... Houthi-Raketen aus Nordkorea – Die Houthis zu isolieren war ein Fehler – Mwatana für Menschenrechte –Investitionen von Islah in der Türkei – und mehr
November 8, 2021: Yemen review, October 2021 – Aid Must Do More Good than Harm – Outsiders Fighting for Marib – The Plight of Yemenis in Lebanon – Rising food prices and food security crisis – Yemeni women and girls in prison – Houthi missiles from Northern Korea – Why isolating the Houthis was a mistake – Mwatana for Human Rights – Islah investments in Turkey – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-769b-yemen-war-mosaic-769b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabiacp8a Jamal Khashoggi
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp11 Deutschland / Germany
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp12a Katar-Krise / Qatar crisis
cp12b Sudan
cp12c Libanonkrise / Lebanon crisis
cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade
cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage
cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy
cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism
cp15 Propaganda
cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
cp19 Sonstiges / Other
Klassifizierung / Classification
***
**
*
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:
Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-einfuehrende-artikel-u-ueberblicke
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
(** B H K P)
Houthi Forces Close in on Marib City – The Yemen Review, October 2021
Contents
October at a Glance
The Political Arena
Developments in Government-Controlled Territory
Developments in Houthi-Controlled Territory
International Developments
State of the War
Pro-Government Tribes Struggle to Hold the Line in Marib
Anti-Houthi Forces Fail to Unite in Shabwa
Economic Developments
Oman’s Salalah Port and Maersk Establish Logistics Partnership to Service Yemen
CBY-Aden Suspends the Licenses of Dozens of Money Exchange Companies
Local Currency Depreciation, Price Hikes Continue in Non-Houthi Areas
Houthi-Run YPC Regulates Consumer Petrol Purchases
Features
How Outsiders Fighting for Marib are Reshaping the Governorate – By Casey Coombs and Salah Ali Salah
Forgotten War, Abandoned Refugees: The plight of Yemenis in Lebanon – By Ali al-Dailami
Book Excerpt: The Day the Gunmen Came – By Abdulkader al-Guneid
The Sana’a Center Editorial: Aid Must Do More Good than Harm
Many of the challenges facing humanitarian operations in conflict zones today are well known. Any package of assistance must survive the politics of individual donor countries before it even starts the journey down the pipeline to the United Nations and other aid agencies. From there, it navigates a maze of bureaucracy between headquarters and destination countries, often running the gauntlet between warring parties and local realities before hopefully making its way to people in need. Humanitarian operations, wherever in the world they occur, are almost certainly flawed.
The politicized and financially constrained structures that international aid must traverse mean no single agency bears responsibility. While many individuals working within the humanitarian community certainly do their best to make the system work better where they can, it remains reasonable to expect that humanitarian aid does more good than harm. At a bare minimum, humanitarian aid should reduce the suffering of the most vulnerable. Whether that is the case in Yemen today is, at best, unclear.
Many of the challenges facing humanitarian operations in conflict zones today are well known. Any package of assistance must survive the politics of individual donor countries before it even starts the journey down the pipeline to the United Nations and other aid agencies. From there, it navigates a maze of bureaucracy between headquarters and destination countries, often running the gauntlet between warring parties and local realities before hopefully making its way to people in need. Humanitarian operations, wherever in the world they occur, are almost certainly flawed.
The politicized and financially constrained structures that international aid must traverse mean no single agency bears responsibility. While many individuals working within the humanitarian community certainly do their best to make the system work better where they can, it remains reasonable to expect that humanitarian aid does more good than harm. At a bare minimum, humanitarian aid should reduce the suffering of the most vulnerable. Whether that is the case in Yemen today is, at best, unclear.
Last week, the Sana’a Center published a six-part report series examining UN-led humanitarian operations in Yemen since 2015, when the war escalated and the humanitarian emergency response began. While the UN regularly claims that Yemen is the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, the findings of the research would suggest that instead Yemen hosts among the world’s worst humanitarian responses. The fault lies first and foremost with the aid system and its leadership, both within and outside of Yemen. This stands in stark contrast to the tendency of senior leaders in the humanitarian effort to blame the failures of the response exclusively on the warring parties.
Yemen’s fundamental challenges are rooted in longstanding development issues, which have only been exacerbated by the current conflict. After the onset of war, long-term international development projects stopped and humanitarian operations began. But the latter are meant to be short-term responses to sudden, large-scale catastrophe, and to some degree such aid will continue to be required until there is peace. Humanitarian aid does not solve systemic problems, and should not be expected to do so.
The humanitarian response to the war started poorly in 2015. It supported institutions run by warring parties, centered almost all operations in Houthi-held Sana’a and failed to branch out substantively beyond the capital; it also prioritized security over aid delivery and lost sight of basic principles of independence and neutrality. And there was no course correction. Instead, these mistakes became entrenched as institutional investment built behind them, aided by the extraordinary success of the UN’s fundraising effort, which was galvanized by its claim that Yemen is on the brink of famine. To date, humanitarian operations in Yemen have received more than US$17 billion, making Yemen the most expensive international relief effort in the past decade, other than Syria.
The UN’s consistent narrative that famine is imminent, however, misrepresents the situation. Famine is not the key issue facing Yemen. Rather, the key issues are food security, malnutrition, access to water and problems related to purchasing power. There is food available, but people struggle to afford to buy it. Endlessly delivering food baskets does not help people develop the means (or the money) to feed themselves. In fact, this form of rapid response helps to reproduce the kinds of food insecurity that Yemenis experience because it diverts attention from the deeper structural issues at play – and the emergency food supplies are readily diverted to fund the war.
The UN’s flawed narrative regarding Yemen has gone generally unchallenged because the humanitarian response has normalized the use of incomplete, skewed, and decontextualized data to guide its operations, which has then been easily reframed or discounted according to the prerogatives of the senior leadership.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15660 = https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15651
How Outsiders Fighting for Marib are Reshaping the Governorate
Analysis by Casey Coombs and Salah Ali Salah
The battle for Marib has attracted a growing number of military and security forces from outside the governorate. At the same time, political groups have sought to gain a foothold there. As part of broader strategies aimed at winning Marib, these outside actors have reshaped the local landscape in many ways, including through the installation or co-optation of tribal sheikhs who are more welcoming to their presence, and the appointment of loyalists in military, security and political institutions.
Identifying the most influential outside actors fighting for control of Marib and the strategies they are using to impose their will on the governorate is important to an understanding of how the socio-political landscape has changed during the war and what that means for the future.
While both Houthi and government forces have recruited Maribi locals to varying degrees, many of these individuals named to leadership positions do not wield as much power as their titles would indicate. Both warring parties have sought to highlight the presence of Marib locals on the frontlines and in decision-making roles to foster tribal and local legitimacy for their combat operations.[14]
After a brief overview of Marib’s pre-war indigenous population, this paper will identify the main military, security and political actors affiliated with the warring parties in Marib and describe how they are trying to reshape the governorate in their own image. The paper concludes by examining how Marib could change in the long term in the event of a decisive military victory by either of the warring parties.
Government Military, Security and Political Forces in Marib
When Houthi forces seized the capital Sana’a in September 2014, Marib’s tribes formed a fighting force known as the ‘popular resistance’ in anticipation of Houthi incursions into the governorate. These resistance forces found a willing military partner in the internationally recognized government, which, after being driven out of Sana’a, quickly transformed Marib into its de facto capital in the north and military hub from which it could launch operations against the Houthis.
The Islah party, which has a great deal of influence in the internationally recognized government, also established Marib as a base after losing its presence in most northern governorates when the Houthis swept to power. The relative stability in Marib attracted a number of middle-ranking and lower-ranking Islah party leaders to the governorate.[17] As the war has dragged on, Marib has continued to be a destination for other Islah officials and supporters, such as those driven out of parts of southern governorates as the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) has consolidated control of Aden and surrounding areas.[18]
Marib’s Abidah tribe has, indeed, become a center of gravity of the Islah party during the war. Abidah areas historically voted for the GPC in parliamentary elections. A number of prominent Abidah tribesmen, including Governor Al-Aradah, who was formerly a member of the GPC Standing Committee and a Member of Parliament with the party, have gravitated toward Islah in recent years. This shift has been based more on pragmatism than ideology, as Islah has emerged as a dominant power in Marib with ample resources. These stem in large part from the party’s close relationship with the central government and Saudi Arabia.
While tribal identity remains stronger than party affiliation or other factors, the Islah party has been relatively successful in partnering with Marib locals. This alliance is primarily rooted in the common goal of preventing Houthi incursions into the governorate, but is strengthened by a shared adherence to Shafei Sunni Islam, which has a long history of opposition to inroads by the Zaidi Shia groups that ruled parts of northwest Yemen, on and off, over the last millennium.
However, Islah’s relations with Marib’s locals have been strained at times by the party’s appointment of unqualified loyalists to military, security and public administration positions. A frequent complaint from political leaders and social figures who are not affiliated with the Islah party is the presence of a large number of teachers affiliated with the group, who previously worked in public schools, Quran memorization schools or the education ministry, in civil and military institutions.[21]
Islah has directly supported Marib sheikhs who are perceived as loyalists at the expense of sheikhs aligned with other political parties
As the governor and one of the Abidah tribe’s most respected leaders, Al-Aradah has played a crucial role in managing relations between Marib’s indigenous population and power brokers like the Islah party, as the governorate grew into a major government stronghold during the war.[
Houthi Forces in Marib
The majority of Houthi commanders overseeing the Marib fighting hail from the group’s northern stronghold in Sa’ada governorate along the Saudi border.
Only a handful of Houthi military and security leaders in Marib are from the governorate
Most of the rank-and-file Houthi forces fighting in Marib come from Amran, Sana’a and Dhamar governorates.[34] The small numbers of Houthi forces from Marib are mainly from the Hashemite Al-Ashraf group or the Zaidi minority of the Bani Jabr tribe and its Jahm subtribe in Harib al-Qaramish district.
The Houthis have struggled to recruit Marib locals to their cause for a number of reasons. The vast majority of people in Marib follow the Shafei branch of Sunni Islam, including the Al-Ashraf group. The Houthis’ divisive sectarian rhetoric during the war has exacerbated distrust between Shafei and Zaidi communities.
There are also deep historical rifts between populations in Marib and Sa’ada governorate, which is a traditional Zaidi stronghold and the Houthi movement’s homeland.
Changing Tribal Dynamics
Like Saleh before them, Houthi and government forces have tried to coerce and co-opt local tribal leaders to control Marib. The warring parties have recruited a new class of sheikhs who are more welcoming of their presence and objectives. This has led to a rebalancing of tribal power in the governorate reminiscent of former President Saleh’s patronage politics.
Throughout the war, the Houthis have sought to empower loyalist sheikhs in areas where the group has geographical and cultural ties with local tribes.
Conclusion: What’s Holding Marib Together? How Long Will it Last?
The outcomes of the battle for Marib will change many of the parameters of the current political equation, whether in the event of a forcible Houthi takeover of the governorate, or if government forces stem recent Houthi advances – or even if an accommodation is reached.
As the internationally recognized government’s last stronghold in northern Yemen and a source of abundant oil and gas reserves, Marib is a strategic and highly prized governorate in the war between the Houthis and the government.
