... im Südjemen – Die Emirate als regionale Macht – und mehr
July 31, 2020: Yemen – a chaos? (in German) – Yemen’s Response to COVID-19 – “Safer” tanker, a “floating bomb” – Revival of power sharing Riyadh agreement in Southern Yemen – The VAE as a regional power – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-670b-yemen-war-mosaic-670b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavitrus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp11 Deutschland / Germany
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism
cp15 Propaganda
cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
cp19 Sonstiges / Other
Klassifizierung / Classification
***
**
*
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:
Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-einfuehrende-artikel-u-ueberblicke
Neue Artikel / New articles
(* B H)
Film: Jemen: Hunger bedrohlicher als Covid-19
Im Jemen herrscht die größte humanitäre Krise der Welt. Rund 80 Prozent der Bevölkerung benötigen Hilfe, darunter mehr als 12 Millionen Kinder. Seit dem Ausbruch des Coronavirus ist die Hungersnot im Land besorgniserregender denn je.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CA5UKzMOvmI
(* B H K P)
Yemen in Crisis
Yemen’s internal divisions and a Saudi-led military intervention have spawned an escalating political, military, and humanitarian crisis.
Yemen faces its biggest crisis in decades with the overthrow of its government by the Houthis, a Zaydi Shiite movement, and the resulting offensive led by Saudi Arabia. The fighting, and a Saudi-imposed blockade ostensibly meant to enforce an arms embargo, has had devastating humanitarian consequences, causing more than one million people to become internally displaced and leading to cholera outbreaks, medicine shortages, and threats of famine. The United Nations calls the humanitarian crisis in Yemen “the worst in the world.”
What are Yemen’s divisions?
Yemen faced numerous challenges to its unity. The country’s north and south had long been fractured by religious differences, experiences with colonialism, and Arabic dialects.
What caused the current crisis?
Several factors widened these political divisions and led to full-scale military conflict.
Subsidy backlash. Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which had extended to Yemen a $550 million loan premised on promises of economic reforms, Hadi’s government lifted fuel subsidies in July 2014. The Houthi movement, which had attracted support beyond its base with its criticisms of the UN transition, organized mass protests demanding lower fuel prices and a new government. Hadi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated party, al-Islah, held counterrallies.
Who are the parties involved?
What is the role of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?
AQAP has benefited from the chaos.
What has the humanitarian impact been?
With a poverty rate of more than 50 percent, Yemen was the Arab world’s poorest country even prior to the conflict. A 2019 UN report said the country’s “degree of suffering is nearly unprecedented,” with more than twenty million Yemenis struggling with food insecurity and half of those on the brink of famine.
What are the prospects for a solution to the crisis?
UN-backed peace negotiations have made some progress, but have failed to bring an end to the conflict.
Although the Riyadh Agreement appeared to founder when the STC declared self-governance in March, the separatists’ return to the deal has raised hopes that Yemen can overcome its internal divisions. Still, peace between the internationally recognized government and the Houthis remains elusive, and experts worry that lingering friction among regional actors, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE could mean the war will continue.
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis
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Film: Thousands of Children in Yemen Face Starvation and Famine
10-year-old Hassan weighs less than 20 lbs — and his story represents a much larger issue endangering thousands of kids across Yemen
In US news and current events today, thousands of Yemeni face starvation as famine wreaks the war-torn country. The Yemen civil war, or Yemen war, has been raging for too long, exacerbated by Saudi Arabia. Yemen are faced with violence and suffering on a daily basis, but an even more insidious problem is Yemen starvation.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P-4eQm5DFxw
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
Abkommen von Riad: Siehe cp6 / Riyadh agreement: Look at cp6
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Die vielen Auslöser der Gewalt. Der Jemen – ein Chaos?
Die Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen im Süden sind das Resultat der sozialen Sezession und Fragmentierung sowie der damit verbundenen lokalen Grenzziehungen, die den Krieg um die Herrschaftsordnung im Jemen gegenwärtig prägen.
Dazu sind mit Saudi-Arabien und den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten auf der einen und Iran auf der anderen Seite die militärischen Schwergewichte der Region involviert. Es ist zur Gewohnheit geworden, diese Ordnungsmuster nicht nur zur Erklärung von Konflikten und Allianzen heranzuziehen, sondern sie auch gegeneinander auszuspielen.
Doch warum ist die Orientierung an diesen verschiedenen Ordnungen unter den beteiligten Akteuren so dominant und was macht einige Ordnungen erfolgreicher als andere?
Die schiitischen Huthis zeigten in den vergangenen Jahren, dass sie ihre Allianzen durchaus opportunistisch eingehen und auch Sunniten als Partner in Betracht gezogen werden. Die Annahme ist denn auch falsch, dass, wenn von der Konfessionalisierung des Jemens gesprochen wird, ein Konflikt zwischen Schia und Sunna aufgrund religiöser Dogmen und Auslegungen stattfinde oder den Konflikt ausgelöst habe. Vielmehr ist die Konfessionalisierung der Huthis als Schiiten eine Form, Repräsentation und Patronage zu organisieren. Eine eigentliche Konfliktursache ist im Jemen nicht auszumachen. Vielmehr müssen wir von einem Konfliktpluralismus ausgehen.
Die Schiitisierung der Huthis
Nicht nur die Rhetorik, auch die Ästhetik der Huthis wurde seither ihrem libanesischen Vorbild und den iranischen Revolutionsgarden nachempfunden. Dadurch wurden sie Teil einer schiitischen Allianz, die mit Iran und der Hizbullah in der Region einen wichtigen Machtfaktor darstellt. Diese Schiitisierung der zaiditischen Huthis zeigte sich auch auf anderen Ebenen. So führten sie die im Jemen zuvor grösstenteils unbekannten ʿAshura-Feierlichkeiten ein, die in der Zwölferschia eine wichtige Rolle spielen.
Sich als «Schiiten» zu begreifen, bedeutete für die Huthis somit, innerzaiditische Rivalitäten zu durchbrechen und einen Bezug zu einem übergeordneten, regionalen Konflikt herzustellen. Die Schiitisierung der Huthis wurde aber auch von deren Gegnern betrieben. So nutzte die jemenitische Regierung das internationale Feindbild Iran, um die Huthis zu delegitimieren, indem sie diese als Handlanger Teherans denunzierten. Dieses Vorgehen spielte auch für Saudi-Arabien zur Rechtfertigung des eigenen militärischen Vorgehens gegen die Huthis ab 2015 eine wichtige Rolle.
Die Frage nach der tatsächlichen iranischen Unterstützung für die Huthis wird unterschiedlich beantwortet. Am wahrscheinlichsten scheint heute, dass diese Hilfe zwar vorhanden war, aber erst im Verlauf des Krieges zu einem relevanten Faktor geworden ist.
Die Konfessionalisierung und ihre Grenzen
Auch wenn strategische Überlegungen sicher Teil des Prozesses waren, wäre es verfehlt, all diese Eigenschaften der Konfessionalisierung einer bewussten Strategie der beteiligten Akteure zuzuschreiben. Weder ist die Konfessionalisierung ein Produkt primordialer Identitäten noch ist sie rein instrumentalistisch erfolgt. Vielmehr integrierte dieser Prozess unterschiedliche Konfliktlinien und gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen. Die Bedeutung des zaiditischen Islams, die Vernachlässigung und Ausgrenzung der nördlich von Sanaa gelegenen Gebiete durch die Regierung, die Konfrontation mit verschiedenen im erweiterten Sinn islamistischen Strömungen und schliesslich die Integration in einen Konflikt zwischen regionalen Grossmächten – all das wird durch die Orientierung an den Kategorien Schia und Sunna erfasst.
Die fehlende Sunna
So wirkmächtig die konfessionelle Deutung des Konflikts auch sein mag, sind ihr doch auch Grenzen gesetzt. So sind die Huthis zwar stärkste Kraft im Norden, aber eben auch Teil einer Allianz – und dieser gehören wiederum auch Sunniten an. Die Huthis bezeichnen ihre Gegner denn auch nicht als «Sunniten», wie das bei einer kompletten Konfessionalisierung zu erwarten wäre. Wenn konfessionelle Bezüge hergestellt werden sollen, werden die Gegner als Terroristen oder Wahhabiten bezeichnet (in Anlehnung an die dominante Islam-Auslegung in Saudi-Arabien).
«Süden» als Zugehörigkeit
Auch der südliche Separatismus des STC hat eine Entwicklung durchgemacht, der an diejenige der Huthis erinnert.
Doch analog zu dem, was zu den Huthis gesagt wurde, sollte auch der STC nicht als reine Marionette emiratischer Politik gesehen werden.
Denn auch der STC verfügt über einen integrativen Aspekt. Die jemenitischen Gegner der Huthis sind zwar darin vereint, dass sie deren Machtzuwachs ablehnen, darüber hinaus finden sich aber sehr unterschiedliche Positionen. Da wären zunächst die verschiedenen Bezüge, die auf eine islamische Ordnung gemacht werden.
Der Begriff «Süden» dagegen verweist auf die fest verankerte Unterscheidung der beiden Landesteile inklusive der Selbstwahrnehmung, wonach der Süden der eigentliche Erbe des antikolonialen Kampfes sei. Zudem vermag der Begriff eine lokalen Streitigkeiten übergeordnete Einheit zu repräsentieren.
Machtteilung unausweichlich?
«Schia» und «Süden» sind also Zugehörigkeiten, die unterschiedliche Konfliktlinien zu integrieren vermögen. Sie bilden Grundlagen für Repräsentationsordnungen und dadurch für Patronage-Systeme. Ihre aktuelle Hegemonie erhalten sie dadurch, dass sie sich gegenwärtig zu ergänzen vermögen, da die von den Huthis kontrollierten Gebiete grob dem alten Nordjemen entsprechen.
Konfessionalisierung und südlicher Separatismus konvergieren in der faktischen Nord-Süd-Spaltung, was diese Grenze weiter stabilisieren wird. Das zeigt sich auch an Vorschlägen für künftige Friedensverhandlungen.
