... Safer: Das Schiff, das zur Bombe wurde – Einbindung von Frauen in den Friedensprozess im Jemen – das Ölgeschäft vereint Huthis und Hadis Regierung – Jemens alte, hoch aufragende Wolkenkratzerstädte – CENTCOM: Abkehr von Amerikas imperialen Wahnvorstellungen – und mehr
Oct. 7, 2021. Yemen, a battle for the badlands – Biden’s Yemen conundrum – Al-Qaeda’s decline in Yemen – Improving relations between central state institutions and local authorities – Safer: The ship that became a bomb – Engaging women in Yemens’s peace process – Oil business unites Houthis andHadi's government – Yemen's ancient, soaring skyscraper cities – CENTCOM: Recovering from America’s imperial delusions – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-763b-yemen-war-mosaic-763b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp8a Jamal Khashoggi
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp11 Deutschland / Germany
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp12a Katar-Krise / Qatar crisis
cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade
cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage
cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy
cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism
cp15 Propaganda
cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
cp19 Sonstiges / Other
Klassifizierung / Classification
***
**
*
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:
Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-einfuehrende-artikel-u-ueberblicke
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
(** B K)
In Yemen, a battle for the badlands
In harsh desert terrain on the outskirts of Marib, Iran-backed Houthi rebels are fighting the internationally recognized government, backed by a Saudi-led military coalition, for control of its strategic stronghold in the country’s north.
If the Houthis were to seize control of the province, also called Marib, this would award the group near-total control of northern Yemen, access to key oil and gas infrastructure, and an upper hand in talks aimed at ending the conflict. For government forces, this would mark an enormous setback.
More than 1 million civilians fleeing fighting elsewhere have streamed into Marib province in recent years, and many could now be displaced again as the battle inches closer. Some, including children, have already been killed and wounded by missile attacks and shelling.
The Houthis have instead pressed their campaign to wrest control of Marib province. To hold the Houthis back, government troops and allied local forces have dug trenches into hillsides and positioned themselves atop the peaks that dot the arid landscape, using the high ground to fire across the sandy expanse.
They are bolstered by frequent Saudi airstrikes against Houthi positions nearby. But the government forces are themselves vulnerable to Houthi missile and drone strikes.
“Facing the ballistic missiles and drones, this is the biggest problem,” said Lt. Gen. Sagheer bin Aziz, chief of staff of the Yemeni army, speaking near the front line west of Marib city. The interview was briefly interrupted when a Houthi drone was spotted overhead, forcing soldiers and Washington Post journalists to scramble to a safer location.
The Houthis have stepped up those missile and drone attacks in response to Saudi airstrikes, according to Dhaifallah al-Shami, minister of information in Houthi-controlled Sanaa, saying that “it’s one eye for another.”
At least 1,700 government troops in Marib province have been killed and around 7,000 wounded so far this year in such attacks as well as by persistent sniper fire and other hostilities, bin Aziz said. The Houthis, who do not release official death counts, are also believed by analysts to be sustaining serious casualties, largely due to the Saudi airstrikes.
The battle for this strategic province is hampering renewed efforts to put an end to the war, analysts say, with talks largely stalled.
“What we see is full-on determination by the Houthis to take Marib,” said Timothy Lenderking, who President Joe Biden appointed as U.S. special envoy for Yemen. And the battle for the province, he said, is “the stumbling block” in negotiations.
Early this year, the Biden administration, eager to distance itself from the widely criticized conflict, withdrew its support for the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive operations and reversed a Trump administration decision labeling the Houthis a terrorist group. That designation threatened to interfere with international aid efforts, relief groups said.
The withdrawal of U.S. support “affected our morale as leaders,” said bin Aziz, the army chief of staff. “We want our American friends to reconsider this decision.” – BY SIOBHÁN O’GRADY, ALI AL-MUJAHED
https://www.stripes.com/theaters/middle_east/2021-10-01/yemen-marib-strategic-stronghold-iran-backed-houthi-rebels-3091551.html = https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2021/yemen-war-marib-houthis/
und eine schlechte deutsche Teilübersetzung: https://www.theaktuellenews.com/nachrichten/der-kampf-um-das-oedland-des-jemen/
(** B P)
Biden’s Yemen Conundrum
Despite asserting that the United States was not giving up on conflict resolution, and specifically mentioning Yemen and Ethiopia in this context, Biden’s critics accuse him of doing exactly the opposite and charge that his “America is back” slogan is no different from his predecessor’s “America first.” Critics cite that Washington is clinging to the security partnerships in the Gulf and preparing for a potential confrontation with China as evidence of the persistence of a cold war mentality. The recent submarine deal with Australia, for example, prioritized an Anglo-Saxon alliance with the United Kingdom and Australia over a broader NATO/European entente, one that could not be guaranteed to go along with a forceful strategy in the Pacific.
US-Saudi Tensions
The urge to end US involvement in Middle East wars—demonstrated by the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan—clashes with the expressed need to continue the global war on terror. This was a concern voiced by ranking military officers in their September 29th congressional testimony that al-Qaeda elements remain on the ground in Afghanistan. Indeed, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), considered the organization’s strongest branch, remains very much a factor in Yemen; the continued US effort to confront it requires both the direct use of force and the assistance of friends and partners in the region. American officials have historically described Saudi Arabia as a partner in the war on terror, and the Biden Administration has not been an exception in this regard. The desire of the United States to disengage from the Middle East poses conflicts in its war against terror, and Biden’s pledge to pressure Saudi leaders on their human rights policies (it is noteworthy that Sullivan’s recent visit coincided with the third anniversary of the murder of Jamal Khashoggi) makes for dissonance regarding the kingdom’s role as a US partner while continuing to act as a human rights violator.
Leverage on Saudi Arabia, therefore, remains compromised as long as conflicting goals pull the United States in different, often opposing, directions. The same could be said of the United Arab Emirates, whose cooperation is also needed in tamping down the war in Yemen—but this is once again complicated by an uneasy relationship with the Biden Administration.
The Iran Factor
Biden’s desire to enlist Iran’s cooperation not only in returning to the nuclear agreement but also in conflict resolution in the region also faces a tough challenge. Iran, which remains a foe—pending a return to the JCPOA—is another important regional player with impact on the Yemeni conflict. However, it also presents a difficult case in terms of exercising any leverage to induce collaboration on ending the war.
Despite a genuine desire to return to the JCPOA, the Biden Administration seems torn between carrot-and-stick approaches.
Yemen’s Internal Dynamics
Regional influences, important as they are to the course of the conflict, only further complicate an already complex internal situation in Yemen.
New Leadership Needed
The presence of Saudi military and intelligence officers on the eastern borders in al-Mahra is testimony to their concern about national interests in that region of Yemen. UAE forces and military advisors, in turn, assert Emirati interests in Aden, Socotra, Mayoun Island, and, most recently, at the port of Balhaf on the southern coast of Shabwa—perhaps in preparation for potential Houthi advances should their forces succeed in taking Marib city. Differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two main pillars of the Arab coalition fighting in support of “legitimacy” in Yemen, are partly (but only partly) to blame for Yemeni divisiveness since the two countries support different factions and promote disparate potential leaders for a future Yemeni government. That said, and even if the United States could get these two regional powers to put aside their differences and work for a united, peaceful, and democratic Yemen, the internal schisms, which for long frustrated a skillful maneuverer like the late President Saleh, would certainly prove to be an insurmountable difficulty for any American peace negotiator. This is unless, of course, a new and more charismatic and skillful leader than President Hadi emerges on the scene and succeeds in bringing Yemenis back together – by Nabeel Khoury
https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/bidens-yemen-conundrum/= https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/10/09/bidens-yemen-conundrum/
(** B T)
Al-Qaeda’s Decline in Yemen: An Abandonment of Ideology Amid a Crisis of Leadership
Introduction
The decline of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen over the past five years was unexpected. Indicators in the years prior to the onset of the current conflict showed a group primed to expand its influence. The wave of protests against then-president Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011, and his subsequent resignation the following year, had left the country in disarray. A new president was at the helm and struggling with the ascending power of the Houthi movement. Conditions were thus favorable for AQAP to thrive amid the disorder and make inroads in Yemen outside its traditional areas of influence.
Circumstances shifted in 2015, however, as AQAP was at the height of its power. In April of that year, AQAP head Nasir al-Wuhayshi was killed in a US drone strike. Some observers have linked the killing of Al-Wuhayshi and other senior figures with the group’s decline in subsequent years, concluding that AQAP was going through a leadership crisis.[1] However, this reading of events, even if logical, oversimplifies the issue. It does not fully take into account the conditions, events and decisions that not only led to rifts within the group but, more importantly, caused an unprecedented identity crisis within AQAP. The most urgent crisis of Al-Qaeda in Yemen is linked not only to its faltering leadership, but also critically, wavering faith in the group’s ideology.
This paper tracks the evolution of AQAP from the period following Yemen’s 2011 Arab Spring-inspired uprising to the present day. Major topics covered include: the group’s reaction to the armed Houthi movement’s takeover of Sana’a and military expansion across large swathes of the country; its participation in the Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen, a turning point that exposed fatal security gaps; and the growing tensions with the Islamic State in Yemen, eventually leading to intra-jihadi conflict, internal security measures that alienated many members and ideological fractures within the organization.
Information for this paper was gathered through discussions with Al-Qaeda members, figures affiliated with the group, tribal leaders and former jihadis, conducted from 2014-2021, in the quest to understand the circumstances that have led to the declining power and footprint of the group in Yemen. Events related to AQAP and media content released by AQAP and others about the group over the same period were monitored and analyzed. Discussions were conducted through face-to-face meetings, virtual communications, as well as via intermediaries for those for whom a direct meeting was deemed too risky. All sources cited in this paper have been granted anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the topics discussed.
Conclusion: Will AQAP’s Retreat Continue?
There are two factors that indicate that AQAP’s decline will continue: the waning belief in the core idea of Al-Qaeda among many members; and the fact that the current leadership has proven incapable of dealing with the crisis in confidence.
A former jihadi who was close to Osama bin Laden believes that the Al-Qaeda branch in Yemen will likely go into a catatonic state for years to come. He attributes this mostly to the fact that Batarfi lacks leadership characteristics and is an ideological extremist.[44] AQAP’s second in command, Ibrahim al-Qawsi, known as Abu Khabib al-Sudani, shares similar failings with Batarfi. “I say this because I know him well, back from the days of jihad in Afghanistan when he was Sheikh Osama’s personal chef and one of the Shariah leaders close to him,” the former jihadi said.
Another former AQAP commander seconded these observations and stressed that the group’s leadership issues dated back to Al-Wuhayshi’s killing. His successor, Al-Raymi, was a brave fighter but lacked strategic vision and nuance.[45] “For instance, most of his strategy talks focused on the United States, and ignored Saudi Arabia, even though the latter was a bigger threat [to the group],” the former commander said. This misreading of the situation became clear when Saudi Arabia engaged Al-Qaeda under Al-Raymi to fight the Houthis, which ultimately weakened the ideological commitment and fighting spirit of the group’s members and critically undermined its security. The former commander has a more negative view of Batarfi, who he sees as lacking leadership qualities and strategic vision, as well as allowing emotions to guide his decision-making.
On the ground, Al-Qaeda has lost its main strongholds in multiple governorates and its number of local operations have significantly decreased. Its ideological foundation, meanwhile, has grown unstable as internal discord widened and a state of paranoia took hold of the group since 2015, leading to many defections and resignations.
Al-Qaeda in Yemen is certainly going through a leadership crisis. However, this is not the main factor behind its steady decline. The killing of Al-Wuhayshi and other prominent leaders in a short period was indeed unusual in the wider context of AQAP’s losses, but the direct link between his death and its regression does not tell the entire story. It was rather an indication of major flaws that existed before Al-Wuhayshi’s killing and persisted thereafter.
Since 2015, AQAP has misread Saudi Arabia’s intentions and left its security exposed; it allowed itself to be swept in the coalition’s war against the Houthis at a time when conditions were right for it to instead expand its independent influence; it sided with Al-Zawahiri’s position on IS against the general internal mood of the group; finally, it adopted a series of internal security measures that alienated many members. Whether it was out of arrogance, incompetence, or fear for its existence, the AQAP leadership made a series of decisions that shook the trust of the group’s members. The group’s main crisis lies in the weakening belief in its ideology, without which no willingness to sacrifice for the bigger cause can be mustered.
The intricacies of Al-Qaeda’s existence in Yemen, not least of which is its complex relationship with different segments of Yemeni society, and the road that led to its decline, call for further research to shed more light on how to counter the potential threat posed by the group. Topics for future study could include the relationship between AQAP and Al-Nahdi’s breakaway faction, as well as looking into the experience of counterterrorism efforts in southern Yemen by groups such as the Elite Forces. Finally, the Yemeni government and other countries whose citizens have joined AQAP should take advantage of the state of restlessness felt by many members to facilitate and encourage their return to their home countries and reintegration into society, which could be done through measures such as a general amnesty or reduced sentences – by Abdelrazzaq al-Jamal
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/15138
(** B P)
Improving Relations Between Central State Institutions and Local Authorities
Executive Summary
Local councils are responsible for spearheading development projects and providing basic public services to Yemen’s population of more than 30 million people. The councils are particularly important in rural areas, where about 70 percent of Yemen’s population lives.
In July 2018, the Rethinking Yemen’s Economy initiative published a White paper that explored how the collapse of Yemen’s economy and the fragmentation of central government institutions during the war affected local councils. This new White Paper builds on those findings by examining how local governance has evolved in the intervening years, with a focus on the relationship between local authorities and the central governments in Sana’a and Aden. This White Paper also incorporates new research on local governance in Yemen since 2018.
The findings of this paper broadly reflect governance trends witnessed in various parts of Yemen during the war. In Houthi-controlled areas, the central government in Sana’a has restricted the autonomy of local authorities as part of efforts to consolidate political control and redistribute revenues to the war effort. In Houthi-run parts of Hudaydah governorate, for example, the central government in Sana’a tightly controls virtually all aspects of local governance.
