... 6 Jahre Huthi-Herrschaft in Sanaa – Wer braucht Freunde mit Feinden wie diesen? – Jemens wirtschaftliche Probleme wegen Covid-19 – Kinderehen im Jemen nehmen zu – Jemens Bewässerungssystem, ein Opfer des Krieges – Kampf von Frauen für Menschenrechte in Saudi Arabien – und mehr
October 25, 2020: Civilian impact of war in Q3 2020 – Jemen in September 2020 – The battle for Marib – The international approach to the Yemen War – 6 years of Houthi rule at Sanaa – With enemies like these, who needs friends? – Yemen’s economic problems due to Covid-19 – Child marriage raise as families struggle to cope in Yemen – Yemen’s irrigation system a victim of war – Women struggling for Human rights in Saudi Arabia (in German) – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-689b-yemen-war-mosaic-689b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavitrus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
cp1b Am wichtigsten: Großer Gefangenenaustausch / Most important: Great prisoner swap
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp11 Deutschland / Germany
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp12a Katar-Krise / Qatar crisis
cp12b Sudan
cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade
cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage
cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy
cp15 Propaganda
cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
cp19 Sonstiges / Other
Klassifizierung / Classification
***
**
*
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:
Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-einfuehrende-artikel-u-ueberblicke
Neue Artikel / new articles
(* B H K)
Devastated Yemen
The main theatre of conflict in Yemen however, remains between the Saudi coalition forces and Houthis in the North. Saudis share more than one thousand and three hundred kilometres of contentious border with the north of the country, and consider the Houthi as a permanent threat to their territorial borderlands, accusing Iran of providing weapons to their adversary.
Ever since the civil war started, according to the United Nations estimation, 80 percent of Yemen’s population is suffering from hunger and disease; 8.17 million is deprived of clean water, while more than 2 million children are suffering from food shortages. 70 percent of Yemenis need immediate assistance. A country which is already a recipient of different diseases is further facing grave challenges, after the outbreak of Covid-19. The humanitarian crises severely aggravate the velocity of ongoing deadly attacks from the warring parties.
The unfortunate part of this human suffering is that as the world watches the poorest Muslim Arab country is under a constant onslaught, with vengeance by its rich /Arab Muslim neighbours
https://nation.com.pk/23-Oct-2020/devastated-yemen
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
(** B K)
Civilian Impact Monitoring Project: Quarterly Report - Q3: July - September 2020
This is the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project quarterly report, providing an overview of all incidents of armed violence reported in July, August and September 2020 across the country that had a direct civilian impact. The report covers civilian casualties, incident distribution, type of armed violence and impact upon civilian infrastructure, as well as providing key analytical takeaways from the quarter.
ANALYTICAL HIGHLIGHTS
28% more civilians were killed by armed violence in Q3 2020 than in Q2 2020
Across the country, the number of incidents of armed violence reported to have directly impacted on civilians decreased from the previous quarter. However, the number of civilian casualties reported during Q3 2020 increased to 527, up 11% from Q2 2020, and the highest since Q3 2019. There were several factors responsible for the uptick in civilian casualties. The most significant increases were seen in Jawf, which saw a more than sixfold increase from Q2, driven by a high casualty count (52) from airstrikes, and in Ma’rib and Bayda, which together saw a 78% increase in civilian casualties, in line with the escalation in hostilities seen in southern Ma’rib along the border with Bayda and the accompanying uptick in airstrikes. By type of armed violence, the increase in civilian casualties can largely be attributed to airstrikes, sniper fire and UXO. Furthermore, the number of civilian fatalities saw a proportionately higher increase, up 28% to 215 in Q3, from 168 during Q2, and the highest toll reported since Q3 2019.
The number of civilian casualties caused by airstrikes doubled in Q3 2020
Twice as many civilians were killed and injured by airstrikes during Q3 than during Q2, up to 94 from 47. Having seen no civilian casualties on account of airstrikes during Q2, airstrikes resulted in 52 civilian casualties in Jawf during Q3; more than all other governorates combined. The high number was largely driven by two mass casualty incidents. On 15 July, 24 civilians were killed, including 6 children and 2 women, and 7 civilians were injured, including 5 children and 2 women, when airstrikes hit a house during a celebratory occasion in Al-Maraziq area in Khabb wa ash Sha’af district. Three weeks later, on 6 August, 9 children were killed and 12 civilians were injured, including 7 children and 4 women, when airstrikes hit 3 civilian vehicles in Al-Maatarah area in Khabb wa ash Shaaf. The civilians were reportedly hit while travelling to Eid festivities. A mass casualty airstrike incident was also reported in Hajjah on 12 July; 7 children and 2 women were killed and 2 children and 2 women were injured when airstrikes hit a house in Bayt Al-Qutayb in Washhah district.
Child casualties increased during Q3, particularly on account of airstrikes
135 child casualties were reported as a result of armed violence during Q3, 53 of whom were fatalities. This is a 61% increase in child fatalities on account of armed violence compared to Q2, when 33 children were killed by armed violence. Notably, five times as many children were killed or injured by airstrikes during Q3 than during Q2, up to 45 from 9. More children were killed or injured by airstrikes than by any other type of armed violence over the past three months. Conversely, the number of reported women casualties saw a decrease, dropping by 14% from 90 to 77, of whom 32 died. Despite the overall decrease, more than twice as many women (18) were killed or injured by airstrikes during Q3 than during Q2. This is also the highest number of women to be harmed by airstrikes in one quarter since Q2 2019. Resultantly, two thirds (63) of the 94 airstrike casualties in Q3 were women and children, an increase from Q2, when one third (16) of the 47 civilian casualties reported from airstrikes were women and children. The high casualty toll among women in Q2 was driven in large part by a shelling incident on the women’s section of Ta’izz Central Prison in Al-Mudhaffar, in which 8 women were killed and at least 26 injured.
Shelling continues to result in the most civilian casualties (one in three) in Q3 2020
Despite airstrikes causing more civilian casualties in Q3 than in Q2, for the eighth consecutive quarter shelling remained responsible for more civilian casualties across the country than any other type of armed violence, resulting in 172 civilian casualties; roughly a third (32%) of the total. Shelling was also responsible for almost half (204) of all 431 civilian impact incidents reported during Q3. The 172 civilian casualties it caused, however, marks a small decrease compared to the previous quarter, when shelling resulted in 185 civilian casualties. This is the eighth consecutive quarter to have seen this downward trend. It is also the third consecutive quarter to see a decrease in the proportion of casualties on account of shellfire, down from 38% in Q2 2020, 39% in Q1 2020, and 49% in Q4 2019. Moreover, half as many children were harmed by shellfire in Q3 2020 than in Q2 2020; 29, down from 60. The same was true for women; 57% fewer were harmed by shellfire in Q3 than Q2, down from 65 to 25. The decrease is likely largely on account of frontlines shifting away from residential areas: 27% fewer houses (765) were hit by shelling in Q3 than during Q2 (1,049), with the reduction most notable
(** B H K P)
Battle for Marib – The Yemen Review, September 2020
Contents
Commentary: With Enemies Like These, Who Needs Friends?
UN Envoy Warns Marib’s Fall to Houthis Would Undercut Political Process
Commentary: Marib’s Tribes Hold the Line Against Houthi Assault
The South: Casualties in Lahj, Al-Dhalea; Houthis Focus on Al-Jamajem Mountains
Hudaydah City Fighting Draws Yemeni Government Ire; Coalition Infighting Eases in Taiz
Abyan: Coalition Infighting Flares with No Advances
Warring Parties Agree to Prisoner Swap
Hadi, in Speech to UN, Blames Houthi ‘Arrogance’ for Failed Peace Efforts
New STC-affiliated Aden Governor Makes Slew of District Appointments
Continued Rial Collapse in Aden Spurs Central Bank Intervention.
Hadramawt Governor Threatens Suspension of Crude Oil Exports
Sabafon Moves its Headquarters to Aden
Humanitarian and Human Rights Developments
UN Pushes Donors, Warns of Famine with Yemen Relief Effort Less Than ⅓ Funded
In Focus: ‘A Pandemic of Impunity’: UN Eminent Experts Report on Yemen
UN Urges Houthis to Reopen Sana’a Airport to Humanitarian Flights
Video-taped Murder Prompts Outrage
New School Year Begins in Yemen
Lack of Data Obscures COVID-19 Case Numbers, Polio Reemerges
Q&A with Jonathan Allen, UK Chargé d’Affaires to the UN
Developments in the United States
Congress Investigates Weapons Sales Procedure
Washington Calls on Houthis to Halt Marib Assault, Mulls Terrorist Designation
Iran Acknowledges Sharing Arms Expertise with Houthi Movement
Other International Developments in Brief
The Battle for Marib: Houthis Gain on Key Fronts
The battle for Marib governorate, a Yemeni government stronghold for most of the war, dominated attention in Yemen during September, with Houthi forces seizing territory in several areas, particularly in the northwest and south. Yemeni government-allied tribes, especially the Murad and Bani Abd, struggled to slow the Houthi advances, which highlighted the weakness of the Yemeni government armed forces.
After taking full control of Mahliyah district in southern Marib in early September, the Houthis pressed north into Rahabah district, attacking Yemeni government forces and allied tribes in the Al-Sadirah area that lies between Mahliyah and Rahabah. The clashes led to few gains for the Houthis until a September 7 agreement between the Houthis and tribal sheikhs from the Qaradi’ah and Al-Jameel tribes, which are part of the Murad tribal confederation, ceded Rahabah district to Houthi control.
This rapid takeover of Rahabah, after a slower campaign in Mahliyah, led to questions about how much longer pro-Yemeni government Marib tribes would be able to hold out against a sustained Houthi offensive. Adding to those fears, local sources said that the Rahabah deal was the result of tribal frustration at a perceived lack of support from the Yemeni government. Following the takeover of Rahabah, clashes moved to the mountainous Jabal Murad and Al-Jubah districts, the tribal heartland of the Murad tribe. Yemeni government and allied tribal forces have gathered at the border of the latter two districts with Rahabah, stopping the Houthi advance, at least temporarily.
Along with its advances in the south, the Houthis inched closer to Marib city from the northwest, taking control of Al-Sufayraa area in northwestern Marib’s Madghel district on September 20. That placed the fighting in the vicinity of Maas base, the headquarters for the 7th Military District, approximately 57 kilometers from Marib city. The Houthis had taken control of all the villages in Madghel by mid-September, leaving Yemeni government forces holed up in Maas base and its environs in the northwest of the district. On September 9, 12, and 25, Houthi forces fired ballistic missiles on Marib city, hitting civilian and military locations. There were no reports of casualties, although the September 25 attack targeted a school where officials were scheduled to attend an event marking the anniversary of the 1962 revolution that ended the Yemeni imamate in North Yemen.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/11678
(** B P)
Made in Marib: A Local Response to Instability and Violence
The international community’s go-to response to instability, conflict and violent extremism in fragile states is almost exclusively hard power, military approaches.[1] Often, these responses are undertaken without taking into account local drivers of conflict and violence.[2] In parallel, there are always efforts by local communities that attempt to address factors that lead people to violence, built on deep-set knowledge of local conditions.[3] Unfortunately, these efforts are almost always undercut, bypassed or contradicted by international efforts “which often end up undermining peace and security”.[4] Instead of mounting military responses independently from local efforts, the international community would benefit from addressing local drivers of violence[5] by supporting, building onto and learning from community responses.[6] Only then will it be able to effectively stop existing (and prevent future) violence,[7] which provides an avenue to building sustainable stability and security.
Changing the international community’s response to conflict is particularly important because it fails to be successful even according to its own objectives of combating armed groups.
This briefing will discuss how community leaders in Marib have addressed local drivers of instability and violence with significant success. First, it will give a brief introduction to Al-Qaeda’s evolution in Yemen, followed by a swift analysis of the effects of the international security approach on the community. Thereafter, drawing on comprehensive field research, it will examine how Maribi leaders, aided by widespread community support, developed a local security response that not only improved the province’s security, but also drove economic growth.
