Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 737 - Yemen War Mosaic 737

Yemen Press Reader 737: 27. April 2021: "Die Welt wendet sich ab" – Zaghafte Initiativen, um den Jemenkrieg zu beenden – Anhörungen im US-Kongress: US-Jemen-Politik u. humanitäre Krise im Jemen
Bei diesem Beitrag handelt es sich um ein Blog aus der Freitag-Community

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

... Jemens kritischer Moment – Stämme in Jemen: Ihre Rolle für Waffenstillstände und Deeskalation – Jemens Mahra von geopolitischen Rivalitäten bedroht – Wasserkrise in Westjemen – Wasserprojekt für Aden – und mehr

April 27, 2021: “The World Is Turning A Blind Eye” – Timid Initiatives to Bring Yemen out of War – US Congress Hearings: U.S. Policy on Yemen and humanitarian Crisis in Yemen – Yemen’s Critical Moment – Tribal Cease-fire and De-escalation Mechanisms in Yemen – Yemen's Mahra Threatened by Geopolitical Rivalries – Water Crisis in Western Yemen – Aden Water Project – and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2:

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain

cp11 Deutschland / Germany

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade

cp13b Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp17a Kriegsereignisse: Schlacht um Marib / Theater of War: Marib battle

cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle

cp19 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification




(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

(B H)

Film: Es ist die schlimmste humanitäre Krise der Welt. Das sind 3 Dinge, die man über die Situation im #Jemen wissen sollte.

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

(** B H)

“I Feel The World Is Turning A Blind Eye”

While the Biden administration drags its feet on the Yemen crisis, aid workers on the ground there say the situation is worse than ever.

Half a world away, Fatik Al-Rodaini can imagine the suffering. The native Yemini has seen it with his own eyes.

Two months ago, Al-Rodaini visited a dusty mountain village in his country, where he found a bedraggled-looking family of seven sitting against the stone wall of their home, stooped over a boiling pot on an open fire. A smell like vinegar hung in the chilly February air.

In the pot were leaves from a halas vine — the family’s entire meal.

Al-Rodaini had come to the village as part of a supply run for the humanitarian aid organization he runs called Mona Relief. The native Yemini founded the operation in 2015, two months after the country found itself in its current war. Mona Relief delivers foodstuffs and supplies to about 6,500 families in the midst of a historic humanitarian crisis.

Al-Rodaini had seen leaf eating on his relief trips to more remote areas of Yemen. But seeing it so close to the capital left him horrified.

“I feel the world is turning a blind eye to the largest humanitarian crisis,” he tells The Daily Poster. “The suffering of this area is a living example of how the war has exacted a terrible and massive human cost.”

If anything, he says, the people in Yemen are worse off than ever.

Those who know Al-Rodaini describe him as personable and deeply committed to his work.

Al-Rodaini never planned on running an aid organization. Born in Sana’a, in 1996 he got a job as researcher at the state-run news agency, Saba. That job lasted a decade. In 2010, he started his own blog and a year later began writing for the Yemen Post.

But his country’s unrest and misery forced a career change.

Thanks to the years of upheaval, Yemen is now home to the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

In his own small way, Al-Rodaini is using his organization to fill in the gaps. He started Mona Relief, named after a charitable donor he met online, by delivering food baskets to 32 families in Sana’a. Since then, the operation has grown to encompass 12 provinces in Yemen, delivering supplies such as flour, rice, beans, sugar, cooking oil, milk, clean water, cash assistance, medicine, blankets, clothes, tents, education items, and hygiene products.

The organization’s supply runs are difficult and dangerous. They require clearance from local authorities, which can be challenging to get, and take Al-Rodaini and his colleagues into some of the worst conflict zones on the planet.

“There is no one who doesn’t worry about his life,” says Al-Rodaini. But the most difficult part of the work, he says, is keeping the operation afloat. Supply costs change frequently. The country’s fuel shortage makes transportation difficult, and getting proper permission from local authorities to make deliveries is also a constant worry.

Despite his efforts, Al-Rodaini says the situation continues to deteriorate around him.

“The number of families who are living under the poverty line is huge,” he says. “There is a lack of every single thing.”

A Policy Of Denial

To date, the State department’s official position is that Saudi Arabia is not blockading Yemen, because some supplies are entering the country and Saudi vessels are voluntarily acting on orders of the deposed Hadi government, which operates out of Saudi Arabia.

At the House hearing, Lenderking reiterated this position, stating that food was entering Hodeidah and inaccurately claiming that fuel restrictions were a relatively recent development.

Al-Rodaini says he is waiting for Biden to make good on his campaign promises. To him and so many of his countrymen, it is a matter of survival.

Last month, he and his family sheltered in their home through multiple days of airstrikes on Sana’a. Saudi Arabia launched the bombings as retaliation for a recent Houthi offensive that was, in turn, a response to the Saudi blockade.

“We stayed in our places waiting for our fate,” he says. “Not only me but many Yemenis, we live in a very bad condition each time that we hear the sounds of warplanes.”

It was not the first time the family had been near a bombardment.

“You cannot decide what you are going to do,” he says. “Your life is in danger and your family too. Your children are crying and the situation is not good at all. I felt then that I'm going to die and you become suddenly without a home and the place that you are living in has become not safe at all.”

Once the bombing ended that day, Al-Rodaini drove his family to his sister’s house for safety. Then, true to form, he went back to his neighborhood to pick up the pieces – by Walker Bragman

To donate to Mona Relief, clickhere. ( ) =

(** B K P)

Timid Initiatives to Bring Yemen out of War

Although most world attention focuses on the Saudi-led coalition’s air strikes, the majority of deaths and suffering are caused by the naval blockade on the Red Sea ports, particularly Hodeida where most food, fuel and medical supplies arrive. Fuel is essential to transport goods, to operate water pumping stations and the multiplicity of (larger and smaller) private electricity generators which have replaced the state network destroyed by the war. Fuel ships have been systematically delayed by the Saudi-led coalition in agreement with the IRG: in the first quarter of this year, 8% of diesel requirement was unloaded and 0% of petrol; not surprising therefore that hospitals have stopped operating their generators due to the lack of electricity, let alone the closure of factories and other facilities.


Regardless of starvation, disease and other horrors, the war continues and war profiteers on all sides are benefiting. Since early February, military activities focused on the renewed Huthi offensive threatening the city of Marib, about 170 km east of the capital Sana’a.

The importance of Marib is demonstrated by the determination of both sides. Anti-Huthi forces have depleted other fronts to strengthen resistance, including elements whose relationship with the internationally recognised government (IRG) is, to say the least, problematic.

Up to now, supporting air strikes from the Saudis have enabled the IRG forces to resist, but their progress on the ground is hindered by inadequate material support for front line regular and tribal troops who lack ammunition.

The Huthis persist with their offensive despite very heavy losses in terrain unfavourable to their forces and equipment. Although frontally attacking the city, their priority is elsewhere: in the past year, they have taken much of the governorate and are currently focused on a pincer movement to reach the governorate’s hydrocarbon resources, refinery and power station. Taking them intact would significantly contribute to solving Huthi financial, let alone fuel, problems.

While the battle for Marib lasts, there is time for internal tensions to intensify in each party. Among the Huthis, some are ready to negotiate from what is already a position of strength, while others want to pursue their military advantage to the end. For the IRG, retaining control over Marib is essential but while it goes on, the “internal” struggle with the STC festers. Meanwhile the STC has not given up control of Aden and appears in early April to be preparing for a new military push against the Hadi group, while fighting in Abyan has already started.


Biden may have been misguided into believing that Yemen would be relatively easy by comparison with the other major tripwires left behind by Trump.

In addition to the fact that increasingly frequent Huthi drone and missile strikes on Saudi Arabian territory justify continued military support to the Saudis, there are other difficulties. The Biden administration’s stated goal of working within the framework imposed by the UN Security Council is a major hurdle. The determining Security Council resolution on Yemen is 2216 of April 2015 which, in plain English, demands Huthi surrender and withdrawal to their positions prior to 2014. As the Huthis now control the majority of Yemen’s population and areas way beyond those under their influence in 2014, the likelihood of them agreeing to this demand is zero. There have been numerous calls over the years for the replacement of UNSC 2216 by a more realistic one recognising the reality on the ground, forming the basis for serious negotiations. They fell on the deaf ears of the UK, the “pen holder” on Yemen at the UNSC which prioritises its relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE over the welfare of 30 million Yemenis. The Biden administration could take the initiative thanks to its influence on the UK and the UNSC.

Almost two months after Biden’s initiative, the Saudis announced their own “ceasefire plan” as they had done prior to Ramadan last year: that one barely reduced the level of fighting. The current one is likely to meet the same fate: it was immediately rejected as completely inadequate by the Huthis who said it was no improvement on earlier proposals. Reading it confirms this assessment: it yet again calls on the “three references” explicitly mentioning UNSC 2216. Its proposals for the reopening Sana’a airport and access to Hodeida Port are conditional and ignore the Huthi’s demand for unconditional and complete ending of the blockade complemented by a complete cessation of air strikes.


During the last six years, Yemeni leaders, UN and all other international officials concerned have constantly repeated that the only solution to the Yemeni crisis is political while pursuing a military strategy in practice. UN supported diplomatic efforts produced three meetings in the first two years, including three months of failed negotiations in 2016. The December 2018 Stockholm Agreement was widely promoted as a first step towards peace, but only achieved a limited ceasefire in Hodeida, and the installation of the UN Mission for the Hodeida Agreement in the city whose activities were halted more than a year ago.

The paralysis of formal Yemeni politics in recent years is striking, manifested only by the establishment of rival Southern organisations, both separatist and others, and individuals competing for positions in the government.

The current international moves, whether US or Saudi, claim allegiance to a UN process which has failed Yemenis abysmally for the past half decade, with a Special Envoy now entering his fourth year without any notable achievement. These developments and the worsening Covid crisis combine to further disappoint 30 million long-suffering Yemenis, whose expectations have been sobered by the experience of the past six years. Their scepticism and distrust of leaders, whether military or political, national or foreign, has certainly been confirmed by events. The outcome of the fighting in Marib, combined with political developments may bring a significant change to the overall crisis in Yemen – by Helen Lackner,4716

(** A B H K P)

Congress: U.S. Policy on Yemen

Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism

Timothy Lenderking, US Special Envoy for Yemen: main points had already been reported in Yemen War Mosaic 736a, cp9.

Lise Grande, United States Institue of Peace

Amanda Catanzano, International Rescue Committee

Hearing in full, film:


and also


The conflict in Yemen has lasted six years, resulted in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, wrecked public institutions, created new forms of corruption, fragmented political power and turned Yemen into a failed state likely to collapse, or worse, split into independent, separately administered zones.

The humanitarian crisis, in particular, is so shocking in its magnitude, it is hard even to describe.

The humanitarian crisis in Yemen has a very specific cause—the war.

Yemen’s war is being waged along two fronts. Militarily, belligerents are doing everything they can to degrade and disable the capabilities of their enemies. This includes airstrikes, bombing, missile and mortar strikes, artillery shelling, landmines and fighting. The impact of this warfare on civilians is enormous. Four million Yemenis have been displaced from their homes and nearly 20,000, probably more, have been killed. Hospitals, schools, water and electricity grids, food stores and irrigation canals have been hit and destroyed.

The “second front” includes the coercive measures directed at destroying the enemy’s economy. This strategy is used deliberatively and to great effect by the Saudi-led Coalition. Measures include controls over the number and timing of all ships entering the port city of Hodeida, the entrepot for close to 90 percent of all basic goods entering northern Yemen.

