Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 674 - Yemen War Mosaic 674

Yemen Press Reader 674: 21. Aug. 2020: Jemen-Krise: Chronologie der Misserfolge – Angriffe auf Jemens Schulen – UN-Friedensplan – Riad-Abkommen scheitert erneut – Schmuggel iranischer Waffen ...
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... Schmuggel iranischer Waffen nach Afrika – Verband der Mütter der Entführten – Vereinigte Arabische Emirate, Jemen-Krieg und Somalia – Zeitbombe Tanker SAFER – und mehr

August 21, 2020: The Yemen Crisis: A Chronology of Failures – Attacks on Yemen’s schools – The UN peace plan – New failure of the Riyadh agreement – Iranian weapons trafficked to Africa – Abductees‘ Mothers‘ Association – UAE, Yemen war and Somalia – Time bomb SAFER tanker (in German) – and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2:

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavitrus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp1b Am wichtigsten: Regen und Überschwemmungen / Most important: Rain and flash floods

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain

cp11 Deutschland / Germany

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp12a Katar-Krise / Qatar crisis

cp12b Sudan

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms Trade

cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage

cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle

cp19 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification




(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

Neue Artikel / New articles

(* B H K)

Film: Krieg im Jemen

Seit fünf Jahren herrscht im Jemen Krieg. Die Bevölkerung leidet und ist auf humanitäre Hilfe angewiesen. Arzt Tankred Stöbe will helfen und bereitet sich auf seinen zweiten Einsatz im Jemen vor. Said AlDailami klärt weitere Hintergründe.

(B H)

How To Help Those Affected By The Ongoing Crisis In Yemen

Since 2015, Yemen has been in the midst of a civil war. Described by Oxfam as one of world’s “gravest humanitarian crises,” the war has claimed more than 12,000 civilian lives and a further four million have been displaced. Approximately 80% of the country’s population is in need of emergency aid – the greatest number in any country in the world. Below are the top line facts you should be aware of, as well as suggestions of how you can help the people of Yemen.

There are a number of ways to support and help the people of Yemen:

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

(** B K P)

The Yemen Crisis: A Chronology of Failures

In this essay, I will offer my assessment of why efforts to resolve Yemen’s political crisis and end the war have failed and explore how future efforts can avoid similar failures, which stem from misjudgments, poor management of the peace negotiations or interference by regional and international players with their own agendas and rivalries.

There is no doubt that the reason for the protracted Yemen crisis is in part due to the intransigence of the Yemeni parties, but the United Nations’ special envoys, the ambassadors of the countries sponsoring the peace process, and the coalition military intervention, in addition to UN Security Council resolutions, have all contributed to the protraction of the conflict. The reality of the conflict is confused by the blame game of the conflicting parties and by the multitude of articles and reports written by journalists and research centers, especially those funded by regional powers that sponsor conflicting parties in Yemen to promote their agendas and defend their positions. Additional factors preventing progress were the special envoys’ perceptions of Yemen’s crisis and of the Yemeni people as well as their experience in resolving conflicts or working in conflict areas. Thus, they came with readymade and theoretical solutions, which they believed could be applied to Yemen’s crisis in a copy-and-paste method.

One mistake made by those non-Yemeni actors involved in trying to resolve Yemen’s crisis was their lack of understanding of the roots of Yemen’s political crisis. The current crisis started long before the Arab Spring; it bears the marks of the many political upheavals in both North and South Yemen, internal political conflicts and the influences of regional powers as well as sectarian, tribal and local grievances due to poor governance and unequal distribution of wealth and power.

Support from some of the international sponsors of peace for the passing of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2216, which essentially required unconditional surrender from the armed Houthi movement, Ansar Allah, demonstrated their lack of impartiality and complicated a resolution of the conflict. These sponsors for the resolution of the conflict, especially the five permanent members of the Security Council, ignored the GCC initiative, which was confirmed in all UNSC resolutions at the time as the basis of the 2011 political agreement. They have never adhered to it in subsequent phases of the conflict.

Acceptance of the GCC initiative by Yemenis resulted from the fact that its original draft was written by negotiators from the GPC who understood the roots of the conflict and the positions of the different opponents. More importantly, they were committed to preventing the escalation of the political crisis into military conflict. Unfortunately, the first UN special envoy, Jamal Benomar, despite his success in getting the parties to agree on the implementation mechanism for the GCC initiative, failed – along with the sponsors of peace – to ensure that President Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi and the presidency committee of the 2013-14 National Dialogue Conference (NDC) adhere to the GCC initiative and the conference’s rules. Ignoring irregularities contributed to the subsequent failures and impacted progress in the transitional period. Especially damaging was the inclusion of non-consensual recommendations in the final NDC report in order to satisfy Hadi’s interest in marginalizing certain political parties and his desire to impose his own vision for the system of federal regions, which would maintain the presidential system instead of the parliamentary system chosen by the state-building working group.