In the event of a Houthi takeover, Marib tribes, for their part, would likely resume sabotaging power lines leading to Sana’a, as they did at various times prior to the war as a means of leverage over the Saleh and Hadi governments. However, the tribes do not consider the Houthis to be a legitimate government and would likely not attack the pipelines simply as a tool for concessions, but more likely as part of an insurgency and a tactic to weaken Houthi power.
Even in the event of a Houthi takeover of Marib, the victory could therefore be pyrrhic. Local tribesmen share a deep cultural memory that considers Zaidi Hashemite groups like the Houthis to be outsiders seeking to dominate and subjugate them, rather than incorporate them into the ruling system.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15660#Reshaping_Marib = https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15651
Forgotten War, Abandoned Refugees: The Plight of Yemenis in Lebanon
By Ali al-Dailami
Lebanon is one of a few remaining countries Yemenis can enter without onerous visa restrictions. While they still need a visa, they can obtain a three-month-long tourist one upon arrival at the Beirut airport — as long as they are carrying $2,000 in cash and proof of a hotel booking.
Before the start of the war in 2015, Yemenis were frequent visitors to Lebanon. They came for medical treatment, on business, as students and tourists.
Today, as life in Lebanon has become extremely difficult for most of its residents, Yemenis face compounded challenges: trying to survive economically while navigating a procedural labyrinth for refugee status that leaves them in limbo and uncertainty.
Daily Life for Yemenis in Lebanon
For the average Yemeni in Lebanon, navigating a cost of living that is 55 percent higher and rent that is 276 percent higher than in Yemen is no easy feat — especially when they cannot legally work. The Lebanese Labor Act bars any visiting foreigner from work except for those with a work permit issued by the Lebanese Ministry of Labor, which requires applicants to meet conditions that are very difficult to fulfill. For example, one condition is that prospective migrants receive pre-approval from the ministry before arrival in Lebanon. Fearing imprisonment and deportation, Yemenis stay away from work in Lebanon.
Students, who make up the majority of the Yemeni community in Lebanon, face the biggest hurdles. Some of them relied on scholarships and a regular stipend from the Yemeni government before the war, but now continuous delays in payments have had many of them go hungry or be kicked out of dorm rooms when they couldn’t pay rent.
Although students protested these conditions in front of the Yemeni Embassy in Beirut in 2016, their acts were not picked up by Lebanese or international media, and the situation has not improved.
Those students without scholarships relied on their families in Yemen for financial support, but six years of war has almost depleted this source.
Even renewing their residency permit, which the Lebanese state requires be done annually, is a source of stress for students. Costing around 300,000 L.L., the renewal process requires identification papers, proof of a foreign source of income, a certificate by an institution or university that specifies the enrollment period, proof of domicile in Lebanon, and an attestation signed by a notary that the student will not work.
“It is frustrating. I no longer know whether I should focus on my studies, or on how to spend the little money I have to survive for as long as possible,” confessed Sam, a Yemeni student who came to Lebanon in 2013 to attend university.
Forced to choose between hunger or an education, dozens of Yemeni students have dropped out of school.
Yet, many Yemenis do find life in Lebanon personally enriching and enjoy the eye-opening exposure to multiple cultures, rich history, different languages and lifestyles. Personal freedoms are also crucial: Yemenis can move freely around the country, provided they carry their visa or residency permit, and they are not concerned about any direct religious oppression.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15660#Yemenis_in_lebanon = https://thepublicsource.org/yemen-refugees-war-lebanon
(** B E H)
The critical role of escalating food prices in Yemen’s food security crisis
A number of devastating shocks in 2020 and the beginning of 2021 have stressed the vulnerable Yemini population and pushed the country towards a potential famine.
Based on when and where food access declined, rapidly rising food prices are a particularly important driver of the food security crisis. Figure 1 demonstrates that poor food access accelerated in mid-2020 and also was worse in the south, which were times and locations when and where food prices escalated most rapidly. Further suggesting that rapidly rising food prices are a particularly important determinant of food access in Yemen, Figure 2 demonstrates that the share with poor access to food increased similarly during the 2018 currency crisis, a time during which both food and fuel prices rapidly increased; and Figure 2 also demonstrates that the share with poor food access hardly changed during the complete air and sea blockade in 2017, a time during which only fuel price rapidly increased.
Every poor and vulnerable household is affected by rising food prices. Alternatively, income shocks from COVID-19 and rising fuel prices tend to have stronger food security impacts on slightly better-off households. Analysis of the timing and location of price increases during the past year and a half suggests three factors driving food price increases:
Increases in global food prices during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Rapid increase in inflation and substantial currency depreciation in the south regions.
Intermittent difficulties in importing fuel in north region has contributed to rises in food prices through transport costs.
Importantly, similar to a number of other food security crises that have occurred across the world, there is little evidence that the cause of rising food prices is due to insufficient agricultural production. Yemen imported over 90% of its food prior to the conflict, and over the past year there has been little change in agricultural production.
However, even though the crisis is in large part due to rapidly rising food prices, the crisis extends beyond the ability to afford food. Rapidly rising food prices lead to a significant decline in resources available to purchase key non-food goods and services once a household has purchased a minimally sufficient amount of food, and households are being forced to choose between which urgent needs to satisfy more than at any other time during the conflict. Figure 3 demonstrates that access to health care significantly worsened during the current food security crisis and is near its peaks since monitoring began. Importantly, nearly all households that skipped needed medical care by early 2021- between 86 and 88% - did so because of the inability to afford medical care.
These findings have implications for both short- and long-run responses to the crisis – by Michael Geiger, Sharad Tandon, Siddharth Krishnaswamy
(** B H P)
The Yemeni women and girls being illegally imprisoned
Women are being illegally detained for not having a male relative to whom they could be released or even under the pretence of ‘protection’
The Yemeni government, however, denies that stories like these are true. It says that in areas under its control, which include Taiz, no woman is imprisoned beyond her sentence.
The situation is no better in the parts of Yemen that the Houthis control, such as the country’s capital, Sanaa’. There, underage girls are also subjected to indefinite incarceration. Shama, 14, has been detained in Sanaa’s Central Prison since 22 February. Shama, who sold tissues and water bottles on the streets of Sanaa’, was in prison because she had refused a gangster’s attempt to extort money from her. As revenge, the gangster accused her of ‘immoral behavior’ with the result that she was arrested and detained despite committing no crime, according to lawyer and activist Naseem Al Mahthali, who is also a member of the Yemen Women Union.
The attorney general ordered her release due to the lack of evidence, but Judge Essam Meyad renewed her detention, says Al Mahthali.
The authorities will not free her unless a male family member is present to accompany her when she is released. But this is impossible for Shama: her father is dead and she has no brothers or relatives besides the paternal aunt with whom she lived.
Her continued imprisonment breaks Yemen’s Juvenile Law, which stipulates that the detention of juveniles, when necessary, should be in social welfare centers – not prison.
Customary laws
Other laws, too, should make it impossible to deprive women of their freedom after they have served a prison sentence. The Yemeni Penal Code does not include any provisions that would allow this to happen. It also does not require the presence of a male guardian for their release. On the contrary, the law makes it a criminal offence to detain inmates after serving their sentences.
So, theoretically, the detention of any person after the end of their sentence violates Yemeni law. But in reality, incarcerated women are treated in accordance to some kind of unwritten ‘customary’ law. The absence of special provisions for women prisoners in official law causes loopholes that allow the application of these customary laws all across the divided country.
Abdul Rahman Al Zabib, a legal consultant for Maysarah for Development, a national Institute advocating for the rights of prisoners, says that these loopholes are a result of “the overhasty enactment of the law after the Yemeni Unification on 22 May 1990, without taking into account the nature of the Yemeni society and its traditions, hence producing a law that tyrannizes women inmates.”
According to Al Zabib, the continued detention of women after serving the prison sentences determined by the courts or prosecutors is a violation of human rights agreements and declarations, in addition to the rights of inmates guaranteed by the Yemeni Constitution.
Unjust punishments
Lawyer Naseem Al Mahthali took over the case of inmate Yusra, 21, who remained incarcerated one year after the end of her original court-ordered sentence. Yusra, according to her lawyer, was a victim of rape whose perpetrator got away unpunished.
Al Zabib says that the continued detention of children with their incarcerated mothers is a crime against childhood.
Suha Al Aryani, an activist and legal consultant with the National Prisoner Foundation in Sanaa’, says that the problem of children in prison extends to the refusal of their family members to take any form of responsibility for the child’s care or welfare.
“One inmate had two daughters who remained with her in prison for eight years. Another inmate in Ibb delivered her baby in prison, and at the age of eight, her daughter and another child were removed from prison into the custody of the National Prisoner Foundation.”
According to Suha Aryani, there are not enough alternative detention centers where women who have not been convicted of a crime can stay during the various stages of investigation. These centers would provide protection from the stigma of serving time in a prison which remains associated with these women even after being proven innocent.
“Damaged goods”
According to official statistics (until March, 2020), 376 women are incarcerated across Yemen. 57 of them have completed their sentences yet are still being detained. 17 of these are held in what is known as “liberated areas” controlled by the Yemeni government, while the other 40 are held in areas controlled by the Ansar Allah group or the Houthis.
In areas controlled by the Houthis, authorities are more strict at prohibiting the release of women inmates without the personal presence of a male family member, despite the fact that no legal provisions stipulate such a practice. Colonel Mohammad Abali, Deputy Director of the prison authority in Sanaa’ justifies that by saying that, “the reality of our society forces us into this practice. We cannot simply throw women out on the street. There used to be a women’s shelter in the past but it was closed due to the scarcity of resources.”
However, a source who prefers to remain anonymous said that, in early December of 2019, the UNDP presented the governments of Sanaa’ (the Houthis) and Adan (the Yemeni government) with a proposal to train and rehabilitate women inmates and establish women’s shelters to accommodate them after the end of their sentences.
The Houthis, for unknown reasons, rejected the proposal, while the Yemeni government welcomed it and provided all needed capabilities and facilities for its successful implementation in the areas under their control
According to Abdul Rahman Al Zabib, what adds psychological damage is that all sorts of women prisoners are detained together. “An inmate who is a criminal gangster is held with someone detained due to a personal or a simpler issue. This takes a mental toll on the long and short run.”
As long as authorities continue to ignore the law under the pretext of custom or protection, and family abandonment persists, girls like Shama and others will remain under illegal detention and will spend their lives deprived of both real protection and hope of any near release from prison – by Najm Aldain Qasem
(** B K)
The Houthis Might be Using North Korean Missiles
The Houthis inherited from the defunct Yemeni military a large number of Soviet-exported Scuds as well as North Korean-made Scuds called “Hwasong-6s.”
It’s possible the missile strikes that badly damaged a key Saudi oil facility on Sept. 14, 2019 involved far-flying drones firing small, guided munitions.
Yemen's Houthi rebels, who have been at war with a Saudi-Emirati coalition since 2015, claimed responsibility for the coordinated attacks on the Aramco sites, which lie around 800 miles from the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border. Iran’s hard-line Revolutionary Guard Corps in the past has supplied the Houthis with weaponry including drones.