Other measures, devastating in their impact on civilians, include the decision to stop payment of salaries for public servants in areas under the control of Ansar Allah, restrictions on lines of credit, quotas on the importation of basic goods including fuel and cooking gas, controls on capital flows through the Central Bank and on foreign exchange, liquidity shortages, import restrictions on industrial materials and differing customs regimes.

The measures which together constitute the “second front” are now the main drivers of the humanitarian crisis. They have led to the immiseration of the population in areas under the control of Ansar Allah, ruined many economic and financial enterprises and starved public and national institutions of necessary resources. Although impossible to know for sure, at least 130,000 civilians are conservatively estimated to have died as a result of these

The “second front” may now be a main driver of the humanitarian crisis, but it is not the only cause

In northern Yemen, Ansar Allah has systematically taken over and transformed governance in the areas they administer. Oversight and control of state institutions are now fully in the hands of the movement. Parallel institutions, staffed exclusively by Houthis, have been established for key functions including policing and internal security.

Virtually all public revenues are now channeled directly into institutions under the control of the movement, including the branch of the Central Bank in Sana’a. The movement has also introduced mechanisms to set and execute district and governorate budgets. Ansar Allah has usurped Zakat, a main pillar of social protection, making it a compulsory tax, and imposed draconian tariffs on agriculture and trade.

The new structures and mechanisms created by Ansar Allah are not an improvement on the old system; they are predatory, operate without public accountability and constitute a separate system of authority with wide-ranging powers.

Houthis are using these instruments to divert revenue from public goods and services to their fighters, sabotage private sector companies that do not cooperate with them, and manipulate currency and liquidity for their interests, not those of the general public.

At the same time, Ansar Allah has introduced literally hundreds of restrictions on humanitarian aid, seeking to control the type, flow and targeting of all forms of assistance. Ansar Allah also continues to threaten, bully, intimidate and detain humanitarian staff.


2021 could be Yemen’s worst year yet

Today, Yemen has the world’s largest population in need of aid at over 20 million. But the conflict has not produced a major refugee crisis. The closures of air and sea ports and land border crossings have prevented Yemenis from finding safety abroad. But the war has displaced four million Yemenis internally - the fourth highest number of internally displaced people (IDPs) globally.

Yemenis are trapped in a country where their most basic needs cannot be met, where warring parties are destroying lives at every turn - from the missiles and artillery shells that decimate the infrastructure civilians depend on to purposeful currency manipulation that prices families out of basic goods to constraints on the imports of food, fuel and medicines that jeopardize the humanitarian response.

Today half of all Yemenis cannot access clean water, two-thirds lack access to health care, and half of Yemenis are going hungry.3 In fact, more Yemenis have died and continue to suffer from these indirect impacts of war than from the violence itself. UNDP estimates that if the war lasts until 2022 there will be nearly half a million deaths. Two-thirds of these deaths would be due to the indirect impacts of the conflict.

We have no right to be shocked by these numbers or the warning of famine yet again in Yemen. To describe this unraveling as a tragedy would miss the point. Yemen’s cycle of crisis is not an accident. It is the predictable outcome of political failure and a war that has put civilians - and the systems that sustain them - in the crosshairs. A hunger crisis is what happens when nearly 1,000 markets, farms and food storage locations are bombed.9 When health facilities are unable to function and treat illnesses like malnutrition - because they have been bombed, or lack fuel for power, or basic supplies to care for patients. When the international community cuts aid in half and five million fewer Yemenis are able to access live-saving aid each month.

First, conflict is escalating - forcing Yemenis to contend not just with the war’s destructive legacy but its continued daily horrors.

Yemenis are suffering from the effects of six years of a cruelly conducted war that has eroded resilience and coping strategies and made recovery nearly impossible. Since 2015, there have been ten air raids every day, on average. In attacks where the target could be identified, nearly half hit civilian infrastructure. Over the course of the war, an airstrike has hit a school roughly every six days; a water or electricity site every two weeks. Markets have been attacked every ten days; farms every three days despite a hunger crisis.

Over 130,000 people have been killed as a direct result of the violence

But this is more than a two-sided fight between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces. This conflict is also a fragmented set of local power struggles.

Second, the economy is collapsing - both as a result of the violence and economic warfare carried out without regard for civilians.

The Yemeni economy is not just a victim of this brutal conflict but increasingly a driver of it, as parties compete for control of key resources and institutions at the expense of ordinary Yemenis. For example, the Central Bank of Yemen is divided into rival branches in Sanaa and Aden in 2016. The causes of Yemen’s economic crisis are complex and interconnected, but the effect on the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen is clear. Between them, the de facto authorities in Sanaa and the IRG in Aden have failed to pay salaries for many civil servants, depriving millions of Yemenis of their incomes with a ripple effect on the collapse of basic public services. As a result, remittances became a lifeline for many of the 80% of Yemenis living in poverty, worth an estimated fifth of Yemen’s GDP in 2019.22 Last year, the pandemic led to a sharp 80% drop in remittances, as Yemenis living outside the country have lost their jobs and become unable to send money back to their families.

Meanwhile, a combination of mismanagement and economic posturing has left the split Central Bank unable to stabilize the Yemeni currency; the Rial's value has fallen by 75% in the South and by two-thirds in the North since the war began.24 The Central Bank’s inability to fund essential imports has had an equally devastating impact in the import-dependent country. Prices have soared and purchasing power plummeted - the price of rice has quadrupled since the start of the war.25 Three in five Yemenis surveyed by the IRC could not afford basic items, leading two-thirds of them to reduce food consumption. Moreover, COVID-19’s disruptions to the global supply chains widened cracks in the country’s already fragile economy.

Yet commercial imports to northern Yemen through Hodeidah and Saleef ports remain slowed and disrupted by inspection regimes and administrative delays, even as these ports are located near an estimated 70% of people in need of humanitarian aid.26 While food imports have arrived in steady quantities in recent months, fuel has been in dangerously short supply. In recent years, disputes over import revenues have added additional obstacles to the already duplicative import inspection regime, in which both UN and Saudi clearance are required.

A new phase of economic warfare has occurred since June, when, according to the UN Panel of Experts, Ansar Allah withdrew more than $1.9 billion in customs revenues from the Hodeidah Central Bank in violation of the Stockholm Agreement. In response, the IRG’s economic committee, responsible for issuing permits for fuel tankers to berth and discharge vital petroleum derivatives, has aimed to slow or stop the import of fuel to northern Yemen. In the first quarter of 2021, fuel imports through these two ports only met 7% of the country’s national requirements.

Fuel shortages undermine health services as hospitals cannot keep their generators running, disrupt clean water supplies because pumps and water trucks cannot run, and increase the overall cost of humanitarian assistance as fuel can only be procured through more expensive informal markets. NGO staff in Ansar Allahcontrolled areas are reporting a 50% price increase in water trucking since December.

Third, and finally, humanitarian aid and access are treated as bargaining chips.

The destruction of health, water, and other infrastructure combined with the unraveling of public services and skyrocketing prices mean that two in three Yemenis are in need of life-saving aid. Yet all parties to the conflict have complicated and slowed our efforts to deliver principled, needs-based assistance to Yemenis.

While there were some improvements, humanitarian actors like the IRC continue to face a byzantine set of bureaucratic constraints and administrative delays, in both the North and the South. These types of constraints accounted for over 90% of all humanitarian access incidents last year. As a result, around 9 million Yemenis were affected by delayed or interrupted aid at some point last year. Right now, as many as 3.5 million people are currently being affected by delayed approval of projects

Unclear and arbitrary processes and capacity constraints at the few accessible air and sea ports slow the import and offloading of critical - often perishable - humanitarian supplies like food and medicines. The main point of entry for humanitarian cargo is Aden port, which requires NGOs to manage lengthy customs clearance processes. Meanwhile, one of the only two ways to import humanitarian cargo to northern Yemen is by driving a 300-mile road from Aden to Sanaa through 50 checkpoints and informal customs set up by Ansar Allah after obtaining another permit from Ansar Allah in addition to IRG. Sanaa airport has been closed to commercial traffic for nearly five years and only humanitarian flights are operating, including humanitarian cargo, though again, only after lengthy and complicated import approvals. The airport’s closure also means that thousands of Yemenis are unable to seek healthcare outside of the country each year - likely resulting in the premature and unnecessary deaths of tens of thousands since 2016

It can also take months to obtain visas for aid workers, line ministry approvals needed to launch humanitarian programs, and the permits required to travel to program locations and conduct assessments. Even when supplies clear and staff receive approvals, challenges remain

A window of opportunity to break the cycle of crisis

For too long, the needs and protection of Yemeni civilians rated low - if at all - on the priority lists of not just the warring parties, but their international backers - including the US. Yemen policy was about counterterrorism, Yemen policy was about Gulf security. It was rarely, if ever, about Yemenis.

and a shorter survey:


(A P)

US Yemen envoy makes false charges: Houthi official

The US special envoy for Yemen markets war on Yemen, member of Houthi Supreme Political Council said Friday, accusing Tim Lenderking of presenting "military briefing including false charges."
"His talks – that his country needs more international assistance to halt arms shipment to Houthis – bear evidence that Lenderking has not come as a peace messenger, but to convey wrong reports marketing the war on Yemen," Mohamed Ali al-Houthi added in interview with the Sputnik International.
On Wednesday, at briefing to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the US envoy dubbed Iran's support to Houthis as very huge and lethal, and Marib current fighting as the greatest threat to peace efforts.
If he wanted peace, the US envoy "would have introduced a plan based on obvious facts and actual visions to which Yemenis may agree with aggression countries, or to study the plans we presented to him via Omani mediators or WFP director," the Houthi official added.
"We tell Lenderking that the blockade imposed on our country is imposed on vessels coming from countries assaulting our country, as the vessels may come from the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia.
"The blockade is unjustified. Talks about siege because of arms are a big lie."

(** B P)

Yemen’s Critical Moment

The new diplomatic initiative launched by the Biden Administration during its first week in office presents a unique opportunity for ending the war in Yemen. The situation on the ground as well as the regional balance of power, however, are in flux and present serious risks of escalation. It is crucial at this juncture for both the US and UN envoys to secure the full cooperation of all UNSC members in their effort to end the war in Yemen and to issue a new and binding resolution to that effect. It is equally critical for the two envoys to announce a plan of action that clarifies to the warring parties what steps should follow a comprehensive cease-fire.

Bridging the Gap

To prescribe an end to the Yemen war, one would do well to recall an old adage: if you find yourself in a deep hole, stop digging! It is understandable for international mediation to be focused on prisoner swaps and humanitarian aid to the millions of Yemenis trapped and starved by this war. However, no amount of foreign assistance will save the civilians of Yemen as long as the war continues. The priority should then rightly be achieving a comprehensive cease-fire to enable both the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance and the advancement of peace talks in a more conducive environment. But given the importance of the battle for Marib for both sides, it is imperative for mediators to identify the next steps toward the final goal so the warring parties will feel secure in ceasing hostilities and accepting a comprehensive cease-fire.

Mutual Security

American mediation must be based on a comprehensive plan and a clear vision, even if notional at this point, to indicate a path from the current situation to ending the war. Before either side takes a bold first step, it must be reassured of next steps as well as the end-goal. To wit, Saudi Arabia needs to have a guarantee that rockets will no longer be fired across its borders from Yemen, and that Iranian military assets will not be deployed on that border by the Houthis or any future Yemen government. The Houthis need to know that a partial lifting of the siege will be administered by a neutral force and not by their current enemy, the government of President Hadi. From their point of view, the Hadi government will only represent one side in future comprehensive negotiations and that Hadi is not accepted, a priori, as the president of Yemen.

The plan must specify further that follow-on steps will include a complete lifting of the siege and that regional and international powers will push for an all-inclusive government that would represent the interests of both the northern and southern regions of the country. A president and government would accordingly be decided after elections, organized and supervised by the United Nations. Additionally, and even at this early stage in the negotiations, some thought has to be given to what form a future government of Yemen might take.

