludes that the government exerts little to no authority over many of them, and that last year’s fighting further diminished “the already tenuous level of control exercised by President Hadi” (paragraph 9). The sobering irony is that the coalition claims it operates in Yemen only at Hadi’s request, yet most of its constituent parts do not follow his orders.
Instead, at least half a dozen armed organizations operate under different chains of command—some reporting to Hadi, some to the United Arab Emirates, some to Saudi Arabia, and some unclear. The panel calls them “non-State armed groups” (para. 25). They include the Security Belt Forces, Shabwani Elite Forces, Hadrami Elite Forces, Abu al-Abbas Forces, and West Coast Forces, with the latter containing three subgroups: the Amaleqa (Giants) Brigades, Tihama Brigades, and Guards of the Republic.
The West Coast Forces are a prime example of the problem. Most of them were under the UAE’s de facto command until it left the western front last summer. They now fall under a Joint Forces Command in which officers from the various armed groups report to the Saudi/Emirati-led coalition. In another example, the report details how the Security Belt Forces in Aden were subject to vacillating government control from 2016 to 2019 (Table 8.1). Then, last August, they affiliated themselves with the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—only to fall under Saudi operational control in November. Meanwhile, the Shabwani and Hadrami Elite Forces remain notionally under UAE control.
This has real implications on the ground, particularly when it comes to establishing law and order and safeguarding human rights.
HOUTHI SUPPRESSION
In contrast to the coalition’s chaotic arrangements in the west and south, the panel describes how the Houthis ruled the north with an iron first last year, noting that they “continued to consolidate their control…and present a unified military force” (para. 9). The Houthis managed this feat in large part through suppression of dissent, forced conscription, and other aggressive behavior.
This year’s edition notes that they have used their near-monopoly over security in the north to brutally suppress tribal dissent through new-fangled intelligence organs and hard power—especially against the Hajour tribe, which has suffered “heavy casualties” (para. 20). The panel also highlights the Houthis’ reported use of horrifying tactics such as arbitrarily arresting and detaining women, subjecting them to rape in prison, and threatening to label them as prostitutes in order to shame them and their families.
In addition, the Houthis have allegedly strong-armed local populations into fighting for them, including children—a charge they have repeatedly denied.
Such tactics may backfire if tribes or other groups with grievances are able to seek retribution after the war.
WHAT’S TO COME IN 2020
Yet this stalemate has at least temporarily collapsed—various forces are now fighting again along several fronts around the capital province. Moreover, the Riyadh agreement in the south and Stockholm agreement in the west are hanging by a thread. Leaders on all sides are divided over whether peace or war is the best way forward. Although diplomats made significant progress last fall, their successes were too limited and too slow to maintain momentum. As a result, more hawkish elements may once again come to the fore in the near term.
At the same time, each of the Yemeni parties has been increasingly damaged by the other’s economic warfare, and none of the domestic or foreign players (except perhaps a small contingent of Houthis) wants to be dragged into a larger regional conflict, as was threatened several times in 2019. Given these fears and the population’s broader war weariness, the time is ripe for meaningful talks.
Despite their many flaws, the Stockholm agreement and Riyadh agreement are good starting points for a conversation – by Elana DeLozier
and here is the full report:
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Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen
Summary
After more than five years of conflict, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen continues. The country’s many conflicts are interconnected and can no longer be separated by clear divisions between external and internal actors and events. Throughout 2019, the Houthis and the Government of Yemen made little headway towards either a political settlement or a conclusive military victory. In a continuation from 2018, the belligerents continued to practice economic warfare: using economic obstruction and financial tools as weapons to starve opponents of funds or materials. Profiteering from the conflict is endemic.
In the south, the Government of Yemen confronted the military challenges posed by the forces affiliated with the southern transitional council. The vice-president of the council, Hani Ali Salem Binbrek, initiated a conflict when he used force to remove what little authority the Government of Yemen held in Aden. Ongoing clashes on the Abyan and Shabwah borders and the limited progress in the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement indicate that the situation in the south remains volatile.
In the north, the Houthis continued to consolidate their political and military control, in particular through their pervasive intelligence services, which include both the preventative security and a new security and intelligence bureau. Houthi forces also engaged in the brutal suppression of tribal opposition and political dissent. The Panel of Experts on Yemen has identified a Houthi network involved in the repression of women who oppose the Houthis, including through the use of sexual violence, headed by the director of the Sana’a-based criminal investigation department, Sultan Zabin.
Throughout most of 2019, the Houthi forces continued and intensified their aerial attacks on Saudi Arabia. In addition to the previously known weapon systems, they used a new type of Delta-design uncrewed aerial vehicle and a new model of land attack cruise missile. The Panel has investigated the high-profile attack on 14 September 2019 on the Saudi Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurays and finds that, despite claims to the contrary, the Houthi forces are unlikely to be responsible for the attack, as the estimated range of the weapon systems used does not allow for a launch from Houthi-controlled territory. Nevertheless, a number of other attacks on Saudi Arabia can clearly be attributed to the Houthi forces.
Following the attack in September, the Houthis made a public offer to establish a ceasefire. The ceasefire has been broadly complied with. Both Saudi Arabia and the Houthis now publicly state that they are engaged in discussions, while the launching of longer-range uncrewed aerial vehicles and missile strikes by Houthi forces against Saudi Arabia has abated.
With regard to potential violations of the targeted arms embargo, the Panel observes two major trends: the first is the transfer of commercially available parts, such as uncrewed aerial vehicle engines, servo actuators and electronics, which are exported from industrialized countries through a network of intermediaries to the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, where they are integrated into locally assembled uncrewed aerial vehicles and waterborne improvised explosive devices; the second is the continued reception by Houthi forces of military support in the form of assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-tank guided missiles and more sophisticated cruise missile systems. Some of those weapons have technical characteristics similar to arms manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran. For both commercial parts and weapons, the main smuggling route seems to run overland from Oman and the southern coast of Yemen, through territory controlled by the Government of Yemen, towards Sana’a. The high-profile seizure on 25 November 2019 of a dhow carrying anti-tank guided missiles and other missile parts in the Arabian Sea indicates that, as in previous years, sea transport continues to play a role in potential violations of the targeted arms embargo.
The absence of the rule of law and oversight in Yemen allows for the illicit enrichment of a small number of predatory entrepreneurs, some of whom hold official posts in public institutions. Within this context, and with the lack of any accountability, national wealth and external aid are increasingly either diverted or lost owing to corrupt practices by officials of the Government of Yemen and the Houthis. As tools of economic warfare, the parties have created obstacles to block the financing of the importation of goods and caused delays for the vessels carrying them to Yemen
The Panel found indications of illicit enrichment through the manipulation of foreign exchange rates by the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden. The Panel found that the Houthis were involved in cases of violations of asset freeze measures by allowing the diversion of frozen assets and public funds through false contracts for the benefit of individuals acting on behalf of Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004). Saleh Mesfer Alshaer, a Houthi general in charge of logistics, was also instrumental in the diversion of funds unlawfully appropriated from Houthi opponents.
Violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law continued to be widely committed by all parties in Yemen with impunity. The air strikes conducted by the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen, led by Saudi Arabia, and the indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance, including landmines, by Houthi forces continue to disproportionately affect civilians and civilian infrastructures. Arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced disappearances, ill-treatment and the torture of detainees continue to be conducted by the Government of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the Houthis and the forces affiliated with the United Arab Emirates. In Aden, the absence of the rule of law allows armed groups affiliated with the United Arab Emirates to conduct such violations and to operate outside the control of the Government of Yemen. Threats and acts of violence against humanitarians, as well as administrative hurdles to the delivery of assistance, are increasing in Houthi-controlled areas.
and download also here: https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/letter-dated-27-january-2020-panel-experts-yemen-addressed-president-security-council
and the main points in a thread by Kristine Beckerle, HRW: https://twitter.com/K_Beckerle/status/1227560886321254400
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Yemen’s hopes and expectations - Part 3: living conditions and humanitarian aid
Corruption, war profiteering, and outrageous governance are deepening the severe humanitarian disaster in Yemen.
This four part series summarises the main changes in the Yemen crisis during 2019 and suggests what may happen in 2020. Part 1 deals with the Stockholm Agreement, primarily focused on the Huthi-controlled area. Part 2 deals with the crisis which arose within the anti-Huthi coalition between President Hadi’s internationally recognised government and the separatist Southern Transitional Council. Part 3 addresses people’s living conditions, the humanitarian crisis and Part 4 deals with the looming environmental disaster and other environmental issues
Five years of war, following many others of worsening economic conditions and increased poverty, have taken their toll on the population. Remembering that 70% of Yemen’s now close to 30 million people live in rural areas and that the World Bank estimated in 2018 that around 80% were poor, there is little doubt that Yemenis are living through hell. But again, the situation is different depending on where people are and who is ‘governing’ them. Moreover, profiteers from the war economy have shown zero compassion and have also penetrated the humanitarian sector which is the best known aspect of the war in Europe.