Damit zeigt sich eine Konsequenz der beschriebenen Zugehörigkeitsorientierungen: Die Akteure haben ein grosses Interesse daran, die geschaffenen Repräsentationsordnungen und Patronagesysteme aufrecht zu erhalten. Dadurch werden Friedensverhandlungen weniger zu Bemühungen, bestehende Konflikte aufzulösen, sondern tendieren dazu, eine Machtbalance zu schaffen. Die unterschiedlichen Akteure werden auf diese Weise eingebunden und können dadurch ihre errungene Position wahren. Aktuell scheint es wahrscheinlich, dass ein solches System über die Schaffung weitgehend autonomer Regionen erreicht werden könnte. Nur wenn das nicht gelingt, könnte eine tatsächliche Spaltung des Jemens in unabhängige Staaten zu einer Option werden – von Christian Wyler
https://www.journal21.ch/die-vielen-ausloeser-der-gewalt
Mein Kommentar: Die Houthis sind zaiditen, Zaiditen sind keine Schiiten! Und sie werden es auch nicht dadurch, dass die Huthis – in Anlehnung an Iran – äußere Formen von Iran übernehmen – Formen, die auch nicht typisch „schiitisch“ sind, sondern lediglich typisch für das politische System und die anti-westliche Ideologie, die der Iran propagiert.
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Yemen’s Response to COVID-19: Part I
In Yemen, local actors, governance mechanisms and communities are all shaped by strong cultural roots and regionally nuanced socio-political dynamics. These systems face increasingly extreme threats and pressures, nonetheless they form part of a social fabric which gives direction to a way of life alongside a cyclical, internalised system of conflict. If a nationwide ceasefire cannot be reached, these local actors (whom have led in upholding these systems and ways of living) are likely to be as deeply embedded in an effective response or solution to COVID-19 in Yemen as the many conflict actors themselves are.
This is the first in a three-part series commissioned by PSRP, co-authored by Raiman Al-Hamdani (Researcher at ARK Group and Yemen Polling Centre) and Robert Wilson (Research Analyst at PSRP).
Introduction
This first post starts the series by beginning to set out the possible challenges involved in garnering a response to COVID-19 in Yemen. Overall, the series attempts to examine the local realities necessarily involved in a potential response, by considering the contemporary and historical functions and capacities of local governance systems and the differing groups and sectors within Yemeni society living under them. If any response is to have a positive impact, by harnessing the varying capabilities of groups and sectors within Yemeni society, then understanding the reality of local power structures and the underlying culture of community subsistence is crucial. There is a potential for these systems and groups to support responses across Yemen; albeit possibly in vastly different ways.
After a number of years of state absence, complex networks of actors have formed differing governance systems across different local spaces and governorates. In adapting these local governance systems, actors have displayed a clear ability to navigate extremely complex conflict conditions, which necessarily involve shifting and non-linear political and security affiliations. Imbued within this are varying contested political claims around these differing modalities of governance.
The first part of this series examines these governance systems and sets out the realities of how different areas throughout Yemen function, due to differing systems of authority and subsistence across areas with varying geographies and political-military agendas. This post goes on to focus on how governance systems impact everyday conditions for communities living in these different areas, and the implications this has for a collective response to COVID-19. The authors conclude that engaging with these powerful local networks, recognising local governance systems and understanding their differing functions (particularly in the places where they appear to be most effective) is likely to be central in navigating the circulation of resources to counter COVID-19.
Governance Systems
It seems part of building towards a more developed collective response in Yemen will involve information or resource sharing across governorate boundaries. As of March 2020, Yemen was reported to be divided across three substantively competing political-military entities: the Houthis; the southern separatist group known as the Southern Transitional Council (STC); and the internationally recognised Government. Building on this, as of July 2020 the International Crisis Group report has found Yemen to be divided into five areas based on territories of political-military control.
Southern Transitional Council (STC) Controlled Areas
Shortly after their takeover of Aden at the end of April 2020, the STC announced that it was following its historical approach as a first responder to other humanitarian crises such as dengue fever and malaria. Their newfound position of governance involved claims of harnessing vital health resources and already limited testing capacities. Eventually the STC closed several main hospitals in Aden, with the Government maintaining control of a few hospitals in the city of Aden itself.
The group presented the closures as a coping mechanism to halt the risk of transmissions from admitting new COVID-19 cases to already strained hospitals. What is clear, however, is because Government controlled hospitals remained in Aden after the STC takeover, control of these hospitals and private health facilities have been points of tension as cases have increased. Even with a growing discontent among the population over the STC’s ability to manage the COVID-19 crisis, on 13 June 2020,armed groups affiliated with the STC seized a convoy leaving Aden port carrying 64 billion riyals, printed for the Government controlled central bank. It was claimed that this act revolved around the need to seize public resources and counter Government corruption.
In both pro-government and STC held areas which neighbour one another, competing governance narratives are intertwined with complex and non-static inter-group dynamics among the local groups whom provide security.
Government Aligned Areas
In less stable areas in the south, Government services have been limited. In Aden, the STC stronghold, the Government have so far converted a cancer treatment centre into a COVID-19 hospital, which is now run by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). The other main southern Government administered hospital is al-Jamhouria, however both are struggling to facilitate the needs of the growing population in Aden governorate which was a challenge even prior to COVID-19.
Up until July 2020, in more stable Government aligned governorates like Marib, authorities have upheld a system of curfew in the city of Marib and continued with community education programmes about COVID-19. As an increasing number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) arrive in the area, health services and officials have stated that they have largely borne the cost of health equipment by self-financing, using their annual governorate budget. Much of the functionality in Marib so far described, does however hinge on networks of trust and informal alliances between groups who shore up a level of function and control.
Houthi Controlled Areas
The Houthis recent ground gains in part account for their handling of COVID-19 in their areas of governance. In creating reported conditions of fear and misinformation around the arrival of the virus, it has been claimed that the Houthis have attempted to censor and intimidate people, including medical workers carrying out their work and the reporting new cases. This is in line with the governance style the Houthis have practiced throughout the conflict, with ongoing accusations of human rights abuses committed by the group. The arrival of COVID-19 creates the opportunity to seize on the uncertainty created by the virus for military and political gain. It has been reported that local health officials and international aid officials have been told not to discuss cases, with rhetoric of the Houthis requiring uninterrupted momentum on the frontlines increasingly being tied to fighters defecting due to mounting public fear of COVID-19. Much of this has been driven by the Houthis public claims that being on the front lines is safer than living in close-knit community spaces.
Furthermore, it seems clear that in some areas, with the freedom to operate more autonomously and with resources at their disposal, local authorities have been capable of providing function, structure, and sub-economies in community spaces.
Local Authorities
In the southern governorate of Hadramawt, even where there is a stronger pro-government security presence, the lack of a central authority providing services and only collecting revenues has led to push back from local governorate leaders.
https://www.politicalsettlements.org/2020/07/27/yemens-response-to-covid-19-part-i/
Yemen’s Response to COVID-19: Part II
In Yemen, local actors, governance mechanisms and communities are all shaped by strong cultural roots and regionally nuanced socio-political dynamics. These systems face increasingly extreme threats and pressures, nonetheless they form part of a social fabric which gives direction to a way of life alongside a cyclical, internalised system of conflict. If a nationwide ceasefire cannot be reached, these local actors (whom have led in upholding these systems and ways of living) are likely to be as deeply embedded in an effective response or solution to COVID-19 in Yemen as the many conflict actors themselves are.
This three-part series commissioned by PSRP is co-authored by Raiman Al-Hamdani (Researcher at ARK Group and Yemen Polling Centre) and Robert Wilson (Research Analyst at PSRP). Read Part I here.
This second part of the series looks to examine the ways that communities have dealt with a number of health crises prior to the arrival of COVID-19. It considers the current condition and development of Yemen’s health system. Further, it also considers the potential role of tribes as influential local actors whom have a history of supporting communities. It considers the possibility of tribes guiding community responses to COVID-19.
History of Community and Responses to Health Crises in Yemen
Prior to COVID-19, Yemen’s health systems and humanitarian programmes had been overwhelmed. Throughout the current conflict, the country has endured a resurgence of epidemics, including what was described as the world’s worst cholera outbreak in recorded history, in May 2017. Then, in December 2017, a diphtheria outbreak affected 18 of the 22 governorates. More recently, in May 2020, the city of Aden experienced a combination of diseases, including pneumonic plague, dengue fever, malaria and COVID-19, killing nearly one thousand civilians. Added to this are the narratives provided by conflict actors, circulating misinformation about the arrival of disease, which include the Houthis tying COVID-19 to foreign conspiracies, claiming that a cure will come under their rule. Despite this, it has been observed that Yemeni people remain trustful of health systems and experts [1].
Even around the onset of the most recent conflict in 2015, doctors in the country often lacked the resources to perform other fundamental procedures, such as caesarian sections. As the burden on infrastructure and facilities grew, the nexus between health systems and community networks seemed increasingly clear; an overall response was not dichotomous, as communities attempted to accommodate local and international efforts.
The Yemen Community Engagement Working Group (CEWG), comprising of international and national NGOs, was conceived in late 2015 as a facilitation mechanism in engaging community networks and focusing the humanitarian response to the conflict. It was recognised by CEWG that there was a need to align the various communications and engagements with the experiences and capacities of differently affected populations in Yemen.
The CEWG’s 2016 report set out the reality of community diversity in shaping humanitarian responses to varying cycles of crises. It highlighted a need to fully engage communities and integrate them as a tangible part of adaptive responses. It suggests that there is a clear connection between the efficacy of the wider humanitarian response and the agency of communities. Therefore, improving processes of community engagement through communication and information sharing may assist differing humanitarian responses in being more effective in adapting to a variety of challenges in Yemen.
This historical context explains a clearly engrained tradition of power in the expression of Yemeni communities, as well as an ability to adapt and develop systems of subsistence moving forward through a series of contemporary crises. This ability has involved navigating substantial health challenges over recent years, and contributing to a response.