International Intervention

Iran and the five permanent UNSC members have indicated their willingness to help, but none of them has come up with any concrete suggestions or interventions. It is time for the American envoy, jointly with his UN counterpart, to present a plan to fill the gaps between the opposing positions and to place the full weight of the United States and United Nations behind it.

UNSCR 2216 is now out of date and needs a fresh look. Issued in the immediate aftermath of the Arab coalition’s entry into the war against the Houthis, and fully seven months after the latter’s takeover of Sanaa in September of 2014, its provisions are inadequate in dealing with all that has transpired in more than six years since. The resolution condemned the coup and called for the return of President Hadi’s legitimacy (surprisingly, it misspelled his name as “Abdo Rabbo”) while ignoring the fact that his mandate had expired by then. To be sure, Hadi has a legitimate claim to the presidency by virtue of international recognition, but his own people have not had a chance to renew their trust in him because of the ongoing war. On the ground, his forces have been evicted from the north and kept at bay in the south by the STC and others.

A new Security Council resolution is needed because a sense of urgency has to be injected into the peace process to get all the big powers to act; indeed, Yemen can wait no longer as millions of its people’s lives are at stake.

Houthi and Saudi visions of peace are clearly not in tune and must be reconciled for the war to end. On the surface, both parties say they seek an end to violence and a national reconciliation among Yemenis, leading to a genuinely representative government.

Arms Imports

Yemenis have always maintained arms in their homes, obtained via a black market that has historically operated and will likely continue to do so after the war ends. What fuels the war, however—and what all sides legitimately worry about—are heavy weapons including rockets, tanks, and armored vehicles. Despite a strong siege around Yemen, Iran has managed to keep arming and training Houthi fighters. The re-export of arms—supplied by the West to Saudi Arabia and the UAE and then to armies and militias established, supplied, and trained by them inside Yemen—has also continued despite congressional objections and a halt to sales of offensive weapons to Saudi Arabia by the Biden Administration.

The Urgent Promise of Diplomacy

Oman, the only Gulf Cooperation Council state not to get involved in the Arab coalition’s war in Yemen, is currently at the center of peace efforts and has again offered its good offices to local, regional, and international diplomats toward that end. Oman’s involvement is a sign of optimism. – by Nabeel Khoury

(** B P)

Peacebuilding in the Time of War: Tribal Cease-fire and De-escalation Mechanisms in Yemen

As the current U.N.-led political negotiations between the Yemeni government and the Houthis seem to have hit a dead end, there has been growing interest from the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY), Western diplomats, and Western-funded organizations to explore the role tribal leaders and local tribes can play in ending Yemen’s conflict. The role of Yemeni tribes, however, remains largely misunderstood among Western observers and urban Yemenis alike. The authority of tribal leaders and the influence of tribes on national political decision making are often largely overestimated. There is an assumption among some Westerners involved in Yemen that tribal leaders have the ability and influence to mediate or pressure the main conflict parties in Yemen to cease hostilities and accept a political solution to end the war.

This report looks into the possibilities and limitations of tribal mediation on de-escalation and cease-fire. It argues that while the tribes developed relatively effective mechanisms to limit the spread of violence into their areas, there are major limitations to their ability to mediate the national-level and political conflict.

Tribes in Yemen are based on individual freedoms and collective responsibility. As individuals, members of tribes are free to choose who they want to support and fight for so long as their political allegiances do not bring harm to the tribe as a collective. Largely based on honor, forgiveness and the culture of apology are imbedded in tribal culture. The interests of the collective tribe are prioritized over the interests of individual tribesmen.

The current war has taken an outsized toll on the tribes. Most fighters come from tribes and the most active frontlines are in tribal areas. Additionally, the war has internally divided some tribes along political lines, sometimes at the level of the nuclear family.

In response to the spread of violence and building on their customary law, Yemeni tribes developed relatively effective measures that helped limit the impact of the internal divisions among their members caused by the war and achieved a reasonable level of stability in tribal communities.

Tribal mediations helped secure towns and villages, de-escalate tensions, open safe routes for civilians, exchange thousands of prisoners, and reopen roads. Challenges to tribal de-escalation mechanisms include risk to reputation and safety, Houthi violation of agreements with tribes, the influence of outside actors, and U.N. interference inadvertently undermining prisoner exchanges.

Tribes are eager to see the war end and to restore peace and stability to their areas. But they are concerned that the solutions currently proposed by the U.N. Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths and supported by the Biden administration would consolidate the Houthis’ military gains at the expense of the tribes, reproducing the power SUMMARY dynamics that have marginalized them for centuries, leaving their grievances unaddressed, and locking them in a cycle of perpetual violence that threatens their very existence.

While tribal mediation has helped mitigate the impact of the war on tribal communities, it has major limitations in relation to national-level and political conflicts. Engaging tribes in cease-fire and de-escalation without serious commitment by the Houthis and Yemeni government can carry serious risks to tribal mediators and to stability in tribal areas. The U.N. envoy, international donors, and the organizations they fund need to understanding those limitations in their work to avoid doing harm – by Nadwa Al-Dawsari

full PDF:

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Yemen's Mahra: An oasis of calm threatened by geopolitical rivalries

Yemen's most isolated province has largely been spared the horrors of war, but it now faces destabilisation due to a geopolitical struggle involving Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman.

Mahra, Yemen's second largest but least populated Yemeni governorate bordering Oman, has managed to avoid the ravages of war which have devastated the rest of the country during the past six years.

But this oasis of calm, which has provided a safe haven for some 250,000 internally displaced people, is threatened with instability as Saudi Arabia increases its military presence and plays an increasingly active role in the governorate's affairs, much to the chagrin of local residents who have protested against their involvement.

With barely 120,000 inhabitants, Yemen's most easterly province has for several years now been the subject of interest for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as part of their military intervention in the country.

The UAE's efforts between 2015 and 2017 to build influence in the governorate and create an elite force were eventually rebuffed by local opposition to foreign interference. Mahris have a unique history of running their own affairs as well as a common vision of sovereignty within a federal system that has kept them remarkably unified.

According to a report by the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, Saudi Arabia "has leveraged its sway over the internationally recognized Yemeni government to force the replacement of uncooperative officials in Mahra and the appointment of pliant replacements". In late 2017, "Riyadh began deploying armed forces in Mahra under the pretext of combating smuggling of weapons to the Houthis across the Omani border," the report added.

Saudi Arabia controls the governorate's airport, border crossings and main seaport and has established more than a dozen military bases around the province where it has stationed thousands of its own troops and Yemeni proxy forces imported from other southern governorates.

"The deep-seated sense of local identity has spurred a growing opposition movement to the Saudi presence in Mahra – an opposition movement Oman has actively supported," the Sana'a Center report said. "While this opposition began as peaceful demonstrations, there have been clashes with Saudi forces, with the Saudi air force carrying out airstrikes against Mahri tribesmen."

The Saudis have now turned the airport into a military base with administration offices. They have also established religious centres and brought imams to speak in the mosques.
The Mahri people did not want a repeat of the Southern Transitional Council's (STC) takeover of Socotra in their governorate and when the head of the General Council for Mahra and Socotra Abdullah bin Isa, the son of the last sultan of Mahra, did not denounce the takeover he was replaced with Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah.

The Mahra Peaceful Sit-in Committee was set up in 2018 to demonstrate against the presence of the Saudis and Emiratis. Led by an important tribal leader and ex-deputy governor of Mahra, Ali Salman Hurayzi, the committee has implemented water, electricity, and road building projects.

"It is in the far east away from the military fronts in the north and south and many people came to Mahra to start businesses. But there is an unhealthy economy related to the war economy. The Saudis have recruited thousands of tribesmen and pay them a monthly salary."

Mahra has historically been inhabited by the Mahri people, a South Arabian tribe with its own language.

Muscat has since the 1970s regarded Mahra as a natural extension of its national security sphere. In subsequent decades, Riyadh pursued efforts to build an oil pipeline through the governorate to the Arabian Sea and this project is being mooted once again.
Abu Dhabi's interests in Mahra are an extension of its support for the STC and its interest in Yemen's coastline to control south Yemen's ports, establishing a wider sphere of influence across the Horn of Africa, and bolstering its global maritime trade through the Indian Ocean and Bab el Mandeb.

As the report by the Yemen Center for Strategic Studies points out, it is not in the interest of any party to see Mahra spiral into chaos – by Karen Dabrowska


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Congratulations to #women in #Mahra #Yemen on issue 9 of their newspaper - Fascinating!

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Groundwater depletion clouds Yemen’s solar energy revolution


Warnings have long been sounded about Yemen’s water security. The country has a per capita water availability roughly 1.3% of the world average, and a groundwater extraction rate well in excess of its recharge rate.1 The issue of long-term water availability, however, has been eclipsed by the immediate humanitarian needs in the country, now torn apart by years of war. More than 10 million people – a third of the population – are at risk from famine, with 47,000 expected to experience it in the first half of 2021.

Amidst the horror of war, however, a positive story has begun to emerge. The country, which faced months of blackouts as the national grid collapsed in the early stages of the conflict, and is subject to crippling fluctuations in diesel markets for its power, has started to embrace solar energy. Markets for solar panels are booming as anyone with the capital invests in solar in order to meet the basic needs of their households. Solar has now spread to health, education and agriculture.

Agriculture in Yemen is dependent on diesel for the extraction of groundwater and successive crises in fuel markets – as they shape and are shaped by the conflict – have taken a heavy toll. Solar power has the potential to break this devastating cycle and increasingly, this is becoming a reality. Amid reports of unproductive land becoming fertile again, international development agencies have invested in solar power, the government is tendering for vast projects, and the private sector is heralding its deployment of this life saving technology. The take-up of solar by individual farmers also appears to be significant.

But the ‘solar revolution’ in Yemen is not without its dangers. CEOBS has used an approach based on satellite remote sensing to assess changes in groundwater levels, information about which has not been analysed since the conflict disrupted the country’s water well monitoring capacity. In this report, Leonie Nimmo and Eoghan Darbyshire analyse groundwater change in Yemen, incorporating insights from expert interviews alongside data on energy markets, agriculture, the armed conflict and rainfall. We conclude that a significant drop in groundwater since 2018 is likely a result of the spread of solar in agriculture, and argue that interventions are required on multiple levels and by all stakeholders to halt severe groundwater depletion.

The research

CEOBS has sought to assess changes in groundwater levels in the west of Yemen – home to 90% of the country’s population2 – using satellite measurements of the Earth’s gravitational field and soil moisture.3 We adopt a holistic analysis by combining this with expert interviews and complimentary datasets: precipitation, diesel price, agricultural production, conflict intensity, solar power data, satellite imagery, and vegetation data.

Taking each dataset in turn, the picture in western Yemen as a whole is examined, beginning with background information on the relationship between groundwater, energy use and war, and the historical agricultural context. In part two we assess the heterogeneity of the western Yemen groundwater trend by clustering regions with similar time-series. This is followed by detailed analysis of groundwater in the central and northern highland plains, and the coastal Tihamah region.4 In part three we review the prospects for future groundwater monitoring and take stock of the solar stakeholders in Yemen. Recommendations for actions on all levels to avert precipitous groundwater decline are presented in part four. These are summarised in Table 1 below.

Key findings

Groundwater in western Yemen is at its lowest level since satellite records began in 2002,5 in spite of some recovery in the early years of the conflict and above average levels of rainfall in recent years.

We hypothesise that these drops are driven by the spread of solar power, which is decoupling the historical relationship between diesel markets and groundwater pumping. In the early years of the conflict this relationship constrained the extraction of groundwater,6 resulting in agricultural losses that negatively impacted food security.