In areas nominally controlled by the internationally recognized government, the story is more mixed. Local authorities in the oil-producing governorates of Marib and Shabwa have gained unprecedented autonomy from the central government and used newfound revenues from oil and gas sales to fund government work and provide services.
However, in other governorates like Aden, local government autonomy has been crippled by political infighting and a shortage of revenues. Despite their proximity to central government institutions in Aden, local officials have struggled to carry out their basic duties. In parts of Hudaydah controlled by the internationally recognized government, local authorities receive negligible support from the central government, relying instead on the Saudi-led coalition and its partners on the ground for funding and support – by Abdilghani Al-Iryani, Casey Coombs and Salah Ali Salah
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/15153
(** B P)
The Ship That Became a Bomb
Stranded in Yemen’s war zone, a decaying supertanker has more than a million barrels of oil aboard. If—or when—it explodes or sinks, thousands may die.
Soon, a vast, decrepit oil tanker in the Red Sea will likely sink, catch fire, or explode. The vessel, the F.S.O. Safer—pronounced “Saffer”—is named for a patch of desert near the city of Marib, in central Yemen, where the country’s first reserves of crude oil were discovered. In 1987, the Safer was redesigned as a floating storage-and-off-loading facility, or F.S.O., becoming the terminus of a pipeline that began at the Marib oil fields and proceeded westward, across mountains and five miles of seafloor. The ship has been moored there ever since, and recently it has degraded to the verge of collapse. More than a million barrels of oil are currently stored in its tanks. The Exxon Valdez spilled about a quarter of that volume when it ran aground in Alaska, in 1989.
The Safer’s problems are manifold and intertwined. It is forty-five years old—ancient for an oil tanker. Its age would not matter so much were it being maintained properly, but it is not.
Before the war, the Yemeni state-run firm that owns the ship—the Safer Exploration & Production Operations Company, or sepoc—spent some twenty million dollars a year taking care of the vessel. Now the company can afford to make only the most rudimentary emergency repairs. More than fifty people worked on the Safer before the war; seven remain. This skeleton crew, which operates with scant provisions and no air-conditioning or ventilation below deck—interior temperatures on the ship frequently surpass a hundred and twenty degrees—is monitored by soldiers from the Houthi militia, which now occupies the territory where the Safer is situated. The Houthi leadership has obstructed efforts by foreign entities to inspect the ship or to siphon its oil. The risk of a disaster increases every day.
A vessel without power is known as a dead ship. The Safer died in 2017, when its steam boilers ran out of fuel. A boiler is a tanker’s heart, because it generates the power and the steam needed to run vital systems. Two diesel generators on deck now provide electricity for basic needs, such as laptop charging. But crucial processes driven by the boiler system have ceased—most notably, “inerting,” in which inert gases are pumped into the tanks where the crude is stored, to neutralize flammable hydrocarbons that rise off the oil.
Given these concerns, it is striking that many tanker-safety experts and former sepoc employees are more worried about the ship sinking than about it exploding. Its steel hull is corroding, as are its many pipes and valves. Last year, the skeleton crew had to make emergency repairs to a cracked pipe leaking seawater into the engine room; a sinking was narrowly averted. If the Safer goes under, one of two scenarios is likely: it would break free of its moorings and be dashed against coastal rocks, or its weakened hull would shear apart. In either event, the ship’s oil would spill into the water.
The Safer threatens not only the ecosystems of the Red Sea but also the lives of millions of people. A major spill would close a busy shipping lane. Not long ago, a British company, Riskaware, worked with two nonprofits, acaps and Satellite Applications Catapult, to generate projections for the U.K. government outlining possible outcomes of a disaster on the Safer, allowing for seasonal variations in Red Sea currents and wind patterns. In the worst forecasts, a large volume of oil would reach the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—the pinch point between Djibouti, on the African mainland, and Yemen.
In any scenario, Yemenis would suffer the most. The country, which has a population of thirty million, is already experiencing the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Tens of thousands of Yemenis live in famine conditions, and another five million face dire food insecurity. Twenty million people require the support of non-governmental organizations to access basic provisions, and four million are internally displaced.
A fire or an explosion on the Safer could pollute the air for up to eight million Yemenis, and would complicate the delivery of foreign aid to the western coast. A spill would be even more calamitous. Yemen’s Red Sea fishing industry has already been ravaged by the war. An oil slick would knock it out entirely. A big spill would also block the port of Hodeidah, which is some thirty miles southeast of the tanker. Two-thirds of Yemen’s food arrives through the port. In every projection presented to the U.K. government, Hodeidah remained closed for weeks; in the worst case, it did not reopen for six months. The United Nations, whose mission to Yemen is overstretched and underfunded, has no contingency plan to accommodate a shutdown of the Hodeidah port.
The Safer is not sinking. It is not on fire. It has not exploded. It is not leaking oil. Yet the crew of the ship, and every informed observer, expects disaster to occur soon. But how soon? A year? Six months? Two weeks? Tomorrow? In May, Ahmed Kulaib, the former executive at sepoc, told me that “it could be after five minutes.” Then five minutes passed, and then another.
The tension surrounding the Safer crisis is generated as much by different calibrations of time as by different assessments of risk. In an instant, a leak, a crack, or a spark could cause a disaster, and even in the best-case scenario any solution would take months to execute. If the U.N. were given permission to inspect the vessel tomorrow, it would need up to eight weeks to assemble a team and to reach the Safer. As for the military, commercial, or Iranian solutions, who knows how long they’d require? A spare supertanker cannot be summoned like a taxi. Unexpected things can happen in a war zone. Because of all these conflicting scenarios with unclear time frames, the Safer crisis feels at once urgent and endless. Each passing day seems like proof to one side that the worries about the ship are overblown, and to the other that one more inch on a bomb’s fuse has burned. The crisis unfolds at the speed of rust. – by Ed Caesar
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/10/11/the-ship-that-became-a-bomb
(** B P)
ENGAGING WOMEN IN YEMEN’S PEACE PROCESS REQUIRES BETTER ALLIANCES
The traditional approach to Yemen’s peace process—in which armed groups meet behind closed doors to mold a ceasefire or a political agreement—has hit a dead end.
The collective accomplishments and extensive experiences of Yemeni women as peacemakers and peacebuilders qualify them to be front and center in any and all processes that will shape Yemen’s future. These women have worked relentlessly to provide peace and stability to their respective communities. In addition to facilitating prisoner exchanges and opening humanitarian corridors, they continue to mediate local ceasefires and provide critical services to local populations. And yet, the essential contributions of Yemeni women to peace on the ground have yet to land them a seat at the formal negotiation table. Instead, their engagement with the formal peace process has been restricted to Track II informal consultations, often derisively referred to as forums for token representation.3 Furthermore, women and civil society working at the grassroots level (Track III) find it difficult to connect with actors at Track II and Track I of the peace process. This means that the current framework of the peace process fails to incorporate the needs and views of a broad constituency of Yemenis who are key to establishing a more locally resonant and sustainable peace.4
Currently, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY) is exploring new pathways for civil society actors to become more involved in the preparations for a ceasefire mechanism, which includes a temporary cessation of hostilities accompanied by humanitarian relief measures. Feeding into this process, in June 2021, the Yemen Policy Center (YPC) conducted consultations with 22 activists and women-led civil society organizations working at the grassroots level in Aden, Hadramout, Marib, Sana’a, and Taiz, as well as two women activists in the diaspora. These consultations identified challenges and opportunities for grassroots women’s engagement with the ceasefire negotiations at the different levels. To ensure the inclusivity of these processes, this research shows that improved alliances and partnerships between local state institutions and women’s groups (operating at various levels) are required. Connecting the different tracks can increase the engagement of women’s and civil society groups in the peace process—including in ceasefire negotiations—offering them the opportunity to enact a more influential role in the ceasefire implementation process.
The ceasefire negotiations present a good opportunity for the UN to deliver on its promises to ensure a more inclusive peace process.5 The research reveals that holding consultations with local women and civil society groups is paramount to understanding the various options for their involvement—so long as these engagements are meaningful and not simply box-ticking exercises. Research respondents warned against rushing these consultations and the whole ceasefire negotiation process to avoid creating a fragile ceasefire that would fail to hold up in the face of the weakest challenges. At the same time, they asserted that the OSESGY and other international actors (i.e. European Union member states, Security Council members) should apply pressure on Yemeni warring parties to open up the ceasefire negotiations to women and civil society groups. At a minimum, OSESGY should ensure that women and civil society groups are well informed about the ceasefire process and that their inputs can be channeled into the ceasefire negotiations and agreement.
Arguments that justify women’s exclusion from peace processes, including ceasefire negotiations, based on a perceived lack of capacities do not hold water.15 To the contrary, Yemeni women’s accomplishments and extensive experiences as peacemakers qualify them to be at the front and center of negotiations. International donors and INGOs, especially those working on the women, peace, and security agenda, should coordinate and channel their support to these grassroots women’s groups. As their work is mostly self-funded, grants with less prescriptive requirements and longer timeframes, but fewer bureaucratic hurdles, could create equitable funding opportunities accessible to small and informal organizations. Flexible funding approaches could allow grassroots organizations to respond to new and urgent problems with projects informed by the communities’ needs and priorities. Furthermore, equipping grassroots organizations with the necessary tools and training on advocacy, building network structures, and promoting organizational development will go a long way toward empowering Yemeni women and rebuilding Yemen’s civil society structures – by Hadil al-Mowafak
(** B E P)
The Yemeni oil business unites Houthis and supporters of Hadi's government
What appears to be corruption at the highest levels in Yemen has been exposed by the Pandora Papers, the series of leaked documents obtained by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) which mark the biggest ever cross-border journalistic collaboration project.
As Yemen's government-owned oil company was filing a complaint at the Public Prosecutor's office against oil trader Tawfiq Abdel-Rahim for stockpiling petrol and causing a crisis in the domestic market, two other traders were completing the paperwork to establish an offshore company, Red Sea Refinery Limited. Ahmad Saleh Al-Issi and Hussein Al-Huthaili are partnered with Zafar Ikram Sheikh, a Pakistani-born American businessman who lives in Dubai.
In early 2020, Al-Issi was appointed deputy director of the President's Office for Economic Affairs. He believes that he is a suitable candidate to be the next president of Yemen. His competitors, however, describe him as a "crocodile", and media reports have quoted the current Yemeni prime minister describing him as "corrupt".
In his early days, Al-Issi supervised a petrol station owned by his father in Yemen's Hudaydah Governorate. According to Le Monde, this was the first step on his way to a monopoly of the fuel that reaches the port of Aden. This would not have been possible if it had not been for his relationship with Hadi when the latter was minister of defence in the 1990s. Hadi and Al-Issi both come from Abyan Governorate in southern Yemen, and their strong relationship helped them to build a fleet to transport fuel.
The leaked documents reveal that Al-Issi established an offshore company with Al-Huthaili and Sheikh in the British Virgin Islands on 7 May, 2014. Its main purpose was to invest and contribute to other companies, and have a bank account.
Earlier this year, Al-Issi denied having any business activities in northern Yemen, which is controlled by the Houthis.
This claim is not consistent with his partnership with Al-Huthaili, whose activities have not stopped in the regions controlled by the Houthis. The transfer of oil there continues.
On 28 October 2015, after the Houthi movement took control of most of the northern governorates, the director of the Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) sent a letter to the acting minister of oil to complain about Al-Huthaili's company selling oil on the black market. The company only seized oil trucks in Al-Sabahiyah region, as it does not have any authority in the Ras Issa area of Hudaydah, which is run by Al-Issi. At this point, the Houthis were not in control of Ras Issa or Hudaydah Governorate.
The same memo accused Al-Huthaili's company of contributing to the hike in the dollar exchange rate from 215 to 280 Yemeni Riyals at that time. The company emptied the oil in Ras Issa and sold it on the black market. In just one week, it sold oil for $48 million.
According to Al-Issi, the prime minister is linked to large companies and commercial groups that facilitate their work and harness the state's support. These companies pay taxes to the Houthis.
Abdel-Malik reacted by paying Al-Issi what was owed to him in April. Al-Issi had said that the Yemeni government owed him money and had not paid its debts.
This conflict over the import and distribution of oil between Al-Issi and the government is due to the prime minister's decision to develop plans to allow traders to import oil to end the current monopoly.
The oil business in Yemen is linked to figures that have not changed for twenty-five years because they are connected to people in positions of power within the state. It is fairly common knowledge among Yemenis that Hussein Al-Huthaili, who owns an oil transportation fleet, is the frontman for Vice President Ali Muhsin Al-Ahmar, and Yemeni media outlets have published government directives to facilitate and protect Al-Ahmar's business activities. Moreover, as noted above, Al-Issi has had a strong relationship with President Hadi and his children since the early nineties.
In October 2019, citizens of the oil-rich Ma'rib province protested when Al-Huthaili's company was given the exclusive rights to transport oil from Ma'rib to Shabwa. Al-Huthaili's oil tankers were attacked, and there were demands for the transportation of oil to be handed over to local people. The same thing happened earlier this year in the Hadhramout Governorate when a group of local people objected to the transfer of oil from their land by Al-Huthaili's company – by Arab reporters for Investigative Journalism
(** B C)
Yemen's ancient, soaring skyscraper cities
Constructed using natural materials, Yemeni high-rises are superbly sustainable and perfectly suited to the hot and dry Arabian desert climate.
Sana'a is filled with buildings unlike anywhere else in the world. At street level, where mud-brick walls are only broken up by large wooden doors, there was often not much to see. But when I looked up, I realised these slender buildings, some with just one or two rooms to a floor, soared high into the sky.