Surviving 5 years of war
People living under Huthi control have to deal with a highly centralised and restrictive environment, with the constant threat of arbitrary arrest on baseless accusations, while their economic circumstances are worsening on a daily basis, due to the lack of jobs and income. Government employees receive half a month’s pay every few months, while the full salary was completely inadequate to maintain a family before the cost of the basic survival basket more than doubled with the war. Most private sector enterprises are either closed or work way below capacity, as people only buy absolute necessities. Rural people cannot survive from their very small holdings and depleted livestock.
Those in the ’liberated’ areas fare slightly better though the above-mentioned constraints are also present. But the impact is less, as these areas receive far more humanitarian assistance coming directly from the main coalition states, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, through their national mechanisms. Here it is more difficult to generalise due to the wide range of authorities involved, which have little connection with each other and a wider range of administrative income sources: for example both Mareb and Hadhramaut collect oil revenue income directly and manage their own affairs under their respective governors and use some of it to pay medical, educational and other staff.
Throughout the country, corruption plays a major role in enriching war economy profiteers, whether from direct military related activities, ‘taxation’ of businesses and the citizenry or through their demands from humanitarian actors, international or national. Community and households’ ability to manage their own affairs, develop their economic potential, or relate to line ministries or official local administrations, have been undermined, if not destroyed by a combination of rising war economy and the impact of the massive humanitarian intervention, creating dependency rather than supporting self-reliance.
Economic and financial warfare
In the absence of a military strategy to defeat the Huthis, the coalition and the Hadi government are focusing their efforts on the economic war which causes little suffering to the leaderships, but massive problems for all ordinary people. This is similar to the outcome of most sanctions which cause suffering to the population while leaders successfully manipulate the situation to benefit personally. In Yemen fuel is the prime example.
Throughout 2019, import constraints on fuel and particularly diesel have been manipulated by the coalition by restricting imports, by senior internationally recognised government (IRG) officials obtaining contracts at inflated prices without open bidding, and by the Huthis who control the distribution of the limited supplies thus allowing the black market to flourish, a black market which is, of course, run by their allies. All that has been at the expense of the population at large throughout the country who need fuel to pump water for domestic purposes, for the operation of generators and for transport, and thus suffer both shortages and increased cost which they can’t afford.
Financial issues are at the heart of the struggle between the Huthi movement and the IRG and a major element of the war. The transfer of the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) to Aden in 2016 has slowed remittance flows, almost stopped payment of salaries, caused the currency to collapse, and worsened inflation.
The list of problems is long. All these actions have contributed significantly to increased poverty but have also allowed senior central bank and other officials to make millions from manipulating exchange rates and operating black markets. The transfer of the CBY resulted in the existence of two rival central banks vying to control the currency and trade. This has reduced commercial imports through their competitive and incompatible administrative requirements from importers, thus limiting the number of traders who have access to the letters of credit essential for the import of fuel and basic food supplies. This has favoured those with good relations with the officials in charge, some of whom have not missed the opportunity for enrichment.
Humanitarian issues
Despite the publicity surrounding the very high levels of humanitarian aid and the millions of beneficiaries, significant amounts are diverted by the authorities or distributed on a nepotistic basis rather than objective criteria of need. Access to humanitarian assistance has become increasingly important throughout Yemen, despite the fact that the majority of food and other basic imports are done through commercial channels.
There is no doubt that millions of Yemenis are suffering increasingly from the crisis and the war, but it is clear that those benefiting from humanitarian aid and support also include individuals and organisations which are appropriating goods and cash for personal gain. This takes place at the expense of those who are in real need.
A further important problem is that much assistance provided directly by the Saudis and the UAE goes primarily to the less populated areas out of Huthi control, and that in some of these areas, people are receiving far more than they can use. But the Huthis prevent them from sending it to friends and relatives in Huthi controlled areas where the majority of the population in desperate need reside.
The Huthis are also involved in a whole range of issues concerning humanitarian assistance – by Helen Lackner
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Yemen: World's biggest humanitarian emergency nears breaking point
A crisis within the world's greatest humanitarian emergency could be reaching breaking point over the control of lifesaving aid millions of Yemenis need to survive.
Major donors and some of the world's biggest aid agencies will meet in Brussels on Thursday in an effort to forge a collective response to what is being widely described as unprecedented and unacceptable obstruction by Houthi authorities who hold sway over large swathes of northern Yemen.
The lives of millions of Yemenis depend on it. A recent Yemen briefing to the UN Security Council underlined that access constraints were affecting 6.7 million Yemenis who needed assistance - a figure which it noted has "never been so high."
"Humanitarian agencies must operate in an environment where they can uphold humanitarian principles," says Lise Grande, the UN's Resident Humanitarian Coordinator in Yemen. "If we reach a point where the operating environment doesn't allow us to do that, we do everything we can to change it."
Months of meetings, a succession of envoys despatched to the capital Sana'a, and a series of statements to the UN Security Council have failed to resolve a catalogue of complaints ranging from delays in permits to harassment and detention of staff. One aid official expressed concern over an "extremely hostile environment".
Concern spiked when a levy on every aid agency was proposed, amounting to 2% of operational budgets, by the body established to exert greater control over aid known as the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (SCMCHA).
"This is huge," explains one aid official who, like most agencies operating in Yemen, did not wish to speak on the record given the acute sensitivity of these issues. "It could be seen as financing the war."
"We don't want any disagreements with aid agencies," insists Man'e Al Assal who heads SCMCHA's Department of International Cooperation.
"We informed them that if we work together towards a common goal to help people in need then we will not disagree, but not if they bring in political considerations," he tells me when we meet in Sana'a
His words underscore an atmosphere often clouded by suspicion and criticism of major western aid agencies and their spending priorities.
As for the tax, he explains "there should be nothing wrong with providing funds which enable us to coordinate aid when we're suffering from a blockade," a reference to restrictions imposed on air and sea ports by the Saudi-led coalition battling the Houthis aligned to Iran. He then hastens to add the tax is still only a proposal.
We're surrounded by towering stacks of boxes in a vast warehouse at Sana'a International Airport, a spot chosen by Al-Assal to make his point as forcefully as possible.
"When this aid comes, like these expired medicines or spoilt food, we stop this aid so we don't make Yemenis sick, or add to the tragedy," he says, pointing to medicine belonging to an international medical charity.
When I point out that the pallet next to us has an expiry date of June 2020, he explains that by the time the required paperwork is complete, and distribution underway, they will no longer be fit for purpose.
Conversations with several international NGOs working in northern Yemen all relayed the same story: goods stuck in warehouses while paper work drags on; agreements delayed; permits denied.
Some governments have been reluctant to take drastic steps, worried it could adversely affect embryonic efforts to bring an end to Yemen's devastating war which now encompass secret talks between senior Saudi and Houthi officials.
But major donors are reported to be increasingly uneasy over perceived compromises to humanitarian principles including misuse of tax payers' money – by Lyse Doucet
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51445539
My comment: Let’s tell it in short: “Paper work” required by the Sanaa government kills.
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Trump administration considers suspending humanitarian assistance to Yemen amid new rebel restrictions
The Trump administration is considering suspending much of its humanitarian assistance to Yemen as part of an international response to new restrictions imposed by Iranian-linked Houthi rebels, officials said.
That one of Yemen’s biggest donors is considering such a move, which, if implemented, could worsen already dire conditions, underscores the challenge of managing aid operations in areas controlled by a rebel movement that is hostile to the West.
A senior State Department official said the United States has not made a final decision but was coordinating with other donor nations and aid organizations on possible responses to a 2 percent “tax” on assistance projects and other new measures in swaths of Yemen administered by the Houthis.
“We’re in an unfortunate situation and we’re trying to work the problem,” the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the issue publicly. “If such an action were taken, it would be one that was forced by basically unprecedented Houthi obstructionism.”
Whether the United States and other donors should suspend or reduce assistance in Houthi-controlled areas will be a central question when donor countries and aid groups meet in Brussels this week.
Officials familiar with the discussions say the Trump administration has already informed humanitarian organizations that a suspension, if finalized, would take effect March 1. The United States provided $746 million in Yemen assistance in fiscal 2019.
The possible move also coincides with heightened U.S. tensions with Iran, which is believed to have provided military support to the Houthis. The White House has applied a “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran that includes punishing sanctions aimed in part at forcing Tehran to end its support for foreign armed groups.
Humanitarian officials, who already have cut back assistance because of Houthi restrictions, describe a morally fraught situation in which they acknowledge that donor countries need to ensure taxpayer-funded aid is properly delivered but also worry that large-scale suspensions will aggravate conditions for Yemenis.
“What we really want to do is make sure people don’t get hurt,” a senior U.N. official in Yemen said, also speaking on the condition of anonymity. “But we recognize that we have very big problems.”
The discussions in Washington about a potential suspension may also reflect skepticism about whether the United Nations and aid groups can manage the risks of aid diversion.
It was not immediately clear whether a U.S. suspension would affect funding for U.N. aid programs in Yemen or only assistance provided via smaller aid groups. Reuters previously reported that a reduction to international aid to Yemen was likely because of the Houthi restrictions.
Mane’a Al Assal, chairman of international cooperation for the Houthis’ aid oversight body, said it was “natural” that authorities would require a “minimum percentage for administrating and coordinating humanitarian affairs,” which he likened to overhead costs managed by most nongovernmental organizations, but said that collection of that percentage had not yet begun.