The briefing is based on research conducted during a field trip to Marib, Yemen, in July 2018, and draws on interviews with five dozen people. In order to capture the experiences of a cross-section of society, interviewees included local government and security officials, Yemeni and Saudi military officials, civil servants (including women at Marib’s Department for Women’s Affairs), journalists, shopkeepers, aid workers and civil society members. During the trip I met dozens of people who had lost loved ones in drone strikes or had themselves survived strikes. Many regularly experienced drones flying above their homes. I also visited a family that had been the target of a US and Emirati special forces raid. They explained that drones fly overhead daily. The day of my visit was no exception.
The effects of the traditional, international military response to insecurity and violent extremism
For more than 15 years, Yemen has been a central battlefield in the U.S.-led war on terror.[19] The U.S. strategy appears to have been broadly the same there as in Pakistan and Somalia, namely to take out terrorist leaders (but also lower level members) through remote methods of war, primarily via drone strikes, but also through Special Forces raids.[20] Whereas some drone strikes have done just that, others have targeted AQAO foot soldiers and even people who have only been alleged of being foot soldiers. Strikes have resulted in the killing of many civilians, disruption and destruction of property, essential infrastructure and livestock.[21] The strategy has also subjected local populations to widespread and constant fear of being targeted.[22]
In Marib, one mother told me that every time the village children hear a drone, they run home from school, with her child yelling “the Americans are coming to kill us!” Then, the village’s 1900 inhabitants will get in their cars and evacuate into the desert.[23] In tribal areas, the killing of civilians has caused “deep anger…towards the Yemeni and United States governments” which, in turn, is exploited by AQAP.[24]
Over the years, the U.S.’ intelligence and targeting process has been widely criticised, with civil society investigations revealing its underreporting of civilian casualties.[25] In Marib, the US counterterrorism strategy has been denounced and its success questioned, with the strategy failing to reduce the number of local terrorist attacks.[26]
The ‘Marib Model’
Over the years, Marib’s local government has developed its own strategy to counter AQAP and provide security and stability for the province’s population. I call the region’s approach to security, stability and economic growth the ‘Marib Model.’ This strategy is a) driven by well-respected and capable leaders, b) empowered by national decentralisation, providing Marib with an unprecedented level of provincial autonomy and financial independence, and has c) enabled the development of an effective and accountable security force; cross-community trust-building and consensus-driven decision-making (which in turn has built community support) and financial investment in the local economy.
Contrary to the U.S. response, the aim and focus of local efforts extended beyond AQAP and addressed the root causes of the province’s insecurity and the drivers of extremist recruiting. This stretched from addressing the governance and security vacuum that in the past left Marib’s population vulnerable to AQAP attacks. Moreover, without access to state protection or justice, socio-economic grievances – including those based on poverty, isolation and unemployment – are often taken advantage of and used as recruitment tools by AQAP. The Marib Model has had far-reaching knock-on effects, driving economic growth and development, and creating employment and educational opportunities.
Whereas the first steps toward developing a coherent and effective strategy started in 2002, when Marib’s tribal and political leaders came together and publicly and unequivocally stated their opposition to AQAP,[33] it was not until 2015 that the local strategy would get teeth. In 2012, Sheik Sultan al-Aradah was appointed Governor of Marib by Yemen’s transitional President, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Al-Aradah’s grounding within Marib’s tribal system, experience resolving tribal disputes, deep knowledge of, and commitment to, the province and military skills – seen in his role in the liberation of Marib from the Houthis in 2015 – gave him local legitimacy.[34]
The local community’s trust in its leadership has been the “backbone” of Marib’s successful development.[35] – by Camilla Molyneux
https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/made-in-marib-a-local-response-to-instability-and-violence
(** B K P)
Marib: A Yemeni Government Stronghold Increasingly Vulnerable to Houthi Advances
Executive Summary
Marib, a centrally-located governorate connecting Al-Bayda, Shabwa, Hadramawt, Al-Jawf and Sana’a, has undergone a drastic transformation since the war started in 2015, emerging as a booming economic, social, political and military center. Natural resources including irrigation from the Marib dam and oil and gas reserves were instrumental in building a bustling metropolis in Marib city over a short period. But it was the autonomy afforded by decentralization under Governor Sultan al-Aradah that harnessed those resources for local development. Obtaining its share of the national gas and oil revenues, for example, has helped fund the improvement of infrastructure, pay civil servants’ salaries and build government institutions. Though hardly insulated from the war, Marib has become a haven for displaced people and the last stronghold of the central government in northern Yemen. Its relative stability and success, however, have been threatened by escalating fighting in the governorate, with Houthi forces relentlessly seeking its takeover since the beginning of 2020.
This paper adds color to the monochromatic narrative that has developed around Marib in recent decades by highlighting its rich history, complex social fabric and important role in the national economy. Against this backdrop, the paper examines the factors that have contributed to Marib’s emergence as a pocket of relative stability since the outbreak of civil war in 2015, details the latest attempts by Houthi fighters to capture the governorate and illustrates what is at stake if a Houthi takeover of Marib comes to pass.
from Introduction
Long marginalized by the central government in Sana’a, Marib has emerged as a key governorate in Yemen’s shifting balance of power during the ongoing conflict. Oil and gas is by far the highest-value industry in the governorate, though the largest sources of livelihood and employment are agriculture, animal husbandry and beekeeping.[5] More recently, hotels, restaurants, construction companies and other types of commerce associated with Marib city’s urban expansion have grown the economy. Despite more than 30 years of oil production in Marib, the governorate has received only a fraction of the wealth derived from its fossil fuel resources. The central government in Sana’a long had full control of revenues from the lucrative industry. In 2015, after Houthi de facto authorities took control of the central bank in Sana’a, the bank’s Marib branch stopped transferring any revenues, only later renegotiating terms for doing so with the substantially weakened, now Aden-based central authorities. In late 2016, Marib formally secured a 20 percent share of the revenues generated from the governorate’s oil and gas resources, which has fueled the expansion of the capital and the provision of public services for its populace.[6]
Marib’s indigenous population has a strong tribal identity that has been a large factor in regulating society in the absence of an effective state. There are five main tribal groupings in the governorate: Abidah, Murad, Al-Jadaan, Bani Jabr and Bani Abd. The Abidah tribe has the largest geographical footprint in Marib, staking claim to all of Marib al-Wadi district, which covers the entire eastern half of the governorate. Abidah’s territory encompasses most of the governorate’s oil and gas fields and infrastructure,[7] as well as important heritage sites and a Saudi military base. Marib’s governor, Sultan al-Aradah, hails from the Abidah tribe.
Murad, which is the largest tribe in terms of numbers, has the second-largest geographical reach, predominantly located in five districts in southwest Marib: Rahabah, Al-Jubah, Jabal Murad, Mahliyah and Harib. Murad tribesmen also have a strong presence in government and military leadership. The Jahm tribe, a sub-tribe of Bani Jabr, is concentrated in Marib’s western Serwah district, where heavy fighting between the government and the Houthis has taken place off and on since the start of the war, especially in recent months. Yemen’s main oil pipeline travels through Jahm’s territory in Marib to the Ras Isa oil terminal on the Red Sea. Bani Jabr tribesmen are also located in neighboring Bidbedah and Harib al-Qaramish districts. Al-Jadaan’s tribal territory stretches across three districts in northwest Marib – Majzar, Madghel and Raghwan – which have become active battlefronts since early 2020 when the Houthis seized Nehm district of Sana’a governorate as well as Al-Hazm, the capital of Al-Jawf, and pushed toward Marib. The Bani Abd tribe, located in Marib’s southern Al-Abdiyah district on the border of Al-Bayda and Shabwa governorates, has clashed with Houthi forces since June.
Most of Marib’s tribes follow the Shafei branch of Sunni Islam, except for the Bani Jabr tribe and its Jahm subtribe, which are Zaidi. Since 2015, the tribe has been divided among supporters and opponents of Houthis, who also are Zaidi, as some tribal leaders, most notably Mubarak al-Mashan al-Zaidi, have aligned with the Houthis.
In addition to Marib’s tribes, the Al-Ashraf group[8] represents another important population in the governorate. Composed of a network of families with the surname Al-Sharif, they identify as Hashemites, or descendants of the Muslim prophet Mohammed. Their presence is concentrated in Marib city, as well as in some parts of Harib and Majzar districts.
While Marib’s native residents are not free from rivalries, they have generally put aside their differences and closed ranks to defend the governorate against Houthi incursions – By Ali Al-Sakani and Casey Coombs
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11778
(** B K P)
THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE YEMEN WAR: TIME FOR A CHANGE?
The international community has mediated in the Yemen war since its outbreak. Although the efforts have yielded some results, none have resulted in a lasting de-escalation of violence and real progress on finding political solutions. Here is why the international approach has failed and what could change to make the international approach to Yemen more effective.
Almost two years on from the Stockholm Agreement, the fleeting opportunity it presented to end the civil war appears to have been squandered. Instead, a major escalation is currently underway. In addition, the international policy approach towards its resolution is “handcuffed” to a two-party framework that may no longer make sense and that thus far has done little to mitigate two of the core factors on the ground that continue to prevent a resolution to the conflict: Houthi empowerment and government fragmentation. To make diplomatic progress and to end the conflict, the overall approach to mediation may need to change. In particular, talks could be expanded to include more of the Yemeni parties, and international policy makers may need to coordinate more closely and establish a clear division of labor to ensure progress.
ON THE ROAD TO SWEDEN: SAUDI INTERVENTION AND RESOLUTION 2216
A Houthi offensive against Aden that month proved a step too far for neighboring Saudi Arabia, which at Hadi’s request launched a military intervention, on March 26, 2015. A month later, Riyadh made a successful push for UN Security Council Resolution 2216, ostensibly affirming Hadi as Yemen’s legitimate president and imposing an international arms embargo on the Houthis, which Saudi officials then used to justify the effective blockade of Houthi-controlled ports.
The vote on the resolution—14-0, with Russia abstaining—reflected the Western powers’ general position on Yemen. They viewed Hadi as the legitimate leader and the Houthi takeover, which the Houthis’ call their “revolution,” an Iran-backed coup. U.S. policy makers in particular had in addition felt the need to show their support for Saudi Arabia amidst a very public debate over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, i.e., the Iran nuclear deal.
Negotiations over the nuclear deal, eventually signed in July 2015, had caused consternation and upset among some of the Gulf states, where officials believed it would provide Tehran with a pathway to normalized relations with the West without curbing its regional ambitions. Support for the Saudi intervention in Yemen, in the form of intelligence sharing and arms supplies as well as political cover, was partly shaped by a desire to assuage Saudi fears. Resolution 2216 was one-sided, effectively demanding the complete Houthi surrender that Riyadh had sought and claimed it could achieve. The conflict descended instead into a quagmire necessitating a mediated solution based on a balanced compromise between the parties.
DETOUR TO ISTANBUL: SALEH, HODEIDAH, AND KHASHOGGI
TOWARDS A COURSE CORRECTION? CURRENT INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
Facts on the ground in Yemen have shifted further since 2018.
Citing the threat posed by COVID-19, since early 2020 Griffiths has sought to broker a nationwide cease-fire and bring the Houthis and the government back to the table for talks, but to little avail. The Houthis sense that victory is near in Marib while the government has balked at the Houthis’ terms for a truce—reopening Sana’a airport, easing restrictions on imports to Hodeidah, and instituting a new joint mechanism to pay state salaries nationwide (the government says it does not object to any one of these measures in principle, but instead to the way they have been presented by the UN thus far). The Houthis’ confidence stems from the anti-Houthi groups’ collapsing unity and sinking morale and international policy makers’ increasing exasperation with the Hadi government.
A WAY FORWARD
Diplomats working on the Yemen file are vexed by the intransigence of the parties, frustrated by the Hadi government’s shrinking credibility, and hindered by the lack of tools at their disposal to hurry them all along, the Houthis in particular, towards a political settlement. Whereas in 2018 military aggression could be tempered by Western appeals to UAE and Saudi policy makers, there is no easy way for diplomats to coerce or persuade the Houthis to halt their Marib campaign, other than the economic concessions that the government has thus far rejected. A mediated settlement in Yemen is not impossible, but ending the conflict may require a new approach.