While the lower floors, at street level, were windowless due to their use as animal shelters or working spaces, the ornate windows higher up were either covered by stained-glass or by delicate mashrabiya screens screens protecting the privacy of the women inside. The window frames and the friezes between the floors were marked in intricate white lime to contrast the mud-coloured background, creating a gingerbread house effect. Many had rooftop terraces, which doubled as entertainment spaces as well as outdoor bedrooms on warm nights. The magnificence of the buildings, together with their simple practicality, made for an inspiring architectural vision.
From the alleyway, it was practically impossible to appreciate the true height of these buildings, but when I reached the souq, I could see that some were up to seven storeys high.
Yemen is scattered with similar soaring constructions, from those in smaller villages to bigger towns, such as the famous Shibam, dubbed in the 1930s "The Manhattan of the Desert" by Anglo-Italian explorer Dame Freya Stark; or the exquisitely decorated Dar-al-Hajar, the Imam's Palace of the Rock.
The Yemeni skyscraper style of architecture is so unique that the cities of Zabid, Shibam and the Old City of Sana'a have been recognised as Unesco World Heritage sites, with the tradition dating at least to the 8th and 9th Centuries, according to Trevor Marchand, professor of social anthropology at London's School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) and author of Architectural Heritage of Yemen - Buildings That Fill My Eye. Exact dating is next to impossible, as these mud brick or adobe buildings need to be constantly patched up and restored to keep them from succumbing to the harsh elements, but "medieval sources tell us that the Ghumdam Palace in Sana'a, allegedly built in the 3rd Century BC and the seat of Yemen's ancient Sabaean rulers, was 20 storeys high and elaborately decorated," Marchand said.
"An important contributing factor to Yemen's history of tower-house was the need for security against invading forces, as well as during times of local tribal dispute or civil war," Marchand explained.
Constructed using natural materials, Yemeni high-rises are superbly sustainable and perfectly suited to the hot and dry Arabian desert climate. Roof terraces double as open-air bedrooms, while screens on the windows invite even the slightest breeze to enter the house, while also allowing light but not too much heat.
Incredibly, construction usually didn't use scaffolding. Instead, master builders would start with a stone foundation, often some 2m deep, upon which mud bricks were laid in a running bond, meaning one brick is overlapped by two above. They then slowly built upwards, placing wooden joists for strength and adding floors made from wood and palm materials as they went higher up. Scaffolding was generally only used at a later date, once the house was finished and needed replastering or restoration.
However, according to Damluji, these building skills are on the brink of extinction. "We are looking at structures that can stand for up to 300 years and more. Six and seven storey buildings built out of sun-dried mud brick in a way that no contemporary architect can build today."
To prevent this knowledge from being lost, Damluji works closely with the Dawan Architecture Foundation, which is striving to preserve these methods of building, encouraging the use of traditional materials and methods over modern convenience – By Ulrike Lemmin-Woolfrey (with photos)
https://www.bbc.com/travel/article/20211004-yemens-ancient-soaring-skyscraper-cities
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“A Horrible Mistake”: Recovering from America’s Imperial Delusions
A sprawling military network across 4 million square miles and 560 million people in the Middle East undermines goals of security and stability.
Given our notoriously short national attention span, Americans are overlooking a “horrible mistake” of far greater consequence. I refer to the very existence of CENTCOM.
Created by Ronald Reagan in 1983, it’s presently one of 11 Pentagon “combatant commands” that quite literally span the globe, even extending into the great beyond of outer space and cyberspace. CENTCOM’S earthly area of responsibility (AOR) encompasses 20 nations stretching across the Greater Middle East (and only recently came to include Israel as well). The command’s website spells out the specifics: 4 million square miles inhabited by more than 560 million people from 25 ethnic groups adhering to myriad religious traditions and speaking 20 languages along with a host of local dialects. In itself, though only one of those 11 commands, it’s already a realm of impressively imperial dimensions.
According to its mission statement, the command “directs and enables military operations and activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and stability in support of enduring U.S. interests” throughout that vast area. Yet while security and stability may describe CENTCOM’s nominal aspirations, its true purpose is quite different. Indeed, the implicit purpose of the entire constellation of combatant commands is to affirm American primacy. CENTCOM exists to demonstrate the enduring necessity of American global “leadership,” expressed in straightforwardly military terms via security commitments, a far-flung network of foreign bases, contingency plans and capabilities, muscle-flexing, and the ever-present possibility of what the Pentagon evasively refers to as a “kinetic action.”
Someday, probably decades from now, an ambitious historian will publish a critical history of US Central Command during this era. It will be a big book and it will tell an important tale. One thing is certain, however. Whatever that author decides to title her book, it won’t contain the phrase “Security and Stability.” That it may contain some reference to “Decline and Fall” is a distinct possibility. After all, CENTCOM is where the American empire began to come undone.
Painful as it may be for former CENTCOM commanders to admit, the organization’s very existence has coincided with an almost staggering deterioration in regional security and stability throughout the Greater Middle East. The mortifying collapse of the US war effort in Afghanistan 20 years after it began has only served to emphasize the point. Whether things have gone badly due to or in spite of US efforts may be debatable. Nonetheless, whatever Washington’s intentions or those of the Pentagon, the situation in the CENTCOM AOR has become radically more precarious since 1983.
Indeed, CENTCOM is to Pentagon combatant commands what Ford’s 1950s “car of the future,” the Edsel, was to automobiles. Can there be any question that if CENTCOM were a profit-oriented enterprise, it would have gone belly up long ago?
So as members of Congress and the media try to unearth the roots of the Afghanistan debacle, they might consider this proposition: perhaps the problem lies not with General McKenzie or his long train of predecessors but with what those commanders were charged with doing in the first place. They should consider the possibility that, from the very outset, CENTCOM’s chiefs were engaged in an entirely misbegotten enterprise. If indeed that’s the case, then corrective action should involve something more than replacing McKenzie with another officer inevitably cut from the same cloth.
Simply put, the first “horrible mistake” was creating CENTCOM and thereby militarizing American policy in the Greater Middle East. By extension, a necessary step toward preventing further Afghan-style disasters is apparent: Washington should simply abolish that combatant command altogether.
In other words, CENTCOM should go the way of the Edsel.
CENTCOM’s creation expressed a conviction that the United States has interests in the Persian Gulf that are worth fighting for. Arguably understandable in the context of the times—the latter part of the Cold War found the American economy dependent on imported oil—this proved to be a misjudgment of epic proportions.
Today, the United States is no longer dependent on foreign oil. Instead, it faces an urgent need to wean itself from fossil fuels altogether.
“Regional security and stability,” the phrase found in CENTCOM’s mission statement, neatly describes those interests. Making the State Department rather than the Pentagon the lead agency in pursuing those goals would bring an entirely different approach to the forefront.
For too long, US policy in the Greater Middle East has been characterized by reckless miscalculation. Henceforth, in a post-CENTCOM era, its hallmarks should be prudence, patience, and restraint.
All in all, the United States should lower its regional military profile to approximately what it had been before CENTCOM was created. Going forward, it should be Washington’s policy to defuse conflicts, not fuel them and certainly not to become party to then – By Andrew J. Bacevich
https://tomdispatch.com/a-horrible-mistake/ = https://www.thenation.com/article/world/american-empires-unwinding/
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
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37 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 9,271 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 46 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 15 others.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33850
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Impact of COVID 19 on Food Security, Gender Equality, and Sexual and Reproductive Health in Yemen, Summary Report: September 2021
The overall number of cases in Yemen is largely under-reported.
The main objective of this assessment was to determine the impact of COVID-19 on food security & livelihoods, gender equality/inequality, and sexual and reproductive health access in the assessment area, with a gender and protection lens. The assessment also aimed to understand the impact of the COVID 19 pandemic in terms of gender roles and relations as well as on access to basic services. The assessment also examined the current coping mechanisms utilized by community members to mitigate the impacts of COVID 19.
The assessment was conducted in Salh and Al-Waziyah districts, Taiz Governorate. The two districts were selected to compare the impact of COVID-19 across rural (Al-Waziyah) and urban (Salh) populations.
Highlights
COVID-19, and in particular the associated containment measures, has had a significant impact on food security and livelihoods. Rural areas have been impacted more than urban areas across most livelihood and food security measures, and women more than men.
The COVID-19 pandemic has had little impact on household decision-making patterns among respondents, with traditional gender roles and responsibilities remaining unchanged, and men dominating household decision-making. However, women are less involved in decisions regarding food purchases than before the pandemic, reflecting the increased scarcity of both income and food. Across most of the decision-making domains considered, urban women had greater autonomy than rural women.
Access to healthcare and especially sexual and reproductive health information and services remains low. Movement restrictions associated with COVID-19, as well as reduced income for travel and services, has further reduced access to sexual and reproductive health services, especially for women
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Senior official dies from COVID-19 in Lahj
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33847
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Supporting health workers - the backbone of the COVID-19 response
Yemen’s conflict, now entering its seventh year, has led to human displacement, overcrowding, inadequate safe water and sanitation, and increased exposure to infectious and deadly diseases, including COVID 19. Frontline health workers like Monther have shouldered a disproportionate burden of the country’s fight against these diseases.
As of 31 August 2021, 8265 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 3252 associated deaths have been reported. However, this number does not reflect the reality of actual COVID-19 cases that have been under-reported and are likely much higher.
“It is emotionally tough to see patients who are fighting to live, especially when they are admitted in very critical condition, and must have oxygen just to breathe. This makes us feel extremely anxious, and we try our best to keep them alive, until their condition is stabilized.”
WHO is partnering with the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre to support infectious disease prevention measures in Yemen
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28 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 9,139 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 8 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of 5 others.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33840
cp2 Allgemein / General
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Interactive Map of Yemen War
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Yemen Daily War Map Updates
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-october-6-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-october-5-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-october-4-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-october-3-2021-map-update/
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PEACEMAKING UNDER BIDEN AFTER AFGHANISTAN: PATHS TO JUSTICE AND PEACE IN YEMEN (VIDEO)
On September 28, 2021, the Yemen Policy Center held a panel event on ‘Peacemaking Under Biden After Afghanistan: Paths To Justice And Peace In Yemen’, moderated by YPC Research Fellow Ibrahim Jalal.
The panelists explored the Yemen conflict in light of recent events in Afghanistan, noting that US President Biden’s statement to ‘end wars’ to remake other countries inevitably has far-reaching and unconsidered consequences for many countries, including Yemen. The US engagement in Yemen can be seen through the lens of ‘strategic narcissism’ (an idea articulated by Lt. General McMaster, Ret.), in which US foreign policy actors assume its unilateral actions are enough to shape the course of the future. At the same time, the US is perhaps unable to see or think of the implications of its disengagement from the Middle East as it pivots towards interests elsewhere.
In this context, the Houthis and other armed non-state actors closely watch the consequences of the US intervention in and subsequent withdrawal from Afghanistan, learning from these experiences to seize new opportunities and secure further gains, aware that they can continue to act with relative impunity. There are also other parallels – with state structure collapsing, the Houthis have seen further opportunities to reshape the identity of Northwestern parts of Yemen. For peace and justice in Yemen, there have to be strong and credible accountability measures and action must be taken against all parties to the conflict – from non-state actors to regional players – through international mechanisms such as the Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court. Therefore, the US still could play a role in peace and justice for Yemen.
Baraa Shiban is a human rights activist and researcher for the British human rights organisation Reprieve, where he worked as the Project Coordinator in Yemen, conducting field investigations into the US drone program. He continues to comment regularly on Yemeni politics in the media.
Radhya al-Mutawakel is a human rights defender and the co-founder and chairperson of Mwatana Organisation for Human Rights, an independent organisation working to defend and protect human rights in Yemen. In 2004, she began work on focusing on the enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrests that took place during the Saada War.
Peter Salisbury is the Senior Analyst for Yemen at the International Crisis Group, a research-based conflict prevention and resolution NGO. Peter has more than 14 years of extensive experience as a print, online and broadcast journalist, political economy researcher, and analyst.
Moderator: Ibrahim Jalal joined the Yemen Policy Center as a Research Fellow in 2021. His research examines third party-led peace processes in Yemen, the internal dynamics of the conflict, and the proliferation of armed non-state actors.
Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQvJw7SIztg&t=2s
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Yemen: Extremism and Terrorism
Overview
Yemen remains locked in a sectarian civil war between Iran-backed Houthi rebels, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Yemeni government. The Houthis began taking control of parts of the country in mid-2014. In 2015, the threat to the Yemeni government prompted the intervention of a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states, including five Gulf Arab states, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan. The ongoing conflict has reportedly resulted in the deaths of more than 12,600Yemeni civilians and over 112,000 casualties overall. More than 4 million others have been displaced since 2014, according to the United Nations. As of May 2020, the internationally recognized government of Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi controls the central district of Marib and the eastern provinces, the south is controlled by the STC, and the Houthis continue to control much of the north, including the capital Sanaa. However, the continued violence and dire prospects of the end of the war have ignited former tensions between Yemenis in the north and south. After the UAE-backed separatists seized the city of Aden on August 10, 2019, the STC has issued demands seeking to redirect autonomy back into the hands of southern Yemen. The two regions were formerly separate countries but united under a single state in 1990 under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. (Sources: Associated Press, Associated Press, Al Arabiya, Middle East Monitor, Wall Street Journal, Reuters, Defense Post, BBC News, United Nations)
On April 26, 2020, the Aden-based STC declared self-rule, breaking a peace deal signed in November with Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Yemen’s Foreign Minister Mohammed Al-Hadhrami issued a statement claiming the announcement was a “resumption of [the STC’s] armed insurgency…and an announcement of its rejection and complete withdrawal from the Riyadh Agreement.” The Riyadh Agreement was signed on November 5, 2019 in Saudi Arabia, and was a power-sharing deal to end months of infighting between the Saudi-led multinational coalition and the separatists both battling the Houthi movement. The agreement saw that the STC and other southerners would be given equal representation in the government while their military and security forces would be incorporated into Yemen’s defense and interior ministries. (Sources: BBC News, BBC News, Al Jazeera)
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and multiple ISIS affiliates are based in Yemen. AQAP has been tied to global plots such as the 2015 attack on French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and the 2009 underwear bomb plot carried out by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to destroy a Detroit-bound airliner. In addition, online videos of deceased AQAP propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki continue to inspire and radicalize people around the world to fight alongside al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other jihadist groups. U.S. President Donald J. Trump cited Yemen’s ties to global terrorism as reason for the country’s inclusion in a temporary travel ban in early 2017. (Sources: CNN, CNN)
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has conducted intermittent counterterrorism operations in Yemen, including surveillance, drone strikes, and special operations. Former U.S. President Barack Obama significantly increased the number of drone strikes against AQAP, and current President Trump has continued counterterror operations against the group. As of March 6, 2017, the United States had conducted more than 40 strikes against AQAP. The United States has reportedly carried out a total of 372 drone and air strikes in Yemen since 2002, killing up to 1,533 militants. (Sources: Telegraph, New York Times, BBC News, BBC News, TIME, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Washington Post, New York Times, New America Foundation)
By the end of December 2020, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that over 233,000 Yemeni citizens have died in Yemen’s War. More than 131,000 of those deaths were the result of indirect causes such as lack of food, health services, and inadequate infrastructure. In September 2019, Oman began mediating informal talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis on ending the war. The talks have led to few breakthroughs and Saudi Arabia resumed its air campaign in Yemen in January 2020 after a ballistic missile strike on a military camp there killed at least 116 people. (Sources: Reuters, Associated Press, United Nations)
Polling by the Yemen Polling Center (YPC) in 2013 revealed that nearly 40 percent of 2,000 people surveyed across Yemen’s 21 governorates believe the country’s security situation is getting worse. Of the armed groups in Yemen, the 2013 YPC poll ranked the Houthis as the most disruptive to the country’s security, followed by AQAP. (Source: Yemen Polling Center)
https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/yemen
My comment: Many details, but very biased, for editing think tank look at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counter_Extremism_Project .