Current Medical Community
The medical community in Yemen continues to experience similar pressures compared to those faced by Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), yet displays a clear capacity and resilience in navigating increasingly challenging conditions. In addition to the issues around seeking medical training abroad so far set out, in 2015 with the onset of conflict, more Yemeni doctors left the country seeking safety. Many of those remaining now fear for their safety due to the arrival of COVID-19 and a lack of resources and personal protective equipment. Throughout the conflict, others have left in search of a better life, as invariably their salaries have consistently gone unpaid at home, with doubts over whether any salaries have been paid at all.
Moreover, the lack of protective equipment has seen a sharp rise in Yemeni doctors’ deaths in both the north and the south. The medical community, which includes nurses, caretakers, and volunteers have been demonstrating resilience in making use of whatever limited resources they have.
Tribes
Yemeni tribes have shown themselves to be rational, fluid and heterogeneous structures, and at times, fully capable of enacting the traditional functions of the state through justice and security provision. This section provides a glimpse into how their influence can be leveraged, based on political associations, geographies, and their respective credibility. These factors allow tribes to facilitate ceasefires and ask for populations to stay at home, thus securing compliance.
Throughout Yemen, local governments and tribal figures have met consistently to try and plan security responses, and more recently, COVID-19 responses. Nevertheless, tribes in Yemen face a multitude of threats from varying sides, from extremist groups to being drawn into direct conflict with other tribes.
https://www.politicalsettlements.org/2020/07/29/yemens-response-to-covid-19-part-ii/
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A 'floating bomb' off Yemen’s coast could dwarf the Exxon Valdez disaster
A major environmental, humanitarian and economic disaster lies in wait in the Red Sea - and there's only a tiny window of opportunity to prevent it.
A neglected vessel, the FSO SAFER, is anchored within five miles of Hudaidah, an important Yemeni port on the country’s Red Sea coast. Moored there since 1988, this Yemeni state-owned tanker, which the Houthis took control of in March 2015, is decaying. The ship has received no maintenance for more than five years.
Described as a “floating bomb”, the 1,188-foot FSO SAFER has approximately 1.14 million barrels of crude oil that risk spilling. To provide some perspective, that is four times as much oil as the Exxon Valdez tanker spilled in Alaska’s Prince William Sound region back in 1989. That disaster from 31 years ago, which resulted in over 1,300 miles of shoreline being damaged, continues causing ecological harm to this day.
So, regarding the FSO SAFER, the stakes are, to say the least, extremely high.
Such an environmental disaster would result in the Red Sea’s ports and shipping lanes closing. For the millions of Yemenis who depend on international aid, which can only be delivered via Yemeni ports, such a catastrophe could produce unimaginably disastrous consequences.
But Yemenis are not the only people who would suffer from this potential catastrophe. Given how many desalination plants exist on both the Arabian and African sides of the Red Sea, the FSO SAFER’s current condition poses a grave danger to numerous countries.
There is no easy or simple way to resolve this crisis in the making, although doing so is absolutely vital. Under ideal circumstances, inspectors from the UN could appraise the FSO SAFER’s condition so a salvage team could offload its oil to other vessels before bringing the vessel to a port to be inspected and scrapped.
The realities of Yemen’s war between Houthis on one side and forces loyal to the Saudi-backed government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and the Riyadh-led Arab coalition on the other make this process dangerous. The continuation of this war makes it increasingly risky for a salvage team to do the job which is necessary to prevent such an oil spill. After all, this vessel is situated in an extremely militarised body of water.
While lacking an agreement on how to deal with this looming crisis, the different sides in Yemen are playing the blame game. Saudi media is busy accusing the Houthis of having “actively prevented international engineers from boarding FSO SAFER to carry out essential repairs.”
Various reports allege that the Houthis are exploiting the “floating bomb” for political purposes, using the vessel as a “bargaining chip” to gain control of the oil on board (worth roughly USD 40 million—down from USD 80 million before oil prices collapsed earlier this year) to finance salaries of employees within the de facto Houthi proto-state. The Hadi government’s position is that the oil proceeds should be invested in projects across Yemen to help the country better cope with humanitarian emergencies.
Hussain Al Bukhaiti, a 'pro-Houthi' journalist, recently said that blame for the FSO SAFER not being maintained belongs on the Saudi-led coalition’s doorstep. Prior to March 2015, regular maintenance was done on the vessel. Thus, he argues that the Saudi military intervention in Yemen has led to the FSO SAFER’s decaying. The Houthis have also been dissatisfied with the company which the UN has tried to use to inspect the vessel.
Recently, the Houthis agreed to allow the UN permission to access the ship. Yet it is unclear what will happen, or when, as on several past occasions the UN has been granted authority, only to have that permission denied later on technical grounds. Put simply, the possibility of an explosion is growing as more time passes without anything being done.
Ultimately, the UN has failed the Yemenis since 2015 – by Giorgio Cafiero
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Regionalmacht Vereinigte Arabische Emirate
Abu Dhabi tritt aus dem Schatten Saudi-Arabiens
Seit dem Arabischen Frühling 2011 verfolgen die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate (VAE) eine zunehmend aktive Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und sind eine wichtige Regionalmacht geworden. Gemeinsam mit Saudi-Arabien intervenierten sie im März 2011 in Bahrain, als das dortige Regime der Herrscherfamilie Khalifa befürchtete, dass ihm von einer schiitischen Protestbewegung Gefahr drohen könnte. Im Juli 2013 unterstützten die Emirate – wiederum im Verein mit Riad – den Staatsstreich des ägyptischen Militärs unter der Führung von General Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi. Im Frühjahr 2015 begann der Krieg Saudi-Arabiens und der VAE gegen die Huthi-Rebellen im Jemen, gefolgt von der Blockade Katars, die die beiden Nachbarn im Juni 2017 verhängten. Außerdem intervenierten die Emirate im Konflikt in Libyen auf der Seite von General Khalifa Haftar, der seit 2014 versucht, das Land unter seiner Herrschaft zu vereinen. Seit 2017 profitieren die Emirate davon, dass sie sehr gute Beziehungen zur Trump-Administration unterhalten, die die Regionalpolitik der emiratischen Führung entschlossen unterstützt und wie sie eine aggressive antiiranische Linie verfolgt. Erst Mitte 2019 zeigte sich ein Dissens, als die Emirate gegenüber dem Iran auf eine vorsichtigere Politik setzten.
All diese Ereignisse demonstrieren, dass die VAE nicht mehr der Juniorpartner Saudi-Arabiens sind, als der sie bis 2011 und teils darüber hinaus galten. Seither häufen sich vielmehr die Berichte, dass gemeinsame außenpolitische Projekte der beiden Partner (wie beispielsweise der Jemen-Krieg und die Blockade Katars) auf die Initiative Abu Dhabis zurückgehen. Es wird immer deutlicher, dass die Emirate im Nahen Osten längst nicht mehr der zweitrangige Akteur sind, der nicht mit den regionalen Schwergewichten Ägypten, Türkei oder Iran konkurrieren kann. Vielmehr nimmt das Land heute weit jenseits seiner eigenen Grenzen Einfluss und hat zuletzt durch seinen Teilabzug aus dem Jemen im Jahr 2019 gezeigt, dass es in der Lage ist, auch gegenüber Saudi-Arabien einen unabhängigen Kurs zu verfolgen.
Aus diesen Beobachtungen ergibt sich jedoch die Frage nach den Grundlinien und Prioritäten der emiratischen Außenpolitik. Folgen die vielfältigen Aktivitäten der VAE gegenüber Katar, im Jemen, in Ägypten, Libyen und im Konflikt mit dem Iran einer Strategie oder sind es lediglich mehr oder weniger opportunistische Reaktionen auf die Krise der arabischen Welt seit 2011? Die in dieser Studie vertretene These ist, dass die neue Regionalpolitik der Emirate trotz vieler reaktiver Elemente von drei deutlich erkennbaren Leitlinien geprägt ist:
Erstens bekämpfen die VAE die Islamisten in der Region, weil sie in der Muslimbruderschaft, der größten und wichtigsten Bewegung des politischen Islam in der arabischen Welt, eine ernsthafte Bedrohung für die Regimestabilität im eigenen Land ausgemacht haben. Die Führung in Abu Dhabi ist überzeugt, dass die transnationale Struktur der Islamistengruppe gefährlich ist. Denn wenn diese in Ländern wie in Ägypten die Macht erringe, werde sie versuchen, ihre Anhänger in den Golfstaaten und vor allem in den VAE gegen ihre Regierungen zu mobilisieren. Deshalb stützt die emiratische Führung autoritäre Regierungen oder Militärs in Ägypten, Libyen und – allerdings in geringerem Maße – Sudan.
Zweitens richtet sich die neue emiratische Regionalpolitik gegen die iranische Expansion im Nahen Osten. Seit 2015, als die VAE und Saudi-Arabien einen Krieg gegen die lose mit dem Iran verbündeten Huthi-Rebellen begannen, ist der Jemen aus Sicht Abu Dhabis der wichtigste Schauplatz dieses Konflikts. Die antiiranische Dimension der emiratischen Außenpolitik ist aber deutlich schwächer ausgeprägt als die Abneigung gegenüber den Islamisten.
Drittens ist Abu Dhabi an der Kontrolle der Seewege vom Golf von Aden in das Rote Meer gelegen. Zu diesem Zweck haben die VAE seit 2015 mehrere jemenitische Häfen und Inseln übernommen und Basen in Assab in Eritrea und Berbera in Somaliland eingerichtet. Auf diese Weise haben sie ein kleines Seereich rund um den Golf von Oman gegründet und sich als eine Regionalmacht im Südwesten der arabischen Halbinsel und am Horn von Afrika etabliert.