The comprehensive NDC started on wrong footing by first ignoring the principle of consensus in the formation of the preparatory committee for the conference, its presidency and secretariat. Hadi, with his confidants, and the special envoy took control of the whole process, which lacked transparency and failed to adhere to the rules and procedures of the NDC. The second factor for the NDC’s failure to achieve its objectives was the inability of political party’ leaders to understand that the NDC was about saving Yemen, and not a platform for settling old feuds. In other words, the parties participating in the conference were neither reconciliatory nor prepared to make concessions.

Instead of attempting to regain the confidence of the political parties that expressed written objections on the final report, Hadi continued to implement some recommendations of the NDC in a selective manner while ignoring others.

These events, plus Hadi’s continuous efforts to influence the constitution committee while the draft constitution was being prepared, heightened tension and mistrust, especially among members of Ansar Allah. Hadi’s main concern at the time was to save his presidency by ensuring that the draft constitution reflected his own vision for a unified multi-region state under a presidential system.

While the crisis between Hadi and Ansar Allah was escalating, the special envoy played the role of a mediator between them. At that time, Hadi was losing control and Ansar Allah was gaining momentum, fighting Salafi groups in Damaj, Sa’ada governorate, and progressing toward Sana’a. For their part, the team of ambassadors sponsoring the peace process, if anything, emboldened Ansar Allah by their inaction both on the ground and within the UNSC as the situation seriously deteriorated.

The transitional period also was plagued by poor leadership across the board and a deteriorating relationship between Prime Minister Mohammed Basindwah and the president because Hadi bypassed the prime minister to deal directly with cabinet ministers.

Yemen stands today at a crossroads between reconciliation and peace, or becoming a hotbed for dissent, rebellion and regional instability that could spiral completely out of control. It is, therefore, time for the coalition and regional players to accept that the first step toward resolving Yemen’s conflict is to abandon their hidden agendas and proxy wars that will not serve their long-term interests and regional stability. These players must instead join forces and work together to end the war and preserve a united and stable Yemen, which will partner with all in securing regional security, for the benefit of all.

The spoilers of peace and the beneficiaries of the conflict, whether warlords or arms manufacturers, must reconsider their positions in view of the devastation they are causing to Yemen, and in order to ease the danger of the spread of the conflict to other countries in the region. This is unlikely to be achieved without getting the non-Yemeni players to end their proxy conflict in Yemen. Therefore, there must be a fully concerted effort by the UNSC to sponsor regional and international powers to agree on a process for peace that will form the basis for Yemeni-Yemeni comprehensive negotiations. It must be based on bringing all Yemenis to the negotiating table, without any exclusions or impositions, and making it their responsibility to negotiate a peace agreement that is fair and equitable to all with the necessary guarantees and incentives from international and regional powers. At the same time, Yemeni spoilers to the process must understand that they will be held accountable for their obstruction of the peace process - By Dr. Abu Bakr Al-Qirbi

(** B H K)

Undermining the future. Attacks on Yemen’s schools March 2015 to December 2019

Executive Summary

For decades, access to education has remained a dream for millions of Yemenis. Across the country, Yemeni families have struggled to help their children achieve this dream, and to enjoy their basic right to an education. In tandem, new and escalating armed conflicts have prevented Yemenis from achieving their aspirations to an education. As the conflict nears its sixth year, the future of education in the country looks ever more tragic. Day by day, children fall prey to recruitment by the warring parties and are thrown into the frontlines of the war. Dozens of children are killed and maimed, and become fuel for a war that has devoured their future and that of Yemen.

Since the armed conflict began in 2014, when the Ansar Allah (Houthi) armed group took over Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, by force, and since that conflict escalated in 2015 with the intervention of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition on behalf of the internationally-recognized government, schools and educational facilities have witnessed various forms of attack and abuse by the warring parties. The Ansar Allah (Houthi) armed group, forces and armed groups loyal to the internationally-recognized government of President Hadi including Islah-affiliated armed groups, the Saudi-UAE led coalition, and UAE-backed armed groups, including Southern Transitional Council forces, have all damaged, destroyed, used, occupied, or attacked schools.

Attacks on and impacting schools have caused different degrees of damage to school buildings. Airstrikes and shelling have caused significant damage. Attacks have also killed and wounded students and teachers and had a psychological impact on students. Many schools stopped functioning or became dangerous due to remaining ordnance, including missiles and explosive materials, in or near school grounds, or due to the fact that the facility is located near or in the midst of clashes, increasing the potential reoccurrence of another attack, and the fear associated with it. The warring parties have also repeatedly used and occupied schools for military purposes, gravely endangering schools by further exposing them to attacks by opposing parties. In addition, warring parties have, for example, planted landmines in or near schools and entered schools by force. In these school attacks, the warring parties appear to have repeatedly committed serious violations of international humanitarian law and grave human rights abuses. To date, accountability has been absent.

This report, produced by Mwatana for Human Rights (Mwatana), examines attacks on and impacting schools and education facilities between March 2015 and December 2019 by the warring parties in Yemen. The report does not cover many other attacks and abuses that have killed, wounded and otherwise harmed school-age children during the conflict, which have ranged from airstrikes that have killed or wounded dozens of young children, to recruitment and use of school-age children across Yemen.[1]

The report is based off more than 600 interviews with witnesses, victims’ families, parents and education workers conducted in 19 of Yemen’s 22 governorates.

