... Geheimgespräche zwischen Huthis und Saudis – Änderungen in den Schulbüchern der Regierung von Sanaa – Der neue Verhaltenskodex der Huthis für Staatsbedienstete – Luftkrieg der Huthis jenseits der Grenzen – Die Südjemen-Frage – Südjemen im Jahr 2023 – Der Krieg auf den Straßen des Jemen – Amerikanische Jemenpolitik löst bei den Saudis Panik aus – Jemen in WikiLeaks – und mehr
January 18, 2023: Yemen air war in 2022 – Human Rights Watch annual report 2022 – US-/UK-armed air raids against Yemen – Yemen: Stubborn, stalemated, starving – Houthi-Saudi back-channel talks – Changes in Sanaa government schoolbooks – The new Houthi state employees’ nemployment code of conduct - Houthi cross-border aerial warfare – The Southern Yemen question – Southern Yemen in 2023 – The war on Yemen’s roads – American moves in the Yemeni file raises Saudi panic – Yemen in WikiLeaks – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-837b-yemen-war-mosaic-837b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Aden-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Aden government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp9b Beziehungen der USA zu Saudi-Arabien und den VAE / US-Saudi and UAE relations
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp11 Deutschland / Germany
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade
cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage
cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy
cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism
cp15 Propaganda
cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
cp19 Sonstiges / Other
Klassifizierung / Classification
***
**
*
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
(B H K P)
Jemen: Der vergessene Krieg
Der Krieg im Jemen dauert bereits acht Jahre und kostete 380.000 Menschenleben. 2023 ist mit weiterer Gewalt und einer anhaltenden humanitären Katastrophe zu rechnen.
Nach acht Jahren Krieg im Jemen leben drei Viertel der dreißig Millionen Bewohner in Armut und benötigen humanitäre Hilfe, vier Millionen Jemeniten sind nach Angaben des UN-Flüchtlingswerks Binnenvertriebene.
https://www.mena-watch.com/jemen-der-vergessene-krieg/
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
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YEMEN DATA PROJECT AIR RAIDS SUMMARY JANUARY 2023
Yemen Air War 2022 Data Overview
Civilian Casualty Spike Precedes Extended Ceasefire
Civilian casualties more than double in 2022 despite nine months without air raids
Despite nine months of the year without air raids in 2022 there was a major surge in bombings in the first quarter, resulting in the highest annual civilian casualty rate in the air war since 2019.
Yemen Data Project recorded 471 civilian casualties in Saudi-led bombings in 2022, all in the first three months of the year before the ceasefire began in April. No further air raids* were recorded in the year beyond 31 March despite the failure of waring parties to renew the ceasefire in October.
January 2022 saw the highest number of civilian casualties (426) recorded in a single month since December 2017. Almost 70 percent of all casualties recorded in the year were the result of a single incident. An air raid on a detention facility located inside a military compound and reportedly housing migrants killed at least 91 civilians and injured 236. YDP recorded up to three individual airstrikes on the site. More civilians were killed in this single incident on 21 January than in all 1,790 air raids in 2021 combined.
Saudi Surge
The surge in air raids in the first quarter of 2022 continued the sudden rise in Saudi-led bombings following the UN Human Rights Council vote in October 2021 that brought to an end the mandate of the Group of Eminent Experts (GEE) on Yemen. The October vote ended U.N. investigations into violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law and war crimes in the conflict, closing the only international route to accountability for Yemenis. It was the the first time in the UN Human Rights Council's history that a resolution was defeated.
In the two months following the GEE's dissolution, Saudi coalition bombing rates increased by 43% in December compared to October. Civilian casualties in the Saudi-led air war more than trebled every month in the three months following the end of the GEE. By January 2022, at the peak of the surge, civilian casualties in the air war reached the highest monthly rate in over four years. The 779 air raids recorded from January 2022 to the end of March marked the heaviest quarterly period of bombing since April-June 2018. January 2022 saw the highest monthly rate of air raids (401) since March 2018. Saudi-led coalition airstrikes caused more civilian harm in the first month of 2022 than in the two previous years combined.
Coalition bombings killed at least 155 civilians last year during the three months when air raids were carried out, a 121% rise on 2021. 12 children were recorded amongst the dead. A further 316 civilians were injured including 15 women and children.
During the air raids surge in 2022 the Saudi-led coalition carried out an average of 9 air raids per day, a rate 80% higher than the average daily rate for all of 2021. In the first quarter of 2022 the average number of civilian casualties per air raid increased more than fivefold on the 2021 average.
Yemen Data Project recorded up to 3,574 individual Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in the three months of air raids in 2022 - an average of almost 40 individual airstrikes per day, double the average daily rate recorded in 2021.
Civilian casualty rates in the air war in 2022 reversed the declining trend seen since the first year of the bombing campaign. The 471 civilian deaths and injuries in three months of air raids in 2022 contrasted with the 187 recorded in 12 months of air raids in 2021 - the lowest of any year since the air war began in 2015.
Yemen Data Project has recorded a total of 19,226 civilian casualties in 25,054 air raids* from March 2015 to the end of 2022 with up 75,157 individual airstrikes.
Marib was the most heavily bombed governorate in 2022. 32% - almost a third - of all air raids hit Marib. January 2022 saw the heaviest month of bombing in the governorate since the air war began, with 145 air raids recorded.
The ceasefire that came into effect on 2 April 2022 brought to an end a violent and deadly resurgence of the Saudi-led bombing campaign.
https://mailchi.mp/60ff81639e32/january2023-yemen-data-project-update-13652849
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Human Rights Watch Annual Report 2022: Yemen
Arbitrary Detentions, Torture, and Enforced Disappearances
Blocking and Impeding Humanitarian Access
Women’s Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity
On April 1, the United Nations announced that it had brokered a two-month truce agreement between the Houthi armed group and the Saudi and United Arab Emirates-led coalition. While the truce was renewed for an additional two months on June 2 and August 2, on October 2, parties to the conflict failed to renew the temporary ceasefire. While the truce was in effect, violations and abuses persisted in Yemen, including unlawful attacks that killed civilians; restrictions on freedom of movement and humanitarian access to and from Taizz, Yemen’s third-largest city; arbitrary detention; and forced internal displacement.
After more than seven years, the protracted conflict in Yemen has led to one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises, with more than 20 million Yemenis in need of assistance and suffering from inadequate food, health care, and infrastructure. The conflict has included unlawful attacks against civilian objects such as homes, hospitals, schools, and bridges, which were carried out deliberately and indiscriminately. Fighting has internally displaced more than 4 million people from their homes. There has been virtually no accountability for violations committed by parties to the conflict. Food insecurity, already on the rise, was further exacerbated by Russia’s war on Ukraine.
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/yemen
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NATO gegen Jemen
Oxfam-Bericht: Vier Angriffe auf zivile Ziele täglich
Sie zahlen den Preis: Zivilisten werden im Jemen im Schnitt jeden Tag mehr als viermal militärisch angegriffen. Dies geht aus einer vergangene Woche von der britischen Hilfs- und Menschenrechtsorganisation Oxfam veröffentlichten Untersuchung hervor. Im Berichtszeitraum Januar 2021 bis Februar 2022 habe es demnach 1.727 Angriffe auf zivile Ziele gegeben. Bei einem Viertel von ihnen habe es sich um »Luftschläge« der von Saudi-Arabien geführten Kriegskoalition gehandelt. Hinzu kommen weitere Einsätze von Artillerie, Drohnen und Raketen sowie Gefechte mit diversen Kleinwaffen und Sprengstoffanschläge. Laut Oxfam wurden 839 Zivilisten getötet, Tausende seien verletzt worden.
»Die schiere Zahl der Angriffe auf Zivilisten ist ein deutliches Zeichen für die schreckliche Tragödie, die die Menschen im Jemen erleiden müssen«, so Martin Butcher von Oxfam. »Die Intensität dieser Angriffe wäre ohne einen ausreichenden Nachschub an Waffen nicht möglich«, so der Autor der Studie weiter. Die britische Friedensorganisation CAAT schätzt, dass sich die Waffenverkäufe der britischen Regierung an Saudi-Arabien seit Kriegsbeginn im Jemen 2015 auf eine Summe von 23 Milliarden Pfund (26 Milliarden Euro) belaufen. Die britische Firma BAE Systems gilt als wichtigste Ausrüsterin der saudischen Luftwaffe; ohne den sechstgrößten Rüstungskonzern der Welt wäre der saudische Bombenkrieg im Jemen in dieser Form nicht möglich. BAE hat allein in den ersten fünf Kriegsjahren vor allem Kampfjets und dazugehörige Munition im Wert von mehr als 15 Milliarden Pfund (17 Milliarden Euro) an Saudi-Arabien geliefert, wie die britische Tageszeitung Guardian im April 2020 berichtete. Historisch sind die USA der mit Abstand größte Exporteur von Rüstung in die Golfmonarchie. So verkaufte Washington seit den 1950er Jahren Waffen im Wert von über 174 Milliarden US-Dollar an Riad, heißt es im Oxfam-Bericht, was das Königreich in den letzten sieben Jahrzehnten zum größten Importeur von Kriegsgütern weltweit macht.
Die Waffen für den seit 2015 wütenden Krieg im Jemen stammen zu knapp 84 Prozent aus Ländern, die dem NATO-Kriegsbündnis angehören, wie aus den jährlich aktualisierten Datenbanken des Stockholmer Friedensinstituts SIPRI hervorgeht. Demnach stammen 56 Prozent aller in den Kriegsjahren an die acht Staaten der gegen den Jemen kriegführenden arabischen Koalition gelieferten Waffen aus den USA, zwölf Prozent aus Frankreich, neun Prozent aus Russland und fünf Prozent aus Großbritannien
https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/443003.verdr%C3%A4ngte-katastrophe-nato-gegen-jemen.html
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Fueling Conflict: Analyzing the human impact of the war in Yemen
UK-armed airstrikes part of a ‘pattern of violence against civilians’ in Yemen - Oxfam
More than four armed attacks on civilians were carried out daily during 14 months of the war in Yemen, according to an Oxfam report published today.
The new analysis counted more than 1,700 attacks on civilians who were killed, injured or forced to flee their homes and found that air raids by the Saudi-led coalition, using weapons solely supplied by the UK and US, accounted for a quarter of all attacks.
Oxfam's report comes ahead of a legal challenge brought by Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) against the UK government about the supply of weapons to the war, taking place at the High Court in January. Oxfam is intervening to provide expert witness in support of the legal challenge.
While all parties to the conflict have repeatedly harmed civilians during the eight years of war, the research found that between January 2021 to the end of February 2022, in addition to widespread destruction of infrastructure that is vital to the civilian population, Saudi-led coalition air strikes were responsible for at least:
87 civilian deaths and 136 injuries
19 attacks on hospitals, clinics and ambulances
293 attacks that forced people to flee their homes -- 39 per cent of all attacks causing displacement
Martin Butcher, Oxfam's Policy Advisor on Arms and Conflict and author of the report, said:
"The sheer number of attacks on civilians is stark testament to the terrible tragedy the people of Yemen have suffered. Our analysis shows there is a pattern of violence against civilians, and all sides in this conflict have not done enough to protect civilian life, which they are obligated to do under International Humanitarian Law.
"The intensity of these attacks would not have been possible without a ready supply of arms. That is why it's vital the UK government and others must immediately stop the arms sales that are fuelling war in Yemen."
Since the Saudi-led coalition began its intervention in Yemen, the UK has licensed at least £7.9 billion in arms to Saudi Arabia across 547 licences. Researchers at CAAT have estimated that the true value of arms sales is over £23 billion when additional 'open licenses' are taken into account.
An earlier court hearing about the UK's arm sales to Saudi Arabia in June 2019 forced the government to suspend new arms licences and review its arms licensing decisions. The government later announced it had carried out a review and resumed issuing new licenses.
Butcher said: "One of the reasons the government gave for restarting arms sales was its view that attacks that breached or potentially breached International Humanitarian Law were isolated incidents that did not display a particular pattern.
"Our report reveals a very different picture, a large number of attacks which harm civilians every day. These daily events require proper investigation and while there is a risk that serious human rights abuses could be taking place, arms sales must be immediately discontinued."
The war has caused tens of thousands of civilian casualties and forced over four million people from their homes, contributing to one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. Over 21.5 million Yemenis are in need of assistance and 17.3 million people suffer from acute hunger, including over two million children with acute malnutrition.
Hanan and her family were amongst those forced to flee Al Hudaydah, which has come under severe Saudi aerial bombardment during the war. A single mother with two young daughters, she spoke to Oxfam in February 2021 from the Ammar bin Yasse camp for internally displaced people.
She said: "I was living in Al Hudaydah. My children were going to school. We fled our home because of war, as we were vulnerable to the bombing and hearing its roar over our heads from inside the house. We were living in constant fear."
She described her life in the camp, saying "I beg door-to-door and on the streets. I beg restaurants and grocery stores to provide lunch for my children."
The report is based on analysis of data provided by the Civilian Impact Project (CIMP) in the period from January 2021 to the end of February 2022, when negotiations for the subsequent truce were taking place. The truce came into force on 2 April 2022 and ended on 2 October 2022.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/fueling-conflict-analyzing-human-impact-war-yemen
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Yemen: Stubborn, Stalemated, Starving
Even without being officially renewed, the ceasefire is continuing because neither side wants to risk the heavy casualties a resumption of full-scale fighting would mean. Iran is technically at war with most of the Arab oil states as well as Israel, the United States and anyone else who gets in their way. Given the growing number of countries that oppose Iran or are losing patience with Iranian troublemaking, there is something of a deathwatch attitude towards Iran. At least for the rest of 2023 not much is expected to change in Yemen.
There are older, more persistent problems that beset Yemen. These currently include;
The North-South Divide. This one is centuries old and was last “mended” in the 1990s. The possibility of a split has returned because the UAE (United Arab Emirates) has been in charge of security (and aid delivery) in the south since 2015 and supported formation of the STC. This group is composed of southern tribes that want autonomy but are willing to fight and defeat the Islamic terrorists as well as the Shia rebels first. Aidarous al Zubaidi, the STC leader, is seen as more popular in the south than Abdrabu Mansur Hadi, the most recently “elected” president of united Yemen. Hadi has only briefly visited Yemen a few times since becoming president in 2015 and spends most of his time in the Saudi capital. This is for Hadi’s safety, given the number of assassinations going on in Aden, where the Hadi government was moved to in 2015. The Saudis and the UAE do not agree on dividing Yemen once more but for the moment it is more convenient to support the STC and efforts to defeat the Iran backed Shia rebels. After that, who knows?