He said international aid should focus on things such as medicine, water, food and shelter before other kinds of assistance are considered.
“I don’t see any excuse for reducing the humanitarian aid,” he said. “This reduction would greatly affect Yemenis.”
While views about a possible U.S. suspension vary in the assistance community, several aid officials said they hoped that donor countries, including the United States, would adopt a uniform response to maximize leverage over the rebels and possibly prompt them to drop some of the restrictions – by Missy Ryan and John Hudson
https://www.ctpost.com/news/article/Trump-administration-considers-suspending-15042263.php = https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-administration-considers-suspending-humanitarian-assistance-to-yemen-amid-new-rebel-restrictions/2020/02/09/4cb5cf6e-4a70-11ea-9475-535736e48788_story.html
My comment: On this subject, read https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2020/02/03/Yemen-Houthis-aid-worker-safety and https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-aid/aid-to-houthi-controled-yemen-to-be-cut-back-over-risk-it-can-be-diverted-sources-idUSKBN2001JT. – Who actually is behind the idea to restrict humanitarian help to Northern Yemen? What’s the role of the Trump government which a) deeply distrusts all UN institutions; b) is eager to cut humanitarian help abroad as it does in the US itself; c) in its grotesque anti-Iranian paranoia, sees Iranians everywhere and claims this would be a part of fighting Iran?
Comment by Nabeel Khoury: The irony of U.S. providing $700 m in aid all while enforcing a total blockade, aiding & abetting war in #Yemen. Now considering suspension of aid Instead of an all out diplomatic effort to end the war. Theater of the Absurd could not depict such cold heartedness more clearly!
https://twitter.com/khoury_nabeel/status/1227246571626078208
(** B H K P)
Divided, Yemen is Falling
The country’s suffering has been exacerbated by the rise of internal borders, from which militias have greatly benefited.
The humanitarian catastrophe afflicting Yemen over the past five years has been exacerbated by the country’s suffocating isolation from the outside world. The Saudi-led Arab coalition has blockaded most of the country’s air and sea ports. Meanwhile, fighting has further isolated Yemen’s regions from each other. The expansion of the conflict zone and the competing local parties’ control over different areas have contributed to the rise of internal borders that have systematically kept inhabitants apart.
One example of such dynamics is the growing difficulty to cross from the northern part of Ta‘iz, which is controlled by Ansarullah, more commonly known as the Houthi movement, to the city center, which is held by parties loyal to the internationally recognized government.
A similar situation exists on the routes that connect Yemen’s northern cities, controlled by the Houthis. Dozens of military checkpoints have been set up to screen travelers and search their belongings. Armed men usually demand documents issued by the travelers’ sponsors in places where they are visiting, or by the authorities the travelers intend to see. The aim it to prevent the entry of anyone who may potentially belong to the opposing camp. Whoever does not meet the criteria risks being detained.
Residents of western and northern areas of Yemen are also finding it increasingly difficult to enter Aden in the south. The forces of the Southern Transitional Council, which controls the city and surrounding towns, have restricted the flow of people into the areas under their control.
In central and northern Yemen, both Houthi and loyalist forces have carved out internal borders by setting up checkpoints at the edges of the areas they control. The most prominent of these are the Houthi-controlled checkpoint in the Rada‘a area of Bayda Governorate and the government-controlled Falaj checkpoint in Marib. Both checkpoints, again, restrict the movement of people and goods.
Regional actors have also exacerbated Yemen’s geographical segregation. In early 2018, the United Arab Emirates pressured the then-governor of Socotra into barring the entry of all Yemenis except those originally from the archipelago.
Similarly, just as smuggling is common across international borders, so too has it developed along Yemen’s internal borders. To facilitate their smuggling efforts, some networks have coordinated with the militias at checkpoints and paid them off with part of their revenues from smuggling operations.
Yemen’s internal borders have impacted heavily on the lives of civilians. Other than restricting their freedom of movement, such borders have nurtured regionalism and rallied society behind local identities, a phenomenon that will have both short- and long-term effects. Economically, these internal borders have limited work opportunities and raised the cost of basic goods, deepening the suffering of ordinary Yemenis
The presence of internal borders has added an extra layer to Yemen’s many challenges, which include managing its international borders and dealing with a battle for domination among regional states. Yet internal borders are no less relevant. Understanding them allows for a better grasp of Yemen and its conflict – by Ahmed Nagi
https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/80980
(** B H P)
Human Rights Watch Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on Yemen
We write in advance of the 77th pre-session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and its review of the Republic of Yemen’s compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
Protection of Education and Equal Access to Education During Armed Conflict (Article 10)
The armed conflict in Yemen has had a grave impact on the accessibility of education for girls. UNICEF states that 2 million children are currently out of school; half a million of these children are estimated to have dropped out since 2015, and another 3.7 million are at risk of dropping out as the humanitarian crisis escalates.[1] Girls are especially vulnerable to dropping out of school for financial and safety reasons, which increases the likelihood of early marriage, abuse, and exploitation. As a result of the recruitment practices of armed groups nationwide, children, especially girls, are displaced in large numbers and vulnerable to sexual violence.
The lack of a steady source of income has made it difficult for families to afford sending their children to school, as well as provide the transportation, supplies, and other materials their children need to receive a full education. If families can only afford to send some children to school, there is a higher chance that boys will be prioritized over girls for safety and cultural reasons.
Human Rights Watch has documented numerous incidents of parties to the conflict using schools for military purposes, as well as attacks on schoolchildren and education infrastructure, including attacks on or near school buildings and school buses
Child Marriage (Article 16)
Current trends suggest that child marriage is on the rise in Yemen. According to the UNFPA, the average age for girls to get married is about 15 years old.[12] More precise estimates are difficult to ascertain in this context.
Economic instability and poverty in Yemen are among the prevailing reasons for children to enter marriages. Girls who enter marriages at a young age face greater risks in pregnancy, including difficulties during childbirth that can result in death. Child marriage also often ends a girl’s education and can expose her to domestic violence.
Yemen currently has no minimum age for marriage.
Violence Against Women and Girls (Articles 1, 2, 3, and 12)
Violence against women has increased about 63 percent since the conflict escalated in 2015.[16] Prior to the conflict, women faced discriminatory laws that increased the vulnerability of females to violence, but during the current conflict, warring parties’ actions have led to the displacement of women and girls in large numbers, and exacerbated discrimination and violence against them.[17]
Gender-Based Violence
Yemen has no law designed specifically to protect women from gender-based violence, only the general protection provided in the Penal Code that criminalizes infliction of physical harm. Provisions in the Personal Status Law create conditions that can facilitate marital rape and domestic violence. Article 40 of the Personal Status Law, for example, as revised in 1998, requires a woman to be obedient to her husband. Article 40 does not permit a woman to leave the matrimonial home without her husband’s permission except in very narrow circumstances. The provision requires that women allow their husbands to have sexual relations whenever the husbands require.[18] Marital rape is not criminalized.
Abuse Against Migrant and Yemeni Women and Girls in Detention (Articles 1,2 and 12)
Yemeni government officials have tortured, raped, and executed migrants and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa in a detention center in the southern port city of Aden.
Past videos and photos of the detention facility show hundreds of men and boys in a crowded concrete hangar, with women and girls sitting on a stone floor. Former detainees reported that the facility was overcrowded, with dire sanitation conditions and little access to medical care. The provision of food was inconsistent, and guards would occasionally withhold food. Former detainees said guards sexually assaulted women and girls regularly.
Women’s political participation (Article 3)
Women could always be found at the forefront of political and academic activist spaces in Yemen, although the context of turmoil and violence since 2015 has significantly impeded their access to formal political and peacebuilding channels
(** B H P)
How Yemen's civil war played a role in Africa's great locust swarm
Monitoring and eradication system suffers from lack of funding
When juvenile locusts first appeared on Juneid Saeed’s farm, he appealed for help to local agriculture officials, the deputy governor of Yemen’s Hadramawt province, and even contacted charities.
No one responded to his calls and the insects continued to grow.
The locusts had ruined almost half of the wheat and fodder crops by the time an agriculture ministry team from neighbouring Seiyun city arrived one month later and killed them off.
“If they came early, they could have saved the farms. The team had effective spraying equipment that killed the locusts quickly,” Mr Saeed said as he lamented his losses. Altogether, he said, the infestation had cost farmers in the area several million rials.
Agriculture ministry officials say Yemen’s civil war broke up the country's once effective locust response system and affected funding for monitoring and controlling the pests. As a result, calls for help from farmers are either neglected or responded to only after funding is provided.
The consequences are being felt far beyond Yemen's borders. Experts say the spread of locust swarms that are ravaging crops and vegetation in Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya this year is because of the inability of authorities in Yemen to apply survey and control mechanisms.
Ashor Al Zubairi, an agriculture official responsible for combating locusts who is based in Seiyun, said his office had detected swarms of desert locusts in different areas of Hadramawt recently but did not have the funds to send teams across the vast south-eastern province.