Die Prioritäten der Führung in Abu Dhabi zeigten sich in aller Deutlichkeit im Juli 2019, als die VAE einen Großteil ihrer Truppen aus dem Jemen abzogen und die meisten Positionen lokalen Verbündeten überließen. Ein wichtiger Grund für diesen Schritt dürfte gewesen sein, dass die VAE eine weitere Eskalation des Konflikts mit dem Iran fürchteten. Im Mai und Juni hatten die Iraner – teilweise nahe der emiratischen Küste – Öltanker sabotiert bzw. entführt und den Emiraten so ihre Verwundbarkeit vor Augen geführt. Darauf folgte eine vorsichtige Entspannung des Verhältnisses mit dem Iran, während der Kampf gegen die Islamisten und ihre Unterstützer in der Region unvermindert fortgesetzt wurde – von Guido Steinberg
https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/regionalmacht-vereinigte-arabische-emirate/#hd-d39849e284
and
(** B P)
The features of the UAE’s new governance model
The new model adopted by the UAE in its domestic and foreign policies is becoming clearer, and the understanding of its main features and disadvantages is growing. This month, two reports on UAE foreign policy were issued by Britain’s Chatham House and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs which make interesting reading.
Both studies conveyed the same message: the UAE’s policy has changed, particularly since the Arab Spring. It no longer adopts the traditional policy for which the Emirates was known during the rule of Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan, who sought consensus and built frameworks for joint Arab and Gulf development. The current UAE policy, which is driven by the de facto ruler of the country, Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed, is very different and has had an impact across the Arab world. It requires us to focus on it, understand it and rationalise Western dealings with it, as old perceptions are no longer valid.
The report by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, written by researcher Guido Steinberg, states that it was Bin Zayed who persuaded the Saudi leadership in 2015 to get involved in the Yemen war. Both studies indicate the great influence that he has over his Saudi counterpart, Mohammad Bin Salman, and the close relationship that binds them, noting that the latter considers Bin Zayed a role model and teacher.
Both studies show that Mohammed Bin Zayed’s political vision is based on his animosity towards Iran — which has occupied Emirati islands since the 1970s and has increasingly spread its influence in the region — and the Muslim Brotherhood, especially since the Arab Spring. The German Institute says that Bin Zayed’s hostility towards the Brotherhood is the main driving force behind his foreign policies and exceeds his hostility towards Iran. The root of this is the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince’s fear of political opposition and the fact that the Islah group, which is linked intellectually to the Brotherhood, is the largest political opposition movement in the UAE. Hence, he has focused on suppressing the group and outlawing it after the Arab Spring; he continues to oppress liberal activists as well.
The problem is not the Muslim Brotherhood itself, but Bin Zayed’s objection to political opposition per se, and his fear that the regime will be changed. As such, he insists on portraying all branches of the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorists, even if they are not violent. He also portrays them as non-national groups, suggesting that their loyalty lies with the mother movement in Egypt and not to their own countries. The Crown Prince fights the group across the whole region, even if this exposes him to political losses, as happened in Yemen, where the study says that the Houthis succeeded in controlling Sanaa because the Arab coalition did not stand strongly against their encroachment on the capital in the hope that the Yemeni Brotherhood would be drawn into a violent confrontation. This did not happen, however, and Sanaa fell into the hands of the Houthis, after which Saudi Arabia allied itself on occasions with the Yemeni Brotherhood, while the UAE remained hostile to the movement. Hostility towards the Muslim Brotherhood as well as political opposition, and working to spread dictatorships and autocracies since the Arab Spring, seem to be the most important focuses for UAE foreign policy today.
The UAE’s animosity towards Iran appears to be more complicated, due to the direct threat that it may pose to the Emirates, which also fears that it will suffer heavy material losses in the event of a military confrontation between the US and Iran and its regional allies.
According to the German Institute study, “The UAE is also important to the current US administration because it has the least problems with Jared Kushner’s plans for peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Bin Zayed would probably also accept a solution that is largely in line with the Israeli government’s ideas.” – by Alaa Bayoumi
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200730-the-features-of-the-uaes-new-governance-model/
My remark: The Chathan study here: https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/risk-in-uae-salisbury. Another important report here: http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/reflections-on-mohammed-bin-zayeds-preferences-regarding-uae-foreign-policy/.
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
Siehe / Look at cp1
(A H)
15 new cases of coronavirus reported, 1,726 in total
http://en.adenpress.news/news/23707
(A H)
8 new cases of coronavirus reported, 1,711 in total
http://en.adenpress.news/news/23697
(B H)
Im Kriegsgebiet an der Covid-Front: Wie ein Tiroler im Jemen half
Daniel Walder war für „Ärzte ohne Grenzen“ für sieben Wochen im Bürgerkriegsland und kämpfte unermüdlich gegen das Virus (Zahlschranke)
(B H)
GOING DOOR TO DOOR TO PROTECT YEMEN'S CHILDREN
Every day, Saba travels into the countryside on foot, going door-to-door to bring urgently needed health care to children and families cut off from vital services after more than five years of brutal civil war. She screens children for malnutrition and refers them for treatment, and conducts socially distant COVID-19 awareness sessions, teaching families proper handwashing and hygiene techniques.
"My duty requires me to educate my community on how to follow the basic precautions to avoid being infected by the coronavirus," she says proudly. "I feel there is positive feedback because I serve my country and society."
"People are frightened about the virus. Everyone around the world is scared," says Saba.
https://www.unicef.ca/en/blog/COVID19/going-door-door-protect-yemens-children
Film. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4AlIaRS1Mg
(A H)
12 new Covid-19 cases reported in Yemen, all in Hadramout
https://debriefer.net/en/news-18799.html
(* B H)
COVID-19 in Fragile Contexts: Reaching Breaking Point
Virtually no country has been spared by the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, but some of them – including many fragile and conflict-affected - are hit particularly hard.
In a country like Yemen, a widespread outbreak of COVID-19 on the scale seen in countries in East Asia, Europe, or the United States would be catastrophic for people already living through the worst man-made humanitarian crisis in the world.
https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/covid19-fragile-contexts
cp2 Allgemein / General
(* A K P)
Interactive Map of Yemen War
(* A K)
MILITARY SITUATION IN YEMEN ON JULY 29, 2020 (MAP UPDATE)
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-july-29-2020-map-update/
(* B K P)
Film: Stop the War on Yemen - Stop Arming Saudi
The [UK] government's decision at the start of July to resume arm sales to Saudi Arabia is nothing short of horrifying. Against all the evidence of war crimes by the Saudi-led coalition, a Court of Appeal ruling and a global pandemic which is taking hold in Yemen, the Tories see fit to continue allowing the sales of billions of pounds worth of arms to one of the most autocratic regimes on earth. The decision completely and utterly exposes the hypocrisy at the heart of Britain's foreign policy. We're going to be joined by Jeremy Corbyn MP, Iesa Ali (#MarchForYemen), Steve Bell (Stop the War Officer) and Amina Atiq (Yemeni-Scouse Activist) to discuss what the next steps are for the campaign to end the arming of Saudi Arabia and the brutal war on Yemen.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GVomJqnwB88
(B P)
Strong statement by @salam_alhajj @abducteesmother today to #UNSC special meeting with #WASL peacebuilders stating their incredible work releasing 944 detainees and their feeling let down by UN led peace process for excluding them
https://twitter.com/munaluqman/status/1288885883337347074
(* B K P)
Libya: Deja vu of Yemen?
In 2015, the Saudi regime created an alliance of mercenary nations to wage war on Iran. Where? In Yemen. Iran did not and does not have a military presence in Yemen, therefore, the Saudi alliance faced the Yemenis in Yemen. Out of the nine members of the alliance, only two remain active: The regimes of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). That is unless, of course, we include their arms suppliers, the United States, Britain and France, who continue to make financial gains from the Yemeni crisis, the most recent being the British arms sale to Saudi Arabia, which has demonstrably used those and other Western weapons in the genocide in Yemen.
The Saudi-UAE alliance’s war on Yemen with more than 20,000 airstrikes and the blockade, now continuing into its sixth year, has resulted in the killing of tens of thousands, death by starvation of 85,000 children and destruction of the country’s medical institutions, food storage, schools and transportation system.
Supporting secession threatens to split the nation of 30 million into never-ending warring mini-states. The creation and arming of militias across the southern region of the country and bringing in of foreign mercenaries to the country have wreaked havoc.
The total occupation and control by the Saudis and UAE of Yemen’s southern ports and islands has eliminated the political role of the internationally recognized Yemeni government, whose restoration had, until recently, been the pretext used by the Saudi coalition’s military intervention. These moves have resulted in the displacement, internally and externally, of millions of Yemenis, leaving most of them destitute.
Meanwhile, Iran stands across the Gulf waters. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE – whose mantra is to fight Iran – are able to fire a single shot in its direction, fearing Tehran's retaliation, which they know will be swift, destructive and decisive.
In Libya, Abdel Fatteh el-Sissi threatens the same predicament, funded by the Saudis and the UAE, the financiers of every regional political upheaval, from Oman to Morocco and every country in between.
Like in Yemen, Libya will see another Arab military intervention that results in the death and destruction of Arab lives and livelihoods.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/libya-deja-vu-of-yemen
My comment: from Turkey while Turkey itself intervents in both countries.
(B K P)
Neue Allianzen im Süd-Jemen
In New York wurde am Dienstag der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen zur Lage im Jemen gebrieft: Nie sei es schlechter gewesen als jetzt, sagte der Uno-Sondergesandte Martin Griffiths. Eine Einigung mit den Huthi-Milizen, die große Teile des Nord-Jemen kontrollieren, sei nicht in Sicht. Insgesamt 43 Fronten habe man gezählt, im Januar waren es noch 33.
So scheint es ein kleiner Lichtblick zu sein, dass die Regierung des Landes und eine Organisation namens »Südlicher Übergangsrat« (STC) kurz nach der Sicherheitsratssitzung bekanntgaben, man habe sich auf eine gemeinsame Regierungsbildung geeinigt.
https://www.neues-deutschland.de/artikel/1139833.neue-allianzen-im-sued-jemen.html
(B P)
Peace at Last for Yemen?
Ending Yemen's bloody civil war is critical first and foremost for the country's long-suffering people. But a peace deal would also serve as a confidence-building step toward stability in the Middle East, and would send a positive signal at a time of increasing international friction and polarization.