Between March 2015 and December 2019, Mwatana documented more than 380 incidents of attacks on and impacting schools and educational facilities in Yemen. The documented incidents can be put in four main categories of attack. First, Saudi/UAE-led coalition airstrikes impacting educational facilities—Mwatana documented 153 coalition airstrikes on or impacting schools between 2015 and 2019 in 16 Yemeni governorates. Second, attacks impacting schools during ground fighting—Mwatana documented 36 such attacks, with Ansar Allah responsible for 22, Hadi government forces responsible for 8, and Ansar Allah and Hadi government forces both responsible in the remaining 6. Third, military use and occupation of schools—Mwatana documented 171 instances of military use and occupation of schools, with Ansar Allah responsible for 131 of these incidents, forces loyal to President Hadi and affiliated Popular Resistance forces responsible for 30, UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council forces responsible for 8, and Ansar Al-Sharia responsible for one. In addition to these three primary patterns, Mwatana documented 20 incidents of other forms of abuse impacting schools, examples of which are included in the report’s final section.

Based on the documented cases, Saada was the governorate most affected by school attacks, with 155 documented incidents, including 87 Saudi/UAE-led coalition airstrikes and 58 cases of occupation and military use of schools by Ansar Allah. Taiz governorate was also significantly affected, with 53 of the documented attacks occurring in Taiz.

The patterns and cases included in the report provide insight into the most distinctive patterns of attacks affecting schools and educational facilities during the years of war in Yemen. The facts and cases included are not exhaustive. The case studies provide a small window into the tragic effects these attacks have had on the education process, and the implications this holds for children in Yemen, and the country’s future. Mwatana continues to document attacks on Yemen’s schools.

(** B P)

Griffiths’ Amended Peace Plan and Prospects of Political Solution in Yemen

In the last few weeks, the UN special envoy to Yemen Martin Griffiths has intensified his efforts to revive the path of the political solution in this country and resume direct talks between the parties to the conflict. Those efforts had ceased since the Sweden round of consultations in late 2018. In this context, in the last two months (July and August 2020), Griffiths submitted to the two parties to the conflict two revised proposals for a peace plan that was drawn up by his team in March 2020. Griffiths had then promised to work on the plan in light of the observations he had received from the legitimate Yemeni government and the Houthi Ansar Allah group. On the whole, the plan is based on three principles: halting military confrontations, initiating economic and humanitarian measures, and resuming the political track.

According to the available information, the draft revised UN peace plan, known as the declaration of a comprehensive ceasefire and humanitarian and economic measures, includes the signing of a "joint declaration" by the government of President Hadi, the Houthis and all those affiliated with those two parties, stipulating a ceasefire throughout the country, with a complete cessation of all land, air and sea military offensive operations, including the redeployment of forces, heavy and medium weapons and ammunition, the release of all prisoners, detainees, missing persons, arbitrarily detained and forcibly disappeared persons, persons under house arrest and persons deprived of their liberty due to the conflict in accordance with the Stockholm Agreement, especially in light of the threat of the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic in places of detention.

The plan also includes proposals to form a committee to monitor the ceasefire, open up the main roads to the cities, especially in Taiz, Sanaa, Al-Hudaydah, Ma’rib, Sa’da and Al-Jawf, pay the salaries of all civil servants throughout the country according to the 2014 payroll, start to repair the Ma'rib-Ras Isa pipeline to resume pumping oil, ensure the safety of the dilapidated oil tanker (Safer), restart the Ma’rib gas power station, lift restrictions on the entry of container and oil derivative ships to Al-Hudaydah port, restart Sanaa International Airport and open it to humanitarian, commercial and civil flights, and form two joint committees, the first of which would coordinate the monetary policy, and the second would handle issues of unifying monetary policy and supporting foreign exchange reserves abroad. In light of this, political consultations would be resumed.

Despite the issuance of statements by officials in the government of President Hadi, in mid-July 2020, confirming that it has officially informed Griffiths of its rejection of his recent proposals because they "undermine its sovereignty and exceed his mission," according to the spokesman for the internationally recognized government, the UN envoy hastened to visit Riyadh once again between 10 and 13 August 2020, with the aim of persuading both the legitimate government and the Saudi leadership to agree to his peace plan, and to demonstrate his openness to the possibility of making any additional necessary and reasonable adjustments to advance his plan. In this context, diplomatic sources indicated that on his recent visit to Riyadh, Griffiths presented an amended version for the third time of the draft joint declaration between the government and the Houthis.

The fluctuating and ambiguous positions of the two parties to the conflict in Yemen on Griffiths' revised peace plan and his recent efforts to formulate a "joint declaration" leading to an immediate cessation of fighting and the resumption of direct talks between them demonstrated the enormous complexities that prevent a rapid breakthrough in terms of reviving the path of the political solution to the Yemeni crisis as a whole. Trust between the conflicting powers continues to be lacking.