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Wikipedia: List of political parties in Yemen
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_parties_in_Yemen
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SCHLACHT UM MARIB
Angriffskrieg geht weiter
Saudische Militärkoalition intensiviert Aggressionen gegen Ansarollah in Jemen. Blockade der Versorgungswege dauert an
Immer weiter rücken die Ansarollah (»Huthis«) auf die Provinzhauptstadt Marib im gleichnamigen öl- und gasreichen Gouvernement im Nordjemen vor. Die demokratisch seit sechs Jahren nicht mehr legitimierte »Regierung« von »Präsident« Abed Rabbo Mansur Hadi und die ihn unterstützende Kriegskoalition unter Führung Saudi-Arabiens könnten die wirtschaftlich und strategisch bedeutende Stadt und damit langfristig den Krieg verlieren. Denn Marib gilt als »Tor« für weitere Eroberungszüge im von Hadi und den Separatisten des Südübergangsrats kontrollierten Süden des Landes.
Trotz anderslautender Behauptungen hat die Militärkoalition ihren Angriffskrieg aber nicht eingestellt. Im Gegenteil: Raketen- und Artillerieangriffe insbesondere auf die Provinz Hodeida, deren gleichnamige Hauptstadt gemäß einem 2018 unter Ägide der Vereinten Nationen ausgehandelten Abkommen als neutrale Zone gilt, sind zuletzt verstärkt worden – nur Tage nach einer Reise von Jacob Sullivan, dem nationalen Sicherheitsberater des US-amerikanischen Präsidenten Joseph Biden, nach Riad. So meldete der Ansarollah-Sender Al-Masirah am 29. September rund 60 Luftangriffe in der Region Marib innerhalb von 48 Stunden. Das von Biden im Januar gegebene Versprechen, keine »Angriffshandlungen« der Kriegskoalition mehr zu unterstützen, entpuppt sich damit ein weiteres Mal als Farce.
Ebenfalls nicht erfüllt worden ist die von der UN-Sicherheitsratsresolution 2451 aus dem Jahr 2018 gedeckte Forderung der Ansarollah, den für die Versorgung von Millionen Jemenitinnen und Jemeniten essentiellen Hafen Hodeidas sowie den Flughafen in Sanaa freizugeben. Seit fünf Jahren wird die Einfuhr von Lebensmitteln, Treibstoff und Medikamenten erheblich erschwert und so das Leben von 26 Millionen Menschen aufs Spiel gesetzt.
https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/411953.schlacht-um-marib-angriffskrieg-geht-weiter.html
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Yemen Key Message Update: Protests intensify in the south due to further sharp depreciation of currency and food price increases, September 2021
Driven by conflict, the deteriorating economy is exacerbating the severity of acute food insecurity and shortfalls in public services, particularly across areas controlled by the internationally-recognized government (IRG) where local populations continue to face high levels of inflation. Declining purchasing power and dilapidated public services and infrastructure continue to increase the vulnerability of the majority of Yemenis—many of whom have limited access to essential life-saving services such as health care and clean water—to shocks such as COVID-19 and flooding. Widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely to continue at the governorate level, with worst-affected households likely to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes. Although not the most likely scenario, Famine (IPC Phase 5) would be possible if food supply is cut off for a prolonged period.
The recent military re-escalation in Marib, Al Bayda, Shabwah, and expansion to parts of Abyan has forced more households to flee their homes and has left many more at risk of losing their livelihoods and sources of income. As of September 25, 2021, 11,186 households (67,116 individuals) have been displaced since the beginning of the year across 13 out of the 22 governorates monitored by IOM. Of these, 39 percent have been displaced in Marib.
Civil unrest and demonstrations have reached new levels of intensity in IRG-controlled areas since mid-September, where many of the poorest households—including those dependent on daily wage labor—continue to be impacted disproportionately by rising living expenses and deterioration in public services due to insufficient government revenue.
The Yemeni riyal (YER) has continued to depreciate rapidly in areas under IRG control, reaching 1,171 YER/USD (selling rate) in Aden as of September 28, 2021
Currency depreciation continues to drive rapid food and fuel price increases in areas under IRG control. According to data from FAO, the average cost of the minimum food basket in August 2021 was 62 percent higher than at the same time last year.
https://fews.net/east-africa/yemen/key-message-update/september-2021
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Eine furchtbare Bilanz
Die humanitären Kosten westlicher Interventionen nach »Nine Eleven« – ein Überblick
Die Anschläge vom 11. September 2001 waren ein lokaler krimineller Akt, der mehr als 3.000 Menschen tötete. Die Folgen der damit gerechtfertigten Interventionen hingegen waren global: Ganze Städte wurden zerstört, Staaten zerschlagen, die Gesellschaften zerrissen und ins Elend gestürzt. Die Zahl der Opfer übersteigt die von New York und Washington tausendfach.
Jemen
Auch für den Jemen gilt, wie der renommierte Nahostkorrespondent des Independent, Patrick Cockburn, feststellte, dass »das Fehlen glaubwürdiger Zahlen über die Todesopfer« es »ausländischen Mächten leichter« macht, »den Vorwurf der Mitschuld an einer menschlichen Katastrophe von sich zu weisen«.¹⁵ Einem dem UN-Menschenrechtsrat Anfang September vorgelegten Bericht zufolge wurden im Jemen seit Beginn des von Saudi-Arabien und seinen Verbündeten geführten Krieges im Jahr 2015 schon mindestens 18.000 Zivilisten allein durch Luftangriffe getötet oder verwundet. Diese wurden überwiegend von Saudi-Arabien und ihren Verbündenden geflogen, die von den NATO-Staaten politisch und mit Waffen sowie von den USA auch direkt militärisch unterstützt werden.
Crawford und Lutz übernahmen für ihren Report die von der britischen Initiative ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project) veröffentlichten Zahlen zum Jemen, die allerdings nur die Jahre 2015 bis 2019 umfassen. In diesem Zeitraum hat ACLED rund 112.000 direkte Kriegstote erfasst. In ihrer öffentlich zugänglichen Datenbank summieren sie sich mittlerweile auf ca. 145.000.
Das an der University of Sussex entstandene Projekt sammelt und analysiert weltweit Informationen über gewaltsame Konfliktereignisse. Zum Jemen hat es wesentlich mehr Todesfälle registriert als die UNO, scheint in der Erfassung aber dennoch weniger vollständig zu sein als die auf einzelne Länder spezialisierten Projekte. Der »Iraq Body Count« ermittelte beispielsweise 2016 im Irak 16.400 zivile Opfer von Gewalt, ACLED nur 10.600.
Das Entwicklungsprogramm der Vereinten Nationen (UNDP) schätzte die Gesamtzahl der Opfer des Krieges sowie der vom Westen tolerierten Blockade des Landes bereits 2019 auf 233.000. Zu 102.000 bei Kampfhandlungen getöteten Opfern rechneten ihre Wissenschaftler noch 131.000 indirekte hinzu. Auf Basis der Entwicklung in vergleichbaren Kriegen kalkulierten sie mit statistischen Methoden, wie viele Opfer bei Fortführung des Krieges in den folgenden Jahren zu erwarten sind. Für 2022 rechnen sie in diesem Fall schon mit 482.000 Toten. Ausgehend von den eher niedrigen Zahlen von ACLED sind jedoch sehr wahrscheinlich bereits jetzt mehr als 700.000 Jemeniten infolge des Krieges gestorben.
https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/411757.20-jahre-krieg-gegen-den-terror-eine-furchtbare-bilanz.html
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Yemen on a slippery slope
There may now be little to prevent Yemen from becoming another Somalia, a country on the verge of disintegrating into fiefs controlled by rival warlords
As international frustration mounts over the inability to find a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Yemen, the battle for control over Marib has emerged as a major stumbling block.
The Houthis are increasingly seen as the “warlords of Sanaa,” ruling by fiat from the Yemeni capital and their militias enforcing the imposition of de facto realities. They reportedly rely on structures bequeathed by the former regime of Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, with specially tailored additions to the security apparatus such as the “preemptive security agency” and special female security branches inspired by Iranian military divisions.
The situation in Southern Yemen seems equally intractable. Last week, the inhabitants of Aden were shaken by armed clashes near the central district of Crater. The accounts vary, but the common denominator is the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC), the de facto authority in the South.
The STC blamed the disruption onImam Ahmed Abdo Al-Silwi (aka Al-Nubi), whom they described as a “terrorist” bent on inciting strife. According to some reports, Al-Nubi’s militia is a breakaway contingent from the STC. Other sources, including Houthi ones, held that the fighting was an outbreak of longstanding tensions between the STC and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Reform Party (Al-Islah), which has a strong influence in Yemeni government ranks.
Such developments reinforce the image of competing warlords with various fiefs in the north and south. According to some observers, even the Yemeni army is essentially cobbled together from heterogeneous militia and/or tribal forces that have defied attempts to integrate them effectively. As a result, the army lacks cohesion and appropriate training, which is why it does not live up to the expectations pinned on it despite the huge support it receives.
Yemen is now at the bottom of the Global Peace Index, not surprisingly given the complex and long-entrenched dynamics of conflict in the country. It could be another candidate for “Somalisation,” in other words, the disintegration of the country into fiefs controlled by rival warlords.
There is no sign of a possible roadmap to a solution between the Houthis and the government. Even in the event of negotiations, the STC insists on having a place of its own at the negotiating table.
(A H K)
Jemen: „Save the children” prangert Lage an
Laut „Save the children“ spitzt sich die humanitäre Lage im Kriegsland Jemen weiter zu. Die NGO berichtet über etliche Morde an Zivilisten.
https://www.vaticannews.va/de/welt/news/2021-10/jemen-save-the-children-prangert-lage-an.html
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Exclusive: Iran, Saudi Arabia agree to create mechanism to end Yemen war, restore ties
After a months-long hiatus due to the power transition in Tehran and the annual Haj pilgrimage, Iran and Saudi Arabia last week resumed their dialogue in Iraq. Amwaj.media has learned that the fourth round of talks between the two sides was held at Baghdad International Airport. The main issue on the table was Yemen as well as the restoring of bilateral diplomatic relations.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, an informed Iraqi source stated that “a roadmap was discussed” and that “both sides were very positive.” He added, “They agreed on several proposals on bilateral issues….[and] and they were positive about regional issues.”
When pressed on the specific agenda on regional matters, the Iraqi source explained that it concerns “places where they are both involved,” without going into details.
The sense that the talks were fruitful was echoed by an Arab diplomatic source, who revealed to Amwaj.media that Iranian and Saudi officials agreed on refraining from engaging in media campaigns against one another—and even backing each other in international organizations. This would be a huge shift from the past years of mutual acrimony in public between the two regional rivals.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, the Arab source explained to Amwaj.media that the meeting at Baghdad International Airport was attended by senior officials from Iran and Saudi Arabia along with Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al Kadhimi.
Importantly, the Arab diplomatic source further asserted that both sides agreed on establishing a mechanism for a sustainable long-term solution in Yemen, where Saudi Arabia has been at war with the Iran-backed Ansarullah movement, better known as the Houthis, since 2015.
A third source who preferred to speak on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment confirmed that the talks on Yemen have reached a point where details have been discussed with Houthi leaders.
Crucially, the third source also asserted that top officials of the Iran-backed Houthis have expressed their readiness to facilitate the long-term solution that could stem from the mechanism being set up by Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The third source also confirmed that another major s
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Film: Krieg im Jemen: Die schlimmste humanitäre Katastrophe und die Welt schaut weg!
Im Barcode mit Norbert Fleischer berichten der Friedensaktivist Matthias Tretschog und der Sanitäter Yahya al-Sharafi, aus dem Jemen, über die täglichen Entbehrungen – und über die tägliche Angst, wieder vom Tod eines nahen Angehörigen hören zu müssen.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z8TNHy3EN58
(A P)
Saudi crown prince insists on Saudi initiative as solution to Yemeni crisis
The Saudi initiative is essential to solve the Yemeni crisis, the Saudi crown prince, Mohamed Bin Salman, said Thursday at meeting with the US national security advisor, Geek Sullivan.