The long-running conflict in Yemen is riper for resolution than ever before. Yemenis on all sides are exhausted by the fighting and were quick to embrace the appeal issued in March by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres for a global ceasefire amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The following month, the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen announced a two-week unilateral ceasefire, which it subsequently extended.
Iran, which supports the rebel Houthi movement (formally known as Ansar Allah, or Supporters of God), has no strategic reason to stand in the way of an agreement. Critically, although international powers including the United States, Russia, China, India, and leading European states are struggling to cooperate over Yemen, they are unlikely to obstruct progress toward ending the fighting.
From the Kremlin to Whitehall to the White House, the desirability of ending the suffering in Yemen is widely recognized. Our countries have nothing to gain from the civil war continuing.
My comment: This really is worthless US twisted BS, deflecting from what really matters.
(* B P)
Audio: Jemen: "Es wird eine diplomatische Lösung geben müssen"
Alle Beteiligten seien der Überzeugung, den Krieg im Jemen militärisch gewinnen zu können, sagt Jemen-Experte Achim Vogt. Das werde jedoch nicht funktionieren. Um eine diplomatische Lösung zu finden, komme es jetzt auf alle Parteien an.
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US informs Security Council of detention of Iranian ship off Yemen coast
The US has formally notified the United Nations Security Council on Tuesday of the detention of an Iranian arms ship off the Yemeni coast.
“I would like to draw the council’s attention to the events of 28 June, when US and partner forces intercepted a ship off the coast of Yemen that contained Iranian weapons destined for the Houthi group,” expressed US Representative Kelly Craft at a special session on Yemen at the Security Council.
“The ship’s illicit cargo included 200 RPGs, more than 1700 AK rifles, 21 surface-to-air missiles, assault missiles, anti-tank missiles and other advanced weapons,” Craft added, without further clarifying the ship’s fate.
The US official noted that Yemen: “Does not need more weapons, and Iran must stop its efforts to arm the Houthis, because this only prolongs the conflict.”
In her testimony, Craft called on the Yemeni government and the Houthi group to: “Reduce tension on the ground and return to the commitment to a political settlement mediated by the United Nations.”
My comment: Once again, the US brings up such stories to justify their claim and propaganda campaign for the UN to prolong an anti-Iranian arms embargo.
(* B K P)
Yemen: A Slow-Motion War
Saudi Arabia, the UAE (United Arab Emirates), the STC (South Transitional Council) and the Yemen government have resolved their differences. The main problem was the STC effort to once more divide Yemen into two Yemens. The STC had a point as “two Yemens” was the norm for most of the last few centuries.
The main supporters of the last (2012) elected and current Yemen government are Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Together these two dominate Arabia and the Persian Gulf oil market. Yet there are differences. The UAE is less dependent on oil and was always more of a trading nation. Actually, the UAE is a coalition of smaller trading states, some with little or no oil. The Saudi are more inward looking as they have a lot more oil and administer the two most holy Islamic shrines. This confers enormous prestige, along with considerable wealth from millions of pilgrims a year. The pilgrim income was even more important before oil income became the main source of wealth after World War II.
These differences mean the UAE could get along with two Yemens while the Saudis cannot.
https://www.strategypage.com/qnd/yemen/articles/20200729.aspx
My comment: An overviews by a somewhat strange US website, mixing a viewpoint which is strait anti-Iranian, anti-Houthi, sometimes close to conspiracy theories. Editor in chief: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Dunnigan. Senor editor: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Nofi.
(* B H K P)
Yemen: A Torrent of Suffering in a Time of Siege
Cataclysmic conditions afflict Yemen as people try to cope with rampant diseases, the spread of COVID-19, flooding, literal swarms of locusts, rising displacement, destroyed infrastructure, and a collapsed economy. Yet the war rages, bombs continue to fall, and desperation fuels more crimes.
The highest-paying jobs available to many Yemeni boys and men require a willingness to kill and maim one another, by joining militias or armed groups which seemingly never run out of weapons. Nor does the Saudi-Led Coalition, which kills and maims civilians; instead, it deters relief shipments, and destroys crucial relief infrastructure with weapons it imports from Western countries.
The aerial attacks displace traumatized survivors into swelling, often lethal refugee camps. Amid the wreckage of factories, fisheries, roads, sewage and sanitation facilities, schools, and hospitals, Yemenis search in vain for employment and, increasingly, for food and water. The Saudi-Led Coalition’s blockade, also enabled by Western training and weapons, makes it impossible for Yemenis to restore a functioning economy.
Even foreign aid can become punitive. In March 2020, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) decided to suspend most aid for Yemenis living in areas controlled by the Houthis.
Scott Paul, who leads Oxfam America’s humanitarian policy advocacy, strongly criticized this callous decision to compound the misery imposed on vulnerable people in Yemen. “In future years,” he wrote, “scholars will study USAID’s suspension as a paradigmatic example of a donor’s exploitation and misuse of humanitarian principles.”
As the evil-doing in Yemen comes “like falling rain,” so do the cries of “Stop!” from millions of people all over the world. Here’s some of what’s been happening:
On top of all this, reports produced by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, the Norwegian Refugee Council, and the International Commission of the Red Cross repeatedly expose the Saudi-Led Coalition’s human rights violations.
Yet this international outcry clamoring for an end to the war is still being drowned out by the voices of major military contractors with well-paid lobbyists plying powerful elites in Western governments. Their concern is simply for the profits to be reaped and the competitive sales to be scored – by Kathy Kelly
https://progressive.org/dispatches/yemen-torrent-of-suffering-in-time-of-siege-kelly-200729/ = https://www.eurasiareview.com/30072020-yemen-suffering-of-the-innocent-continues-to-mount-oped/ = http://warisacrime.org/2020/07/29/yemen-a-torrent-of-suffering-in-a-time-of-siege-kathy-kelly/
(* B K P)
David Jamieson: As Covid-19 heaps more dead in Yemen, its time for the UK to stop aiding carnage
The frantic pleas of the charity sector speak directly to the appalling contradictions at the hear of the world order. So desperate has the situation become in the country, supposedly impartial humanitarian institutions have largely abandoned criticism of the Saudi-led and US and UK-backed attacks on the countries heavily urbanised areas.
On the same day the coalition was condemned for another war crime – the killing of 13 civilians in northern Yemen, including four children – UN secretary-general António Guterres removed it from a blacklist of state and non-state actors, specifically established to shame forces killing children. The widely understood reason? To encourage Saudi Arabia to continue sending aid to the country it is mauling.
As Yemeni anti-war campaigner Jehan Hakim put it: “The same hand we’re asking to feed Yemen is the same hand that is helping bomb them.”
Let’s be clear about the degree of Western complicity; the UK is supplying far more than arms (many from Scottish factories) and diplomatic cover to the Saudi regime. It has sent its own military specialists from the Army and RAF to actually target the air-to-ground bombing attacks.
When you make the gun, put the bullet in the chamber, then point the barrel while another man pulls the trigger, who is responsible for the shooting? By any reasonable definition the UK is at war with the people of Yemen, where the killing is next to indiscriminate.
Writing for the Telegraph in an article that does at least call for an end to the conflict and mention the UK’s role in arming the slaughter, Save the Children chief executive Steven Jenkins said: “The UK already deserves credit for bucking the trend of declining international donations and delivering £160m for the Yemen response. We now need diplomatic heft to persuade Gulf donors and others who have cut humanitarian aid to step up to the plate.”
The thrust of his argument is that the UK state and the Gulf coalition partners should dole out more rice and bandages as they bomb. It is the miserable lot of the NGO to beg the warmongers for the cash to heal a fraction of the wounds they are inflicting.
The West is determined to protect Saudi Arabia as a key ally in a region whose resources and strategic position is only going to become more contested, both by foreign competitors and domestic demands for democracy and justice, in the coming century.
But beyond all the callous strategising is a human catastrophe and a moral collapse that will be remembered, and produce consequences, for generations to come. The UK’s continued involvement is indefensible. The claims to be fighting a just war ring as hollow in Yemen as they do any other recent foreign policy mess; or at least they would if they rang-out in our official political discussion at all.
and
(* B H P)
The lives of children in Yemen matter too; the war must end now
As a mother myself, it pains me to think that the children of Yemen are suffering on an unprecedented scale without access to life-saving aid or medical facilities. It was reported that Mark Lowcock, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, told the Security Council on 24 June that Covid-19 was spreading rapidly across Yemen and that 25 per cent of the confirmed cases have been fatal, about “five times the global average.” This is extremely concerning and should be treated as a matter of urgency by those in power around the world who need to act now and speak out against the war.
However, Britain has recently resumed arms sales to Saudi Arabia, claiming that the human rights and other violations arising from Riyadh’s contempt for the terms and conditions of the deal were “isolated incidents”. The concern is that the resumption of arm sales will exacerbate the situation.
The international community has a duty to speak out against injustice, and to provide humanitarian aid for those in need in Yemen as the crisis continues to get worse.
“If we do not receive urgent funding,” explained Sara Beysolow Nyanti, UNICEF Representative to Yemen, “children will be pushed to the brink of starvation and many will die. The international community will be sending a message that the lives of children in a nation devastated by conflict, disease and economic collapse, simply do not matter.”
Despite this clear warning, the level of humanitarian aid going into Yemen remains the same, and the world remains silent as more children die in this brutal war. Saudi Arabia and its allies have to put political ambitions aside and end the war now. The lives of the children in Yemen do matter; they must be allowed to have the childhood that they deserve.
(* A K P)
RT: Entire battalion defects from Hadi's forces to Houthis
The Russian state-run television network RT quoted a Houthi official as saying that an entire battalion has defected from the President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi's armed forces to the Iran-backed Houthi putschist militia and returned to Sana'a.
The member of the Houthis' political bureau, Mohammed Al-Bukaiti wrote on Twitter that "an entire battalion along with its commander returned home" without providing further information or giving any names.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/23677
(* A P)
U.N. still waiting for Houthi approval to visit decaying oil tanker off Yemen
The United Nations said on Tuesday it was still waiting for Yemen’s Houthi group to authorize deployment of an assessment team to a decaying oil tanker that is threatening to spill 1.1 million barrels of crude oil off the war-torn country’s coast.