Consensus is growing in some diplomatic circles that the accepted framework no longer reflects the realities on the ground and may not be able to end the war and build peace.
Even if the Houthis and Hadi were to reach an agreement, it is not clear that the full range of armed and political groups that hold areas of Yemen outside of Houthi-controlled territory would support its implementation.
International efforts to end the war have also been too fragmented. If the UN envoy adopts a new approach, and indeed even if he does not, he could seek U.S. assistance in forming a new international contact group to support his effort – by Peter Salisbury
https://www.yemenpolicy.org/the-international-approach-to-the-yemen-war-time-for-a-change/ = https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/international-approach-yemen-war-time-change
(** B P)
Six Years of Houthi Rule in Sana’a
When the armed Houthi movement, Ansar Allah, took over Sana’a on September 21, 2014, it was almost inconceivable that they would still be holding the Yemeni capital six years on. Look ahead to six years from today, however, and current trajectories seem to foreshadow the group and its leaders being only further entrenched in power at the head of a state they are dramatically recrafting in their image. The increasing likelihood of that possible future should alarm most Yemenis, regional leaders and the international community alike.
The Houthis exemplify the dynamic of the oppressed becoming the oppressors.
In 2014, however, Houthi leaders managed to cultivate a populist veneer with which to ride into the capital. The Arab Spring-inspired Yemeni uprising had led to Saleh being replaced in 2012 by his deputy, Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who quickly spoiled the general good will accompanying his rise to the presidency through mismanagement and corruption. Houthi promises to fight corruption and reinstate a fuel subsidy Hadi had clumsily revoked, causing prices to spike, earned the group a degree of welcome when it entered the capital in September 2014. That the Houthis had by then entered into an alliance with Saleh also added a layer of popular cover for their subsequent coup d’etat against Hadi and the internationally recognized Yemeni government.
The Saudi- and Emirati-led coalition lost the military initiative after the Stockholm Agreement, allowing Houthi forces to gradually regain it and eventually relaunch offensives on other frontlines.
In 2019, Houthi forces, with support from Iran, then demonstrated their increasing technological prowess by dramatically escalating their use of weaponized drones and precision guided missiles, allowing them to consistently hit targets across Yemen, Saudi Arabia and potentially beyond. In raising their profile beyond Yemen to become a regional threat, Houthi leaders are accruing international leverage. This is the lens through which to make sense of why the group is allowing the threat of an environmental catastrophe in the Red Sea to persist by preventing UN crews from assessing the decrepit Safer oil terminal offshore of Hudaydah. Similarly, Houthi forces’ periodic threats and attacks against international shipping passing through the Red Sea, one of the world’s busiest corridors for commercial freight, are another way to demonstrate the international community’s vulnerability to the group.
Meanwhile at home, the Houthis have been progressively disassembling the existing republican structures and remaking governance and society beneath them. Houthi opponents have accused the group of attempting to reestablish the imamate or to emulate the Iranian model, and while elements of both are present, the group is, in practice, cultivating a bespoke arrangement for social suppression.
The Houthi authorities have placed monitors and supervisors throughout government ministries and departments, creating a parallel command and control network to the traditional institutional hierarchy and thereby supplanting and disempowering the formal state. In a direct affront to the concept of equal citizenry in a republic, the Houthis’ theocratically-inspired khums, or one-fifth tax, implemented this year, to the benefit of Hashemites, seeks to institutionalize a sectarian elite and social caste system. The effective privatization of public schools through new school fees and the remaking of the school curriculum to reflect the Houthi sectarian doctrine seem intended to foster a culture of ignorance in which to raise the next generation of frontline soldiers, not learned scholars and thinkers.
While casting themselves in religious rhetoric, Houthi cadres employ a ruthless and pragmatic criminality akin to the mafia, using the tools of extortion, intimidation, co-option, corruption and the like in social and economic affairs. The engineering of fuel shortages in areas they control – which the Houthis publicly blame on the Saudi-led coalition’s import controls – to extract revenue from the local market through blackmarket fuel sales is a good example of Houthi racketeering on a mass scale. Another is the Houthis’ organized plundering of the international relief effort.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/11696
(** B K P)
With Enemies Like These, Who Needs Friends?
It has become a requirement to use the expression “Iran-supported” whenever referring to Ansar Allah, more commonly known as the Houthis. The revivalist and repressive movement has taken over large parts of Yemen and embarked on a campaign to recast the Yemeni people and society in its own image: one that values martyrdom over life.
It is also necessary, however, to be skeptical about the extent of Iranian support to the group. I have always argued that this influence has been exaggerated by Houthi opponents. No matter what the extent of Iranian assistance, the main factor behind Houthi successes over five years of conflict has not been Iran. Iran couldn’t have had that level of impact in the group’s victories without boots on the ground in Yemen. Rather, Houthi successes should be primarily attributed to the incompetence, corruption, and pettiness of its Yemeni enemies, the duplicity and scheming of their regional allies, and the indifference of the international community, represented by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Hadi’s long absence from Yemen, his failure to build a national army, his mishandling of the national economy, his corruption and nepotism are only a partial list of acts that served to legitimize Houthi control.
Two disastrous decisions deserve particular mention. On the governance side, Hadi’s decision to transfer the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) headquarters to Aden in September 2016 was the single most important event that prompted the Houthi takeover of state institutions in Sana’a. Until then, a tacit agreement to maintain state institutions had prevailed between the warring parties. The Houthis did not appoint ministers or heads of state enterprises and institutions at that time, but rather appointed acting ministers and acting heads. The CBY in Sana’a had continued to pay the salaries to all state employees, including Yemeni army soldiers who were actively fighting on both sides of the frontlines. When the CBY was moved, all of that changed, with the Houthis quickly seeking control over the mechanisms of state in the north.
On the military and political level, the president’s insistence on using his office and, indeed, the entire Yemeni government, to settle old scores with southern opponents fractured any potential coherent military response to Houthi expansion. In short, the “Hadi-supported militia” would be a more appropriate descriptor for the Houthis.
Other Yemeni parties also did their bit to support the Houthis.
The Saudi- and Emirati-led coalition was equally generous to the Houthi movement. This started with the first civilian massacre in Sana’a – a giant explosion in Faj Attan in April 2015, witnessed personally by the author, which destroyed an entire neighborhood and claimed hundreds of casualties. At times, Yemeni informers gave the gullible Saudis coordinates of civilian targets, often to settle local scores. Such incompetent coalition military actions mainly punished civilians and lent Houthi recruitment drives popular appeal.
The United Arab Emirates’ contribution to the Houthis’ success also was significant. It fractured and weakened the anti-Houthi front by forming an assortment of militias in Taiz, along the west coast and in the south. Their destructive campaign in the south was enabled by Hadi, who monopolized southern representation at the national level and weaponized Yemeni unity against his rivals in the south. The icing on the cake of the UAE’s gifts to Houthis was the recent theatrical normalization of relations with Israel, which, in the eyes of the majority of Yemenis, validates Houthi claims that they are fighting Israel. With that exaggerated display, the UAE handed a poison pill to its allies in Yemen and all the anti-Houthi forces.
However, the Saudis gave the greatest gift to Houthis. Between 2016 and 2018, when frontlines were largely static, the coalition provided the Houthis the opportunity to complete their military takeover of northern Yemen and get rid of their erstwhile partner, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
The international community, particularly through the UNSC, also helped the Houthis, with their greatest gift being Security Council Resolution 2216. The resolution was intended to prevent the Houthis and Saleh from overtaking the Yemeni state and military. In reality, the coalition used the resolution to legitimize its massive military assault and blockade on northern Yemen, unleashing a humanitarian and economic crisis, and weakening the local population vis-a-vis the Houthis. This made the people more compliant and easier for the Houthis to recruit.
Those who puzzle over the incredible Houthi success should stop thinking of the movement as an Iranian pawn or a satanic plant. It is neither. It is a youthful Yemeni ideological movement that exploits the weaknesses and contradictions of an aging political system paralyzed by decades of kleptocratic authoritarianism and its scheming regional allies at odds with each other. With enemies like these, the Houthis hardly need friends – by Abdulghani Al-Iryani
(** B E H)
Yemen’s Accelerating Economic Woes During the COVID-19 Pandemic
Since early 2015, when the onset of war led to the cessation of large-scale oil exports, Yemen has been almost completely dependent on three main external sources to secure foreign currency inflows and stimulate economic activity: foreign humanitarian aid, Saudi financial support to the Yemeni government, and – by far the most significant – remittances from Yemeni expatriates, most working in Saudi Arabia. All three of these foreign currency sources have dramatically declined in 2020.
The Saudi response to the COVID-19 global pandemic, in concert with record low oil prices, led to historic economic contractions and spending cuts in the kingdom, in turn undermining the ability of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis to work there and send money home. This occurred alongside a steep decline in international donor funding for the Yemen relief effort and the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden effectively exhausting the US$2 billion Saudi deposit it received in 2018.
Roughly half the population in Yemen was already food insecure before the onset of the current armed conflict. The general economic collapse the war precipitated led to millions more requiring emergency food assistance to survive. The current acute shortage of foreign currency sources has profound implications for the value of Yemen’s domestic currency, and the country’s ability to finance fuel and basic commodity imports, and is likely to lead to the rapid intensification of the humanitarian crisis.
This paper presents policy recommendations to address this situation for the United Nations and other international stakeholders, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, as well as the internationally recognized Yemeni government and the de facto authorities in Sana’a (the armed Houthi movement, Ansar Allah).
Since the suspension of oil exports in early 2015, Yemen has become nearly completely dependent on three main external sources to secure foreign currency inflows and stimulate economic activity: foreign humanitarian aid, Saudi financial support to the Yemeni government, and remittances from Yemeni expatriates mainly working in other Gulf countries. Between 2015 and 2019, the country received around $15 billion in humanitarian aid and more than $2.5 billion in Saudi bilateral support that was channeled through the CBY in Aden to help economic stabilization and ease downward pressures on the value of rial.(13) The amount of external aid to Yemen peaked in 2018 at about $5.2 billion in reported aid funding.
Remittances, following the revenue losses in the hydrocarbon sector, have become the country’s main source of foreign currency, providing vital support to reduce the country’s balance of payments deficit and mitigate the food security crisis. During the conflict, the average annual amount of remittances transferred through official financial networks was US$3.4 billion.(15) However, the real amount of remittances is likely much larger.
Both external aid and remittances have played a crucial role in mitigating socio-economic suffering and stimulating economic activity in Yemen during wartime.
Among the biggest economic consequences of the COVID-19 for Yemen is the large drop in remittances from Yemeni workers abroad. In April 2020, the World Bank estimated a decline in inflows of remittances to the MENA region by 19.6 percent, from $58 billion in 2019 to $47 billion in 2020 due to the coronavirus outbreak.(28) The drop in remittances can be traced to the fact that COVID-19, and government responses to try and contain the spread, have created massive disruptions in economic activity and distorted labor market demand worldwide.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/11711
full document: https://sanaacenter.org/files/Rethinking_Yemens_Economy_No7_En.pdf
(** B H)
Child marriages rise as families struggle to cope in Yemen
It can be hard for anyone to understand why fathers are marrying their young daughters to elderly men in 2020. Although historically even in many Western countries, it wasnʼt unusual for young girls to be married off to elderly men, these countries have now largely ended child marriage. However, strict Islamic countries have struggled to abolish the practice due to legalistic interpretations of Islam that forbid any deviation from cultural norms practiced by Arab tribes a thousand years ago.
Such was the case in 1999 when Yemenʼs parliament cited religious grounds as it abolished article 15 of Yemenʼs Personal Status Law, which set the minimum age for marriage for boys and girls at 15. Since then, Yemen has had no minimum age for marriage. Human Rights Watch (HRW) points out that while now “boys or girls can be married at any age, in practice it is girls who are most often married young, often to much older men.”