In many cases, Mr Al Zubairi said, the locusts were able to breed, wreak havoc and move on to new areas before his team arrived. He suggested creating an emergency fund for quick responses to outbreaks.
Before the war, a well-equipped and better-funded office based in Sanaa handled locust invasions across Yemen. But after the Iran-backed Houthis seized control of the capital in late 2014, triggering the civil war, the officials could no longer enter government-controlled areas.
The government had to create a locust-control office from scratch in Aden, the southern port city about 650 kilometres west of Hadramawt where President Abdrabu Mansur Hadi’s officials are now based. But with little funding, it is unable to serve all of the government-controlled territory, which comprises 80 per cent of Yemen.
Saleh Al Harouri, deputy manager of the locust control centre in Aden, said his office was struggling to deal with pockets of locusts along the southern coastline between the Bab Al Mandeb west of Aden and Abyan to the east.
“The coastal areas in Lahj, Aden and Abyan are plagued with swarms of locusts,” Mr Al Harouri said.
But his centre is waiting for funds from the FAO and the government to send teams to the affected areas.
“Our budget is zero,” he said.
“The office in Sanaa has 100 cars and a big team that can reach affected areas within days. The office here in Aden has nothing. We hire cars to visit plagued areas.”
cp1b Am wichtigsten: Kampf um Hodeidah / Most important: Hodeidah battle
(A K pS)
Film: A citizen was wounded by Houthi militias inside his house in the city of Hayes
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iDHzj6v2mHE
(A K pH)
2 Zivilisten verletzt, Eigentum beschädigt aufgrund Verstößen der Aggressionstruppen gegen des Hodeidah-Abkommens
https://www.saba.ye/de/news3087317.htm
(A K pS)
Film: A citizen was injured due to the shelling of the Houthi militia on the town of Al-Tahita, south of Hodeidah
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQiP3xw3oTM
(A K pH)
US-Saudi Aggression Intensifies Raids on Sana’a, Escalates Its Violations in Hodeidah
https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=11135
(A K pH)
Söldnertruppen hindern den Leiter der UN-Mission in Hodeidah daran, Hays und Al-Duraihimi zu besuchen
https://www.saba.ye/de/news3087262.htm
(A K pS)
Film: The destruction of artillery and weapons stores for Houthi militias in Hodeida
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KZ8bBzfHrFw
(A K pS)
Film: Houthi mines bombed the people of Hayes district
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SKZRvAg40cw
(A K pH)
Spionageflugzeug der Aggression in Hodeidah abgeschossen
https://www.saba.ye/de/news3087239.htm
(A K pH)
Spy plane of aggression coalition shot down in Hodeidah
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3087231.htm
(A K pH)
Aggressionsstreitkräfte setzen Verstöße gegen Hodeidah-Abkommen fort
https://www.saba.ye/de/news3087149.htm
(A K pH)
US-Saudi Aggression’s Daily Update for Friday, February 7th, 2020
In Hodeidah, three women were wounded by the aggression forces on Saddam Street in Al-Hali district. […]
https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=11123
(A K pS)
Houthis sustained heavy losses in al-Duraihimi, south Hodeidah
http://en.adenpress.news/news/18387
(A K pS)
Young man badly injured by Houthi sniper in south Hodeidah
http://en.adenpress.news/news/18385
(A K pH)
Aggressionsstreitkräfte setzen Verstöße gegen Hodeidah-Abkommen fort
drei Frauen mit Maschinengewehren verwundet wurden, die die Saddam-Straße im Distrikt Al-Hadi in der Stadt Hodeidah bombardierten, während ein militärischer Bulldozer der Aggressionstruppen neue Kampfbefestigungen im Gebiet Kilo 16 errichtete.
https://www.saba.ye/de/news3087122.htm
(A K pH)
US-Saudi Aggression’s Daily Update for Thursday, February 6th, 2020
https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=11111
(* A K pS)
The Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen: Houthi Militia Continuation of Naval Mine Deployment and Planting Causes Explosion of Fishing Boat and Death of Three Fishermen, Injury of Three Other
“At (0200), Wednesday, 05 February 2020, Coalition Naval forces responded to a communication reporting the sinking of a fishing boat in International Waters in the Red Sea as a result of a naval mine explosion
Six Egyptian fishermen were on the boat, three of them were rescued, and the other three were killed by the naval mine explosion, may Allah accept them.
The terrorist Iran-backed Houthi militia’s continuation of planting and deploying naval mines is a serious threat to maritime navigation and international trade in South of Red Sea and Bab-el-mandeb strait.
https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2031549
My remark: As claimed by the Saudis.
cp2 Allgemein / General
(* A K P)
Interactive Map of Yemen War
(* A K)
MILITARY SITUATION IN YEMEN ON FEBRUARY 10, 2020 (MAP UPDATE)
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-february-10-2020-map-update/
(A P)
TeleYemen says repairs underway on undersea Falcon cable that caused ongoing internet outage
Global Cloud Xchange, the owner of the Falcon cable, told TeleYemen that engineers had started repairing the cable over the weekend
Houthi-controlled telecommunications company TeleYemen received an email on Saturday from GCX, the owner of the so-called Falcon cable, noting that engineers had begun repairing the cable at the damage site, according to a source at TeleYemen, Yemen’s dominant international telecommunication services provider.
Internet services in Yemen have been severely disrupted since Jan. 9, when the cable was damaged. TeleYemen suggested that it was likely damaged by the anchor of a large merchant vessel in the immediate area.
https://al-masdaronline.net/national/323
(A K P)
While butchering the #Arabic language & #Koran verses, #UAE Deputy Chief of Staff General Issa AlMazroui announces #UAE withdrawal from #Yemen. He calls its “ Shifting from Direct Approach to a Strategy of Indirect Approach,”
According to my sources, #UAE unilateral decision to leave #Yemen came after it was clear that its territories will be hit by #Yemeni missiles & after the sharp decline of #Dubai economy. #Expo2020 played a leading role in the withdrawal.
https://twitter.com/AliAlAhmed_en/status/1226921535799275526
referring to https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fBaOX5c7Ulo
(* B K pS)
Houthi firepower is becoming heavier and smarter, [Hadi gov.] Yemen army says
Rebels have improved range and precision of weapons in recent months
Yemen’s military commanders battling the Iran-backed Houthis said their enemies' firepower had improved significantly in range and precision over the past couple of months, confirming reports that the rebels had obtained new weapons.
Col Abdul Basit Al Baher, a Yemeni army spokesman in the southern city of Taez, told The National on Saturday that the Houthis had used more destructive weapons since October last year.
The new arsenal caused a large number of military and civilian casualties in the densely populated city.
“They are using more destructive bombs than we have never seen before,” Col Al Baher said.
He said that during recent battles on the outskirts of Taez, the Houthis fired dozens of shells at government forces in a short period.
Military commanders said the intensity reminded them of the Houthis’ military expansion in the first months of 2015, when they used weapons seized from military bases across Yemen.
“Over the past four years their firepower weakened,” Col Al Baher said.
Yemeni army officers say the Houthis are now using machineguns with four pipes and more destructive 160 millimetre shells.
(A K P)
UAE to celebrate return of its heroes from Yemen on Sunday
Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed welcome those returning home
The UAE will celebrate on Sunday the UAE Armed Forces heroes’ participation in the Arab coalition in Yemen, UAE leaders said on Saturday.
“Greetings to the children of the homeland returning from the land of Yemen, they participated with their brothers in the coalition forces in a mission to restore hope and consolidate the security of the region,” His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice-President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, said on his Twitter account.
Shaikh Mohammed Bin Rashid added they [the UAE heroes] contributed to humanitarian work in 22 governorates that benefited millions of families, and contributed to building huge development projects in the governorates of Yemen. "Welcome to the homeland...They are the protectors of the Union,” Shaikh Mohammad Bin Rashid said.
(* B K P)
Much to Saudi's dismay, the Houthis are standing their ground in Yemen
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman has become a victim of his own assumption that the Houthis were just a ragtag force and the Saudi intervention would be a walk in the park.
At first, the plan looked perfect on paper. With the support of a mix of powerful Western and Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia’s de-facto leader, the young, ambitious but politically inexperienced Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), would bulldoze everything in his way to prove himself worthy for the title of crown prince.
Fast forward to 2020, everything Saudi Arabia had planned in Yemen went wrong.
MBS became a victim of his own assumptions, considering the Houthis a mere ragtag force and hoping the Saudi intervention would be a walk in the park.
The Houthi militias, backed by Iran, were not only able to take control of much of northern Yemen, their stronghold for centuries, they also advanced their fight, changing gears from defensive to offensive, overpowering the Saudi-backed military campaign.