But it’s worth noting that the Houthis also possess a surprisingly sophisticated arsenal of homemade ballistic and cruise missiles possessing the range performance to strike targets deep inside Saudi Arabia.
According to aviation expert Tom Cooper, the main weapon in the Houthi arsenal is the Burkan, a modified version of the Soviet R-17E Scud rocket that’s around five feet longer than the baseline missile and some 4,400 pounds heavier and can travel farther than 500 miles.
The Houthis inherited from the defunct Yemeni military a large number of Soviet-exported Scuds as well as North Korean-made Scuds called “Hwasong-6s.”
Iraq in the 1980s modified its own Scuds to the long-range “Al Hussein” standard, which is similar to the Burkan. An Iraqi engineer told Cooper about the modification effort, perhaps offering a perspective on the origins of the Houthis’ long-range rocket force.
“While this is hardly definitive proof that the Yemenis stretched R-17Es or Hwasong-6 on their own, it at least indicates that modifying older Scud-style missiles for longer range is possible.”
The Houthis also possess a cruise missile called the “Quds 1,” which according to missile expert Fabian Hinz could be a copy of the Iranian Soumar missile -- itself a copy of the Russian Kh-55.
Also, the Quds 1 features a Czech-made TJ100 engine, which is less powerful than the Russian-made engine on the Kh-55.
“All of this leaves the question of just who developed and built the Quds 1,” Hinz wrote. “The idea that impoverished war-torn Yemen would be able to develop a cruise missile without any outside assistance seems far-fetched. Iran’s previous supply of missiles to the Houthis and the fact that the country uses TJ100 engines in its drone program do imply that Iran could be behind the Quds 1.”
“However, so far we haven’t seen any trace of the Quds 1 in Iran proper. This riddle is not unique to the Quds 1. Beginning in 2018, several missile systems began to emerge in Yemen that while broadly similar to Iranian-designed systems have no exact Iranian equivalent.”
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/houthis-might-be-using-north-korean-missiles-195539
(** B P)
Why isolating the Houthis was a strategic mistake
In diplomatic circles, there is an obsession with how to deal with the Houthis, but the decision to abandon Yemen before the war started has clearly backfired.
This question of leverage over the Houthis comes up in every round of negotiations, most recently as a discussion about pushing back against their diversion of humanitarian aid. But in reality, the current situation is a consequence of a poor diplomatic decision to isolate the Houthis and abandon Sana’a by international diplomats in early 2015.
In the run-up to Saudi Arabia starting military operations in Yemen in 2015, embassies were burning so many documents in their compounds that smoke could be seen across Sana’a for days. The war was still little more than talk in exclusive intelligence circles but the fact everyone was backing out and leaving no trace behind was telling of what was to come.
Now the only embassy operating in Sana’a is the Iranian embassy as Iran’s ambassador managed somehow to get into Sana’a in 2020.
An absence of trustworthy communication
Those Saudis who never stopped talking to the Houthis during the war have complained recently of the absence of trusted lines of communications. The Saudi embassy in the middle of Sanaa, previously a crowded street due to the lines of people wanting to get to the embassy, is an abandoned building full of Houthi graffiti. Aside from a few diplomatic trips by European Union (EU) ambassadors to Yemen, there are close to zero diplomatic delegations travelling to Sana’a.
The logic to this desertion is that any diplomatic presence in Sana’a legitimizes the Houthis’ coup, and that leaving Sana’a would isolate the group both economically and politically which would bring first pressure and then a semblance of order. Similar arguments justify the economic sieges in the country and keeping the international airports closed.
But years of war and the reality of Yemen now prove this thinking to be both wrong and catastrophic. The isolation policy has not pressured the Houthi. In fact it has allowed them to be more radical, to control society more, and to build their own economic empire.
The absence of any ‘other’ in Sana’a has only made the Houthis a more radical and brutal group. They can harass aid NGOs because no donor can threaten them by cutting aid or pressuring them while, economically, the siege has allowed the Houthis to build an economic empire to fuel the war – the impact of the sieges have been on the Yemeni people rather than the Houthis.
Creating an ‘embassy vacuum’ in Yemen has achieved what the entire war was supposedly trying to prevent – Iranian influence on Yemen. The relationship between Houthis and Iran is now closer than it was in 2014, mostly because it is the only official relationship the Houthis have. Iran has even given them the Yemeni embassy building in Tehran.
Yemen’s middle-class has disappeared
And isolating the Houthis is not just a bad idea from the international perspective, because large numbers of Yemen’s educated people – intellectuals, politicians, journalists – who had the means to escape Houthi-controlled areas did leave, and almost all the middle-class evaporated.
The isolation of Yemenis has, most importantly, left deep wounds inside the society towards the outside world. They deserve answers, otherwise those wounds will remain deep, catastrophic, and will affect the generations to come. Abandoning Sana’a and leaving it totally to the Houthis was a terrible strategic mistake – and yet it still seems nothing is being learned – by Farea Al-Muslimi
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/11/why-isolating-houthis-was-strategic-mistake
(** B H K)
Spotlight on Mwatana for Human Rights
Mwatana is a human rights NGO working in Yemen, and was nominated for the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize along with UK organisation Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT). Mwatana are working towards a society where every person enjoys rights and justice, through documenting, supporting and influencing.
The team at Mwatana verifies and documents human rights violations, provides legal support to victims, lobbies for human rights led legislation and demands redress and accountability on behalf of the victims. They also use social media, films and other materials to raise awareness among young people about their human rights, and use training and capacity building to equip human rights workers with the skills to be more effective in their work.
The humanitarian situation in Yemen has dropped off the news radar since the Covid pandemic swept the world. Can you give us an assessment of the current situation in Yemen in terms of the conflict and the humanitarian impact on health services and access to food and water?
Yemen became the worst man-made humanitarian crisis in the world and the warring parties’ violations have contributed significantly to this situation. Furthermore, the warring parties in Yemen, including Ansar Allah (also known as the Houthis) and the Saudi/ UAE-led coalition, have attacked the health sector in different ways. Mwatana has documented such attacks in a joint report with Physicians for Human Rights which was released in March 2020.
The parties to the conflict in Yemen have waged war with a disregard for international norms that has increasingly obliterated Yemenis’ capacity to survive.
What are the biggest challenges you face working in a conflict zone?
Yemen is a very challenging situation for human rights workers. In addition to the challenges of the poor infrastructure, there are significant challenges related to the reactions of the warring parties and the security situation. Some of Mwatana staff members have been detained, forcibly disappeared, threatened, intimidated, physically attacked and smeared in online campaigns.
The majority of the detention cases were committed by the Houthis, while the majority of the smearing campaigns were launched by those who are pro Saudi-coalition and the internationally recognized government of Yemen. The purpose of the warring parties in attacking Mwatana is more or less the same; to silence an independent voice that exposes their violations and abuses.
Yemen is a complex environment with multiple parties and conflicting interests. How do you ensure neutrality in delivering protection and humanitarian services to all?
Firstly, Mwatana doesn’t work in delivering humanitarian services or aid. Mwatana only works on documenting violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, advocating for human rights in Yemen locally and internationally, and providing legal support to victims of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance in all areas under the control of all warring parties and authorities. These are the only services we provide.
One of the principles in Mwatana’s code of conduct (which is obligatory to be signed by all staff members) is neutrality. We do our best in conducting background checks, before hiring staff, to ensure their neutrality. In addition, the information of incidents gathered by the field team goes through different levels of verification to ensure accuracy. We keep monitoring the situation on the ground and ensure that we are documenting violations committed by all warring parties, no matter what the background of the perpetrator or the victim.
What more should the international community be doing to help end the conflict in Yemen and support the Yemeni people?
The international community can do a lot to positively change the situation in Yemen if it has the political will. One of the many aspects that the international community can help with is supporting the efforts toward ensuring accountability. The disgraceful vote that took place at the last 48th Human Rights Council session, to end the mandate of the UN Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen (GEE), should be a turning point for the international community to support an international criminally-focused investigative mechanism for Yemen similar to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) for Syria. Supporting accountability and redress in Yemen should be considered as one of the key factors to establish a durable peace in Yemen.
In such a dynamic and fast changing situation on the ground, how do you access the most up to date information and keep your operations safe?
The team that documents the violations and abuses on the ground works on a daily-basis, and the recruited staff are from the areas where they work which helps, since they are familiar with their areas. Moreover, their daily work includes the regular process of verification that is conducted by the supervisors and the communication with the field team helps in keeping ourselves up to date regarding the situation of human rights on the ground.
There is no full protection for us. Anything could happen to the staff and it has already happened, such as detention. We try to do our best to protect ourselves. Being neutral and independent and working on the violations of all warring parties gives us some protection, because they know we are monitoring the behaviour of all sides; however, there is no full protection.
https://hrcessex.wordpress.com/2021/11/02/spotlight-on-mwatana-for-human-rights/
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Study reveals vast wealth and investments of Saudi-backed mercenaries in Turkey
The Turkish Statistics Authority has released a new statistic shows the amount of investments owned by leaders in the mercenary government within Turkish territory.
According to the statistic, Yemeni figures belonging to the Islah Party, Yemeni branch of Muslim Brotherhood bought about 949 properties between January and September 2021, including 139 properties in September alone in Turkey.
The Turkish Statistics Authority recorded the purchase of 391 properties by the leaders of the Islah Party in 2017, reaching 851 properties in 2018 and 1,564 properties in 2019,.
The total number of 5,390 properties purchased by the Islah party leaders since 2015 , at estimated at $1.347. 500.000, considering the average value of the property is $250,000, which is enough to stabilize Yemen’s currency, which has been constantly collapsing in areas controlled by the mercenary government for more than a year .
Yemeni sources indicated that Sultan al-Arada, Ma’rib governor in the mercenary government owns 19 of these properties worth $43 million, at a rate of 55 billions Yemeni riyals.
Other documents indicated that the Islah Party purchased a city in Turkey for more than 5,000 properties during the war with looted people’s money, and from January to September 2021, 949 properties were purchased, including 139 properties, during September as clashes intensified in Ma’rib, the last stronghold of the Islah Party.
Yemenis take the third place among all the Arab countries in the residential property purchase competition in Turkey last year.
During the war years, Turkey hosted hundreds of leaders of Islah Party. Some of them prominent leaders in the mercenary government and benefited from the war in Yemen.These leaders migrated to the Turkish capital Istanbul and started setting up their own projects and buying real estate, while the leaders sending many of those mislead people towards the fronts and fuel conflicts in order to serve their interests.
Moreover, Among these leaders, Yemeni Nobel Peace Prize-winning activist Tawakkol Karman. She founded a civilian humanitarian aid organization in Taiz, with the aim of acquiring aid and donor funds under humanitarian cover, in return for purchasing a number of properties in Turkey as well as establishing then with Qatari and Turkish support for her TV channel based in Istanbul.
Furthermore, another leader, Hammoud al-Mekhlafi, who calls himself the leader of the resistance in Taiz, have also emerged, acquiring much of the financial support provided for the so-called the liberation of Taiz and treating the wounded of the resistance, but he used these funds to buy luxury properties in Turkey and establish his own projects.