Unless pressure continues to be exerted by influential international powers on the parties to the conflict, the chances of success of the settlement endeavours in Yemen will - most likely - remain very slim, and their challenges and obstacles would be greater than the capability of the UN mediation to overcome them. What a mediator such as Martin Griffiths badly needs today is to support and push forward his current approach to ending the conflict, despite its flaws and weaknesses, and the criticisms and accusations it faces (as is the case with all international mediators in conflict cases). It is important for this support for Griffiths' approach to be based on a better and more realistic understanding of the dynamics and transformations of the conflict in Yemen and the interests of the local and regional powers involved in it.

(** B P)

Riyadh Agreement 2.0 Changes Nothing in Yemen

Despite claims to the contrary and references in the document to a comprehensive peace, the second version of the Riyadh Agreement (now dubbed an implementation mechanism) that was recently signed by Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) does not change the status of forces on the ground in southern Yemen. Nor does it produce harmony between the two sides, let alone improve the chances of comprehensive peace in the country. Despite stipulating that all armed forces will be subject to the authority of the ministry of defense, current tensions, accusations, and clashes indicate that the ongoing conflict between the Hadi government and the STC continues unabated.

Despite initial optimism after the signing of the Riyadh Agreement in December 2019, and again after the signing of the implementation mechanism, the main provisions of the agreement remain unfulfilled. Implementation was supposed to be phased gradually, starting with halting the media wars then stopping the actual fighting on the ground and finally merging politically into a unity government. Militarily, the STC forces were supposed to be subsumed under the Hadi government’s ministry of defense and both STC and Hadi forces were supposed to leave Aden—a strange provision since Hadi’s troops were not in Aden but fighting their way toward it from the neighboring governorate of Abyan. These opposing groups remain engaged in occasional battles at the city limits of Abyan and Aden. Yemeni Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed was supposed to come back to work in his offices in Aden within a week of the signing, and a new cabinet formed within 30 days. There has been no progress on facilitating the travel of Hadi’s ministers to Aden nor on the formation of a unity government.

Hadi and the Legitimacy Government

Little love has been lost between Hadi’s government and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) which, among other irritants, hosts Ahmed Saleh, the late president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s son who is viewed by some as the heir to his father’s post. When the agreement was signed in Riyadh, many Hadi supporters used social media and interviews to voice their dissatisfaction and their suspicions about UAE intentions.

On the Southern Front

If Hadi has had trouble finding support in the south of Yemen, the STC itself also has not been met with universal acceptance as the representative of the entire south, with some factions in the southern Hirak (secessionist movement) voicing objections to the STC being in charge of doling out the southern cabinet posts decreed by the Riyadh Agreement. Some southern critics are also objecting to what they see as the STC giving up on the ultimate goal of southern independence by at least verbally agreeing to forsake the idea of self-administration. For example, Hassan Baoum, head of the southern Hirak movement that is seen as allied with (but not under the sway of) the STC, was critical of the Riyadh Agreement for falling short of answering the needs and achieving the aspirations of the people of the south—a euphemism for a separate state in south Yemen.

Even within the STC, there are differing views on the value of the agreement,

Many in the south have long perceived a Muslim Brotherhood dominance, especially on the military side, over the forces that dominated the south under the late president Saleh’s regime and that are now fighting to wrest away the STC’s control of southern cities and governorates.

In the meantime, STC statements already show that the appointment of a governor, Ahmed Hamed Lamles, to “the capital” Aden alongside the new security chief, Mohammed Ahmed al-Hamdi, means that the Riyadh Agreement is lopsided in favor of the STC. It also lends credence to the theory that the Arab coalition intended to simply confer legitimacy to southern leadership and, eventually, independence. If the agreement goes through, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the president of the STC, can then claim to be representing Hadi and go ahead and rule an independent south using that fig leaf as a cover.

All is not well, however, for the STC with southern citizens at large who, despite having a general sympathy for self-government, are not necessarily happy with the way their cities are being administered.

The Regional Factor

Hadi has not fared very well in Riyadh; rumors abound that his hosts have reached the end of their patience with him—or possibly have exhausted what usefulness he has had for them over the past five years and are now thinking of replacing him. The reason for this change of heart could be because Hadi has been an ineffective leader, unsuccessful at uniting the country behind him and therefore failing militarily against the Houthis. This could also be explained as part of the ongoing and complex dynamic between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, or more specifically the reported influence of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) on Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS)

The Trump Factor

If the Riyadh Agreement itself did not state it so bluntly, US expressions of support—at least in official and conservative circles—blurted out optimism that this agreement strengthens the anti-Houthi side in the war. In a statement of praise for the Riyadh Agreement, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said “it’s a way of strengthening the alliance against the Houthis.” The Wall Street Journal, echoing this official position, stated in an editorial essentially the same sentiment: “This matters because it puts the U.S. and its Gulf allies in a better position to handle the Houthis, the Iran-backed group….” That this optimism has not yet been borne out with positive results on the ground has not, to date, troubled the Trump Administration enough to put its diplomatic weight behind an effort toward comprehensive peace.

the thrust by two successive US administrations has been to side with the Saudis and to support their narrative that their military intervention in Yemen is part of a mission they share with the United States: to deny victory to Iran. Secretary Pompeo was again labeling the Houthis as tools in the hands of Iran, as follows: “If you truly care about Yemeni lives, you’d support the Saudi-led effort to prevent Yemen from turning into a puppet state of the corrupt, brutish Islamic Republic of Iran.” Such statements indicate a very hard line on Yemen that is not at all respectful of the nuances and internal dynamics in the country.