The Saudi plan suggests a nationwide ceasefire under UN supervision, oil tankers be allowed access to Hodeida ports as proposed by the UN, Sana'a airport be reopened for certain flights, and negotiations be started to reach a political solution for the crisis.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27184.html
cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade
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Saudi-led blockade illegally seizes yet another fuel ship bound for Yemen
The Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) has on Wednesday confirmed that the US-backed Saudi-led aggression coalition has detained yet another oil transport ship and prevented it from reaching the port of Hodeidah.
The coalition detained the SEA HELIOS, a vessel carrying 25,000 tons of gasoline and diesel belonging to private sector factories, and prevented it from reaching the port of Hodeidah, the Executive Director of YPC, Ammar al-Adhra’i said.
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UNVIM Situation Analysis – September 2021
Food and Fuel Discharged in September 2021
▪ In September 2021, there was a decrease of 8% in food discharged compared to the 2020 monthly average and a 2% decrease compared to the UNVIM monthly average since May 2016, or 284,417 metric tonnes (t) compared to 308,746 t and 289,018 t, respectively.
▪ During the reporting month, there was a 64% (51,010 t)* decrease in fuel discharged compared to the 2020 monthly average (142,221 t) and a 62.6% decrease compared to the monthly average since May 2016 (136,548 t).
47,880 t of the 51,010 t of fuel discharged in September 2021 was coal
Food and Fuel Vessel Delays in September 2021
In September 2021, food vessels spent an average of 2.8 days in the Coalition holding area (CHA); 3.6 days at anchorage; and 7.9 days at berth, compared to an average of 2.9 days in the CHA; 4.5 days at anchorage; and 9.3 days at berth in September 2020. Vessels spent 5%, 20% and 15% less time in the CHA, at anchorage and at berth, respectively, compared to September 2020.
In September 2021, nine (09) food vessels proceeded from the CHA to anchorage; 11 berthed; and 10 discharged their cargo and sailed.
In September 2021, the average time spent by fuel vessels in the CHA was 69.3 days, whereas it was 95.6 days in September 2020, or a 28% decrease year-on-year. In comparison to the 2020 monthly average of 82.2 days, the month of September 2021 saw a 16% decrease.
Two (02) fuel vessels were permitted from the CHA to the anchorage area in September 2021 and subsequently berthed and sailed.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unvim-situation-analysis-september-2021
and also https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unvim-operational-snapshot-september-2021
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
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Autistic children in Yemen – helpless amidst ongoing conflict
https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=3001259&language=en#
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UN: Food Prices Have Risen by 60% in Yemen
The United Nations warned this week from the alarming food insecurity in Yemen as prices have risen by around 60 percent in some parts of the country, driven by the collapse of the Yemeni rial (YER) and intensifying already inadequate food consumption.
In a report released Tuesday, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said that ongoing devaluation of the Yemeni currency and soaring prices are compounding hunger in Yemen, where some 16.2 million people already face food insecurity.
https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3231481/un-food-prices-have-risen-60-yemen
(B H)
Mit Ärzte ohne Grenzen im Jemen
Klinik im Kriegsland
Zwei Monate in einer anderen Welt. Die Ärztin Laila Schmidt hilft in einem jemenitischen Krankenhaus.
Marib liegt am Rande der Wüste, etwa 300 Kilometer nordöstlich von Aden. Die Stadt wurde im Krieg mehrmals angegriffen. Ich arbeite hier für zwei Monate in einem Krankenhaus, um die Fachkräfte zu unterstützen. Es ist für jemenitische Verhältnisse riesig. Die Ausstattung ist gut, aber es gibt nicht genügend Ärzte und Ärztinnen. Während der schweren Angriffe am Anfang des Jahres arbeiteten vor allem Anästhesist:innen teilweise rund um die Uhr.
Ich helfe hauptsächlich dem Arzt der Intensivstation. Er betreut 30 kranke Menschen an Beatmungsgeräten. In Deutschland ist ein Arzt höchstens für zwei Intensivpatient:innen zuständig. Wir machen zusammen die Morgenvisite, diskutieren die schwierigeren Fälle. Dr. Najeeb Dobhani hat ein großes Wissen, ist aber dennoch dankbar für meinen Input. Irgendwann merke ich, was ihn am meisten unterstützen würde: die Krankenpflegekräfte. Wir entscheiden, dass wir diese zusammen so firm machen, dass sie ihn auf der Intensivstation entlasten können.
https://chrismon.evangelisch.de/artikel/2021/51911/mit-aerzte-ohne-grenzen-im-jemen
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Yemen has averted famine — for now. But donor support is still needed
While accelerated deployment of resources into Yemen has temporarily slowed the food insecurity crisis, sustained funding is needed to keep people out of famine, the United Nations’ highest-ranking official in the country told Devex.
At the start of this year, roughly 50,000 people in Yemen were experiencing famine — the fifth and most severe phase of food insecurity in the IPC Acute Food Insecurity classification system. Five million people were in the fourth phase, indicating “Emergency” conditions, and 11 million others were in the third phase with “Crisis” levels of food insecurity. The U.N. currently reaches about 13 million people in the country with food assistance.
“We’ve stopped the move towards famine temporarily, but I emphasize the last word because ‘temporary’ is fragile and needs to be sustained,” said David Gressly, U.N. resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator for Yemen.
“It’s very tenuous. I think with additional funding again we’re good for a few more months, but after that …” he said, trailing off. “We’re constantly at the edge in terms of the pipeline of financing — as well as food supply — coming in. So those streams need to continue coming.”
https://www.devex.com/news/yemen-has-averted-famine-for-now-but-donor-support-is-still-needed-101760
(* B H)
Peace and Conflict Assessment in Selected Districts of Aden, Lahj, and Taiz Governorate, Sept 2021
This Peace and Conflict Analyses (PCA) contributes to a better understanding of the causes, dynamics, power, and actors of conflict(s) in the potentially targeted regions of the CARE program in Yemen. It contributes to a better understanding on how the conflict dynamics might impact CARE’s programming, and how the intended program could positively impact the conflict dynamics and reduce risks of fueling conflict. The findings of the PCA will provide a basis for the multi-sectoral and integrated program that CARE is proposing to undertake.
Main conclusions
Conflict dynamics and insecurity
The main types of conflict in Aden, Lahj and Taiz are conflicts over land and water, followed by family conflicts and conflicts over power. In Aden, conflict over power isreported significantly more than in the other governorates. Importantly, conflicts caused by aid agencies is reported. The main driver of conflict in Aden and Lahj is corruption. In Taiz, the main conflict driver is the shortage of and competition over natural resources.
The identified underlying causes of conflict are conflict over lands, corruption, poverty, and lack of access to services and basic needs.
Poverty is by far the biggest conflict trigger. Other triggers include State absence, the spread of weapons, land conflicts and an increase in prices.
38% of respondents do not feel safe, mainly because of the overall insecurity and instability and the absence of the State. Women feel most unsafe because of customs, instable security situation, having no financial guardian and unemployment. Men feel most unsafe because of the war or due to their unemployment.
Perceived reasons to join armed groups are unemployment and being paid by armed groups. NSAGs2 are the conflict actors most often reported, followed by politicians and local leaders. The respondents also identify the risk of people who will be excluded as beneficiaries as potential spoilers for a future CARE program.
Types of conflicts
As presented in figure 4, conflict over land and water are by far the most reported types of conflicts, followed by family conflicts. Other conflicts include conflicts caused by humanitarian aid, where aid agencies do not follow transparent approaches in identifying the beneficiaries. Consequently, some people are excluded. This triggers conflict between the selected beneficiaries and the excluded beneficiaries. Further, the excluded beneficiaries may become negative agents of change who may cause trouble for the project implementation. Further evidence of conflict caused by humanitarian aid is included in section 2.4.
Conflict over land was more reported by male respondents, while family conflict was more reported by female respondents. This can be explained by the gender roles in Yemeni culture, in which men are usually responsible for taking care of land issues while women take care of the home and family affairs.
Analyzed by governate, in Taiz and Lahj governorates, conflict over water and conflict over lands are the highest reported conflicts. In Aden, conflict over power stands out compared to the other governorates, as presented in figure 5 below. This can be explained by the fact that Aden is the temporary capital of Yemen and the center of politics now.
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@monarelief received today an amount of €3600 as a fund sent by our great partners in Poland @SzkolydlaPokoju. The fund will be used to purchase 100 food aid baskets to be distributed to the most vulnerable families in the capital Sana'a soon.
https://twitter.com/Fatikr/status/1445820670504423424
(A H)
UNICEF cargo plane arrives in Sana'a
the plane carries a cargo of vaccines for children under one year.
The cargo contains 53,430 polio vaccines, 75,620 measles and rubella vaccines, and 140,000 oral polio vaccines, he added.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3158609.htm
(B H)
Donate to CARE’s Yemen Emergency Appeal
Seven years of war, then cholera, famine, and now COVID-19: Yemen is suffering the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.
https://www.care.org.au/appeals/yemen-emergency-appeal/
(B H)
Yemen WASH Cluster - Humanitarian Dashboard (January - August 2021)
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Yemen | FAO and the World Bank collaborate to restore lost hopes and agricultural livelihoods in flood-affected areas
With funding from the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme and the support of the World Bank, FAO implemented the “Smallholder agricultural production restoration and enhancement project” during the period from August 2017 to June 2021. The project supported vulnerable small scale farming households across Yemen through financing community projects to increase smallholders’ production, income and food security. In Abdurrahman’s village, the project constructed and rehabilitated floodwalls and irrigation canals, enabling Abdurrahman to sustainability irrigate and protect his flood prone land from erosion.
“We have benefited greatly from this project. Most importantly, through the protection of our land from soil erosion. The construction of irrigation canals has saved us a lot of trouble and money…we can now irrigate our land any time, as these canals have improved the availability of water, unlike in the past.” said Abdurrahman.
http://www.fao.org/emergencies/fao-in-action/stories/stories-detail/en/c/1442302/
(B H)
2021 YHF and CERF funding to Yemen (4 October 2021)
As of September 2021, the Yemen Humanitarian Fund (YHF) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) have jointly provided nearly US$95.9 million for life-saving assistance in Yemen this year. This funding was allocated through a CERF Rapid Response (RR) allocation in May, followed by a YHF Standard and Reserve Allocation launched in June and August, respectively. These YHF and CERF funds enable partners to provide life-saving services to some 10.2 million people in need, including in some of the hardest to reach areas. This pooled funding represents 4.6 per cent of the total funding contributed to the 2021 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) by mid-September. Of the $95.9 million allocated, $46.2 million (48 per cent) went to NGOs and the Red Crescent Society.
YHF and CERF funding was jointly prioritized and allocated in a complementary manner. In May, the CERF RR allocation of nearly $40 million went to UN agencies and partners in response to large-scale displacement and further deterioration of living conditions of already displaced populations in Al Jawf and Ma’rib governorates. It aimed to enable an immediate scale-up of the response capacity through the provision of air transport and logistics support for humanitarian partners, and the delivery of life-saving, multi-sectoral services for over 768,000 people in need.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/2021-yhf-and-cerf-funding-yemen-4-october-2021
(A H)
415 food aid baskets were delivered during the last two weeks by @monarelief to families living at three IDP hosting sites in Sana'a. Our distribution was funded by @monareliefye's fundraising campaign in Patreon with the support of @PartnersRelief (photos)
https://twitter.com/Fatikr/status/1444706502930046984
(B H)
A fighting chance for children born prematurely in Yemen
To improve the quality of care for babies born premature or sick, the WHO country office in Yemen, in partnership with the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre, has trained 94 neonatal care nurses and midwives from 19 district hospitals. The training focused on essential and life-saving care for newborns, especially in the most critical first hours after birth.
“We must provide intensive and urgent medical care to newborns with very weak immunity,” said Najat, one of the 94 health workers receiving this training, “This can start from the very first minutes after birth.”
“I learned how to monitor the babies’ vital signs and how to save their lives,” Dr Najat explained. “If their condition requires, we refer them directly to the incubators where they are given medications and oxygen until they stabilize.”
This training was the first of its kind in Yemen
http://www.emro.who.int/yemen/news/a-fighting-chance-for-children-born-prematurely-in-yemen.html
(B H)
UNOCHA Yemen Humanitarian Update - Issue 9 / September 2021
Food insecurity in Yemen grows as economy shrinks
Over 3,500 children in Yemen suffered grave violations in 2019 and 2020
Call to action for demining to save lives and livelihoods
Humanitarian Coordinator advocates for Yemen in Gulf countries
Funding the protection of civilians in Yemen
Ongoing devaluation of the Yemeni rial (YER) and soaring prices are compounding hunger in Yemen, where some 16.2 million people already face food insecurity this year. Food prices have risen by around 60 per cent in some parts of Yemen since the start of the year, driven by the collapse of the YER and intensifying already inadequate food consumption – a measure of hunger tracked by the World Food Programme (WFP). In areas under the control of the internationally recognized government (IRG), where food has become most unaffordable, the rial fell by nearly 40 per cent against the US dollar in the first eight months of 2021, surpassing YER 1,000 per USD for the first time ever in July. As of endSeptember, it had surpassed YER 1,200 per USD. In these southern areas of Yemen, inadequate food consumption is now over 45 per cent. In the country’s north, where tight economic controls imposed by the de facto authorities (DFA) keep the rial relatively stable, it is around 37 per cent. The devaluation of the rial is making it substantially harder for ordinary people in Yemen to afford basic food, an already difficult prospect given disruptions to market functionality due to over seven years of conflict, the displacement of more than 4 million people, and the impact of COVID-19. This is compounded by the high transportation costs resulting from high fuel costs and the effects of increasing global food prices on a country where some 90 per cent of food and other essential commodities are imported.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-update-issue-9-september-2021
(B H)
Development funding hasn't grown enough 2 meet actual LONG-term needs of the affected Yemenis. In UNGA event on Yemen, SFD Managing Director called on all partners to raise development support, "In the last 5years, SFD received 5% only of the total fund for #Yemen
https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1444334453401214982
(A H)
Mona Relief delivers food aid baskets to IDPs in Sana'a and conducts PSS for IDP Children
Funded by Mona Relief fundraising campaign in Pateron with the support of Partners Relief and Development.