Over the past year, the Yemenis have purchased 1,181 properties to be among the top 20 nationalities around the world, according to Anadolu Agency.
According to Turkish official data, 44 companies with Yemeni capital were established in 2017 and 79 companies were established in 2018 , as well as 164 companies were established in the first seven months of 2019 in Turkey .
The number of homes purchased by these leaders in Turkey increased to 536% in the first nine months of 2019, compared to the same period in 2015, bringing the number of homes to 1,082 between January and September 2019.
https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/11/07/study-reveals-vast-wealth-and-investments-of-saudi-backed-mercenaries-in-turkey/ = http://en.ypagency.net/243063/
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
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12 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 9,870 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 35 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of two others.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34024
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COVID-19 vaccines delivered to Yemen cover only 1.5% of population: UN
War-torn Yemen has seen escalation in conflict between Houthi rebels and pro-government forces
Coronavirus vaccine doses received by Yemen are enough to only 1.5% of the country’s population, according to the UN.
“War-torn Yemen has so far received COVID-19 vaccine doses enough to cover only 1.5 percent of its population,” the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said in a Twitter post.
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Corona-virus-21-confirmed-cases-and-4-deaths
https://en.smanews.org/south-arabia/corona-virus-21-confirmed-cases-and-4-deaths/
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12 new cases of COVID-19 reported in Aden, Hadramout
Yemen's supreme national emergency committee for coronavirus reported on Friday, 12 new confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Aden (11) and Hadramout (1).
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of six coronavirus patients in al-Mahra governorate, in addition to the death of four others in Aden (3) and Hadramout (1).
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34014
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21 new cases of COVID-19 reported, 9,831 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of 17 coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of four others.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34006
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Four new cases of COVID-19 reported, 9,810 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of five coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of three others.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34000
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United States provides additional $4.55 million for urgent COVID-19 assistance in Yemen
Today, the United States, through the United States Agency for International Development, announced $4.55 million in urgent COVID-19 assistance for Yemen. This assistance will provide much needed, life-saving oxygen for 25 COVID-19 isolation units and strengthen the country’s COVID-19 response to minimize the risk of the virus.
cp2 Allgemein / General
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Interactive Map of Yemen War
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Yemen War Daily Map Updates
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-november-7-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-november-6-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-november-4-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-november-3-2021-map-update/
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Audio: Warnings of 'more death and suffering' in Yemen as US moves to sell Saudis missiles
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Audio: Für einen nachhaltigen Frieden in Jemen
Die schweizerisch-jemenitische Politikwissenschafterin Elham Manea hat auf ihren Reisen im Nahen Osten zahlreiche Gespräche mit Vertretern aller jemenitischen Kriegsparteien geführt, auch mit Verhandlungsführern der Huthi-Miliz. Welche Erkenntnisse aus der Region bringt sie in die Schweiz zurück?
https://www.srf.ch/audio/echo-der-zeit/fuer-einen-nachhaltigen-frieden-in-jemen?partId=12085676
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Film: Yemen at the Crossroads: Updates On the Humanitarian Crisis and What Congress Can Do About It
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B3SQ7vNshzc
Snippets: “It’s not acceptable to continue to put Saudi preferences—and the preferences of weapons manufacturers—over the lives of the people of Yemen." https://twitter.com/QuincyInst/status/1457045913109684224
@RepRoKhanna & @SenSanders' NDAA amendment would end US support for the war in Yemen. Will Congress seize this moment, or will US leaders keep America complicit in this humanitarian disaster? https://twitter.com/QuincyInst/status/1457050751801434119
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The “third capital” is awaiting resolution… The influence of the Marib front extends beyond Yemen
Yemeni political activist Hamed Al-Bakhiti told Al-Hurra: “Certainly, the battle of Marib is close to being decided in favor of Sanaa. This progress achieves breaking the effects of the economic blockade imposed by the countries of aggression on the Yemeni people, which makes its resolution a national necessity,” he said.
In this context, retired Brigadier General Amr al-Amiri told Al-Hurra: “The fall of Marib will be a turning point in the war because it is the source of oil, gas and resistance.”
In the event that Marib falls into the hands of the Houthis, Yemeni writer and political researcher, Abdel Nasser Al-Mouda’, told Al-Hurra: “The current round of conflict will be resolved in their favour, and Yemen will enter a new phase of war in other regions, such as the western and southern coasts.”
Al-Bakhiti sees “liberating and controlling Marib” as a solution to the political crisis and the stalled negotiations. Despite this, he said, the Houthi takeover of the city would enable them to “control the cities under the control of the coalition, accompanied by an unanimous popular momentum.”
Professor of Political Sociology, Abdul-Baqi Shamsan, told Al-Hurra that the Houthi forces’ control of Marib will enable them to move towards Shabwa, which is rich in oil in the south, as well as Hadramawt.
According to Shamsan, the Houthis are trying to reduce the Yemeni crisis in the Marib governorate, explaining: “The talk has become centered around Marib, while the world is ignoring the root of the problem related to the Houthi coup against an elected authority.”
In the event of controlling Marib, the Houthis will become adjacent to the kingdom, and will obtain sources of funding by controlling oil wealth and resources, according to Shamsan.
But a military commander in the government forces told Reuters: “The Houthis’ options are limited, because if they head across the desert towards the area of gas and oil fields east of Marib, they will be easy prey for the coalition fighters.”
The depositor believes that the battle of Marib is still far from decisive, telling Al-Hurra: “The fall of important cities, such as Marib and other areas of oil and gas production, is still difficult for the Houthis.”
The depositor attributed the main reason for this to geography and topography, saying: “These sites are located in open desert areas where the Houthis are not able to fight, and all the places controlled by the Houthis are in the mountainous vicinity of the city of Ma’rib.”
The Houthis have advanced in most areas of Marib, which is the only gas-producing governorate in Yemen and which includes one of the country’s largest oil fields in the Wadi region, which, along with the city of Marib, is still under full government control.
However, Al-Modaa’ stresses that “they were unable to advance in the open areas and suffered great losses when they tried. In the desert, its defenders, as well as aviation, were able to prevent the Houthis from taking control.”
He stresses that the parties defending Marib and Saudi Arabia will not hand it over easily, adding, “There is a will so far to defend it.”
https://middleeast.in-24.com/world/384382.html
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Build back better or more of the same? New arms deal to Saudi announced
While denying it, the White House continues to put its thumb on the scale for the Kingdom, with no end to Yemen war in sight.
U.S. security assistance to repeat human rights violators like Saudi Arabia has driven internal repression, state fragility, and strategic instability. Consequently, arms sales to the Gulf have drawn increasing bipartisan pushback. The United States has nonetheless continued to pursue the proposed weapons sale to Saudi Arabia, suggesting Biden’s limited security objectives vis-a-vis Iran hinder U.S. action to resolve the crisis in Yemen. The proposed sale, then, likely stems from the Biden administration’s concern about Iranian drone technology and efforts to reassure Saudi Arabia of continued commitment to the U.S.-Saudi relationship ahead of nuclear talks with Iran.
The Biden administration should instead condition any future sales on Saudi concessions in the Yemen peace process and implementation of human rights law in terms of sale.
In an announcement about Thursday’s notification, the State Department pointed to the “increase in cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia in the last year” and the use of air-to-air missiles in intercepting those attacks. A State Department spokesperson likewise emphasized Saudi self-defense.
If the sale itself speaks to the Biden administration’s continued preoccupation with Iran, the announcement’s timing speaks to the administration’s continued prioritization of Gulf monarchies. Like the Obama administration, Biden’s State Department has often provided updates on nuclear negotiations with Iran in tandem with arms sales to Gulf partners like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
With the latest arms sale likely to proceed, it seems that re-affirming U.S. support for the Arab Gulf monarchies against Iran will outweigh the lofty human rights goals of Biden’s first speech.
In moving forward with the sale without any meaningful change in Saudi behavior, the Biden administration signals unconditional support for the Saudi-led coalition’s actions, entrenching existing tensions in the Gulf — and America’s role in it — and increasing the risk of arms races and inadvertent escalation.
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Smearing the Movement for Peace in Yemen
The National Interest, the neoconservative foreign policy journal, has published a vicious smear job on four groups working to end Saudi Arabia’s aggression against Yemen (William R. Hawkins, “In Attacking Yemen War, Some Americans Call for Abandoning Allies,” National Interest, Oct. 12, 2021). The author maligns Code Pink, the Yemen Alliance Committee, the Yemeni Liberation Movement, and Just Foreign Policy, while whitewashing the US, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates which have murdered tens of thousands of innocent Yemenis since 2015, turning Yemen into what the UN calls the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”
Defending the Indefensible
The National Interest identifies Hawkins as “a former economics professor who served on the professional staff of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee.” He alleges that Yemen peace activists are biased against the Saudi-led coalition and biased in favor of Yemen’s Houthi rebels.
That’s a serious charge. The Houthis are murderous thugs whose motto is “Allah is Greater, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam.” Their human rights violations are many and include torture, killing of noncombatants, shelling of civilian population centers, forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and rapes.
The Saudi coalition commits all these crimes too. Why doesn’t Hawkins tell us? He doesn’t because he has a bias of his own toward the coalition and its accomplice the US.
What else does Hawkins sweep under the rug? Quite a lot. Hawkins does not mention that the coalition is much better bankrolled than the Houthis. Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst now at the Brookings Institution, says that the war costs the Saudis “billions of dollars, if not tens of billions, a year.” One scholar estimates that Saudi Arabia has spent $100 billion on the war in Yemen.[1] Imagine if that money had been spent instead on regional development. Whereas supplying the Houthis, Riedel says, costs Iran “a pittance. Maybe $20 million at most a year.”[2] Supporting the Houthis is a relatively low-cost means for Iran to harass and bankrupt its Saudi adversary.
The UN reports that there have been a staggering 23,000 coalition airstrikes since the coalition intervened in Yemen in 2015.
Blockade
In 2015, the Saudi-led coalition imposed a full land, sea, and air blockade on Yemen—not simply on the port of Hodeidah, the only part of the blockade Hawkins mentions. Hawkins also skips over the fact that the coalition routinely detains ships for periods up to 100 days and that the coalition even detains ships previously cleared by the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM). Nor does Hawkins mention that, in September, the coalition allowed only 9.5% of the fuel Yemen needs each month into the country.[5] The blockade has been a catastrophe for a country which historically imports 85% of its food and medicine.
The Houthis steal some humanitarian aid deliveries and delay others. But the coalition’s airstrikes and blockade are a far greater contributor to Yemen’s developing famine.
Sometimes, Hawkins just points and splutters. Code Pink has mounted a “We Love Iranians” campaign”! Code Pink wants to drop sanctions on Iran and revive Obama’s Iranian nuclear deal! The peace groups want the US to reduce the number of its military bases in the Middle East. To Hawkins, these are self-evidently bad things. If you disagree with him, tough. He makes no attempt to change your mind.
https://www.counterpunch.org/2021/11/05/smearing-the-movement-for-peace-in-yemen/
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Lebanon Calls Out The Royals
When will the Biden administration do something to check the Saudi and Emirati cruelties in Yemen?