Nezar explains that these brief marriages allow the men to have sex with the children legally. The couple will then be divorced and the girl returns home to be sold again. “According to what I hear, there are hundreds of cases among the Yemeni people, inside and outside Yemen,” says Nezar.
The girls endure terrible consequences. They face shame and social isolation. There are almost no prospects of finding a husband who will accept them. There is broken trust with their father. If the child becomes pregnant, her children will be rejected by society. There will be deep emotional consequences of being married while such a young child.
Nezar says families are driven by the need to survive. “Fathers initially despair, when they feel they must marry off their young daughter,” he explains. “But sometimes these fathers, once they have tasted money, continue with their other daughters. Some marry their daughters over and over in these sho these short marriages. We hear some are married to foreigners. Many are smuggled into Saudi Arabia.”
Nezarʼs words about the growth of child marriages in Yemen are confirmed by many others. In 2017 the UN's Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that 52% of Yemeni girls and women had gotten married before the age of 18. Between 2017 and the next year, the OCHA reported a threefold increase in under-18 marriages although accurate statistics are difficult to collect amid the conflict.
According to Girls Not Brides, a global partnership of more than 1400 civil society organizations committed to ending child marriage and enabling girls to fulfill their potential, “This rise in child marriages in Yemen is a visible indicator of the conflictʼs disproportionate impact on children. Child marriage has been used both as a coping mechanism to protect girls and sustain families, and has left child brides with nowhere to turn due to a breakdown in welfare services and schools.”
Girls Not Brides says that child marriage is driven by gender inequality and the belief that girls are somehow inferior to boys. For Yemen, they identify contributing factors as the armed conflict, the level of education, family honor, forced sexual exploitation by members of armed groups, and gender norms.4
Turning the tide on child marriage in Yemen currently revolves around two key issues: awareness and the war. In several Islamic countries, it is common for fathers to make marriage decisions for their daughters. Other people in the community donʼt seem to care or are hesitant to intervene in another familyʼs choices, especially when they are unaware of the devastating consequences of child marriage.
According to a publication of the World Economic Forum, “Girls who marry as children are less likely to achieve their full potential. They are more likely to leave education early, suffer domestic violence, contract HIV/AIDS and die due to complications during pregnancy and childbirth – their bodies simply arenʼt ready.”
https://www.mnnonline.org/news/child-marriages-rise-as-families-struggle-to-cope-in-yemen/
Full report: https://christianresponse.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Child-Marriages-on-the-Rise.pdf
(** B H K)
[From 2017]: Yemen's irrigation system: invisible victim of the war
Water infrastructure has been hit by war in Yemen's food-basket, affecting farmer income and food security
The war has destroyed crucial services in the region. An estimated 8.5 million people, for instance, have no longer access to safe drinking water, resulting in higher morbidity. Other victim of the war has been “spate irrigation”—the use short duration flood waters to irrigate land. The ancient Yemeni practice makes use of the short terms floods in normally dry rivers to water crops and grazing areas and to recharge groundwater. It covers an estimated 200,000 hectares in Yemen.
Spate irrigation systems were attacked in the bombing campaigns. In war, however, such civil structures are not supposed to be targeted by any one. According to the 1977 Protocol Additional to Geneva Conventions[1] in Article 14, starvation as a means of combat is not allowed: ‘’it is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove, or render useless objects indispensable for survival of the civilian population - such as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, water installations, and irrigation works’’. This has not happened in war-torn Yemen: Irrigation infrastructure was targeted directly, making systems hard to operate, causing more neglect.
Agriculture is vital for food security in Yemen. More than 70 per cent of its people depend on agriculture either directly or indirectly as their economic foothold. Yet the harmless sector has been brutalised like anything else. The war damage to the agricultural sector is already more than US $16 billion.
Spate irrigation systems in the coastal red sea zone of Yemen, the Tihama, made it the food basket of the country. Tihama produced most of the grains, livestock and export fruits in the country. But water system infrastructure has been hit by the war while Tihama Development Authority’s equipment and machines stores have been directly destroyed. Below are the images of Wadi Siham branch in Waqer Area of the Tihama Development Authority that has been wilfully destroyed. In addition to the physical damage a lot of documents and computer files, containing data and studies carried out since many decades have also been lost.
The indirect repercussions of the war are even larger. Flood-based irrigation systems need to be cleaned regularly to allow the flood water to flow. The lack of maintenance due to war, however, has led to accumulation of sediments and harmful tree growth in the bottom of canals. As a result, the Wadi Sihamspate irrigation system runs at 50 per cent of its capacity, as confirmed during meetings with farmers and Water User Association members.
It is descent into poverty: half the production in the country’s food basket has gone; food prices escalated; income severed and employment opportunities disappeared.
The socio-economic situation in Tihama's wadis is similar, where the share of land owners is less the 30 per cent. Poverty rate is more than 80 per cent, due to the scarcity of resources and the multilayered crisis in the country. We interviewed several farmers.
Worst still is the fate of the many tenants and farm workers, who constitute 70 per cent of the agricultural population. Sharif and his family of six, were poor to start with. Now his options as farm worker have shrunk. In the farms of rich farmers, some economic ventures have stopped—cultivation of fodder (not profitable) or tobacco (cannot afford to pump groundwater).
Come July, a new flood season will start in Wadi Sihamm. The period used to be of anticipation and blessing, but this year will be different. Flood may bring little respite with ill-prepared systems. They may instead suffer from the sediment-laden floodwater running across them.
https://www.downtoearth.org.in/blog/yemen-s-irrigation-system-invisible-victim-of-the-war-57759
(** B P)
Gegen Krone und Patriarchat: Frauen in Saudi-Arabien
Über die unermüdlichen Kämpfe all der unbeugsamen Frauen in Saudi-Arabien für ein Leben in Würde
Mitte Mai 2018 verübten saudische Sicherheitskräfte eine präzedenzlose Arrestwelle, in der Loujain zusammen mit vielen weiteren Aktivistinnen festgenommen wurde; darunter auch die 70-jährige Dr. Aisha al-Mana, sowie einige männliche Unterstützer.[2] Loujains Wohnung wurde in der Nacht gestürmt, mit vorgehaltener Waffe wurde sie aus dem Bett heraus verhaftet. Vom Königshaus kontrollierte Medien diffamierten die Frauen als „Verräterinnen“. Bis zum heutigen Tage sitzt die mittlerweile 31-Jährige hinter Gittern und wurde von einem Hochsicherheitsgefängnis zum nächsten verschleppt. Die Frauen werden unter fadenscheinigen Begründungen unter Anti-Terrorgesetzen angeklagt, sie würden die nationale Sicherheit untergraben und als ausländische Agentinnen fungieren, wobei die Gerichtsverhandlungen im März 2020 auf unbestimmte Zeit ausgesetzt wurden. Was mit „Terrorverdächtigen“ in Haft normalerweise geschieht, ist allgemein bekannt. Bei einem der seltenen Besuche ihrer Eltern erzählte Loujain, sie wurde in Isolationshaft gehalten, wiederholt geschlagen, Waterboarding unterzogen, mit Elektroschocks traktiert und sexuell belästigt, ihr wurde mit Vergewaltigung und Mord gedroht. Ihre Schenkel waren schwarz von Hämatomen, wie ihre Eltern berichten.
Viele andere Frauen wurden in Haft gefoltert, wie Berichte von Human Rights Watch und Amnesty International vom November 2018 dokumentieren. Zusätzlich zu den Foltermethoden, von denen Loujain al-Hathlouls Eltern berichteten, werden in den zwei NGO-Berichten weitere genannt: Schläge mit Stöcken auf die Oberschenkel, sexuelle Übergriffe und das Aufhängen an der Decke. Die Frauen waren außerstande zu laufen oder still zu stehen, ihre Hände zitterten. Mehrere Frauen versuchten, ihrem Leben in Haft ein Ende zu setzen.
Laut Loujains Geschwistern war Saud al-Qahtani – engster Berater von Kronprinz MbS und berüchtigter Geheimdienstmann, der auch in den Mord an Jamal Khashoggi und viele weitere Geheimoperationen verwickelt war – während einiger Foltersessions persönlich anwesend. Wir haben es also nicht mit einigen freidrehenden sadistischen Gefängniswärtern zu tun, sondern mit Folter unter Mitwissen – und gewiss Anweisung – des Herrschers selbst. Al-Qahtani selbst drohte der jungen Loujain, sie zu vergewaltigen und zu töten.
Trotz dieser genannten Fortschritte werden progressive Kräfte im Land – nicht zuletzt wegen der präzedenzlosen Verhaftungswelle der Driving Activists – seit der Machtübernahme von MbS zunehmend von einem Klima der Angst dominiert. Eine steigende Zahl von teils auch nur zaghaft politischen Menschen verlässt aus Angst vor Repressionen das Land.
Frauen als ökonomischer Parameter
In den letzten fünf Jahren wurden weitreichende Reformen auf den Weg gebracht, die das Leben saudischer Frauen verbessern. Andererseits vegetieren all die Aktivistinnen in Folterkellern vor sich hin oder fliehen aus Angst vor Repressionen ins Exil. Um diese Widersprüchlichkeit verstehen zu können, ist ein Blick auf MbS, den De-facto-Machthaber des Landes, und auf dessen Trademark-Programm, die Vision 2030, vonnöten.[20]
Das ökonomische Megaprojekt Vision 2030 soll die saudische Volkswirtschaft umfassend restrukturieren und diversifizieren – weg vom Öl, hin zur High-Tech-Nation und zur Investmentdrehscheibe des eurafrasischen Raums. Saudi-Arabien soll die Speerspitze des globalisierten Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus in Nahost werden.
Die Vision 2030 soll einerseits von den jungen Menschen des Landes realisiert werden und andererseits: von den Frauen. Denn davon abgesehen, dass Frauen in der Regel die Hälfte einer Gesellschaft ausmachen, sind saudische Frauen in der Tendenz besser ausgebildet, arbeiten härter, schreiben sich öfter an den Universitäten ein und schließen diese öfter erfolgreich ab als die saudischen Männer. Zur Erschaffung seiner Hightech-Nation braucht MbS viele hochausgebildete Menschen.
Den Stimmlosen eine Stimme verleihen
Wenn Frauen aber so zentral für MbS‘ Vision sind: Warum sperrt er all die Aktivistinnen hinter Gittern und foltert sie? Warum macht er sie mundtot? Warum lädt er sie nicht proaktiv in seinen Palast ein, um gemeinsam das „neue“, progressive Saudi-Arabien zu zelebrieren, das er der Welt doch so gerne verkaufen will? Was für ein Fotoshooting, was für eine PR das doch für ihn wäre!
Nicht zuletzt an dieser scheinbaren Schizophrenie – die bei genauem Hinsehen weder schizophren noch impulsiv, sondern machtpolitisches Kalkül ist – läuft das im Westen verkaufte Selbstbild des progressiven Reformers ins Leere. Das Kartenhaus MbS bricht in sich zusammen und offenbart den paranoiden, machthungrigen, kontrollsüchtigen Despoten, der er nun mal ist.
Wir erleben „eine Revolution von oben“, wie Princeton-Professor Bernard Haykel das System MbS umschreibt.[25] Doch diese ist keine gesellschaftlich-politische Revolution flankiert von wirtschaftlichen Reformen als das neue System stabilisierende Maßnahmen. Es ist genau andersrum. Die Vision 2030 ist eine ökonomische Revolution, die sich gewisser gesellschaftlicher und politischer Zugeständnisse bedient, solange sie das für diese Umwälzung zwingend notwendige Image nähren und so der volkswirtschaftlichen Agenda dienen.
