... Die expansionistische Agenda der VAE auf Sokotra – Waffenstillstand: Weniger Verstöße, beide Seiten beschuldigen sich gegenseitig – und mehr
April 14, 2022: Yemen Review, March 2022 – The Yemen Crisis: An Interview with Helen Lackner – Yemen and the Dynamics of Foreign Intervention in Failed States – Escalating Fuel Crisis – Will Yemen's New Presidential Council Succeed in Ending the War? – The UAE's Expansionist Agenda on Socotra – Ceasefire: Fewer violations, both sides blame each other – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-801b-yemen-war-mosaic-801b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp11 Deutschland / Germany
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp13a Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage
cp13b Wirtschaft / Economy
cp15 Propaganda
cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
cp19 Sonstiges / Other
Klassifizierung / Classification
***
**
*
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
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Yemen
In March 2021, Yemen entered the seventh year of war since the launch of the Saudi-led military campaign against the Houthi-Saleh alliance, after the latter took over the country’s capital. The war in Yemen is multilayered and has resulted in the country’s deep fragmentation at all levels, leading some to conclude that “a unified Yemeni state no longer exists” (Arab Gulf State Institute in Washington, 8 October 2021). The internationally recognized president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, resides in Saudi Arabia, while the Houthis control Yemen’s capital, Sanaa. The temporary capital of the Hadi government, Aden, is in the hands of the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC).
On the ground, Houthi forces are fighting against a mix of military and tribal pro-Hadi forces in northern and central governorates, National Resistance Forces (NRF) on the western coast (for more on the NRF, see ACLED’s report: Who are the UAE-backed Forces Fighting on the Western Front in Yemen?), and forces affiliated with the STC in the southern governorates. In the south, control is split between Hadi and STC loyalists under the November 2019 Riyadh Agreement.1 While Islamist insurgencies, led by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Yemeni branch of the Islamic State (IS), have also plagued the country, both groups appear considerably weakened today (for more, see ACLED’s report: Wartime Transformation of AQAP in Yemen).
Despite the country’s continued fragmentation, overall levels of political violence fell in 2021. ACLED records less political violence in Yemen in 2021 — fewer than 7,400 events — than in any year since the beginning of ACLED coverage in 2015. This sharp decrease in 2021 — a drop of 27% compared to 2020 — can be explained by the relative freezing of a number of fronts between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces. Battle events, for instance, decreased by 66% in Ad Dali governorate, 53% in Sadah governorate, and 49% in Al Jawf governorate between 2020 and 2021.
The overall decrease in political violence levels, however, belied the deadly state of conflict in 2021. Although reported fatalities decreased for the third consecutive year in 2021, the lethality of the conflict — the number of reported fatalities per event — increased sharply in 2021 compared to 2020. ACLED now estimates that more than 150,000 people have died as a direct result of the violence, including over 14,500 civilians killed in targeted attacks. In 2021, nearly half of all reported fatalities from political violence stemmed from the Houthi offensive on Marib, launched in February 2021. Political violence in the governorate increased by 34% between 2020 and 2021, with reported fatalities increasing by 75%.2
What to watch for in 2022:
Despite the overall decrease in political violence in 2021, developments during the latter part of the year provide rather bleak prospects for the beginning of 2022. The revived diplomatic process in the first half of 2021 faded as the military track was once again favored by the conflict parties. In his last briefing of the year to the Security Council, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg acknowledged that the conflict parties’ focus remained on military options (Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, 14 December 2021).5
https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/yemen/
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
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Ramadan Truce Faces Uphill Struggle – The Yemen Review, March 2022
March saw an escalation in cross-border attacks between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, with Houthi missiles and drones targeting Saudi oil and gas infrastructure, and the kingdom responding with airstrikes on Houthi-held areas in northern Yemen. However, the month ended on a hopeful note, with the warring parties declaring that they were entering, for the first time in more than seven years of war, a nationwide cease-fire. The truce, which commenced on April 2, the first day Ramadan, is set to last two months and includes a halt to military operations and cross-border attacks, in addition to the easing of coalition restrictions that would reopen Sana’a airport to commercial flights and allow fuel tankers to resume deliveries to the Houthi-held port of Hudaydah. Despite multiple early accusations of violations, there is hope that the cease-fire will provide Yemenis a reprieve from both the fighting and the three-month long fuel crisis that has gripped the country. The cease-fire also provides breathing space for peace consultations among anti-Houthi parties, brought together in Riyadh in late March and early April under the auspices of the six-state Gulf Cooperation Council.
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/march-2022
Military and Security
A March wave of Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabian energy installations and retaliatory coalition airstrikes stopped, at least temporarily, with the April 1 announcement of the first nationwide truce of the war. The cease-fire took effect April 2, the start of the holy month of Ramadan, and was agreed to last two months, during which time military operations, including cross-border attacks, would halt and blockades on Hudaydah port and Sana’a airport would ease.
The truce followed a month of an intensified air war. Houthi authorities said their missile and drone strikes were aimed at ending the Saudi-led coalition blockade on Houthi-controlled northern Yemen – a set of trade and travel restrictions that prevent the Houthis from controlling access to northern sea and air ports – and in particular blaming the prohibition on ships from offloading fuel at Hudaydah port for an ongoing fuel crisis (see: ‘Gasoline and Cooking Gas Prices Continue to Spike’). The text of the cease-fire specified that 18 fuel vessels would be given access during the truce period and two commercial flights a week would operate from Sana’a to Jordan and Egypt. The parties also agreed to discuss the opening of roads in Taiz and some other regions.
Southern governorates also experienced political violence throughout March, including abductions and assassinations by Islamic militants. Coalition airstrikes continued with their shift toward Hajjah in an effort to dislodge Houthi forces from the Saudi border.
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/march-2022/17324
Politics and Diplomacy
Yemeni parties came together in Riyadh at the end of March in an effort to build unity, but in the month running up to the event the schisms among them were on full display in southern Yemen, where the Southern Transitional Council (STC) pushed back against political competitors in Aden and Shabwa.
On March 1, forces affiliated with the STC stormed the headquarters of the General People’s Congress (GPC) party in Al-Tuwahi district in the interim capital of Aden, abducted its security guards and shuttered the building. The GPC issued a statement accusing the STC-aligned governor of Aden, Ahmed Lamlas, of ordering a “provocative criminal act that undermines the foundations and rules of democracy on which the peaceful political parties in the country were based.”
Hours after the takeover of the building, forces wearing police uniforms removed a GPC sign on the outside of the building and raised an STC banner. An STC-organized protest in Sayoun on the same day demanded Yemeni army troops be removed from Hadramawt governorate. The rift played out later in the month as well, when the Interior Ministry overruled an STC order to restructure security forces outside the command and control of the ministry (see: Military and Security, ‘Interior Minister Cancels Restructure of STC Forces’).
The storming of the GPC headquarters took place a day after the Political Bureau of the National Resistance Forces, led by Tariq Saleh, nephew of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, announced the opening of an office in Shabwa governorate. Following suit on March 14, the STC inaugurated an office in the capital, Ataq, having previously seen its political activities in the governorate severely curtailed under the pro-Islah former governor, Mohammed bin Adio.
On March 19, STC supporters in Shabwa demonstrated in the capital, Ataq, against the presence of northern Yemeni political parties in general and the National Resistance Forces’ political office specifically. The director of the STC’s Foreign Affairs Department, Mohammed al-Ghaishi, said in a later interview that the STC would support northern parties against the Houthis in northern governorates, but that they were not welcome in the south.
Both Saleh’s National Resistance Forces and the STC are backed by the United Arab Emirates. The former, which has been based in the port city of Mokha in Taiz governorate since 2018, announced the establishment of a political arm on March 24, 2021, in the presence of several well-known individuals from the GPC. Tariq Saleh remains a popular figure among some segments of the former ruling party.
The STC appears increasingly threatened by the GPC’s growing clout in the south. In the final days of December, President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed Awadh bin al-Wazir al-Awlaqi, a Shabwani tribal leader and GPC member of parliament, as governor of Shabwa. He succeeded Bin Adio, who was sacked on December 25 – by Casey Coombs
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/march-2022/17330
Humanitarian & Human Rights
UN Humanitarian Funding
The UN’s main event to raise money for humanitarian aid to Yemen, the High-Level Pledging Event for the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen, raised US$1.3 billion on March 16, just 30 percent of the US$4.3 billion UN funding appeal for the 2022 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP). As of the end of March, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was reporting that just US$66.5 million in pledged funds had thus far been received. The High-Level Pledging Event, jointly hosted by the UN, Sweden and Switzerland, occurred a month after UN humanitarian chief Martin Griffiths warned millions face a “death sentence” if funding gaps were not addressed.
MSF Suspends Work in Marib After Abductions
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/march-2022/17327
Economics
Gasoline and Cooking Gas Prices Continue to Spike
The fuel crises that erupted in both government- and Houthi-controlled areas in January continued throughout March. By mid-March, the authorities in Sana’a had increased the commercial price of gasoline by 43 percent to YR16,000 for a 20-liter tank, while the same quantity on the black market sold for YR26,000 (both priced in old rials, issued prior to 2017).
In areas under the nominal control of the internationally recognized government, the Yemen Petroleum Company’s Aden branch raised the official price of gasoline 17 percent in March, from YR948 to YR1,110 per liter (YR22,200 for a 20-liter tank), while in Hadramawt, authorities raised gasoline prices almost 35 percent, from YR948 to YR1,278 per liter (YR25,560 for a 20-liter tank). These prices are in new rials, issued since 2017 by the government-controlled central bank in Aden (CBY-Aden). At the end of March, old rials were worth roughly twice the value of new rials, with US$1 buying YR609 of the former and YR1,232 of the latter (see, ‘Slight Depreciation of Old Yemeni Rials in Houthi-Held Areas’).
Inflation Jumps, Spurred by Local Fuel Crisis and Global Food Prices
The recent surge in the global prices of food and fuel, accompanied by the local fuel crisis, has put upward pressure on the cost of most goods and services in Yemen. F
https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/march-2022/17331
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The Yemen Crisis: An Interview with Helen Lackner
Helen Lackner, a research associate at SOAS at the University of London and author of, among other works, the award-winning Yemen in Crisis: The Road to War, which will be coming out in a new updated edition from Saqi in August, and Yemen: Poverty and Conflict, to be published by Routledge in July. She has lived in Yemen at various times for more than 15 years. She spoke with Steve Shalom of New Politics on April 6 and lightly edited the transcript to bring it up to date.
NP: Did you think Security Council Resolution 2216 was ill-conceived?
HL: Oh absolutely! It was more than ill conceived. Many people call it a war resolution, rather than a peace resolution. It did two fundamental things that have prevented UN personnel from doing anything serious.
First, it recognized Hadi as the President, whose legitimacy is highly debatable. And second, it demanded that the Huthis withdraw to where they were in 2011. Given the size and the expansion of their gains in that period, the likelihood of them agreeing to basically surrender everything they’ve done in 10 years or so, is zero.
The resolution was, according to all assertions, written on more or less under the instructions of the Saudis at that time. But the resolution is still in force. There have been other resolutions that could be used, but it seems that the current UN Special Envoy is managing to do extremely well without changing it so maybe it’s possible to do something simply by ignoring it.
NP: What are the terms of the current ceasefire and what do you see as its prospects?
HL: The talk until it happened was that it would be a ceasefire for the duration of Ramadan. Now it’s been announced to be for two months, so it’s already twice as long as the original talk. The Huthis had said all along that they would agree to a ceasefire if Sanaa airport were reopened and if the blockade, and particularly the fuel blockade on Hudaydah port were ended. These are the two things that they have obtained. To my knowledge, as of 13 April, no flights have yet arrived in Sanaa, but there have already been three fuel ships arriving in Hudaydah in the last few days. So they’ve gotten what they really wanted, I think, from the ceasefire. That’s not the long-term solution, but it’s major progress.
So that’s one element. The other element is that the statement promoting the ceasefire does bring up the issue of Ta’izz. Now Ta’izz is the city where basically there’s been ongoing stalemate and fighting throughout the period. The Stockholm Agreement had a provision about Ta’izz that was completely ignored, from the time it was signed in December 2018, until now. One of the elements of the current truce is the reopening of roads in and around Ta’izz, which is something that’s very important for the people of that city.
Another element which has been emerging in recent weeks has been an indication of progress on the liberation of prisoners. Now the Stockholm Agreement had agreed on the exchange of 16,000 prisoners and absolutely nothing happened, until late 2020 when 1,080 were liberated, but none of the big names. Now according to a lot of things that have been published in the last week, there’s been a new agreement, which will allow the liberation of about 800 more prisoners, including some of the big names that have been talked about throughout the period. I’m assuming that negotiations are continuing on this and will hopefully reach a positive outcome.
This particular truce is the first time since 2016 that anybody has achieved a kind of a ceasefire, so this is significant in itself. It’s happening in the context of the establishment of the Presidential Command Council at a time when the new UN Special Envoy is currently holding consultations with all the different political groups in order to prepare for some more formal negotiations. Whether the PCC will help or hinder his efforts is unclear at this point.