The Shia Tribal Autonomy War. This has been going on forever as well and is all about the traditional autonomy some of the northern Shia tribes long enjoyed but was taken away several times in the last century. The tribes always manage to regain it but this time they are trying to revive an autonomy they lost over fifty years ago and are doing it with the backing of Saudi archenemy Iran. The Shia tribes are persistent because they see themselves on a Mission From a Shia God sponsored by Iran.
The Saleh Loyalists. Ali Abdullah Saleh and his clan lost national power in 2012 and wanted it back. Saleh demonstrated that he could not be ignored and sided with the Shia rebels. Saleh ruled Yemen for decades before the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings unified his many opponents. Unfortunately, Saleh decided to switch sides again in late 2017 and was negotiating a deal with Hadi when the rebels found out and killed him in early December 2017. Tarek Mohamed Abdullah Saleh, the brigadier general nephew of Saleh, united the many pro-Saleh factions who were willing to switch sides. This weakened the Shia rebels, but not fatally so. The Saleh clan is still out there, but not as powerful as it was when the elder Saleh was still alive.
Al Qaeda. Yemen has always been full of Islamic conservatives and radicals and many of those who founded al Qaeda came from Yemen or Yemeni families that had moved to oil-rich neighbors in the last fifty years and prospered economically but not mellowed theologically.
Failed State. It’s not just the many conflicts that make Yemen such a mess. There are other, more fundamental problems. The Saudis have no problem with Yemen fragmenting. Many Yemenis insist that the country is not becoming a failed state, because modern Yemen has always been a failed state. The problems of tribalism, religious radicalism and corruption make it impossible for Yemen to function as a country.
https://www.strategypage.com/qnd/yemen/articles/20230113.aspx
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Hoffnungsschimmer für den Jemen
Jetzt glimmt ein Hoffnungsschimmer auf: Indirekte Gespräche zwischen Saudi-Arabien und den iranisch unterstützten Huthi-Rebellen machen Fortschritte, die UN-Vertreter vorsichtig optimistisch stimmen.
Als der UN-Gesandte Hans Grundberg jetzt von der jemenitischen Hauptstadt Sanaa aus dem Sicherheitsrat in New York über die Lage im Land berichtete, bemühte er sich, keine Euphorie aufkommen zu lassen. Insgesamt aber sieht der schwedische Diplomat „eine potenziell weit reichende Veränderung in der Entwicklung dieses acht Jahre alten Konfliktes“.
Seit Jahren führen Saudi-Arabien und der Iran indirekte Gespräche. Vermittelt werden die Kontakte vom Sultanat Oman, das als Nachbar an Stabilität im Jemen interessiert ist und das die Kontrahenten in jüngster Zeit einander näher gebracht hat. Zuletzt äußerten sich die Huthis diese Woche positiv über die Gespräche mit den Vermittlern. Aus UN-Kreisen verlautet, dabei gehe es um militärische Zugeständnisse beider Seiten und den Abbau wirtschaftlicher Blockaden.
Hinter der neuen Verhandlungsbereitschaft steht auf beiden Seiten die Ernüchterung über militärische Misserfolge. Saudi-Arabien, das ursprünglich auf einen schnellen Sieg über die Huthis setzte, sucht schon länger einen Ausweg aus dem Jemen-Desaster. Die Huthis waren 2022 mit einem Großangriff auf die ölreiche Stadt Marib gescheitert und hatten schwere Verluste erlitten.
Ob aus den Gesprächen ein Friedensprozess wird, ist ungewiss. So sind die jemenitische Regierung, die VAE und die jemenitische Zivilgesellschaft bisher nicht eingebunden, nur Saudi-Arabien und die Huthis verhandeln. Grundberg warnt deshalb vor Stückwerk bei den Gesprächen.
https://www.stuttgarter-nachrichten.de/inhalt.krieg-im-jemen-hoffnungsschimmer-fuer-den-jemen.f8c86d1b-bfdd-42be-8919-05f061285434.html = https://www.stuttgarter-zeitung.de/inhalt.krieg-im-jemen-hoffnungsschimmer-fuer-den-jemen.f8c86d1b-bfdd-42be-8919-05f061285434.html
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Yemen rebels, Saudis in back-channel talks to maintain truce
Amid Yemen’s longest-ever pause in fighting — more than nine months — Saudi Arabia and its rival, the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, have revived back-channel talks, hoping to strengthen the informal cease-fire and lay out a path for a negotiated end to the long civil war, according to Yemeni, Saudi and U.N. officials.
Saudi Arabia restarted indirect exchanges with the Houthis in September, when it became clear the U.N.-brokered truce wouldn’t be renewed. Oman has been acting as intermediary.
“It’s an opportunity to end the war,” a U.N. official said, “if they negotiate in good faith and the talks include other Yemeni actors.” Like other officials, the U.N. official spoke on condition of anonymity because of the fragility of the talks.
A Saudi diplomat said his country has asked China and Russia to exert pressure on Iran and the Houthis to avoid escalations. Iran, which has been regularly briefed on the talks by the Houthis and the Omanis, has so far supported the undeclared truce, the diplomat said.
Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have held indirect negotiations in the past, mainly for prisoner swaps or sporadic cease-fires.
The most ambitious talks, in 2019, helped stop a government’s advance on the Houthi-held port of Hodeida on the Red Sea.
The kingdom has developed a phased roadmap for a settlement, which has been backed by the U.S. and the United Nations, said the U.N. official. In it, the coalition makes a number of key promises, including to further reopen the airport in Sanaa and ease a blockade on Hodeida, the official said.
The Houthis demand the coalition pay salaries of all state employees — including the military — from oil and gas revenues, as well as open all airports and ports under Houthi control. A Houthi official involved in the deliberations said the Saudis had promised to pay the salaries.
The Saudi diplomat, however, said paying military salaries is conditioned on the Houthis accepting security guarantees, including a buffer zone with Houthi-held areas along the Yemeni-Saudi border. The Houthis also should lift their blockade on Taiz, Yemen’s third largest city, he said.
The Saudis also want the Houthis to commit to joining official talks with other Yemeni stakeholders, the diplomat said.
The Houthi official said his side has not accepted parts of the Saudi proposal, particularly the security guarantees, and refuses the resumption of oil exports from government-held areas without paying the salaries. The Houthis proposed a distribution of oil revenues according to a pre-war budget, the official said. That means Houthi-held areas receive up to 80% of the revenues since they are the most populated, according to the official.
The Saudi diplomat said both sides were working with Omani officials to develop the proposal to be “more satisfactory for all sides,” including other Yemeni parties.
The Houthi-Saudi talks, however, have left the internationally recognized government without a voice, a Yemeni government official said. He said the government’s presidential council worries Saudi Arabia “might give unacceptable concessions” to reach a deal.
But the Yemen anti-Houthi alliance remains riven with internal divisions so there is little room to maneuver – by Samy Magdy
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“LOOK OUT! YOUR SON COULD BE THE NEXT MARTYR”: CHANGES TO NORTH YEMEN’S SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS
Recently, the Houthis, ‘Partisans of God’, also known as Ansar Allah, introduced new changes to the school textbooks taught in primary education in areas under their control. The changes express their ideological, religious, and political views.5 During conflicts, education is forcefully politicized, and teachers, schools, and students become weapons and targets of war.6 The religio-political scene in Yemen was in a tumult during the last few decades.7 Before 1990, Yemen was two different states, south and north, the former led by communists and the latter in the liberal-capitalist camp. In the north and after the fall of the Zaydi8 Imamate, Sunni9 and Salafi10 Islam expanded even in areas dominated by Zaydi followers. Activities included establishing religious schools, which did not require any official approval. In 2000, Yemen had 1,200 theological institutes with 600,000 students.11 These institutes were supported by political parties and governments, for example Ma’ahid ‘Ilmiya (scientific institutes), which taught the Sunni doctrine, and were supported and dominated by the Islah12 Party, with the support of the central government and Saudi Arabia. Salafi schools also spread across Yemen, and their famous school, Dar Al-Hadith, was in Saada, the centre of Zaydi teaching. Zaydis in Sadaa saw such an expansion as a war on their Zaydi doctrine.
The establishment of Salafi schools in Zaydi areas posed a threat to the predominantly Zaydi population. This threat increased Zaydi followers’ interest in education as a defence mechanism to preserve their religious identity. In addition, after the revolution of 1962 in north Yemen against the Imamate, the ruling families who belonged to Al Al-Bait13 were excluded and stripped of power, which exacerbated their grief.14 1990 marked the establishment of two Zaydi Islamist parties, Al-Haq and the Union of Popular Forces, and educational institutes and camps15 which would have an active role in militarizing education. Religious infiltration, political-economic exclusion, and absence of government services in Sadaa became elements for Hussein al-Houthi, the leader of Ansar Allah, to catalyse a radical movement upon his return from his academic and religious education journeys in Iran and Sudan.16
It is, then, no surprise that Houthis have deployed education to reinforce both their identity and legitimacy since the outbreak of the 2015 conflict, when the Saudi-led coalition announced its war against the group, as the conflict has mobilised doctrinal differences (Zayidi-Shiite vs Salafi and Sunni Islam) as another milieu of war.17 The changes introduced to school textbooks in areas under Houthi control serve to ‘deepen faith identity’18 and reinforce claims of fighting Western imperialism, and its regional and local puppets. Additionally, the Houthis are forcing certain practices in schools such as prohibiting gender mixing and the replacement of entertainment songs with Houthi slogans and religious anthems and hymns.19 The new changes reflect political and ideological ambitions and seek to establish a hegemonic discursive knowledge to shape a public and political order that normalizes violence and conflict and to legitimize the ideological and political vision of the Houthis.
This debrief utilizes thematic analysis using a qualitative approach. This approach allows for a proper elaboration on the themes emerging from the data.20 The research explores how textbook changes have the potential to escalate conflict and devalue efforts towards peace. It analysed 57 textbooks from grade 1-9 (age group 7-16) on the following subjects: Quranic studies, Islamic studies, Arabic, and social studies (which includes geography and history).
In the last four years, school textbooks used in areas under Houthi control have undergone ideological and political changes. Textbooks are loaded with materials that promote zero sum conflicts, where there is always a losing side that should be eliminated. They seem to function as a tool for values inculcation, political socialisation, and obedience cultivation. More recently, as Yemen has moved towards dialogue and negotiations, many political dynamics hint at the coalition’s desire to move towards relinquishing conflict. Yet changes, including in education, by the Houthis allude to a long-term vision where prospects for peace are absent, perhaps prompted by a desire to continue to be the primary authority in the north. These changes might have far-reaching effects on children, who are the seeds for any prospects of peace; particularly when conflicting parties have no hesitation in recruiting child soldiers.27 The following four sections look at some of the ways in which school textbooks are altered to inculcate the chosen ideology.
CONSTRUCTING A POSITIVE SELF-IMAGE
Houthis claim that they have a divine right to rule the ‘Umma’, referring to the Islamic nation, and lead in all areas of life. This was part of the 2012 document issued by their leader, Abdul-Malek al-Houthi, which highlights:
“We believe that God Almighty elected the house of the Prophet and made them guides to the Umma and inheritors of the holy book after the Messenger of God until the day of judgment, and that in every age, He prepares one to be a guiding light for His worshippers, one able to lead and champion the Umma in all its needs.”28
The new changes in the textbooks stress such beliefs through exulting the Houthis’ religious and political leaders as the descendants of Prophet Mohamed (Al Al-Bait) to construct a legitimate and positive self-image.
IDENTITY AND RELIGIOUS REPRESSION
The Houthis’ claim to represent Al Al-Bait aims to construct their identity as superior, giving them a holy right to be followed and to sanctify their acts. The texts mention some of the Houthis’ deceased leaders as ‘martyrs’. Other figures who do not affiliate with their political views are erased. Further, the Houthis seek to establish uncontested religious rights to justify the excessive extraction of money from Yemenis. In a grade-8 Quran textbook, they employ a Qur’anic verse to insinuate that what was taken in wars ‘as booty’ without fights belongs to Al Al-Bait. These changes establish their political legitimacy as a divine right that neither should be rejected nor negotiated.
Recent changes in textbooks deploy the recent past and transform it into an ‘active past’, which can serve as a starting point for political legitimacy. The textbooks discuss the contemporary conflict and the Houthi takeover of Sanaa in 2014 as a second revolution, to articulate a ‘starting point’ of history written anew and to shape students’ political views.
NORMALIZING MILITARISM AND ENCOURAGING PARTICIPATION IN CONFLICTS
To normalize weapons and violence, textbooks used pictures of weapons, deceased children, bloodshed, and militarizing narratives in a repetitive manner across all 1-9 grades. The use of these pictures potentially perpetuates violence as a natural response to conflicts and as an unfortunate process that Yemenis must endure to protect their religion, culture, and land. In a grade-1 Quran textbook, there are pictures of the ‘Mujahedeen’ army with heavy artillery with a caption of ‘Al-Mujahedeen defend their country’. The fact this was discussed within a religious frame gives extra righteousness and virtue to the conflict, making violence inevitable to achieve a ‘holy cause’.
VICTIMIZATION, AND THE DELEGITIMIZATION OF OTHERS
Reading across the textbooks, one can trace a systemic approach that creates a societal memory of what religion, history, and culture consider as ‘common sense’. The textbooks place Yemenis as victims, portraying the world outside Yemen as a force that seeks to exploit Yemeni resources and destroy its religion and culture. They are also using the Palestinian struggle as a model of victimization in a notion that their conflicts are an extension of the Palestinians’. After establishing this societal image, the textbooks go further, to give legitimacy for their violence, denoting how despite being victims they heroically defend Islam and the weak in Yemen and beyond.
Lessons of victimhood predominately appear across all nine grades. A grade-9 geography textbook mentions the Emiratis’ takeover of Socotra Island, and the coalition ‘Al-Eduan’ stealing oil. In the same grade, a Quran textbook includes an exercise that asks students to talk about ‘Shahid’ or a martyr that they know.
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Between the lines: Understanding the Houthi Employment Code of Conduct
Since the failure of international efforts to renew the ceasefire in Yemen this past November, the Houthi movement has—with increasing speed—spread its influence and dominance over the men and women living under its control.
There has been concern about a process of institutionalized indoctrination of children and youth through coordinated changes to school curricula in educational institutions. Of late, indoctrination in public-sector employment has also come to light. The vast majority of Yemen’s public-sector employees are under Houthi control, accounting for around one million public- sector employees out of 1.2 million nationwide. This indoctrination is most thoroughly evidenced by the public-sector Code of Conduct that has been forcibly imposed on all state agencies since November.