Dies ist auch die bittere Erkenntnis, die im Zentrum der Frauenkämpfe steht: MbS ist kein Reformer, dem die Sache der Frauen aufrichtig am Herzen liegt. Er ist ein Opportunist, der Frauen als politisch-ökonomische Manövriermasse instrumentalisiert, solange es ihm als Führer der herrschenden Klasse dient. MbS ist kein progressiver Hoffnungsträger, wie er selbst und die liberale Intelligenzia im Westen, die reihenweise auf ihn hereinfiel, der Welt gerne weismachen wollen. Die Hoffnung auf emanzipatorischen Wandel liegt immer und einzig bei den unermüdlichen Menschenrechtsaktivistinnen im Inland und im Exil überall auf der Welt, bei den mutigen Frauen auf der Straße, die jeden Tag gegen Bevormundung und Patriarchat aufstehen und sich unbeugsam auch von unaussprechlicher Repression nicht einschüchtern lassen – von Jakob Reimann
https://diefreiheitsliebe.de/politik/gegen-krone-und-patriarchat/ = https://www.graswurzel.net/gwr/2020/10/gegen-krone-und-patriarchat/ = https://www.freitag.de/autoren/jakob-reimann-justicenow/gegen-krone-und-patriarchat
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
Siehe / Look at cp1
(A H)
Coronavirus: No new cases nor deaths reported
http://en.adenpress.news/news/30376
(A H)
Five coronavirus patients have recovered in Hadhramout, the national Commission on Coronavirus said on Friday. Source: Almanarah Net.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-42824
(* B H)
Film: After suffering six years of war and one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, many people in Yemen believe the coronavirus is being used as a weapon by their enemies.
(* B H)
The Effect of COVID-19 on Developing Countries: Yemen
The pandemic has exacerbated the already existent suffering of Yemen’s population. As previously mentioned, years of conflict have destroyed most of the country’s remaining medical infrastructures. Therefore, COVID-19 in a territory like Yemen can cause fatalities beyond belief.
urthermore, the Journal of Global Health stated that ‘Yemen is almost entirely dependent on a resource-limited setting supported by WHO which… only allows testing [for]a small number of highly suspected cases’.
Due to such restrictions, Yemen cannot approach COVID-19 in the same way that countries in the Western World can. In the more developed regions of the world, we are witnessing an emphasis on mass testing and treatment, as well as lockdowns and travel restrictions. Yemen cannot test and treat on such a mass scale. Instead, there needed to be a focus on choke holding the virus at its entry points to try and prevent it from reaching the territory on a mass scale.
Due to the multi-sided conflict rippling throughout Yemen, it is hard to know exactly how successful these measures have been. With every side of the conflict ultimately having their own agendas to pursue, it can be difficult to know if the figures being put out are accurate. The territory is extremely fragmented, but during a pandemic of this scale, unity is more important than ever before. Global issues like COVID-19 require united global responses.
Continually, anonymous sources have stated that ’Houthi authorities do not share the results of the tests with doctors and with the WHO when the results are positive’. The level of infections within Houthi controlled areas of Yemen are of particular importance as they currently control some of the most highly populated areas in the country
With such mystery surrounding exactly how many cases and fatalities there have been from COVID-19 in Yemen, and the potential spread of dangerous conspiratorial misinformation – the region is at a breaking point. To make matters worse, due to a lack of critical funding, the UN has had to cut aid into Yemen.
https://media.lsu.co.uk/?p=42928
(* B P)
How COVID-19 Is Worsening the Crisis in Yemen
“COVID-19 shook countries with advanced health systems and services. What will it do to a country like Yemen that has lived in the shadow of war for five years?” This statement, made by Yemeni pediatrician Nahla Arishi, clearly highlights the nation’s main concern right now.
According to the United Nations’ head of humanitarian operations in Yemen, the number of deaths caused by the pandemic could “exceed the combined toll of war, disease, and hunger over the last five years.” More than 80 per cent of the population is in dire need of humanitarian assistance, a percentage which now consists of over 24 million people. Due to the ongoing war, the country’s health system is collapsing, making it one of the most vulnerable nations in the world. As a result, when the first cases of COVID-19 began to appear in early April 2020, the mortality rate soared to a whopping 27 per cent, which is more than 5 times the global median. According to reports, about 18 per cent of the nation’s 333 districts have no doctors. Out of communities with medical staff present, they have divided 500 ventilators and 700 care unit beds among them; this is a minuscule number of supplies for the size of the population suffering. As of October 2020, only 2,041 cases have been confirmed positive for COVID-19 since April.
This year, however, Western contributions to the aid funds have been rather limited.
The situation has been labelled “the worst humanitarian crisis” in the world for years, yet it does not seem to be close to its end, and the situation for millions of Yemeni civilians worsens each passing year. The COVID-19 outbreak this year placed additional stress on Yemen’s remaining resources ― one that the nation has not been able to handle. Unless effective international actions are taken, the country will likely continue down the negative spiral of increased poverty and famine indefinitely.
https://www.mironline.ca/how-covid-19-is-worsening-the-crisis-in-yemen
(* B H)
Why Yemen is hit even harder by the coronavirus
hospitals are having a very hard time because of the war. Theyve been bombed, damaged by combat, or they dont have enough equipment to take good care of people.
Moreover, there are far too few masks and protected suits, says Nizar Jahlan. He works for Doctors Without Borders in Yemen. “At first there were many volunteers, doctors and nurses,” he says. “But as soon as they found out that coronas were coming to the hospital, they all disappeared.” As a result, half of all hospitals are closed, because there is simply no staff to care for the sick.
In the country, officially only 844 people have been infected and 208 deaths have been killed, but almost everyone knows for sure there are many more. The Minister for Health in Yemen actually admits that these figures are not correct. He said to a large press agency: We do not publish figures because they have a terrifying effect on peoples mental health.
What is clear is that cemeteries in big cities like Aden suddenly have to bury a lot more people. On some days, eight or nine times more than usual. Most likely, most of them died from the coronavirus.
Who finds what?
“ The situation is very bad,” says Belinda van der Gaag of the Red Cross. “There is far too little food and people try to survive in all kinds of ways. They try to remodel something themselves or get the leftovers from a baker that is still open.”
https://cceit.com/why-yemen-is-hit-even-harder-by-the-coronavirus/
(B H)
IOM Yemen COVID-19 Response Update (04 - 17 October 2020)
The economic and political crisis, compounded by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, is having a devastating toll on Yemen, hitting displaced persons and migrants the hardest. With inadequate testing, surveillance and reporting, humanitarian partners remain concerned about the spread of the virus and coverage of needs. Even with the severe shortage of supplies and vulnerabilities observed across communities, response activities continue to be hampered by operational restrictions that limit the procurement of COVID-19 supplies and response activities more broadly, particularly in northern governorates where only four cases have been officially reported.
As Yemen’s currency continues to heavily depreciate, southern governorates are badly affected, with 133 districts having already surpassed Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) forecasts for July-December.
IOM teams continue to monitor countrywide COVID-19 movement restriction
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-covid-19-response-update-04-17-october-2020
cp2 Allgemein / General
(* A K P)
Interactive Map of Yemen War
(A K)
Latest Updates on Yemen, Oct. 21, 2020
https://english.iswnews.com/15872/latest-updates-on-yemen-21-october-2020/
MILITARY SITUUATION IN YEMEN ON OCTOBER 19, 2020 (MAP UPDATE)
https://southfront.org/military-situuation-in-yemen-on-october-19-2020-map-update/
Oct. 18: HOUTHIS REPEL ADVANCE OF SAUDI PROXIES IN YEMEN’S SAWRAH AREA (VIDEO, MAP)
https://southfront.org/houthis-repel-advance-of-saudi-proxies-in-yemens-sawrah-area/
(* B K)
215 civilians die during 3 months in Yemen: UN
'More children affected by conflict, about 135 children were injured and killed,' says UNHCR
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Yemen said Friday that 215 civilians have died in three months during the ongoing civil war.
The figures were from July to September, according to the agency on Twitter that said families are facing restricted access to aid.
"More children affected by conflict, about 135 children were injured and killed," it said.
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/215-civilians-die-during-3-months-in-yemen-un/2017262
(* B H K)
Yemen, fragments of war
Dominique Quinios' gaze falls on the civilian victims of these multiple conflicts around the world, deprived of their future.
This is what wars do, in three snapshots: snatches of this world war in pieces denounced by Pope Francis. It is not necessary or even important to show soldiers or weapons to understand it, but to highlight civilians directly victims of multiple conflicts around the world. Not to forget that in the midst of the pandemic which, rightly so, occupies our minds and our governments, other tragedies are playing out, depriving young people of their dreams for the future. To understand, too, how vibrant is their will to live, to learn, to pray, despite the ruins and the danger ...
Small treatise on proportionality, in three images.
https://www.la-croix.com/Debats/Yemen-fragments-guerre-2020-10-19-1201120247
(* B H K)
Yemen - Conflict and Forced Displacement (DG ECHO, UN, INGOs) (ECHO Daily Flash of 23 October 2020)
The number of civilian casualties reported across the country during the third quarter of 2020 increased to 527 (215 civilians killed), which is the highest tally in 12 months. The escalation of hostilities in Al Jawf, where airstrikes caused 52 civilian casualties, and in Taiz, Ma’rib and Bayda are largely attributed to selling, airstrikes, sniper fire and UXO.
Conflict related forced displacement moved over 150,000 Yemenis out of their homes in 2020. From 1 January to 17 October 2020, an estimated 25,634 households (153,804 individuals) have experienced displacement at least once (IOM Displacement Tracking).
Over 40,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) across 77 informal hosting sites live only 5km away from areas of active hostilities. Displaced families are also increasingly forced to flee displacement sites, in an increasing pattern of impoverishing and multiple displacements.
(A P)
Iran: USA können Jemeniten und Iraner nicht über bilaterale Beziehungen belehren
Der Sprecher des iranischen Außenministeriums reagierte auf intervenierende Äußerungen eines US-Funktionärs, der die Beziehungen Irans zum Jemen kommentierte. Es hieß Washington solle lieber seine jahrelangen Gräueltaten gegen die verarmte Nation beenden, als sie über ihre Beziehungen zur Außenwelt zu beraten.
"Die USA haben ein 5-jähriges von Saudi-Arabien geführtes Blutbad im Jemen gesponsert", twitterte Saeed Khatibzadeh am Donner
(A P)
FM Spox: US in no position to lecture on Iran-Yemen ties
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh in a message stressed that the United States is in no position to lecture on Iran-Yemen bilateral relations.
"The US has underwritten 5yrs of Saudi-led slaughter in Yemen. Its abuse of diplo cover is also notorious: just ask ex-spymaster @SecPompeo," Khatibzadeh wrote in his Twitter account on Thursday.
"US is thus in NO position to lecture Yemenis & Iranians abt their bilat ties. Better to end your crimes & malign presence in our region," he added.
https://en.irna.ir/news/84085686/FM-Spox-US-in-no-position-to-lecture-on-Iran-Yemen-ties
(* B H)
Film: The other side of Yemen's war
Atiaf Z. Alwazir was born in Sana'a, spent her childhood in Beirut and Jeddah, and as a teenager settled in the Washington D.C. Metropolitan area. She currently lives in Brussels, where she is a research consultant by day and writer by night, with extensive knowledge of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), focusing on gender, human rights and the intersection of art and politics. She has worked in non-governmental organizations and research institutions in Washington D.C., Cairo, Sana'a, Tunis, Beirut, Berlin, Lille, and Brussels, and carries each city with her, making her identify as a world citizen. In 2011, she actively participated in the Yemeni Revolution, documented the events on her blog and co-founded SupportYemen, a storytelling collective. Her articles have been published in several outlets including The Guardian, Foreign Policy, openDemocracy, Fair Observer, and Al-Jazeera English. She is the co-author of Change Square, a photo book on Yemen’s revolution. This talk was given at a TEDx event using the TED conference format but independently organized by a local community.
https://www.ted.com/talks/atiaf_alwazir_the_other_side_of_yemen_s_war
(* B P)
Yemen: Horror stories
Why would a hostage not want to go home? Al-Ahram Weekly delves into the horrors of Yemen’s six-year war
The agreement to exchange hostages was executed under the auspices of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen. The International Committee of the Red Cross facilitated the exchange process and its technical procedures.
The deal was implemented in accordance with five principles.