People have been saying from the beginning that there’s no military solution to this war, there’s only a political solution. I regard this as a nonsensical statement. If you look at any war, you always end up with a political solution. When does it happen? It happens either when one side has won and the other one has lost, or when both sides have reached such a stalemate for so long that they’ve given up on trying to win. And I think in this particular case, we are reaching a situation, I think, where the stalemate element is probably the stronger element, because the Huthis for the last two years have been trying a major offensive to take the last stronghold in the northern part of the country of the IRG, a place called Marib. And they have failed.
They have failed because, ultimately, the anti-Huthi forces have actually united and really fought back to prevent them from taking this place. The fact that this has been going on for two years, that a lot of people have gotten killed in the process, has contributed to the Huthis being more willing to negotiate. And they’ve been given what they want, what their primary demands were: namely, to have the Sanaa airport re-opened and the Hudaydah blockade ended, at least temporarily.
So I think there is more hope at this point of coming to some kind of ending of the fighting in Yemen, within maybe a year or so, because there is still going to be an enormous amount of discussion to happen.
But what has to be remembered, is that any discussions that the Special Envoy manages to arrange will be discussions between a group of leading elites who have in the last seven years shown zero consideration for the welfare of the population and have continued fighting primarily because they were increasing their own incomes with the war economy.
It’s not as if it’s going to bring about automatically a peaceful Yemen that would be democratic and address the urgent needs of the population.
I think it’s also important to remember that we are in the Arabian Peninsula. The rest of the Peninsula states are all autocratic monarchies with — okay, a little bit of democracy going on in Kuwait and maybe in Qatar, slightly less autocratic states than Saudi Arabia or UAE. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the ones that dominate and they’re not going to support a social democratic regime that focuses on people’s requirements.
So in the medium to long run, I think there’s a hope for an ending to the fighting; whether that will bring about significant real improvements to the living conditions of the population is a very different question.
https://newpol.org/the-yemen-crisis-an-interview-with-helen-lackner/
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Yemen and the Dynamics of Foreign Intervention in Failed States
With no end to the conflict in sight, Yemen now has the status of a failed state, one with no governmental authority or rule of law. This humanitarian tragedy raises many unanswered questions about the effects of foreign intervention on failed states: Why has Yemen’s civil war continued? Why is Saudi Arabia siding with a country lacking a working government? What does Iran have to gain by allying with the Houthis, and why hasn’t it intervened directly? Has Yemen as a failed state exacerbated the conflict? What is at stake for each actor?
The use of the term failed state is debated by political science researchers. Definitions of the term range from complete anarchy to a functioning government with weak institutions. In this article I use the term failed state for two reasons: (1) it places greater emphasis on the system of governance as a path to civil war than on extremism and terrorism (Cordesman and Molot, 2019), and (2) it has been used explicitly as justification for intervention by Saudi Arabia. I use political scientist Robert Rotberg’s commonly accepted definition of a failed state
Results: Three Opportunities
My research suggests that foreign actors may perceive the cost of intervening in a failed state—a space devoid of authority—as low and therefore simply too good an opportunity to pass up to influence regional power. In pursuing opportunities to intervene in a failed state, foreign actors may exacerbate the conflict and plunge the state into chronic instability. After concluding my research, including my review of the articles and databases mentioned in my methods section, I argue that failed states create three opportunities for actors who intervene.
The first is the Opportunity for Security, in which foreign actors may perceive failed states to be security threats to their own inhabitants and to neighboring countries. Therefore, actors looking to gain favor domestically and regionally may claim to intervene to defend the inhabitants of the failed state while protecting themselves from regional spillover.
The second is the Opportunity for Influence. Because failed states are unable to defend themselves militarily and are unable to pursue diplomatic measures, foreign actors perceive intervention as low risk, and victorious foreign actors gain the opportunity of influencing the restructuring of the government of the failed state in their favor.
The third is the Opportunity for Amplifying Power, in which actors who intervene can amplify their regional power by securing a swift victory at a low cost.
Saudi Arabia: Opportunity for Amplifying Power
With its intervention in the conflict in Yemen, Saudi Arabia claims to pursue the Opportunity for Security, but the reality shows that it pursues the Opportunity for Amplifying Power. Despite claiming to defend the Yemeni people and restore the Hadi government, the extent and intensity of Saudi Arabia’s military efforts, their unwillingness to cooperate in peace talks with the Houthis and other actors or abide by ceasefires, their blocking of food and medicinal imports, and deliberate attacks on civilian infrastructure such as hospitals indicate they are uninterested in the well-being of Yemen’s inhabitants and its stability. Actors insecure in regional power likely pursue more aggressive intervention as a desperate attempt to amplify their regional status. Saudi Arabia’s regional power status has been waning since 2014, driven largely by their dwindling oil reserves and unsuccessful interventions in Iraq after 2003 and Lebanon in 2008 (Council, 2011), which evidences their motivation behind intervention.
As mentioned previously, Saudi Arabia has not acted in a way that suggests it is concerned with a strong Yemeni state, and especially not one as an ally. Driving Yemen into further instability has created a breeding ground for terrorism, illegal immigration, and regional spillover. Under the guise that it is pursuing the Opportunity for Security, Saudi Arabia has been able to justify its intervention as countering Iranian influence while defending itself against fallout from a failed state. In reality, Saudi Arabia’s intentions extend further than self-defense. By pursuing the Opportunity for Amplifying Power, Saudi Arabia has supported an illegitimate government, destroyed critical infrastructure, killed innocent civilians, refused to accept anything other than complete victory over the Houthis, and blocked imports, thereby guaranteeing Yemen’s instability for years to come.
Iran: Opportunity for Influence
Iran’s intervention in Yemen suggests that it is pursuing the Opportunity for Influence. I
Conclusion
If a peace settlement is reached through Saudi Arabia and Iran brokering a peace agreement between the Houthi and Hadi regimes, the question remains: What is to prevent intervention from occurring every time an internal conflict arises? If Yemen and other failed states experience conflicts via revolution or civil war, what can prevent external actors from intervening? As this research has demonstrated, the incentive to intervene in failed states is a powerful one. Reworking a state’s entire structure of government is complex, and there is no one-size-fits-all.
Given that Saudi Arabia sought to amplify its power, its inability to conquer an easy target will be a major blow to its regional power status. If Iran is to cease support, it is likely that the Houthis would be capable of surviving on their own. Having sought gains in soft power, Iran will not lose out as extensively. Regardless, the real loser at the end of the conflict will be Yemen. The real calamity is that unchecked intervention has degraded the state and created further conflict. Under the guise of championing the oppressed, Saudi Arabia, the Houthis, and Iran have all made for a grave future for Yemen. I hope that readers will see through the layers of complexity of the Yemen conflict and better understand why foreign intervention can be dangerous and costly – by Bryn Lauer
https://www.unh.edu/inquiryjournal/spring-2022/yemen-and-dynamics-foreign-intervention-failed-states
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Yemen Key Message Update: Escalating fuel crisis further harms economy and worsens already poor livelihoods and living conditions, February 2022
Key Messages
Civilians continue to suffer most from seven years of conflict in Yemen. Living conditions continue to worsen dramatically, as living costs increase in a context of significantly limited livelihood options and deteriorating provision of public services. Humanitarian assistances delivery has also become more challenging in recent months due to funding shortages, high fuel needs amidst shortages, and rising costs of food and fuel, with areas controlled by the Sana’a-based authorities (SBA) most affected. Given reduced assistance rations for 8 million beneficiaries (in Al Maharah, Aden, Hadramout, Taizz, Al Hudaydah, Sa’ada, Al Mahwit, Dhamar, and Raymah) since December—from around 80 percent to around 50-60 percent of energy requirements—food security is likely worsening for many households. Widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are likely to continue at the governorate level, with additional worst-affected households likely to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4).
Increased tensions between the parties to conflict have contributed to more severe fuel shortages in SBA-controlled areas since late 2021. Long queues at fuel stations and surging parallel market prices have continued in February, especially in Sana’a city. As of February, fuel remained only sporadically available in official stations in SBA-controlled areas, at prices around 9,900 YER/20L, 72 percent higher than last year. Usually, people pay prices more than four times higher (around 40,000 YER/20L, equivalent to 67 USD) for parallel market fuel. While fuel remains generally available at official stations in areas controlled by the internationally-recognized government (IRG), the Yemen Petroleum Company in Aden raised official gasoline prices for the second time in one month, for a total 7.6 percent increase to reach 20,400 YER/20L in late February. This was mainly due to rising global price increases given the Russia-Ukraine conflict; Yemen experienced rapid fuel and food price increases—especially in IRG-controlled areas—in the days following the invasion due to its high dependence on imports and the absence of government price controls and strategic reserves.
In SBA-controlled areas, prices of public transportation have doubled due to fuel shortages. In response, authorities established free transportation buses in Sana’a city. Prices of other commodities including bread have increased by more than 10 percent, according to key informant estimates. On average in February, the cost of the Minimum Food Basket (MFB) across SBA areas was 4 percent higher than January and 29 percent higher than last year according to data from FAO. Meanwhile, in IRG areas, prices of commercial services (transportation, private hospital services) have continued to increase due to rising fuel prices. On average in February, the cost of the MFB across IRG areas was 3 percent higher than January and 82 percent higher than last year. More recently, according to media and key informants, wholesale prices of all basic commodities increased by more than 20 percent in IRG areas, with wheat flour and vegetable oil registering the greatest increases, due to the Russian-Ukraine conflict and depreciation of the currency. With no adjustment in government salaries and insufficient wage increases, many households nationwide will not be able to meet their food needs.
In February, levels of conflict including ground fighting across all of the active fronts (especially in Marib, Hajjah, Taizz, Al Dhale’e, and Al Hudaydah) and cross-border attacks declined relative to high levels in January
https://fews.net/east-africa/yemen/key-message-update/february-2022
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News Analysis: Will Yemen's newly-formed presidential council succeed in ending years-long war?
Forming a more representative PLC is a key consensus reached during the Yemeni peace consultations held in late March in Riyadh.
The talks, backed by the United Nations and the Gulf Cooperation Council, gathered scores of Yemeni political, tribal, and religious leaders, activists, economists, and leaders of non-governmental organizations.
"The participants came up with recommendations regarding the ceding of powers of President Hadi and appointing two deputies with full powers or forming a presidential council," Ahmed Al-Saleh, a political official from southern Yemen who attended the consultations, told Xinhua.
But analysts have cautioned that the road to achieving lasting peace in Yemen is still a long and strenuous one.
Speaking of the ceasefire and government reshuffle, Mahmoud Amer, a Yemeni political writer said "what really matters is whether these positive factors can really translate into lasting peace across Yemen."
Amer noted that the PLC is very "anti-Houthi" as it comprises some of the most steadfast Houthi opponents.
"Given the members of the council were handpicked by the coalition, it reveals the fact that there has not been a fundamental shift in the coalition's hostility toward the Houthis," Amer said.
Moreover, the truce lacked effective monitoring mechanisms despite Saudi Arabia and Iran having expressed support, so the sporadic clashes may quickly spiral into a full-blown conflict, Amer noted.
Mohamed Al-Ahmadi, a political expert, said though the transition of power may bring the political changes that Yemenis need, it has set up a dangerous precedent of replacing a legitimate head of state without a transparent and due procedure.
"It is a new political system established away from the aspirations of Yemen's people and has no relation to the current Yemeni constitution," Al-Ahmadi said, adding it could lead the country to an "unknown future."
Amer said the key to solving Yemen's problems lies in whether the Houthis can gain a legitimate place on Yemen's political stage.
He noted the Saudi-Iranian rivalries still have an important influence on Yemen, and although Saudi Arabia and Iran have engaged in a series of contacts and negotiations over the past year, there is little hope of an imminent breakthrough in bilateral relations.
In this context, it is hard for Saudi Arabia to be truly comfortable with the Houthis. "Saudi Arabia is likely to remain hostile to the Houthis. It is equally likely that the Houthis will launch a new round of attacks after the cease-fire period," the analyst said.
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/20220409/749947ec3f3a42ec994f29cfe43f9a14/c.html
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The UAE's Expansionist Agenda in Yemen Is Playing Out on Socotra
In May 2017, officials in the UAE acknowledged that their country's military recruits were engaged in "intensive" training on Socotra following years of rumors about such Emirati activities on the islands.
By 2018, the Emiratis had set up a military base on Socotra. In June 2020, Hadi's U.N.-recognized government accused the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council, or STC, of "a full-fledged coup that undermined state institutions" on Socotra "with various medium and heavy weapons, targeting state institutions and citizens' properties, and storm[ing] government camps and headquarters as well."
The Emiratis have tried to expand its ecotourism potential, permitting tourists to fly to Socotra directly from Abu Dhabi on an Emirati airline, Air Arabia, and even on visas granted by the UAE itself, completely undermining Yemeni sovereignty.
The UAE's claims on Socotra have not only angered many Yemenis but also the Saudis, their coalition partners, fueling some tension between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, especially after the establishment of the Emirati military base on Socotra.