Mona Relief was able yesterday to reach out 350 households approximate (2450) individuals with food aid baskets at two IDPs hosting sites in Hamdand district of Sana'a governorate. (photos)
and more from Mona Relief:
https://www.patreon.com/posts/500-school-to-in-56156839
https://www.patreon.com/posts/malnourished-in-54796309
https://www.patreon.com/posts/mona-relief-sets-54983765
https://www.patreon.com/posts/mona-relief-100-55213007
https://www.patreon.com/posts/school-supplies-55769147
https://www.patreon.com/posts/400-school-by-in-55930848
(B H)
UNICEF: Yemen: Nutrition Cluster Snapshot (January - September 2021)
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-nutrition-cluster-snapshot-january-september-2021
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Stopping the march towards famine a UN Resident Coordinator blog
Massive gaps in emergency funding
We've fortunately been able to get enough funding coming in, particularly between April and June, to stop the march towards famine, but it's fragile and it needs to be sustained.
We've received approximately $2.1 billion so far, and last week we've seen additional pledges of approximately $600 million. So, it gets us a little bit closer, but we’re still short of the total requirements.
There are massive gaps in areas such as health, education, water, sanitation, protection support for the eradication of land mines and unexploded ordinance. All of those areas are around 80 to 85 per cent under funded.
We’ve been able to reach children at risk of malnutrition, but funding needs to continue through to the end of this year into 2022. And we need to start preparing for that push for more funding in the coming year.
The COVID-19 pandemic is complicating what is already a very difficult situation. I've been to many hospitals on the ground, and I've seen how crowded they are. Because clinics are no longer functioning outside the provincial capitals there’s a lack of space and the beds are full. Mothers have been turned away and told to go to another province.
So COVID-19 just adds to that burden on top of everything else, including the many other diseases that affect the Yemeni people.
The UN can make a difference
There are three things we really need in Yemen right now. One is to sustain the humanitarian response and stop people from falling into famine or acute malnutrition.
The second is to take a step back and take a look why this humanitarian catastrophe exists. It's linked of course, to the war, but what the war did is destroy the economy and most jobs were lost, so people don't have the income to buy food.Even in the midst of a conflict, we need to have a more economic approach to compliment the humanitarian assistance, and find ways to unlock the economy and help businesses to open up where possible, and generate jobs and income so that families can buy their own food.
And of course, the third element we need is a political settlement to end the conflict.
https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/10/1101972
(B H)
Film: Nutrition Crisis In Yemen: A UNICEF Video Story
One-year-old Ghosson was sickly and weighed just 11 pounds when her worried parents brought her to UNICEF-supported Al Sadaqa Hospital in Aden, Yemen. Doctors there treated the little girl for severe acute malnutrition, diarrhea, fever and respiratory infections.
The war in Yemen, now in its seventh year, has created the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. The combined effects of conflict, economic decline and the COVID-19 pandemic have pushed food prices out of reach for many families; basic services like health care, sanitation and education are "incredibly fragile and on the brink of collapse," said UNICEF Executive Director Henrietta Fore.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/unicefusa/2021/10/01/nutrition-crisis-in-yemen-a-unicef-video-story/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hVANWP8qZR0&t=31s
(* B H)
Near-Famine, Civil Conflict And COVID Leave Yemen In Devastating Humanitarian Crisis
DAVID GRESSLY: It's really devastating. You see the consequences of the war. The economy has collapsed. People don't have work. They don't have jobs. They can't afford food. And this is what's really driving this crisis. What you see are bombed-out schools, towns that aren't habitable because they're full of land mines or UXO, unexploded ordnance. You see factories no longer functioning, see power plants no longer functioning. You see people unable to carry out their day-to-day lives, whether it's farming or fishing. It's devastating not only from a lack of food or difficulty accessing food, but just from a personal dignity point of view. It's just really, really difficult for the people. And they're crying out for help, literally, everywhere I travel.
FADEL: So what needs to happen right now to bring any type of alleviation to this crisis?
GRESSLY: Well, I think three things. Number one - the humanitarian assistance that's ongoing needs to be sustained because if that doesn't continue, those that we've prevented going into famine will continue to do so in the months to come. So that has to be sustained - number one. Number two - there are a lot of factors on the economy because of the war that hold it down - the lack of access to all the ports, to the airport. The problems of moving goods around, all of the taxation, extraction of revenues and so forth drive up the cost of food. And the fact that businesses have collapsed means there's no income. So we need to find an economic solution to unlock the economy as much as possible. And, of course, the third thing is a political solution, ultimately, is what's required to stop this.
(* B H K)
Ministry of Health warns for imminent health crisis as storage of life-saving medicines about to run out completely
The Ministry of Health in the National Salvation Government of Yemen has on Friday warned of an imminent health disaster that could claim the lives of thousands of patients suffering from chronic diseases as a result of the lack of life-saving medicines.
Dr. Ibrahim al-Shami, Director General of Medical Supply Stores at the Ministry of Health, said that since the Saudi-led coalition closed Sana’a airport, medicines for chronic diseases are almost not available because they require tight special transport and storage conditions.
He noted that the demand for medicines for chronic diseases is high and sharp in the stores of the pharmaceutical supply in the ministry, in light of the great scarcity of these items. For his part, Dr. Abdul Nasser al-Quraishi explained that medications requiring refrigeration can save the lives of patients with chronic diseases such as diabetes, blood and liver diseases, bloodnclots, immunity deficiency, as well as people needing to dialysis, gynecology and childbirth aid”.
Al-Quraishi confirmed that the ministry’s storage of the medicine for patients with multiple sclerosis is sufficient only to treat no more than 6 patients.
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"Badria and the Dream of Four Years"
As soon as I gave my childbirth, I thought that the pain would go away, but it came back again, and that is why my husband had to sell the only goat we have, to go to the nearest health center.” When Badria and her husband arrived at Jasser Al Hamli Health Center, Dr. Wafa’a Al Maliki received her immediately. A medical examination was given to Badria, and it found that she suffers from puerperal fever, which usually accompanies childbirth and, in many times, it may lead to the death of a mother. Badria was given the necessary medicines free of charge,
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/badria-and-dream-four-years
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
(B H)
IOM Yemen: Rapid Displacement Tracking - Yemen IDP Dashboard Reporting Period: 26 September - 02 October 2021
During the reporting period, between 26 September and 02 October 2021, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 556 households (HH) (3,336 individuals) displaced at least once. Conflict was the main reason for displacement, accounting for 98 per cent (545 HH) of the total, followed by economic reasons, accounting for two per cent (11 HH). From 01 January to 02 October 2021, IOM Yemen DTM estimates that 11,806 households (70,836 Individuals) have experienced displacement at least once.
(B H)
Shelter Cluster, Yemen - Winterization Strategy, October 2021 – February 2022
During the winter season, temperatures can drop dramatically, with frequent frost in some locations. Yemen is cooler than most of the Arab world due to its high elevation. The highlands have a cool, moderately dry winter with temperatures occasionally dipping below 0 °C (32.0 °F). It should be recognized that the prolonged crisis has prevented most conflict-affected people from recovering their livelihoods, and many households have exhausted financial savings and are unable to prepare adequately for the coming winter. Additionally, the country’s alarming economy decline, including rapid depreciation of the Yemeni Rial and related price rises, including fuel hikes, has made household items and shelter materials increasingly unaffordable for Yemenis in local markets. Due to these facts, the winterization program is a live-saving activity for temperature exposed vulnerable families.
This strategy is developed on the basis of past winterization response experience
(* B H K)
Yemen: Seven Illegal Immigrants Killed Near Saudi Arabian Border After Crossfire
A survivor told on Saturday that at least seven Yemeni illegal immigrants were murdered in a crossfire while attempting to enter Saudi Arabia.
A survivor told on Saturday that at least seven illegal Yemeni immigrants were murdered in a crossfire while attempting to enter Saudi Arabia in the last 24 hours, according to Xinhua. He said that five bodies of migrants and 21 other wounded were taken from a border valley on Friday evening. He further said that two more bodies and five other wounded were retrieved this morning.
The event was confirmed by a survivor who returned home to Sanaa, Yemen's capital. According to him, they were trying to cross into Saudi Arabia on foot when they were caught in an exchange of artillery bombardment between the Houthis and Saudi border guards in Sanaa, just hours after their arrival.
Such mishaps have been reported regularly in this area. Since the civil war in Yemen erupted seven years ago, Monabih in Saada province has become one of the busiest crossing points into Saudi Arabia for illegal migrants who have lost their jobs.
(B H)
Over 1,500 African migrants evacuated from Yemen this year
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has announced the evacuation of 1,500 African migrants from Yemen this year.
“1,500 migrants from the Horn of Africa who were stranded in Yemen, have been evacuated to return safely to their homes in 2021,” the IOM tweeted. The organisation did not give further details.
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
(* B P)
Houthis
Executive Summary:
The Houthis—officially known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God)—are an Iranian-backed, Shiite Muslim military and political movement in Yemen.* Its members, who subscribe to the minority Zaidi sect of Shiite Islam, advocate regional autonomy for Zaidis in northern Yemen. The group has waged a series of bloody insurgencies against the Yemeni government since 2004, overthrowing them and seizing power in Sanaa in 2015.* In 2016, the group announced the formation of a government.*
The Houthi movement began as an effort to maintain tribal autonomy in northern Yemen and protest Western influence in the Middle East. Today, the Houthis seek a greater role in the Yemeni government and continue to advocate Zaidi minority interests.*
The Houthis have received training and military equipment from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). According to the Saudi ambassador to the United States, the “first thing the Houthis did when they entered and occupied Sanaa was to free Iranian Revolutionary Guards operatives and Hezbollah operatives from the jails.”* The Iranian ship Jihan I was seized allegedly en route to Yemen in 2013 with arms meant for the Houthis.*
The movement is known for its virulently anti-American and anti-Semitic rhetoric, including the group’s ubiquitous slogan: “God is great! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse upon the Jews! Victory to Islam!”*
The Houthis have targeted U.S. citizens, kidnapping four Americans in May 2015 and releasing one in early June.* Several of the group’s leaders have been designated as terrorists by the United States.*
The Houthis’ roots trace back to the 1990s, when Houthis founder Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi created the al-Shabab al-Mumanin (Believing Youth) movement in an effort to combine religious revivalism with anti-imperialism.* The movement sought to educate local youth about Zaidism’s long history in Saada Governorate, northern Yemen. To that end, the al-Houthi family launched a network of associations, sports clubs, and summer camps.* The al-Houthis also sought to protect Zaidism from perceived encroachment of Salafism and Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia into northern Yemen, where Zaidism has been dominant for centuries.*
Beginning in 2017, the Houthis have also repeatedly attacked Saudi Arabia with missiles and drones, and has ramped up strikes in the spring and summer of 2019.* On August 27, 2019, the U.S. government was reportedly preparing to initiate negotiations with Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in an effort to bring the four-year civil war in Yemen to an end.* This round of peace negotiations is aimed at convincing Saudi Arabia to take part in secret talks with the rebels in Oman to help broker a cease-fire in the conflict. Oman currently stands at the front line in the regional proxy war between Riyadh and Tehran. The Houthis have previously engaged in peace talks, however both instances—once in 2015 during the Obama administration which sought to broker a cease-fire and the release of Americans held in Yemen, and once just last December during the United Nations peace talks—did not result in any significant progress.* Saudi Arabia resumed its airstrikes in Yemen in January 2020 after a suspected Houthi ballistic missile strike on a military camp in Yemen killed at least 116.* On November 16, 2020, a senior official from Saudi Arabia allegedly told the Houthi’s chief negotiator, Mohammed Abdulsalam, that Riyadh would sign a U.N.-sponsored ceasefire if the Shiite movement agreed to a buffer zone along the Kingdom’s border. In exchange for the buffer zone to prevent incursions and artillery fire, the Kingdom claims it will ease an air and sea blockade.* Saudi Arabia presented another ceasefire plan to the Houthis in March 2021, which the militants rejected unless Saudi Arabia fully lifted its blockade of northern Yemen and ceased targeting Houthi positions.*
On June 21, 2021, the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis attempted to negotiate a peace deal with the help of U.N. envoy Martin Griffiths and U.S. envoy Tim Lenderking. However, the Houthis’ chief negotiator, Mohammed Abdulsalam, noted that the Houthis wanted to ensure reopening access to Sanaa airport and Hodeidah port before discussing a comprehensive ceasefire, conditions which Riyadh is unlikely to guarantee.* By providing the Iranian-backed Houthis with open access to Sanaa and Hodeidah, Riyadh would intentionally be putting Saudi Arabia’s domestic security at risk. Iran is Saudi Arabia’s greatest regional adversary and would potentially make use of their Houthi connections to exploit access to Sanaa airport and Hodeidah port to disturb regional security.*
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/houthis
My comment: Many details, but very biased, for editing think tank look at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counter_Extremism_Project .
(* B P)
“Systematic and silent extermination”: interview with Hamed Kamal bin Haydara on the persecution of Baha’is in Yemen
Proponents of Zaidi Shi’a Islam, the Houthi authorities administer ‘a strict religious regimen’, marked by a ‘trend of religious intolerance which restricts the religious freedom of non-Zaidi Yemenis from across a variety of religious affiliations and identities’. While many of Yemen’s religious minorities (including Christians, Hindus, and Jews)—and indeed the religious majority (Sunni Muslims)—have been persecuted at the hands of the Houthis, the marginalisation, discrimination, and egregious rights violations to which Yemeni Baha’is have been subjected is unparalleled. In March 2018, Abdel-Malek Al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthi movement in Yemen, gave a speech in which he labelled the Baha’i community ‘satanic’ and claimed that its members were ‘waging a war of doctrine’ against Islam. He then called upon Yemenis to defend their country against religious minorities, declaring that ‘those who destroy the faith in people are no less evil and dangerous than those who kill people with their bombs’.