In some parts of the country a continuation of these trends may result in the accessible groundwater running out, or becoming inaccessible for those most in need. Furthermore, associated problems of land subsidence and sea water intrusion will increase.

There is a need for further expert technical analysis of the groundwater situation in Yemen, combining remote sensing with existing hydrogeological data, and renewed well monitoring with local stewardship, where feasible.

Averting severe groundwater decline will require action to be taken on multiple levels by all stakeholders, from civil society organisations to international agencies. Addressing water rights and access, and supporting the development of sustainable livelihoods, are key.

There is a need to improve the exchange of knowledge in Yemen about groundwater resources in general, and the impact of solar-powered water pumping in particular.

Civil society in Yemen can play a key role in groundwater stewardship, and should be supported with data and appropriate technologies.

and report by DW:

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Yemen Water Project

With your support, our team have been rehabilitating wells in rural Yemen, converting them to solar-powered wells to supply clean drinking water to vulnerable and displaced families round-the-clock.

Now, we are launching our biggest ever water project in Yemen, which will provide 1.7 million people in the Aden and Lahj Governorates with clean water piped directly into their homes. We aim to complete this project by July 2021, but we need your help.

This article will explain the current situation in Aden, how its existing water infrastructure works, how the conflict has impacted water supply in Aden, what our intervention is and, finally, how your support can change the lives of 1.7 million people.

Aden is no longer recognisable as 'an economic hub'; instead, it is a humanitarian nightmare.

About 86% of the population in Aden is connected to the public water supply system. Water is supplied by the reservoir, pumped into well stations via electricity. The water is then sanitised and pumped into people’s homes.

Well stations are also referred to as well fields. They consist of a collection of wells, connected to the reservoir by electricity. There are three main well fields in Aden: Al-Manasrah, Bir Nasser and Bir Ahmed. They are mainly supplied by the Bir Ahmed reservoir.

It is worth noting that, geographically, the Bir Nasser well field is located in Lahj Governorate, but is under the administration of Aden Governorate. Thus, any changes to its wells will also impact water supply in Lahj.

Aside from the impact of the conflict, the main problem with Aden's infrastructure is that it is extremely worn out. The system is over 50 years old, dating back to the British colonial era. On a practical level, this means:

The electric network can't handle increased water production.

The water wells require regular cleaning and maintenance, but the teams are struggling with rudimentary equipment which doesn't perform this task well.

The wells are clogged by accumulated sediment which strains the pumps and reduces water production.

There are no devices installed to measure well output, and wells are operated manually

The field management situation is 'disastrous', to quote our team on the ground, as the people working in the well fields are constantly suffering from system faults and even explosions.

Population expansion over the last 50 years means the water network is connected to many areas randomly and without metres, which obviously makes the water supply difficult to calculate and manage.

The system was thus outdated and difficult to manage even before the conflict began in 2015. But the situation has worsened over the last six years, and at this point, our team on the ground are reporting that households are receiving piped water for only a few hours every three days. This is absolutely appalling, and has led to many families drinking unsafe and extortionately-priced water, as seen below.

How has the conflict impacted water supply in Aden?

By 2017, it was reported that Aden's water system had sustained $59 million worth of structural damage.

By July 2018, water pumps were only operating for 8 hours per day [UN], while they had been operating for 22 hours per day pre-conflict.

Today, they are only operating for 2-4 hours every three days, partly due to this structural damage, and partly due to ballooning fuel prices which make it impossible to operate the system full time. There are frequent power outages and many wells are simply non-functioning. This has led to families being forced to cut down on the water they use for drinking, cooking, bathing, laundry and personal hygiene purposes.

It is important to note that this structural damage has led to huge health and environmental hazards.

On the one hand, disruptions in the water system have led to sewage overflowing into the streets and untreated water being dumped into the sea. There have been outbreaks of cholera and diphtheria across Yemen, and Aden had the second highest number of cholera and Acute Watery Diarrhoea cases in the initial outbreak. In 2019, a report found that IDPs in Aden were especially impacted by cholera.

On the other hand, without access to piped water, people have been forced to resort to the private water sector, which is not only unsafe, it is also extortionate. In the private sector, water is distributed from private wells via water trucks who set their own prices - in 2018, they were selling water at over 16 times what they had paid for it! If the water required desalination, the water truck would charge for that as an additional service. On top of that, many private water tanks are not covered or closed off, which contributed to outbreaks of water-related illnesses. So essentially, families living in the midst of an economic crisis and famine are being forced to pay an incredible amount of money just to drink unsafe water.

This crisis is compounded by the lack of healthcare in Aden, which means that, if someone falls ill due to cholera, which is entirely treatable, they may pass away simply because they couldn't access medical care. Many health facilities in Aden - including hospitals, pharmacies, private specialised clinics and health centres - are either completely non-functioning or only partially functioning. Walking to the nearest health facility can take up to one hour, but hight fuel prices and damaged roads hinder transport by car or bus.

So to summarise: people in Aden primarily rely on piped water, but they can only receive this every three days. They resort to private water tanks, but this is extortionate and also unsafe. And if they contract a waterborne disease, they may not even be able to access the healthcare they need. At every step, they encounter the water and health crisis and have no way to protect themselves from its consequences.

The primary reason for the water crisis in Aden is lack of public water supply. Our overall objective is to increase the water production from the Bir Nasser and Al-Manasrah well fields by 10%, thus improving the water supply for 1.7 million people.

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

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Infectious diseases in Yemen

Outbreaks of COVID-19, cholera, and vector-borne diseases compound the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

It is difficult to gauge the extent of the COVID-19 pandemic in Yemen. The vast majority of people who contract the disease stay at home. But health-care workers talk of overwhelmed hospitals, and gravediggers talk of overflowing cemeteries. On March 25, 2021, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) warned of a “dramatic influx of critically ill COVID-19 patients requiring hospitalisation” in Aden, the temporary capital city on the southern coast of Yemen. The country is already in the midst of the longest-running and largest cholera epidemic in recorded history. Diphtheria returned to Yemen in 2017, after an absence of 25 years, and there have been reports of sizable outbreaks of mosquito-borne diseases. “Yemen is becoming a haven for infectious diseases”, said Hesham Al-Mekhlafi (Jazan University, Jazan, Saudi Arabia).

Perhaps COVID-19 would have ravaged Yemen with or without the war. Nonetheless, years of conflict are no way to prepare for a pandemic.

In 2016, WHO estimated that just 45% of Yemen's health-care facilities were fully functional and accessible. Since then, things have worsened. “If I am being optimistic, I would say that you have functionality in no more than 25% of facilities”, said Al-Mekhlafi. “These places are doing their best but they cannot offer full services; a lot of health-care workers have left”.

There remain some private clinics, but these do not typically accept people with symptoms of COVID-19. MSF runs the only COVID-19 treatment centre in Aden, a city of 1·1–1·5 million people. “We have 11 intensive care unit beds and 20 inpatient beds for people who need a high level of oxygen”, said Veicht. “It is an extremely tough situation. Nowhere else is offering treatment and all the other pillars of the response are not happening. There is no health promotion, vaccination, or water, sanitation, and hygiene”.

“The chaos in Yemen makes concerted public health interventions impossible”, Veicht told The Lancet Infectious Diseases. “There is no social distancing, people are not wearing masks in public, and it speeds up transmission”. The Houthi authorities were slow to respond to the pandemic. They did not report the first case in their territory until May 5, 2020.

Cholera emerged in Yemen in 2016. But it really took hold the following year. Thus far, there have been an estimated 2·5 million cases. 2020 saw 229 887 suspected cases, down from 860 000 in 2019. Fekri Dureab (Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany) stresses that there is no reason to believe that cases will continue to fall in 2021. “Nothing has changed; all the things that made the disease break out in the first place are still there”, he said. “Northern and rural places are at particular risk”.

Two-thirds of the Yemeni population lack access to clean water and sanitation.

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Film: In war-torn Yemen, Covid-19 fears can have deadly consequences

Sitting by his wife's graveside in the Yemeni capital Sanaa, Musheer Farhan recalls how she was turned away from three hospitals over fears she had coronavirus, although she was heavily pregnant and suffering from breathing problems. =

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46 new cases of coronavirus reported, 6,183 in total

The committee also reported the death of 18 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 84 others.
991 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.


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Covid-19 hits Hadhramout, Taiz severer than other Yemeni provinces

Yemen recorded on Monday 46 new infections of Covid-19 in six different governorates, the official government-run emergency committee tweeted.
The southwestern governorate of Taiz recorded 19 new cases, the southern Shabwa 12, the eastern Hadhramout 8, the southern Aden 3, and the central Baydha and northeastern Marib recorded 2 infections each.
The pandemic claimed 12 lives in Hadhramout (4), Lahj (2), Mahara (2), Marib (2), Dhalea (1) and Taiz (1), according to the committee.

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Covid wave stalking Yemen strikes fear in hospitals

a second wave of the pandemic in the country -- already on its knees amid a war in its seventh year -- that is leading doctors to refuse treatment to those suspected of infection.

Along with medics' uncertainty over how to treat suspected Covid-19 cases, hospitals lack critical supplies, including oxygen, and are blighted by frequent power cuts.

The Iran-backed Huthi rebels, who seized the capital from the government in 2014 and control much of the north, do not release data on infections.

But the toll from Covid-19 has become a hot topic in Sanaa, with evidence mounting of a spike in cases in the past month across the country, including the south which is under the control of the internationally recognised government.

Despite the pandemic, outside the overstretched hospitals, life in Sanaa seems normal, with markets bustling and mosques crowded with worshippers during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

It is rare to see anyone wearing a mask, and precautionary health measures are nonexistent.

"There is no official data, no official communication, and the results of tests aren't published," a humanitarian worker familiar with the health situation in Yemen said of the rebel-held areas.

Cases reported in the south began escalating in mid-March, prompting a warning from the country's coronavirus committee of a public health "emergency".

But there is also mounting evidence of an uptick in infections in the capital, the source said.

"Public hospitals are close to being full. At private hospitals, the situation is unclear."

"People are often reluctant to go to hospital when they have Covid-like symptoms," the source added.

"People are concerned about the stigma, sometimes they don't believe they will be treated. They are afraid because of rumours and don't trust the medical system." = =

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Houthi senior leader, Yahiya Shami, dies of Covid-19

A Houthi senior leader and advisor to the group's Supreme Political Council died on Monday of coronavirus infection in Sana'a City.
After fighting illness for nearly 6 weeks, General Yahiya Shami at hospital where his wife and son Zachariah received medication and died of the pandemic some one month ago, a source with links to the family told Debriefer.

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32 new cases of coronavirus reported, 6,137 in total

The committee also reported the death of 12 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 60 others.
828 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

and also

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Houthis deprive medical workers of COVID-19 vaccines as disease spreads

Yemen’s health minister has urged heath workers who live in Houthi-controlled areas to head to liberated provinces to receive coronavirus disease (COVID-19) vaccines, after the Iran-backed group refused to run an inoculation program in densely populated areas.

“Health colleagues who were deprived of the coronavirus vaccine in the Houthi-controlled areas can get vaccinated in the provinces under the authority of the legitimate government,” Dr. Qasem Buaibeh said on his official Facebook page.

Yemeni health officials told Arab News on Monday that the Houthis, having first agreed to take 10,000 doses, later demanded just 500 for 250 health workers despite reports of numerous deaths in the capital Sanaa alone.
“The (Houthis) have never disclosed the real numbers of COVID-19 (cases) and deny the existence of the virus in their areas,” Dr. Ishraq Al-Subaee, a spokesman for the Aden-based National Coronavirus Committee, said.
This prompted Yemeni health officials to urge doctors to travel to government-controlled areas such as Aden, Hadramout or Taiz.
“They can show up at any health facility here in the south, and get their shots of the vaccine,” Al-Subaee said.