Ever since the Houthi movement took power in 2014, it has worked to gradually spread its influence to state agencies and all public-sector positions and sought to get rid of public-sector employees who are not associated with the movement—particularly those in decision-making roles. The movement has established numerous bodies with which it maintains direct ties, and these bodies have taken power from revenue-bearing ministries and other entities, rendering them fully subject to the movement. These include zakat (through the Houthis’ establishment of the General Authority for Zakat) and international cooperation (through the replacement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a new administration called “SCMCHA”). It is SMCHA that, in accordance with the movement’s laws, administers donors and international relief organizations and their projects carried out in Houthi-controlled areas. SMCHA also selects the Yemeni organizations (mostly associated with the Houthis) that partner with international organizations.
The Houthis have also imposed mandatory cultural courses on public-sector employees in order to propagate their perspective, with sections dedicated to the movement’s chief, Hussein al-Houthi. This is intended to attract and indoctrinate employees. Those who refuse are punished and face accusations of treason, leading many to be fired and replaced by unqualified and incompetent followers.
Meanwhile, high-level employees and officials in public-sector and Houthi-associated entities, as well as their associates, are receiving generous monthly salaries under the rubric of “incentives” and “gratuities,” as evidenced by their rising standards of living. In contrast, government employees who are not associated with the Houthis have not received their salaries for more than seven years. Various excuses have been put forward
Now, public servants are subject to the Code, which is considered mandatory and part of employees’ performance standards. All who refuse to sign are under threat of being fired and replaced. The Code is based on the beliefs and statements of movement leadership and Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, as well as on the movement’s lectures and lessons about the Holy Quran, rather than being based on the Quran itself. The hadith of the Prophet are completely excluded, and the Code is chiefly based on Malik al-Ashtar’s statements about Imam Ali. Yemen’s constitution and laws are considered only secondary reference materials.
In reading the Code of Conduct, one finds that it strives to fully impose the perspective and authority of the Houthis on public-sector employment. This is by imposing loyalty to the movement’s leader (Abdul-Malik al-Houthi) instead of to the nation or to human rights principles. Signing and acknowledging the Code is being imposed as a requirement to remain in public-sector employment. This denies the existence of any diversity in perspective, political affiliation, religion, or sect. Any violation of the code is considered treason for which the employee must be punished. As one finds in the concluding clauses, it is even considered a violation for an employee to comment on, amend, or criticize the Code – by Laila Lutf Al-Thawr
Code of Conduct in original: https://www.saba.ye/storage/files/blog/1667842489_pTyQTA.pdf
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Beyond Riyadh: Houthi Cross-Border Aerial Warfare 2015-2022
On 25 March 2022, the Houthis launched a large-scale attack on Saudi Arabia using a combination of loitering munitions, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. This coordinated attack targeted oil refineries and energy infrastructure across Saudi territory, from Asir to the Eastern Province, and even threatened the Formula 1 Grand Prix in Jeddah. Yet, it turned out to be the last major gasp of the aerial war between Riyadh and the Sanaa-based government that had started in 2015. A few days later, on 2 April, a United Nations (UN)-mediated truce came into effect, which lasted until 2 October and, as of the time of writing, has effectively terminated Houthi cross-border attacks into Saudi and Emirati territories. In the current situation of relative stability, Saudi-Houthi talks are ongoing to renew and expand the truce.1
According to military expert Michael Knights, Houthi missile and drone technology has evolved significantly since the beginning of the conflict.2 Between 2015 and 2016, Houthi forces relied predominantly on a pre-existing supply of rockets inherited from the Yemeni army stockpile. Due to Iranian expertise, however, they were later capable of developing extended-range missiles and unmanned aerial vehicle capabilities. Since 2018, a domestic military industry with headquarters in Sanaa and the northern city of Saada has developed, allowing for a prolonged campaign of rocket, drone, and missile strikes. Technological developments have also been accompanied by relevant shifts in the Houthis’ strategic approach to aerial warfare.
Aerial warfare has played a pivotal role in the regionalization of the civil conflict between the Houthis and the forces supporting Yemen’s Internationally Recognised Government (IRG). Since March 2015, the Saudi-led coalition (SLC) backed IRG forces with intense waves of airstrikes that slowed down Houthi military advances while inflicting heavy casualties and damage (for more, see this ACLED report on SLC activity in Yemen). Meanwhile, Iranian technology transfers to the Houthis broadened the arena of competition between regional powers, allowing the de facto Houthi authorities in Sanaa to strike military targets and civilian infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
It can be argued that the de facto Houthi authorities have used their missile forces to gradually compel the SLC to withdraw its forces from disputed territories in Yemen. This strategy of “compellence” has evolved into one of “deterrence,”3 as the Houthis included civilian infrastructure in their military targets while the UAE and Saudi Arabia have partially disengaged from the conflict. In the words of Thomas Schelling, compellence refers to “a threat intended to make an adversary do something (or cease doing something),” whereas deterrence uses threats to prevent the adversary from starting something.4
Drawing on recently updated ACLED data, this report examines the evolution of cross-border aerial warfare, focusing on rocket/missile5 and drone attacks perpetrated by the Houthis in Saudi and Emirati territories between 2015 and the beginning of the UN-mediated truce in April 2022. It explores Houthi cross-border aerial warfare at the intersection of technological developments, local and regional political shifts, and military strategies. Based on these dimensions, it identifies four stages in the development of Houthi aerial warfare: an initial phase (2015-August 2016) characterized by a heavy reliance on the prewar stockpile, direct engagement with Saudi Arabia, and high levels of cross-border attacks; a second phase (September 2016-2018) marked by a gradual development of the domestic missile industry, rapprochement with Iran, and expansion of military targets; a third phase (2019) in which high-precision aerial weapons were used to deliver lethal attacks and maximize pressure on Saudi Arabia; and a final stage (2020-2022) characterized by the use of high-precision weapons as a means of deterrence, direct engagement with Saudi Arabia, and stabilization of the Yemeni-Saudi border.
Analysis of ACLED data reveals some key trends. Between 2015 and 2 April 2022, the Houthis engaged in nearly 1,000 rocket/missile attacks and over 350 distinct drone attacks. The number of attacks involving unguided rockets has steadily decreased, while the use of guided rockets/missiles has increased from 15% of the yearly total in 2015 to 89% in 2022. This change suggests decisive technological improvements, and it is also associated with a decrease in the lethality of such attacks. Almost all deadly rocket/missile attacks occurred between 2015 and 2019. Drone attacks, which have outnumbered rocket/missile attacks since 2019, played a key role in enabling this shift, allowing for an expansion of military targets and strengthening Houthi deterrence credentials.
Against the backdrop of an overall stabilization of activity along the Yemeni-Saudi border, Houthi rocket and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia evolved in a new direction. In 2020, ACLED records a substantial drop in the number of unguided rockets events, arguably as a result of the complete depletion of the stockpile of Zilzal rockets. In contrast, guided rocket events remained at levels comparable to those recorded in 2019. However, their lethality decreased significantly compared to the year prior, with the overall number of reported fatalities associated with these events dropping from over 350 in 2019 to 10 in 2020. Likewise, in 2020, no fatalities were reported from the impact of drone attacks. Reduced lethality hinted at a new strategy of deterrence. The achievement of high-precision, extended-range technology allowed for symbolic attacks on key infrastructure which proved ever more effective in preventing enemy action.
Yet, a second factor also arguably impacted on the lethality of Houthi attacks: an improvement in the effectiveness of Saudi air defense. ACLED data show that the interception rate by Saudi forces doubled in 2020 relative to 2019, rendering the majority of Houthi drone and missile attacks in 2020 ineffective (see graph below). The interception rate for drones reached 77%, while the rate for rockets/missiles hit 40%. Indeed, after the September 2019 attacks, Saudi Arabia received new ground-based air defense systems from the US and started developing novel counter-drone systems.62 In response to Saudi interceptions, the Houthis developed new combined drone and missile attacks. In the past, the Houthis had deployed suicide drones to down Saudi defense systems and open the way for missile attacks.63 However, these combined attacks saw a 360% increase in 2020 compared to the year prior, and were especially directed against oil refineries – by Luca Nevola
https://acleddata.com/2023/01/17/beyond-riyadh-houthi-cross-border-aerial-warfare-2015-2022/
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THE SOUTHERN QUESTION
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
This White Paper provides an analysis of public perception on how to address the political, economic, and social demands of the Yemenis living in the South, and surveys what they most prefer for the future of Southern Yemen, a lace of diverse groups and political actors with different goals and interests. Though both qualitative and quantitative surveys, this paper addresses questions of political leadership, economic status, and overall security for those in the South, and seeks to provide clarity on what a future Yemeni state may look like, based upon public opinion.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
International observers understand that the “southern question” — how to address the political, economic, and social demands of Yemenis living in the South — is central to the future of a unified Republic of Yemen. Less well understood is whether the answer to the southern question will entail an independent South Yemen, and if so, how political support for it might coalesce. South Yemen was an independent state known as the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) prior to 1990, and longstanding internal identity conflicts were central to its civil war in 1986. The resolution of the southern question, therefore, is unlikely to be simple since there is little unity, competition and some enmity among southern political actors. The fight for equitable representation in the South could amplify historic struggles between these social, political, and identity groups.
The Amplifying Pathways to Peace in Yemen (APPY) program collected quantitative and qualitative data from 2019-2021 in Yemen, including in the eight southern governorates discussed below. (See Annex I, Methodology). While the surveys did not include questions related to individual desires for a future state, they asked in-depth questions related to security, the economy, and who Yemenis preferred to be involved in peace negotiations, all of which can help identify public sentiment about leadership. Significantly, in August 2021, respondents were asked about public acceptance of leading southern secessionist political groups, providing a glimpse of the potential for fragmentation within the South, as well as possible policy initiatives to stop this process.
https://www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/the-southern-question-yemen
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2023 in South Yemen: How Will the Scene Look Like?
Politically, South Yemen enters the new year while being stuck in a “de-facto truce”. South Yemen is apparently the biggest loser of this truce as the Houthis maintain the privileges of the collapsed truce while targeting the oil ports in South Yemen.
Moreover, PLC, which includes the President of Southern Transitional Council (STC), faces a lot of problems and internal challenges. This has left an impact on PLC’s performance and its commitments towards the liberated areas, mostly in South Yemen.
Over the past period, PLC and the parity government failed to solve multiple issues, especially those related to the poor services in Aden and the other governorates in addition to other issues such as the salaries of the military and civil employees.
At the military level, the de-facto truce has so far prevented the return of the full war in the country. However, it has not hindered the Houthi aerial military escalation against South Yemen. During the new year, the Northern group will move forward towards targeting oil production and export processes.
Additionally, the First Military District (FMD) constitutes one of the biggest dilemmas in Hadramout which is the biggest governorate in South Yemen. All options remain open for Southerners including the military solution. This is due to not resolving the FMD issue by moving its forces to the fronts where the Houthis are deployed as stipulated in the Riyadh Agreement.
At the economic level, the deadlock in producing and exporting oil has increased the economic concerns in South Yemen and has weakened the ability of the Yemeni government to fulfill the simplest obligations towards people. This is in addition to the ongoing economic collapse that began some years ago.
In parallel with that, the Saudi-Emirati deposit has not fully reached the Yemeni Central Bank although it was declared 9 months ago on April 7th. With the continuous presence of all these factors, the economic scene in 2023 may apparently be worse than before.
Regarding the political scene in South Yemen in 2023, Southern academic Dr. Saeed Al-Jariri said: "The scene is apparently open to all possibilities given the nature of the general scene of what can be called "the Yemeni issue".
He told "South24 Center": "What I mean by the Yemeni issue is the sin of the political Yemenization and the failure of the Yemeni Unity. The uncertainty is an outcome of the conflict between the Northern and Southern issues which has not been resolved by the war. They are two different issues each of which has its own characteristics, problems and prospects".
He added: "South Yemen ran out of its political flexibility stock. The Yemeni legitimacy and the Arab Coalition did not leave any choices to South Yemen except for searching for measures that don’t weaken its points of strength. These parties have had undue opportunities that enable them to gain more time which is exploited by the Houthis as a tool to pressure the Coalition, especially Saudi Arabia".
He elaborated : "The main issue has become between the Houthis- who are depicted as a Yemeni party entrusted with the capital in which they launched a coup against its legitimacy- and the KSA which is being described by the Houthis and their affiliates as the leader of an aggression alliance".
According to him "This enables the Houthis and their implicit ally (the Yemeni legitimacy) to blur the origin of the Yemeni issue with an aim to alienate South Yemen (state and people) from the equation of the comprehensive political solution. This is the challenge which faces Southerners. Will they prepare themselves as a national bloc with one goal as part of desirable national dialogue outputs? Or will they bet on the Coalition's generosity although there are no free gifts in the world of politics?"
Al-Jariri concluded with the question: "Will the Southern national resistance resolve the issue by imposing a new reality which would impose a table of a comprehensive political solution outside the expectations of the Houthis and their implicit allies?"
He added: "2023 is the year of decisiveness as the only alternative is going nowhere.”
Despite the hopes that some place on the possibility of reaching an agreement to prolong the truce which can lead to comprehensive political negotiations, Saleh Abu Awdal the Head of "Al-Youm8" downplayed the importance of the truce.
He told "South24 Center": "South Yemen has long been the only loser of this truce which has benefited the Houthis who have been able to achieve many demands through it and raise their ceiling at the expense of South Yemen".
The economic scene
In a previous report issued by "South24 Center", the STC's Higher Economic Commission expected a number of economic ramifications in South Yemen during 2023. This is due to the halt in oil production in South Yemen during 2023 as a result of the Houthi attacks and the lack of governmental reforms.
In an interview with "South24 Center", economic expert Majed Al-Daeri warned of "the continued disruption of oil exports, which the government considers the first source of the state budget and the revival of the economy".
He added: "The situation will become catastrophic". Al-Daeri believes that there are practical moves to correct the catastrophic path now through "activating the oversight and accounting bodies, and the Anti-Corruption Commission".
He said: "All banks and state institutions have to be moved to Aden as well as re-establishing a national government based upon the principle of efficiency and integrity as well as ensuring accountability against those who are involved in looting public money." – by Abdullah Al-Shadli
https://south24.net/news/newse.php?nid=3117
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The War on Yemen’s Roads
Executive Summary
Yemen’s limited network of paved highways in the densely-populated western third of the country has been battered and weaponized during eight years of war. At least 100 bridges and approximately one-third of Yemen’s paved roads (between 5,000-6,000 kilometers) have been destroyed in military operations, according to estimates from Houthi authorities in Sana’a and the internationally recognized government in Aden. The warring parties have closed main highways due to their proximity to the frontlines, damages sustained during clashes, or to deprive opponents of access to strategic areas. Roads that have not been closed for military reasons have not been maintained since the start of the war, leaving many of them unfit for travel. As a result, motorists are forced to take alternative roads that are often unpaved, remote, and unsuitable for a high volume of traffic or heavy vehicles.