The Houthi authorities have been accused of wielding the death penalty as a weapon to deliberately stifle the rights of religious minorities and perceived dissidents (such as journalists, human rights defenders, and political opponents) to freedom of religion and expression. Hamed's trial is a case in point, and has been described by Philip Luther, Middle East and North Africa Research and Advocacy Director for Amnesty International, as follows:
“[Haydara] is a prisoner of conscience who has been tried on account of his conscientiously held beliefs and peaceful activities as a member of the Baha’i community. This sentence is the result of a fundamentally flawed process, including trumped up charges, an unfair trial and credible allegations that Hamed Haydara was tortured and ill-treated in custody. It is also part of a wider crackdown on critics, journalists, human rights defenders and members of the Baha’i community.
There are… reasonable grounds to believe that the right to freedom of religion or belief has been violated in Yemen. The de facto authorities continued to persecute Baha’is on the basis of their belief, including by detaining and charging them with apostasy, openly deriding and demonizing the Baha’i faith in legal filings, issuing death sentences, and threatening their supporters.”
Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7NYBCi64qEg&t=1s
(A P)
Jemen: US-Interessen hindern saudische Koalition daran, Krieg zu beenden
Der jemenitische Außenminister Hisham Sharaf Abdullah hat die Vereinigten Staaten für die Verlängerung der von Saudi-Arabien geführten Militärkampagne gegen sein Land verantwortlich gemacht und erklärt, dass amerikanische Interessen ein Ende des Krieges 2015 blockieren.
Im Gespräch mit al-Masirah TV am Dienstag sagte Abdullah, dass jede Entscheidung der von Saudi-Arabien geführten Kriegskoalition, die verheerende Kampagne zu stoppen, vom Diktat der Vereinigten Staaten abhänge.
(A P)
Yemeni Foreign Minister: There will be a change in attitude towards Sana'a government
Regarding the statements made by the US State Department regarding Yemen, Sharaf said: “The US interests are the ones that govern the decision of the Saudi-led coalition whether or not to stop the aggression on Yemen,” adding that “the continuation of the warplanes bombing Yemeni lands does not reflect the sincerity of intentions towards peace.”
(A P)
Yemeni Minister of Transport urges UN to end Saudi blockade on Sana'a Airport
(A P)
Yemen Parliament Appeals to UNSC to Stop Saudi-Led Coalition’s Carnage in Sa’ada, Ma’rib
(A H P)
Yemeni hospital launches surgery department with Iran’s help
Republican Hospital in Sana’a, Yemen launched its urgent surgery department for the maternity section after 25 years with the help of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Iran’s Ambassador to Yemen Hassan Irlou announced the news on Tuesday, saying that the department went inoperative 25 years ago.
Irlou said that the help was offered at the request of Yemeni Health Minister Dr. Taha al-Mutawakkil and in the framework of bilateral cooperation between Iran and Yemen.
https://en.irna.ir/news/84494396/Yemeni-hospital-launches-surgery-department-with-Iran-s-help
(* B P)
Plight of teachers in Yemen goes ‘unheard’
Coinciding World Teachers Day, Yemeni teacher’s body charges Houthi militants for killing 1,500 teachers, imprisoning 600
Besides being denied salaries, teachers in war-ravaged Yemen are subjected to killings, kidnappings, displacements, and forced disappearances, claims the teacher’s body.
Speaking to Anadolu Agency coinciding the World Teachers Day on Tuesday, spokesman of Yemeni Teachers Syndicate, Yahya al-Yanai, said teachers in the country were experiencing the worst violations. He said that three of his colleagues were executed in the capital Sanaa on Sept. 18 by Houthi rebels.
“While the government has been reluctant to pay the salaries of more than 21,000 displaced teachers, the Houthis have done the worst violations against teachers since their coup in 2014,” he said.
While World Teachers’ Day aims to focus on appreciating, assessing, and improving the educators of the world, teachers in Yemen are scurrying for cover to save their lives.
Yanai claimed that since 2014, Houthi militants have targeted teachers.
“Houthi militants killed more than 1,500 teachers, injured nearly 2,400, displaced more than 20,000, and took the lives of 22 imprisoned teachers after torturing them to death,” he said.
He said the militant group also destroyed 21 schools and 44 homes of teachers. Further 90 schools were converted into detention centers.
Yanai said that more than 600 teachers including Saad al-Nazili, head of Sanaa branch of the Yemeni Teacher’s Syndicate, are still in Houthi prisons.
“There are 32 teachers who have disappeared after Houthi militants kidnapped them from their homes and schools from 2015-16,” he added.
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/life/plight-of-teachers-in-yemen-goes-unheard-/2383292
(* B P)
Public Executions in Sana’a Herald Houthi Reign of Terror
Yemenis have become well acquainted with death and the many faces of injustice during these past seven years of war, but the Houthi movement’s September 18 public execution of eight men and a teenager staked claim to a new level of horror. With it, the Houthis sent a clear and unambiguous message to ordinary Yemenis of their intent to cement their rule through terrorizing society into submission.
The nine victims, all from the western Tihama region, were neither politicians nor activists or journalists, but ordinary people plucked from their ordinary lives to serve as a message to all Yemenis. They were convicted in a secretive sham “trial” of providing the coordinates for an Emirati drone strike that killed Saleh al-Sammad, then-president of the Houthis’ Supreme Political Council, in Hudaydah in April 2018. Three years after their detention, based solely on confessions secured through torture and their presence at a rally attended by Al-Sammad, they were slaughtered in one of Yemen’s most famous and revered public spaces, Al-Tahrir Square.
The Houthi organizers sought a festive atmosphere for their spectacle of death, with children present, music blaring for the crowds and cameras capturing the scene as the executioners pumped bullets into the bodies of the eight men. The teenager among the nine condemned, Abdulaziz Ali Al Asowad, had been arrested at just 13-years-old and so tortured during his three years in Houthi custody that he had been partially paralyzed and had to be carried by his killers to his terrifying end. The Houthis had intended to execute a tenth man at the event, Ali Abdo Kazaba, but he reportedly did not live long enough at the hands of his interrogators to attend.
Houthi rule already had set the country back decades, with the group crushing Yemen’s vibrant media, throttling civil society and silencing the many voices and parties that had made the capital city’s political scene relatively active and free-speaking. Even after seven years of this though, the horrific scenes the Houthis proudly celebrated this month had been unthinkable. Yemenis were stunned.
Besides Al Asowad, on September 18 the Houthis unjustly executed Moaz Abdul Rahman Abdullah Abbas, Ibrahim Mohammed Abdullah Akil, Abdul-Malik Ahmed Hamid, Mohammed Khaled Haig, Mohammed Mohammed Ali Al-Mashkhari, Mohammed Yahya Muhammad Noah, Ali Ali Ibrahim Al-Quzi, Mohammed Ibrahim Al-Quzi. The names of these ordinary people, who along with Kazaba were largely overlooked while in Houthi custody, should be known and remembered because their deaths made it undeniably clear just what sort of post-conflict society the Houthis envision if the world accepts and recognizes their “governance”.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15190
(A P)
[Houthi “lackland”] Yemeni governor: STC separatists betrayed and besieged by Saudi-Emirati forces
Governor of Dhamar province and Ansarullah leading member, Muhammad al-Bukhaiti has said that the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) militia is almost entirely besieged by the Saudi-led coalition countries in the occupied southern Yemeni city of Aden.
Al-Bukhaiti said in a series of tweets on Twitter, “The STC has become almost besieged because of the countries of coalition, after being placed at the mercy of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tariq Afash group.”
“There are no salaries, services, and weapons going to the STC without approval of the Islah Party and Tariq Afash.”
Tariq Afash, nephew of former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, is a mercenary leader and warlord who has received significant support from both Saudi Arabia and the UAE over the past years as one of the rising figures in the collaboration forces.
Al-Bukhaiti, addressing the leaders of the STC, said, “The STC must realise that loyalty does not exist in the dictionaries of greedy countries, and that the only correct loyalty is to the homeland.”
(A P)
Sanaa: Riyadh should stop invading Yemen instead of false plans
The Prime Minister of the Yemeni National Salvation Government said that the recent US-Saudi statements about peace in Yemen are deceptive.
The recent US-Saudi statements about Yemen are a deception and an attempt to conceal the fact that Riyadh is a "dove of peace," said Abdul Aziz bin Habtour, the prime minister of the Yemeni National Salvation Government.
He told Al-Masira that it would be better for the Saudi coalition to announce an end to the attack on Yemen and lift the siege instead of presenting false plans.
https://www.yjc.news/en/news/53752/sanaa-riyadh-should-stop-invading-yemen-instead-of-false-plans
(A P)
The Houthi militia consider journalism a crime," Yemen's Information Minister said on Saturday after the terrorist militia arrested journalist Abdurahman Alghaberi who was planning to shoot a documentary film in Old Sana'a/Saba news agency
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-51337
(A P)
Houthis are preparing to close the remaining headquarters of political parties in Sana'a/Almashehad Alkhaleeki
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-51337
(A P)
Parliament approves bill regulating relationship between landlord, tenant
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3158274.htm
(A P)
Parliament condemns int'l community silence on coalition-committed massacres against Yemen's children
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3158376.htm
(A P)
Yemeni parliament condemns Zionist FM visit to Bahrain
https://en.mehrnews.com/news/179311/Yemeni-parliament-condemns-Zionist-FM-visit-to-Bahrain
(A K P)
Houthi extremists are doing all they can to recruit Yemen students to the war, informed sources say
Two education officials in the militia's controlled territories have confirmed on Saturday the reports that the militia have begun in the last two weeks a "a campaign aimed at the compulsory recruitment of 80 thousand fresh school leavers" to deploy them to "the warfront in Marib and other" fronts.
"The examination results are being controlled like stick and carrot to reward and to punish (or blackmail) students to go to the warfronts," one senior official at a Sana'a province school identifying himself as A.A. H said on the condition of anonymity.
Meanwhile Yemeni media outlets have reported that the students of four secondary schools in the northern Al-Mahweet province have deliberately been failed at the orders of the militia to make them lose hope in pursuing university education and choose to go the war on the militia's side.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-50319
(A P)
Photo: Two heroes, the father and the son - Yahia Al-Jubaihi and Hamza Al-Jubaihi. Both are brave journalists who were imprisoned by the Houthis. Finally they are united outside prison. Hamza was released last week after a prisoners swap deal Welcome back
https://twitter.com/BShtwtr/status/1444264766365749249
cp6 Südjemen und Hadi-Regierung / Southern Yemen and Hadi-government
(* B P)
UN accused of turning a blind eye to Yemen abuses
Yemen activists denounce the United Nations and its former envoy Martin Griffiths for ignoring rights breaches and putting ‘politics before humanity’.
Human rights advocates from southern Yemen have accused the United Nations of turning a blind eye to human rights violations committed in areas under government control at the hands of what they described as “terrorist” groups.
“The government of Yemen is using violence against its citizens in Shabwa, including targeted assassinations with the help of agents from extremist and terrorist groups,” said Nasr Obaid, a human rights activist with the Southern Independent Group, an NGO representing southern Yemenis.
Speaking on the sidelines of the Human Rights Council last week in the Swiss city of Geneva, Obaid said Yemeni citizens who collaborated with the Shabwani Elite Forces, a UAE-backed militia that fought al-Qaeda alongside the tribes in the south, are now victims of government reprisals.
Some 55 assassinations and more than 600 arbitrary arrests have been reported in the southern governorate of Shabwah since the Saudi-backed government of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi took control of the region, according to Frontline, a Yemeni NGO. But UN reports fail to acknowledge the increase in violations taking place in the south of the war-torn country, Obaid said.
‘Committing heinous crimes’
Presenting a documentary film on the human rights situation in Shabwah, Obaid said summary executions are committed in broad daylight by government officers, as well as agents of Al Islah, the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, and other hardline groups.
“These extremists come from the north of the country and from Marib,” said Obaid. “The southern tribes have been fighting them all along, but they commit heinous crimes to punish all those that refuse to collaborate with them.”
Obaid and other activists claimed the central government is using armed groups against tribal leaders, human rights advocates, and political adversaries in Shabwah and the southern provinces in order to curb dissent.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/6/southern-yemenis-warn-against-government-human-right-abuses
(A P)
STC spokesman Ali Al Kathiri however told The National that Yemeni government forces were not doing enough to tackle the Houthis and Marib and were leaving the fighting to local militias. The risk of a Houthi victory in the oil-rich regions was real, he added.
“The STC does not want Marib to fall to the crazy bloodthirsty Houthi militias. But Marib is at risk of falling to the Houthis and if that happens the STC will have a say in what happens next,” Mr Al Kathiri said.
The outcome of the Marib offensive would likely impact the strategy for the STC, which is nominally allied to exiled Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s government under the Saudi-led coalition but also seeks independence for the south.
Mohamed Al Ghaithi, the STC’s head of foreign affairs, told The National that southerners were taking “gradual steps” and “progressing quite well on achieving independence”, while carefully monitoring the potentially game-changing Houthi advance to the north.
and also https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/stc-urges-un-consider-all-parties-yemen-peace-talks
(A P)
Yemen PM says looks forward to UN unequivocal naming of peace obstructing party
Yemen’s Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik said he looks forward to a UN unequivocal identification and naming of the party obstructing peace in the country from materialization.
and also https://www.arabnews.com/node/1942261/middle-east
and
(A P)
PM rules out peace will be established soon in Yemen
Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik on Tuesday ruled out that peace will be established in Yemen soon due to Iran's insistence on its subversive acts through its instruments in the region including the Houthi group.