Health experts believe the real number is more than triple the official figure, due to poor testing resources and Houthi refusals to reveal accurate numbers in areas under their control.
Despite their rejection of media reports about the transmission of the virus in Sanaa and elsewhere in northern Yemen, the militia recently announced the deaths of several leaders from undisclosed causes.

Abdulla bin Ghouth, an epidemiology professor at Hadramout University’s College of Medicine, and an adviser to the Yemeni health minister, told Arab News that Yemen is going through its second wave of the virus, which started in the first week of February this year, and reached its peak earlier this month, with 720 cases and 100 known fatalities.
“The situation is still grave given the high number of deaths,” bin Ghouth said.

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Houthis refused to allow COVID vaccine into the areas they control. They asked for only a 1000 dose that they can use as they wish.

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Yemeni Doctors in Diaspora Initiative says in an appeal on Facebook to the international community that it has documented the deaths of 153 physicians from Covid-19 in #Yemen since March 2020. 43 physicians have died in the second wave of the pandemic, it says.


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This is a message I received today from a doctor in Yemen "We have lost more than 150 doctors, consultants, and medical staff in Yemen due to Corona We urgently need to ensure that medical staff & patients in Sanaa and Yemen have access to vaccines"

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49 new cases of coronavirus reported, 6,056 in total

The committee also reported the death of 10 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 32 others.
1.014 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

and also

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Two senior SCT military commanders die, one from Covid-19

Former PDRY's Minister Dies of Covid-19

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36 new cases of coronavirus reported, 6,056 in total

The committee also reported the death of 8 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 61 others.
756 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

and also

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60 new cases of coronavirus reported, 6,020 in total

The committee also reported the death of 10 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 84 others.
1,169 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

and also

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Yemen bans travel to India amid COVID-19 surge

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23 professors, who worked at Sanaa University, have died of Covid-19 and other diseases in the past four months, academic sources said in a statement circulated on social media platforms on Thursday.

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93 Yemeni physicians have died from Covid-19, Physicians & Pharmacists Syndicate says, according to news websites. Total confirmed Covid-19 cases in Gov't-run regions have reached 5.960, including 1.147 deaths, since the first infection was reported in the country in March 2020.

(* A H)

42 new cases of coronavirus reported, 5,960 in total

The committee also reported the death of 9 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 28 others.
906 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

and also

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COVID-19 vaccination campaign begins in Mukalla

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Household survey of treatment of malaria in Hajjah, Yemen

The practice of self-medication is widespread in the Republic of Yemen. The objectives of this study were to describe the treatment of malaria in households and to promote rational treatment. We surveyed 201 households with family members suffering from malaria or being treated with antimalarials. Numbers of prescribed and non-prescribed drugs were recorded and treatment rationality assessed. Common patterns of irrational treatment of malaria were observed. Polypharmacy was common, with an average of 3.8 total drugs and 1.3 antimalarials found per encounter. Misused and over use of injectables antimalarials was common. People practised self-medication because of belief, experience, lack of confidence in health services and cost of treatment. Most had no knowledge concerning possible risks of antimalarials

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Disruptions to immunization put millions of children at risk, says UN

Millions of children whose immunizations have been disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in Africa, are now at risk from life-threatening diseases such as measles, polio, yellow fever and diphtheria, UN health agencies warned on Monday.
Gaps in vaccination coverage have led to serious measles outbreaks in Pakistan and Yemen, the agencies said, and are likely to lead to future epidemics as more regular childhood vaccinations are missed.
“Gaps in vaccination coverage are already having grave, real world consequences,” said the World Health Organization’s (WHO)chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus at a virtual briefing in which he also announced a new global immunization strategy.
The strategy aims to reduce by half the number of so-called “zero-dose” children receiving no inoculations from 20 million to 10 million, among other steps.

cp2 Allgemein / General

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Interactive Map of Yemen War

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Daily Yemen War Map Updates

April 26:

April 25:

April 24:

April 22:

April 21:

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Audio: The Yemen Brief Podcast: Episode 1: Gulf Feuds in Yemen: The UAE

Sana'a Center Researcher and Program lead Holly Topham talks to Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa and Sana'a Center Non-Resident Fellow Thomas Juneau about the role of foreign actors in Yemen as the country's history is filled with stories of foreign powers stepping in to leave their mark. This episode zooms in on the gulf feuds in Yemen, with a special focus on the UAE.

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Piloting Humanitarian Biometrics in Yemen

The World Food Programme’s (WFP) Brief Points use of biometrics in Yemen is a prime example of challenges related to the use of biometric solutions in humanitarianism. The humanitarian crisis in Yemen is the worst in the world and it is deteriorating.

Simultaneously, the WFP is a frontrunner in placing data and digital technologies at the centre of humanitarian operations.
This brief explores the tension between the expanding use of biometrics to increase aid transparency and the respect for privacy. =

My comment: Humanitarian reasons are misused as a pretense to start the totel digital registration of the whole 7.7 billion humans allover the world – the “Digital identity” as a tool of total control people like Bill Gates dream of.

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Annelle Sheline: Discussing Yemen on @AJArabic: The status quo incentivizes conflict: the only way to be heard is through violence The international community & @POTUS must push for a process that empowers non-armed groups now, even before a possible ceasefire

As I discussed w/ @elsyabiassi of @AJArabic, the longer the Saudis keep fighting in Yemen, the worse their position becomes, yet they persist w/ a failed strategy The longer the conflict drags on, the harder it will be for Yemen to return to peace

Film (Arabic):

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Saudi, Emirati, US Aggression against Yemen Guarantor to Reveal Hidden Face of Riyadh, Abu Dhabi

The occupying countries that manage the conflict between their tools in the southern governorates share the wealth of the south and exchange control. Abu Dhabi enables Riyadh to take over Aden and allows it to bring military forces and armed arsenal The government of Hadi, led by Al-Thurji Muin Abdul-Malik, hands over Al-Mahra to Saudi Arabia under the pretext of the reconstruction program and gives Riyadh the right to complete military control over the eastern gate of Yemen.

Likewise, Saudi Arabia hands Socotra to the loyalists of the Emirates in response to Abu Dhabi’s handover of Aden and its preparation to facilitate the task of the Saudis' assault on large parts of Hadramawt.

This is colonial liberation, so what happens is that the aggression coalition has transformed the southern governorates into an arena of struggle between its people and an arena of international conflicts and ambitions.

Ansarullah did not reach Al-Mahra, nor did Riyadh go to war directly with them there, nor did they exist in Socotra or Hadramout, and what is taking place today in Shaqra and Abyan fronts between the agents to the aggression confirms that the war is a deception, but this major deception has not and will not deceive the free people of the southern governorates.

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Audio: Gespräch zehn Jahre nach dem Arabischen Frühling

Was hat sich in den vergangenen zehn Jahren in den arabischen Ländern getan und wie geht es weiter? Diese Fragen wollen Franz Maget und Said AlDailami ihrer Gastgeberin Marita Krauss, Inhaberin des Lehrstuhls für Europäische Regionalgeschichte an der Universität Augsburg, in unserer Reihe „Akademie aktuell“ beantworten, das auf Video aufgezeichnet wird.

Dr. Said AlDailami ist im Jemen geboren und lebt seit seinem 9. Lebensjahr in Deutschland. Nach seiner Offiziersausbildung sowie seiner Promotion in Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften war er Leiter des Regionalbüros für Tunesien, Algerien und Libyen der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung in Tunis, mittlerweile ist er als Leiter des Referats für internationale Stipendien der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung zurück in München.

(* B K)

1.410 children, aged 10-15, were killed fighting alongside Houthis in 2020, lawyer & human rights activist Huda Alsarare @h_alsarare has said, adding Houthis have recruited 40K children, 10K forcibly recruited, since their coup against UN-backed Government in late 2014

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Audio: Yemen Envoy Feigns Ignorance

Bryan Bowman, fellow for Middle East Policy at the Friends Committee on National Legislation joins us in a conversation about the state of the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Yemen, how the special envoy from the U.S. seems to be clueless about what is going on there, how this exacerbates the crisis in the country, where civilians are suffering the worst famine in the world, how the U.S. role supporting Saudi Arabia’s war is even more obfuscated, despite promises of withdrawing it, and how the Houthis and regional actors could finally come to negotiating table in good faith to end this humanitarian disaster.

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Reporters Without Borders: Yemen

The war in Yemen, which began in 2014, continues to ravage the country and exact a heavy toll on press freedom. Yemen’s division into areas controlled by the Houthi rebels, the so-called legitimate government and southern separatists has exacerbated the media’s polarization. Neutral reporting on the war is rare, as the various parties to the conflict control the media. There are very few foreign reporters on the ground, while Yemeni journalists are trapped in the middle of all these forces. Around 20 are currently held by the Houthis or Al-Qaeda, most of them since 2015. One of the Houthi hostages, Anwar al Rakan, died tragically shortly after his release in 2018. In the part of the country controlled by the so-called legitimate government, journalists are also arrested arbitrarily and are subjected to abusive treatment by militias. Online access to media outlets has been blocked ever since the Houthis seized control of the telecommunications ministry. In all parts of the country, citizen-journalists are monitored and can be arrested for a single social media post. Some journalists gave up journalism to avoid reprisals but that has not stopped them being persecuted for what they wrote in the past.

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Big conspiracy against Yemen cooked up at secret talks in Arab capitals, former minister

A big conspiracy against Yemen is being cooked up at secret talks in some Arab capital cities, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Abu Baker Al-Qirbi said on Wednesday.

The secret negotiations in Iraq, Oman and Saudi Arabia are seeking to find approaches to serve the interests of the regional actors away from the interests of Yemen and the Yemeni people, he said in a statement on Twitter.

Such approaches could lead to handing Yemen to warmongers and leaving it as a prey for conflicts of regional powers, he said, calling on all Yemenis to put the interest of the country above all consolidations and loyalties and foreign agendas.

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Houthi official urges Hadi to follow Chadian president's model

Mohamed Ali al-Haouthi, a member of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, on Wednesday called on the Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi to follow the Chadian president's model.
On Tuesday, Chad's army said President Idriss Deby (68) died of wounds he sustained while fighting the "terrorists coming from Libya" and visiting the Chadian combating troops.
President "Hadi has to be a symbol of sacrifice, as the Chadian president did, instead of sending the fools, recruiting terrorist militias, and establishing the occupation in the Republic of Yemen," the Houthi official tweeted.

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The Houthi militia announces the funeral of about three thousand of its militants who have been killed since the beginning of the year

Hardly a day goes by without the Iranian-backed Houthi militia spreading dozens of its members who were killed on separate fronts in confrontations with government forces backed by the Saudi-led Arab coalition.

More than two thousand corpses have been declared by the coup militias to be buried and buried within 107 days in the governorates of Sana'a, Amran, Dhamar, Ibb, Reemah, and Al Mahwit, in addition to their areas of control in “Saada, Al-Bayda, Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah and Taiz.”

According to what was published by the militia's media and monitored by the editor of Al-Masdar Online, the number of Houthi funerals during the month of March was only 737, in addition to 395 killed during the first days of April.

During the month of January and February last year, the militia carried out 968 bodies, bringing the number of the group’s dead since the beginning of this year to 2,100, among them hundreds of elements to whom the militia distributed mock ranks and leaders in the group.

This comes as hundreds of the bodies of those elements (have not been identified, and others refuse to be received by families) are still distributed in the refrigerators of the dead (my travel, central) in many hospitals in Sana'a and other governorates, according to what medical sources confirmed to "Al-Masdar Online", in addition to Corpses scattered in the areas of confrontation in Marib.