Accidents or emergencies occurring on these remote secondary roads are compounded by limited mobile phone and internet coverage, a lack of roadside services, and the absence of emergency rescue services. The delays associated with traveling on remote, dilapidated roads have driven up the costs of transporting commodities and other essential goods. At the same time, fuel shortages, rising petrol prices, and different tax, licensing, and customs policies enforced by competing authorities have made travel prohibitively expensive for a growing number of Yemenis.
Arbitrary searches, detention, illegal levies, and other forms of extortion at security and military checkpoints manned by an array of armed groups are common features of wartime road travel in Yemen. While the UN-brokered truce agreed in April 2022 sought to address Yemen’s road situation with a focus on the blockaded city of Taiz, it ended up being the only unimplemented element of the six-month truce.
The vast majority of the Yemenis surveyed for this policy brief said they no longer travel long distances unless it is absolutely necessary. The top reasons cited for travel in response to a general questionnaire were work obligations, family visits, seeking medical treatment at hospitals inside Yemen, and reaching airports for medical treatment abroad. The majority of respondents said security is their highest priority when planning a road trip. They reported taking a variety of precautions, such as deleting sensitive information from their phones and lying to soldiers at checkpoints about their destination, where they are from, political and regional affiliations, and profession.
Journalists, activists, or those with certain political or regional affiliations are at heightened risk for harassment, interrogation, and detention at checkpoints. Yemeni women in Houthi-controlled areas face tightening travel restrictions due to mahram (guardianship) requirements. When issued in March 2022, the mahram policy required complex and costly procedures to obtain consent from a male relative, which also had to be certified by a number of Houthi officials, before a woman could travel. Since then, the rules have become stricter; the physical presence of a mahram is now often required during a woman’s travels even if she has obtained the necessary documents to travel alone. Women who are deemed not to have met these requirements may be detained at a checkpoint until a mahram comes to pick her up. If she is a political activist, an employee of a non-governmental organization (NGO), or is affiliated with a political party opposed to the Houthis, she may be detained for multiple days, forced to pay a bribe, and sign documents pledging to follow the rule in the future. It has become increasingly clear that the mahram requirements are aimed at reducing the participation of women in civil society.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/19304
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American Moves in the Yemeni File Raises Saudi Panic
An American move in Yemen file sparked on Monday unprecedented Saudi panic, revealing fears of Washington’s return to the forefront of the scene in Yemen, in light of Riyadh’s attempt to remove it.
US envoy, Tim Lenderking, who has just returned from Saudi Arabia, is organizing a leader’s conference recently known for their opposition to the coalition, specifically Saudi Arabia.
Tawakkol Karman, a member of Islah Shura Council, was invited to the upcoming conference, along with Abdulaziz Jabari, deputy speaker of House of Representatives, along with Saleh al-Jabwani, the former Minister of Transport in Aden government, as well as Islah governor in Socotra, Ramzi Mahrous, invited to attend.
During the recent period, these leaders continued to attack the coalition; it criticizes his “colonial” politics from her residence in Turkey, despite her support for the war during its early years.
It was not clear whether the American movement was coordinated with the Saudis to contain these leaders
within the course of arranging for a new phase, or an American effort to search for papers in Yemen
US envoy, Tim Lenderking, who has just returned from Saudi Arabia, is organizing a leader’s conference recently known for their opposition to the coalition, specifically Saudi Arabia.
Tawakkol Karman, a member of Islah Shura Council, was invited to the upcoming conference, along with Abdulaziz Jabari, deputy speaker of House of Representatives, along with Saleh al-Jabwani, the former Minister of Transport in Aden government, as well as Islah governor in Socotra, Ramzi Mahrous, invited to attend.
During the recent period, these leaders continued to attack the coalition; it criticizes his “colonial” politics from her residence in Turkey, despite her support for the war during its early years.
It was not clear whether the American movement was coordinated with the Saudis to contain these leaders
within the course of arranging for a new phase, or an American effort to search for papers in Yemen, In which its influence declined with the control of Anssarallah in the north of the country and the decline of the coalition’s dependence on Biden administration in the south and east of the country, but the arrangement of the conference, following the announcement by the American envoy from Riyadh of his continuation to efforts reviving peace with “relentlessness,” indicates Washington’s attempt to return to the scene from its widest gates.
In this context, the assistant editor-in-chief of official Okaz newspaper, Abdullah Al Hatilah, described Tawakkol as a “nasty old women.” hinting to Washington’s leadership aided Islah plot against his country during the last conference.
Saudi Arabia fears that the recent American move will move the public opinion and decision-making centers in the United States to pressure on Saudi Arabia to release leaders in what was called “legitimacy,” most notably Hadi, whose file Washington recently activated and forced Saudi Arabia to release his family after months of detention.
An American center reveals pressures to thwart the coalition’s “surrender” to “Houthis”, in addition, an American study center revealed Washington’s attempt to thwart what it described as the coalition’s “surrender” to what it described as “Houthis”.
The American Atlantic Council, which is affiliated with US intelligence, stated in a report that Washington is trying to restore what it described as the balance of power in the negotiations instead of what it described as “surrendering to Houthis’ demands.”
The report confirmed the existence of a division among the Yemeni forces loyal to the coalition due to the conflicts fueled by Saudi Arabia and UAE.
The report tried to arouse Saudi fears by saying that they will not get what they want except with “a Yemen that has a future.”
He also stressed the need for Saudi-Emirati consensus on a unified vision, the only solution to restore balance. Pointing out that the absence of agreement between the main members of the coalition on the future of Yemen and the role of its various political entities, as well as the distribution of oil and gas revenues, are the most prominent obstacles to achieving a permanent ceasefire agreement and moving towards a comprehensive peace.
The report acknowledged Washington’s efforts to preserve Islah Party, calling for a settlement of its status.
The report coincides with US arrangements to hold a conference of Islah Party leaders and others allied with it, as part of Washington’s efforts to restore its influence in Yemen. He refers to US administration’s fears of the negotiation’s success sponsored by the Sultanate of Oman between Sana’a and Riyadh.
In this context, the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar revealed, in a press release, a new American offer that includes granting Anssarallah “Houthis” the administration of Yemen in return for guarantees related to border security and others.
https://alkhabaralyemeni.net/2023/01/10/204698/
Main points in thread: https://twitter.com/bgh2_ac3b/status/1612582588132081664
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American-#European information and reports leaked to WikiLeaks reveal massive plots against the Yemeni people
#WikiLeaks: #American-European reports and other headlines for independent news and newspapers, as well as information from #WikiLeaks
Leaks reveal massive and heinous plots being practiced against the Yemeni people with the intention of weakening #Yemen and bringing it into a dirty war and a scenario of destruction amid economic calamities in full view and knowledge of the international community. The #UAE does its best to exhaust the people socially, economically and voluntarily after it has been divided into warring states. The following report reveals to you the most important points I extracted from UN reports and foreign newspapers and research coverage;About Yemen's oil and gold, with shocking economic figures: -#Yemen's oil reserves; More than the common precautions of all Gulf countries. -#YEMEN; It owns a quarter of the world's oil, with an oil rate estimated at 34%. -3.4 million barrels of oil; It passes through the Bab al-Mandab Strait daily. - Saudi war against #Yemen; It is not related to sectarian conflict, but rather to its oil reserves. -#YEMEN; Owns 100 oil and gas sectors. - In 2008.. the ambassador of the United States; He informed his boss that: "#Shabwa, #Marib and Al-#Jawf have high potentials and large reserves of natural gas." American politician: "The #Saudi position on #Yemen is taking advantage of the tensions as religious friction, but the country's oil reserves are behind all that suffering." After 65 years, the largest oil field in the world - the Saudi Ghawar field - is rapidly disappearing. - The enhanced oil recovery process - with carbon - will help extract the remaining oil inside it - the Ghawar field - until it is dried. Saudi Arabia established an alliance with France to seize oil fields in Yemen, with limited oil production. - in 2017 AD; The Saudi field produced 5.7 million barrels/day. - In 2019 AD; The Saudi field produced 3.8 million barrels/day Saudi Arabia steals 63% of the meager oil extracted.fields of #Yemen.
- In April 2013, the Yemeni oil companies; it tried to obtain a government license from the Basindwa government to explore oil and gas reserves in the fields of New #Yemen, but Basindwa was refused. Saudi pressure "at the time". Fouad Al-Muzaini - Former Representative of #Yemen to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation: "It is enough for 5 years of war against Yemen, in order to control its strategic location and rich wealth." after that; He was expelled, by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has weakened the legitimate army in the oil-rich province - Al-Jawf. - America; Saudi Arabia was forced to reduce its influence in the oil regions. - For vague reasons.. Hunt Company continued to operate in #Yemen; to March 2015 AD.
- In 2005 A.D.. the Yemeni government handed over the oil production rights to a national company - after the Exxon and Hunt contract expired - but the two companies submitted complaints to the International Chamber of Commerce, but they failed to do so, incurring a loss of more than $1,000,000,000+ billion. - During the Gulf initiative... Saudi Arabia; She was afraid of the new political developments in Yemen, which would lead #Yemen to safety. boosting its economy 100,000,000 million tons; The size of gold in #Yemen.
Another study: -30,000,000 million tons; The size of gold in #Yemen. _ International companies - Thani #Dubai Mining - transport and smuggle large quantities of gold and precious stones from Wadi Hajar and the exploration mines in Hadramout; To #Abu_Dhabi, through the new port of #Al_Dhaba "near the port of #Mukalla". _ 24 gold mines; He is located in #Yemen. 16 silver mines; He is located in #Yemen. _ Famous Hadhrami families - we keep their names - cooperate with companies in smuggling gold.
https://twitter.com/bgh2_ac3b/status/1613225566991224844
cp2 Allgemein / General
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Interactive Map of Yemen War
(A K P)
Latest Updates on Yemen War, Jauary 14, 2023
https://english.iswnews.com/26181/latest-updates-on-yemen-war-14-january-2023/
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Female researchers at the Research Center in Sana'a Yemen in the eighties, before the arrival of Wahhabism (photo)
https://twitter.com/KawkabAlwadeai/status/1615537512729952258
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After the failure of Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, who bears responsibility?
With every day that goes by, we move further away from reaching a resolution to the conflict in Yemen. Not only did the government and the Saudi-led coalition fail to make a military victory but they also turned to be on the defense side face Houthi attacks and sought to make peace with them. This brought some questions to my mind: What is the benefit of the Decisive Storm? Who will bring back its victims on both sides and the destruction the war caused, such as the infrastructure, the blockade on ports and airports, and the isolation of Yemen from the world for many years? Who bears responsibility? Why wasn’t it enough for the Saudi-led coalition to provide support for the government in its fight with the Houthis on the frontlines instead of waging an all-out war when the Houthis did not attack the Kingdom’s territory? They did not even respond to the source of fire until more than two months later.
In contrast, we have seen more chaos, even in areas not under the control of the Houthis. It is agreed that the Houthis are the ones to be held accountable for staging a coup but who is to blame for the all-out war and who will bear its human and material cost in Yemen, which is hundreds of billions of dollars? How is it logical that we demand the return of the legitimate government to Sana’a when it is incapable of ruling Aden and other areas? – by Ali Albukhaiti
https://republicanyemen.net/archives/32790
My comment: This piece is rmarkable, as it’s written by an anti-Houthi propagandist.
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[Sanaa gov.] Fisheries Ministry condemns mercenaries' burning fisherman's boat off coast Al-Khawkha
Fisheries Ministry condemned the aggression's mercenaries' burning of a fisherman's boat on the Qataba coast in Al-Khawkhadistrict, Al-Hodeida province.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3219280.htm
and also https://en.ypagency.net/284193/
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Will Riyadh Realize Its Trouble for Depending on the US against Yemen?
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia represents a clear example of American hegemony over countries that lack sovereignty and independence of decision-making.
Saudi Arabia did not have any vision for its war on Yemen, or for the internal situation in the Kingdom, and the result was the collapse of the Saudi war strategy in its first months of the war on Yemen, before it witnessed more failure later on.
It is clear, through a quick review of events, that the Americans were not sincere advisors to their ally, Saudi Arabia, as the Americans allowed the Saudis to declare war on Yemen from Washington on March 26, 2015. Washington did not provide any advice to Saudi Arabia regarding the dangers of war on a country of its neighbors and the costly consequences of this kind of war.
The Saudi regime believed that American support was a guarantee of achieving victory, and the Saudi political and military experience believed that the use of American influence represented a spell sufficient to bring victory and achieve goals.
Saudi Arabia bet on the support of Washington, while the latter was planning to benefit from the war without giving Saudi interests any regard for the dangers that the Kingdom would be exposed to as a result of the war.
However, Washington did not skimp on the Saudi regime with everything to ensure that Riyadh would be able to continue the war for the eighth year in a row, not out of love for the Saudis, but to ensure the continuation of the implementation of the American agenda to control the Bab al-Mandab and the islands of Yemen in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, with the aim of stifling the expansion of China's commercial empire, which almost overthrows the hegemony of the United States in the global economy.
It seems that the disappointing results that Saudi Arabia reaped from the Yemen war are, in fact, a natural outgrowth of Saudi naive perceptions of war and politics.
Today, Riyadh is waging war on fronts that were not taken into account, during which the closest partner in the coalition, represented in the UAE, has turned into an opponent that does not show any sympathy for the setbacks suffered by the coalition, while the unilateral agendas of Abu Dhabi and the Islah party in Yemen have become a heavy burden.
During the past three months, Saudi journalists expressed that Riyadh realized that the price of saving the kingdom from the Yemen war requires getting rid of the burden of a heavy coalition that does not care about what Saudi Arabia is exposed t
(* B K P)
According to the data and figures obtained by the field team of the Rasd Coalition, most of the areas in which children are forcibly recruited and involved in military operations are the areas under the control of the #Houthi group, especially the far northern governorates. (map)
https://twitter.com/ycmhrv/status/1613997215600545801
https://twitter.com/ycmhrv/status/1613974293523595274
(B K P)
Yemen’s Peaceful Future Snatched Away
Yemen has been plunged into a new uncertainty and a heightened risk of war. Houthi military spokesman, Yahya Saree, is reported as saying the group is ready for another round of fighting, and civilian deaths and injuries from sniper attacks and shelling have continued.