Before his appointment Kordahi was impolitic enough to speak the truth about Yemen’s Houthi insurgents “defending themselves … against an external aggression.”
Too bad he left out the major coconspirator, the U.S. The Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations sold and serviced warplanes, supplied munitions, provided intelligence, and for a time refueled Saudi aircraft. Thus, Washington shared responsibility for the Kingdom’s murderous attacks. The State Department even warned that American officials could be charged for war crimes.
Alas, murderous aggressors always hate the truth.
Given the facts, Kordahi let the murderous Saudi and Emirati regimes off easy.
Nor is Yemen their only offense.
As for America, the last two decades have seen a disastrous passage of arms in the Middle East. The most important lesson Washington should have learned is the importance of staying out. Iraq and Libya were bigger mistakes, but Yemen was the least justifiable, an immoral gift to perhaps America’s worst, most oppressive friend. President Joe Biden should stop sacrificing U.S. principles and interests for Riyadh’s benefit.
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/lebanon-calls-out-the-royals/
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UN Should Create New Yemen War-Crimes Investigation
Saudi Arabia and UAE Fight for Impunity in Yemen Conflict
The UNHRC could seek to create a new Yemen accountability mechanism at its next session in March. But why wait? The General Assembly could establish a standing independent and impartial investigative body that would not only report on alleged violations to UN member countries but also gather and preserve evidence and prepare cases for possible future prosecutions.
Since 2015, the conflict between the Saudi and UAE-led coalition and the Houthi armed group has resulted in abuses and laws of war violations that have killed and injured thousands of civilians, and sparked the world’s worst humanitarian crisis .
Some delegations fear failure. Creating the IIIM wasn’t easy but the efforts were successful. The Saudis and Emiratis will fight hard to prevent such a mechanism from seeing the light of day. But their joint statement backed by some two dozen states hardly represents an insurmountable obstacle at the General Assembly. And even if a push for a new mechanism fails, the people of Yemen will be no worse off than they are today.
We owe it to the people of Yemen to try.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/03/un-should-create-new-yemen-war-crimes-investigation
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Dieser Öltanker könnte jederzeit explodieren – mit üblen Folgen, die auch du spüren wirst
Vor der Küste Jemens könnte sich jeden Moment eine grosse Öl-Katastrophe ereignen. Sie hätte wohl Auswirkungen bis in die Schweiz.
Der Öltanker «F.S.O Safer» ist zur Bedrohung für den globalen Welthandel geworden – und ein kürzlich erschienener Artikel des Magazins «The New Yorker» hat den Diskussionen um die Problematik neue Dringlichkeit verliehen.
Das Schiff wurde 1976 in Japan fertiggestellt und war als einer der grössten Tanker in den Weltmeeren unterwegs. Seit 1988 transportiert das Schiff jedoch kein Öl mehr von A nach B. Es liegt vor der jemenitischen Küste, wo es als Öl-Lager dient.
Im Jahr 2014 übernahmen die Huthi-Rebellen die Kontrolle über die Hauptstadt Sanaa und somit auch über die «F.S.O Safer». Vor der Machtübernahme gab die staatliche Firma, der das Schiff gehört, 20 Millionen jährlich für Wartungsarbeiten aus. Über 50 Personen arbeiteten vor dem Krieg auf dem Schiff. Unter den Huthis ist die Besatzung gerade mal auf sieben Personen geschrumpft.
Seit 2017 gilt das Schiff als «tot». Denn der Dampfkessel an Bord, der unter anderem für die Stromversorgung zuständig ist, funktioniert nicht mehr. Strom gibt es seither nur noch von zwei Diesel-Generatoren.
Seit dem Ausfall des Dampfkessels können viele wichtige Systeme an Bord nicht mehr betrieben werden.
Die Konsequenz: Ein kleiner Funke, ein Zigarettenstummel oder ein losgelöster Schuss einer Waffe könnte das Schiff zum Explodieren bringen oder einen Brand auslösen. Dies hätte dramatische Folgen für den Jemen
An Bord der «F.S.O. Safer» befinden sich eine Million Barrel Öl. Das ist etwa vier Mal so viel, wie auf der Exxon Valdez im Jahr 1989 auslief. Ein Unglück auf der «F.S.O. Safer» könnte nochmals weitaus schlimmere Konsequenzen haben. Wie brenzlig die Lage ist, zeigen die folgenden vier Punkte:
cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade
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Audio: Saudi Arabia's Yemen blockade, denied by US
https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2021/11/07/670109/Saudi-Arabia-s-Yemen-blockade,-denied-by-the-US
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Film: Sustained failure in war, Saudi Arabia now tightening blockade on Yemen: Analyst
Activist and political commentator Hussein al-Bukhaiti says Saudi Arabia is tightening its blockade on Yemen due to its failure in the war it waged on the country in 2015.
https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2021/11/06/670038/Saudi-Arabia-Yemen-blockade-war-
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President Biden: Use US Leverage To End The Saudi Blockade Of Yemen
Yemen is currently undergoing one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, driven by nearly seven years of war and a crippling air and sea blockade imposed by Saudi Arabia. The blockade is a key driver of this crisis, which started in March 2015, and has stifled the flow of critical necessities like food, fuel, and medicine to millions of Yemenis.
Saudi Arabia’s forced closure of Sanaa airport and its land and sea fuel blockade are not often highlighted in the media, but these impediments are at the core of the country’s humanitarian struggle in several important ways.
The Saudi-led coalition’s restrictions on fuel imports are a key driver of the economic crisis, making basic needs unaffordable. The UN commodity tracker says that Yemen needs 544,000 metric tons of fuel per month through its Red Sea ports. However, according to the UN Verification Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), zero fuel was allowed to enter the major port of Hodeidah in February 2021, and less than 10% of Yemen’s fuel needs through the Red Sea Ports were cleared in September.
The healthcare system in Yemen is now under immense pressure as fuel shortages prevent hospitals from providing services. In March 2021, World Food Programme executive director David Beasley told the UN Security Council that “most hospitals only have electricity in their intensive care units because fuel reserves are so low.”
It is the children of Yemen who are being hurt most.
Concerned by the lack of progress on lifting the blockade, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (MA) in May led a 16-member letter urging President Biden to call on Saudi Arabia to “allow the unfettered delivery of food, fuel, and other humanitarian aid through the Hodeidah port, under United Nations auspices to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Yemeni people.”
https://www.fcnl.org/updates/2021-11/president-biden-use-us-leverage-end-saudi-blockade-yemen
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YPC: Coalition detains three oil ships
Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) said on Saturday that Saudi-led coalition forces are still detaining a number of oil vessels.
In a brief statement, the YPC confirmed that the coalition is still holding three oil ships carrying more than 80,000 tons of diesel.
The coalition continues to prevent the ships from reaching the port of Hodeidah despite receiving UN permits and being inspected in Djibouti, the statement read.
https://en.ypagency.net/242960/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/11/06/saudi-blockade-is-still-illegally-holding-over-80000-tons-of-diesel-meant-for-yemen/
and also https://www.saba.ye/en/news3163007.htm
(A K P)
YPC: Aggression coalition seizes diesel-loaded ship
The US-Saudi aggression coalition seized on Wednesday a ship carrying 29,545 tons of diesel.
The official spokesman for the Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC), Issam Al-Mutawakel, told Saba that the aggression coalition detained the ship "Sea Line" and prevented it from reaching the port of Hodeidah despite it was inspected and obtained an entry permit from the United Nations.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3162674.htm
and also http://en.ypagency.net/242710/
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
Siehe / Look at cp1
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A recent @WorldBankMENA study says that 88% of Yemeni households skipped necessary healthcare as they couldn't pay 4 service cost This is why theSFD-supported #CashTransfers, building & equipping health facilities are key community priorities (photos)
https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1457397243099635723
(B H)
Yemenfriends: Video von unserem Hilfsaktionsprojekt im November 2021 im Jemen
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JWnd3TMY_QU
(B H)
SCALING UP RESPONSE AFTER MA’RIB, SHABWAH AND AL BAYDA ESCALATION
Humanitarian partners are scaling up response to the rapidly changing situation in parts of Ma’rib, Shabwah and Al Bayda governorates, where escalating hostilities since early September have induced civilian casualties, renewed displacements and further restricted civilians’ movements as well as humanitarian organizations’ access to people in need.
Between 1 and 23 October, more than 1,130 families (more than 6,700 people) were displaced in Ma’rib Governorate, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). More than half of these fled to Ma’rib City, about 24 per cent went to safer areas of Al Jubah District and another 22 per cent to Ma’rib Al Wadi. Some were displaced to Sirwah and Jabal districts. In September, nearly 10,000 people were displaced in Ma’rib Governorate – the highest displacement rate recorded in the governorate in a single month this year. Overall, over 55,000 people have been displaced in Ma’rib between January and September this year.
While hostilities are complicating response efforts, aid organizations have continued to deliver life-saving assistance.
Some 122 metric tons (MT) of food were delivered to assist nearly 2,500 families (17,400 people) in Al Abdiyah District as part of September rations. Since the third week of October, partners started general food distribution in Al Juba as part of October rations. More food aid distributions are expected in other areas. Food partners support nearly 950,000 people across Ma’rib, Shabwah and Al Bayda governorates.
Medical supplies have reached parts of Ma’rib, Shabwah and Al Bayda governorates. The Alshaheed Ali Abdulmogni Hospital which was partially damaged due to an attack on 12 October, resumed operations on 20 October.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-update-issue-10-october-2021
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You remember baby Saif, severe acute malnutrition & brain, by support of my friend, we had transferred him last week from Aslam villages to treat in Sana'a. Thk God he's getting better & weight is rising. & started 2nd stage of his treat 1> http://gogetfunding.com/food-and-medicine-for-yemen… (photos)
https://twitter.com/ghalebalsudmy/status/1456764762486886404
(B H)
Film: Lovers of Light
To all Yemeni people on all paths of life: human rights, media, development, health care, education, relief, and other professions and crafts.. We draw inspiration and strength from you.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T38ZoSu9WX0
(B H)
Small ideas may be critical 4 communities needing minimal service. In BaniAlabas cluster of villages, we support 36 community initiatives incl solar-powered pumping of water fm tank to village, collecting wasted spring water in a tank, protecting a tank base fm torrential erosion (photos)
https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1456342378017665027
https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1456335820269539334
(A H)
Delivery of hundreds of blankets to IDPs in Sana'a, 4 November 2021, Sanaa
Mona Relief delivered 1350 blankets today to 450 of the most vulnerable families and IDPs (internal displaced people) in the capital Sanaa each HH received 3 blankets.
The project is funded by Mona Relief's fundraising campaign in Patreon with the support of Partners Relief, and we are aiming at targeting 2000 families (photos)
https://www.patreon.com/posts/delivery-of-of-4-58353611
https://twitter.com/Fatikr/status/1456173339622379524
(* B H)
Yemen: 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan Periodic Monitoring Report, January - June 2021 (Issued October 2021)
More than six years of war has pushed Yemen to the edge of famine, uprooted millions of people from their homes, destroyed the economy and fostered the spread of diseases, including COVID-19. A protracted economic blockade and the collapse of basic services and public institutions compound the suffering of people in Yemen, increasing needs even as humanitarian funding remains insufficient. Unprecedented levels of humanitarian assistance helped to avert famine and other disasters in recent years, yet the underlying drivers of the crisis persist, and Yemen remains at high risk of descending into deeper crisis.