As of 2020, the war continues and peace looks distant. The conflict has resulted in far-reaching catastrophic consequences for the people of Yemen, the poorest nation in the Middle East.
cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade
(A K P)
Ankunft eines mit 29.363 Tonnen Benzin und Diesel beladenen Schiffes im Hafen von Hodeidah
In der Erklärung wurde darauf hingewiesen, dass die Aggressionskoalition immer noch acht Ölschiffe hält, die dem Meer ausgesetzt waren. Die erste Haftzeit betrug mehr als 89 Tage, und die Mengen, die auf diesen Schiffen sichergestellt wurden, betrugen ungefähr 187.000 und 37 Tonnen Benzin, 5.000 und 826 Tonnen Kerosin sowie Nahrungsmittel-, Arzneimittel- und Haushaltsgasschiffe.
https://www.saba.ye/de/news3087263.htm
(* A H P)
Audio: Luftbrücke für Kinder und Kranke - Medizinische Versorgung im Jemen
Medizinische Versorgung im Jemen von Per Byman im Gespräch mit Britta Fecke
(* A H P)
Film: 30 Yemenis medically evacuated for the first time in three years
Two UN-chartered planes carrying Yemenis in need of urgent medical care have left Sanaa for Jordan.
More than 30 people have been evacuated since Monday after the Saudi-led coalition eased restrictions on Sanaa airport for the first time in three years.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/30-yemenis-medically-evacuated-time-years-200209094230851.html = https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ecG-xdGwPkc
Al Jazeera's Natasha Ghoneim reports from Amman, Jordan, where children are among those awaiting surgery.
(* A H P)
New 'mercy flight' leaves Houthi-held Yemen capital: WHO
A second medical evacuation flight carrying 24 critically ill Yemenis left the Houthi-held capital Sanaa on Saturday, the World Health Organization said.
"The flight just took off from Sanaa headed to Amman," a WHO spokesperson told AFP.
The plane was carrying men, women and children in need of medical treatment, along with their companions, the spokesperson added.
The flight had been due to leave Sanaa on Friday but was rescheduled for "technical reasons," according to the WHO.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1624806/middle-east
Photos: https://twitter.com/sadeqalwesabi/status/1226221078588076032
My comment: It’s remarkable that Saudi propaganda is labeling these flights as “mercy flights”, as if it would be a “mercy” by the Saudi side to no more obstruct such flights, as they did for several years.
and
(* A H P)
UN medical relief flights continue from Yemen’s capital
There has been no announced explanation for the medical flights but they could be a result of talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis.
Among those who left Sanaa on Saturday was 30-year-old cancer patient Entisar. WHO said the cancer had spread all over her body.
“The physical & psychological pain is unbearable; all I want is to feel better,” she was quoted as saying by the U.N. agency. Her last name was not given.
Welcoming the arrival of the second flight to Jordan’s capital, Amman, U.N. envoy to Yemen Martin Griffiths said the two flights transported patients to “receive life-saving medical care currently unavailable in Yemen.”
The Houthi rebels criticized the U.N. for the delay of the second flight and for the small number of patients airlifted out of Sanaa.
https://apnews.com/bf6c9fe30c29ca50b8d843d5cdc48c70
(A H P)
Krankheitsflug vom internationalen Flughafen Sanaa wurde abgesagt
https://www.saba.ye/de/news3087141.htm
(A H P)
Mercy Flight from Yemen’s Sanaa Delayed over ‘Technical’ Reasons
(* A H P)
New 'mercy flight' due to leave rebel-held Yemen capital: WHO source
A plane is due to evacuate 24 critically ill Yemenis from the rebel-held capital on Friday, a World Heath Organization source said, as the UN seeks to consolidate a medical air bridge.
A first "mercy flight" evacuated seven children from Sanaa on Monday for medical treatment in the Jordanian capital Amman and the United Nations is eager to build the necessary confidence between the warring parties to enable more.
"A plane carrying 24 patients and their companions is scheduled to leave today from Sanaa to Amman," a World Health Organization source told AFP.
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
Siehe / Look at cp1
(* B H)
Unterstützung für starke Frauen im Jemen
Frauen und Kinder leiden im Krieg besonders
Noha al Eryani kennt die Bilder des Jemenkrieges und hungernder Kinder nicht nur aus dem Fernsehen oder Internet. Die humanitäre Helferin stammt aus dem Jemen. Während eines Aufenthalts in Deutschland suchte sie im vergangenen Jahr Kontakt zu arche noVa, um langfristige Unterstützung für die Menschen in ihrem Heimatland zu finden.
"Unsere wichtigste Zielgruppe sind Frauen und Mädchen, die im Krieg besonders stark leiden und an denen gleichzeitig der Zusammenhalt oder das Überleben von Familien hängt", sagt Noha al Eryani.
Frauen ein selbstbestimmtes Leben ermöglichen
So kam die Zusammenarbeit von arche noVa mit der Jemenitischen Frauenunion zustande. Die lokale Hilfsorganisation kämpft seit knapp 30 Jahren für Frauenrechte, berät Frauen in juristischen Angelegenheiten und setzt sich für Gewaltfreiheit ein. Außerdem betreibt die Organisation Schutz- und Frauenhäuser in verschiedenen Regionen des Jemen.
(B H P)
WFP Welcomes China's contribution for food assistance to four countries
The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and the Government of China have recently signed agreements to provide food assistance to Yemen, Lesotho, Dominican Republic, and the Republic of Congo to respond to their food needs outlined in recent Humanitarian Response Plans. https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-welcomes-chinas-contribution-food-assistance-four-countries
(B H P)
Film: This started when I read the comments about @MarinSanna‘s parents. Then I wrote an article about the misconceptions that people have about the LGBT community. I enjoyed this interview a lot
https://twitter.com/HindAleryani/status/1225126742450491392
(B H)
Film: I'm now in hospital with this beautiful girl Tahani 6Yrs, suffer from thalasimia, spleen so larg, need urgent surgery to remove it, costs over $ 1,000 surgery & treat in Sana'a long time with family to recovery You can help by #pray, #RT, #donate via link http://gofundme.com/food-and-medicine-for-yemen
https://twitter.com/ghalebalsudmy/status/1226433066161360897
https://twitter.com/ghalebalsudmy/status/1226888243955691522
(* B H P)
WFP biometric aid delivery system still not fully launched in Yemen, humanitarian operation in jeopardy
Despite efforts to secure aid delivery with biometrics, United Nations officials say the situation in areas of Yemen controlled by Houthi rebels has deteriorated to the extent that the world’s largest humanitarian aid operation will be scaled-down next month, according to a Reuters report.
The biometric registration program is still not online in Houthi areas, eight months after a partial suspension of aid was caused by a dispute Houthi leadership said was over control of the biometric data. The World Food Programme (WFP) reached an agreement with Houthi leaders to use biometric authentication to prevent the misdirection of food aid in August of last year, and the WFP has been feeding more than 12 million Yemeni people each month, including up to 80 percent in Houthi areas.
Reuters reports that a Houthi official says that it is illegal for WFP to demand control of the data, and that alternative methods of assuring aid delivery have been proposed.
(B H)
World Food Programme, Logistics Cluster: Yemen Monthly Overview January 2020
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-monthly-overview-january-2020
(* B E H)
Famine Early Warning System Network: Reduced capacity to import food expected in Yemen with millions in need of urgent action
Expected foreign currency shortages in Yemen are likely to lead to further depreciation of the Yemeni Rial (YER), disruptions to food imports and salary payments, and upward pressure on food and fuel prices (Figure 1). FEWS NET understands the $2 billion deposit contributed by Saudi Arabia in early 2018 to stabilize economic conditions will likely be fully depleted within the next couple of months. Data and information on current food security outcomes and conditions in Yemen are limited by the current humanitarian environment, though available information suggests an estimated 17 million people are currently in need of humanitarian food assistance. Given Yemen’s high dependence on food imports, the scale and severity of acute food insecurity is expected to increase in the absence of action to stabilize the economy. Although Famine (IPC Phase 5) is not the most likely scenario, the risk of Famine is expected to increase due to the anticipated rise in food security needs and the pressure on market systems.
In the absence of further fiscal intervention, FEWS NET anticipates steady depreciation of the YER in the parallel market in the coming months, with a devaluation of the currency to close the gap. This is likely to make imports more expensive, increasing prices of both food and fuel. Elevated fuel prices are expected to increase transport costs, exerting additional upward pressure on food prices. Meanwhile, public sector salary payments are expected to decline due to limited government revenue. These circumstances are likely to further reduce purchasing power among millions of already food insecure Yemenis, with most unlikely to be able to expand income earning.
Many households already facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes are likely to experience widening consumption gaps or engage in increasingly severe and unsustainable coping to cover their basic needs.
https://fews.net/fr/east-africa/yemen/alert/january-2020
(B H)
SFD: Empowerment of females is at the heart of #SFDYemen capacity building and service delivery response as they are a key driving force for stronger #HumanCapital in #Yemen (photos)
https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1225478973045575680
(* B H)
UN Children's Fund, WASH Cluster, REACH Initiative: Yemen Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (December 2019)
The Yemen Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI) was launched by REACH in collaboration with the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) Cluster and the Cash and Market Working Group (CMWG) to support humanitarian actors with the harmonization of price monitoring among all cash actors in Yemen. The JMMI incorporates information on market systems including price levels and supply chains. The basket of goods to be assessed comprises eight non-food items (NFIs), including fuel, water and hygiene products, reflecting the programmatic areas of the WASH Cluster. The JMMI tracks all components of the WASH Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) since September 2018.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-joint-market-monitoring-initiative-december-2019
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
(A H K)
Two thousand internally displaced people are forced to flee again from al-Khaniq camp as a result of the war in Nahm district, east of Sana'a
https://twitter.com/BelqeesRights/status/1226552763364102145
(B H)
A dive into the realities of the humanitarian response plan in #Yemen this is what we have been trying to signal for a long while! Insights into the IDP crisis in Hodeida and the humanitarian response [the site linked here is spoiled, as tells Antivirus]
https://twitter.com/munaluqman/status/1226021532188729344
(B H)
UN High Commissioner for Refugees: Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, 6 February 2020
UNHCR and partners continue to provide cash assistance to vulnerable refugee families and those with specialised needs, such as unaccompanied and vulnerable children, SGBV survivors and other persons with specific needs. Eligible cases receive between USD 80 – 200 to meet their priority needs, depending on their level of vulnerability.