First, the parties agreed to release all prisoners, detainees, missing persons, arbitrarily detained and forcibly disappeared persons, and those under house arrest. Second, each party shall hand over prisoners held whether they are Yemeni or from Arab Coalition countries. Third, no party shall have the right to refrain from extraditing any person who was arrested.
Fourth, all parties are obliged not to exclude any person who was imprisoned, arrested, detained or captured for any reason. Fifth, in the event that any detainees are found not released after the exchange process, all parties are obliged to release them immediately and unconditionally.
The reporter of Yemen’s Window who was present during the exchange process at Aden International Airport wrote that one of the hostages shocked the Red Cross International Committee when he refused to board the plane to Sanaa a few moments before take-off.
The unnamed hostage told the Red Cross he didn’t want to go to Sanaa because the militias will force him and others to return to the battleground. He tried to convince the committee to replace him with another detainee, but the committee refused in order not to violate the agreement. The website reporter continued that many of those detained by the Houthis had lost contact with their families after their field leaders refused to call their families to reassure them on their wellbeing.
A Houthi hostage by the name of Haal Abdallah Hussein, 28, was released to find his wife had married his brother and that the Houthis had pronounced him dead a year earlier when he was held captive by the legitimate government since 2017.
(A P)
Film: Wounded released captives in Sanaa hospitals
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lOBQd8emKuM
(* B K P)
Yemen: Prisoner Swap and What May be Behind It
Transcript of an Interview with Press TV Iran
Peter Koenig: A prisoner swap is always a positive sign. It could be a first step to a cease fire and leading hopefully to peace negotiations.
At the outset, yes, it may look like a victory, perhaps rather a “first step” towards peace, because victory is saying a lot, of the Yemen’s Ansarullah movement, actually for better understanding it is the Houthi Shia’ movement.
All depends on what the Saudis will do next. If they get instructions from the US and the UK and other European allies, like France to halt the bombing, then we may be able to talk about an interim success.
The Saudis will do what their western Masters tell them to do. The Saudis have been mostly a proxy for the US and UK. If you look at the map, you see how strategically located Yemen is… and Yemen in control of a left-leaning government, a government that supports the people, supports a move towards democracy, is not what the west wants.
However, the US has already reached a little talked-about target; namely, to set up via the UAE (United Arab Emirates) a military base on Socotra, a beautiful island with some 60,000 inhabitants off the Yemeni Coast, off Aden, in the Gulf of Aden.
PressTV: How significant do you think this exchange is where initially the Saudi regime thought that its war on Yemen would only take a month and now more than five-and-a-half years later, Riyadh has had to agree to negotiate with AnsaraAllah?
PK: What we don’t know is what went on behind closed doors. I understand negotiations on Socotra started already in 2016… That would be one explanation. Another one, more straightforward, is the Irani support the Houthis received.
It wasn’t or isn’t direct weapons support, but military advice and technical support, so that the Yemeni Houthis are able to build their own military precision weapons, like rockets, missiles and drones, and are able to hit with drone guided missiles anywhere in Saudi Arabia, as we have seen when Yemeni missiles destroyed a Saudi pipeline last year. Therefore the Saudi bombing had to go on with, of course, weapons – bombs and missiles – supplied by the US, UK, and France. A financial bonanza for the western weapons industry. War is a very profitable business.
https://dissidentvoice.org/2020/10/yemen-prisoner-swap-and-what-may-be-behind-it/
(A H P)
The rejoice of Rashad family over the release of their son, a government soldier, Mohammed- under the latest prisoner exchange transaction between the government and Houthis - was short lived. Upon his release and arrival in Aden Airport, he (picture attached) was immediately taken to hospital and the happiness of his relatives vanished as soon as they found he had lost memory and no longer remembers anyone of them due to years of torture in Houthi jails
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-42773
Films: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iCPiRV_sqgE&t=180s = https://twitter.com/Bn_spaa/status/1318993535438381056
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oXsLKJquaFc
(* B P)
Was it oil leaking from the FSO SAFER off Yemen?
Phytoplankton bloom or oil? Satellite analysis shows that it’s phytoplankton, this time…
On September 14th, the first evidence that oil had begun to spill from the FSO SAFER oil tanker off Yemen was captured by satellite imagery. In the last week, further signs of potential spills have been visible, but the jury’s still out on whether they are oil and where they originate from. This initial analysis by Eoghan Darbyshire seeks to initiate a conversation about what we are seeing in the imagery.
Visual inspection of the optical satellite imagery (Fig. 1) indicates that there seem to be two types of substance, one that appears white or silver in slithers, and another that appears brown and blotchy. This is about as much as can be concluded without very high spatial resolution imagery.
We know from very high-resolution optical imagery, showing oil flowing from the stern, that the SAFER has leaked recently (14th September). Based on our updated analysis here, and thanks to combined community efforts, it seems the substance in the water around the SAFER in recent days is not oil, but an algal bloom. We will continue to monitor the SAFER for further signs of an oil spill, now armed with a better understanding of the surrounding marine environment.
It remains essential that UN inspection teams are allowed onboard as soon as is possible, and ought to act as a spur to stop political manoeuvrings and inaction. At the time of writing we are still awaiting news on whether the Houthis have agreed to allow a UN technical inspection team access to the vessel.
https://ceobs.org/is-oil-already-leaking-from-the-fso-safer-off-yemen
cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade
(A K P)
US-Saudi Aggression Continues to Detain 15 Oil Tankers: YPC
Yemen Petroleum Company announced, Thursday, that the US-Saudi aggression continues to detain 15 tankers of oil derivatives. It reiterated its assertion that the aggression coalition continued to detain (12) oil tankers of (325,059) tons of gasoline and diesel, for about 202 days in unprecedented maritime piracy.
The Yemeni Petroleum Company, indicated that all these ships have completed all inspection and audit procedures through the mechanism of the verification and inspection mission in Djibouti (UNVIM). They have obtained UN permits that confirm the conformity of the cargo to the conditions stipulated in the concept of verification and inspection mechanism operations.
https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=15456
(A P)
Houthis urge UN to open Sana'a airport for commercial flights
The Houthi group renewed on Wednesday its call on the UN to press for opening the Sana'a international airport for commercial flights.
The Saudi-led coalition has been imposing blockade on commercial flights to and fro Sana'a airport since early August 2016, accusing the Houthis of smuggling arms and persons via the facility.
Yemenis from northern and western provinces, who want to travel abroad, have to take up to 15 hours in land trip to the city of Aden or Seyoun in Hadhramout where the airports provide limited flights abroad.
Sana'a airport has proven its technical and operational preparedness to receive all civil flights, the Houthi-run transport ministry said in a statement, citing the air bridge to airlift prisoners under the swap deal on 15 and 16 October.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-20629.html
(* B P)
[from 2015]: THE POLITICS OF IMPUNITY AND THE PURPORTED ‘YEMEN MODEL’ - Why the ‘Amnesty’ to Former President Saleh Not Only Violated International Law, But Was One of the Conditions for the Dramatic Eruption of the Armed Conflict
Hailed for years as a “model”, Yemen has progressively entered into the tunnel of internal strife and non-international armed conflicts, which have been suddenly transformed into a fully-fledged international armed conflict in March 2015 with the military intervention of a coalition of States led by Saudi Arabia. The consequences of this conflict are extremely serious, encompassing the commission of serious war crimes and crimes against humanity by all sides to the conflict, namely the officially recognized Government and the Saudi-led Coalition of States on one side, and the Houtis rebels allied with other insurgents under the authority of the former Yemeni President Saleh on the other side. A third entity present in Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has been taking advantage of the military confrontation to extend and consolidate its territorial control over large portions of territory. With this brief article, the author tries to demonstrate how an “impunity deal” facilitated by a regional power (Saudi Arabia) and endorsed by the United Nations Security Council in 2011 has, in turn, contributed to the progressive destabilization of an already critical situation, showing how a peace-process without justice and accountability may not only be unlawful, but also counter-productive and criminogenic.
(B P)
[from April 2016]: Conflict Assessment of Yemen 2015 civil war
The Yemeni civil war was chosen as a case for conflict assessment because is very complex and presents many structural problems which have kept the Country in state of crisis since its creation.Moreover, the lack of real coverage from the International Media is very concerning, since it could be symptom of a classification of the current conflicts in first tier conflict, as in Syria, and second tier conflicts as the Yemeni one seems to be considered.
https://www.academia.edu/24772747/Conflict_Assessment_of_Yemen_2015_civil_war
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
Siehe / Look at cp1
(B H)
Film: Students struggle to study in public #schools lacking basic facilities in #Taiz
https://twitter.com/BelqeesRights/status/1320079420925923328
(A H)
MONA Relief: We are partnering now to distribute 1000+ food aid baskets, 1000 blankets, and 1000 school bags. We will share you more pictures very soon.
https://twitter.com/monarelief/status/1319009844146458624
(B H)
Film by Human Aid UK: Baby Milk Distribution in Yemen
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=edAG6cXzKj8
(B H)
RDP | FSL success story | Oct 2020 | Yemen - It Helps Us Survive!
Aiysh Alhaydi, 47 years old, lives with his wife and four children in Qaa Radaa sub-district of Wald Rabie district, Al Bayda governorate. 17 years ago, he had a horrific car accident while working in transporting goods from one place to another by his car which led to the amputation of his legs. Aiysh said, “I realize how excruciating it is to see my children suffering and not able to do anything to help them. Yes, both of my legs have been taken, but I am deeply thankful for having other parts of my body."
Thanks to the continuous support of WFP, RDP has been able to respond to the food needs of this vulnerable family since June, 2019
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/rdp-fsl-success-story-oct-2020-yemen-it-helps-us-survive
(* B H)
Films: Yemen: Life for children in a conflict zone
What’s life like for children living through a conflict? A video series lets them tell you themselves.
More than 24 million people in Yemen are in need of humanitarian assistance, half of them children. But how do some of these children feel about their lives? What have been the hardest moments? And the moments that have brought them joy, despite the chaos and devastation? UNICEF asked 14 children aged 5-18 years to talk more about growing up in Yemen – and their hopes and dreams for the future.
https://www.unicef.org/stories/yemen-life-children-conflict-zone
(* B H)
YEMEN: A BLOODLESS POPULATION
Since the intervention of an international coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates against the Houthis in March 2015, the conflict in Yemen has spread, causing a large-scale crisis for the population. Médecins Sans Frontières is one of the rare humanitarian actors present in this country where access is extremely restricte
Already failing before the start of the conflict, Yemen's health system collapsed : it is estimated that more than half of health infrastructure is destroyed, and more than 20 million people are in need of humanitarian aid in Yemen (UN , 2017), out of an estimated population of 27 million. Due to the access restrictions imposed by the belligerents, extremely precarious security conditions, and the difficulties for journalists to enter and work in Yemen, independent and reliable information on the conflict and the state of the country is extremely difficult. to obtain .
The collapse of the health system
The consequences of the conflict on civilian populations are dramatic. Access to basic necessities is cut off for the populations of the northwest, difficult for those of the southwest, and throughout the country, the health system has collapsed. Dozens of health centers have been destroyed, those that function are often deserted by health personnel, and suffer from a haphazard supply. A large part of the country's civil servants, including hospital staff, has not been paid since August 2016.
A major cholera epidemic spread across the country in 2017, thanks to a deplorable state of sanitation facilities and limited access to drinking water. By the end of the year, MSF had treated more than 100,000 patients in its cholera treatment centers. The activity of these centers continued in 2018, although the number of patients decreased compared to the previous year. Between January and October 2018, MSF treated 6,680 suspected cholera cases.