President Hadi,4 who has not shown effective leadership in general, repeats the same message in all his statements: that the UN Security Council Resolution 2216 must be the be basis for any solution and that the Houthi/Iran axis must be defeated. Repeating the main government’s negotiating position and railing against the Houthis are not effective ways of healing the wounds and reaching out to his enemies—something he has rarely done since the conflict broke out in 2014. As he urges the STC to implement the provisions of the agreement, Hadi stresses in the same statement the need to confront “the Houthi-Iranian project in Yemen.”

When It Rains, It Pours

Meanwhile, indirect talks on implementing the Riyadh Agreement between Hadi and the STC are mediated by Saudi officials. President Hadi headed to the United States for medical treatment and this will throw further doubt about the process. In his absence, Vice President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar presides and may have to officiate at the inauguration of any new cabinet that emerges, should Hadi’s absence be prolonged. Amidst all these problems and uncertainties, it is likely that none of those involved in ongoing discussions in Riyadh may feel sufficiently empowered to make any significant concessions – by Nabeel Khoury

(** B P)

A New Failure in the Making?

Saudi Arabia has pressed hard for a recent agreement in Yemen, but mistrust between the parties may well derail it.

Both accords were concluded under great Saudi pressure, as the negotiating parties didn’t sit at the same table during the two rounds of negotiations. This revealed a serious lack of confidence and willingness to reach an agreement due to contradictory agendas. The Yemeni government cannot exist without a form of unity in a federal Yemen, which it has called for, while the STC seeks separation. These irreconcilable factors are likely to lead to another failure.

On the ground, STC forces control Aden, Socotra, and the western parts of southern Lahaj and Dhale‘ Governorates and a part of Abyan Governorate. Government forces still control most of the eastern areas of the south as well as parts of Abyan, Shabwah, Hadhramawt, and Mahra. Oil-producing areas in Hadhramawt tend to be under government control.This division is a reflection of the deep historical hostility between Dhale‘ and Lahaj on the one side and Shabwah and Abyan on the other. During the time when there was a South Yemen (1967–1990) there were many conflicts between these regions, mainly during the civil war of 1986.

The current Yemeni president, ‘Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, is a southerner from Abyan who led the southern forces that fought alongside Saleh in 1994. The STC is dominated by individuals from Dhale‘ and Lahaj, which only revived the old hostility.

The July 29 agreement was crucial for the Saudis. They want to end their military intervention in Yemen by uniting all those opposed to Ansar Allah, better known as the Houthis, so that they can reach a peace agreement with the Houthis. Also, the agreement is important for the kingdom to prove that its presence and influence in Yemen remain strong, and in order to reinforce Saudi Arabia’s image as a sponsor of political processes in the country.

A number of regional powers have challenged Saudi influence in Yemen, especially in the south, where the UAE enjoys great influence and has a different agenda than Riyadh. The main disagreement between the two sides is their relationship with the Islah Party, the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood, whose complete exclusion from political life the UAE has demanded.

Unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE has built up political allies in Yemen who are more committed to its policies than Riyadh’s allies are to those of Saudi Arabia.

This July 29 agreement reaffirmed Saudi influence in Yemen. However, Saudi Arabia has been hampered by the fact that it lacks the ability to follow through on agreements, as it took six months to revive the negotiations to implement the Riyadh Accord of November 2019.

This suggests that the latest version of the Riyadh Accord may go the same way as its predecessor. Even if a government is formed it’s difficult to assume that it will be successful, given the complete lack of trust existing between the parties – by MAYSAA SHUJA AL-DEEN

(** B K P)

Evidence suggests Iranian weapons being trafficked by criminal networks into the Horn of Africa

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime has uncovered evidence suggesting that Iranian weapons supplied to Houthi insurgents in Yemen are being trafficked by criminal networks into the Horn of Africa.

Such seizures provide compelling evidence for the established illicit movement of weapons from Iran to Yemen. However, evidence has emerged to suggest that some of these Iranian weapons may subsequently be trafficked by criminal networks into the Horn of Africa from Yemen (or even be diverted while en route to Yemen). The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (GI-TOC) research has indicated that there may be a plausible link between Iranian arms supplies to the Houthis and weapons smuggled into Somalia.