"The UAE position on Socotra provides yet another indication that the UAE has shifted policy in Yemen away from the original goals of the Saudi-led coalition to focus instead on its own commercial, strategic and security interests," says Elisabeth Kendall, a leading Yemen expert and a senior research fellow in Arabic and Islamic Studies at Pembroke College at the University of Oxford. "Socotra is the jewel in Yemen's crown. The UAE's exertion of influence over Socotra, which is located across the ocean hundreds of kilometers from any frontlines [on the Yemeni mainland], suggests it is cherry-picking its involvement in Yemen to serve its own agenda."
Neo-Mercantile Ambitions
The UAE has worked to establish various networks of influence near critical chokepoints for global trade around Yemen, from the Gulf of Aden to the vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait that connects it with the Red Sea. The UAE has reportedly built an airbase on Mayun, a small volcanic island that commands a key position in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Exerting influence via Socotra is critical to this grander agenda.
"For the UAE, it's absolutely instrumental that they control chokepoints," says Andreas Krieg, an assistant professor at the School of Security Studies at King's College London. That means having DP World, the Dubai-based multinational logistics company, "controlling container terminals in Aden, or a variety of other ports in this part of the world," Krieg adds—"or having a military or maritime base, as the UAE has done in Assab [in Eritrea], in Socotra, and a variety of places in southern Yemen, like Aden, [and in] northern Somaliland and Puntland," on the other side of the Gulf of Aden. "You have this string of pearls that supports UAE interests."
So Much for an Emirati Withdrawal
Although there is much talk about the UAE's foreign policy moving away from some of its military adventures and in a more diplomatic direction, the situation in southern Yemen and Socotra tells a more nuanced story. Put simply, it is inaccurate to claim that there has been an Emirati retreat from Yemen—despite the UAE's own claims that it has withdrawn its forces—or a wider drawdown of its presence in the Horn of Africa, even if the UAE's posturing in this part of the world may appear less aggressive or perhaps somewhat benign to some observers.
Yemeni factions, such as the pro-government Giants Brigade and armed groups serving under the umbrella of the secessionist STC receive training, equipment, and money from Abu Dhabi. These militias are the UAE's Yemeni proxies, proof that it has not at all abandoned Yemen or withdrawn from the war. The Emiratis are using proxy warfare and various forms of diplomacy to advance their interests in southern Yemen and on Socotra, where the presence of STC forces underscores this reality.
"While the UAE drew down some of its forces in Yemen in 2019 in response to pressure from the international community, they have remained active in Yemen, through a small number of remaining Emirati forces as well as via their backing of southern militias," says Alexandra Stark, a senior researcher at New America.
"There are still UAE forces in Yemen on the ground—special forces, advisers, trainers," according to Krieg. "But for the most part, the UAE's military lever has been reduced for now to surrogate warfare."
If the UAE eventually uses its leverage over Socotra to open it up to China and perhaps Russia, which has its own ties to the STC and a strong partnership with Abu Dhabi, such an outcome would be of Washington's own making. The U.S. has largely outsourced its foreign policy in Yemen to the Saudis and Emiratis, while continuing to arm both of them. Going back to Barack Obama's presidency, Washington has done much to embolden the Emiratis, not just to intervene in Yemen but to essentially annex these Yemeni islands for themselves – by Giorgio Cafiero
https://dawnmena.org/the-uaes-expansionist-agenda-in-yemen-is-playing-out-on-socotra/
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
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One new COVID-19 case reported, 11,815 in total
In its statement, the committee also affirmed the recovery of one coronavirus patient in the same governorate. No death has been recorded.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34875
(A H)
One new COVID-19 case reported, 11,814 in total
In its statement, the committee also affirmed the recovery of one coronavirus patient in Marib. No death has been recorded.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34863
cp2 Allgemein / General
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Interactive Map of Yemen War
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Washington’s dirtiest war at last goes silent
There’s been a ceasefire in Yemen, though you can forgive the Yemenis for having doubts
The truce, set to last for two months with the possibility of a two-month extension, is aimed less at ending the war in its entirety than at creating an environment for serious diplomacy.
Will the truce stick? That’s the immediate question Yemenis are asking themselves, and you can forgive them if they have doubts.
The Yemeni people have heard endless officials preach about the desire for peace, only to wake up the next morning to find those same officials justifying further military operations. That the current truce is alive and kicking after a week, despite complaints about violations on the ground, is in itself a significant victory and perhaps an indication that the parties are beginning to understand the futility of a military solution.
There is plenty we don’t know about this latest peacemaking attempt in Yemen. But there are some things we can say with certainty. The most obvious is that for Saudi Arabia, Yemen is nothing short of a debacle of epic proportions.
Yet today the Houthis are nowhere near making a beeline back to their strongholds; in fact, after seven years of bombardment, the organization is arguably more powerful today than ever before.
Second, Yemen’s war is a fitting warning of how poor decision-making on the part of the United States can compound a humanitarian nightmare. Washington decided to assist the Saudi-led coalition with military, logistical, and diplomatic support not because there was some core US security interest at stake but because the Obama administration was seeking to reassure its partners in the Gulf as it concluded a nuclear deal with Iran.
One can only hope the last week of relative peace in Yemen is the prelude to a conflict-ending settlement.
https://spectatorworld.com/topic/will-truce-yemen-stick-this-time/
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Ray of hope looms for peace in Yemen
Rasha Al Joundy, a senior researcher at the Dubai Public Policy Research Centre, said Hadi's decision gives the council the authority to negotiate with the Houthis, which will be crucial for reaching an end to the conflict.
"I believe (the Houthis) would seriously consider joining－and refusing will not be easy at this point with all these developments," said Al Joundy.
Nagapushpa Devendra, a West Asia analyst and research scholar at the University of Erfurt in Germany, said the establishment of the presidential council will provide "significant momentum" in rebuilding Yemen's peace process.
She said it is crucial for the council members to come to a common understanding and strategy to deal with the Houthis.
Hussein Al-Suhaili, chairman of the Tamdeen Youth Foundation in Sanaa, said Riyadh appears willing to deal with the situation in Yemen by ending its military operation and reaching a formula that would prevent Yemen from being used as a launchpad for attacks.
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202204/12/WS6254dd0fa310fd2b29e566b0.html
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Saudi Arabia Abandoning its Puppet in Yemen: Coming to Terms
KSA can no longer “pretend” that things are under control and going according to plan. Actually, there is no plan, and no horizon, for the Saudis.
After seven long years of aggression in Yemen, Saudi Arabia is coming to painful terms with the truth on the ground. The Saudi enterprise in Yemen has failed miserably in all directions. The Saudi-led coalition “to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen," the banner under which KSA launched its war on Yemen in 2015, has all vanished. Only UAE is still in it, though half-heartedly. The large sums of money that KSA invested in Yemeni espionage groups have gone in vain, with no real achievement on the ground. The government of Hadi does not have a significant real presence or control in Yemeni territories. The Hadi government is still stationed in a Riyadh hotel, leaving Ansar Allah in control of the North and West of Yemen (where the main population is concentrated), and the secessionist Transitional Council controls most of the South and Eastern parts of Yemen (with the sporadic presence of Al Qaeda & ISIS). After seven years of war, Hadi and his government are practically powerless and irrelevant.
But what’s more catastrophic for the Saudis is the way military operations are going. The war launched in 2015 is now back-firing very badly.
To put it in a word: It’s obviously defeat, plain and simple. KSA can no longer “pretend” that things are under control and going according to plan. Actually, there is no plan and no horizon for the Saudis. Realities on the ground must be acknowledged, the sooner the better. That’s the background for Hadi’s dismissal. The Saudi know very well that Hadi, in his position for ten years, cannot be entrusted with leading a new stage in Yemen. A totally new group will be needed for the negotiations with Ansar Allah and Sanaa government.
What’s next?
We’ll have to wait and see the reaction of Ansar Allah to the new call for a Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue with the new “Presidential Council”. It is known that Ansar Allah so far has insisted on negotiating with KSA on a state-to-state basis, i.e. Yemeni-Saudi negotiations, refusing to grant KSA the image of the mediator or sponsor to the peace talks between the Yemenis.
However, this time things look serious. Saudi Arabia appears keen to get off the tree and embark on real negotiations with its adversaries in Yemen, Ansar Allah. There is a pressing interest for the Saudis to prolong the brittle ceasefire that is now in place and try to make it permanent. The Saudis don’t want to see their oil facilities in flames any time soon. Therefore, they will be ready for real concessions. A kind of negotiated settlement in Yemen that sees Ansar Allah holding major positions in the national Yemeni government is probably in the minds of Saudis. Ansar Allah, in its turn, has always wanted peace with dignity in Yemen.
For that higher goal, formalities could be overlooked. Ansar Allah and Sanaa government could accept to negotiate with KSA indirectly through its “Presidential Council”. Without a doubt, negotiations will be very difficult and complex, because of the broad range of horny issues like the South-North sensitivity maps, the role of Al Islah Party (Muslim Brotherhood), and Yemen’s political positioning in the region. But the beginning itself is a positive step. If Saudis give up the “victory” notion and start readiness to acknowledge the Yemeni realities, then this will be a starting point to achieving peace in the war-torn country.
My remark: A more pro-Houthi view.
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Film: The Yemen War After Ukraine: Searching for a permanent Ceasefire Amid Evolving Gulf Region Ties
As the war in Yemen enters its seventh year, a nation-wide truce was reached although conflict resolution is still missing: the internal, regional, and international scenarios have never been so complex. At the internal level, the Houthis’ military offensives have escalated, also in oil-rich areas. Yemen’s economic and currency crises have further worsened humanitarian conditions as the weakened internationally recognized government still struggles to provide basic services and salaries, facing the return of popular protests in Southern regions. On the road towards ceasefire and stabilization, the role of Middle Eastern and global players is fundamental.
However, following Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the relationship between the United States and some of its allies in the Gulf, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have significantly been challenged. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh aim to preserve significant economic ties with Russia, as post-oil diversification has also enhanced the diversification of alliances in the Gulf. How have the character and context of the Yemen war changed over the last year? Where to start to design a viable conflict resolution path? To what extent is the Houthis’ relationship with Iran stronger or weaker than before? Is it possible to insulate Yemen from rising political tensions between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the US?
Panel Discussion -Nadwa Al Dawsari, Non-resident Scholar, Middle East Institute -Ahmed Nagi, Non-resident Scholar, Malcom H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center -Sanam Vakil, Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House Chair -Eleonora Ardemagni, Associate Research Fellow, ISPI
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gbTGO0n74ac
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Film: Why The West's Narrative On Russia-Ukraine ISN'T LANDING With The Rest Of The World: Dr. Parsi
Dr. Trita Parsi breaks down the North/South divide when it comes to perspective on the war in Ukraine.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9MM98jvIYoI
Snippet: https://twitter.com/HillTVLive/status/1514279749996097537
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Film: Jemen: Fußspuren des Westens
di-Arabien geführte Koalition die Schlinge um das ärmste Land der Region enger gezogen. Unter diesen Umständen haben die USA als selbsternannter Verfechter der Menschenrechte nichts getan, um diese humanitäre Tragödie zu stoppen. Im Gegenteil, sie unterstützte Saudi-Arabien und seine Verbündeten immer noch militärisch und nachrichtendienstlich.
https://parstoday.com/de/mediathek/programs-i67680-jemen_fu%C3%9Fspuren_des_westens
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War-ravaged Yemen gets a truce and dumps a tired president
Soon after iftar, the fast-breaking meal during Ramadan, a group of influential Yemenis was summoned to the Saudi royal court. They were in Riyadh on April 6th for peace talks to help end Yemen’s long war. But there was little to discuss: the Houthis, a rugged Shia group from northern Yemen who have conquered much of the country (see map), refused to attend, saying they would talk only in a neutral country. Instead the peace conference became a venue for palace intrigue. The balance of power continues to shift against the Saudis and their Yemeni allies. But a lasting peace remains elusive. [paywalled]
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Die USA richten inmitten der angespannten Beziehungen am Golf eine neue Marine-Einsatztruppe für den Nahen Osten ein
Die US-Marine hat am Mittwoch erklärt, dass sie eine neue multinationale Task Force einrichten wird, die gegen den Waffenschmuggel in den Gewässern um den Jemen vorgehen soll. Dies ist die jüngste militärische Reaktion der USA auf die Angriffe der Houthi auf Saudi-Arabien und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate.
Der Befehlshaber der Fünften Flotte, Vizeadmiral Brad Cooper, erklärte, dass die Einsatztruppe ab Sonntag im Roten Meer, in Bab al-Mandab und im Golf von Aden Präsenz zeigen und eine abschreckende Haltung einnehmen werde.
"Dies sind strategisch wichtige Gewässer, die unsere Aufmerksamkeit verdienen", sagte Cooper in einem Telefonat mit Reportern und fügte hinzu, dass auch der Menschen- und Drogenhandel ins Visier genommen werde.
Mein Kommentar: Die USA spielen Weltpolizist und beanspruchen weltweit die Vorherrschaft.