During the reporting period, the Sub-National Protection Cluster continued to respond to the urgent needs of families displaced in Al-Jawf governorate due to recent clashes. In coordination with the Shelter Cluster partners and the Executive Unit under the Government of Yemen (GOY), the partners delivered 62 tents and 157 blankets; distributions are on-going.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-unhcr-operational-update-6-february-2020
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
Siehe / Look at cp1
(* B P)
Report: Houthis torture detainees in Taiz, extort their families
The detainees in the Al-Saleh detention camp of Taiz city are vulnerable to various forms of torture by the Iran-backed Houthis rebels, a report by Sam Human Rights Organization said.
A human rights taskforce was able to meet 27 victims of people who had been detained in the same detention place.
The Al-Saleh detention camp is composed of 20 buildings that are divided into five prisons that are run by five different Houthis-run security services, according to the report.
The Houthis use also other nearby buildings as residence for their leaders and military hardware stores as well as launching points of missiles and shells that for bombing Taiz city.
People interviewed by the report are panicked when they hear name of the detention camp due to severe physical and psychological torture they had in the place.
“The Al-Saleh detention camp has become a nightmare for residents of Taiz city. The people of Taiz have been renowned of education and renounce of weapon use prior the Houthis-imposed siege on the city in early 2015,” the report said.
It said that atrocities committed by the Houthis against the detainees in this detention camp are similar to Tadmur Prison in Syria and Bastil of France.
The report documents different types of inhumane treatment including starvation, and ban of access to hygiene, sunlight and ventilation.
The Houthis detain people in Al-Saleh detention camp for several purposes including punishment, forcible military recruitment, hostages for exchange of detainees with the war prisoners and financial extortion on detainees’ relatives,” the report said.
The report said that 51 private prisons exist throughout Taiz city.
The Houthis manage 29 prisons out of the total private detention facilities
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-37797
and also: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200211-yemen-houthis-hold-500-prisoners-in-southwest/
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/houthis-hold-500-prisoners-in-southwest-yemen-report/1731147
https://al-masdaronline.net/national/326
(* B P)
Grilling: Latest Houthi technique of torturing captives in Taiz
Khaled Al-Zabeedi is still "haunted by memories of reverse hanging and electric shocks at the hands of Houthis" when he was in their jail in the Red Sea port of Hodeidah in 2018.
Living in government-held Marib city now and pursuing therapeutic treatment for post-traumatic stress, the 41-year-old said he was for eight months "subjected to all methods of torture the Houthis knew about for my background as a teacher and a supporter of the (UN-recognized) government."
"They apply electric shocks to your penis, hang you in reverse from legs downwards, assault you and rape you. And if the charge against you amounts to high profile (peaceful) dissent, you should have no hope of freedom again," he says, tears glistening in his eyes.
Now the militia of Shia extremists seem to have introduced a torturing technique into their prisons: Grilling.
Safiya Hassan and Aneesa Saeed two women protesters in Taiz said their sons, recently released from Al-Saleh Jail run by the extremists, were subjected to "grilling on an open flame" on a continual basis for months. The two women were participating in a protest rally organized by the Association of Mothers of Abductees in Houthi jails. The rally was held in the government-held downtown Taiz on Thursday to protest abuses by the extremists encircling the city for six years.
The Association said in a press statement, "Prisoners are suspended over a rod with hands and legs firmly tied around it. Then they get exposed to on-and-off open fire."
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-37768
My remark: As described by a pro-Islah-Party news site.
(A P)
Over $7 billion approved for road projects in Saada during 2020: Minister
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3087201.htm
My remark: Apparently Yemeni rial (The sum would be about US $. 11 million.
(A K P)
Militias #Al-Houthi establish group wedding and stipulate heading to the fronts after spending honeymoon
At the expense of some businessmen and merchants, Houthi militias backed by Iran held a group wedding a few days ago in the Al-‘ud region, south of Ibb governorate, and stipulated that beneficiaries should go to the fronts after their honeymoon.
(A P)
Houthis kidnap local passengers in Ibb
The Houthis militia kidnapped a number of citizens in Ibb, central Yemen while on the road heading to Hadhramout, east Yemen looking for job opportunities.
The Houthis militants took the abductees to the Houthis-run Criminal-Investigation Prison, local sources said.
Ashraf Al-Mutwakel, the Houthis Mushref [supervisor] who was designated by his group as undersecretary of Ibb governorate, has instructed his militants to abduct the citizens.
The victims were on a truck in Al-Odain Roundabout
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-37739
(? B P)
Mimicking the mullahs: The Houthi model of government
Before the flare-up the conflict appeared to be winding down. The government and the rebels are mulling UN proposals to share power and allow the president, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to return from exile. Saudi Arabia has carried out fewer air strikes since October. It now seems less concerned with restoring the government-in-exile to the capital, Sana’a, than with reaching an agreement that safeguards its borders from Houthi attacks.
The Houthis (who prefer to call themselves Ansar Allah, or the Partisans of God) are “behaving like they’ve already won”, says an international official in Yemen.
Now they are consolidating their grip and establishing a state modelled on the theocracy in Iran, which arms them.
The rebels have preserved parliament and the army, but created a parallel tier of government which wields ultimate power. The Supreme Political Council runs day-to-day affairs and a new security force acts as the regime’s Praetorian guard. Mr Houthi has adopted the title of wali al-alam, which loosely translates as supreme leader.
Sana’a is changing under Houthi rule. The rebels have closed cafés where men and women once mixed. They have ordered private primary schools to segregate boys and girls (public ones already did). Austere fighters back from the front enforce the new rules. The city increasingly resembles Baghdad or parts of Beirut run by Hizbullah, say visitors. Huge billboards honouring “martyrs” loom over its thoroughfares. Schools have been infused with anti-Western thought. “The trajectory is towards a Zaydi version of the Taliban,” says Abdul-Ghani al-Iryani, a Yemeni analyst.
The Houthis say they are leading a Zaydi revival, but they are also changing the way Zaydism is practised, bringing it more in line with mainstream Shiism (you must register)
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/02/08/the-houthi-model-of-government
My comment: This is a quite biased article – the Houthi rule certainly adopts features from Iran, but is very different in many points.
cp6 Südjemen und Hadi-Regierung / Southern Yemen and Hadi-government
(A)
The 1st coffee shop "Singer Cafe" for both men and women opened in eastern #Yemen's #Marib today (photos)
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1226902327329787904
(* B P)
The report said that 51 private prisons exist throughout Taiz city.
The Houthis manage 29 prisons out of the total private detention facilities, the government forces run nine private prisons and other nine prisons are managed by forces affiliated to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the western coast.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-37797
(A P)
FM: STC’s obstruction to Al-Riyadh agreement will backfire
Mohammed Al-Hadhrami, Foreign Minister of the legitimate government warned against consequences to continuous obstruction to implementation of Al-Riyadh agreement by the Southern Transitional Council (STC), an armed separation group based in Aden,
The STC militants banned on Saturday government’s forces and Saudi military personnel from entering Aden, the interim base of the government.
Al-Hadhrami said that implementation of the Al-Riyadh agreement is a must and it is irreversible.
Al-Hadhrami voiced this during a meeting that he had with ambassadors of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to Yemen.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-37796
(* A K P)
Film: New batch of Saudi military vehicles to Aden
Yesterday a new batch of Saudi military vehicles arrived in various kinds gradually to the interim capital Aden in southern Yemen, this batch comes in conjunction with the announcement of the commander of Saudi forces, Brigadier General Mujahid Al -Otaibi who had announced that Saudi Arabia intends to support the battle fronts in implementation of the terms of the Riyadh agreement.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mNErMkgdzI8
(A P T)
Al-Qaeda Blows up House of Top Security Official in Abyan
Al-Qaeda terrorist organization blew up a house of a high-ranking official in the Security Belt Forces (SBF) on Sunday in Abyan governorate.
SBF reported that Al-Qaeda group, the armed wing of the Islah Party blew up the house of the commander of their rapid intervention forces, Jamal Lakmah al-Awlaki in al-Mahfed district of Abyan in the early hours of Sunday.
The same sources added that al-Awlaki's family, including women and children were injured in the explosion.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/18395
My comment: This is by a pro-separatist news site. The victim is no “security official”, but a local leader of the separatist “ Security Belt” militia, which is known by its human rights violations. – And Al Qaeda isn’t the “armed wing of Islah Party”, this claim is propaganda to blame the separatists greatest internal foe.