The militia authorities deliberately broadcast the processions of their dead on the "Al-Masirah" channel daily to attract more fighters from relatives and relatives of the dead, while none of those names were published on the channel's website, so as not to be monitored by the media and human rights organizations, while the Sheba Agency publishes its Houthi version A limited number of those names.

And after the funeral ceremony, the Houthi channel publishes videos and has documented it of fighters who were killed in confrontations with government forces over the past years, and it calls this "martyrs breaks", with the aim of winning over the group's followers and pushing them to the battle fronts, in which they suffered heavy losses in equipment and lives.

Despite the Houthi media announcing the funeral of dozens of the group's fighters on a daily basis, they do not indicate the place and time of their death, and only say that they were killed while "performing their duty in the battle to defend the homeland on a number of fronts," indicating that they were killed in a confrontation. Government forces.

It is likely that most of the members of the militia’s media spreading their funeral were killed on the fronts of Marib, where the frequency of confrontations has escalated since the beginning of 2021, following attacks launched by the Houthis, which met with solid resistance, from the legitimate government forces and the Marib tribes who support them.

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Audio: What the People of Yemen Want, with Shireen Al-Adeimi

But so far little is said about the reasons the war has gone on so long, or about what motivated it to begin with, and what are the political forces driving it forward.

Instead, most mainstream media coverage of the politics of Yemen is mediated through a dense network of security-minded analysts who mystify the dynamics underlying the war, and leave out the Yemeni people entirely. You can find endless analyses about the war in Yemen as either a proxy war between Saudi Arabia, the US and Iran, how it’s a part of the never-ended War on Terror, and how it’s really a sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia.

Little is said about what the people of Yemen want, and how these demands can be achieved. Their suffering is decontextualized and depoliticized, and they are depicted as helpless objects of despair amidst a raging conflict that is beyond their reach.

My guest today is here to set the record straight. I’ll be speaking with Shireen al-Adeimi, a Yemeni activist and Assistant Professor at Michigan State University.

Together we’ll debunk the myths surrounding the war in Yemen and highlight a foundational but rarely discussed dynamic that informs much of it. We’ll hone in on how the conflict can be viewed as part of an ongoing adversarial relationship between the elites, who have organized themselves into governments and warring parties as a method to ensure their power remains in place, and the people, whose dream of a responsive political and economic system remains unfulfilled.

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The Great Fall: Putting Together Peace Talks for a Broken Yemen

With Yemen’s increasingly fractured political landscape, the longer the war continues, the harder it will be to resolve.

In many ways, this is the key challenge to ending the war in Yemen: how to accommodate a number of different actors with widely divergent political goals. What started as mainly a two-sided war between the Houthi rebels and the Saudi-led coalition in support of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government in 2015 has not remained that way. Yemen has fractured and fragmented as new political groups have formed, old alliances have shifted, and armed groups have multiplied. Six years into the war, Yemen is Humpty Dumpty after his great fall: broken and impossible to put back together again.

In 2015, Tariq Saleh was in Sanaa, fighting Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen’s United Nations-recognized government alongside the Houthis. Today, he is on the other side, drawing financial and military support from Saudi Arabia and the UAE while fighting against the Houthis.

Saleh’s shift is emblematic of how the war has created new and more complicated realities in Yemen.

Tariq Saleh slowly reconstituted a military force, which he dubbed the National Resistance Forces, transforming his initial nucleus of 3,000 fighters into roughly 20,000, thanks in large part to the military backing of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Today, Saleh and his fighters are based in the Red Sea port city of Mokha, where they are aligned against Houthi fighters up the coast in Hodeidah.

Saleh, however, is far from the only actor outside of Hadi and the Houthis that international negotiators will need to accommodate if they want to construct a lasting peace in Yemen. There is also the Southern Transitional Council, which didn’t exist in 2015, but by 2019 the STC held President Hadi’s temporary capital of Aden, a city it continues to control.

There are similar issues in Marib, Shabwa, and Hadramout. These governorates, Yemen’s so-called “triangle of power,” account for most of Yemen’s oil and gas exports. All three governorates have also acquired a significant degree of political and economic autonomy over the course of the war, as roughly 20% of oil and gas revenue is now channeled back to local governments, instead of being deposited with the central government like it was before the war. Perhaps nowhere is this more acute than in Hadramout, which has long advocated for greater local rule.

Six years of war have broken Yemen and fractured the country’s political landscape. In 2016, it was possible for peace talks in Kuwait to be held between Hadi’s government and the Houthis. Such a two-party approach is no longer possible. Today, mediators have to shuttle back-and-forth among Hadi, the Houthis, and the STC, as well as the Saudis and Emiratis.

Tariq Saleh’s announcement makes clear that he wants to be added to that list. Constructing a deal that satisfies all these various parties is an incredibly challenging task as three successive U.N. special envoys can attest. But if the two-party talks of 2016 are not possible in 2021, the three- or four-party talks of 2021 will not be possible in 2023. The longer the war in Yemen continues, the more groups will emerge, and the harder the conflict will be to resolve.

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

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Mass Protest of Health Sector in Hodeidah Condemning Detention of Fuel Ships

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The Saudi Blockade of Yemen Must be Lifted – But Not in Isolation

The blockade does not deny the entry of all goods into Yemen; oil and food, in particular, do get imported through the port of Hudaydah on the west coast. The Saudi-led coalition does, however, enforce a long list of banned products. Moreover, a lengthy and often arbitrary inspection process significantly hinders the delivery of necessary goods, causing price increases and worsening Yemen’s already acute humanitarian crisis. In this context, calls to lift the blockade have come from Europe, and also from progressive factions within the Democratic Party in the US, which have been increasingly vocal in expressing impatience with what they view as President Joe Biden’s excessive caution in his approach toward Saudi Arabia.

The appeal of this proposal is obvious: the blockade is a highly visible and clearly morally repugnant aspect of the war. It is also tangible: if only the US mustered the courage, it could, according to critics, easily convince – or, if necessary, force – Saudi Arabia to lift it. For these advocates, this is usually driven by the noble aims of alleviating the suffering of the Yemeni people, who are victims of the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world today. Yet as history amply demonstrates, even policies based on good intentions can be counter-productive.

Lifting the blockade is not the panacea that proponents claim it is. The notion that such a unilateral gesture of goodwill might prompt the Houthis to compromise and nudge them toward engaging constructively, even if only a little, in the peace process is not consistent with their behavior in recent years. On the contrary, as their power has grown, so have their ambitions, which they have pursued increasingly aggressively. Should Saudi Arabia lift the blockade, partially or completely, the Houthis would not likely respond benevolently but would instead exploit the opportunity to violently push back their rivals. Oil allowed to come into Hudaydah port, for example, would largely be diverted to fuel the Houthi war machine. As they have repeatedly done, the Houthis would also weaponize humanitarian assistance, diverting food to their fighters and supporters.

The Houthis are in the process of building an increasingly brutal, repressive and obscurantist political order in northwest Yemen. Unilaterally lifting the blockade would only provide them with more resources to continue moving in this direction. It would not, in the longer term, improve the humanitarian situation in the areas of Yemen they control. However, it would damage the prospects of reaching a workable political solution in the future.

The Houthis’ response to the Stockholm Agreement is revealing in this regard.

The assumption behind the proposal to push Riyadh into lifting the blockade is that such an approach would represent a valuable first step toward improving the humanitarian situation, and would perhaps create more space for an eventual peace process to make progress. This is appealing in theory. In practice, however, the proposal’s desired impact – stopping and hopefully reversing the deterioration of the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen – would be unlikely to materialize. It would instead strengthen the Houthis’ brutal rule and would make future progress in pursuing peace more, not less, difficult. Friends of Yemen, in civil society and in regional and western capitals, should instead focus their energies on identifying, and then pursuing, solutions for a comprehensive peace process – which include, as part of a broader package but not in isolation, the lifting of the blockade.

My comment: This would mean that the matter of the blockade should be used as a bargaining chip for any negotiations with the Houthis.

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Wikipedia: Blockade of Yemen

The blockade of Yemen refers to a sea, land and air blockade on Yemen which started with the positioning of Saudi Arabian warships in Yemeni waters in 2015 with the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen. The United States fired at Houthi rebels in the region in October 2016.[1] In November 2017, after a Houthi missile heading towards King Khalid International Airport was intercepted,[2] the Saudi-led military coalition stated it would close all sea land and air ports to Yemen,[3] but shortly began reopening them after criticism from the United Nations (UN) and over 20 aid groups.[4] The blockade of Yemen has resulted in widespread starvation, to the extent that the United Nations has raised concerns about the possibility of it becoming the deadliest famine in decades.[5][6] The World Health Organization announced that the number of suspected persons with cholera in Yemen reached approximately 500,000 people.[7][8]

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YPC: Three Fuel Tankers Left to Outside Yemen

The official spokesman for the Yemen Petroleum Company, Essam Al-Mutawakel, said that three fuel tankers left to outside Yemen, after the coalition prevented their entry to Hodeidah port several months ago.

Al-Mutawakel clarified that 5 other tankers are still being held off the coast of Jizan, despite having obtained United Nations permits, which have become clear that they ignore the suffering of Yemeni people.

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Yemen Petroleum Company in Sanaa calls on UN to return to Convention on Law of Sea

The Yemen Petroleum Company in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa on Tuesday said it has called on the United Nations to return to the Convention on the Law of the Sea as it criticised holding fuel ships destined for Hudaydah seaport by a Saudi-led coalition fighting in the country.

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

Siehe / Look at cp1

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Islamic Relief: Jemen : 6 Jahre Leiden

Hungersnot, Cholera, Gewalt und der Coronavirus verschlechtern die ohnehin schon sehr schwierigen Lebensbedingungen der Jemeniten noch zunehmend.

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Turkish organizations bring hope to Yemen in Ramadan

Aid organizations distribute iftar, food packages to those in need in Yemen

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Our team distributed 15 urgent Ramadan food baskets to poor families in a remote village north of Sana'a (photos)

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With Children Near Death, 'Hunger Ward' Is A Hard Film To Watch

NPR's Scott Simon speaks to director Skye Fitzgerald about his Oscar-nominated documentary Hunger Ward, and the children who are starving to death during the civil war in Yemen.

SIMON: "Hunger Ward" is a nominee in the best documentary short subject category for tomorrow night's Academy Awards. It is the second Oscar nomination for the director Skye Fitzgerald, whose other films include "Lifeboat" and "50 Feet from Syria."

SIMON: The nurse we meet in your film, Mekkia Mahdi, talks about Yemen. She says, all the pillars of our society have been destroyed. And you see the shattered apartments and the schools and no food, no work and, of course, families. She says, we have gone back 100 years. Is there much of anything left that resembles what we would call normal life?

FITZGERALD: If you look at just the infrastructure of the country, you know, access to stores, to paycheck's, easy transit from one side of town to another in these conflict areas, I would say normal life does not exist in Yemen right now. And yet you see this incredible resilience. And I think nurse Mekkia and Dr. Al-Sadeeq are examples of that, right? Both of them, despite this fractured landscape they're working within, continue to do this work as if it's the most normal thing in the world to get up in the morning and to walk into a therapeutic feeding center and to be faced with dozens of children on the verge of death because of simple lack of food.

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Minnesota native hopes Oscar-nominated film draws attention to crisis in Yemen

If "Hunger Ward" wins an Oscar Sunday night at the 93rd Academy Awards, it could help the short documentary save lives.

Coproduced by 1984 Stillwater High School graduate Mike Scheuerman, and directed by Skye Fitzgerald, the 39-minute doc was shot in two pediatric malnutrition hospitals in Yemen in 2020.

Its main "characters" are health care workers and two children, Abeer, who was 6 and weighed 12 pounds during filming, and Omeima, who was 10 and weighed 24 pounds.