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US Navy says new task force to patrol Red Sea amid Yemen war
The U.S. Navy said Wednesday it will begin a new task force with allied countries to patrol the Red Sea after a series of attacks attributed to Yemen’s Houthi rebels in a waterway that’s essential to global trade.
Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, who oversees the Navy’s Mideast-based 5th Fleet, declined four times to directly name the Iran-backed Houthis in his remarks to journalists announcing the task force. However, the Houthis have launched explosive-laden drone boats and mines into the waters of the Red Sea, which runs from Egypt’s Suez Canal in the north, down through the narrow Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the south that separates Africa from the Arabian Peninsula.
“In a macro sense, this region literally and figuratively fuels the world,” Cooper said. “The area is so vast that we just can’t do it alone so we’re going to be at our best when we partner.”
The Combined Maritime Forces command, a 34-nation organization which Cooper oversees from a base in Bahrain, already has three task forces that handle piracy and security issues both inside and outside of the Persian Gulf. The new task force will be commissioned Sunday and will see the USS Mount Whitney, a Blue Ridge class amphibious command ship previously part of the Navy’s African and European 6th Fleet, join it.
Cooper said he hoped the task force of two to eight ships at a time would target those smuggling coal, drugs, weapons and people in the waterway. Coal smuggling has been used by Somalia’s al-Qaida-linked al-Shabab to fund their attacks. Weapons linked by the Navy and analysts to Iran have been intercepted in the region as well, likely on their way to the Houthis. Yemen also sees migrants from Africa try to cross its war-torn nation to reach jobs in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.
https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/the-new-us-led-multinational-navy-explained-56355
My comment: This really isn’t US business at all. The US by playing policeman of the world secures its supremacy.
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Ongoing talks on fate of oil aboard ‘Safer’ should not delay progress, UN says
David Gressly, the UN's Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Yemen, is touring the Gulf to mobilise $80 million in funds desperately needed to replace the oil tanker FSO Safer.
The “floating time bomb” was moored in the Red Sea off the coast of Yemen in 2015 and has remained there unmaintained since Houthi militias took control of the coastline. Experts fear the vessel's deteriorating hull could be breached by corrosion, causing a devastating oil spill or that gases building up in its chambers could cause an explosion.
The fund-raising is part of a wider effort to ensure that a UN-brokered plan to offload the 1.1 million barrels of oil aboard Safer takes place before September when the season
As part of the plan, a temporary ship would contain the barrels of oil, as the Safer is cleaned then taken off the water, while a longer-term replacement is secured - a process which could take 18 months.
In the meantime, another complex issue is being discussed, the fate of the oil.
“There are a lot of issues over selling the oil — the question of who owns it and the quality of it, how valuable it is or not,” Mr Gressly told The National.
“Any sale of the oil will require clearance from the [Saudi] coalition, the government of Yemen and the authorities that control the vessel in Sanaa.”
However, Mr Gressly said these talks cannot pause the operation to eventually dismantle and replace Safer.
“We cannot wait for those discussions to conclude before safeguarding the oil in a temporary vessel.”
There are several options as to what would happen to Safer itself, which, as a Floating Storage and Offloading (FSO) vessel is obsolete.
“It has a good scrap value. The company that we are working to contract this with would clean up the vessel so it’s ready to be towed for salvage. We are looking at how this could offset costs for a replacement vessel,” Mr Gressly said.
However, for now, there have been no solid agreements as to what will happen to either the oil or the vessel.
Procuring a temporary ship to contain Safer’s oil barrels is in its “final stages,” Mr Gressly said, noting that the $80m required for the operation has yet to be raised although the prospects look promising.
All of this, however, is not enough if the agreement reached between the Houthis and the UN is not met.
“In order to gain the confidence of the authorities in Sanaa, their expectation that the FSO will be replaced, so we need to focus on the temporary [ship] but especially the replacement in order to continue to secure their co-operation. Without that, we might find the obstacles we have in the past.”
“So while we may want to focus on getting the $80 million upfront, it can’t be the end of the effort and we can’t act like that’s the end of our objective.”
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Biden’s policy in Yemen is ‘disappointing’: professor
“One word explains Biden's policy in Yemen: Disappointing,” Nader Entessar tells the Tehran Times.
“Although candidate Joe Biden had criticized Saudi Arabia's conduct in Yemen's conflict and expressed his desire to lessen Washington's carte blanche political and military support of the Saudi-led war in Yemen, President Biden followed Trump's policies in supporting the Saudi war efforts by enabling the Saudi war machine in the region,” Entessar remarked.
Following is the text of the interview with Nader Entessar about the repercussions of the Yemeni attack on Aramco:
Q: Why did the Saudis decide to remove Abdo Rabeh Mansour? Is that a message to facilitate the negotiations with Ansallah?
A: Abdo Rabeh Mansour was already a politically spent figure, and the Saudi regime had already gotten as much mileage from him as had been possible. By forcing Mansour to renounce his claim to Yemen's leadership, Riyadh wanted to convey to the other side that it is, at least in theory, ready to entertain a negotiated exit from its Yemen quagmire and that Abdo Rabeh Mansour will no longer be an obstacle to a possible negotiated peace agreement.
Q: Do you believe that the negotiations about the war in Yemen will reach a result while Saudi Arabia is actually a party to the war and tries to exclude Ansarallah from Yemen’s political scene?
A: For a negotiated settlement of the war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia must play the role of an honest broker among the contending parties in Yemen's conflict, including the all-important Houthis/Ansarallah. Given the Saudi regime's immoral and illegal conduct in perpetuating the carnage in Yemen, I remain doubtful about Riyadh's willingness to change course when it comes to its destructive involvement in Yemen's conflict.
https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/471632/Biden-s-policy-in-Yemen-is-disappointing-professor
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A Window of Opportunity Has Opened for Ending Yemen’s War Combined with a change in leadership among the Saudi-backed Yemeni government, the quieting of the guns, though temporary, could open a window of opportunity for resolving the conflict. But both developments also underscore the difficulty of ending a war that has resisted efforts to do so for years, with no relief in sight for the long-suffering civilians who are bearing most of its deadly cost. [paywalled]
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/30464/on-ending-war-yemen-sees-a-glimmer-of-hope
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Film: This Isn’t Ukraine, It’s the World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis | Saudi Siege of Yemen
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ic_cuS4Cgt4
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Film: Dr. Annelle Sheline: END US Support For Yemen Catastrophe | Breaking Points with Krystal and Saagar
Krystal and Saagar are joined by Middle East expert Dr. Annelle Sheline to better understand the catastrophe in Yemen waged by the Saudis with US support and the recent news surrounding it.
the 2 month ceasefire in Yemen allows for cautious optimism, esp. if ships & planes are allowed in But is the new Presidential Leadership Council primarily intended to negotiate with the Houthis, or fight them?
The US can be crucial in pushing the Saudis & Emiratis to pressure the Presidential Leadership Council to negotiate with the Houthis US leverage reflects the fact that the Saudi air force cannot function without US military contractors: we withdraw support, they can't fly.
The Saudis' & Emiratis' newfound motivation to end their aggression towards Yemen also reflects the Houthis' increased missile & drone capacity A single attack can shatter their carefully cultivated images as safe for tourists & investors = economic disaster, esp for MBS.
A pause in the airstrikes is huge But unfortunately most of the 400,000 Yemeni civilians killed by the war have died due to lack of food, clean water, medical care Those conditions sadly persist.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YYXVBk0BBd0
Main points: https://twitter.com/AnnelleSheline/status/1514293814126682112
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Yemen Peace Deal “Positive Development” as Port Reopens, But Houthis Excluded from Talks
SARAHLEAHWHITSON: Well, first of all, it is a tremendous positive development. This is the first truce for over the past six years. And so far it’s held.
Domestically, it will remain to be seen whether this attempt by the international community, the U.N., to establish a new government structure — President Hadi has turned over his executive powers to a new government structure that includes, basically, every party to the conflict inside the country except for the Houthis, in an attempt to bring them together to, I suppose, defeat the Houthis, once and for all. Whether that will hold remains to be seen. I think we all have to realize that the Houthis will have to be part of any negotiated settlement in the country, and excluding them, as they represent certainly a sizable minority in the country, will not be a recipe for success. Nevertheless, this is a tremendously important respite for the Yemeni people from bombs and weapons that have been devastating them for the past over six years.
https://www.democracynow.org/2022/4/12/yemen_un_truce_deal_us_houthis
Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6vJOVqkP1zQ
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A war’s end by light of the innocent?
A fresh approach by a new U.N. mediator in Yemen’s seven-year war puts the priorities of civilians first, yielding a truce and other peace-promising benefits.
Since late 2021, the timing has been ripe for a new United Nations mediator, Hans Grundberg, to bring an approach that involves listening to women’s groups, tribes, and civil society about their priorities.
The result was a truce that includes meaningful economic relief and a broadening of political participation. Saudi Arabia has dumped its key and unpopular ally in Yemen, former President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi.
Mr. Grundberg’s multitrack approach relies on continued efforts to give voice to the millions of Yemenis still suffering under one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Direct talks toward a political settlement have yet to begin. The U.N. does not have people on the ground to monitor the cease-fire.
Yet, says the Swedish diplomat, “Across the plurality of voices, a common message has emerged – Yemenis want the war to end, and they want a just and durable peace.”
Yet credit for the budding peace goes to Yemeni civilians. They “are united in their desire for the truce to be upheld, renewed, and consolidated as a step towards peace,” said Mr. Grundberg. By listening to their first priority – a bolstering of the economy – mediators have widened the door to a political peace.
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Finally, Some Movement in Yemen?
In an interview, Ahmed Nagi explains what the establishment of a Presidential Council last week means for the future.
Ahmed Nagi is a nonresident scholar at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where his research centers on Yemen
Michael Young: What was the reason for President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s resignation on April 8 and the formation of a Presidential Council?
Ahmed Nagi: There were several reasons. The Saudi-led coalition that opposes Ansar Allah, better known as the Houthis, had become convinced that there was a need for a different approach to the Yemen conflict, one more focused on finding political solutions than relying on a military-first strategy. This conviction was strengthened by recent Houthi attacks against the territories of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which showed how the dynamics of the conflict were spreading beyond Yemen’s borders and becoming a real threat for both countries. Deescalating the conflict has become a priority for the coalition, at least for now.
Another reason was that Hadi was very weak in managing Yemen’s multiple disasters during the war.
But the coalition’s recent change in strategy meant that Hadi was no longer the right person, as this required a new Yemeni leadership.
On the local level, the war produced several military groups. Many are not under Hadi’s control but have direct ties with the coalition. There was an effort to merge these forces under the supervision of presidential institutions.
In addition, the Presidential Council and its subsidiary committees and bodies were formed in a flexible way to absorb more members in the future, if a political compromise is achieved with the Houthis. In other words, the council’s structure prepares the ground for any possible understanding among the actors in the Yemeni conflict.
Although the Houthis refused to attend, the inter-Yemeni talks were held under the sponsorship of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This aimed to revive the role of the GCC as a mediator in Yemen, especially after it was announced that these talks would continue in the future. Despite discussions about the consistency of such a move with the Yemeni constitution, the GCC umbrella was an important step to legalize the Presidential Council, knowing that Hadi became president based on a GCC initiative brokered between former president Ali Abdullah Salah and opposition parties in 2011. Therefore, the GCC, which orchestrated the transfer of power from Saleh to Hadi, is now transferring power from Hadi to a new leadership.
It is clear that there were understandings between the UAE and Saudi Arabia over the steps needed to unify their agendas in Yemen. Without these understandings, the Presidential Council would not have seen the light. The council aimed to bring all the actors backed by the two countries into a partnership that would cover presidential decisionmaking and ensure that no one actor alone could dominate decisions.
The crossborder attacks by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia and the UAE forced both countries to realize that having conflicting agendas in Yemen would serve neither country.
MY: What are the key challenges the Presidential Council will face?
AN: So far, there is a consensus among all the anti-Houthi parties to support the Presidential Council. Each party feels represented in the body. However, the council’s success or failure will depend on how the situation develops on the ground and how it will address three key issues. First, it will have to take on the relations among council members. The council contains different figures with different political agendas.
A second challenge will be addressing the relationship between the Presidential Council and the Saudi-led coalition. There was considerable mistrust at one point between the Saudis and the UAE on one hand and the Hadi government on the other. Today, the council brings together all the nonstate actors with which the coalition dealt as trusted allies. So, will the ties be different this time and will the council receive more support than Hadi did, and will it be dealt with as a sovereign entity?
And third, the biggest challenge remains how the council is going to deal with the Houthis.
MY: There have been suggestions that we are nearing the possibility of an overall settlement in Yemen. What signs indicate this?
AN: Recently, there were intensive diplomatic efforts led by the United Nations, and in which Oman played a major role, to achieve a two-month truce among the conflicting parties.
https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/86871 = https://middleeasttransparent.com/en/finally-some-movement-in-yemen/
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Satire!