The road to peace is clear and it starts with the implementation of the Gulf Initiative, the outcomes of the national dialogue conference and the UN resolutions on Yemen, he said at a meeting with the UN envoy Hans Grundberg
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27239.html
(A P)
Yemen's STC calls for real, unconditioned peace
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27230.html
(* A P)
Aden experiences STC arresting scores deploying additional forces
The Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) on Monday arrested guards of the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) in Aden, as part of wide arrest campaign following the recent clashes between STC rival divisions in the southern port city.
Early on Monday, STC forces besieged the CBY building based near the presidential palace in Crater district, one of CBY staff told the Anadolu Agency.
The Emirati-backed forces arrested all the bank's security guards, the employ added asking anonymity for security reasons.
The arrest led the CBY to stop activity and close doors, obstructing many banking transactions related to government departments and their salaries for the second day, he said, as the bank paused work on Sunday following clashes.
While he did not tell why the guards were arrested, the banker said the men support Imam al-Nowbi, a security leader who rebelled against the STC sparking the recent clashes.
STC forces deployed huge reinforcements and carried out broad arrest campaign in Crater in search for Nowbi supporters, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed quoted local residents and rights sources as saying.
Tens of houses were raided by STC forces that arrested scores of people and took them to the unknown on a charge of backing the rebel, the rights sources said.
On Saturday, Aden saw fierce infighting that was triggered by Nowbi mutiny against the STC and continued on Sunday.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27229.html
and
(* A P)
Dozens of northern Yemeni civilians arrested in Aden during large-scale separatist crackdown
Dozens of people from the northern Yemeni provinces who work in the Crater area of Aden, southern Yemen, have been kidnapped by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) militias on Monday, local sources said.
STC militia members raided a number of shops and kidnapped dozens of workers across Crater area, and took them to detention centers on charges of helping Salafist militia leader Imam al-Noubi escape from the area, according to the sources.
In a Facebook post, southern Yemeni journalist Abdul-Rahman Anis mocked the STC militia for celebrating the arrest of workers from Taiz working in a sewing shop as a “security achievement.”
He described holding vendors and sellers as punishment for al-Noubi’s escape as “stupid behavior.”
Local sources revealed that the escape of Imam al-Noubi, was secured through a mediation led by his brother Mukhtar, who works as a leader of the STC militia in Abyan, and as such is not the fault of any local people.
and STC reports and propaganda:
(A P)
STC's National Assembly calls for hunting down terrorists
The National Assembly of the Southern Transitional Council strongly condemned the crimes committed last Saturday by the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated terrorist elements in Crater, the old city of Aden.
In a statement issued on Monday, the National Assembly urged the Security Committee, led by the governor of Aden, Ahmed Lamlas to hunt down the terrorists who triggered the clashes in the densely populated city of Crater and to bring them to trial.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33848
My remark: NO “terrorists” but STC infighting, see below.
and
(A P)
Shatara: Plans to show Aden as unsafe place thwarted
Southern Transitional Council (STC) managed to foil a plan to carry out hostile operations in the southern port city of Aden with a view to obstructing the visit of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg, the member of the STC Presidency, Vice-President of the National Assembly for Financial Control and Inspection, Lufti Shatara affirmed on Tuesday.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33849
and more of this kind: https://en.smanews.org/south-arabia/governor-of-aden-the-capital-crater-has-become-safe-and-those-responsible-will-be-held-accountable/
(A P)
MSF worker killed at STC checkpoint
A worker in Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), also known as Doctors Without Borders, was reportedly killed at a checkpoint run by gunmen affiliated with the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) in the southern province of Lahj.
Atef Seif Mohammed Al-Haraz,35, who was working as a nurse in MSF in Ibb province, was killed late on Monday by gunmen at a checkpoint in Lahj province while headed with friends to Aden to buy a car, local sources said.
According to sources familiar with the matter, Atef was killed by the same checkpoint that killed a Yemeni-American citizen last month while he was headed to Dhamar province, coming from the U.S.
https://republicanyemen.net/archives/29233
and also https://twitter.com/RepYemenEnglish/status/1445489561652498437
https://twitter.com/FuadRajeh/status/1445410713258823692
https://twitter.com/msf_yemen/status/1445351117609742338
and
(A P)
Yemen: UAE-backed separatists abduct scores of bank guards
Militiamen affiliated with the UAE-backed separatist group the Southern Transitional Council (STC) have kidnapped around 60 guards at the Central Bank in Aden, local sources have reported.
The sources revealed that "The Storm" militants abducted the guards yesterday and detained them at Al-Tawahi Prison. Their military vehicles were also seized.
(A P)
Justice requires that the accused be brought to court
The Transitional Council must surrender those who killed Abdul-Malik Al-Sanabani
The Southern Transitional Council must surrender the defendants in the case of killing Abdul-Malik Al-Sanabani to the Public Prosecution. Failure to comply with the prosecution’s orders to surrender the defendants for investigation and refer them to trial is a serious conduct that would perpetuate the policy of impunity and keep the STC-controlled areas and residents in isolation from the rule of law and principles of justice, which opens up possibilities for horrendous violations. Mwatana for Human Rights, said .
Abdul Malik Al-Sanabani (30 years old) was killed after he had been stopped at Al-Farsha checkpoint in Tur Al-Bahah district, Lahj Governorate at around 10 am, Wednesday, September 8, 2021, by armed elements affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council. He was on his way to visit his family in Sana’a after arriving at Aden International Airport from the United States of America, where he has resided for seven years.
“The incident of arresting and killing Abdul-Malik Al-Sanabani, and then how the Transitional Council dealt with it, is an example of the violating parties’ indifference and unconcern because of the lack of accountability. This reaffirms the responsibility of the international community to work on opening an international track for accountability to protect civilians in Yemen”. Radhya Al-Mutawakel, Chairperson of Mwatana for Human Rights, said.
https://mwatana.org/en/al-sanabani/
(* B P)
UAE-Israeli Annexation of Socotra is Most Significant ME Occupation Since 1967
UAE-Israeli annexation of Yemen’s strategically located Socotra Island has profound implications for the ever-changing balance of power in the Middle East and Africa.
According to a report published in mid-September by the Iran-based Ahlul Bayt News Agency (ABNA), Israel and the UAE have reached an agreement to share control of the UNESCO listed island for the purpose of expanding their shared military intelligence operations at Socotra’s airport, the largest on the island.
Citing “informed sources,” ABNA alleged that the UAE’s Khalifa Foundation and the Red Crescent have entered into a contract with Israeli companies Yossi Abraham and Mifram to expand the Hidaybu airport, which the UAE and Israeli security forces are using to conduct naval and air intelligence operations.
This report has since been confirmed by the Yemeni Press Agency (YPA).
UAE-backed militias, known collectively as the Southern Transitional Council (STC), seized Socotra last June from forces aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognized governmen
The UAE’s criminality in supporting the STC and the potential harm from its partnership with the Israeli military cannot be overstated. Socotra is strategically located at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden, overlooking the Bab el-Manded Strait, which connects the Red Sea to both the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. Thus, having a hold over it would complement the UAE’s control of seaports in Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Sudan.
In the race for dominion of the Red Sea, the UAE is the clear front runner, and it’s piggybacking its newest ally – the Israeli state – along for the ride.
As noted by the Daily Sabah, the UAE’s annexation of Socotra adds to the 78 operational marine and island terminals it already owns in 40 countries, across six continents, which potentially could “make the UAE one of the most powerful nations on the planet.”
Hiding behind the locally-based and privately-owned Dubai Ports World (DP World), the UAE government is “spearheading the aspirations of both the Emirati private and public sectors in the Red Sea and the Horn,” observes Rohan Advani for The Century Foundation.
(A P)
Yemen: Security forces arrest a journalist and close two radio stations in Aden
Radio stations Adeniya FM and Bandar Aden were suspended after police raided their headquarters in Mansourah, Aden governorate, on 27 September. Journalist Raafat Rashad was arrested the day after. The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) joins its affiliate the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate (YJS) in calling for the journalist’s immediate release.
(A P)
Namibian Fishermen Detained in Yemen Repatriated
Seven Namibian fishermen returned to Namibia two weeks ago after being detained at the port of Al Mukalla in Yemen for almost a year.
Their detention and that of 24 other fishermen from Russia, Indonesia, Peru and Senegal, was effected after their vessel, the Cobija, was held at a port in Yemen when their captain, Pablo Villar, was informed Australia had issued an Interpol warrant for his arrest over the illegal catching of toothfish.
The crew has been detained since 26 September last year and were only released two weeks ago with the help of Vilho Nghifidaka, Namibia's ambassador to Egypt.
In a series of letters Villar sent to Nghifidaka, the Namibians said their situation was dire, and asked to be repatriated.
https://allafrica.com/stories/202110040724.html
(A P)
Internet connection has been cut off in Aden, Dhale'a and Abyan/Almashehad Alyemeni
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-51337
(A P)
The Southern Transitional Council rebels have failed to capture Crater district in Aden from the hands of fellow rebel leader Imam Alnoobi despite yesterday's violent infighting. Tensions remain. /Multiple websites.
Crater has been totally surrounded. Entries and exits into the districts are banned as confrontations widen/Voice of Yemen website.
Clashes renew, the STC impose a srangling siege on Crater/Sawt Al-Horiya website
The ongoing armed confrontations [between members of the STC militia] in Crater district of Aden is a result of the lack of implementation of the Riyadh Agreement's military and security provisions, sad the southern Yemeni journalist Sami Horoobi./Multiple websites
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-51337
(A P)
STC forces arrest senior security officer in Aden
Forces loyal to the southern transitional council on Friday stormed the house of the investigations chief at the police station in Crater District of Yemen's interim capital Aden, Maj. Awad Al-Sayyed, and took him to an unknown place, a local source said.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27195.html
(* A K P)
Officials say clashes in southern Yemen kill 10
Clashes between Yemeni separatists backed by the United Arab Emirates and a rival splinter group in the southern port city of Aden killed at least 10 people including four civilians on Saturday, security officials said.
The fighting has taken place in Aden’s residential neighborhood of Crater, where the presidential palace and other government buildings are located, they said. It pits forces of the of the secessionist Southern Transitional Council against an armed religious group that was once part of the council, according to the officials.
The armed group is led by Brig. Imam al-Noubi, a Salafi officer who commanded a faction of the separatist militia known as the Security Belt. He became a dissent two years ago after he fell out with the council leader, according to one official.
The officials said a dozen fighters were also wounded in the clashes, which had subsided by Saturday evening after the Security Belt deployed reinforcements, including armored vehicles, to the neighborhood.
The Security Belt called for Crater’s residents to remain at their homes, as “Aden’s security forces and counter-terrorism forces clear the area from some groups and terrorist hotbeds.”
Residents reported hearing heavy gunfire and shelling that hit apartment buildings.
https://apnews.com/article/business-middle-east-yemen-sanaa-09909043e02a8ba05f0810937cd833dd
Photos: https://twitter.com/h_alsarare/status/1444224954254381060
Films: https://twitter.com/I4Yemen/status/1444384384094806024
https://twitter.com/RepYemenEnglish/status/1444332491041562628
https://twitter.com/TheYemenMirror/status/1444181147718717443
and
(A K P)
Three civilians killed in street warfare in Aden
street warfare between rival factions of the Southern Transitional Council STC militia in Yemen's Aden city this Saturday, local sources have said.
The clashes erupted between a senior STC militant Imam Al-Noobi and a "police station" in Crater district in downtown Aden
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-50320
and
(A K P)
Child among civilians killed in crossfire between pro-STC groups in Aden
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27197.html
and
(A K P)
Journalist killed in clashes in Aden
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33839
and
(A K P)
Yemen: Clashes between STC separatist forces kills four in Aden
Fighting broke out between members of the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) in the Yemeni city of Aden on Saturday, leaving at least four fighters dead, security sources said.
Residents reported heavy gunfire in Aden's central Crater district, which houses government headquarters and the central bank.
Tensions have been rising in the city between the internationally recognised government and the STC over control of the south.
"We ask citizens in Crater to remain at home during the next few hours as security and anti-terrorism forces clean the city from some... outlaw elements," the STC's Security Belt Forces unit said in a Twitter post.
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-stc-clashes-aden-kills
and how the separatists tell it:
(A K P)
Aden's security forces pledge to bring outlaws to justice
Heavy armed clashes broke out in the old city of Aden (Crater) in the early hours of Saturday between the security forces and outlaw armed groups.
According to local residents, several types of weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and mortars, were used in the confrontations that caused numerous casualties on both sides.
The clashes erupted only three days after the return of the Prime Minister, Dr. Maeen Abdul-Malik accompanied by a number of ministers amid popular anger over deteriorating living conditions.
The security committee in Aden called on the people of Crater, in a statement issued today, to stay at home, pledging to cleanse the city of outlaw gangs in the next few hours.
Last Wednesday, the security forces launched a large scale operation to ensure the safety and security of people in the southern capital Aden.
Mobile patrol units have been deployed and a number of new checkpoints have been set up to promote security and stability in the city.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33838
(A P)
Yemen women demonstrate against deteriorating economic conditions
Tens of Yemeni women took part on Friday in a demonstration organised in Aden against the deteriorating economic conditions and the decline in the value of local currency, Anadolu Agency reported.
According to Anadolu Agency, female activists called for the demonstration that took place in the south of the city.
Participant women condemned the deteriorating economic conditions in the country, as well as the price hikes as a result of the unprecedented decline of the value of the local currency.
(A P)
Protests hit Aden in response to rapidly increasing cost of living
Angry protesters in Aden have on Friday called for comprehensive and total civil disobedience, citizens reported.
This came during a protest rally in Sira district, where demonstrators roamed the al-Taweel and al-Zafaran streets and the surrounding neighbourhoods.
The marchers rallied against the high prices and the economic deterioration under Saudi-UAE occupation, demanding that all shops close their doors in protest.
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp7 – cp19
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-763b-yemen-war-mosaic-763b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-762-yemen-war-mosaic-762
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-762 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-762:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
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