Recognized as one of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis for the past half a decade, some 20.7 million people in Yemen are in need of humanitarian assistance and protection and over 4 million people are internally displaced, making this the world’s fourth largest internally displaced population. Between January and June this year, the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP) reported an estimated 1,023 civilian casualties in Yemen, while the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on grave violations committed against children in times of armed conflict reported the death of 82 children and injury of 268 children due to conflict, and recorded at least 16 attacks affecting schools and hospitals.
Over the same period, more than 41,000 people were displaced in areas under the Government of Yemen (GoY), according to IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix. IOM DTM Yemen also estimates that around 10,000 migrants entered in Yemen mostly from Ethiopia and Somalia heading for Saudi Arabia. In addition, Yemen hosts some 140,000 asylum seekers and refugees, many of whom endure inhumane conditions and face rising discrimination, stigmatization and marginalization especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
With only 50 per cent of Yemen’s health facilities functional, the ongoing pandemic is placing additional pressure on the country’s already fragile health system.
(B H)
Program Quality Unit: Lesson Learned from the use of Cash plus in the support of Agricultural and Fishery inputs in Khanfar, Sarar and Rusad districts in Abyan Governorate
How does Cash Plus work?
Introduction
Strengthens the productive impact and sustainability of cash transfers.
Addresses immediate basic needs in addition to supporting livelihoods.
Improves the productive potential of poor and very vulnerable households.
Enables the utilization of goods and services (“plus”) as they were intended to (e.g., full engagement of the household in livelihood activities) as it prevents people to having to result to negative coping strategies.
The seed security and fishery sector production inputs are largely affected in Yemen as a result of prolonged conflict in the country. The lack of access to these critical agricultural inputs has been attributed to the heavily weakened purchasing power. In response, CARE Yemen through Yemen Humanitarian Fund provided support to 2500 most vulnerable and food in-secured farming and fishing households with cluster-approved cereal/vegetable seeds, farm tools and fishing kits in Khanfar, Sarar and Rusad districts in Abyan Governorate. The same households receiving the production inputs were also provided with cash aid of 50$ per month for 3 months. The cash aid also known as Cash plus was utilized by the farmers and the fisherfolk to bridge the food gap faced before a harvest.
(B H)
Yemen Nutrition Cluster: GAP Analysis (as of 31 Aug 2021)
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-nutrition-cluster-tfc-gap-analysis-31-aug-2021
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-nutrition-cluster-vit-gap-analysis-31-aug-2021
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-nutrition-cluster-sam-gap-analysis-31-aug-2021
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-nutrition-cluster-mnp-gap-analysis-30-sep-2021
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-nutrition-cluster-mam-u5-gap-analysis-31-aug-2021
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-nutrition-cluster-mam-plw-gap-analysis-31-aug-2021
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-nutrition-cluster-iycf-gap-analysis-31-aug-2021
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-nutrition-cluster-iron-folat-gap-analysis-31-aug-2021
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-nutrition-cluster-bsfp-u2-gap-analysis-30-sep-2021
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-nutrition-cluster-bsfp-plw-gap-analysis-31-aug-2021
(B H)
Yemen: Four children killed or maimed a day, as war grinds on
UNICEF Executive Director, Henrietta Fore, said that “whenever the conflict in Yemen flares and violence escalates, children are the ones who pay the heaviest price.”
“Families are being torn apart by horrific violence. Children cannot and must not continue to be the victims of this conflict”, she added.
https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/11/1104842
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
Siehe / Look at cp1
(A H)
UNHCR Yemen Operational Update, covering the Period 26 October to 4 November 2021
Funding:
USD 271 M required for 2021 operations
IDP Response
As part of the scale-up of the Marib response, UNHCR shelter partner Society for Humanitarian Solidarity (SHS) provided non-food items (NFI) to 630 families (3,506 individuals) recently displaced from Rahba, Harib, Al-Abdiyah, Al-Jubah, and Jabal-Murad districts into Marib district and urban areas. Meanwhile, information gathered by UNHCR, which remains unverified, highlighted precarious conditions in Marib's southern districts. Cut off from access to Marib, IDPs face challenges in accessing services in neighbouring Al Baydha governorate, as transportation costs have reportedly doubled in price. The presence of humanitarian actors in these areas remains limited and requires further scaling up.
UNHCR provided more than 1,000 internally displaced Yemenis in Taizz governorate with emergency shelter kits.
Since the beginning of the year, some 2,428 families have been displaced to Taizz governorate.
Refugee Response
Some 19,952 refugees and asylum-seekers in urban areas in Sana’a, Aden, and Mukalla received emergency multi-purpose cash assistance (MPCA) to help them cope with hardships stemming from the ongoing conflict, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the general lack of livelihood opportunities.
(* B H K)
Displaced by war, Yemenis converge on Marib's camps as frontline closes in
In his eighties, Mohammed Hadi al-Harmali has been uprooted four times by shifting frontlines during the seven years of Yemen's brutal civil war.
Abdelhamid Ali Mothana, a doctor at a nearby hospital, warned of winter outbreaks of flu and COVID-19, fuelled by the camps' unsanitary conditions, and urged aid organisations and other countries to offer the displaced more support.
"Demand is high and the hospital has poor resources to treat patients," he said.
Should Marib governorate fall on what is now the war's key battleground, it would deal a blow to the pro-government military coalition led by Saudi Arabia that has been fighting the Houthis since 2014, and to United Nations-led peace efforts.
Either way, with each Houthi military advance, more internal refugees are forced to move.
Marib's authority for displacement camps on Wednesday said more than 15,000 people were forced to flee in a few days by approaching fighting in the governorate's west - the third time many had been moved.
(* B H K)
Film: Yemen- Al-Samiya camp displaced people live in difficult situations under aid cuts
The constant bombing of Houthi groups compelled thousands of civilians in Ma’rib Governorate to forcibly flee into the unknown, leaving the homes that they built over the years of their lives, to live in harsh humanitarian conditions, in displacement camps that do not protect them from the cold of winter nor the heat of summer, while amid the lack of aid provided to them by international associations and organizations, their conditions have deteriorated. Like other camps, the displaced people of the Sumaiya camp in the Al-Wadi district, eastern Ma’rib governorate, eastern Yemen, face inadequate living conditions. Meanwhile, the director of the executive unit of the camps for the displaced in the city appealed to the international community for assistance and aid in the field of shelter, water, food, and protection, after the number of displaced people surpassed sixty thousand until October, due to the continuing Houthi attacks.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tb8enFCWdSQ
(A H P)
Ethiopia Brings Back 443 Nationals Stranded in Saudi Arabia, Yemen
At least 443 Ethiopian migrants stranded in Saudi Arabia and Yemen in dire conditions were flown home on Friday, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The latest repatriation is part of an ongoing effort to bring Ethiopians living in difficult situations abroad back home, according to the Ministry’s spokesperson Office.
The office said a total of 455 nationals were flown back from Jeddah, a Saudi Arabian port city on the Red Sea, and Sanaa, the largest city in Yemen, on Friday afternoon.
A senior official from the Foreign Ministry received the returnees upon their arrival at the Addis Ababa Bole International Airport.
(* B H)
Yemen humanitarian crisis: 37,000 displaced in Marib as fighting increases
Recent attacks have killed dozens of civilians and nearly 37,000 people have been displaced this year because of the increased conflict in the area.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPobKmI9Opw
(* A H)
Yemeni Refugee Camp in Marib, Yemen
Displaced Yemenis set up makeshift camps in the new Al-Nugea, located in Marib. Families seek refugee amid fears of possible future attacks on the city by Iranian backed Houthi fighters
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tLj6kVw0JhQ
(A H K)
Photos: The displaced are subjected to a new displacement process by the Houthis, who bombed their villages with ballistic missiles and forced them to migrate again in Marib
https://twitter.com/MCetiy/status/1456343701538721800
(A H K pH)
Mercenaries' authority prevents displaced from entering Marib city
The mercenaries' authority of the aggression in Marib city has prevented dozens of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from entering the city where fighting and clashes are taking place.
The media center of Marib province said the security checkpoints of the mercenaries at the entrances of the city blocked the IDPs from entering the city during the past few days.
The mercenaries' authority forced the IDPs to go to unpopulated places on the city's outskirts and areas in Wadi Abedah area without providing them with the slightest services.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3162724.htm
(* B H)
Displaced by war, Yemenis converge on Marib's camps as frontline closes in
Al-Harmali, who has been in the Al-Suwaida camp east of the city since May last year, is among the almost one million people estimated to have been displaced from elsewhere in Yemen who now form part of Marib's three million population.
Some 80 per cent are women and children, a group of aid agencies said this week, forced towards the city as the Iran-aligned Houthi forces press for full control of one of the country's main energy-producing regions.
"Humanitarian needs in Marib city far outstrip current humanitarian capacity on the ground," said the group of agencies, including Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam and Save the Children.
Abdelhamid Ali Mothana, a doctor at a nearby hospital, warned of winter outbreaks of flu and COVID-19, fuelled by the camps' unsanitary conditions, and urged aid organisations and other countries to offer the displaced more support.
"Demand is high and the hospital has poor resources to treat patients," he said.
Marib's authority for displacement camps said yesterday more than 15,000 people were forced to flee in a few days by approaching fighting in the governorate's west – the third time many had been moved.
https://www.reuters.com/article/yemen-security-marib-int/displaced-by-war-yemenis-converge-on-maribs-camps-as-frontline-closes-in-idUSKBN2HP1QP = https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20211104-as-fighting-increases-yemens-internally-displaced-remain-on-the-move/
(A H)
Yemen's government announces its intent to set up five new IDPs camps to accommodate thousands of new families displaced by the Houthi war on Marib province/Multiple website
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-51943
(A H P)
Large numbers of refugees return to their homes as [Sanaa gov.] Yemeni forces secure Ma'rib province
Ma’rib province districts have witnessed the return of large numbers of displaced people, after the army and Popular Committees forces secured about 12 districts in the province.
This came in the wake of the deployment of security teams by the National Salvation Government in Sana’a to secure the movement of displaced people back to their homes in the province’s districts.
https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/11/03/large-numbers-of-refugees-return-to-their-homes-as-yemeni-forces-secure-marib-province/ = http://en.ypagency.net/242699/
My remark: As claimed by the Houthi side.
(* B H)
Severity of internal displacement 2021
At the end of 2020, IDMC recorded 55 million IDPs worldwide. Knowing these numbers, however, is not enough to provide them with adequate support. That is why IDMC started assessing the conditions in which IDPs live.
IDMC's Severity of Internal Displacement 2021 Report provides information on the conditions in which IDPs live across 45 countries affected by conflict and violence.
The present severity assessment, conducted between October and December 2020, assesses the conditions of people internally displaced by conflict in different countries and contexts. IDMC has developed a methodology to assess the severity of internal displacement, to call attention to situations of particular concern, highlight key threats to IDPs’ safety and wellbeing, and better measure progress towards finding solutions to internal displacement.