U.N. Yemen mediator Martin Griffiths told the 15-member council on Tuesday: “We are still awaiting the permissions necessary for this team to deploy.”
The Safer tanker has been stranded off Yemen’s Red Sea oil terminal of Ras Issa for more than five years. Earlier this month the Security Council called on the Houthis to facilitate unconditional U.N. access to the tanker as soon as possible.
Lowcock earlier this month said a U.N. team could deploy within three weeks of receiving all necessary permits.
“An independent and expert driven assessment is critical ... to allowing us to fully understand the scope, the size, the threat of this issue and the possible solutions to it,” Griffiths said on Tuesday.
(A P)
2 prisoners liberated in exchange deal in Marib front
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3104104.htm
(A E K P)
Al-Houthi Accuses Saudi-led Aggression of Plundering Yemen’s Oil Wealth, Destroying Its Capabilities
Member of the Supreme Political Council Mohammed Ali al-Houthi has accused the Saudi-led aggression and its mercenaries of destroying Yemen’s oil resources and plundering its wealth in a “frightening and deplorable” manner.
“The destruction made by Saudi-led aggression and its mercenaries against the country’s capabilities has reached the targeting of the pipeline dozens of times in the areas under the occupation,” Al-Houthi wrote in a post published on his Twitter page on Monday.
“All of this was done with the suspension of expenses of the staff, who protects and maintains it,” he added. “They (the coalition’s forces) are conspiring against oil wealth for the sale of equipment, stopping maintenance budgets, and looting the wealth in a frightening and deplorable manner.”
https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=14184
cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade
(B H K P)
Infographic: Here is a slide on the impact of fuel ships blocked by Saudi from entering #Yemen.
https://twitter.com/AishaJumaan/status/1288648340792471552
(A H K P)
[Sanaa gov.] Minister of Health: Hundreds of Thousands of Patients Are at Risk of Dying Due to Continuation of Oil Tankers Prevention
The Minister of Health and Population, Dr. Taha Al-Mutawakkil, warned Thursday that hundreds of thousands of patients are at risk of dying due to stopping the organizations from providing their aid amid the spread of epidemics and the continuation of the blockade and preventing the entry of fuel ships.
The Minister of Health stated during a press conference with the Supreme Council for Administration and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs that intensive care in public and private hospitals is threatened to be stopped due to the lack of oil derivatives.
He added that the crisis of oil derivatives doubled the suffering of the health sector.
https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=14214
(A P)
Al-Iryani: Houthi militia hindered government’s efforts for paying salaries
Minister of Information Mua’mar al-Iryani has said that Houthi claims on international pressures for banning it paying half salary every six months to government’s employees are rude.
Talking to Saba on Monday, al-Iryani added that Houthi militia claims are sheep propaganda aiming for misleading public opinion and covering crimes of continuous looting of government employees’ salaries and incomes as well as thwarting efforts of the UN for paying the salaries regularly.
and also https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200729-yemen-stop-houthis-looting-employee-salaries/
My comment: The story is going to get absurd, as both sides claim that the other side blocks the payment of state officials’ salaries. What’s making this situation even worth, is the fact that the Hadi government misuses the blockade of fuel for Northern Yemen as a bargaining chip to enforce its claims.
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
(* B H)
‘Perfect storm’: 2020 could be worst year yet for hunger in Yemen with millions on brink of famine
Special report: Before the pandemic reached Yemen, more than half the country’s population were already relying on food aid to survive. Now, a deadly combination of war, Covid-19, floods and locusts has pushed millions to the brink of starvation
“Mostly we eat bread, and some rice donated from friends or a charity. We never have any protein,” says Noha’s mother, who also appears malnourished and frail. They can only very occasionally get hold of vegetables like tomatoes.
“We have had no money coming in because of the war and the restrictions imposed because of the coronavirus, so we cannot afford to eat,” says the mother, who asks that her name not be published.
The whole family is going hungry, but became increasingly alarmed when Noha started suffering from diarrhoea that left her severely dehydrated and malnourished.
“A basic basket of goods costs over $45 now (£34), which is a month’s salary that we haven’t had in years,” the mother continues.
“We do not have enough money to feed any of the children properly.”
A gynaecologist by trade, Muharram has for years been running a mobile nutrition clinic from the back of her car that tours the more remote areas of Hodeidah.
Despite a critical lack of medicine and doctors, Hodeidah’s Thawra hospital is treating several critical cases, having long been the front line of Yemen’s five-year war. The city is among the hardest-hit by soaring food prices, as well as diseases such as cholera, which only exacerbates malnutrition cases.
“The situation was already terrible because of the war but made worse by the coronavirus, which has meant any work [people had] has now halted,” she tells The Independent.
Before the pandemic reached Yemen’s shores, more than 15 million people – over half the country’s total population – were already relying on humanitarian food aid to survive, according to the UN.
The arrival of Covid-19, which shuttered businesses and disrupted supply lines, has only made that hunger crisis more acute.
Vanessa Roy, from Famine Early Warning Systems Network, tells The Independent that 2020 could be a record bad year for hunger in Yemen.
“This year will be the worst in terms of the total population anticipated to be in need of food aid,” she says.
This week, the UN sounded the alarm about another potential famine.
The Yemen Data Project, which tracks airstrikes in the country, told The Independent that since the start of the war there have been over 680 air raids on farmlands across the country, killing and injuring nearly 400 civilians, and disrupting agricultural production. At least 153 of those strikes have battered farms in Hodeidah alone.
Caught in the crossfire, farmers have had to abandon their plantations to drought, disease and destruction, says Yemeni journalist Mohammed al-Hakimi, who has done extensive research on the topic.
“Palm plantations in places like Hodeidah are at risk of extinction as a result of drought and desertification, which is swallowing up areas.”
The full impact of this on the local communities has yet to be properly quantified, but the destruction of crops such as date palms removes a source both of income and food – by Bel Trew
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Social Protection Amidst Social Upheaval: Examining the Impact of a Multi-Faceted Program for Ultra-Poor Households in Yemen
Social protection programs are needed more than ever during periods of social upheaval, but are also likely to be even harder to implement successfully. Furthermore, social upheaval makes measuring the impact of such policies all the more difficult. We study the impact of a multi-faceted social protection program, often referred to as a “graduation” model program, in Yemen during a period of civil unrest. We are unable to measure outcomes for four years, thus much remains unknown about what transpired in the intermediary time. After four years we find positive impacts on asset accumulation and savings behavior, albeit substantially less than the amount the household originally received.
https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/27583.html
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Yemen: Conflicts impact access to food and livelihoods
More than 20.1 million Yemenis – or more than 67% of the total population – need emergency food assistance. In addition, 3.6 million people have been displaced since 2015 and remain so today. Trapped by their proximity to the front line or made vulnerable due to their having been displaced, the populations of Al Hudaydah governorate are particularly affected and, faced with a lack of access to food and basic services, their lives are in danger.
Only a few NGOs, including SOLIDARITÉS INTERNATIONAL, are able to intervene, thanks to their expertise and knowledge of the field. Thus, with the support of OCHA (the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), our teams have set up an emergency assistance food security programme for those persons most at risk, who are threatened by famine and who face the catastrophic conditions in the area.
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As aid money dries up, Yemenis are at ‘the end of the line’
Over the past five years of war, I can’t count the number of times I’ve thought to myself that surely things can’t get more desperate in Hodeidah, the Yemeni city where I live and work as an aid worker.
But then they do, and time and time again I have to watch families squeezed just a little more, making it that much harder for them to survive.
In Hodeidah, once a bustling port city and trading hub, things have been going from bad to worse for years.
In 2018, even as the bombs fell, sometimes just hundreds of metres from our homes and food distribution sites, aid workers like me kept working. But the UN’s appeal for Yemen is now so underfunded that for the first time in years my staffers are staying home: we just don’t have any aid to give out.
It feels once again like we’ve been abandoned by the world, and at precisely the most dangerous moment.
The World Food Programme has had to cut back rations, so this month we will not be delivering anything to the 700,000 people we usually serve on WFP’s behalf. The food baskets we gave them in June containing staples like flour, rice, cooking oil, dates, and sugar – designed to feed a family for a month – will now have to last two.
Across the country, the World Food Programme, often through other NGOs, feeds about one in six of Yemen’s 28 million people, either through rations or vouchers that they can spend at markets and shops. If the WFP does not have enough money to continue, millions more people will feel the pain.
Even before these funding cuts, food aid could not meet the needs of everyone. Yemenis have endured hunger and uncertainty with humility and patience.
They’ve done what they can to adapt, selling their furniture and wedding rings. But they’ve come to the end of the line.
I know this because people plead with me to bring them more food, and there is nothing I can do. With food prices up, I can already see the impacts of the decreased rations. The same families who had their rations cut are now bringing their children, who are just skin and bones, to our malnutrition centres. Emergency admissions to these centres are up.
More and more people are begging on the streets. On my short walk to work, I now see well over 100 people asking for help, including elderly women and young children. Grown men are also out begging because they cannot buy food or medicine for their wives or children, who have perhaps grown too weak to venture out themselves.
The problems do not just stem from a lack of international funding: the reasons why Hodeidah, which has long been one of the most food insecure parts of Yemen, finds itself in this ever-worsening crisis are many and complex. And, at the moment, they’re all crashing together into what’s already the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.
Hodeidah’s port has barely been functioning for years, leading to massive job losses. In addition, the $10 billion in remittances Yemenis usually send home from abroad each year are down as family members outside Yemen lose their jobs due to COVID-19-related economic problems.
And even as oil prices fall to record lows elsewhere, they are shooting up in Yemen.
COVID-19 has made everything worse.
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/aid-money-Yemen-war
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Empowering Enterprising Coastal Women in Yemen
In the small seaside village of Mayfa, in Yemen’s Hadramawt Governorate, the whir of a salt grinding machine serves as the backdrop for the regular motions of six women gathered along a simple assembly line. Sitting in pairs around three plastic tables, they fill, measure, and seal small plastic bags of refined sea salt destined to be featured in the spice aisles of the region’s grocery stores, providing livelihoods for hundreds of local families.