Um mehr Beachtung zu finden: Kriegszerstörter Jemen ändert Fahne und Nationaltracht
Ist das der Weg zum Frieden? In seltener Eintracht haben heute die beiden Kriegsparteien im Jemen bekannt gegeben, die Fahne des Landes und dessen Nationaltracht ändern zu wollen. Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi (unterstützt von Saudi-Arabien und den Emiraten nebst einer sunnitisch geprägten Allianz der Golfstaaten) und die Huthi-Rebellen (gefördert vom schiitischen Iran) einigten sich auf ein Tuch mit zweigeteilter Horizontale in blau und gelb als offizielle Fahne des Landes. Die neue Nationaltracht soll osteuropäischen Vorlagen entsprechen und mit zahlreichen Stickereien und dekorativen Elementen versehen werden.
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[Sanaa gov.] National Delegation Member: We Refuse Saudi Treatment of Peace, Truce as Joke
National Delegation Member Abdulmalik Al-Ejri, affirmed refusal to deal with peace as joke and he said " Our position is always with any step leading to real peace."
Al-Ejri considered that the real test for peace is the implementation of UN sponsored humanitarian truce, whether by completing the procedures for lifting restrictions on the airport and the port, or related to basic rights, especially salaries and electricity.
The US-Saudi aggression is still preventing flights to Sana'a Int. Airport and fuel ships to Hodeidah's port, in violation of the terms of the military humanitarian truce.
and also https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/04/11/yemeni-diplomat-real-peace-only-possible-through-abiding-by-un-truce/ = https://en.ypagency.net/258786/
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Yemen: YJS reports 20 media violations in the first quarter of 2022
The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate (YJS) has documented 20 violations of press freedom in the country between 1 January and 31 March 2022, ranging from arbitrary detentions to physical assaults and threats.
The violations recorded by the YJS include two cases of detention, six cases of suspension of radio stations, five cases of attacks on press organizations and journalists and five cases of torture of arrested media workers.
The union also reported the detention of two journalists while doing their job and the killing of journalist Fawaz Al-Wafi in Taiz city by unknown killers.
The Houthi group was responsible for 11 of the cases, according to YJS. They are accused of the detention since 2015 of media workers Abdulakhleq Amran, Akram Al-Waleedi, Hareth Humaid and Tawifq Al-Mansoori, who have been tortured in prison and are currently on the death row after The State Security Court in Sanaa, under the control of Ansar Allah/the Houthi Movement, has sentenced them to death.
The Yemeni government was responsible for 4 cases, including the arrest of journalist and media activist Hala Fouad Badawi by a Yemeni military intelligence command over social media posts, calling for improving living conditions and holding to account those responsible for corruption in government institutions.
The rest of the media violations were carried out by unknown individuals (5).
The YJS highlights that six radio stations have been closed in the last three months due to the lack of work permit and the payment of fees by the Houthi authority.
and media report: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220411-20-violations-against-yemen-journalists-in-3-months-report-finds/
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Is This the Beginning of the End of Yemen's Civil War?
The ouster of Yemen’s president and the formation of a presidential council could finally end the civil war – if the Houthis get on board
For now, any optimism should be cautious: Ending the war doesn’t depend only on the composition of the government in Yemen’s south. It also needs the consent of the Houthis, who control northern and central Yemen, including the capital Sanaa. The Houthis are still treating the change as mere political trickery that does not assure their demands will be met.
Even so, when a change in government follows a roughly week-old cease-fire that has held, with the exception of some local violations, and when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the patrons of this change, the optimism isn’t completely groundless.
Behind the scenes of the negotiations, apparently a Saudi-style pressure campaign was conducted. Some reports say it including the “abduction” of Hadi’s two sons and their incarceration in Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s palace, effectively turning them into hostages to pressure their father to sign the agreement and announce his resignation.
Hadi has already been under a kind of house arrest in the Saudi capital of Riyadh for years, as have some of his cabinet ministers, on the pretext of protecting their lives. His ouster became necessary at this point because the Houthis won’t talk with him. Officially, he is under a death sentence from a Houthi court. His deputy, Al-Ahmar, deserted from the Yemen army in 2012 to join the rebellion against Saleh. He has close ties with the Islah (Reform) party, the Yemenite branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Another question is Iran’s position and its influence over what the Houthis do. Until now, it was thought that Iran was behind the Houthis’ attacks on the Gulf states and that it could dictate how the Houthi leadership conducted negotiations with Riyadh and the Yemeni government. But in light of the recent attacks, which hinder Iran’s plan to repair its relations with the Gulf states, it seems that unlike Hezbollah, the Houthis have their own agenda, which isn’t necessarily subordinate to Iranian diktats.
Ever since the war began, Houthi leaders have insisted that their connection with Iran isn’t ideological or religious, but stemmed from the need to obtain arms and money.
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Cautious Optimism in Yemen That Truce Will Hold, Improve Conditions
The two-month cease-fire in the seven-year civil war would greatly alleviate the suffering of the Yemeni people, if promises made by the warring parties are delivered, expert says
“The real truce should be in lifting the siege on oil derivatives, paying salaries that have been suspended for five years, and obtaining goods at reduced prices. Without that there is a war without gunpowder,” Mejally explained.
Mejally has been in the fuel line for four days, waiting for the gas tanker to arrive. He had previously worked in Yemen’s Ministry of Education, before leaving his job due to the non-payment of public sector salaries and his need to provide for his family.
However, some optimists believe that this truce is the last chance to bring peace to Yemen, and that the initiatives that preceded it, including a prisoner exchange and wide-ranging discussions on issues related to a truce, are solid ground for completing peace negotiations.
Abdul Razzaq Al-Shami, a journalist in the Houthi-run Saba News Agency, said that Sanaa’s de facto Houthi authorities received the initiative “with good faith” and accepted it to ensure the alleviation of the suffering of Yemen’s citizens caused by the siege imposed on them.
The leadership of Ansar Allah, known as the Houthis, “had presented dozens of similar initiatives aimed at opening Sanaa airport and lifting the siege as a first step for a Yemeni dialogue to alleviate the suffering of citizens,” said Al-Shami adding: “We are dealing with this initiative clearly and awaiting the commitment of the other party.”
With great caution on both sides, even after the announcement of the armistice, military mobilization is still ongoing on the war fronts. In addition, news websites of the warring parties are still exchanging accusations of truce violations.
Political researcher Saddam Qassem said that the political parties have reached a stage where they themselves are searching for solutions after seven years of war.
“The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) are convinced that the Houthis have become a force on the ground that threatens the security of the kingdom and global oil [market], especially with the Houthi strikes on Aramco oil fields and the global crisis resulting from the Russian-Ukrainian war,” Qassem said.
He added that the Houthi movement will not soon find again this kind of opportunity to obtain international recognition of the group’s authority and for participation in the upcoming political process, if the planned dialogue in conjunction with the armistice succeeds.
Qassem also told The Media Line that this truce would greatly alleviate the suffering of the Yemeni people if the promises made by the warring parties are delivered.
https://themedialine.org/by-region/cautious-optimism-in-yemen-that-truce-will-hold-improve-conditions/ = https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-703850
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WHO FROM THE UAE IS SUPPORTING THE INTERVENTION IN YEMEN?
The UAE joined Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen to support the Hadi government.
Table of contents
Which Country Is Helping The Yemen Government?
What Countries Are Helping Yemen?
Are The Uae And Russia Allies?
What Countries Are Allies With Dubai?
Why Is Yemen Attacking The Uae?
https://www.ipsinternational.org/who-from-the-uae-is-supporting-the-intervention-in-yemen/
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Cease-fire watershed in ending Yemen war: Former Iran envoy
A string of political developments has occurred in Yemen, enhancing prospects for ending a seven-year-old war waged by Saudi Arabia and a number of its allies against the Ansarullah movement. Days after a two-month cease-fire brokered by the United Nations came to force in Yemen, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, the self-proclaimed president, stepped aside on Thursday and handed over all his powers to a newly-formed Presidential Leadership Council.
In an exclusive interview with Iran Daily, former Iranian ambassador to Yemen Morteza Rahimi said the temporary truce could be a turning point in bringing the Saudi-led aggression to an end.
MR: It seems that different experiences have led all parties to back down on their maximalist demands. Ansarullah is now the leading force in Yemen. In the past, Ansarullah’s capacity was compared to smaller groups, but now the situation is different, and Ansarullah can claim to play a pivotal and decisive role in a future government. However, if the talks between the various Yemeni groups become serious, Ansarullah may also budge on this position and give in to a coalition government that would be formed based on the social, political and military capacities of all groups and parties.
Although lasting peace in Yemen is not something that can be achieved in the short term, the announcement of a cease-fire and the start of dialogue is positive, especially since the killing of Muslims by Muslims has stopped during Ramadan. International organizations and regional countries must also help start these internal talks and bring about a desired outcome. It seems that one of the main topics of several rounds of talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia has been to help end the war in Yemen. And now with Iran welcoming the fifth round of Tehran-Riyadh talks, efforts for peace in Yemen will surely intensify.
It is worthy of note that Saudi Araba’s current position for a cease-fire and moving toward talks in Yemen is the result of the firm resistance of the Yemeni people and the Ansarullah movement. The Yemenis have shown that they stand against excessive demands and aggression at any cost, and they are confident that these expenses and resistance will pay off some day.
https://en.irna.ir/news/84712262/Cease-fire-watershed-in-ending-Yemen-war-Former-Iran-envoy
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The Abductee Mothers Association and the American Center for Justice (ACJ) invite you to @cj_usa To participate in the Yemeni Abductee Day campaign To advocate the cause of the kidnapped, forcibly disappeared and arbitrarily detained, and to demand their release and rehabilitation.
https://twitter.com/abducteesmother/status/1512875570891313158
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Film: Mayyun Human Rights Organization: The seven-year siege imposed by the #Houthis on #Taiz is an “insult to human dignity.”
https://twitter.com/RepYemenEnglish/status/1513225859632705549
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Film: Ramadan in #Yemen old Sana'a.
https://twitter.com/AhmadAlgohbary/status/1513184935078735877
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PROMOTING EQUAL RIGHTS AND WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION TOWARDS PEACE (2022)
The present publication is the result of an online panel debate organized by the Geneva Centre for Human Rights Advancement and Global Dialogue in collaboration with European Public Law Organization (EPLO), on 23 March 2022, entitled “Promoting Equal Rights and Women’s Participation Towards Peace“.
The publication contains a summary of the panel presentations, the discussions during the ensuing Question and Answer session, an analysis of the lessons learned from the panel debate and recommendations, followed by the full statements of the six panellists.
The presentations addressed innovative ways to promote gender equality and reinforce participation of women in society, capacity-building at the national and local levels, the vital role of women in countering extremist discourse and fostering intercultural and interfaith dialogue, particularly at the community level, implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 Women, Peace and Security agenda, and the role of digital technologies to enhance women’s participation in conflict prevention and peace building.
In today’s post-Covid reality, women bear the brunt of inequalities in various domains and acutely suffer the impact of conflicts on their lives and societies. There is an urgent need to effectively protect women’s rights and actively promote their invaluable role in conflict prevention, dialogue and peacebuilding.
https://gchragd.org/promoting-equal-rights-and-womens-participation-towards-peace-2022/
Panel in full: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tidQszG5J68
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The New York Times: Saudi-led Coalition seeks to get out of Yemeni Quagmire
According to the The New York Times, initially, Saudi Arabia told the United States that the coalition could swiftly defeat Ansarullah. However, that did not come to pass and Saudi officials have been looking more recently for ways to end the war, which has tarred the kingdom’s reputation and taxed its finances.
The newspaper added, the war, after seven years of bloodshed, settled into a stalemate, which has helped Ansarullah develop sophisticated drones and missiles that have struck deep inside Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, another gulf member of the coalition. Those strikes have damaged oil infrastructure in both countries.
The report added that Hadi announced his abdication days after a two-month cease-fire took effect, another sign that Saudi Arabia and its Persian Gulf allies may be looking for a path out of the years of bloodshed. He delegated the new presidential council to run the government and lead peace talks with the Sana’a government.
The paper pointed out that analysts raised questions about how effective the move would be at pushing the peace process forward given the divergent positions of the council’s eight members.
https://en.ypagency.net/258722/
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Friedensgespräche im Jemen: Hoffnung nach Jahren des Krieges
Im Jemen herrscht Waffenruhe, endlich könnte es zu einer Friedens-Lösung kommen. Doch Experten warnen: Die Huthi-Rebellen müssen mit einbezogen werden, sonst droht das Scheitern.
Viel mehr haben die Huthis das neu geschaffene Gremium bereits verurteilt - ein Dämpfer, was die Hoffnungen auf einen baldigen Frieden angeht.
Hisham Al-Omeisy, ein Konfliktanalyst, der einst selbst von den Huthis inhaftiert war, ist skeptisch, was den Friedensprozess angeht. "Fraglich ist, wie die Mitglieder des Präsidialrats miteinander umgehen werden. Die Mitglieder haben sehr verschiedene Hintergründe und haben verschiedene Agenden." Uneinig ist man sich im Rat zum Beispiel darüber, ob der Süden sich von den Huthis im Norden abspalten solle oder ob die Einheit des Landes erhalten bleiben soll. "Und das ist ja nur ein Aspekt", so Al-Omeisy, "ein anderer ist die Verschlankung des Militärs und der Sicherheitsorganisationen im Land. Wer hat am Ende die Macht über das Militär, den internen Sicherheitsapparat, das Verteidigungsministerium?".