Conflict is the main driver of internal displacement in Yemen. The ongoing civil war has displaced millions, and their plight was exacerbated in 2020 by heavy rains, flooding and the COVID-19 pandemic. There were 3.6 million IDPs displaced by conflict and violence in the country at the end of 2020.162 The severity of internal displacement countrywide is still very high, with the score increasing to 2.0 and 73 per cent of the questions answered.
More than a million IDPs lived in informal settlements not reached by humanitarian actors. Ninety-three per cent of these settlements lacked basic services, such as shelter assistance, food distribution, water, sanitation and hygiene facilities and education.166 Fourteen per cent of IDPs recently surveyed in Yemen were forced to leave their homes because of financial difficulties resulting from the COVID-19 crisis.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/severity-internal-displacement-2021
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
Siehe / Look at cp1
(A P)
A Houthi extremist (Ghamdan Ali Alshegagi) shot dead his father in north Yemen's province on Wednesday, the latest in a growing rate of parenticides and the second in a month by members of the Shiit Houthi militia/Multiple websites
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-52004
(A E P)
PM inaugurates Global Entrepreneurship Week in Yemen
Prime Minister Dr. Abdulaziz bin Habtoor inaugurated on Sunday the activities of the Global Entrepreneurship Week, under the slogan “Towards an Effective Partnership to Improve the Entrepreneurship Environment”.
http://en.ypagency.net/243096/
(A P)
Yemeni politician warns of subversive plot targeting floating tank “Safer
A Yemeni politician has warned of a subversive plot targeting the floating tank “Safer” on the coast of Hodeidah province, western Yemen.
“With the imminent return of the entire Marib province to the homeland, attempts and plots against Yemen will escalate to sabotage the floating Safer reservoir in Hodeidah,” Abdullah Salam al-Hakimi said in a tweet followed by Yemen Press Agency.
http://en.ypagency.net/243132/
(* A P)
the Houthi militia on Sunday sentenced model Entisar Al-Hammadi to five years in prison. The model was arrested in Sanaa in February on charges of violating Islamic dress code. The Iran-allied militia has also fabricated charges against her, including drugs trade.
https://twitter.com/FuadRajeh/status/1457277307450757124
Amid shameful silence from human rights activists, Houthi-run court sentenced #Yemeni model Entisar al-Hamadi & her friends Yusra al-Nashri, Mahliyah al-Baadani, &Ruqayah al-Swadi, to 5 years in prison on alleged charges of prostitution & drug possession after a sham trial.
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1457461574504009733
as a reminder: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/30/yemen-houthis-subject-model-unfair-trial
(A P)
Official denies coalition’s rumors on FM’s assassination attempt in Sanaa
http://en.ypagency.net/243029/
(A P)
Central Military District Court holds Two sessions to trial 34 traitors
The Central Military District Court held on Saturday in Sana'a its third public session to try thirty accused of treason, facilitating the enemy's entry into the territory of the Republic of Yemen, impersonation, and other facts.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3162976.htm
and also http://en.ypagency.net/243001/
(A P)
Jemeniten verurteilen US-Waffenverkauf an Saudi-Arabien
Die Ansarullah-Bewegung im Jemen hat das neue US-Waffenabkommen mit Saudi-Arabien als Zeichen der anhaltenden Unterstützung Washingtons für die Kriegstreiberei in Riad verurteilt.
Ein hochrangiges Mitglied des Obersten Politischen Rates des Jemen, Mohammed al-Houthi, hat den jüngsten US-Waffenverkauf an Saudi-Arabien kritisiert und erklärt, dass dies den Widerspruch in der Regierung Bidens in Bezug auf den Jemen bestätigt.
In einem Tweet sagte al-Houthi, die Waffenverkäufe hätten einmal mehr gezeigt, dass die Regierung von US-Präsident Joe Biden nicht wirklich die Absicht habe, die Unterstützung für den von Saudi-Arabien geführten Krieg gegen den Jemen zu stoppen.
(A P)
Yemen: US Weapons Sale to Saudi Arabia Shows Biden Not Committed to Peace
A high-ranking member of Yemen's Supreme Political Council denounced the United States over approving a 650-million-dollar sale of air-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia.
Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi stated that the major weapons deal with the Persian Gulf kingdom shows that the administration of President Joe Biden is not committed at all to Yemen peace, and in contrast supports the Saudi war on the impoverished Arab country, presstv reported.
He stressed in a post published on his Twitter page that the deal clearly shows Washington’s lack of seriousness and credibility to stop the ongoing devastating onslau
and also https://www.saba.ye/en/news3163007.htm
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27634.html
(A P)
Deputy FM: Washington Misleads Truth About Its Obstruction to Peace in Yemen
The Deputy Foreign Minister, Hussein Al-Ezzi, said that the remarks of the US envoy to Yemen, Timothy Lenderking, "reflected the White House's insistence on continuing to mislead American and international public opinion".
In his tweet, Al-Ezzi described the statements as a "failed attempt to hide the reality of Washington's position obstructing peace", Al-Masirah reported.
and also http://en.ypagency.net/243066/
(A P)
Top officials in capital Sanaa receive delegation from Al-Abdiyah district of Marib (photos)
https://en.ypagency.net/242904/
(A P)
Al-Houthi: New US arms deal to Saudi Arabia is flagrant contradiction to Biden’s commitment to peace in Yemen
https://en.ypagency.net/242920/
(* B P)
Book Excerpt: The Day the Gunmen Came
By Abdulkader al-Guneid
(Editor’s note: The following is an excerpt from Abdulkader al-Guneid’s book ‘Prison Time in Sana’a’, published in September by Arabian Publishing.)
The gunmen came for me at 3:00 in the afternoon. When they drove me away an hour later, I didn’t know if I would ever see my home again.
It was August 5, 2015, and I was being abducted from the home my wife Salwa and I had built together – the home where we had celebrated my 66th birthday just three days previously.
After a short drive, I was taken from the car and led – handcuffed and blindfolded – into a building. I was made to stand facing a wall. And then my interrogation began. It would continue for five exhausting hours.
Two men questioned me. By their accents, one was from Taiz and the other was from the north. I asked which branch of the security forces they were from, and the northerner claimed they were merely ‘God’s supporters’.
(Editor’s Note: Ansar Allah, Supporters of God, is the official name for the armed Houthi movement.)
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15660#book_excerpt
(A P)
Sayyid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi meets with tribal delegation from recently liberated areas in Ma'rib and Shabwah
The Leader of the Yemeni Revolution, Sayyid Abdul-Malik Badreddin Al-Houthi, has met on Thursday with a delegation from tribes of the districts that have recently been liberated in Ma’rib and Shabwah provinces.
During the meeting, Sayyid al-Houthi directed the release of captives from al-Abdiyah district, and urged the government and the local authorities in the two provinces to take care of the citizens in all the liberated districts.
https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/11/04/sayyid-abdul-malik-al-houthi-meets-with-tribal-delegation-from-recently-liberated-areas-in-marib-and-shabwah/ = http://en.ypagency.net/242834/
(A P)
Mohammad al-Houthi calls Iranian recovery of ship stolen by US forces an "honourable step
https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/11/04/mohammad-al-houthi-calls-iranian-recovery-of-ship-stolen-by-us-forces-an-honourable-step/ = http://en.ypagency.net/242787/
(A P)
Houthi militants ransack a Sunni library and burn its books in Osaylan district in [eastern Yemen's] Shabwa governorate/Anaween Post
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-51943
(A P)
Mohammed al-Houthi condemns Hadi puppet government's actions against Lebanon
(A P)
Prime Minister of Yemen warns that British occupation will be driven out of southern Yemen once more
Prime Minister of the National Salvation Government in Sana’a, Dr. Abdul Aziz bin Habtoor, said that Great Britain “made a mistake” by returning to southern Yemen, and “will pay the price for this mistake twice.”
In a statement to Al-Masirah Channel , Bin Habtoor considered that “the British continue to commit mistakes in the Arab region ever since Sykes-Picot and the ominous Balfour Declaration, all of which have brought woes to the region.”
https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/11/03/prime-minister-of-yemen-warns-that-british-occupation-will-be-driven-out-of-southern-yemen-once-more/ = http://en.ypagency.net/242688/
(A P)
Al-Houthi: Closing Yemeni Embassy in Lebanon is better than accepting ambassador who does not represent Yemen
http://en.ypagency.net/242677/
cp6 Südjemen und Hadi-Regierung / Southern Yemen and Hadi-government
Siehe / Look at cp1
(A P)
Islah Declares War On Saudi Coalition
Islah Party, the wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, demanded on Saturday Hadi to disengage officially from the alliance, in a move described in terms of timing as an official declaration of war after years of implementing the agenda.
Members of the party’s parliamentary bloc sent a message to Hadi, asking him to quickly provide weapons for those who described it as the “National Army” in reference to the party’s factions, through a third party and away from the coalition in reference to Turkey.
The message came at a time when Saudi Arabia is pressuring on Hadi and his entourage to pledge allegiance to Tariq Saleh, the leader of the pro-Emirati factions in the West Coast, as part of arrangements to hand him the helm of “legitimacy”, this indicates that the party, which still maintains large military forces, is planning to overthrow the alliance arrangements especially in light of the signs on the fall of its last strongholds in northern Yemen.
The letter is considered an extension to the partisan escalation against the coalition that Islah started recently and reached it to the point of threatening to join “Houthis” and handing over Hadhramaut, as contained in the statements of the deputy speaker of Hadi’s parliament and the head of Islah branch in Hadhramaut Mohsen Basurah.
https://www.dailyyemen.net/2021/11/08/islah-declares-war-on-saudi-coalition/
(A P)
STC militia hangs to death government soldier who tried to foil smuggling of arms to Houthis
Yemen's Southern Transitional Council militia hanged to death a government soldier and brutally tortured two others who tried to foil the smuggling of arms to the their fellow anti-government militia in the north, the Houthis, this weekend, local sources have confirmed.
The STC militia is a main facilitator and smuggler of arms to Houthis.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-52005
(A P)
Angry protests against Hadi gov’t erupt in Lahj
http://en.ypagency.net/243074/
(A K P)
UAE’s aircraft fly low over citizens’ homes in Socotra
http://en.ypagency.net/243082/
(A P)
STC rejects new appointments made by Hadi
The Southern Transition Council (STC) has rejected the decisions made by the President of Yemen, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi last night, to appoint new directors in state-run oil companies.
The STC expressed its total disapproval of unilateral decisions that contradict the Riyadh Agreement.
The STC spokesman, Abdullah Al Kathiri said in a statement today that Hadi's decisions are meant to further obstruct the efforts to complete the remaining terms of the Saudi-sponsored deal.
Hadi issued on Saturday night two decrees appointing Eng. Mohammed Yeslam Saleh as Executive Director of Aden Refinery Company and Eng. Amar Nasser al-Awlaqi as Director General for Yemen Oil Company (YOC).