In late June 2020, the GI-TOC contacted an arms dealer based in Sana’a, the capital of Yemen. We will refer to him with the pseudonym Jabir Al-Haadi. In approaching Al-Haadi, the GI-TOC assumed the persona of an Arabic-speaking Somali national who lived in Nairobi and went by the alias “Jama”. Jama told Al-Haadi that he was attempting to broker an arms deal on behalf of a (fictitious) South Sudanese client.

Between 27 June and 5 July, Al-Haadi and Jama exchanged dozens of recorded voice messages on the WhatsApp platform. Over the course of these exchanges, Al-Haadi shared detailed information about his operation, including his current weapons stocks, his associates and preferred means of receiving financial transfers. He also provided several photographs of weapons held at his storehouse in Sana’a, including one showing the serial number and related markings of a recently manufactured Chinese Type 56-1 rifle.

Based on this serial number, we subsequently determined that the rifle shared characteristics with weapons reportedly provided by Iran to the Houthi movement. Moreover, a Type 56-1 rifle with a highly similar serial number sequence had been documented in central Somalia in April 2019. The GI-TOC’s research tentatively indicates the existence of illicit-arms smuggling networks that see Iranian arms intended for Yemen end up in Somalia, and potentially beyond.

The history of the Yemen–Somalia arms trade

Somalia has been under a UN arms embargo since 1992, making all imports of military equipment into the country (outside of specified Security Council exemptions) violations of international law. Since that time, Somali arms importers have looked to Yemen as their primary source for illicit arms

The anatomy of an (abortive) arms deal

Over the course of conducting research for a forthcoming study on the Yemen–Somalia arms trade, the GI-TOC found contact information for Jabir Al-Haadi, an arms dealer based in Sana’a. Using the fictitious identity “Jama”, in late June the GI-TOC contacted Al-Haadi with the aim of better understanding the modalities of the Yemen– Somalia arms trade.

Al-Haadi’s willingness to communicate openly over a messenger application and furnish detailed information about the nature of his arms business to a new acquaintance was indicative of the environment of impunity in which he operates. From the GI-TOC’s exchanges with Al-Haadi, he appeared to be a small-scale supplier who primarily services domestic requirements in Yemen. However, his possession of assault rifles similar to those documented in Somalia provides an interesting window into the possibility of a common origin in Iran. While far more data is required before any definitive conclusions can be drawn, the Al-Haadi case study suggests interesting avenues for future research.

(** B P)

[from May 2, 2019]: Freeing the Kidnapped in Yemen’s War

How Yemeni Mothers Succeeded Where Everyone Else Failed

Thousands of young men are being forcibly disappeared in Yemen, and mediation efforts by the United Nations envoys, the Red Cross, and many other international organizations have not been successful. The only successful group so far is a coalition of Yemeni mothers, the Abductees’ Mothers’ Association. These women are the only hope for the young men who are kidnapped, tortured, and sometimes bargained in political standoffs between the Houthis and the Yemeni government. So far the association has negotiated the release of over 600 young man.

“Our story started in Sanaa three years ago,” explains Amal Abdulrahman, one of the leading figures in the Abductees’ Mothers’ Association. “It expanded to Hodeidah and other governorates in 2017, and in mid-2018, there was a fusion with a coalition of mothers of the disappeared in Aden. Every governorate represents itself but we are all under one umbrella coalition.” Before the coalition, each woman would do whatever she could to help get her family member released. “We tried talking to many officials, up to the presidential palace. But they do not care. They may sympathize and wish that the disappeared or kidnapped reemerge, but they didn’t take the issue seriously with us as individuals.” Then the women formed a united front. The coalition provides some protection for them–safety in numbers during protests or meetings. Individually, women were subjected to beating, stoning, and stabbing attempts. Instead of one woman standing in the face of danger, they became a group, united in effort and in voice.

Overall, more than 600 men have been freed so far. The Association negotiated and put pressure till some were swapped, others freed with guarantees, and some under what the Houthis call a “pardon”.

Forcible disappearances and illegal detentions, or kidnappings as Abdulrahman calls it, happen on both sides of the conflict, and the Association does not discriminate. “Houthi mothers have reached out to us, and we helped them in all the ways that we could. A mother is a mother, her pain is like mine, and mothers do not discriminate, she says.

The Association, made up of mothers, sisters, cousins and family members, humanized the issue and made ignoring them a massive political problem for both sides of the conflict. With regular protesting, and persistent attempts at being heard, the women succeeded. “We try to depoliticize the issue. Politics should be serving people, not that people be used as props for a political gain,” Abdulrahman says.

Their inclusion of women from both sides and their ability to humanize the issues, has strengthened the Association’s credibility and people’s belief in the sincerity of their efforts. But such credibility and sincerity do not offer enough safety. In fact, women activists face detentions, prison, and sometimes death sentences, on top of defamation. “I personally have been threatened three times,” says Abdulrahman. Sometimes women protesters get beaten, “We had a peaceful demonstration at the Public Prosecutor’s office. A group of women approached us and we thought they would join our cause or were demonstrating for another one. They beat us. We noticed that the women were coming out of the Public Prosecutor’s office. We understood that this is his reply to our calls.”