Sanitary conditions are such that diphtheria has reappeared in Yemen, when the last case of this deadly infectious disease was recorded in 1992. " The war and the current blockade are pushing back the Yemeni health system decades ago ", noted in December 2017, Marc Poncin, emergency coordinator for MSF in the governorate of Ibb.
https://www.msf.fr/eclairages/yemen-une-population-exsangue
(B H)
RDP | FSL success story | Oct 2020
Months ago, a large family was struggling to meet food and medication needs. 16 family members are living in a small three-room house built with mud, and they earn a small income of about 70,000 riyals per month. The earning this vulnerable family gets may afford either food for children or drugs for parents with chronic illnesses. Until June, 2019, the family was registered within the general food assistance (GFA) supported by WFP, to cover their food needs on a monthly basis
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/rdp-fsl-success-story-oct-2020-yemen
(B H)
In response to the continuing shortage and soaring prices of cooking gas, #SFDc4w has enabled the poorest to acquire skills and build sustainable and tested household-based #Biogas_System-s with innovative adjustment suiting the local environment of Harf Sufyan #Amran #Yemen (photos)
https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1318995799951527936
https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1318992333506052097
(A H)
Film: Amid Rubbles, Yemeni Students Insist On Resuming their Education
In the run-down school, shattered by years of war, about 500 students insist on resuming their education in Taez governorate. Fear and imminent menace gripped those children in a place that was partly demolished, as it is located in the confrontation area, targeted by constant airstrikes. In spite that the school lacks basic educational requirements and the classroom walls are about to fall, students insist on resuming their study regardless of imminent threat.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M6DgNFmOmAc
(* B H)
World Bank Yemen Macro-Poverty Outlook (October 2020)
An unprecedented humanitarian crisis, now aggravated by COVID-19, persists, leaving many Yemenis dependent on relief and remittances. Economic conditions are deteriorating rapidly, driven by a drop in oil exports, downsizing of humanitarian support, and devastating torrential rains and flash floods. Fragmentation of macroeconomic policies add further strains on the fragile economic conditions, with serious humanitarian consequences.
Recent developments
Violent conflict has entered its sixth year, and Yemen continues to face an unprecedented humanitarian, social and economic crisis. Socio-economic conditions deteriorated further in 2020, affected by low global oil prices, the economic fallout of COVID-19, and weak public infrastructure and coping capacity to deal with extreme climate events/natural disasters. Distortions created by the fragmentation of institutional capacity (especially of the Central Bank of Yemen, CBY) and the divergent policy decisions between the areas of control, have further compounded the economic and humanitarian crisis, from protracted conflict, interruption of basic services, and acute shortages of basic inputs, including fuel.
Anecdotal evidence indicates a likely contraction of the economy from an already low base in the first half of 2020. The oil sector—the only large export earner—was hard-hit by low global oil prices. Non-oil economic activity suffered significantly from COVID-19 related trade slowdown and exceptionally heavy rainfalls, which caused intense flooding, infrastructure damage and human casualties. Foreign exchange shortages deepened further with the near depletion of Saudi Arabia’s basic import finance facility, reduced oil exports, and downsizing of humanitarian assistance.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/world-bank-yemen-macro-poverty-outlook-october-2020
(B H)
WFP Yemen Country Brief, September 2020
In Numbers
8.2 million people targeted in September 2020
72,800 mt of general food assistance dispatched
USD 5.9 million cash-based transfers to be made
USD 11.5 million value of redeemed commodities through food vouchers
USD 400 million six-month net funding requirements (October 2020 – March 2021)
Operational Updates
Under the September cycle, WFP targeted 8.2 million people with general food assistance. Of these, 5.9 million people were targeted with in-kind food assistance, 1.6 million people with food vouchers, and some 670,000 people with cash assistance. Also, WFP reached over 85,000 beneficiaries in September with cash transfers for their participation in food assistance for assets (FFA) where participants worked over 150 asset creation projects.
Following recommendations by the Supreme National Emergency Committee for COVID-19 in areas under the Internationally Recognised Government of Yemen (IRG), the seasonal closure of schools was extended till October. WFP and UNICEF have been planning a coordinated ‘Back to School’ campaign for the start of the academic year in schools across Yemen
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/wfp-yemen-country-brief-september-2020
and similar https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/wfp-yemen-situation-report-09-september-2020
(* B H)
Yemen Joint Market Monitoring Initiative: September Situation Overview 2020
KEY FINDINGS
The reported number of business closures in the last 2 weeks within a 2 minute walk from KIs’ stalls decreased with 60% compared to last round in August.
Price inflation remains the most commonly reported constraint faced by the assessed vendors when obtaining fuel, WASH items, food items, and water trucking services.
The food SMEB cost was found to have increased by 8.2% since the last round of data collection in August, and the WASH SMEB cost also increased by 9.7%, contributing to a 8.6% increase in the overall SMEB cost.
Exchange rates considerably increased across the country: The lowest exchange rate was recorded in Ibb with 601 Yemeni Riyal (YER) to one US dollar (USD). The highest exchange rate was recorded in Lahj with 855 YER to one USD, Also, Hadramaut, Marib,Shabwah, Taizz, Abyan, Al Dhale'e and Aden have reported exchange rate values higher than 800 YER to USD
Overall, 24.3% (57/234) KIs reported that their supply routes changed in a way harmful to their business in the 30 days prior to data collection.
(* B H)
Yemen Situation Report, 7 Oct 2020
HIGHLIGHTS
Fuel crisis increases food prices and continues to restrict the aid operation
Health update
Partners finalize Marib preparedness plan
Exchange rate in southern governorates reaches all-time low
CERF funding boosts COVID-19 response and underfunded health programmes
TRENDS
Lack of funding cripples the aid operation
Fifteen of 41 major United Nations humanitarian programmes in hard-hit Yemen have already been reduced or shut down and 30 more will be affected in coming weeks unless additional funding is received.
“It’s an impossible situation,” said Lise Grande, Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, in a statement on 23 September. “This is the worst humanitarian crisis in the world yet we don’t have the resources we need to save the people who are suffering and will die if we don’t help. The consequences of under-funding are immediate, enormous and devastating,” she added. “Nearly every humanitarian worker has had to tell a hungry family or someone who is ill that we can’t help them because we don’t have funding.”
Between April and August, agencies were forced to reduce food distributions, cut health services in more than 300 facilities and halt specialized services for hundreds of thousands of traumatized and highly vulnerable women and girls.
Some 9 million people have been impacted by reductions in food assistance since April. A further 1.37 million will be affected from December unless additional funding is secured.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-situation-report-7-oct-2020-enar
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
(B H)
IOM Yemen | Rapid Displacement Tracking (RDT) - Reporting Period: 18 - 24 October 2020
From 01 January 2020- 24 October 2020, IOM Yemen DTM estimates that 26,040 Households (156,240 Individuals) have experienced displacement, at least once.
Since the beginning of 2020, DTM also identified other 1,247 previously displaced households who left the displaced location and moved to either their place of origin or some other displaced location.
Between the 18 October 2020 and 24 October 2020, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 340 Households (2,040 individuals) displaced at least once, the highest number of displacements were seen in
(B H)
Displaced Yemenis brace for tough winter conditions
Yemen's Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) including those at Darawan Camp have been suffering from famine and diseases.
Now the camp's residents located northern of Sanaa have to deal with tough winter conditions. The tents filled with IDPs are scattered in different places across the sides of Darawan valley and the market of Hamdan district, Sanaa.
Conditions for these families are getting worse every day. Several families live in one tent and the fabric of some of the tents has been torn. Displaced families can't afford to buy food, winter clothes or fabric for their tents. Almost every family in the camp has its own story of suffering which needs the attention of UN agencies and local authorities.
https://iranpress.com/content/28954
(B H)
“It is difficult to coexist with disease outbreaks like #COVID19” Ahmed, displaced in Taizz Living in overcrowded informal settlements, makes it hard for displaced people to stay protected from disease.
Watch how support from @eu_echo helped IOM prevent the spread of COVID19.
https://twitter.com/IOM_Yemen/status/1319637224451936258
(B H)
'I was shocked by everything': an asylum seeker on arriving at Kent intake unit
29-year-old spent two days at centre after being rescued from dinghy
Abia* is a 29-year-old female asylum seeker who fled the conflict in Yemen and arrived at the Kent intake unit in the middle of July 2020.
Her journey through seven countries had been difficult before she reached Calais where she paid smugglers for a place on an overcrowded dinghy with 20 others – four women, one child and 15 men.
However, part way through the journey the dinghy got into difficulty and filled with water.
“We thought we would not survive but the British coastguard came and rescued us just in time,” Abia said
(B H)
UNHCR Yemen Situation: 2020 Funding Update (14 October 2020)
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unhcr-yemen-situation-2020-funding-update-14-october-2020
(* B H)
IOM Yemen Quarterly Migration Overview (July - September 2020)
Between July and September 2020, migrant arrivals in Yemen remained extremely low, with just over 1,500 arrivals recorded compared to nearly 23,400 during the same period in 2019. However, the situation for migrants in Yemen remains precarious.
As the COVID-19 pandemic increases barriers to movement into, out of and within Yemen, more migrants are becoming stranded and are increasingly vulnerable to arrest, detention and forced transfer, as well as at risk of contracting COVID-19.
With extremely limited access to services and reduced local charity, migrants are having to rely on smugglers for support while they remain unable to transit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) or return home. IOM estimates that at least 14,500 migrants are stranded across the main migrant transit hubs in Aden, Marib, Sana’a and Sa’ada governorates. However, the real figure is likely to be significantly higher. Migrants’ living conditions are dire, with many sleeping outdoors or in dangerous abandoned buildings. Migrants lack access to basic services such as health care, clean water or safe sanitation, which remains a key concern as second and third waves of community-wide transmission of COVID-19 become increasingly likely. Migrants’ main request to IOM and partners on the ground has consistently been to assist them to return home safely.
While it is difficult to provide an accurate picture of migrant detention in Yemen, IOM estimates that thousands of migrants are under some form of detention. Reportedly, there is a number of migrant detention sites in northern governorates managed by local authorities that are non-compliant with the obligation to provide minimum standards of living, support and care including access to legal aid. From these sites, migrants are often forcibly transferred to the Sana’a Immigration Passport and Naturalization
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-quarterly-migration-overview-july-september-2020
(* B H)
Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, 22 October 2020
UNHCR through partner JAAHD began constructing 1,750 Tehama emergency shelters in Hudaydah governorate. The emergency shelters are designed to adapt to the hot and humid climate of the region using local materials, which contributes to the income and livelihoods of the internally displaced (IDP) and local host communities. Last year UNHCR constructed some 5,700 Tehama shelters and plans to increase the target to 8,000 shelters for 2020. So far this year, some 3,500 TESKs have been completed.
Ongoing conflict, heavy rains and flooding, the spread of COVID-19 and economic vulnerability continues to drive displacement in Yemen, with more than 25,500 families fleeing their homes this year. As the lead agency for Shelter /Non-Food Items and Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) clusters,
UNHCR and partners continue to support those in need of shelter and basic household items, including through coordination.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-unhcr-operational-update-22-october-2020
(B H)
Trapped in Melilla against the ruling of the Supreme Court: "If they don't let me leave, I'd rather go back to the war in Yemen"
Three months after the Supreme Court concluded that asylum seekers in Ceuta and Melilla can move freely to the peninsula, the protection claimants remain blocked, with no information on how to get the green light to leave the autonomous cities
Aref says that it is not the first time he has migrated. When the war broke out in Yemen, the Houthi forces and the government tried to recruit him, according to his asylum file, which has been accessed by elDiario.es. Both armies, he assures, threatened him: "Either he would fight with them or they would kill him," the document details. This was the reason why he fled to Sudan, where he tried to stabilize himself, until the coup against President Omar al-Bashir, when he decided to find another place to settle with his family, he says. This time to Europe, through Melilla.
(A H P)
U.S.-Bound Yemeni Migrants and Their Smuggler Busted in Brazil
Federal police in Brazil and American agents stationed in that country are on a roll. Along with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, they have busted yet another ultra-distance human smuggler, this one ferrying nine Yemeni nationals toward the American southern border.
Happening as they are in a major hemispheric transit country like Brazil, the human smuggling busts warrant wider public notice as a boon to U.S. national security.