These are the women of the Al Hissi Association for Sea Salt Production, which has been running as an officially registered organization since November 2019, thanks to support from USAID’s Yemen Economic Stabilization and Success (YESS) program. Employing more than 300 local women, along with a few men, Al Hissi is transforming a backbreaking tradition of salt harvesting into a groundbreaking operation for increasing incomes and employment in Yemeni coastal communities.
The gathering and sale of sea salt has long been the purview of coastal women in Yemen, and one of the very few employment options open to them. With the war, the number of female-headed households has risen sharply. For many families in Mayfa, salt harvesting has become the only source of income.
Traditionally, coastal women have harvested sea salt from small pools dug along the water’s edge, using their bare hands to scrape and collect the crystals that form as the seawater evaporates in the sun. Prior to the USAID technical assistance, the women would wash their harvested salt and dry it in the open air, where some 10-15 percent of it would be lost to spoilage from contamination. The women used to sell their raw salt in bulk for use in the production of ice (which freezes at lower temperatures when salt is added) or to local salt processors, fetching just two to three U.S. dollars per 50-kilogram bag.
Today, with technical support and training from USAID, the salt harvesting women of Mayfa have totally transformed their way of doing business, and Al Hissi has truly become a salt production enterprise.
https://www.usaid.gov/yemen/program-updates/jul-2020-harvesting-hope
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Photos: People from Hudaida! Marginalisation on this governorate was practiced for long years. People are poor & always find themselves alone facing hunger, miseries & crisis. The latest is the impact of heavy rains and flooding on their houses and properties.
https://twitter.com/HanaalShowafi/status/1288378942349549569
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Torrents sweep agricultural land away in Sanaa province
Torrential rains swept most of the agricultural land away in Muhnon area in al-Tayel district in Sanaa province.
A local source said to Saba that the torrential rains flowing from mountains of Bani Saham swept agricultural land away from the area of Muhanon and its environs.
The source added that Yaman al-Turabi dam damaged which led the displaced of the population from the dam stream.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3104253.htm
(A H)
Photos: Floods due to heavy rain is another problem started affecting many people in my country #Yemen. Pictures from Ali Sunidar.
https://twitter.com/Fatikr/status/1288618049940205569
More photos: https://twitter.com/BelqeesRights/status/1288474609759600641
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1288676704467247106
https://twitter.com/Naseh_Shaker/status/1288243256468398083
Films from Sanaa: https://twitter.com/alialsonidar/status/1288577680233897985
https://twitter.com/Naseh_Shaker/status/1288486168309510149
Film from Jawf: https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1288678553710743554
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Yemen Food Security Outlook June 2020 to January 2021
Deteriorating macroeconomic conditions expected to drive further food price increases
Ongoing conflict continues to disrupt livelihoods, reduce access to income, and drive poor macroeconomic conditions in Yemen. The Yemeni Rial has been depreciating in recent months, contributing to further increases in already above-average prices of food and non-food commodities. Overall, an estimated 17 to 19 million people are expected to be in need of humanitarian food assistance in 2020. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are widespread.
While not the most likely scenario, Famine (IPC Phase 5) would be possible in the event that food imports are significantly disrupted for a prolonged period of time. Food import levels observed to date in 2020 have been lower than average, a trend that is expected to persist through 2020 due to declining revenue streams. These trends have contributed to the progressively deteriorating food security situation in Yemen, raising the risk that a Famine (IPC Phase 5) could occur should there be a more significant and prolonged disruption to imports.
Due to the restrictive operating environment and resource constraints, WFP has scaled down assistance such that beneficiaries in northern Houthi-controlled areas are being reached every other month instead of monthly, which has reduced assistance by effectively cutting benefits in half.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-food-security-outlook-june-2020-january-2021
(B H)
Yemen Runoff Potential: Runoff volume for 10-year return period - May 2020
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-runoff-potential-runoff-volume-10-year-return-period-may-2020
Yemen Runoff Potential: Runoff volume for 20-year return period - May 2020
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-runoff-potential-runoff-volume-20-year-return-period-may-2020
Yemen Ma'rib: Runoff volume accumulation for 50-year return period - May 2020
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Yemen Watershed Analysis Drainage Basin and Stream Network at National Level - May 2020 (Map)
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Yemen: Nutrition Cluster Partners Profile (January - April 2020)
https://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/yemen-nutrition-cluster-partners-profile-january-april-2020
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A baby named Rescue: the miracle birth in beleaguered Yemen
An IRC mobile health team caring for uprooted families in a camp in Yemen was there at the right time to help a young mother through a difficult delivery.
“We didn’t have any money, or even water,” says Bodor Ali Muhammad Abdullah al-Jabri, remembering the day in November 2018 when she and her husband, Salem, scooped up their two little girls and fled their home near Hodeidah, the port city on the Red Sea in western Yemen. “The missiles were above us, the bullets were very close to us. We ran.”
The situation for families like Bodor and Salem’s is dire. Yemen’s five-year conflict has destroyed the nation’s economy, forcing 80 percent of the population to rely on humanitarian aid, even as that aid dries up. COVID-19 has sent food prices skyrocketing. Yemen’s already depleted health system is overwhelmed.
“Bodor couldn’t afford to go to the hospital, so we came to her,” says Samya Rasam Khaled, an IRC midwife working in Yemen. “During the labor, Bodor was exhausted, so we helped her.”
Bodor remembers her anxiety as the contractions started: she prayed she would give birth safely. “The IRC team came here and helped me,” she says. “They gave me injections and IV infusions that helped me give birth. I gave birth in this tent.” She lost blood as she feared, but getting proper care enabled her to regain her strength. She has fully recovered, and just as important, her third daughter arrived safely and remains healthy.
Says Bodor, holding the child in her arms, “We called the baby Enqath,” which means “Rescue” in Arabic, “after the organization's name—because it rescued us.”
An IRC mobile health team continues to check in on the family, following up with mother and baby and screening the other children for signs of malnutrition.
“What we are seeing in Yemen is unlike any tragedy witnessed before," says Tamuna Sabadze, the IRC’s country director there. “COVID-19 is ripping through the country.”
The IRC is training heath workers, deploying mobile health teams and supporting health facilities with protective gear and proper water and sanitation services to fight COVID-19, even as we continue our other lifesaving programs (photos)
https://www.rescue.org/article/baby-named-rescue-miracle-birth-beleaguered-yemen
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In Yemen, women face added challenges posed by COVID-19 amidst ongoing armed conflict
For the last 17 years, Um Nuria has supported her family by selling traditional Yemeni samosas in front of a local school in Al-Hodeidah, the fourth largest city in Yemen and its principal port on the Red Sea.
Selling the pastries is how she makes enough money to put food on the table for her children.
“I have tried many jobs and alternatives that did not work out. Selling samosa proved to be a good source of income. I have been relying on this job during school time, stopping during holidays. I used to manage even during the holidays with whatever money that I could save,” said Um Nuria.
“I started to suffer from rising prices. I found it difficult to pay rent and meet the daily expenses, not to mention the medicines for me and my children,” she explained. Um Nuria suffers from a heart condition and two of her six children suffer from asthma.
As men enter the conflict, and many do not return home, the number of female-headed households has been on the rise, and women are being pushed to take on new roles with very little or no support.
Their heightened vulnerability led to negative coping mechanisms, including early marriages and child labour.
The World Bank estimates that women are shouldering an inequitable share of the burden in terms of worsening poverty rates and deprivation than the average population.
Yet, Yemeni women persevered to find new ways to support their families, starting their own small businesses in food, handcraft and hairdressing.
Women who found success in their new trades, like Um Nuria, felt empowered.
The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has cut short their success, and with it, hopes of better lives. Many small businesses, have closed, and the closure of schools has increased the burden of care for mothers. For Um Nuria, her only stable source of income – selling samosa near the school – is no longer viable.
The rate of violence against women in Yemen was already very high in the context of the ongoing conflic
"Many Yemeni women have demonstrated a high level of resilience and have worked hard to survive and create their own opportunities during the war, but unfortunately, the COVID-19 outbreak has affected them badly," confirmed Kholoud Hajar, an independent expert in economic development and empowerment of women.
In view of the disproportionate impact of conflict and crisis on women and girls, UN Women has been supporting projects that build women’s self-reliance through livelihoods and protection interventions, vocational training, cash-based project activities and start-up packages for women with small enterprises.
https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2020/7/feature-yemen-covid-amidst-armed-conflict
(A H)
Astral Aviation uplifts 200 tonnes of humanitarian aid for Yemen
Nairobi-based Astral Aviation in association with the EU has operated a B727F for carrying relief supplies from Nairobi to Sanaa International Airport and Aden International Airport in Yemen.
https://www.logupdateafrica.com/astral-aviation-uplifts-200-tonnes-of-humanitarian-aid-for-yemen
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Top Muslim scholar calls for saving Yemen children
Chairman of the International Union for Muslim Scholars (IUMS), Ali al-Qaradaghi, on Wednesday called for launching a global Islamic humanitarian campaign to save children vulnerable to diseases, poverty and malnutrition.
https://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/top-muslim-scholar-calls-for-saving-yemen-children-3535638
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Film: Mehr Kinder im Jemen vom Hungertod bedroht: Gespräch mit Bettina Lüscher, Welternährungsprogramm
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At least ten people died as a result of the flash flood in many areas east of Hodeidah governorate. Dozens of houses were swept away by the flood and many lands and roads were affected and damaged (photo)
https://twitter.com/BelqeesRights/status/1288171109561405440
Photo: https://twitter.com/Naseh_Shaker/status/1288243256468398083
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The incidences of attacks against medical staff by armed and influential men have been repeated across many Yemeni hospitals, while the medical institutions usually resort to protest and stop providing services in order to be protected.
https://twitter.com/BelqeesRights/status/1288201308516704256
(A H)
Omani, Iranian medical aid arrives in Yemen's Sanaa
https://debriefer.net/en/news-18801.html
and
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[Sanaa gov.] Minister of Health: UN Repudiated Transportation of Medical Aid from Oman to Yemen
Minister of Public Health and Population Taha Al-Mutawakkil, on Tuesday, accused the United Nations of renouncing its duty to transfer the shipment of medical aid provided by the Sultanate of Oman to Yemen, renouncing its obligation to provide medical aid to Yemen to confront the corona pandemic.