"Die Finanzhilfen sind ein großer Schritt", sagt Jens Heibach vom deutschen GIGA-Institut (German Institute for Global and Area Studies). Das Geld sei wichtig, wenn es auch gemessen an dem, was die Vereinten Nationen an benötigten Hilfen für den Jemen veranschlagen, sehr wenig sei. Außerdem sei entscheidend, dass das Geld auch wirklich käme. "Die Frage ist auch inwiefern die Huthis imstande sein werden mitzuverhandeln, wofür das Geld verwendet wird". Die Finanzspritze und die Formierung des Präsidialrats werden insgesamt als positives Zeichen gesehen.
Schon vor den aktuellen Ereignissen hatten die UN einen Vorstoß gewagt, um Frieden zwischen den Huthi und Saudi-Arabien zu schaffen. Hans Grundberg, der UN-Sondergesandte im Jemen, war damit beauftragt, eine Grundlage für Gespräche zu schaffen, diese ließ jedoch de facto die existierende Resolution 2216 des UN-Sicherheitsrats außer Acht. Diese Resolution sieht die Entwaffnung und die Kapitulation der Huthis über ihr Territorium vor. Bis vor wenigen Wochen noch hatte die Saudi-geführte Militärkoalition auf diese Konditionen gepocht.
Jens Heibach ist sich sicher, dass Hans Grundberg die Resolution 2216 zwar quasi ausgehöhlt habe, dafür aber einen "Weg eröffnet hat, an dieser Resolution vorbeizukommen. Und zwar für beide Seiten, also auch für die für die Saudis, weil das war praktisch der Hauptgrund". Im Detail wurde vereinbart, dass die Huthis ihre Waffen nicht abgeben müssen, sich aber bereiterklären, keine Marschflugkörper mehr abzuschießen. Die Saudis hingegen beenden ihre Blockade von Huthi-kontrollierten Häfen sowie des Flughafens Sanaa. Das Abkommen hat bereits erste Früchte getragen: Im Hafen von Hodeida konnte ein Schiff anlegen, das dringend benötigte Lebensmittel und Medizin lieferte.
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Die Gene des Krieges
Der Krieg in der Ukraine öffnet vielen die Augen, was Kriege konkret bedeuten – auch wenn sie in den Medien nicht so präsent sind.
Haben die sogenannten chirurgischen Schläge in Jugoslawien und im Irak die öffentliche Meinung im Westen eingeschläfert? Dank der jetzt allgegenwärtigen Medien scheint die Öffentlichkeit nun zu entdecken, was das Wort Krieg bedeutet. Eine Realität, in der die Zahl der Toten in die Hunderte und Tausende geht.
In Konflikten, die hinter verschlossenen Türen ausgetragen werden, ausserhalb des Blickfelds von Kameras und Objektiven, wird die gewalttätigste Konfrontation als ein freundlicher Austausch von Unhöflichkeiten angesehen.
Während des Irakkriegs riskierten allzu neugierige amerikanische Journalisten eine Verurteilung wegen Hochverrats. Was nachher kam, ist nicht erbaulicher. Wer hat die Zerstörung Libyens, des Sudans und des Jemens gefilmt? Das Fehlen schockierender Bilder darf nicht täuschen: Es gibt nie einen gerechten Krieg, es gibt nie einen sauberen Krieg. Jeder Krieg ist schmutzig und bringt Schrecken mit sich. Deshalb muss er um jeden Preis vermieden werden.
Wenn ein Krieg trotz allem stattfindet, wird er mit Propaganda vermischt, das liegt in seinen Genen.
https://www.infosperber.ch/politik/die-gene-des-krieges/
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Prospect of peace
Tehran now has a foothold on the Arabian Peninsula and while the Houthis don’t follow Iran blindly, their military leadership has established a close relationship with Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The world has the ill-conceived intervention in Yemen by the Saudis to thank for this.
https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/prospect-of-peace-1503059185.html
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SOME RARE GOOD NEWS IN A RAVAGED WORLD: A TRUCE IN YEMEN
Ryan Grim and Hassan El-Tayyab discuss the Yemen cease-fire and a new Yemen War Powers Resolution.
HET: Well, thank you so much for having me on.
And, yeah, there’s a lot of exciting news happening in Yemen. And I don’t want to overstate it. It’s obviously a fragile truce. The U.N. brokered this to be a two-month ceasefire for the months of Ramadan here, and I’m really hopeful that it will happen.
The basic framework is that there would be a cessation of hostilities and military operations, and an end to cross-border attacks. There would also be a lifting of some restrictions on ports of entry, and allowing fuel ships finally to get into the ports of entry, and also to open up Sana’a Airport for two flights per week.
So far, we’ve seen only about one ship approved to get through, and that’s been offloaded. There’s another one in the holding area. And we’re hopeful that that will enter the forts of Al-Hudaydah. And we haven’t seen any flights out of Sana’a yet. So we’re still monitoring this very closely. There have been some escalations, there has been some breakdown in Marib, but for the most part it has held and people are cautiously optimistic.
I’ll also announce that there was another shake-up here that people might have seen in the news recently. President Hadi announced this week that he was transferring the power of the presidency to an eight-man presidential council
So, it’s really unclear what’s going to happen going forward. I do think that it’s worth mentioning that Sen. Sanders and Reps. Jayapal, DeFazio, and Khanna have announced their intention of introducing a new Yemen War Powers Resolution — if we don’t see an end to the war or blockade. And it’s just interesting timing that this truce announcement happened on the heels of that announcement of Congress wanting to reassert its Article 1 war powers and terminate ongoing U.S. participation in the war. So that’s obviously pushing things in the right direction.
But obviously there’s a lot of factors. The Houthis have advanced their capabilities to attack targets inside the UAE and Saudi. You’ve also got the wheat shortage. So there’s a lot of factors.
RG: And there was a report recently that at least one oil tanker was diverted by the Saudis to Saudi Arabia, despite having been U.N. approved. What indications are you getting from over there that this is going to work? Do you think that these are hiccups and road bumps? Or do you think these are signs that the whole thing might collapse soon?
HET: Well, we’ve always known that this was a fragile truce and a fragile ceasefire. And I think we have to measure things in inches right now: Getting one fuel ship and getting the next fuel ship, or having one flight leave Sana’a and then having the next one leave.
So it’s, again, we’re in very early stages. Things could easily fall apart. And we’re already seeing skirmishes in Marib. So that’s exactly why I think it’s so critical we do everything we can to support the Rep. Jayapal and DeFazio War Powers Resolution push. Again, they’re lining up co-sponsors now, they have plans to introduce soon, and I think in a moment like this, it’s even more critical that we build support for that.
I’ll say that FCNL and others are working on building out a national organizational coalition. We’ve got about 60 national organizations so far, including folks like MoveOn, and Indivisible, Demand Progress, Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation, and Quincy Institute is supporting. We’ve got folks like Concerned Veterans for America on board. And so we’re really trying to build out this coalition and make a splash here, because really think, again, we could be heading for more war or actually an end scenario to finally lift these restrictions and resolve this humanitarian crisis, or at least try to get it under control.
RG: This is the shot, you think?
HET: Yeah, I do.
https://theintercept.com/2022/04/09/deconstructed-yemen-war-cease-fire-truce/
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Audio / Transcript: Yemen's president steps down in effort to end 7-year civil war
Scott Simon speaks to Yemen analyst Nadwa Al-Dawsari about the Yemeni president's transfer of power and its significance.
SIMON: Could it lead to an end of violence and maybe the civil war?
AL-DAWSARI: That's a far-fetched assumption. In reality, this has been a Saudi-UAE arrangement imposed on Yemenis. None of the participants in the Riyadh conference knew about it. Even members of the presidential council did not know that they were selected. And even Hadi did not know until that night. He was practically forced to transfer his powers, which is not a bad thing. Hadi was an extremely incompetent and corrupt leader. And because of his lack of leadership, we've been in a political and military stalemate.
Having said that, there are two sets of, you know, challenges. One, the Houthis do not recognize the council. They never recognized Hadi. They basically called the council a recycle of Saudi mercenaries. The Houthis are not interested in ending the violence, and that's one of the major problems that will face this council and any efforts to reach peace.
On the other hand also, members of the council - there are eight - they come from different backgrounds. They have different objectives. So it will be challenging to bring them together, to agree on issues, and they will have to agree on major issues.
These members have been handpicked by the Saudis and the Emiratis, so they will be more accountable to their regional backers more than the Yemeni people. What happens when they disagree? Is Yemen going to become even a platform for proxy war between the Saudis and the Emiratis? - and how that will manifest in Yemen. So I think it's too early to be optimistic.
SIMON: The U.S., of course, is a major supplier of weapons to Saudi Arabia, which has fueled the violence in the war. Does the United States have a have a role now?
AL-DAWSARI: The problem with the U.S. are two things. The U.S. is selling weapons to the Saudis and the Emiratis unconditionally. The U.S. should have put conditions on selling the weapons, not only on - you know, that these weapons should not be used to harm civilians, but also that there should have been a plan, a clear plan by the Saudis and the Emiratis about their military intervention in Yemen.
The second problem with the U.S. role is that the U.S. does not have leverage on the Houthis. And that's a problem because the Houthis are the main obstacle to peaceful negotiations.
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Saudi-UAE Aggression Rearranging Mercenaries' Ranks, Attempts to Legitimize Military Intervention in Yemen
The so-called "Presidential Council", whose formation was announced recently, in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, is nothing more than a mixture of militia leaders and symbols of corruption whose goals, interests and loyalties intersect with the interest of the nation.
Any agreement with them will be impossible. This formation imposed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE will surely drag the country into the unknown. It has not yet received any international recognition, and reflects the Saudi-Emirati sharing of influence in Yemen.
It was expected for a while that Hadi’s powers would be transferred to any other group, especially since he has gone into a "hibernation" years ago, and he no longer has anything or powers related to the affairs of the country, which, as is well known, has become administered by the Saudi ambassador, “Mohammed Al Jaber.”
Saudi Arabia and the UAE gathered 500 of its mercenaries in order to demonstrate to the international community that their presence in Yemen is not an occupation, but a legitimate presence dictated by the country’s exceptional circumstances.
The solution to the Yemeni crisis requires giving priority to the interest of the Yemeni people above all considerations, and not rearranging the ranks of pro-aggression government.
The head of the Yemeni National Delegation, Mohammad Abdulsalam said, "the path to peace must start by stopping the aggression, lifting the siege, and ending the expelling foreign forces, and then talking about political dialogue, otherwise any conference is a desperate attempt to rearrange the ranks of the US-Saudi mercenaries to push them towards further escalation."
My remark: The Houthi viewpoint.
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Exiled Hadi gov’t’s minister reveals Saudi-Emirati project to divide Yemen
The minister, Saleh al-Jabwani, said on Twitter: The UAE is working on this project with full Saudi support for its success. The UAE is determined to take over the south and has created the tools for that, while Saudi Arabia needs a divided and weak Yemen.
https://en.ypagency.net/258689/
cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade
Siehe / Look at cp1
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Yemen Key Message Update: Escalating fuel crisis further harms economy and worsens already poor livelihoods and living conditions, February 2022
Humanitarian assistances delivery has also become more challenging in recent months due to funding shortages, high fuel needs amidst shortages, and rising costs of food and fuel, with areas controlled by the Sana’a-based authorities (SBA) most affected. Given reduced assistance rations for 8 million beneficiaries (in Al Maharah, Aden, Hadramout, Taizz, Al Hudaydah, Sa’ada, Al Mahwit, Dhamar, and Raymah) since December—from around 80 percent to around 50-60 percent of energy requirements—food security is likely worsening for many households. Widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are likely to continue at the governorate level, with additional worst-affected households likely to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4).
Increased tensions between the parties to conflict have contributed to more severe fuel shortages in SBA [Sanaa gov.]-controlled areas since late 2021. Long queues at fuel stations and surging parallel market prices have continued in February, especially in Sana’a city. As of February, fuel remained only sporadically available in official stations in SBA-controlled areas, at prices around 9,900 YER/20L, 72 percent higher than last year. Usually, people pay prices more than four times higher (around 40,000 YER/20L, equivalent to 67 USD) for parallel market fuel. While fuel remains generally available at official stations in areas controlled by the internationally-recognized government (IRG), the Yemen Petroleum Company in Aden raised official gasoline prices for the second time in one month, for a total 7.6 percent increase to reach 20,400 YER/20L in late February. This was mainly due to rising global price increases given the Russia-Ukraine conflict; Yemen experienced rapid fuel and food price increases—especially in IRG-controlled areas—in the days following the invasion due to its high dependence on imports and the absence of government price controls and strategic reserves.