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This Ramadan, Children In Yemen Are Struggling To Survive

The holy month of Ramadan will be particularly difficult this year for families in Yemen, home of the world's worst humanitarian crisis.

Six years of conflict, widespread economic collapse and now COVID-19 have pushed the country to the brink, leaving 80 percent of the population — including 12.4 million children — in need of humanitarian assistance.

Nearly 2.3 mllion children under age 5 in Yemen are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition in 2021; 400,000 could die if they do not receive urgent treatment. To protect Yemen's most vulnerable children, UNICEF health workers are on the ground, screening children for malnutrition and referring those in need to health centers, where they can receive the treatment they need to survive.

Yemen's youngest children are not responsible for the violent conflict unfolding around them, but they are paying the highest price. UNICEF has been on the ground since the crisis began, taking every measure possible to protect the health and rights and safety of millions of Yemeni children. But UNICEF can't do it alone. There is an urgent need for individuals, organizations and governments to come together and take action. Every child in Yemen deserves a safe and happy childhood.

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Young boy raises money for Yemen crisis

Nine-year-old Abdullah Chaudhry is fasting during Ramadan to raise money in order to help those in Yemen living under famine and conflict.

He is taking part in the “Kids Fight Famine” challenge, a movement with Islamic Relief Canada that aims to help raise awareness on the crisis in Yemen.

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WHO: Yemen: Health Cluster Achievements (February 2021)

Yemen: Health Cluster Achievements (March 2021)

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Making Health Care Accessible in Yemen: The Power of Mobile Health Teams

In Yemen, millions of people lack access to health care. Less than half of the country’s health facilities are fully functional, though after six years of violent conflict, more than 80% of the population is in need of humanitarian assistance. Healthcare needs are spiking due to COVID-19, widespread acute malnutrition, poverty, and other effects of the conflict, though reductions in funding have forced the UN to suspend aid to 300 health centers across Yemen.

Access to healthcare is most critical for rural, remote, and poverty-affected communities. To address this growing health crisis, MedGlobal is launching a Mobile Teams program to bring health care to communities in need. These Mobile Teams will deliver primary health services to underserved, hard-to-reach areas in the Al Shamayateen and Al Mozea districts of Taiz governorate.

The ongoing conflict – for which Taiz has become a frontline – adds additional hurdles to access and exacerbates health needs. The region has the highest recorded number of landmines and 2,300 civilians have been killed since fighting began, the worst civilian death toll of any governorate. In 2019 alone, seven health facilities were attacked in this region, impacting access to health services for more than 32,500 households.

MedGlobal’s three Mobile Teams, each composed of a team leader, nurse, midwife, and medical assistant, will coordinate with four health facilities in these districts to ensure widespread coverage and continuity of care

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The bloodstained beauty of Yemen

Mariateresa Cacciapuoti, former Head of Sana’a Center Sub-Delegation in Yemen looks back on her mission which began in 2019.

While the entire planet was in lockdown, I had the privilege to travel across Yemen to provide assistance to the COVID-19 quarantine and isolation centers, to support with food and medical supplies to the isolated communities on the frontline areas.

I travelled through beautiful Sana'a, Yemen's capital, with its unique and breathtaking architecture and colorful windows, passing through the dynamic city of Dhammar, reaching the green valleys that guide you to Ibb Governorate, down to the south where Al-Dhale lies with its expansive farm fields.

The long and exhausting trip from Sana'a to Marib, where I enjoyed the priceless privilege to see Yemen's landscape from the vantage point of ICRC's aircraft, a view most Yemeni people have never managed to see: the beautiful bay of Aden with its fishermen and their small boats that become more and more colorful when the RED (the code name of the ICRC's aircraft) approaches the airport.

When the RED does its majestic tour on the bay of Aden you can touch the water, smell the fish and feel the sea breeze on your face.

Yemen is a palette of the nature: the fresh air of Sanaa, the water of Aden, the desert of Hadhramaut, the field of Ibb's valleys.

Travelling from Seyoun to Marib was my One Thousand and One Nights with 400KM of road surrounded by majestic stones, where the mountains are kissed by the first light of the early morning and the last moment of sunset.

This is a conflict that has led to deteriorating economic realities affecting families in almost every governorate, city, or village I visited in Sanaa, Dhammar, al Bhaida, Ibb, Al Dhale, Adhramout, Marib, leaving millions of people surviving on just one meal a day.

As head of an ICRC sub-delegation, I covered an area with extended active frontlines from al Jawf to marib, Al Bhaida, Al Dhale, and Taiz. I have been overwhelmed by the humanitarian needs, the overwhelmed morgues, and the overflowing hospitals.

Schools were often empty. I saw kids in places where they should never be: quarantine centers at the frontline area, outside the morgue waiting to see their father's body, at hospital with their mothers waiting for someone to help them overcome their malnutrition.

Yes, Yemeni people are suffering but they still can smile at you and share with you whatever they have. Thousands of suffering stories are being hidden behind their smiles (with photos)

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Yemen’s Island of Natural Wonder and Beauty

Despite its paradise status, the island faces numerous challenges as many are at the forefront of the impact of rising poverty amidst the conflict.

In addition, Mother Nature has also recently been unkind with severe water scarcity – particularly in rural areas – and devastating cyclones during the Monsoon season. These are only expected to worsen with increasing climate change effects – placing livelihoods and regular income in a precarious position.

In partnership with the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Social Fund for Development (SFD) and our partners in Socotra’s communities, continue to work toward a brighter future for this isolated paradise. By providing key services, temporary employment, increased financial stability, and new skills, Soqotris are better equipped to navigate an increasingly unpredictable geopolitical and environmental climate, and recover better from future shocks through programmes promoting economic growth and development in the region.

The Dragon’s Blood tree, an image of hardiness with its knotted branches and gnarled trunk, is considered a jewel of diversity in the Arabian Sea. It is the crowning symbol of Socotra, bleeding a deep-red resin and cannot be found anywhere else in the world.

But even this natural wonder, a symbol of Soqotris, has not escaped the mark of civil war. Unfortunately, increasing environmental disasters including raging cyclones and crippling droughts – coupled with reduced international aid due to the on-going war – has resulted in the Dragon Blood’s tree numbers dwindling across the island.

Isolated and plagued by storms and floods, Soqotris struggle with weather in its most extreme. When the rain stops, drought prevails. During the dry season, water reservoirs are the lifeblood of the people of Socotra. However, open reservoirs threatened local communities as children and animals easily fall into them – risking contamination or unfortunate deaths.

YECRP helps communities protect their open rainwater reservoirs through cash-for-work programmes to build protection walls around the water. “Fencing our rainwater reservoirs helps protect our children and animals and prevents diseases from contaminating our water,” says Sulaiman Ali Mubarak, one of the 60 cash-for-work participants from Tawafoq village.

“We also received training while we worked, and working on the project helped [community members] gain experience and new skills,” he notes (photos)

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WFP Yemen Emergency Dashboard, March 2021

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WFP Yemen Country Brief, March 2021

8.3 million people targeted in March 2021

64,800 mt of general food assistance

US$10.1 million cash-based transfers

US$9.8 million food vouchers

US$344.3 million six-month net funding requirements (May– October 2021)

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Yemen: Monthly Situation Report (March 2021)

93,653 CU2 were provided with BSFP commodities through hundreds of food distribution points in 11 districts of IBB, Taizz, Hajjah, and Dhamar governorates.

1,743 MAM cases received therapeutic supplements of Plumpy Sup & WSB+ throughout 12 supported health facilities in Sama and As Silw districts of Taizz governorate.

77,715 individuals were benefitted from awareness-raising campaigns on health and nutrition key messages in 11 districts of IBB, Taizz, Hajjah, and Dhamar governorates.

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Real time pics Finally we got the permit from local authorities here in #Yemen to distribute food aid baskets. Our project today was funded by @SzkolydlaPokoju for 100 families & @monareliefye's fundraising campaign in patreon for 100 others.

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Yemen Humanitarian Fund 2020 Stakeholder Survey Results

Despite the Fund’s efforts to enable quick response to the urgent needs in Yemen, nearly half of the respondents indicated that the 2020 YHF allocation processes were not timely. This perception is likely a result of lengthy negotiations to define the 2020 COVID-19 response allocation priorities and delays in launching the 2020 standard allocation until November when sufficient funding was available. In addition, many respondents asked to make YHF allocations more predictable, which would allow partners to prepare for them better.

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Yemen Women Protection AoR Services, Q1 – 2021

Yemen Women Protection AoR Services, Mar 2021

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Welcome to The Humanitarian Forum - Yemen

A local organization made up of 21 local humanitarian organization works in all humanitarian fields around Yemen.

What is the Humanitarian Forum

Humanitarian Forum – Yemen is a local Yemeni NGO. It is the largest network of organizations in Yemen and has more than 21 member organizations in Yemen, acting on enhancing and coordination and cooperation among NGOs in terms of capacity development, implementing various programs and activities and. It was officially established and authorized during the year 2009 to include a lot of civil NGOs/cooperation’s and now seeking to enlarge the membership at governorates.
The Humanitarian Forum believes in the ability of human and humanitarian organizations with different cultural and civilizational backgrounds to work ogether to ddress the causes of poverty and injustice in the world. It will have an unprecedented role in addressing poverty and increasing the volume of aid by attracting aid from local humanitarian development organizations to provide security and prosperity because of the ability of these local organizations to employ their knowledge of Internal characteristics of these communities and the importance of this kind of local knowledge and aexperience in the global humanitarian work .


To develop and develop civil society organizations, build bridges and partnership between organizations and with international organizations and donors to carry out quality humanitarian work at the local and global levels.

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Film: #Socotra, known as the “island abode of bliss” in Sanskrit, is a paradise for unique plants & animals. Find out how

@UNDP's partnership w/ @WorldBank & @SFDYemen helped Socotris protect their island & livelihoods.

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

Siehe / Look at cp17a

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[Hadi gov.] Yemen authorities calls on UNHCR to play greater role in Marib

Deputy Governor of Marib Abd-Rabbu Miftah has called on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to play a greater role towards the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Marib.

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Over 230 Ethiopian migrants return from Yemen

So far in 2021, IOM collaborated with the U.S. State Department's Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) to help over 230 Ethiopian migrants to get back to their country through its Voluntary Humanitarian Return programme, the organization added.

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QRCS builds shelter homes for displaced families in Yemen

Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS) is building 224 housing units in two towns of Abs District, Hajjah Governorate, to shelter 1,680 displaced persons affected by war and flooding in Yemen.

This emergency response is part of Qatar’s continued commitment to relieving Yemenis and alleviating the impact of the prolonged humanitarian crisis.

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Schleppung von 3 Männern aus Jemen: Polizei Vorarlberg

Am 23.04.2021 wurde im Rahmen von Schwerpunktkontrollen am Grenzübergang Hörbranz auf der A 14 gegen 20:30 Uhr ein PKW mit italienischem Kennzeichen angehalten und kontrolliert. Dabei wurde festgestellt, dass die Lenkerin, eine 53-jährige ital. Staatsbürgerin, drei männliche Personen im Alter von 33, 37 und 45 Jahren, die sich mit einem Reisepass aus Jemen auswiesen, in Richtung Deutschland befördern wollte. Die drei Männer besaßen kein gültiges Visum und stellten im Rahmen der Befragung einen Asylantrag. Die Lenkerin wird aufgrund des Verdachtes der Schlepperei auf freiem Fuße angezeigt.

und auch

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'Misery cannot be measured here': a struggle for survival in Yemen

At the end of a treacherous road winding its way between jagged ridges, dozens of families have turned a desolate mountainside into a safe haven of sorts from Yemen's years-long war.