(A P)
SP demands UN peace mediator to quickly intervene to stop Houthi atrocities
Speaker of Yemen’s parliament Sultan al-Barakani demanded the UN peace mediator Martin Griffiths to quickly intervene to stop the Houthi atrocities in the country.
In a meeting with Griffiths here Sunday, al-Barakani recalled the recent Houthi atrocities in Nehm, Marib and Al-Jawf fronts
(A K P)
National Coalition deplores assassinations against Islah leaders
The National Coalition of Yemeni Political Parties condemned murders that target political figures and partisan leaders.
The government-held areas in south Yemen see systematic assassinations against members and leaders of the Islah party.
The murder of Abdulraqeeb Quzee, a leader of the Islah Party in Al-Dhala’ governorate last Thursday was the latest incident of scores of assassinations that targeted Islah’s leaders in Aden, Lahj, Al-Dhal’a and Hadhramout.
A statement by the National Coalition said that it rejects incitement campaigns against the Islah party.
It said that murder crimes against political figures target the political process and political parties in Yemen.
It called on the security services to pursue perpetrators and bring them to justice.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-37777
(A K P)
Yemeni parties urged to adhere to Riyadh Agreement
The commander of the Saudi-led coalition forces in Yemen has asked military and security bodies to help the coalition accelerate the implementation of security and military arrangements under the Riyadh Agreement, pledging to send military support to battlefields in southern Yemen.
At a meeting with commanders of military and security units in southern provinces on Saturday, Brig. Gen. Mujahid Al-Otaibi demanded that officers from the internationally recognized government and the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) comply with a Saudi-led military committee that was tasked to put into place security and military provisions of the agreement, local media said.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1625426/middle-east
(* A K P)
Government: STC attempts fresh fighting in South Yemen
The legitimate government of Yemen has accused the Southern Transitional Council (STC), an armed separation group based in Aden, of new attempts for military escalation in several southern governorates.
STC which led a military rebellion against the government in Aden early last August banned on Saturday government forces from entering Aden.
The government spokesman Rageh Badi said that the government forces were on their way to Lahj when the STC militants stopped the forces nearby Aden.
He explained that deployment of the government forces to Lahj is part of steps related to implementation of Al-Riyadh agreement.
STC militants opened fire at the government forces which were accompanied by Saudi military personnel, according to Badi.
Other STC militants in Al-Alam checkpoint on entrance to Aden, have also opened fire at the government forces and banned them from crossing into Lahj.
“The government forces were exposed to various forms of provocation by the STC militants in an attempt to bring about new fighting,” said Badi.
“However, the government forces exercised maximum restraint and had to go back,” he said.
STC militants received instructions from their leadership to ban the government’s forces from crossing into Aden, Badi said.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-37795
and
(* A K P)
STC’s elements prevent military units from crossing to Lahj
The spokesperson of the Government Rajeh Badi said “the so-called South Transitional Council (STC) has stopped a brigade from the national military troops while en route to Lahj governorate within the course of implementing the articles of Riyadh Agreement”.
In a statement to the Yemeni News Agency, Saba, Badi stated that elements of the STC in the area of al-Sheikh Salim intercepted a brigade of the Coastal Defense Forces accompanied by Saudi troops and opened fire on them, and there were other elements stopped the brigade once again following they arrived in al-Alam checkpoint eastern the interim capital Aden while moving to Lahj prevented them from crossing over by using gunfire.
Badi stated that the Government’s troops were subjected to provocative acts and besieged by the STC’s elements with the aim of triggering military confrontation but the government’s forces exercised utmost degree of restrain, they had to retreat and go back.
http://en.26sepnews.net/2020/02/09/stcs-elements-prevent-military-units-from-crossing-to-lahj/
and
(* A K P)
STC militants ban government’s forces from entering Aden
Militants of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), an armed separation group based in south Yemen, banned on Sunday government forces and other Saudi military personnel from entering Aden, the interim base of the legitimate government.
Military sources told Alsahwa Net that the STC militia in Al-Alam Checkpoint, nearby Aden, has banned the Saudi military personnel and the government forces of the Coat Defense Brigade from entering Aden.
The Saudi military personnel who were banned from entering Aden are members to the Al-Riyadh Implementation Committee which is tasked of supervising reorganizing local armed groups in Aden and redeployment of the government forces in the city.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-37778
(* A K P)
Saudi Arabia Fails to Bring Pro-Hadi Forces into Aden
The Saudi committee supervising the implementation of the so-called Riyadh Agreement failed to bring forces loyal to the resigned Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi to Aden after being prevented by the forces of the Transitional Council.
Forces loyal to Hadi withdrew from Al-Alm point in Aden to Shakra city in Abyan governorate after being prevented by the forces of the so-called Southern Transitional Council.
The deputy head of the Southern Transitional Council, Hani bin Brek, described the pro-Hadi forces as "terrorists", announcing his refusal to their return to Aden.
"Without talking too much, we will stand firmly and strongly against the return of any person classified as a terrorist in the south or by the Arab coalition or the international coalition against terrorism ," bin Brek said in his Twitter account.
https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=11142
(* A P)
Hadi minister accuses UAE of subverting Riyadh Agreement
Saleh al-Jabwani blames failure of deal between Hadi puppet government and southern separatists on UAE
The self-professed Minister of Transport in Hadi’s puppet government Saleh al-Jabwani has accused the UAE and the Southern Transitional Council loyal to it of foiling the so-called Riyadh Agreement.
“The UAE is the one who designed the agreement to strike the power centers of the legitimate government [term used to refer to the Hadi puppet government] in the core, especially in Aden,” the Turkish news agency Anatolia quoted al-Jabwani as saying on Thursday.
He pointed out that the agreement did not take into account the reality and did not find its way to implementation at all.
“So, we expressed our objection from the beginning, because the UAE mercenaries did not hand over any weapons, military vehicles, a tanks or cannon, and not a single soldier was moved from his camp.”
Al-Jabwani added, “The militias in Aden did not stop with this, rather they pushed their soldiers to areas of our forces in Abyan, and sent their gangs through UAE vehicles and soldiers to deliver weapons to their mercenaries in Shabwaj to fight our forces there.”
Al-Jabwani addressed a quesion to Saudi Arabia, asking:, “What are you going to do after the Riyadh agreement failure? Are you with Hadi’s legitimacy, or do the rebel coup gangs in Aden become a reality? ”
https://www.uprising.today/hadi-minister-accuses-uae-of-subverting-riyadh-agreement/
and
(* A P)
Yemeni official: UAE-backed groups torpedo Riyadh pact
Top official calls for government forces to crush in 'rebellion' in temporary capital Aden in southwestern Yemen
A top Yemeni official on Monday said the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and its militias in Aden undermined the agreement reached in Riyadh.
"It is the UAE and its militias [the forces of the Southern Transitional Council] in Aden that caused the failure of the Riyadh Agreement [...] We have said this over and over again," Transport Minister Saleh al-Jabwani said on Twitter.
"What happened yesterday to the National Army and Saudi officers along with soldiers in the Al-Alam region of Aden prove this failure," said al-Jabwani.
"We have no legitimacy other than ourselves to prepare to crush this rebellion in Aden by force and the first introduction to this position is the return of the prime minister to Riyadh," he asserted.
Neither the UAE nor the Southern Transitional Council (STC) commented on the minister's remarks.
On Sunday, two military sources told to Anadolu Agency that a coastal defense firm accompanied by Saudi forces attempted to enter Aden to implement the Riyadh Agreement, but that UAE-backed STC forces stopped them, and forced them to return to the coastal region of Shakra in Abyan.
Both sources said that government forces avoided engagement with the gunmen and returned towards the coast.
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemeni-official-uae-backed-groups-torpedo-riyadh-pact/1729423
(A P)
After threatening to crush mothers of abductees in Aden, Saudi officer vows to investigate fate of their children
The Association of Mothers of Abductees has been holding vigils every week to demand information about the whereabouts of the forcibly disappeared
An officer in the Saudi-led coalition announced on Thursday the formation of a committee to investigate the fate of forcibly disappeared prisoners in the southern port city of Aden, a day after threatening to crush a vigil by the Association of Mothers of Abductees in front of the coalition headquarters in Aden.
At a meeting at coalition headquarters on Feb. 6, the Saudi officer, known by the nickname Abu Sultan, urged all security, military, and prison officials in attendance to listen to the mothers’ requests for information about their abducted sons, according to a statement issued by the association.
Some of the mothers at the meeting spoke in detail about their missing sons and mentioned the authorities responsible for their disappearance.
https://al-masdaronline.net/national/319
and also https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-37761
(A P)
[Hadi gov.] Sana’a Governor inspects army troops in Nihm front
http://en.26sepnews.net/2020/02/09/sanaa-governor-inspects-army-troops-in-nihm-front/
My comment: One more of these “lackland” governors both Yemeni governments have.