In SBA-controlled areas, prices of public transportation have doubled due to fuel shortages. In response, authorities established free transportation buses in Sana’a city. Prices of other commodities including bread have increased by more than 10 percent, according to key informant estimates. On average in February, the cost of the Minimum Food Basket (MFB) across SBA areas was 4 percent higher than January and 29 percent higher than last year according to data from FAO. Meanwhile, in IRG [Riyadh/Aden gov.] areas, prices of commercial services (transportation, private hospital services) have continued to increase due to rising fuel prices. On average in February, the cost of the MFB across IRG areas was 3 percent higher than January and 82 percent higher than last year. More recently, according to media and key informants, wholesale prices of all basic commodities increased by more than 20 percent in IRG areas, with wheat flour and vegetable oil registering the greatest increases, due to the Russian-Ukraine conflict and depreciation of the currency. With no adjustment in government salaries and insufficient wage increases, many households nationwide will not be able to meet their food needs.
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ACAPS Thematic report - Yemen: Al Hodeidah fuel import and fuel price modelling, 04 April 2022
Since March 2019, there have been five significant disruptions at Al Hodeidah port, which have reduced fuel imports into Al Hodeidah by an average of 70%.
In June 2020, the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG) suspended fuel imports through Al Hodeidah port. Barring a brief three-month hiatus between October and December 2020, IRG has since permitted only limited and occasional commercial fuel imports via Al Hodeidah.
In April 2022, the DFA and the Saudi-led coalition agreed a two-month nationwide truce (Reuters 01/04/2022). The deal includes allowing fuel ships to enter Al Hodeidah port and offers a key opportunity for the reduction of commercial fuel prices in DFA controlled areas.
The reduction of direct commercial fuel imports via Al Hodeidah has not led to a fuel supply shortage in areas under the control of the de-facto authority (DFA) in the north of Yemen (also known as the Houthis), even though the port provided almost half of monthly fuel import volumes to the country. Shortages of fuel are often caused by managed rationing in DFA areas rather than reduced availability. In-country supply chains have been able to quickly adjust with fuel being trucked overland from nonDFA areas in order to access the more lucrative market in DFA areas. The strategy that IRG adopted and market response have resulted in recurring disruption to local fuel supplies in IRG areas.
The IRG continues to benefit financially from the additional fuel import taxes and customs applied to the increased volumes of fuel entering via seaports located in non-DFA areas, namely Aden and Mukalla. Meanwhile, the DFA generates revenue through customs fees that would normally be applied at Al Hodeidah but are now being applied against fuel trucks that enter DFA areas overland, in addition to revenue generated from domestic fuel sales.
The current Ukraine crisis has significantly impacted international oil prices. The fuel price modelling within this report does take into account the international oil price, however numbers may vary depending on price fluctuations. Regardless of fluctuations in the international oil price, fuel disruptions at Hodeidah port has a significant impact on DFA commercial market fuel prices.
Full document: https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20220404_acaps_yah_al_hodeidah_fuel_import_and_fuel_price_modelling.pdf
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YPC announces fuel supply stability status
The Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) held on Sunday a press conference to announce the fuel supply stability in the various liberated areas at the actual cost of the materials arriving through the port of Hodeida.
At the conference, YPC executive director Ammar al-Adhruee confirmed that the company announces the suspension of work on the emergency plan and the inauguration of supply stability in all provinces and liberated areas.
Al-Adhruee pointed out that the company will reconsider the actual cost every ten
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3182937.htm
(A P)
Today, the ship "Cornet" affiliated to the private sector factories arrived at the draft of the port of Hodeidah, which carries an amount of 20 thousand tons of diesel, and it is not among the ships of the announced armistice.
https://twitter.com/YPCSpokesperson/status/1512921412213870600
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
(A H)
Rappel bittet um Hilfe
Die Aichacherin Aenne Rappel, die Vorsitzende der Jemenhilfe Deutschland und Jemen-Kinderhilfe, klingt verzweifelt. Zum einen ließen sie die aktuellen Bilder und Berichte über die Situation in der Ukraine nicht zur Ruhe kommen und weckten Kriegserinnerungen an ihre eigene Kindheit, wie sie erzählt.
Zum anderen bedrücke sie die Erkenntnis, dass der Krieg in der Nachbarschaft auch Auswirkungen auf ihre Schützlinge im Bürgerkriegsland Jemen hat. "Wir müssen damit rechnen, dass die Spendenbereitschaft für den Jemen nachlässt", befürchtet Rappel. Sie appelliert deshalb an ihre Unterstützer, die Notleidenden dort nicht zu vergessen: "Der Krieg im Jemen geht inzwischen schon sieben Jahre lang. Kinder verhungern, Corona grassiert, die Menschen können nicht fliehen. Es ist kein Ende abzusehen."
Wie mehrfach berichtet, betreibt die Jemen Kinderhilfe unter anderem ein funktionierendes Kinderhaus für Kriegswaisen in Taiz, die Jemenhilfe Deutschland ein Krankenhaus in der Bergregion von Al Mihlaf. Dort hilft die Organisation zudem der hungernden Bevölkerung mit regelmäßigen Überlebenspaketen.
Um das Jemenhilfe-Krankenhaus zu erhalten, müssen nun laut Rappel wichtige medizinische Geräte, die nicht mehr funktionieren, zwingend erneuert werden.
https://www.aichacher-zeitung.de/vorort/aichach/rappel-bittet-um-hilfe;art18,171516
(* B H)
Charitable bakeries are a welcome lifeline in fighting hunger in Yemen
Through the provision of bread factories and distribution points, UK-based charity Muslim Hands is attempting to help those most in need.
With Yemen and the world now competing for this limited resource, rising prices on wheat and other basic food items will mean that families will either continue to ration their meals or go hungry.
In response to this deteriorating situation, Muslim Hands has spent over 1.5 million pounds establishing five independent bread factories across Yemen since 2020 – being the only charity in Yemen to implement such a project. They are located in the governorates of Aden, Ma’rib and Hadhramaut.
Collectively, these bread factories produce fifty-thousand loaves which reach 25,000 widows, orphans and those with disabilities every day. These loaves are distributed through school feeding programmes, camps housing those that are internally displaced and even to Yemen’s only centre providing specialised, free care for children with cerebral palsy.
As I visited the various distribution points, I met beneficiaries from all walks of life who had their own story to tell. All these stories had one common theme: the families would go hungry without this intervention.
The bread factories employ local workers, often from the IDP community, and ensure a fair and stable income so they can support their families.
https://english.alaraby.co.uk/features/charitable-bakeries-are-lifeline-fighting-hunger-yemen
(A H)
Film: A footage for the Old City of Sanaa before breaking fast this evening in Yemen.
https://twitter.com/Naseh_Shaker/status/1514325835322437643
(B H)
Widerstandsfähigkeit stärken und ländliche Haushalte fördern
Bezeichnung: Stärkung der Resilienz und Partizipation auf lokaler Ebene im Jemen
Auftraggeber: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ)
Land: Jemen
Gesamtlaufzeit: 2019 bis 2025
80 Prozent der Bevölkerung benötigen humanitäre Hilfe, die Nahrungsmittelknappheit befördert insbesondere bei Kindern Mangelernährung und Krankheiten.
Die physische und soziale Infrastruktur ist vielerorts veraltet und in Kriegsgebieten zum Teil zerstört. Zwei Drittel der Jemenit*innen haben keinen Zugang zu sauberem Wasser und Sanitäreinrichtungen, sodass Krankheiten schnell um sich greifen. Besonders betroffen sind verwundbare Gruppen wie Kinder, Jugendliche, Frauen, Menschen mit Behinderungen und die Minderheit der Muhammasheen. Die Covid-Pandemie, die Cholera-Epidemie und die anhaltende militärische Eskalation erschweren die Lage.
Deshalb wurde ein Übergangshilfevorhaben beauftragt, humanitäre Hilfe und langfristige Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Krisenkontext des Jemens zu vereinen.
https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/91325.html
(B H)
Child Protection AoR Achievements in 2021
Mental Health and Psychosocial Support was provided to 615,592 people, including 489,953 children (248,711 boys; 240,942 girls) and 125,939 of the children caregivers (49,834 males; 76,105 females) in 20 governorates through a network of fixed and mobile child friendly spaces to help them overcome the immediate and limit long-term consequences of their exposure to violence
Through the Critical Services activity, CP AoR supported the referral and provision of critical services to children in 20 Governorates, including facilitating access to life-saving health services for the most vulnerable children. 16,908 children (6,356 girls; 10,552 boys) were received services. These services include victims’ assistance for (443 girls; 734 boys).
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/child-protection-aor-achievements-2021
(B H)
Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation
Thanks to the incredible generosity of our donors, YRRF is able to provide support to a rehabilitation center for children with mental and physical challenges. We are proud to support their work. Learn more in this video.
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=556567108992349
What your donations helped accomplish in a month (Feb. 2022):
Distributing 3,328 food baskets distributed (23,296 beneficiaries)
Supporting 909 orphans
Distributing 45 honey bee hives and 35 sewing machine + materials to families for income generation projects
Training 30 orphans in mobile maintenance and programming (Thamar Governorate)
Supporting 20 women with their midwifery diploma
This holy month of Ramadan, consider making a donation in any amount to support this work.
https://www.facebook.com/savealifeinyemen/posts/3209767112569677
More food baskets distribution with the support of our generous donors
https://www.facebook.com/savealifeinyemen/posts/3209262955953426
(* B H)
Yemen: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (November – December 2021)
Humanitarian partners reported 436 access incidents in November and December 2021 across 54 districts in 16 governorates – a slight decrease from the 511 incidents reported in September and October 2021, mainly due to a lower frequency of missions during the holidays. About 50 percent of reported incidents pertained to increased interference in the implementation of humanitarian activities.
Interference in the implementation of humanitarian activities by the authorities in Yemen continued to be the most frequently reported constraint. With 226 incidents reported, delays in approving project sub-agreements (SAs) remained predominant among reported interference incidents. Despite some recent progress, humanitarian partners continue to work with the Government of Yemen and the Ansarullah authorities to establish accountable and principled procedures for timely approvals of project sub-agreements. By December 2021, 127 NNGO/INGO projects were reported to remain unimplemented, in part or in full, due to pending approvals of SAs.
Restrictions on the movement of aid workers and humanitarian goods within and into Yemen were another major constraint, with 111 incidents reported. The incidents involved delays in granting, and to a lesser extent denial of, travel clearances. Delays at checkpoints represented a significant challenge, especially for movements including Yemeni female aid workers.
Hostilities during the reporting period represented only 2.8 percent (12 incidents) of impediments.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-access-snapshot-november-december-2021
(* B H)
Yemen: Analysis on humanitarian access to ‘Hard-to-Reach’ areas in 2021 (June to December 2021)
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS RESTRICTIONS IN YEMEN - KEY FINDINGS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Humanitarian actors in Yemen jointly undertook an analytical exercise to review the quality of access and the severity of access constraints affecting humanitarian operations across the country. The ‘Hard to Reach’ exercise, identifies areas that humanitarian actors cannot regularly access for the purpose of regular sustained humanitarian programming to reach people in need (PIN). This exercise assesses access constraints by looking at a set of three main constraints/restrictions: security considerations related to armed conflict, and limitations related to bureaucracy and geography or lack of infrastructure (logistical constraints). It is meant to inform an overall access strategy for the HCT and identify areas and types of interventions that can improve the quality and sustainability of humanitarians’ access to people in need.
According to the results of the Hard-to-Reach (HTR) analysis for 2021, which was led by OCHA and steered by humanitarian actors, an estimated 10.1 million - 49 percent – of the 20.8 million people in need (PIN) across Yemen, are living in areas affected by access constraints, and the remaining (10.8M, 52 percent) of people in need are living in areas which are comparatively more accessible. The 10.1M people in need who are living in areas where access is more constrained, are located across 1011 sub-districts, 155 districts and 16 governorates in Yemen. The analysis identified that out of 2,148 sub districts, challenges identified in 1,011 sub districts, or 86 percent of those, are related to bureaucratic impediments.
The next common constraint, representing 5 percent of cases, is a combination of security challenges related to intense armed conflict, combined with bureaucratic issues, while there are 3 percent of the sub districts that were affected by all three constraints.
Relatively few access limitations are directly caused by insecurity related to armed conflict or logistical impediments. The vast majority are of issues related to bureaucratic challenges which mainly include denials of movement or access and delays of travel permits.
There are (30 sub districts, 367,000 people in need) being affected by all three access constraints, those areas are as follows:
(A H)
500 Hilfspakete Vom Türkischen Roten Halbmond Für Arme Familien Im Jemen
(* B H)
Film: Vom Hunger geplagt: Jemen fürchtet Folgen des Ukraine-Krieges | AFP
Der von jahrelangem Bürgerkrieg ausgezehrte Jemen wird durch den Ukraine-Krieg noch tiefer ins Unglück gestürzt. Knapp ein Drittel seines Weizens hat das arabische Land bislang aus der Ukraine bezogen. Jetzt bleiben dringend benötigte Getreidelieferungen aus.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXFbf2EPnVA = https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IzLKjbqjiFE = https://www.morgenpost.de/politik/article235056407/Vom-Hunger-geplagt-Jemen-fuerchtet-Folgen-des-Ukraine-Krieges.html = https://www.faz.net/aktuell/gesellschaft/ungluecke/jemen-droht-hungersnot-durch-krieg-in-der-ukraine-17950685.html
(* B H P)
Sanctions on Russia hit famine-threatened Yemen hard
As if Yemen has not had enough; a seven-year war led by the Saudi coalition, followed by a stifling siege, and now sanctions on the Arab world's biggest wheat exporters.