The six months of the truce, from April to October 2022, now appears to have been a brief breathing space in the midst of an unending conflict whose main victims are the hapless people of Yemen. While Iran continues to supply weapons of ever-increasing sophistication, and the Houthis believe they have a chance of overthrowing the government and taking over the whole of Yemen, pleas to them to negotiate another ceasefire seem doomed to fall on deaf ears. Meanwhile Yemen’s hopes of a peaceful future recede into the far distance.
https://www.eurasiareview.com/13012023-yemens-peaceful-future-snatched-away-oped/
(B P)
Film: Former Deputy Chief of the US Political Mission in Yemen Nabil Khoury He mocks the allegations of Iran’s presence in Yemen, saying: “There is not a single Iranian in Yemen. I was the deputy head of the diplomatic mission in Yemen, in which I sat for three years, and I followed it closely later until today, and there are no Iranians.
https://twitter.com/Yemen_in_the/status/1613616480427327488
(A P)
If You Think the Ever Given Was Bad, Wait Until You See the Safer
The vessel is still loaded with 1.14 million barrels of oil. While roughly 15,000 barrels have evaporated over the last eight years, and a thin layer has polymerized, the majority of that cargo remains liquid and liable to spill. The portion of the pipeline that runs for five miles beneath the Red Sea has an additional 17,000 barrels of liquid crude in it. Without intervention, the Safer will either explode or corrode and spill its contents - and likely take the pipeline with it.
The combined risks of a massive explosion, the blockage of international commerce, and a devastating oil spill form only part of the concern with the FSO Safer. Add in the deaths of millions of people (already in famine) from loss of drinking water, caused by the contamination of desalination plants, and limited access to food caused by the blocking of Hodeida, and we will have a humanitarian emergency at a level the world cannot currently sustain.
and
(* B P)
UN: Cost is new obstacle to oil transfer from Yemen tanker
The rising cost of purchasing or leasing a vessel that can hold more than 1 million barrels of crude oil now in a rusting old tanker off the coast of war-torn Yemen is the latest obstacle to resolving the grave threat of massive environmental damage from a possible oil spill or explosion, the U.N. said Tuesday.
U.N. deputy spokesman Farhan Haq said the availability of very large crude oil tankers “has decreased in the past six months, basically due to events having to do with the war in Ukraine.”
He said just as the U.N. was finally gearing up its operation to transfer oil from the FSO Safer tanker, the cost of buying a very large crude oil carrier is now about 50% more than what was budgeted in the original U.N. plan, and the leasing cost has also increased.
“So we have some additional expenses, and it’s a little bit harder finding the right ships, but we’re proceeding with the work,” Haq said.
He said donors have generously pledged more than $84 million of the funding required, and additional funding from the private sector is expected soon.
Haq said more than $73 million of pledges has been disbursed and essential preparatory work has begun.
“All of the technical expertise is in place to undertake the procurement for the complex operation,” he said. “This includes a marine management consultancy firm, maritime legal firm, insurance and ship brokers and oil spill experts” as well as contracting a salvage company that will carry out the emergency operation which is at an advanced stage.
https://apnews.com/article/oil-spills-united-nations-yemen-business-4ec17509e2284b3412a35438a0b38d00
and
(A P)
#USEnvoyYemen Lenderking: “Pleased to continue our joint efforts with @NLintheUSA and @YemenEmbassy_DC in support of the @UN #FSOSafer operation. The U.S. is determined to see progress to prevent a humanitarian, economic, and environmental disaster in the Red Sea."
https://twitter.com/StateDept_NEA/status/1613649964063723520
and also https://twitter.com/NLAmbassadorUSA/status/1613290687100866581
and
(A P)
France's contribution to the rescue plan for the oil tanker Safer (January 16, 2023)
(* B H P)
Film: Annelle Sheline on The Ongoing Tragedy in Yemen
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9dMqBzeixuk&t=1s
(* B P)
Sanaa security services expose Saudi role in Yemen assassinations
The video showcased how Yemeni security services monitored and tracked down the perpetrators of the assassination of Yemeni Youth and Sports Minister Hassan Zaid who was assassinated in 2020.
The official media branch of the Sanaa government's security services published a video titled "In the security force's grip", revealing details of one of the most successful counter-operations carried out by the Yemeni security services against the plots of the Saudi intelligence services.
The video uncovered new information regarding the assassination of the Minister of Youth and Sports, Hassan Zaid, who was shot by an assailant riding a motorcycle while driving his car in Sanaa back in 2020.
According to the information presented in the video, the assassination was carried out by individuals taking orders from the Saudi intelligence services.
The security media revealed that the mercenaries Muhammad Ali al-Maqdashi and Fadel Hussein al-Masqari played an important role "as two main elements who took over the formation of two sabotage cells. The first was assigned to Tariq Al-Ghazali, known as Tariq al-Badani al-Ghazali, to open a front in Baadan, Ibb Governorate, to destabilize the security of the homefront.
The second cell "carried out assassinations and assassination attempts against a number of social and official figures in Sanaa, Ibb, and Dhamar," the security media added.
The footage revealed the assignment of Tariq Al-Ghazali to form a terror cell tasked with destabilizing the Ibb governorate, and also exposed the money transfer mechanism and the purchase and dispatch of weapons with the aim of igniting the military situation in the Baadan region in the governorate.
According to the video, Saudi intelligence directed its members to “carry out assassinations targeting national figures opposed to the aggression.”
Films: https://twitter.com/H_JHZR/status/1612097382866423809
https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/30812/Seizing-Cells-Working-for-Saudi-Intelligence-in-Yemen
(A P)
Yemen [Sanaa gov.] calls on rights organizations to stop Saudi genocide
Yemen’s Ministry of Human Rights has strongly condemned Saudi atrocities against Yemeni civilians and African migrants in border regions, calling on international rights organizations to put a stop to the Saudi genocide.
The ministry said in a Sunday statement that it was “shocked” by the silence of the international community and international bodies led by the UN in face of the crimes committed by the kingdom.
“We remind the world, with all its humanitarian bodies, that the victims of the Saudi attacks, since the beginning of the armistice, have reached 2,258, including 285 martyrs in the border directorates of Sa’ada, and the death toll is still increasing,” read the statement, carried by Yemen’s al-Masirah television network.
https://en.mehrnews.com/news/195898/Yemen-calls-on-rights-organizations-to-stop-Saudi-genocide
(B P)
Film: Al Jazeera documentary film ( PEACEMAKER IN YEMEN ) Sheikh Abdulrahman Al-Marwani
talks about Dar AL-Salam Organization
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OSyQhIqczaM&t=4s
(* B H K)
Film: The war in Yemen - its impact on children
BBC Special Correspondent Nawal Al-Maghafi will speak from her experience of meeting Yemeni children while reporting in Yemen, and will compare this to her own first-hand earlier experience of Yemen’s education system. Also, we receive an update from Victoria Burch, Child Psychologist & Lead Clinical Trustee, ACT International
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TleZ0Oda98A
cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade
(* B P)
Al-Shayef: Flights at Sana'a Airport Throughout Years of Aggression Not Equal to Flights of 2 Months in Normal Situation
Flights at Sana'a airport during the eight years of the US-Saudi aggression are not equal to flights of only two months in the normal situation in 2014, the Director General of Sana'a International Airport Khaled Al-Shayef confirmed on Monday.
“Commercial flights to and from Sana'a Airport over the past eight years did not exceed 1,276 flights, compared to 20,000 flights during 2014 only,” Al-Shayef said in a statement to Al-Masirah Network.
He indicated that the number of travelers during the eight years of aggression did not exceed 162 thousand passengers, compared to one million 900 thousand passengers during 2014 only. He added that the amount of air freight during the years of aggression did not reach 721 tons, compared to 16,177 tons during 2014 only.
Al-Shayef pointed out that Sana'a International Airport was receiving daily, during 2014, about 50 flights for 14 carrier companies, and five thousand passengers arrived and departed from it daily.
The US-Saudi aggression imposes a suffocating blockade on Yemen and closes ports and airports to increase the suffering of the Yemeni People and create deteriorating living and economic conditions. It is trying to barter the humanitarian aspect to obtain political and military gains at the expense of the Yemeni People.
With the beginning of the truce in last April, the aggression tried to evade its commitment to open Sana'a airport and make flights only to one destination, Jordan, and for a very limited number.
Sana'a confirmed more than once that the continued closure of Sana'a airport proves the lack of seriousness of theUS-Saudi aggression to bring peace to Yemen.
and also https://en.ypagency.net/284317/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2023/01/16/sanaa-international-airport-director-decries-lack-of-commercial-flights/
(B K P)
Attempts to Bring About Peace Faltered in Yemen Due to US-Imposed Siege
The US and Western countries pretend day and night that they work according to laws, principles and ethics that glorify noble human rights, however what the whole world knows is that human rights on the surface of the earth are an indivisible whole, and what is applied in this issue in the US and Europe must be generalized to the rest of the world.
My remark: A Houthi view.
(B P)
UNVIM Operational Analysis - December 2022
Food and Fuel Discharged in December 2022
There was a 14%, decrease in food discharged in December 2022 1268..025 t] compared to the 2021 monthly average 1310..85.6 fj and a 10% decrease compared to the monthly average since May 2016 1297..561
There was a 3.59% increase in fuel discharged in December 2022 1204,578 fj compared to the 2021 monthly average [44,589 t) and a 47% increase compared to the monthly average since May 201.6 1139,556 t). Food and Fuel Vessel Delays In December 2012
Food and Fuel Vessel Delays in December 2022
In December 2022. food vessels spent on average of 1.5 days in the Coalition holding area [CHA]. 13 days in anchorage.. and 7.0 days at berth. This comp-ores to an average of 2.7 days in the CHA, 2.2 days in anchorage.. and 8.4 clays at berth in December 2021. Food vessels therefore spent 44% less time in the CHA, 14% less time in anchorage, and 17% less lime at berth, compared to December 2021
In December 2022.. 11 food vessels proceeded from the CHA to anchorage; 10 berthed:. and 10 discharged their cargo and sailed.
In December 2022. the average lime spent by fuel vessels in the CHA was 5.7 days, whereas it was 44_9 days on average in December 2021
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unvim-operational-analysis-december-2022
and also https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unvim-situation-report-december-2022
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
(* B H)
Im Jemen verschlimmert medizinischer Mangel das Leiden von Krebspatienten
Das Nationale Onkologiezentrum des Jemen behandelt 81 000 registrierte Krebspatienten, aber die Finanzierung schrumpft.
Der Konflikt zwischen einer von Saudi-Arabien geführten Militärkoalition, die 2015 im Jemen gegen die Houthis intervenierte, hat die Wirtschaft und die Grundversorgung, einschließlich des Gesundheitswesens, verwüstet und dazu geführt, dass 80 % der Bevölkerung auf Hilfe angewiesen sind.
Das Zentrum listete etwa 130 Krebsmedikamente als entscheidend auf, von denen jedoch nur etwa 50 % verfügbar sind.
„Das Krankenhaus gibt die Medikamente, die sie haben, aber die teuren Medikamente müssen Sie draußen kaufen … wir können uns diese Medikamente nicht leisten“, sagte Jabri und bat um Hilfe von Gratulanten, um seinen Sohn zur Behandlung ins Ausland zu schicken.
Das NOC in Sanaa wird von den De-facto-Houthi-Behörden im Nordjemen finanziert. Die international anerkannte Regierung finanziert zwei parallele Zentren im Süden, wo sie ihren Sitz hat, nachdem sie 2014 von den Houthis aus Sanaa vertrieben wurde.
Jabri, ein Vater von sechs Kindern, verdient seinen Lebensunterhalt als täglicher Landarbeiter in der westlichen Provinz Hodeidah und kann seinen Sohn dank der Wohltätigkeitsorganisation Al Shafaqa Foundation, die sie während der Behandlung beherbergt und ernährt, nach Sanaa bringen.
Die Stiftung wird von lokalen, arabischen und internationalen Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen sowie lokalen Unternehmen finanziert.
Ali al-Mansour, stellvertretender Direktor des NOC, sagte, das Zentrum habe seit 2015 jedes Jahr zwischen 6.000 und 6.500 neue Krebspatienten aufgenommen, verglichen mit etwa 4.000 im Jahr 2014 – wobei der Anstieg teilweise darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass weniger Menschen Zugang zu einer Behandlung im Ausland haben . Er sagte, das Zentrum habe etwa 130 Krebsmedikamente als entscheidend aufgeführt, von denen jedoch nur etwa 50 % verfügbar seien.
https://lomazoma.com/im-jemen-verschlimmert-medizinischer-mangel-das-leiden-von-krebspatienten/
English version:
(* B H)
Medical shortages add to suffering of cancer patients
Ali Jabri cradles his sobbing son Ayoub ahead of chemotherapy treatment at Yemen’s largest cancer hospital in the capital Sanaa where an eight-year war has led to shortages in life-saving medicine and equipment.
“The hospital gives the medicines they have but the expensive medicines you have to go and buy them outside...we can’t afford these medicines,” Jabri said, pleading for help from well-wishers to send his son abroad for treatment.
The NOC (National Oncology Center) in Sanaa is funded by the de facto Houthi authorities in North Yemen.
The internationally recognised government finances two parallel centres in the south where it is based after being ousted by the Houthis from Sanaa in 2014. Jabri, a father of six, ekes out a living as a daily farm hand in the western province of Hodeidah and is able to take his son to Sanaa thanks to charity Al Shafaqa Foundation which is housing and feeding them during the treatment.
The foundation is funded by local, Gulf Arab and international charities as well as local businesses.
Ali al-Mansour, deputy director of NOC said the centre had received between 6,000-6,500 new cancer patients each year since 2015 compared with some 4,000 in 2014 - with the increase due in part to fewer being people able to access treatment abroad. He said the centre listed some 130 cancer drugs as crucial but that only around 50% are available.
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-medical-shortages-compound-suffering-cancer-patients-2023-01-17/ = https://www.gulf-times.com/article/653552/international/medical-shortages-add-to-suffering-of-cancer-patients
(B H)
Yemen: Humanitarian Response Snapshot (November 2022)
By the end of November, the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), seeking US$4.27 billion to assist 17.9 million people, was only 54.8 per cent funded, forcing aid organizations to reduce or close critical assistance programmes.
However, aid agencies continued to provide life-saving assistance. In the first 11 months of 2022, 209 humanitarian organizations continued to deliver aid to an average of 10.7 million people per month. While the number of people reached with assistance per cluster remained low, partners continued to provide support to millions of people – an average of 8.9 million people were reached each month with food assistance, over 3 million people were provided with water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services, over 592,000 people were assisted with healthcare and nearly 592,000 people received nutritional support.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-response-snapshot-november-2022
(B H)
Yemen: Organizations’ Presence - November 2022
In November 2022, 135 aid organizations implemented Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) activities in all of Yemen’s 333 districts. 9 UN agencies implemented response activities in 331 districts, while 80 national NGOs were active in 331 districts, and 46 international NGOs in 238 districts.
The Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC) has the largest number of organizations implementing activities, with 57 active partners in 325 districts. The Protection and Education clusters came second and third in terms of the number of implementing organizations, with 44 organizations active in 274 districts and 39 organizations active in 219 districts, respectively.
Over the same period, the Nutrition Cluster had 34 organizations implementing response activities in 330 districts; the Health Cluster had 28 organizations implementing activities in 325 districts, and the Water,
Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Cluster had 27 organizations active in 119 districts.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-organizations-presence-november-2022-enar
(B H)
Yemen: All Governorates Humanitarian Presence (3W) - November 2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-marib-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-november-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-al-jawf-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-november-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-ibb-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-november-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-taiz-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-november-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-hajjah-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-november-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-raymah-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-november-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-lahj-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-november-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-abyan-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-november-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-aden-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-november-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-al-makha-sub-hub-humanitarian-presence-3w-november-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-ad-dali-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-november-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-turbah-sub-hub-humanitarian-presence-3w-november-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-shabwah-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-november-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-sadah-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-november-2022
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-socotra-governorate-humanitarian-presence-3w-november-2022
(B H)
Yemen’s fragile healthcare system: Training midwives to improve much-needed care for mothers and children
Philips Foundation and Save the Children are jointly deploying mobile ultrasound services to improve maternal and child health in Yemen, a country whose healthcare system is on the verge of collapse. The project aims to address rising maternal and infant mortality rates by equipping nine community centers with Philips mobile ultrasound devices and support through the training of midwives in the community.
Mobile ultrasound technology plays a crucial role in improving maternal health by allowing midwives to detect potential complications early and intervene in a timely manner with the support of a trained physician. This enables midwives to take measures to address these problems and increase the likelihood of a healthy birth.
(B H)
CCCM Cluster Yemen - Situation Report (December 2022)
In the West Coast, IOM’s CCCM team in coordination with the local authorities celebrated the 16 days activism in their managed sites. The teams raised awareness on the importance of involving the women in all activities and standing against gender-based violence. Hundreds of men, women and children took part in the celebration which included an exhibition of crafts and role plays performed by the site residents.
UNHCR is planning to reduce its target for 2023 in light with funding shortfall, focusing its CCCM intervention on maintenance and monitoring.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/cccm-cluster-yemen-situation-report-december-2022
(B H)
Fighting Against Malnutrition - During screening of Al Anoud for malnutrition
In many rural areas and villages of Yemen especially in Al Jawf governorate, the number of children and pregnant & lactating women is at increased risk of malnutrition amid food price hikes. To reduce the malnutrition rate amongst the children and women, BFD with the support of WFP provides nutrition services at some health facilities in Bart Al Anan and Rajuza districts.
(B H)
Ending Child Hunger is crucial - During the screening of Afrah for Malnutrition
Malnutrition is a global problem. Poorer communities especially in Yemen who are affected by the crisis have less access to adequate nutrition. However, by improving maternal, newborn, and child health, humanitarian cooperative partners can end child hunger and curb many of the worst impacts of malnutrition in children U5 and PLWs. BFD is one of the active partners who work in the affected areas to alleviate the suffering of many vulnerable people.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/ending-child-hunger-crucial-during-screening-afrah-malnutrition
(B H)
A Hope to Eradicate Malnutrition - During the screening of Abed for malnutrition
Abed’s mother, Ashwaq, 28 years of age heard that there are health facilities provide nutrition for malnourished children who suffer like Abed. His mother immediately brought him to one of the targeted health facilities.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/hope-eradicate-malnutrition-during-screening-abed-malnutrition
(* B H)
[Sanaa gov.] Health Ministry: 5,000 patients with kidney failure are at risk of death due to running out of medicines
The Ministry of Public Health and Population on Saturday warned of a humanitarian catastrophe that threatens the lives of more than 5,000 patients with renal failure, as a result of the depletion of solutions and medicines.
In a press conference held in Sanaa on Saturday, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Health for the therapeutic medicine sector, Dr. Ali Jahaf, said “We have addressed the United Nations and health organizations operating in Yemen that we need to provide sufficient drug stocks for dialysis sessions for the year 2023, without receiving a response despite many communications and meetings in this regard.”
Dr. Jahf held the international community and the United Nations responsible for providing urgent dialysis sessions to save patients’ lives, stressing that “dialysis centers are standing today on the verge of stopping, and the stock in dialysis centers is not enough for less than two weeks.”
He pointed out that the continuation of the blockade on Sanaa airport and the port of Hodeida exacerbated the suffering of patients and the health sector as a result of the difficulty of importing and the complicated procedures imposed by the Saudi-led coalition.
https://en.ypagency.net/284153/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2023/01/14/kidney-patients-threatened-with-imminent-death-as-dialysis-drug-stocks-run-out-in-yemen/
(B H)
Your good health is our greatest wealth
Aljumhori hospital is located in Sa’dah district of Sa’dah governorate which is assisted by YFCA operational implementations and UNFPA funds. It is considered the reference service delivery point for RH services in the area. This obstetric emergency hospital provides various maternal, newborn and RH services (antenatal care, postnatal care, family planning and normal delivery).
Fatima arrived to Aljumhori Hospital in a very critical condition of severe bleeding. Clinical examination, lab test and ultrasound were immediately applied to her.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/your-good-health-our-greatest-wealth
(B H)
Determination to overcome obstacles to achieve noble goals
Malnutrition in Yemen is a health issue that predates the beginning of the current conflict in Yemen particularly amongst children, pregnant and lactating women. In Hajjah governorate and its surrounding areas including Qarah district, the nearly seven-years long war has exacerbated malnutrition. To reduce malnutrition levels, Yemen Family Care Association ((YFCA)) in partnership with the World Food Program ((WFP)) started the implementation of “the promotion of preventive and lifesaving nutrition intervention” in Qarah district - Hajjah governorate.
At first, our team in the field has faced seven challenges and difficulties.
"Thanks to the hard work of YFCA’s team, we were able to implement the blanket supplementary feeding program ((BSFP)) activities in one of most hard-to-reach areas," one of the volunteers said gratefully. People of Qarah now are receiving the nutritional commodities and attend the awareness sessions conducted by the CHVs
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/determination-overcome-obstacles-achieve-noble-goals
(B H)
Water for all
In response to this shortage of water, YFCA, funded by YHF through provision of comprehensive and life-saving WASH assistance for IDPs and most vulnerable groups project, has completed the rehabilitation of Al-Massnah Haql Al Fard Well No. 2. This intervention is geared towards improving local access to water and community health. The rehabilitation activities included the supply, installation, and operation of a 67.5 kW solar energy system, as well as the rehabilitation of the control room.
Hence, these efforts helped people of the area (9500) direct BNFs and (7200) indirect BNFs to access safe water with ease.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/water-all
(* B H K)
US-Saudi weapons cause deformities defects among Yemeni children.
During the past six years of the aggression, the air, water, and food were polluted by weapons, germ bombs, toxic gases, and other prohibited weapons that the US-Saudi warplanes dropped these diseases.
They caused the spread of epidemic diseases, fetal deaths and congenital malformations for newborns, constituting the worst epidemiological disaster threatening the fetuses.
The Secretary-General of the Yemeni Pediatric Society at the September 21 University of Medical and Applied Sciences, Dr. Noura Nour Al-Din, said: "#Yemen has become like a field of experiments for using the prohibited weapons that have caused cases of fetal death and congenital malformations among newborns."
"What is more painful is that Yemeni families are unable to treat their children because of the low economic situation, in addition to their being killed by air raids and with various weapons while in their homes," she added.
The al-Sabeen Maternity and Child Hospital in the capital, Sana’a, has seen an increase in babies being born prematurely and with deformities, which doctors say is a result of the war and the Saudi-led coalition’s bombs.
These cases of deformities have drastically increased.
Doctors here are convinced that biological weapons were employed by the Saudis.
Cancer cases are also on the rise. The spokesperson for Yemen’s Ministry of Health says the data and statistics recorded since the war started indicate that biological weapons used by the #Saudi-led coalition are the main cause of the steady increase in cancer and birth defects.
We visited the registration office at Yemen’s only oncology center. It was packed with people pushing their way to register for cancer treatment.
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1613540124096344065.html = https://twitter.com/bgh2_ac3b/status/1613959825590714369
(B H)
Post Program Sustainability Assessment of Women’s Economic Empowerment in Yemenn, 2022, CARE Yemen and the Regional Applied Economic Empowerment Hub
Rebuilding livelihoods is of key importance in fragile settings that experienced intense (man-made or natural) shocks causing distribution of household’s capacities to thrive. As CARE has defined its objective to contribute to the reduction of gender inequality and create equal opportunities for both men and women, it is a natural aspect of their work to integrate Women’s Economic Justice (WEJ) also in locations marked by long-term fragility. CARE does not only want to rebuild livelihoods, but it also wants to contribute to building a more inclusive economic system, where both men and women can benefit from and contribute to economic growth. Working in such fragile settings however, dominated by ongoing violence, destruction and the prioritization of humanitarian aid, requires a conscious adjustment of our vision and approach for WEJ. Several teams and programs, among them CARE Yemen and CARE Northeast Syria, have been piloting and learning about supporting WEJ in fragile settings.
The conclusions and recommendations from this assessment are presented in this report after discussing the report’s findings. In addition, the findings were used in the Women Economic Justice review published in November 2022.
(B H)
Humanitarian Action for Children 2023 - Yemen
With more than 4.3 million internally displaced people since 2015, Yemen remains home to one of the largest internal displacement crises globally. If the United Nations-mediated truce collapses, it is feared that further displacements due to intensified conflict, along with the disruption of fuel imports through the Port of Al Hodeidah, would have significant consequences on food and fuel supply flows, including for humanitarian purposes. The result would be even greater levels of acute humanitarian need.
UNICEF’s humanitarian strategy in Yemen focuses both on providing direct life-saving assistance and on building systems to strengthen the link between humanitarian action and development/resilience programming.
UNICEF requires US$484.4 million to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Yemen in 2023. Lack of predictable funding for urgent interventions challenges the continuity of key services, putting children’s lives and well-being at risk.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/humanitarian-action-children-2023-yemen
(B H P)
USAID: Yemen: USG Response to the Complex Emergency (Last Updated 01/13/23)
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-usg-response-complex-emergency-last-updated-011323
and also https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-complex-emergency-fact-sheet-3-fiscal-year-fy-2023
(* B H K pH)
Yemen’s medics: Saudi-led coalition using biological weapons in war
Doctors and medical experts in Yemen believe that Saudi Arabia and its coalition forces are using biological weapons which are believed to be the reason for the increased cancer and birth defect cases in Yemen. Yousef Mawry has the special story.
Sana is dying. She was born just a few days ago, but because of a rare birth malformation, doctors believe she only has a few days to live.
Sana is one of the thousands of Yemeni babies facing similar fate. Here is the Sabeen Hospital in the Yemeni capital Sana’a; and doctors say they have been receiving birth defect cases at an alarming rate since 2015. That's when the Saudi-led coalition launched its war on Yemen. Doctors here are convinced that biological weapons were employed by the Saudis.
Cancer cases are also on the rise. The spokesperson for Yemen’s Ministry of Health says the data and statistics recorded since the war started indicate that biological weapons used by the Saudi-led coalition are the main cause of the steady increase in cancer and birth defects.
We visited the registration office at Yemen’s only oncology center. It was packed with people pushing their way to register for cancer treatment.
According to Yemen’s Ministry of Health, the number of cancer patients increased by more than 50% since the war was launched in 2015.
The Yemeni Ministry of Health says it will form a committee to officially investigate the main cause for the increase in birth defects and cancer cases in the areas that have been hit the most by Saudi airstrikes. Even if it’s evident that prohibited weapons were utilized by Saudi Arabia and its coalition forces, it is unlikely they will face prosecution since most of the weapons used in the war are supplied by the American and British governments.
(B H)
UNICEF Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report, 30 September 2022
Highlights
As part of UNICEF’s education in emergencies response, 6,128 out-of-school children in the Ma’rib governorate have been enrolled into formal schooling after completing non-formal education classes.
32,136 conflict-affected people were reached through explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) activities, including 26,332 children and 5,804 adults.
In September, UNICEF began the COVID-19 vaccination campaign reaching an estimated 226,747 people above 18 years in the South.
As of September, UNICEF received only 36 per cent of the funding required to continue life-saving work in Yemen.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unicef-yemen-humanitarian-situation-report-30-september-2022
UNICEF Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report, 31 August 2022
Highlights
UNICEF continued to provide essential lifesaving interventions to 82,878 people in flood-affected regions and communities, including IDPs, through water trucking, provision of hygiene kits, cholera tables, and desludging latrines.
In August, UNICEF provided psychosocial support to 55,176 individuals, including 48,539 children to children, to help address the immediate and long-term consequences of their exposure to violence.
By the end of August, UNICEF had trained 3,500 community health care workers to provide primary health care services. An estimated 1.5 million people, including 360,000 children under five and 350,000 women of reproductive age, accessed essential primary health care services.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unicef-yemen-humanitarian-situation-report-31-august-2022
(B H)
Your love strengthens Yemen’s suffering farmers
Many parts of Yemen are arid, but in Awad’s region, torrential floods destroyed crops. Awad also didn’t have the tools or knowledge he needed to make the most of his farm or preserve his harvest for any length of time. Without a way to store what they produce, farmers were forced to sell without making a profit.
“We suffered a lot as a result of these issues.” Worst of all, his sheep were dying off “because of my lack of information about livestock diseases and how to deal with them.”
Your generosity make all the difference for farmers like Awad, providing them with the essentials they need to make their farms and herds profitable. “They gave us training and provided us with seeds and money that helped us a lot,” he says.
https://lwr.org/blog/2023/your-love-strengthens-yemens-suffering-farmers
(B H)
Yemen, no room in the hospital: Samia’s delivery
With a mobil clinic, INTERSOS is the only organisation providing basic medical care at the Al-Ribat IDP site (Lahj governorate), where more than 3,000 people live in tents
What is considered unacceptable in Italy is the norm in Yemen. Every two hours a woman dies in childbirth because of a health system that has collapsed.