The situation is different from one province to the other, and from one city to the next. In Aden, “because the government likes to propagate itself as law-abiding, we were able to meet everyone. We were able to meet the President, the Vice President, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, and the Public Prosecutor,” explains Abdulrahman.

But in Sanaa, it is not easy. The women were denied meeting with officials. “After having us wait for a long time outside the Capital Secretary’s office, they told is he left the building. We, then, went outside and saw his car so we ran after the car as he rolled up the window. People kept saying “please at least listen to the women”. We followed the car till the end of the road, and he would not stop for us.”

A year ago, the women also protested at the Presidential Palace in Sanaa, demanding to meet the head of the political council. They ended their demonstration after being promised to get an appointment, no one contacted them till this day.

Other challenges involve attacking the mothers’ character. “I was speaking to the Amnesty Committee (formed by the Political Council in Sanaa) about the release of my son. One of the officials told me, that I did not raise my son properly. I was shocked, I told him I am here to respectfully speak about my son’s release, asking you to objectively view his case, and your answer is to attack my person and how I raised my son?”

But the mothers continue to work, despite everything. Even while Sanaa was being shelled, they demonstrated. “We not only bear all Yemeni’s pain (from the war), but also the pain of having our family members kidnapped. When some Houthi leaders told us to leave, we said we cannot. How does a mother just leave her son behind?”

The state in which the kidnapped are in, after their release is also a huge challenge.

The Association is in regular contact with the UN Envoy office in Yemen, the Red Cross, and any international organization offering support. “Every time we communicate with anyone, we are aware that this subjects us to be imprisoned ourselves.” Abdulrahman says that getting the message to the right people, mediation and continuous demonstrations is what puts pressure on authorities and makes a release mission successful. “Without the demonstrations, we are told by rights activists, human rights advocates would not be able to pressure,” she says.

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Why the UAE wants Somalia in the Yemen conflict

Ties unbind

It would be naïve to assume that the UAE is oblivious to the current state of the SNA and the narrow capabilities it would bring to Yemen’s conflict. This also extends to providing humanitarian relief for Somali migrants caught in the crosshairs of the warring factions and allegedly experiencing mistreatment at the hands of their “hosts.” The UAE knows this because, prior to the Gulf crisis that erupted in mid-2017, Abu Dhabi was also a major provider of military support to Somalia.

Back in 2014, the Emirates embarked on its own program to train and mentor Somali troops. This arrangement started to unravel following Mogadishu’s refusal to take sides in the ongoing blockade of Qatar. The final nail came April 2018, after Somali security forces seized $9.6 million from a plane recently landed from the UAE. Despite Abu Dhabi’s protestations that the money was to pay the troops it was training, Mogadishu suspected the cash was to be used for more insidious purposes.

With an irksome SNA now effectively someone else’s problem, the UAE recalibrated its support for Somalia’s semi-autonomous regions. This included military and police training and the construction of an airbase at the Somaliland port of Berbera. Situated just 300 kilometers away from Yemen, the city is a strategically important location for a country heavily involved in the conflict, not to mention determined to cement its influence around the Red Sea.

However, the UAE’s relations with Somalia’s autonomous states are by no means perfect

For its part, Somalia’s President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo offset poor relations with the UAE by drawing closer to Qatar and Turkey. Over the past decade, Doha has reportedly invested $4 billion in the country and recently struck a deal to build a seaport at Hobyo on the Bab-el-Mandeb. While Turkey has also poured billions into Somalia, Ankara’s most significant investment comes in the shape of Camp TURKSOM, Turkey’s biggest overseas military base. Costing approximately $50 million, this Turkish facility assists in the training of SNA recruits. It also underscores Ankara’s growing influence across the Horn of Africa region.

Meet the opposition

Just as Abu Dhabi knows all about the SNA’s limitations, it also knew its request for Mogadishu to become involved in the Yemen conflict would be rebuffed. Beyond Somalia’s brotherly affinity with its neighbors across the Gulf of Aden, the aforementioned investments demonstrate the depth of its relations with two of the UAE’s biggest strategic rivals. However, this could change once the country is in a position to hold parliamentary and presidential elections.

Accordingly, the UAE and other blockading states seemingly have a cohesive Somali opposition movement to throw its weight behind come election time. Electoral success could result in the redrawing of Mogadishu’s relations with the Emirates at the expense of Somalia’s partnerships with Turkey and Qatar. While the FNP will fight both elections on an anti-corruption and pro-constitution platform, the potential to spin the UAE’s request to join the Yemen conflict is unmissable. By failing to support its neighbor, Somalia has deprived itself of much-needed investment and access to health care just when it needs it most. -by Adam Dempsey =

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Tickende Zeitbombe wird zum politischen Spielball – Streit um Tanker statt Frieden im Jemen

Während die Welt geschockt bleibt von den Eindrücken aus Beirut und Mauritius, warnen immer mehr Stimmen vor einer Katastrophe durch den Öltanker Safer vor der Küste des Jemen. Allerdings verschieben sich die Forderungen, das potenzielle Desaster wird längst politisiert.