Acting on a tip on October 11, Brazil's federal police arrested dual Egyptian-Lebanese national Hussein Mohamed Sobbih Fatouh in the Brazil-Peru-Bolivia border city of Assis Brasil, in the Brazilian state of Acre. They picked up nine Yemeni migrants he allegedly was smuggling
https://cis.org/Bensman/USBound-Yemeni-Migrants-and-Their-Smuggler-Busted-Brazil
Comment: An article where #Yemen is defined 'pre-modern', where smuggled Yemenis are already considered potential terrorists, where the local players in the country's 'civil war' (again) are only 'Iran backed-Houthis', Al Qaeda, Isis and Iran funded terrorists.
Never it is mentioned that, simply put, Yemenis might just be looking for a country far from #US back-Saudi led war on Yemen.
Never
https://www.facebook.com/LivingInYemenOnTheEdge/posts/3478104272242578
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
Siehe / Look at cp1
(A P)
8,140 violations committed by Houthi militia against education in the secretariat of the capital during one year
A human rights report confirmed on Thursday that the Houthi militia committed some 8,140 violations against educational institutions in the Secretariat of the Capital during one year from October 5, 2019 to October 4, 2020.
According to the report prepared by the Human Rights Office of the Secretariat of the Capital, the houthi militia’s violations against education have focused on killings and deaths under torture, to dismissals, job abuse of teachers, curriculum changes, privatization of schools and sectarian activities.
and also https://debriefer.net/en/news-20733.html
My remark: As claimed by the Hadi government.
(* B P)
Houthis continue torturing detainees
Houthis militants continue inflicting various forms of torture on civilian detainees amidst lack of monitoring by human rights organizations.
The recent swap of prisoners and detainees between the government and the Houthis rebels revealed horrific stories on torture of detainees held captives by the Houthis.
Every released detainee has a bunch of stories to tell whereabouts of his arrest, torture, enforced disappearance and deprive of health care and ban of communication with family.
Such under-reported crimes have resulted into the death of scores of detainees and others were released with permanent impairments.
Those released detainees were arrested from workplaces or home and they were exchanged with Houthis military prisoners captured by the government forces while fighting for the Houthis’ side.
Majority of the civilian detainees released by the Houthis were taken to medical clinics upon their arrival to the government-held areas.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-42819
(A P)
Men and women were injured on Saturday as gunman opens fire on them in Ibb. Source: Crater Sky
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-42824
(A P)
Houthis set mosque on fire after worshippers refused to chant the militia’s slogan “Death to America.” Source of the story: Multiple websites including Almanarah Net.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-42824
(A P)
Parliament reviews gov't letters, information, education reports
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3113536.htm
(A P)
Mohammad Al-Houthi: US, Zionist Enemy Are Obstacles to Peace in Yemen
A member of the Supreme Political Council, Mohammad Al-Houthi, confirmed, Saturday, that the US and the Zionist enemy are obstacles to peace in Yemen, noting that those who kill Yemenis are standing with the killers of the Palestinians.
He added: We did not see who normalizes with the Zionists supporting the Palestinians with US F-16 planes and French Caesar caliber gun-howitzer, but rather they kill the Yemenis with them.
And he considered that the UAE is providing all its capabilities to the Zionist enemy while it was offering so little help to the Palestinian cause.
https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=15481
(A P)
Houthi Minister of Justice orders gunmen to storm Albukhaiti’s home in Sanaa
Yemeni political commentator Ali Albukhaiti, currently residing in the UK, said he learned that the minister of justice in the internationally unrecognized government of Houthis, Iran’s proxy militia in Yemen, ordered gunmen to storm his home and confiscate his property in the rebel-held capital, Sana’a.
https://republicanyemen.net/archives/25913
referring to https://twitter.com/Ali_Albukhaiti/status/1319733004152033280
My wife and my baby girl Razan were in @Ali_Albukhaiti's house when A.A(Houthis) gunmen were trying to get in to loot the house. Shameful!
https://twitter.com/AhmadAlgohbary/status/1320081358627233798
Film (in Arabic): A message to Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi, whose gunmen now loot my house and my law firm in Sanaa Live photos of Houthi militants from inside my home in Sana'a in the following tweet
https://twitter.com/Ali_Albukhaiti/status/1319920443156058112
(A P)
Getty Images for Sanaa as citizens prepare to celebrate the prophet's Mohamed Birthday on October 29th.
https://twitter.com/Naseh_Shaker/status/1319858044642185216
More photos: https://twitter.com/Aldanimarki/status/1319708837285449730
https://twitter.com/ibrahim_alwaree/status/1319772406626607104
Films: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P-o9TBmneZE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M6pTleX9R7k
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lw0W050qBoM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k9aG_bzm6to
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kx0qp0gGTZs
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dqeggQ_WzHY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3XQmfbImL-Y
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6MWKH5GhGo
My comment: The Houthis seem to spend a lot of electricity for this – this does not fit to their claim of the Saudi blockade of oil ships. They waste rare energy for mewre decoration purposes.
(A P)
Clash of Houthi parties in # Sana’a
The outbreak of clashes between the Houthi terrorist group, it was not a newborn today, and it will not be the last, especially as terrorist ambitions are constantly increasing. Details of the recent clashes between members of the internally disintegrated terrorist group date back to Tuesday noon.
According to the sources and eyewitnesses, the Yemeni newspapers reported that bloody clashes with live bullets broke out between armed Houthi militia members, in the vicinity of the Fifth Security Zone building, in the Yemeni capital, Sana’a.
Violent and bloody confrontations broke out between armed elements of the Houthi militia and members of the military police of the Houthi militia, similar to the outbreak of a fight that had previously occurred between the two parties.
The clashes occurred after the military police attempted to extract their imprisoned colleague by force of arms, this happened after the military police deployed in the vicinity of the area and closed all entrances, minutes before the bloodshed.
https://en.smanews.org/yemen/clash-of-houthi-parties-in-sanaa/
(B P)
Yemeni prisoners say they were tortured by their Houthis captors
Six Yemeni prisoners recently freed from Houthi jails said they were tortured by their Houthis captors at facilities run by the Iranian-backed militia, state news agency Saba New reported.
The men said they were subjected to physical and psychological torture from the first moment they were in jail.
The torture included receiving electric shocks, beatings, sleep deprivation, starvation and mock executions, the report added.
The prisoners were also forced to admit to crimes they did not commit and were told their wives, children and mothers would also be tortured, the report added.
The freed prisoners said they spent months in overcrowded and dark cells, and then suddenly moved to brightly lit rooms, the report added.
The men suffered serious injuries, including broken bones and dislocated spinal discs.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1752931/middle-east
(A P)
New soldier dies under torture in Houthi jails
the Shia extremist militia of Houthis killed Osamah Ahmed Afiya a government soldier, on Thursday in a jail run by the militia in Amran.
Sources close to Afiya (pictured) said today he was “subjected to systematic and various forms of torture in the jail until he finally suffered kidney failure” and died.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-42795
(A P)
'Media Honor Charter' declared in Sana'a
The Ministry of Information and the official and private media institutions outlets in Sanaa organized on Thursday a ceremony to declare the 'Media Honor Charter', in implementation of the national vision for building the modern Yemeni state.
The charter aims to organize media work within the framework of a strong media front by setting media controls that are governed by professional ethics, religious and national constants and responsibilities.
At the declaration ceremony, Minister of Information Dhaif Allah Al-Shami referred to the importance of the media honor charter, which comes on the basis of the national vision, to work according to a single vision through which everyone moves.
"The honor charter is not a restriction of freedoms as some people imagine," he said, indicating that the principles and objectives of the national media come within the course of confronting the aggression, preserving the security and independence of the homeland, and strengthening steadfastness and cohesion of the internal front.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3113306.htm
My comment: A nice new word for “censorship”.
(A P)
Foreign Minister to UNICEF: Government Continues to Provide Facilities to Continue Paying Incentives to Teachers
https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=15449
(* B P)
Yemen in Focus: New Houthi ambassador reflects Iran's deepening influence
Meanwhile, analysts warn the planting of a senior IRGC official in Yemen reflects deepening Iranian influence in Yemen.
"The Iranian press has previously devoted considerable attention to the Irloo family due to their strong ties to the Iranian Islamic Revolution and its military wing. In 2013, when Irloo's mother died, Qassem Soleimani himself attended the funeral to honour her as the mother of two martyrs - Hussein and Asghar - who were killed in the Iran-Iraq War," Mohammed Albasha of the research firm Navanti Group told The New Arab.
"The smuggling of an enigmatic figure with close familial ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps into Houthi territory under the guise of diplomacy reinforces the primacy of Yemen within Iran's regional 'axis of resistance' framework, and demonstrates that Iran has no intention of disengaging from Yemen in the near future," Albasha added.
Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the United States have also accused Iran of providing weapons as well as military expertise to assist the rebels in developing missiles that have for years rained on the neighbouring kingdom. Iran has long-insisted on denying claims it is supporting the rebels in Yemen with weapons.
But earlier this year, a member of the Houthis' political council said the rebel group benefits from neighbouring Arab and Muslim relations, including Iraq, Iran and Oman, admitting to long-rumoured ties with the Islamic Republic.
The rebels are benefiting from relations with these countries amid ongoing "aggression", Abdul-Malik Alejri, a member of the Houthi political council said, referring to the conflict with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and their allies.
"We do not deny that the authority of Sanaa and Ansar Allah has relations and contacts with Iran, Oman, Iraq and other Arab and Islamic countries," Alejri said on Twitter, referring to the rebel's official political party name.
These relations are "natural, which we should not be ashamed of, based on our vision of establishing positive relations between Yemen and the surrounding Arab and Islamic countries, especially the neighbouring countries, except those who refuse", he added.
"We are taking advantage of this relationship to push aggression against our country," he said, referring to the military operations of Saudi-led coalition, which has been battling the rebels in Yemen since 2015.
My comment: The Hadi government claims and the objections by the US obviously are propaganda BS. The US itself often violates the “international obligations under the United Nations charter, the Vienna Conventions on the Diplomatic Consular Relationship and Security Council resolutions” and creates “dangerous precedents that affect the essence of the rights of members states of the United Nations and allows rogue states and regime to enable rebels to violate state sovereignty,", look at Venezuela with the Guaido clown “president” supported by the US, Syria, all other US regime change attempts, and Palestine.
(A P)
Ask coalition", Houthi leader commenting on arrival of Iran ambassador in Sanaa
Senior Houthi leader, Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi, on Wednesday commented on the arrival of the Iranian ambassador in Sanaa by saying "ask the coalition", referring to a Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen since March 2015.
"America is refusing to reopen foreign embassies in Sanaa. Though it is besieging us diplomatically, the Iranian ambassador is so welcome," he said in a statement to Almayadeen TV.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-20642.html
(A P)
Houthis formed a cell to spy on their own detainees freed in the recent prisoner exchange with the govt. Source: Multiple websites.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-42773
(A P)
Houthi gunmen storm student graduation ceremony and force audience out. Source: Voice of Yemen.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-42773
(A P)
Houthi warlord usurps an ordinary man’s plot of land at gunpoint. Source: Alsahwa Net.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-42773
(A P)
A civil society organization[Volition to Counter Torture] unveils a horrific story of Houthi senior operative who kidnapped, raped and killed 18 boys in Sana’a. Headline of a story on Almanarah website.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-42773
(A P)
FM Calls on the UN to Start Taking Urgent Steps on Humanitarian Crises
In a letter sent to the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, Foreign Minister Hisham Sharaf called for urgent steps to be taken on the humanitarian side, to prepare for any negotiation or consultations process aimed at achieving a peaceful and sustainable political settlement in the interest of Yemen and its people.
The Foreign Minister stressed that the time has come to stop the US-Saudi aggression and lift the siege on the Yemeni people, who are witnessing the worst humanitarian catastrophe made ny the Saudi-Emirati aggression.
https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=15427
and also https://debriefer.net/en/news-20620.html
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp6 – cp19
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-689b-yemen-war-mosaic-689b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-688-yemen-war-mosaic-688
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-688 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-688:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
Was ist Ihre Meinung?
Kommentare einblendenDiskutieren Sie mit.