Thanks to the support of the European Union, we offer emergency integrated health, nutrition and protection services to conflict-affected and displaced people in Hajja (Abs and Ku’aydina districts), Aden (districts of Al-Buraiqa and Dar Sa’ad) and Lahj (Al-Ribat IDP camp in Tuban district).
https://www.intersos.org/en/yemen-no-room-in-the-hospital-samias-delivery/
(B H)
Yemen WASH Cluster - Humanitarian Dashboard (January - November 2022)
(B H)
UNICEF Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report, 30 September 2022
Highlights:
As part of UNICEF’s education in emergencies response, 6,128 out-of-school children in the Ma’rib governorate have been enrolled into formal schooling after completing non-formal education classes.
32,136 conflict-affected people were reached through explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) activities, including 26,332 children and 5,804 adults.
In September, UNICEF began the COVID-19 vaccination campaign reaching an estimated 226,747 people above 18 years in the South.
As of September, UNICEF received only 36 per cent of the funding required to continue life-saving work in Yemen.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unicef-yemen-humanitarian-situation-report-30-september-2022
UNICEF Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report, 31 August 2022
Highlights
UNICEF continued to provide essential lifesaving interventions to 82,878 people in flood-affected regions and communities, including IDPs, through water trucking, provision of hygiene kits, cholera tables, and desludging latrines.
In August, UNICEF provided psychosocial support to 55,176 individuals, including 48,539 children to children, to help address the immediate and long-term consequences of their exposure to violence.
By the end of August, UNICEF had trained 3,500 community health care workers to provide primary health care services. An estimated 1.5 million people, including 360,000 children under five and 350,000 women of reproductive age, accessed essential primary health care services.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unicef-yemen-humanitarian-situation-report-31-august-2022
(B H)
Yemen: Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP) 2022 - Funding Status,10 January 2023
(B H)
Yemen Nutrition Cluster: GAP Analysis Maps, November 2022
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-nutrition-cluster-gap-analysis-maps-november-2022
(B H)
Yemen Education Cluster - Humanitarian Dashboard (January - November 2022)
Yemen: Education Cluster Coverage and GAP Analysis (as of Nov 2022)
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-education-cluster-coverage-and-gap-analysis-nov-2022
Yemen: Increased Inclusive Classroom Capacity (as of Nov 2022)
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-increased-inclusive-classroom-capacity-nov-2022
Yemen: Education Cluster School Learning Materials (as of Nov 2022)
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-education-cluster-school-learning-materials-nov-2022
(B H)
WFP Yemen Food Security Update, December 2022
Highlights
The average exchange rate of the Yemeni rial vis-à-vis the US dollar remained almost the same in areas under the internationally recognized government of Yemen (IRG), compared to the previous month.
Nevertheless, the rial lost 22 percent of its value against the US dollar since the beginning of the calendar year. Foreign currency reserves in CBY Aden are nearly depleted and prospects of foreign financial support from the Arab Gulf are precarious. The exchange rate remains unchanged in areas under Sana’a-based Authorities.
Local fuel prices continued to decrease countrywide for the fourth consecutive month, mainly due to increased fuel supply. Pumping prices for petrol and diesel decreased during November by one percent in the governorates under the control of IRG and by three percent in those under Sana'a-based authorities.
The global Food Price Index (FFPI) retracted to pre-war levels (Russia-Ukraine war) since July 2022, and by end of November the FFPI had decreased by 15 percent compared to the all-time high in March 2022. This decline was mainly driven by the decrease in global prices of oils and cereals by 39 percent and 12 percent respectively.
The monthly average cost of the minimum food basket (MFB) decreased by two percent compared to the previous month. Year-on-year, the cost of MFB remained at similarly high levels in areas under IRG, while it increased by 13 percent in areas under Sana’a-based authorities. High domestic food prices were reported as a principal impediment for accessing adequate diets by 15 percent of surveyed households in the south and nine percent in the north.
As of November, UNVIM data showed no signs of disruption to fuel imports since the expiration of the truce in early October. The flow of imported fuel through Red Sea ports in November 2022 was nearly thirteen times the level of imports reported in November 2021
With recent increases in funding for food assistance in Yemen since September 2022, WFP is currently targeting 13 million people each distribution cycle. Households are receiving reduced rations still, equivalent to 65 percent of the standard food basket.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/wfp-yemen-food-security-update-december-2022
(A H P)
Kuwaiti-funded medical center cornerstone laid in Yemen’s Taiz
https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=3076995&language=en
(B H)
Film by Human Appeal Australia: Yemen winter distribution helping the people of Yemen stay warm in winter
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y_fqYAe-Mpo
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
(B H)
The Displaced Face A Myriad Of Challenges!
Fleeing their destroyed house to end up settling in a straw hut! A family who used to rely mostly on farms and livestock as a main source of income but not anymore. Having three meals a day is a luxury that they cannot afford. Children are losing their appetite due to solid waste that is dumped in open spaces. Additionally, the harsh living conditions of displacement made parents crippled to afford schooling for their children, which is most unfortunate. It goes without saying that the war has inflicted much pain and suffering for thousands of families, including those of women-head households in Al-Hudeidah governorate.
The generous contribution of Sign of Hope (SoH) through RDP will satisfy the dire needs of 110 displaced families, including Sua’d’s family, and will bring a decent life for all targeted IDPs who are listed in the emergency and integrated response project for food security, livelihoods, water, sanitation and hygiene in Al-Marawa’a district of Al-Hodeidah governorate.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/displaced-face-myriad-challenges
(B H)
IOM Yemen: Rapid Displacement Tracking - Yemen IDP Dashboard I Reporting Period: 8 to 14 January 2023
From 1 January to 14 January 2023, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 543 households (HH) (3,258 Individuals) who experienced displacement at least once.
Between 8 and 14 January 2023, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 115 households (690 individuals) displaced at least once. The majority of people moved into/within the following governorates and districts:
(A H)
A young Yemeni asylum seeker committed suicide in the Netherlands. Haitham Abdel Qader Al-Hardi hanged himself in a refugee camp in the city of Vlissingen. Watch for more details from @aliim714 in Arabic language:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9WmKt3tHOKM
https://twitter.com/AhmadAlgohbary/status/1614367428594569216
(B H)
Migration along the Eastern Corridor, Report 33 | as of 30 November 2022
The Horn of Africa and Yemen is one of the busiest and riskiest migration corridors in the world travelled by hundreds of thousands of migrants, the majority of whom travel in an irregular manner, often relying on smugglers to facilitate movement along the Eastern Route. This regional report provides monthly updates on the complex migratory dynamics through Djibouti, Somalia, Yemen and Ethiopia based on diverse data sources and consultations with key informants in the four countries. Moreover, it provides information on the main protection concerns for migrants along the journey
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/migration-along-eastern-corridor-report-33-30-november-2022
(B H)
IOM Yemen: Rapid Displacement Tracking - Yemen IDP Dashboard I Reporting Period: 1 to 7 January 2023
Between 1 and 7 January 2023, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 353 households (2,118 individuals)2 who experienced displacement at least once.
Safety and security concerns as a result of the conflict were the main reason for displacement, accounting for 90 per cent (317 HHs) of the total and followed by economic reasons related to conflict, accounting for 10 per cent (36 HHs).
From 1 January to 7 January 2023, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 353 households (HH)3 (2,118 Individuals) who experienced displacement at least once.
(A H)
Another Yemeni has died on the Belarus-Poland border while trying to cross into Europe! Reports suggest he froze to death due to harsh weather.
https://twitter.com/FuadRajeh/status/1612784501712891908
(A H)
Seven displaced children die of cold in Yemen's Marib desert
Seven children have died of cold in IDPs camp in Yemen's desert province of Marib since mid-December, government sources said on Tuesday.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-62461
and also https://twitter.com/SuaadS/status/1612734567126818816
(B H)
DTM Flow Monitoring Registry Dashboard: Non-Yemeni migrant arrivals and Yemeni returnees in December 2022 [EN/AR]
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
Siehe / Look at cp1
(* B P)
Women's campaign in Yemen protests Houthi dress code rules
Houthi forces require women to wear a black abaya that covers their entire bodies.
Yemeni women are taking to Twitter to defy the Houthi rebels' strict dress code.
What happened: Yemenis have been posting on the social media site using the Arabic-language “Yemeni identity” hashtag. The posts consist of pictures of Yemeni women in colorful traditional clothing and are in response to the strict dress code imposed on parts of Yemen controlled by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels.
The Iran-backed Houthis took power in 2014 and have recently tightened dress code rules for women in Yemen, Al-Araby and Arab News reported.
Women in Houthi areas must wear a long, black, loose-fitting “abaya” that covers them from head to toe.
Few users addressed the restriction of the colored abaya directly. Twitter user @tasabihalh0rimy wrote on Saturday, “This is our identity. Black is a lonely color.”
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/01/womens-campaign-yemen-protests-houthi-dress-code-rules
(A P)
Combating Corruption, Funds Prosecution Recover Billions Of Riyals To State Treasury In 2022
Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption, Oversight and Anti-Corruption Sector Agencies, issued its first annual report on the level of implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2022-2026 in its first year, as part of the national vision to build the modern Yemeni state.
The report, which was reviewed during a special event hosted by the House of Representatives in the presence of the Speakers of the House of Representatives, Yahya Ali Al-Raei, and Ministers Dr. Abdulaziz bin Habtoor, and Shura Mohammed Hussein Al-Aidarous, and the Supreme Judiciary, Judge Ahmed Yahya Al-Mutawakel, on Sunday, the Combating Corruption Authority and the Public Funds Prosecution have recovered billions of riyals to the state treasury.
He pointed out that the authority recovered 276 million and 584 thousand and 476 riyals, and 289 thousand dollars to the state treasury, it seized two billion and 454 million and 964 thousand and 800 riyals, and 37 million and 201 thousand and 615 dollars in banks.
The report pointed out that the measures to seize funds in corruption cases by the Authority included circulating the seizure of eight billion and 70 million and 248 thousand riyals, and the amount of 53 million and 437 thousand and 512 dollars.
He explained that during the first year of implementing the strategy, the authority received two thousand and 294 notifications and preventive measures, and issued one thousand and 274 preventive measures in this regard.
https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/579528
My comment: The Houthi elite itself is extremely corrupt. Of course, they will not be prosecuted at all.
(A P)
Amnesty-Aktionen zeigen Wirkung
Am 7. Dezember wurde auch der jemenitische Journalist Younis Abdelsalam von den De-facto-Behörden der Huthi aus der Haft entlassen. Er war seit dem 4. August 2021 in Sanaa willkürlich gefangengehalten worden, nachdem er Kritik an den Behörden geübt hatte. Nach seiner Festnahme war er mehrere Wochen lang „verschwunden“ und dann unter isolierten Bedingungen in Einzelhaft und ohne Kontakt zur Außenwelt festgehalten worden. Er hatte während seiner Inhaftierung keinen Zugang zu angemessener medizinischer Versorgung. Die ganzen Monate wurde er weder vor Gericht gestellt noch angeklagt.
https://mmm.verdi.de/internationales/amnesty-aktionen-zeigen-wirkung-86289
(A P)
Al-Ruwaishan: No Peace at Sea If Sovereignty Not Achieved for Yemen’s Territorial Waters
There can be no peace at sea if sovereignty is not achieved for Yemen’s territorial waters and islands, Deputy Prime Minister Lieutenant General Jalal Al-Ruwaishan affirmed on Monday.
Al-Ruwaishan indicated in a statement to Al-Masirah that the Maritime Security Conference, which will be held on January 22, carries a two-fold message.
The message, he said, is Yemen is the only one concerned with protecting its shores and territorial waters and it is a partner in the security of international passages.
“There is no concession or division with regard to our absolute sovereignty over our maritime, land and air territories,” he added. “We will face any threat to our territorial waters or our islands."
He stressed that Sana'a is ready for the international partnership in securing trade and navigation routes in international waters, and at the same time it exercises full sovereignty over its water, air and land territory.
He pointed out that Yemen is keen on the security of the Red Sea, waterways and freedom of international navigation, and the continuation of the aggression and blockade makes Sana'a's options open.
and also https://en.ypagency.net/284320/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2023/01/16/national-salvation-government-statement-maritime-security-will-be-upheld-if-yemeni-sovereignty-is-respected/
(A P)
Abductees Mothers Association Hold Protesting Rally to Condemn Sentencing Seven Abductees from Sadaa to Death.
In Marib, Abductees’ Mothers Association held a protesting rally to condemn sentencing seven abductees, from Sa’ada, to death by the Houthi-controlled Criminal Court of First Instance in Sana’a. The sentenced abductees are;
The same court, also, sentenced 7 other abductees to 15 years in prison as well as 6 others to 10 years.
The rally statement demanded stopping all political trials, and dropping all the judgements issued upon abductees, after they had been abducted, forcibly disappeared, tortured, coerced to false confessions, and tried without any principles of fair trials (photos)
https://www.facebook.com/505200403000985/posts/2109242705930072/
and also https://twitter.com/abducteesmother/status/1614884090074873856
My remark: It’s significant that Abductees Mothers cannot rally any more at Sanaa (where they should do in this case) but only in non-Houthi held aereas.
(* A P)
Houthis Raid Company that Determines Aid Recipients in Yemen
Houthi intelligence agents stormed the "Prodigy Systems" offices in Sanaa that manages data collection on citizens who are eligible for humanitarian aid, in cooperation with international organizations.
The Houthi agents forced some of its employees, at gunpoint, to sign documents accusing the company of working for Israel. They also arrested dozens of employees and detained them for investigation until the end of the day. The company was closed for an indefinite period.
Informed sources in Sanaa told Asharq Al-Awsat that dozens of Houthi intelligence vehicles surrounded the company's building, which collects data and conducts field surveys on citizens eligible for relief aid on behalf of the UN and international organizations.
It also helped supervise aid delivery to all displaced and eligible people across Yemen.
According to the sources, dozens of masked agents stormed the building last Wednesday and detained all the employees until late evening after confiscating their phones and computers.
The employees were later released after they were forced to sign papers accusing the company of working for Israel.
The sources indicated that the Houthis confiscated the company's equipment, which employs more than 313 workers.
https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/4099011/houthis-raid-company-determines-aid-recipients-yemen
My comment: “Collecting data” isn’t as innocent as it might look. It really could be a threat to individuals and government authority alike.
(A K P)
Armed Forces Ready to Deal with Any Hostile Operations in Yemen's Water
Member of Supreme Political Council, Mohammed Saleh Al-Nuaimi, praised the high readiness of the Armed and Security Forces in Hodeidah and ability to confront any developments by the US-Saudi aggression.
Al-Nuaimi warned the US-Saudi aggression against continuing procrastination and not respond to opportunities for peace, rejecting the demands the people of Yemen and lifting their suffering.
"The enemy will meet the same fate that it suffered over the past eight years in its aggressive war against the people of Yemen," he said.