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34022
and also http://en.ypagency.net/243101/
(A K P)
Massive explosions provoke citizens in Aden
According to eyewitnesses, the explosions that heard in different areas of At-Tawahi city were caused by anti-aircraft weapons fired at an unidentified drone over the sky of the city.
The area of At-Tawahi, the main stronghold of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) militia,” is witnessing a heavy flight of unidentified drones believed to be affiliated with Saudi-backed Islah Party, which obtained them from Turkey by the Turkish base in Somalia.
http://en.ypagency.net/243104/
(A K P)
British occupation forces prevent Yemenis from fishing in Mahrah
The British and Saudi occupation forces in Mahrah Governorate continue to violate the rights of Yemeni fishermen and prevent them from fishing activities on the coasts of the governorate.
The [Sanaa gov.] Minister of Fisheries, Mohammed Al-Zubayri, explained that the British forces occupying the coasts of Mahrah Governorate expelled fishermen on the Qishn coast and transferred them to the Sayhut district.
http://en.ypagency.net/243048/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/11/07/british-and-saudi-occupation-forces-in-mahrah-actively-sabotaging-yemeni-fishing-industry/
(A K P)
Violent explosion rocks in Abyan
A violent explosion rocked on Sunday the city of Zinzibar, the capital of Abyan province, “southern Yemen,” causing panic among citizens.
According to local residents, a mortar shell was fired from a security camp, which is under the control of the UUAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC)’s militia in the city, on a farm near Shaddad Fort area. No casualties were reported.
http://en.ypagency.net/243086/
(A T)
Official in Hadi government assassinated in Aden
Unidentified gunmen assassinated an official in Saudi-led coalition-backed government in Yemen’s southern port of Aden on Sunday.
Abdul Sahib Fath, former minister of local administration in Hadi government, said that unknown assailants targeted the operations officer of the Ministry of Local Administration Ali Abu Saeeda.
He was killed instantly, he added
http://en.ypagency.net/243069/
and also https://debriefer.net/en/news-27663.html
(A P)
Government temporarily suspends travel by land to Saudi Arabia
Yemen's internationally recognised government has suspended travel to Saudi Arabia through the Wadiah Crossing for three days as of Saturday.
The ministry of transport said the procedure aims to reduce pressure on this crossing after ending restrictions on travel that were imposed due to Covid-19.
Al-Wadiah is the only open land crossing between the two countries at the moment.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27649.html
(* A P)
Yemeni Islah: Riyadh deal obstructers behind Aden assassinations
The parties reluctant to apply the Riyadh Agreement are behind the insecurity and assassinations seen by the southern port city of Aden, the Yemeni Islah Party said on Thursday.
Earlier on Thursday, Dr. Mohamed Aqlan, a leading member of Islah and Aden University deputy rector, survived an attempted assassination in the Yemeni interim capital.
"It's clear now that the parties refusing to apply the Riyadh deal's security and military terms are behind insecurity, blasts and assassinations," the Party said in a statement, hinting at the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council.
"The hands behind assassination crimes have been lured by the [Yemeni] government's and presidency's and international community's silence at their crimes.
"Security and military reality altered Aden to environment for terrorism and criminality to thrive with no accountability," it added.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27635.html
(A P)
Yemeni president calls for international pressure on Houthis to reach cease-fire
Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi wants to end Houthis targeting civilians, refugees, public, private institutions
(A P)
Financial official in pro-coalition Al-Amaliqa Brigades kidnapped in Lahj
http://en.ypagency.net/242979/
(A K P)
#Yemeni MPs condemn the disregard of Yemeni internationally recognized govt for Houthi brutal offensive on #Marib, calling Yemeni president Hadi to urgently provide weapons for the Yemeni army to win what they called "decisive battle to restore the Republic". (letter in Arabic)
https://twitter.com/TheYemenMirror/status/1456694906504761355
(A T)
Vice president of Aden University injured in assassination attempt
http://en.ypagency.net/242805/
and also https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-51976
and
(A P)
The Presidency of the University of Aden issues a statement of condemnation and denunciation about the attempted assassination of Prof. Dr. Muhammad Abdullah Aqlan, Vice President of the University of Aden for Graduate Studies and Scientific Research
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-51979
(A P)
[Sanaa gov.] Dhamar governor reveals fate of pro-coalition Marib governor
Dhamar governor, Mohammed Al-Bakhaiti, revealed on Friday the fate of Marib governor Sultan Al-Arada loyal to the Saudi-led coalition and his family.
Al-Bakhaiti, addressing the fighters deceived by the coalition, said on Twitter that Al-Arada and all his family members left to Cairo a few days ago to join the rest of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders residing in Istanbul, to enjoy the riches of oil and gas that they looted.
Activists exchanged a picture of “Al-Arada” while he was in Turkey, causing widespread controversy.
https://en.ypagency.net/242935/
(* B P)
Media sources reveal secret prisons of UAE on Socotra Island
Media sources have revealed the existence of secret prisons of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in military sites at the airport of Hadibu, the capital of Socotra Island, southern Yemen.
The sources confirmed that the UAE had brought in dozens of foreign mercenaries to work in security companies, some of them Israeli, under the title of the humanitarian field.
The foreign mercenaries work in the UAE military sites, without allowing the people of the island to approach them, the sources explained.
Emirati officers had seized large lands of state property with unofficial contracts from the Land Authority office of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council, according to “Al-Mahriya” TV channel.
The sources stated that the commander of the first battalion that rebelled in the “1st Naval Brigade” of Hadi’s government, called Muhammad Ali, works with the brother of the Emirati ambassador to the Zionist entity, Tariq Mahmoud Al-Khaja, in the purchase of land.
Last week, Al Khaja arrived on Socotra Island for the purpose of opening joint Emirati-Zionist tourism investments on the island.
http://en.ypagency.net/242740/
(A P)
Humanitarian aid organizations accuse Al-Arada of looting money
Humanitarian aid organizations operating in Marib province accused Sultan al-Arada, Marib governor in Hadi government of looting large financial allocations provided as grants to improve the conditions of war displaced people.
Local organizations, including “Human” and “Relief” organizations operating in Marib, confirmed that the Al-Arada office looted financial allocations for the displaced in Al-Wadi district and the city of Marib.
They explained that the looted sums amounted to more than 160,000 US dollars, provided by the International Organization for Migration and UNICEF.
They pointed out that the money was earmarked for the purchase of electric generating stations, solar panels, tents and air conditioners for 12 camps in the valley and the city.
http://en.ypagency.net/242702/
(A P)
STC militia kidnapped citizens after storming homes in Aden
About 2 citizens were kidnapped on Wednesday the he UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) militia after storming their homes in Aden city, south of Yemen.
http://en.ypagency.net/242729/
(A E P)
Coalition forces fabricate fuel crisis in Marib city
Marib city is witnessing a stifling fuel crisis, after stations stopped selling oil to citizens, as they were not supplied with it from the Safer fields.
The price of a benzene liter on the black market has recorded fantastic figures, which doubled the suffering of citizens.
A local source indicated that the price of a 20-liter gallon on the black market ranges between 25,000 riyals and 30,000 riyals, which is a record in the oil and gas province.
The source explained that the authority of the Saudi-led coalition forces fabricated the fuel crisis after stopping production in the Safer fields under the pretext of maintenance, and transferred the Safer company’s annual stock, which usually covers the deficit, to the black market to sell it and make imaginary profits at the expense of the suffering of citizens.
http://en.ypagency.net/242767/
(A E K)
Oil company in Ma'rib shuts down as fighting gets closer to the city
Yemen’s Safer Oil Production Company in Ma’rib has been suspended its services, as confrontations between the [Sanaa gov.] Yemeni army forces and the Saudi-led coalition forces approached the city’s outskirts from several sides.
According to local sources familiar with the firm, the Safer Company stopped working completely, and its employees were given an open leave, justified as a “comprehensive maintenance action.”
and also http://en.ypagency.net/242828/
(* A K P)
STC says it has plan to confront Islah militants after Marib battle is over
Ahmed Saeed Bin Brik, head of the so-called National Assembly of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), said the council has a different strategy, if Sanaa’s forces take control of Marib city.
“If Marib falls, the STC leadership will have a different strategy,” Bin Brik said in an interview with Alghad Almushreq TV.
“We have a strong patience with the actions of some legitimate parties (referring to the Islah party militants) that is trying to thwart the coalition and the STC , and we have repeatedly tried to expose them to the president, the coalition and the international community,” he added.
Bin Brik’s remarks coincided with military reinforcements sent by the “STC” to Abyan province in preparation for a final battle to expel Islah militants and take over the province.
https://en.ypagency.net/242895/
(A K P)
Government denies reports about sending troops to Abyan as untrue
The internationally recognised government of Yemen on Friday said it has not deployed forces to the southern province of Abyan.
All efforts are being focused on facing the Houthi aggression against the Yemeni people, a government official said in a statement carried by the 26 September news website, the mouthpiece of the defence ministry.
Reports about sending troops to the town of Shaqrah are untrue and aim to draw attention away from the battle against Iran and the Houthis, the official said.
The national forces abide by the instructions of the legitimate government since the Riyadh agreement and associated understandings were reached, the official said.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27637.html
(A K P)
STC reinforces its troops in Abyan to confront Islah
UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) militias sent on Thursday a new batch of military reinforcements to its forces in Abyan province, southern Yemen.
Local sources familiar with the matter said deployed four military brigades from Aden to Abyan in moves to confront the Saudi-backed Islah militants in Shakra city.
The sources indicated that the STC militia has implemented a military deployment in the areas of Sheikh Salem, Qarn Al-Klasi, Al-Koud and Wadi Hassan since on Monday.
http://en.ypagency.net/242840/
(A P)
Aden: citizens denounce collapse of economic situation
Dozens of citizens organized on Wednesday a vigil in front of the National Bank in Crater city , Aden province, southern Yemen, to protest the deterioration of the situation and the collapse of the currency.
http://en.ypagency.net/242780/
(A P)
UAE-backed militia abducts Hadi government official in Taiz
and also https://en.ypagency.net/242901/
(A K P)
A government official denies the UAE forces' withdrawal from the Balhaf natural gas liquefaction facility/Bawabati
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-51943
(*A K P)
Remaining UAE troops leaving Yemen
The remaining UAE troops are leaving Yemen's southeastern province of Shabwah, military and political sources said on Tuesday.
The UAE is a member state of a Saudi-led coalition fighting in support of the internationally recognised government since 2015. It withdrew from the country in 2019, but kept a small number of its troops in Shabwah and the Seiyun city in the adjacent province of Hadhramaut.
Its forces have been stationed in the LNG Plant in the area of Balhaf and the Al-Alam Camp.
In recent weeks, part of these troops left the camp to Hadhramaut amid growing calls by the local authorities on the UAE and the coalition to evacuate the Plant in order to resume gas production and exports.
A Saudi committee recently arrived in Shabwah to contain the situation after pro-government forces besieged Balhaf.
It mediated the withdrawal of the UAE forces in three months.
Early on Tuesday, the Saudi troops left Ataq Airport and moved their equipment to the border between the two countries.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27602.html
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp7 – cp19
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-769b-yemen-war-mosaic-769b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-768-yemen-war-mosaic-768
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-768 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-768:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
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