The bedraggled community -- tucked inside a Huthi rebel stronghold close to the Saudi border in Saada province where battles have raged between the Huthis and pro-government forces -- fled their homes three years ago.

With their belongings strapped on the backs of donkeys, they kept moving further north under the threat of snipers and air strikes until they stopped hearing any fighting.

That was when they realised the mountainside of the Al-Azhour range would be their new home.

"They had to flee because of the war... and look for safe areas. They found it here, in this valley, in this place which is completely unsuitable for living," said Mattar Ahmed, an official in Saada's Razeh district.

"Circumstances have forced them to live in this place despite the harsh conditions. Misery cannot be measured here," he told AFP.

In Al-Azhour, more than 700 displaced people, many of them women and children, have been living in makeshift tents haphazardly clinging to the mountainside, amongst garbage and puddles of murky water.

With no health facilities nearby and limited access to clean water, they are vulnerable to disease.

Residents of the camp have to travel long distances on foot for basic necessities, with pregnant women and children the most at risk.

"We live between rocks. We don't have access to clean water," one resident told AFP as a 4x4 truck carrying three fighters strained to make its way up a steep and bumpy slope through the settlement, which is accessible only with the hardiest vehicles.

Razeh district was a battlefield between the Huthis and the government even before the current conflict erupted in the summer of 2014, when the rebels launched their military campaign by taking over the capital Sanaa.

With no sign of a peace deal, the 100 families on the mountainside are among countless Yemenis who have had to do their best to adapt, hoping to return to their homes one day (photos) =

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis


Houthis' missile depot explodes in Yemen's Sanaa: residents

A missile depot of Yemen's Houthi militia exploded in a series of blasts in the capital city of Sanaa at dawn on Monday, residents said.

The blasts in the depot in al-Jiraf neighborhood in the northern part of Sanaa rocked the whole city.

The residents said the windows of many residential buildings in al-Jiraf were blown out by the blasts.

Shrapnel also damaged dozens of the nearby citizens' houses, according to the witnesses.

The Houthi authorities cordoned off the site. There haven't been reports of casualties so far.

and also

Films: A number of explosions rocked #Sanaa last night. The cause remains unclear but many houses in the area (close to Saudi German Hospital) were damaged



Local sources rule out Sanaa explosions caused by airstrike

Local sources ruled out on Monday that the overnight explosions which rocked Yemen's capital Sanaa were caused by a Saudi-led airstrike.

No warplanes were heard before or during the explosions in the northern part of the city which has been controlled by the Houthi group since 2014, the sources told Debriefer.

and also

(A P)

Houthis im Jemen: Corona ist biologische Kriegsführung der USA und der Zionisten

Ein Gelehrter der mit dem Iran verbündeten Houthi-Milizen im Jemen erklärte Israel und die USA würden Corona vor dem Ramadan verbreiten, um die Menschen vom Moschee-Gang abzuhalten. Es ist nicht das erste Mal, dass er mit antisemitischen Verschwörungstheorien zu Corona aufwartet.

(A P)

Houthi Scholar Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Ubeidi: Israel And The U.S. Use Drones To Spread COVID-19 In Yemen To Prevent People From Attending Mosques During Ramadan

Houthi scholar Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Ubeidi said that recent cases of COVID-19 that were identified in Yemen were part of a "premeditated biological warfare" waged against Yemen by the "Israeli-Zionist enemy and the American enemy." He made these remarks during a Friday sermon that was delivered in Sana'a, Yemen, and aired on Al-Eman TV (Houthis-Yemen) April 9, 2021. Al-Ubeidi said that Israel and America use drones to spread the virus so people will be afraid of going to the mosques, because "they want people to be infidels."

(A P)

Ansarallah confirms Iranian Foreign Ministry position on Yemen

Mohammad Ali Al-Houthi confirmed the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement on Friday in which the Islamic Republic only gives political support to Yemen and does not provide military advice to the country.

(A P)

Yemen: Houthis Throw Abducted Model Al-Hammadi Into Solitary Confinement

Iran-backed Houthis have thrown abducted Yemeni model and actress Entesar Al-Hammadi into solitary confinement as punishment for her protest against the initial incarceration and prison conditions, the model’s lawyer said on Thursday.

Khaled Mohammed Al-Kamal told Arab News that a prosecutor from the rebel-controlled West Sanaa court on Wednesday questioned the model inside the central prison after officials refused to transfer her for a court trial over the past few weeks.

When the investigation ended, the 20-year-old Al-Hammadi verbally clashed with a captor and shouted out about the abduction and miserable prison conditions she had experienced.

Prison officials responded to the outburst by holding Al-Hammadi in solitary confinement, the lawyer said.

“She was separated from her colleagues,” Al-Kamal said. “She is going through bad psychological conditions inside the prison.”


(A P)

Yemeni model detained as Huthis impose morals crackdown

But Hammadi's lawyer Khaled al-Kamal said she was targeted for working in the fashion industry which the Shiite rebels consider a violation of Islamic culture.

Hammadi was snatched on February 20 along with two other models and their friend who was driving them to a photo shoot, the lawyer told AFP.

"I still don't know what she is accused of," he said.

According to Kamal there have been attempts to defame the young woman, with unverified local reports alleging that she was involved in prostitution and drugs.

"The prosecution is trying to make it look like an act of gross indecency, claiming that my client has let out two strands of her hair out or was not wearing a hijab in a public space," he said.

Hammadi's detention follows a series of incidents in rebel-held areas that illustrate the Huthis' determination to impose their own moral code on Yemenis who have been enduring years of grinding conflict. =

(* B P)

Videos surface online reportedly showing Iran-backed Houthi child soldier recruitment

Videos have surfaced on social media purportedly showing the militarization of schools in Yemen controlled by the Iran-backed Houthis.

“For the sake of pride, for the sake of dignity, we must sacrifice so that future generations live in pride and honor,” the boy said in the performance that was watched by other schoolchildren.

and also


(B P)

Film: Sana'a .. Education during the era of AbdulMalik Al-Houthi. Militarization of schools


(B P)

Film: #Houthis instill their violent ideology into children's minds


(B P)

Film: "Go, you piece of my soul , ...embark on the path of Al Al-bayt (the family of the Prophet Muhammad/ Hashemits)".

(A P)

Houthis abduct three civilians from Yemeni village

Houthi "terrorists" have abducted three civilians from the Yemeni village of "Beit Al-Jabr" in the governorate of Dhamar, the Saudi Press Agency reported on Friday.

The Houthis took their victims to a detention center in Jabal Al-Sharq district, in the same governorate controlled by the Iran-backed group, the report said.

The raiders claimed they were taking the victims under the pretext of setting up a funeral council, but the official Yemeni News Agency (Saba) quoted a local source as saying there was no such plan to establish a funeral council, SPA said.

(A P)

Member of Hadi’s parliament amongst new defectors who join revolutionary Yemeni ranks

The National Center for Returnees in Sana’a has on Tuesday received about 20 former mercenaries, including a member of parliament.

Hamid al-Jabarti, a member of parliament in the Saudi-led Hadi government, as well as the commander of the First Battalion of the Sixth Brigade, Haitham Ibrahim Arik, have reportedly returned to the homeland from a number of mercenary camps in the border areas and on the West Coast front.

The returnees called on the rest of Yemenis deceived by the Saudis to take advantage of the general amnesty, to return safely and peacefully to the national Yemeni ranks

(A P)

Yemeni diplomat: Saudi actions at border crossing are part of continued campaign of aggression against Yemen

cp6 Südjemen und Hadi-Regierung / Southern Yemen and Hadi-government

Siehe / Look at cp1

(A P)

Clashes erupt between armed factions in Aden

Clashes between unidentified armed factions erupted on Sunday night in Dar Sa’ad district, in the north of Aden city.

Local people told Alsahwa Net that they heard raucous explosions, pointing out that the factions might use RPGs and offensive bombs.

Sources in Aden cited that the clashes might occur due to disputes over lands.

(A P)

Shatara: War on Southerners targets their political project

We will remember these days when the people of the South are being subjected to to a fierce war on basic public services, the member of the Presidency of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), Vice-President of the National Assembly for Control and Inspection, Lufti Shatara said on Monday.
Shatara made it clear in a tweet that "the war launched on the Southerners is meant to eliminate their political project carried by the STC."
"The STC has built an extensive network of relationships that went beyond the region to develop close ties with the international community." he added.
"We will remember this suffering as part of the past as well as the blood of our martyrs spilled on the way to the goal that we all wish for," Shatara confirmed, concluding his tweet by saying "just be patient."

(A P)

Disputes force STC to change military leaders

Disputes between its chairman and leaders forced the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) on Friday to make military changes to its ranks.

(A P)

Power stations in Saudi-held city of Aden on the brink of shutdown due to fuel crisis

The power stations of the Saudi-occupied port city of Aden, southern Yemen, are about to stop in the coming hours, local sources said on Thursday.

The sources attributed the reasons for the potential shutdown of power stations to the lack of fuel to operate the power stations, indicating that the Saudi grant announced a month ago had not arrived yet.

“The depletion of diesel stocks from Aden refineries threatens the residents and people of the city with darkness during the nights of the holy month Ramadan,” the sources explained.


(A P)

Protests held in Aden against power outage

Dozens of angry protesters took to the streets of the southern capital Aden on Friday, in protest against long hours of power cuts.
The protesters blocked the main road of al-Malla district and and set some rubber tires on fire in other districts to express their anger over the continuous power cuts of more than 12 hours.
They also called the people to hold a massive rally against the policy of collective torture that deliberately and systematically practiced by influential powers to target Aden and the South in general.
The electricity supply limited to only 2 hours a day amid the silence of the government and the Arab Coalition, protesters told the local press.

and also

(A P)

Yemen president Hadi convenes meeting of senior officials in Riyadh

(A P)

TSC’s militias seizing 12-year child in Aden

Forces of the UAE-backed Transactional Southern militias have been seizing a 12-year child for five days.

Security sources told Alsahwa Net that the child’s family were trying to contact her child, but the abducting forces refuses to give any information about the child.

The source explained that the child was disappeared to force his family to submit his eldest brother.

(A K P)

Southern soldier abducted in Shabwa

The Islah militias (Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood) abducted on Thursday, a soldier of the Shabwa Elite Forces (SEF) in Shabwa governorate.

(A P)


(* A P)

Coalition spokesman, military delegation arrive in Yemeni Socotra

A military delegation led by the Arab coalition spokesman, Turki al-Maliki, arrived in the Yemeni southern island of Socotra on Thursday.
The coalition delegation "came to solve the problem resulted from the coup against the State institutions in Socotra archipelago," Yemen's former minister of fisheries tweeted.
"There is a common desire to accelerate life normalization in Socotra archipelago and return of the State and local authority, and to galvanize the State institutions," Fahd Kafein added, after "the crisis there worsened and led to security, living and service collapse in the island.
"The coalition delegation arrival in Socotra carries a message that the Saudis seek to solve the problem in the island, following local calls for Riyadh to honor its promise in this regard.
"We expect practical measures after talks on an action plan for local authority to resume work.. so as to halt deterioration experienced by service and security conditions in Socotra.
"Practical actions and application of what was agreed in Riyadh (in terms of the State return and ending the coup) is the sought result from any efforts exerted in this regard," the ex-minister said, noting that any delay would be in cost of Socotra people.
Socotra has been under the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council since 10 June 2020, when the island official government-appointed governor was expelled following clashes.

(A P)

The governor of Socotra Ramzi Mahroos warns against the implementation of a fingerprint collection project – by the occupation state of UAE- in military and security units in the archipelago./Multiple websites.

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp7 – cp19

Vorige / Previous:

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-736 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-736: oder / or

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

07:47 27.04.2021
Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
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Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
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Dietrich Klose