(A P)
Revolution Leader congratulates Islamic Ummah, all women believers on the memory of Fatima al-Zahra's birth
Revolution leader Mr. Abdulmalik Badruddin Al-Houthi congratulated the Islamic Ummah and all women believers on the anniversary of the birth of the Lady Women of the Worlds, Fatima al-Zahra' peace and blessings be upon her.
This blessed occasion is of great importance in entrenching the principles of faith, which elevate man or woman in the ladder of human and faith perfection, it provides good example; Fatma al-Zahra, peace be upon her, as called by the Messenger of Allah, God's blessing on him: The Lady Women of the World's, she is the role models and distinguished model of human, faith and moral perfection at the global level
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3219037.htm
and also https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2023/01/12/sayyid-abdul-malik-al-houthi-speaks-on-birthday-of-sayyida-fatima-al-zahra-2/ = https://en.ypagency.net/284061/
(A K)
Yemen: Eight Houthis killed in fighting with government forces, rebel media says
Eight fighters from Yemen’s Houthi rebels were killed in battle with government forces, media linked to the rebel group reported Wednesday.
The fighters’ funeral was held in the Yemeni capital Sanaa
https://www.newarab.com/news/yemen-eight-houthis-killed-battle-government-forces
(A P)
Film: A #Houthi colonel's home was bombed & his village raided after he defected last week. Mohamad Salah al-Houthi spoke up against Houthis' corruption, indoctrination & starvation policy in #Yemen. There is a rising trend of people speaking against Houthis.
https://twitter.com/YemeniFatima/status/1613534050911752194
(A P)
After banning women from travelling without a male escorts, Houthis move to control women dress code. Senior Houthi govt & security officials met with Abaya shop owners in Sanaa to inform them about new "regulations" for women dress code that Abya shop owners have to abide by. According to new rule: Abayas must be loose with Khemar, and a solid color. For Burqa (face cover) it should have one opening. Abaya shops are prohibited from making Abayas that are colourful, show body shape or that are short.
https://twitter.com/Ndawsari/status/1613232590894284802
(A P)
Smuggled goods, livestock seized in three governorates
https://en.ypagency.net/283969/
(A P)
Foreign Ministry Warns against Insulting Islamic Religious Symbols
Yemen’s Foreign Ministry strongly condemned the French weekly magazine Charlie Hebdo’s abuse of Islamic religious figures and symbols from time to time by publishing offensive cartoons. The most recent of which was the publication of inappropriate cartoons of an Islamic figure represented by Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei, who is considered a global Islamic authority.
(A P)
Houthi militia execute tribal Shiekh by strangling him
Houthi militants executed a tribal chieftain by strangling him to death in the southern Yemeni province of Al-Dhale'a this week, local sources have said.
The militants controlling parts of Al-Dhale'a launched a manhunt and arrested Waze'a Abdurab on the charge of dissent before arresting him, assaulting him severely on a military truck and strangling him to death.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-62447
(A P)
National Negotiating Delegation Warnes: State of No Peace Nor War Will Not Continue
Member of national delegation, Hamid Assem, confirmed that people of Yemen stand behind the leadership in rejecting the US and Saudi occupation ambitions.
He explained that the people of Yemen rejected the continuation of the state of no peace nor war, either war or negotiations leading to a clear solution.
My comment: No, not “Yemeni people”. It’s just the Houthi leading clan.
(A P)
Likely Houthi militants assassinated a tribal leader from Dhamar governorate at his home in Sana’a, northern Yemen, on January 9.[vi]
(A P)
The Houthis are conscripting locals and redeploying key systems to Hudaydah governorate, western Yemen. Unspecified Yemeni military sources said that the Houthis dispatched “heavily armed” reinforcements to central Hudaydah on January 7.[iv] Local sources added that the Houthis forcibly conscripted 20 out of every 500 civilians, including children, in Bayt al Faqih, al Durayhimi, and al Jah, Hudaydah governorate. Yemeni media outlet al Mashhad al Yemeni also reported on January 8 that the Houthis built military communications towers and deployed ballistic missile launchers and drones to Hudaydah governorate.[v]
(A P)
Hisham Ali Qaed recounts how he was badly treated while he was detained in Houthi-run Al Saleh Prison in #Taiz province. (text in image)
https://twitter.com/RepYemenEnglish/status/1612483083680288775
(A K P)
Statistics from a study recently conducted by the Yemeni Coalition for Monitoring Human Rights Violations (NGO) show that the #Houthis are the most group that have recruited #children to join the battlefield in #Yemen. (image)
https://twitter.com/RepYemenEnglish/status/1612475480304939010
(* A P)
Trial of Yemeni Activists Raises Notion of ‘Settling Scores’ among Houthi Factions
Houthis referred four Yemeni activists and celebrities, including YouTuber Mustafa al-Moumry, to a specialized court for terrorism cases on charges of incitement to disturb public peace.
Last year, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, the Houthi leader's cousin, published a video ordering the release of Moumry, who was detained by security services after criticizing corrupt officials. Houthi asserted he would protect Moumri's right to speak.
However, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi did not comment on the recent detention of Moumry.
Moumry, who frequently used profanity in his speech, appeared in a video criticizing the corruption of Houthi officials. He was arrested and released before appearing in subsequent recordings attacking judges who objected to Mohammed al-Houthi's intervention in their jurisdiction and powers.
Moumry and three other activists were arrested after broadcasting videos confirming that people were dying of hunger and that residents in militia-controlled areas were discontented.
Mohammed Ali al-Houthi remained silent and did not comment on their referral to the court specialized in terrorism cases.
The recent developments raised many questions about whether this was a move to control the factions of Mohammed al-Houthi, whose influence had grown at the expense of his rivals.
Some argue that the arrest aimed to improve the image of the militias, which might later release the four celebrities since they were arrested for a few days and referred to the Houthi prosecution.
and
(A P)
YouTubers tried by Houthi militia for inciting ‘chaos’
Three Yemeni YouTubers stood trial in a Houthi militia court on Wednesday charged with spreading misinformation and inciting “chaos,” according to court documents.
The three, including Mustafa Al-Mawmari who has more than 2 million followers, were detained in Sanaa in December after they published videos critical of the Iran-backed militia, who seized the capital in 2014.
Ahmad Hajjar, who has more than 243,000 subscribers, and Ahmad Elaw with 800,000 also appeared before the court.
They were charged with “spreading misinformation” and “harming public interest,” as well as “inciting the masses to commit acts of chaos,” according to the court documents.
The Houthis are increasingly limiting individual liberties, including free speech and the of movement of women in areas they control.
The YouTubers’ influence was seen as “serving the aggression ... against Yemen” by the coalition, the court documents said.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2230816/middle-east
Photos: https://twitter.com/SabaNewsye/status/1613172368788037634
Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Kw9EaXdvKU&t=3s
and
(A P)
4 Yemeni Media Figures Face Possible Death Sentence for Criticizing Houthis
The Iran-backed Houthi militias in Yemen kicked off the trial of four social media figures for allegedly criticizing the militias’ corrupt practices.
They appeared before a court tasked with tackling terrorism cases, sparking concerns that death sentences may be issued against them.
Ahmad Hajar, Mustafa al-Mumary, Hamoud al-Mesbahi and Ahmad al-Law were kidnapped by the Houthis some two weeks ago and made to appear before a Sanaa court.
Social media activists circulated photos of the detainees as they appeared in court where they were charged with inciting to create chaos and calling on the people to storm Houthi-held government buildings.
The charges said the detainees set up YouTube channels that they ran from Sanaa and where they posted false news, statements and rumors with the aim of influencing the public and harming public interests.
They have denied the charges against them.
and
(A P)
Yemen: Houthis kidnap 'own' man for being vocal against corruption as crackdown on influencers continues
In Yemen, Iran backed Houthis have kidnapped their own man as part of their crackdown on online influencers who are publicly condemning their corrupt practices which are allegedly leading the country towards a hunger crisis.
As per reports, Mohammed Salah Al-Houthi was kidnapped by the Houthis from his home in Sanaa’s Khawlan just days after he was heard on recordings criticising the militia’s leaders for enriching themselves while ignoring hunger and poverty.
According to Brig. Gen. Mohammed Al-Kumaim, a Yemeni military analyst, the Houthis arrested Al-Houthi at the weekend after besieging his residence in Dar Al-Sharef because he refused to give himself up.
The operation’s commander, Abdul Hamed Al-Houthi, Mohammed Salah’s cousin, was murdered in the ensuing shooting.
Al-Kumaim claimed that the Houthis only carried out the operation after obtaining a written promise from members of the surrounding tribes, branding Al-Houthi an outlaw for his criticism.
“We have made it clear for a while now that this movement will not put up with criticism. “They would put you in jail for saying, ‘I’m hungry,'” he claimed.
Al-Houthi is a government employee who rose to fame after appearing in many videos to announce his defection from the movement and criticise its mismanagement and failure to alleviate the suffering of the populace. Little else is known about him.
and
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Crackdown on YouTubers leaves little space for dissent in Yemen
Three of Yemen’s most prominent YouTubers have been arrested in the past few weeks by Houthi authorities in Sanaa after their posts were criticised by the rebel group.
The last upload on Ahmed Hajar’s YouTube channel, which has almost 250,000 subscribers and millions of views, was on December 22.
On the same day, Hajar was dragged into a bus in broad daylight on a busy street in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa. Witnesses said armed individuals, believed to be Houthi rebels in control of the city, had snatched him.
The content of Hajar’s penultimate upload may explain why he was taken: a 10-minute video criticising corruption in the Houthi-controlled areas of northern Yemen, titled “The Sanaa Government loots the wealth of Yemen and Yemenis”.
The number of independent media outlets has shrunk in Yemen as a result of the country’s war, which began in 2014. That is particularly the case in Houthi-controlled parts of the country.
YouTube has become a rare space for independent voices who, while careful not to cross any red lines, had expressed dissent towards some Houthi officials, and criticised corruption.
Despite these YouTubers making efforts to criticise the Saudi-led coalition, which backs the Yemeni government warring with the Houthis, the Iran-backed rebel group appears to have decided to further crack down on freedom of expression.
Hajar was not the only one caught in the latest wave of arrests. Mustafa al-Mawmari and Ahmed Allaw, two other prominent Yemeni YouTubers, were also arrested after they posted videos expressing solidarity with Hajar.
Local media outlets reported on Tuesday that all three of the men had their cases referred to a court in Sanaa for investigation.
Khalil al-Omari, the editor-in-chief of Rai al-Yemen news website, told Al Jazeera that the arrests were a continuation of the Houthis’ zero-tolerance approach to opposition voices.
“They want you to speak or write in a specific way that does not oppose them, dispute their rule or control,” said al-Omari. “So, the recent detention of YouTubers is a cruel message to anyone who thinks of crossing the lines drawn by them.”
“They simply talked about high prices, exorbitant taxes, widespread poverty, unpaid salaries, and they called for peace. For the Houthis, talking about these issues is a red line and should not be crossed.”
and
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Five Yemeni YouTubers abducted by Houthis, minister says
Social media influencers taken for posting videos criticising Iran-backed group
Houthi militias have abducted five well-known Yemeni social media influencers who criticised the Iran-backed group, a Yemeni minister has said.
The influencers highlighted the Houthis' widespread corruption, mismanagement and failure to provide basic services for people living in areas under their control.
Yemen's Minister of Information Moammar Al Eryani told The National that Houthi militia abducted YouTubers including Mustafa Al Mumari, Hamoud Al Mesbahi, Ahmed Al Law and Issa Al Outhari.
The quartet had posted videos criticising the pro-Houthi security service for abducting YouTuber Ahmed Hajar as he walked through Sanaa 15 days ago.
Mr Hajar was abducted after posting a video on his YouTube channel in which he criticised Houthi authorities for corruption and mismanagement.
and
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Human rights groups urge Houthis to release detained YouTube influencers
NGOs' efforts are unlikely to achieve the influencers' release and Houthi movement’s crackdown on criticism could backfire, experts say.
Over 100 human rights and civil society organizations in Yemen signed a joint petition urging the United Nations and the international community to demand the release of four Yemeni YouTube influencers who were detained after criticizing the Houthi militia.
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-728086
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Sana'a Security Services Expose Saudi Intelligence Role in Assassinations of Yemeni Leaders
The security services in Sana’a revealed details of one of the most important counter-operations carried out by the Yemeni security services against the projects of the Saudi intelligence agencies.
The security media published a video entitled "In the Grip of Security", revealing new details and information related to the assassination of Minister Hassan Zaid and several assassination attempts and operations carried out by members of the Saudi intelligence in the capital, Sana'a, Ibb and Dhamar.
The security film "In the Grip of Security" presents the war between the Yemeni intelligence and the Saudi intelligence in light of the aggression, which is working to detonate the situation from within, while the security services are doing their part to preserve public tranquility and the home front.
The film reveals the mechanism of work of the Saudi intelligence in forming criminal cells, and exposes, with information and pictures, a number of those associated with the Saudi intelligence who were involved in this treacherous aspect.
It also reveals the identity of the mercenary Mohammad Ali al-Maqdishi and the mercenary Fadl Hussein al-Maqri as two main members who assumed the formation of two cells of aggression. The first, led by Tariq Mohammad Ahmad al-Ghazali, was entrusted with opening a front in the Baadan Ibb region to disturb security and destabilize the home front, but the mission failed.
The second cell carried out assassinations attempts against a number of social and official figures in Sana'a, Ibb and Dhamar.
The film also reveals the details of one of the counter-operations of the Yemeni security services, during which they recorded success in facing the plots of hostile foreign intelligence, and strengthening their position and successes after reunifying them.
and also https://www.saba.ye/en/news3218721.htm
https://en.ypagency.net/283690/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2023/01/09/yemeni-security-services-release-details-of-large-scale-counter-espionage-operation-against-saudi-infiltrators/
https://en.mehrnews.com/news/195936/Yemen-detains-two-terrorist-networks-linked-with-Saudis
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Tens of thousands attended late Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar's funeral in #Sana'a today. Following the funeral, Hashid tribal confederation chose his brother sheikh Hamyar, former deputy speaker of Yemeni Parliament, to succeed sheikh Sadeq as senior chief of the tribe. (photos)
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1612091417467441152
The funeral of Sheikh al-Ahmar in Sanaa, a tribal & Islahi leader, paints a clearer picture of the Islah party's power base in Houthi-controlled areas. This will likely put #Houthis on high alert as more voices have publicly mobilized against them in #Yemen.
https://twitter.com/YemeniFatima/status/1612458404613853185
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp6 – cp19
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-837b-yemen-war-mosaic-837b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-836-yemen-war-mosaic-836
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-836 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-836:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
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