According to Saba News Agency, Al-Mutawakkil said that the aid shipment, which contains modern health equipment, advanced artificial respiration devices, means of protection and medicines, arrived at the Ministry of Health stores, after about three months of delaying their transportation from the Sultanate of Oman to Yemen.
https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=14198
(B H)
Before the war, Ad Dali was famous for its hot springs, where people bathed for health benefits. Now, residents contend with local #water shortages due to damaged infrastructure, and many rely on trucked water for their needs
https://twitter.com/NavantiGroup/status/1288107815320473601
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Pro-aggression Government Kills Yemeni Children with Expired Vaccine
Millions of dollars earned by the World Health Organization from countries for the so-called protection of childhood in Yemen, by contracting with pharmaceutical companies to produce polio vaccines, or “vaccination” drug formulations as a form of child protection.
Many doctors, especially in western countries, have published research on the seriousness of vaccines for children, which caused the discontent of companies and the World Health Organization to those researchers.
The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) launched a campaign to vaccinate more than a million Yemeni children against polio in the occupied provinces of Yemen last Saturday.
On its Twitter account, the organization said it had launched a vaccination campaign in cooperation with what it described as local partners against polio in Yemen.
More than a week after the vaccination campaign, medical sources revealed, Monday, to local media that the polio vaccine provided during the routine vaccination campaign has expired.
The sources confirmed that with the start of the vaccination campaign, there was only three days left for the vaccine to end.
The sources called for an investigation into the scandal that threatens a humanitarian catastrophe against the children of Yemen, and to uncover those involved and manipulated innocent lives.
https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=14174
(B H)
Yemen Cash and Voucher Assistance Snapshot (January to December 2019)
This dashboard provides details of the cash and voucher assistance (CVA), including multi-purpose cash assistance (MPCA), reported by clusters and humanitarian actors between January and December 2019.
Cash and market-based interventions in Yemen began before the current crisis. Needs have increased as a result of the conflict and cash transfer programming continued to be an important component of the humanitarian response in Yemen in 2019. The number of beneficiaries assisted through the cash and voucher modality reached about 5.5 million people in 2019.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-cash-and-voucher-assistance-snapshot-january-december-2019
(B H)
European Union provides vital funding to sustain life-saving services for women and girls in Yemen
The European Union contributed EUR 5 million to UNFPA, the United Nations sexual and reproductive health agency, to provide emergency relief for displaced persons and life-saving reproductive health and mental health services to the most vulnerable women and girls in Yemen. The funds will allow UNFPA to continue providing critical services at a time when a severe funding shortage and the rapid spread of COVID-19 are crippling UNFPA’s humanitarian efforts in the country.
(B H)
An insight into the pharmaceutical sector in Yemen during conflict: challenges and recommendations An insight into the pharmaceutical sector in Yemen during conflict: challenges and recommendations
In our world today, we need to understand, measure, and respond to inequality. The conflict and siege in Yemen have caused serious repercussions and consequences for the pharmaceutical sector and health of the people. Hospital, health centres and facilities, medicines warehouses and pharmaceutical factories have been destroyed. Further, the conflict has aggravated the health situation with shortages of medicines , an increase in chronic illnesses, and multiple epidemics and casualties. This article aims to highlight the challenges faced by the pharmaceutical sector in Yemen. It will address the overall state of health of the Yemeni people, as well as focus on the past, current status and future development of the pharmaceutical sector. Further, it will focus on possible remedial actions to solve some of these problems. These problems can be tackled if the responsible parties have the political will to do so. Acknowledging the different classes of problems is undeniably very important to provide clarity on the future of Yemen's supposedly promising pharmaceutical landscape.
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
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IOM Yemen: Situation Report June 2020
The COVID-19 outbreak is taking an enormous toll on Yemen’s health system and the already vulnerable population: seventy per cent of Yemen’s population lack access to soap, 60 per cent not having access to enough water.
In this context, humanitarian needs are further exacerbated while the conflict remains volatile as clashes continue
Through the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), IOM has recorded new population movements as a result of COVID-19, with more than 550 people citing COVID-19 as a reason for leaving affected areas in Aden and Lahj to locations in Lahj, Al Dhale and Abyan.
Migrants stranded in Yemen are being impacted by acts of xenophobia, movement restrictions, arbitrary arrests, detention and forced transfers to locations where they lack access to food, water, shelter and health care. In Aden city, IOM has observed a marked increase in the number of stranded migrants, as a result of movement restrictions and forced transfers from northern to southern governorates, living in dire conditions. Local security actors this month also rounded up and arrested groups of migrants in Aden and Marib—an estimated 1,500 in total.
IOM continues to scale up humanitarian and COVID-19 response activities where it has access.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-situation-report-june-2020
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IOM Yemen: Situation Report May 2020
The humanitarian community continues to face severe access constraints, particularly in the north of the country. On average, 92 per cent of IOM permits from its Country Office in Sana’a were not approved in the first quarter of the year, and 45 per cent of permits were denied in May. Restrictions are being further institutionalized with the outbreak of COVID-19 in the form of movement restrictions to contain the spread of the virus, while increased hostilities threaten to pose additional operational challenges.
Due to increasing restrictions to migrants’ movements and access to services, linked to scapegoating of migrants as carriers of the virus, migrants across the country are being severely impacted by the COVID-19 outbreak. The IOM protection team reported with large numbers of migrants stranded in Aden, Lahj and Sa’ada unable to continue their journey due to movement restrictions, and others being forcibly moved from northern governorates to the south. Migrants reported being abused and facing other risks and vulnerabilities as they navigate through Yemen. At the same time, COVID-19 restrictions have meant that migrant arrivals into Yemen are down by 94 per cent compared to May 2019.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-situation-report-may-2020
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Covid-19 is deepening the crisis in Yemen
Despite this, many refugees continue to flee from the desperate situation in their home countries. Thousands of African migrants and asylum seekers continue to flow into the country via illegal border crossings by land, sea and air.
Journalist and refugee rights activist Tasnim Amin has said that the conditions in which Somali and African refugees in Yemen are living are tragic. And the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Yemen warns that African refugees are “the most exposed to spread coronavirus, as a result of the lack of access to health care, insufficient access to clean water, sanitation and other basic services.”
This dilemma for African refugees and the humanitarian workers trying to help them represents a tragedy within a tragedy. At a time when the eyes of the international community are looking elsewhere, this pandemic is having a devastating impact on the people of the country and its growing refugee population.
While this continues to unfold, there is an unavoidable feeling that the world has given up on the Yemen. If other countries continue to look the other way while this is unfolding, then it will get worse. In a world where we are all ever more connected, to abandon Yemen would be a terrible oversight from those who have the power to provide relief but choose to stand aside.
https://reaction.life/covid-19-is-deepening-the-crisis-in-yemen/
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
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Six Baha’is imprisoned by the Houthis freed in Yemen
Six prominent Baha’is imprisoned by the Houthi authorities in Sana’a have today been released, the Baha’i International Community can confirm.
Following these releases, the Baha’i International Community calls for the lifting of all charges against these six individuals and the other Baha’is charged, the return of their assets and properties, and, most importantly, the safeguarding of the rights of all Baha’is in Yemen to live according to their beliefs without risk of persecution.
https://www.bic.org/news/six-bahais-imprisoned-houthis-freed-yemen
and also https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-bahai-faith-released-houthi-prison-sanaa
https://apnews.com/6f6964fedfa4a56de4cf74484890e89a
and
(A P)
"The 6 Baha'is who were released are leaving Sana'a on a UN flight to another country, since the Houthis made leaving Yemen a condition of their release."
https://twitter.com/hannaheporter/status/1288935997934370822
Not to mention that all their assets, homes, businesses, life savings, everything they owned was confiscated by Houthis.
https://twitter.com/Ndawsari/status/1288945873557360640
(A P)
Preventing Muslims from reaching holy sites is crime: Gov’t spokesman
Spokesman of the National Salvation Government, Minister of Information Dhaifallah al-Shami on Wednesday affirmed that the holy places are a right for all, and preventing Muslims from accessing holy places under any justification is a crime and a denial of the religion.
Al-Shami explained that keeping silence on this crime is an empowerment of the Zionist project, which wants to separate the nation from its religion and control its sanctities.
He denounced the Saudi regime’s intent to deal with the Holy Land (Mecca and Medina) as a private ownership, pointing out that this regime implements an American-Zionist agenda to prevent Muslims from performing this religious duty, which represents the largest annual conference of Muslims on the Earth.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3104217.htm
and
(A P)
Ministry of Awqaf and Guidance Condemns Saudi Rgime’s Ban on Hajj Pilgrimage This Year
https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=14199
and also https://debriefer.net/en/news-18825.html
(A P)
Sana’a Vows to Thwart Separation Projects in Yemen’s South
Deputy Foreign Minister of the Salvation Government Hussein Al-Ezzi clarified the fundamental point of disagreement between the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the people of Yemen.
"I believe that self-ruled management has become a challenge point between the STC and the entire Yemen,"
Al-Ezzi said in a post published on his official Twitter page.
https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=14185
(A P)
Houthis, Jawf tribes sign paper disavowing traitors
Chief of the Houthi military intelligence Abdullah Al-Hakim and the Dahm Al-Hamra'a tribes in Yemen's Jawf province on the border with Saudi Arabia on Tuesday signed a paper disavowing traitors.
The coalition forces are preparing cells in areas controlled by the Houthi Group to incite riot in the name of the tribes, he said at a meeting with the tribes, according to the Houthi-run Almasirah TV.
Troublemakers will regret very much, he vowed.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-18798.html
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp6 – cp19
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-670b-yemen-war-mosaic-670b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-669-yemen-war-mosaic-669
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-669 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-669:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
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