Northern Yemen's wheat fields stretch into the distance, but they are insufficient to feed a country where millions go hungry following seven years of war led by the Saudi coalition and a siege that has further stifled the country.
Already on the verge of famine, war-torn Yemen fears a lack of the key food item due to a different conflict – one in Ukraine, one of the world's largest exporters of the grain.
Most of Yemen's 30 million people will not be able to experience this locally grown grain because the country is nearly entirely dependent on food imports, with Ukraine accounting for almost one-third of the wheat supply, according to the United Nations.
People across the Middle East and North Africa are battling to obtain even the most necessities like food, and fuel costs skyrocketed as a result of Russia's February military operation in Ukraine.
According to UN-backed assessments in March, more than 17 million Yemenis experience severe food insecurity, and the figure is certain to rise. According to UN organizations, more than 30,000 Yemenis are already suffering from famine.
Moreover, the food prices in Yemen have already doubled since last year and the country's years of raging war have led to an economic collapse
https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/sanctions-on-russia-hit-famine-threatened-yemen-hard
(B H)
Support Yemenis Suffering Under US-Supported War
Jordan Uhl leitet dieses GoFundMe zugunsten von Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation..
Yemen is the home of the worst humanitarian crisis on the planet. 13 million Yemenis are now at risk of starvation due to the US-backed Saudi led war on Yemen.
As global insecurity increases and bandwidth for humanitarian and food support declines, Yemenis need help now more than ever. I'm raising money to benefit Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation, and any donation will help make an impact. Thanks in advance for your contribution to this cause that means so much to me.
More information about Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation.: Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation provides Relief efforts to those most in need and least accessible. This Ramadan, our goal is to provide food baskets that sustain a family of 6 for one month. Our goal is to reach 1000 families.
https://www.gofundme.com/f/support-yemenis-suffering-under-ussupported-war
(* B H)
Ukraine War Worsens Already-Dire Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen
The devastation wrought by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has commanded newspaper front pages and nightly news broadcasts since the war began in February. But the effects of the conflict extend far beyond the borders of Ukraine and already are being felt in Yemen, the country mired in what experts see as one of the most dire humanitarian crises in the world.
On Friday, Yasmin Faruki, a senior policy adviser with the humanitarian aid group Mercy Corps, spoke with VOA about her recent trip to Yemen, the suffering she witnessed there, and the expectation that fallout from the crisis in Ukraine will further immiserate the millions of Yemeni people facing major shortages of food and fuel.
“Overall, it's a very dark picture,” Faruki told VOA. “I saw people, most families, living off of one meal a day, in an extremely unstable security environment, with skyrocketing prices.”
Now, as the lack of wheat shipments from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports begins to be felt in the global supply chain, the results for Yemen are easy to predict.
“The bottom line," Faruki said, "is that this is going to make matters a lot worse for Yemeni families who are already struggling with so little.”
She said that in larger cities — she was primarily in the port city of Aden and in Taiz — commerce has slowed to a crawl, leaving many people unable to earn money to buy food. Outside cities, Faruki described scenes of desperation, with families sharing reduced food rations that leave young children unable to develop normally.
https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-war-worsens-already-dire-humanitarian-crisis-in-yemen/6521947.html
(* B H)
Famine-threatened Yemenis fear impact of Ukraine war
Already teetering on the edge of famine, war-ravaged Yemen fears a shortage of the staple food ingredient because of a different war -- in Ukraine, which is one of the world's major suppliers of the grain.
In a bustling Sanaa bakery, Mohammed al-Jalal and his staff sell small loaves of bread to customers carrying them away in red plastic bags.
"Flour is available on the market but we worry about shortages because of the war between Russia and Ukraine," Jalal told AFP.
In Al-Jawf province, which borders Saudi Arabia, farmers are hard at work to harvest their crops before grinding the wheat and shipping it mainly to the capital, rebel-held Sanaa.
Most of Yemen's roughly 30 million people will not be tasting this home-grown product, because the country depends almost entirely on food imports, with nearly a third of wheat supplies coming from Ukraine, according to the United Nations.
Across the Middle East and North Africa, people are struggling to secure even the most basic staples in view of soaring food and fuel prices triggered by Russia's February invasion of Ukraine.
Jalal said authorities in Yemen "should support farmers so they can grow more wheat in our country".
After more than seven years of civil war, the Arab world's poorest country was already suffering what the United Nations called the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
Food prices in Yemen have already doubled since last year and the country's years of fighting have led to an economic collapse.
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/04/famine-threatened-yemenis-fear-impact-ukraine-war
(* B H)
Education Need Assessment Report Marib Govenorate, October 2021
Conflict and economic collapse have significantly degraded the quality, quantity and accessibility of Yemen’s public services and essential infrastructure. Essential services and the institutions have been seriously weakened in Yemen due to the pressure on these systems, erratic salary payments and dependency on humanitarian aid. As only two-thirds of schools (16,000) are currently functioning.
Approximately 8.1 million school-age girls and boys need Education in Emergencies (EiE) assistance across Yemen. These include 1.65 million internally displaced children, 1.5 million children with a disability and minority groups who face challenges in accessing education. In addition, 171,603 teachers (80 per cent of them male) need support. A total of 2,507 schools are reported destroyed, damaged and/or utilized for non-educational purposes. Conflict and continued disruption of schooling across the country and the fragmentation of the education systems have had a profound impact on the learning and overall cognitive and emotional development of nearly all the 10.1 million school-age boys and girls in Yemen.
More than 2.2 million children in Yemen are out-of-school. While schools reopened after many months of closure due to COVID-19, an additional 3.6 million (for a total of 5.8 million children) children have had their education disrupted. School closures and the worsening economic situation due to COVID-19 restrictions in 2020 increased the vulnerability of children and women to exploitation, violence, abuse, child labour, domestic and gender-based violence and child marriage where girls are being forced into and they remain trapped in a cycle of poverty and unfulfilled potential. Boys and girls are more vulnerable to being coerced into child labour or recruited into the fighting. More than 3,600 children in Yemen were recruited in the past six years
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/education-need-assessment-report-marib-govenorate-october-2021
(B H)
Yemen: Education Cluster Teacher Salary Status 2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-education-cluster-teacher-salary-status-2022
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
(A H)
Am Flughafen in Rom sind 42 Flüchtlinge vom Horn Afrikas und aus dem Jemen durch die humanitären Korridore angekommen
Die 42 Personen, meist junge Alleinstehende, waren seit einiger Zeit in Lagern in Äthiopien auf der Flucht. Darunter waren zwei Familien: eine somalische Frau, eine Witwe mit sieben Kindern, und eine jemenitische Frau mit zwei Minderjährigen.
Humanitarian corridors: 42 refugees from the Horn of Africa and Yemen landed at Fiumicino this morning
All 42 people, mostly young singles, had been refugees in camps in Ethiopia for some time. Two families are among them: a Somali woman, a widow with seven children, and a Yemeni woman with two minors
(A H)
UNHCR Yemen welcomes Japan’s announcement of USD 4.48 million in funding to support internally displaced people (IDPs), refugees and asylum-seekers and host communities in Yemen
(* B H)
IOM Yemen |Rapid Displacement Tracking (RTD) - 2021 Annual Report
DTM recorded 26,259 household displacements (representing 157,554 individuals) who fled, mainly due to conflict (25,258 HHs), across 13 governorates, 94 districts and 948 locations in Yemen during 2021.
This data only represents displacement events in 2021 and does not include people that were displaced in previous years and are still displaced to date. It should also be noted that the total number of identified household displacements (26,259 HHs) in 2021 cannot be added to the total stock of IDPs of 2020 since it contains an unknown number of duplicates (multiple displacements of the same HH) and returns (e.g., HHs recorded as displaced in January 2021 might have returned the following month).
Similarly, in 2020 DTM identified 28,734 households (172,404 individuals) who were displaced across 13 governorates, 118 districts and 1,249 locations. The slight drop in IDP numbers in 2021 compared to 2020 is most likely due to intensified barriers to movement brought on by the shifting frontlines, worsening security situation and increased access constraints.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-rapid-displacement-tracking-rtd-2021-annual-report
(* B H)
IOM Yemen: Rapid Displacement Tracking - Yemen IDP Dashboard Reporting Period: 03 to 09 April 2022
From 1 January 2022 to 9 April 2022, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 5,147 households (HH) (30,882 Individuals) who experienced displacement at least once.
Between 03 and 09 April 2022, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 179 households (1,074 individuals) displaced at least once. The majority of people moved into/within the following governorates and districts:
(B H)
Yemen: Rapid Response Mechanism-First Line Response RRM Cumulative Report (Jan - Mar 2022)
Yemen: Rapid Response Mechanism-First Line Response RRM Monthly Report, Mar 2022
(* B H)
DTM flow Monitoring Registry Dashboard: Non-Yemeni migrant arrivals and Yemeni returnees in March 2022
IOM Yemen DTM’s Flow Monitoring Registry (FMR) monitors migrant arrivals on the southern coastal border and Yemeni return locations on Yemen's northern border with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Enumerators placed at Flow Monitoring Points (FMPs) record migrant arrivals and returning Yemeni nationals in order to identify dierent patterns of migration, and to provide quantitative estimates to help define the population of irregular migrants entering the country. FMR is not representative of all flows in Yemen and should be understood as only indicative of migration trends of the unknown total number of migrants arriving in Yemen at FMPs during the time frame indicated.
Access constraints limit the ability to collect data at some migrant arrival points.
In March 2022, IOM Yemen DTM recorded 5,354 migrants entering Yemen, compared to 8,358 migrant arrivals in February 2022. This significant decrease is likely related to difficult weather conditions and high tides. Furthermore, the drop might also be associated with the tightening of security measures on the borders of Djibouti and Yemen.
The Eastern Route, one of the busiest maritime migration routes in the world, witnessed a decrease in migration flows due to COVID19-related movement restrictions. With the recent loosening of restrictions on international movements, there has been a steady increase in the number of migrant arrivals into Yemen.
(* B H)
“Being A Refugee Stays With You Forever”: 16 Unique Stories Of Displacement, From Iman, Demna And More
In Yemen, displacement has made a terrible alliance with famine to produce one of the worst humanitarian crises on the planet.
Today, more than 17 million war-exhausted Yemenis are on the brink of starvation. It is a purely man-made famine, a direct consequence of a brutal seven-year-old war. But though we know this, since the start of the Saudi-coalition led war against Yemen in 2015, the United Kingdom has sold Saudi Arabia more than £20 billion worth of weapons. Without these arms, the Saudis cannot continue to shell and shatter Yemen. The World Food Programme begs for money to feed Yemen’s hungry; it gets barely any. The UN has said it needs $4 billion to prevent “the worst famine the world has seen for decades”. The United States, which like the UK has armed Saudi Arabia to the teeth, hasn’t offered the funds with the speed with which they gave the Ukraine $13.6 billion in emergency aid. In fact, they haven’t offered the funds at all.
https://www.vogue.co.uk/arts-and-lifestyle/article/british-vogue-stories-of-displacement
(* B H)
Education Needs Assessment: Jeel AL Bena for Humanitarian Development, 2021
Jeel Alben for humanitarian development manages 89 IDP hosting site in Hodieda Governorate under CCCM project. One of the main targets that JAAHD works to achieve is to provide emergency relief and direct assistance for the conflict-affected populations, IDPs, host communities, vulnerable groups and those people caught up in extraordinary lifethreatening situations. Jeel Albena has a presence in Al Hudaydah & AlMahweet and Raymah with the aim of building up protection capacities for people in displacement and it works towards finding durable solutions for them upon return. Over the last year, JAAHD has focused on improving the quality of information provided to all service providers and mechanisms for the delivery of information and gaps identification within sites that JAAHD manages. Education needs assessment under CCCM project has been greatly considered as one of the most important tools in providing information about all needs within the IDP hosting sites. education sector is one of these needed data to be identified and raised to partners and cluster of concern for more comprehensive coordination
1.2 Executive summary:
As a result of the ongoing conflict in Yemen learning has been thrust into high and deeply concerning level of education situations; some of the worst in the world.
More than 49709 IDP students in 16 districts and 89 IDP hosting sites are in dire need for education assistance in terms of school equipment, school rehabilitation and constructions , bags, school feeding, etc.
The overall aim of Education needs assessment is to ascertain the precise situation of the sites needs in host communities in Hodiedah Government focusing specifically on their most critical needs and in the area of access to a better education in other craft humanitarian interventions programme that will meet the yearning of the ID with the objective of assessing the availability of all services in the IDP camps and host communities, and propose interventions to improve the level of access to a better education environment.
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp5 – cp19
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-801b-yemen-war-mosaic-801b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-800-yemen-war-mosaic-800
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-800 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-800:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
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