(A P)
Support and backup command denies rumors of transferring [separatist militia] security belt forces to ” Rescue Police”
The Support and backup Command denied the news circulated on some websites about the issuance by the Arab Coalition Command in Aden of instructions to dismantle the security belt forces in Aden and turn them into the police patrol of “former Emergency Help”
Support and backup Command said in a statement issued through the media department, which said: “We have seen suspicious news websites that work for anti-south agendas seeking to thwart the Riyadh agreement, news of (dismantling the security belt in the capital of Aden and turning it into Rescue Police) and thus the Support and backup Command clarifies that these claims are untrue and baseless.
My comment: Of course, the separatists want to keep their militia, and of course they want them to stay under their own command, and of course they want them to continue dominating the streets of Aden:
(A P)
Film: Security belt forces continue security campaign in Aden
The security belt forces in the capital of Aden have resumed security campaigns to seize unnumbered cars and motorcycles that are used to carry out assassinations and crimes in Aden, and the security campaign that was launched late last year met with popular satisfaction in the city of Aden after achieving its most important goals in reducing assassinations and crimes.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C0E6Q8UMOw0
My comment: This is a propaganda film in favor of the separatist militia, which is known for its human rights violations. According to the Riyadh agreement, such militia no more should play the role of police at Aden, but should leave the city. – And a joke: The greatest part of these assassinations had been committed by mercenaries – which had been commissioned by the Security Belt’s puppet masters in the UAE.
(A P)
[Separatist leader] Shatara: No alternative to the implementation of Riyadh agreement
http://en.adenpress.news/news/18389
My comment: Which requires that the separatist militia leave Aden, but they play “policemen” there and get made a nice propaganda film.
(A K P)
Al-Jaadi: Islah shows hostility towards anti-Houthi forces
Member of the presidency of the Southern Transitional Council, Fadl al-Jaadi said that the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islah Party showed enmity to all the forces that defeated the pro-Iran Houthi militias.
Al-Jaadi wrote on his official Twitter account that "the Islah Party accused the STC of betrayal in the South, it accused the Abu Al-Abas forces and the 35 brigade of betrayal in Taiz and it did the same to the Al-Amalika brigades and the forces under the command of Tareq on the West Coast."
He added that "Islah party enormously exerted pressure in a bid to get the United Arab Emirates out of the battlefield."
http://en.adenpress.news/news/18381
(A K P)
Yemeni commanders visit Saudi Arabia to discuss faltering Riyadh Agreement
The unannounced visit of Yemeni military leaders from Abyan governorate sought to address the failures of the agreement
The Yemeni commanders informed the Saudis that their forces had already withdrawn from the coastal town of Shaqra in Abyan governorate, but the STC forces stationed on the outskirts of Abyan’s capital Zinjibar have not yet withdrawn, the official said.
https://al-masdaronline.net/national/318
(A K P)
Presidential Protection Brigade trucks, ambulances reach Abyan’s Shaqra en route to Aden
The equipment will likely support forces stationed at Al Ma’ashiq presidential palace as part of the Riyadh agreement
https://al-masdaronline.net/national/315
(A P)
Students of the Higher Institute of the Judiciary in #Aden hold a protest to demand to be paid what they are owed. (photo)
https://twitter.com/BelqeesRights/status/1225546595397226501
(A P)
Teachers’ Syndicate: the strike continues and state officials reject decisions of the Prime Minister
The head of the Southern Teachers and Educators Syndicate, the official spokesman for the General Union of Southern Workers Syndicates, “Hussein Al-Jadani,” affirmed the continuation of the strike in schools until all the rights and demands are met
(A T)
A citizen was killed and a child was wounded in Wadi Hadramout
The sources said that gunmen opened fire on a citizen
https://en.smanews.org/a-citizen-was-killed-and-a-child-was-wounded-in-wadi-hadramout
(* A K P)
STC drives Islah from more areas in Shabwah province
Southern separatists advance against Ikhwan militias
The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council ( STC) militias have on Sunday taken control of the local market in Shabwah province, south-eastern Yemen, military sources said.
According to military sources in the province, the militias of the Shabwah Elite, loyal to the UAE, took control of al-Arm market in Haban district, after a violent attack targeting Islah militants in the directorate.
The sources added that the Islah militants fled in the face of the surprise attack.
The sources said the attack left a number of dead and wounded, including Bashir Mohammed al-Qamishi, a field commander in the Shabwah Elite militias of the STC.
https://www.uprising.today/stc-takes-drives-islah-from-areas-in-shabwah-province/
and
(* A K P)
Fierce clashes between southern resistance and Brotherhood militias after raids on homes of citizens in Shabwa
Violent clashes took place between the southern resistance and tribesmen, and the Brotherhood’s militia on Sunday, in Al-Aram
Local sources said that the armed Muslim Brotherhood militants with armored vehicles stormed the Laqmoosh area, an administrative branch of Habban district, and break into some houses.
As the Brotherhood militia kidnapped two children of Sheikh Abdullah Mahdi al-Marem al-Qumishi, from his resident, during its raid, which led to the outbreak of clashes between the militia and the Southern Resistance in Al-Aram region
and also https://en.smanews.org/brotherhood-militia-kidnaps-two-sons-of-a-tribal-sheikh-in-shabwa
and
(A K P)
The southern resistance launches attack on a military barrack for Muslim Brotherhood in Shabwa
A senior source of the Southern Resistance in Shabwa said that the heroes of the Southern Resistance Forces at eight and three in the evening carried out an attack on the Al-Aram Center in Habban district in which the so-called Special Security Forces of the Brotherhood’s Islah Militia are stationed, using various light and medium weapons and rocket-propelled grenades
(A T)
Unknown gunmen murder Islah’s leader in Al-Dahala’
Anonymous gunmen murdered on Thursday’s morning Abdulraqeeb Qazee, one of the Islah’s leaders in Al-Dhala’ governorate, north Aden, south Yemen.
The anonymous armed men who were on a motorbike, shot Qazee dead while in front of the University of Science and Technology in Al-Dhala’ city.
Qazee was also the former director of the Chamber of Commerce in Al-Dhala’ city.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-37738
and also https://al-masdaronline.net/local/313
(* A P)
Socotra: Saudi commander oversees dismissal of UAE-backed coast guard defectors
The rebel battalion's position could be restored if ongoing mediation between Socotra’s local authority and the insurgents fails
Yemeni army officials on the island of Socotra dismissed coast guard battalion insurgents at a military meeting on Tuesday, as a preliminary measure against a group of army defectors from the 1st Marine Brigade.
In the presence of a Saudi coalition commander, Yemeni military leaders dismissed the coast guard batallion’s defecting commander, staff and its assistant, according to a statement by the 1st Marine Brigade. The brigade noted that the rebel battalion's position could be restored if mediation between Socotra’s local authority and the insurgents fails by Saturday.
The statement accused the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and its president in Socotra, Yahya Mubarak, of supporting an insurgency and demanded punishment of the rebels.
Meanwhile, Socotra’s highest tribal leader Sheikh Issa Bin Yakut denounced the coast guard battalion’s actions, saying these developments are "spreading chaos and creating division" and called on the official authorities to do their part.
The battalion announced its allegiance to the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council on Monday.
In a statement, Bin Yakut said the insurgents were acting like an alternative state, accusing them of storming the island’s central qat market and targeting individuals originally from northern governorates. Almasdar Online could not independently verify these claims.
https://al-masdaronline.net/national/312
and what the separatists make of this:
(A P)
Socotra rejects Islah's terrorist acts
Hundreds of people took to the streets of Mori area in Socotra governorate on Saturday, in protest against the provocative move made by Islah-linked troops in the island with the view to intimidating the inhabitants.
The demonstration displayed the people's anger and their resentment toward using live bullets and heavy weapons to deliberately terrorize the inhabitants of Socotra.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/18392
My remark: “Socotra” in the headline just are the separatists’ supporters – whom they called out for such a rally. More on the separatist rebellion against the government on Socotra, look a t Yemen War Mosaic 622b, cp6. As they got promised higher payment, this happened: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/2/8/socotra-coast-guard-battalion-defects-to-uae-backed-southern-separatists
(A P)
Rights group: 156 abductees brutally tortured in Taiz
Association of Abductees’ Mothers said as many as 156 abductees are being subject to cruel torture committed by the Iran-aligned insurgents in Houthi-controlled Al Howban district, north Taiz governate.
During a sit-in staged in front of the governate office, located inside the besieged city of Taiz, the association asserted in a statement that 156 abductees are held in what used to be known as Al Saleh Residential Zone and endure severe physical and psychological torment, citing some abductees who have been recently released whom the association met with.
https://republicanyemen.net/archives/22903
and also https://twitter.com/YemeniFatima/status/1225425943306567682
(A P)
The Southerners Want Their State
Southern activists and journalists take to the social media to launch a hashtag campaign under the title # The Southerners Want Their State with a view to confirming that the people of the South adhere to the restoration of their full sovereign state.
According to the organizers, the hashtag also meant to reveal how treacherous is the Yemeni legitimacy under the control of the Islah Party, Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood, in particular with regard to the Riyadh Agreement which was signed last year on 5 Nov. 2019.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/18376
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp7 – cp18
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-623b-yemen-war-mosaic-623b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-622-yemen-war-mosaic-622
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-622 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-622:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
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