Während die laut UN größte humanitäre Katastrophe der Welt zur medialen Randnotiz geworden zu sein scheint, obwohl zuletzt allein die heftigen Regenfälle knapp so viele Tote gefordert hatten wie die verheerende Explosion in Beirut, steht seit einigen Wochen die Frage um die sichere Entsorgung des Öltankers Safer im Vordergrund.

Auch das Augenmerk der momentan stattfindenden Friedensverhandlungen liegt auf dem Safer-Tanker, der seit Jahren vor der Küste der westjemenitischen Provinz al-Hudaida vor Anker liegt und aufgrund mangelnder Instandhaltung immenses Katastrophenpotenzial berge – ein Problem, das laut UN keinesfalls politisiert werden dürfe. Doch das ist längst der Fall.

Im Juni forderte der UN-Sicherheitsrat die Huthis auf, "den technischen Experten der Vereinten Nationen unverzüglich bedingungslosen Zugang zu gewähren, damit sie den Zustand des Tankers beurteilen, alle möglichen dringenden Reparaturen durchführen und Empfehlungen für die sichere Förderung des Öls abgeben können".

Immer dringender klingen die Aufrufe auch der am Krieg auf Seiten der Saudi-Koalition beteiligten Golfstaaten oder ihrer Medien.

Auch der berüchtigte US-Thinktank Atlantic Council hat im vergangenen Jahr seine Warnungen vermeldet und den Tanker als "schwimmende Bombe" bezeichnet. Und auch Oberst Turki al-Maliki, Sprecher der Arabischen Koalition gegen die Huthis, warnte, der Safer-Tanker sei eine ernsthafte Gefahr für das Rote Meer.

Doch die Huthis selbst, die mittlerweile große Teile des Landes sowie die Region um den Tanker kontrollieren, haben lange vor dieser Katastrophe gewarnt und um Hilfe gebeten, die aber letztendlich an den "saudischen Aggressoren" scheiterte.

So wurde UN-Ingenieuren der Zugang seitens der Huthis gewährt. Doch, so erklärte Ahmed Abdullah Dares, Energieminister der Huthis, bereits im ARD-Interview, dass " jedes Mal, wenn ein Team von uns den Tanker erreichen will, saudische Kampfjets auftauchen und uns angreifen. Das ist ein großes Problem".

Am 22. April warnte Mohammed al-Houthi, der Vorsitzende des Obersten Revolutionskomitees der Huthis, auf Twitter vor den Gefahren für die Umwelt und den Seeverkehr, die von der Safer ausgehen.

Am 30. April schrieb er laut der emiratischen Nachrichtenseite The National: "Wir fordern die UNO und den Sicherheitsrat auf, einen Mechanismus einzurichten, um jemenitisches Rohöl, einschließlich des Öls in der Safer, zu verkaufen."

Demnach sei der Verkauf von Öl für die Huthis geplant, um von den Einnahmen Brennstoffimporte sowie öffentliche Gehälter zu zahlen.

Die Ladung an Bord des Safer-Tankers hat einen Wert von rund 80 Millionen US-Dollar. Im Jemen kommt es immer wieder zu Stromunterbrechungen, die für Krankenhäuser fatal sein können, öffentliche Angestellte wurden seit Monaten nicht bezahlt.

Bevor das Thema in dieser Woche wieder auf der Tagesordnung des UN-Sicherheitsrates stand, bekräftigte der stellvertretende Außenminister der Huthis, Hussein al-Ezzi, dass seit Langem eine Reihe von Anstrengungen zur Sicherung des Tankers unternommen wurde, seit dem Jahr 2016, als das Schiff noch in gutem Zustand war und nur einige Ausrüstungsgegenstände zur Wartung benötigt worden wären, was von der saudisch geführten Koalition abgelehnt wurde.

Während einer Pressekonferenz erklärte al-Ezzi, dass die Vereinten Nationen erst nach drei Jahren des Zögerns zugestimmt hatten, das Wartungsteam zu entsenden, das dann im August 2019 eintreffen sollte.

"Die Vereinten Nationen hielten sich jedoch nicht an die Vereinbarung, obwohl dem Team ein Einreisevisum erteilt wurde. Sanaa war überrascht, dass die Vereinten Nationen die Aufgabe des Teams von der Wartung zur Entsorgung geändert hatten, was von Sanaa abgelehnt wurde. Nach den Bemühungen von Sanaa und der Kommunikation mit dem UNO-Offiziellen gab der UNO-Gesandte zu, dass es einen schwerwiegenden Bruch in der Mission des Teams gab."

Mohammed Abdulsalam, Sprecher der Ansarallah-Bewegung, wie die Huthis auch genannt werden, hatte im August beteuert, dass wiederholte Bitten, den Tanker zu warten und zu reparieren, kontinuierlich ignoriert worden seien, auch hatte der Öltanker seit Beginn der saudischen Aggression keinen Treibstoff für die Durchführung seiner Sicherheits- und Wartungsverfahren erhalten. Weiterhin seien die Vereinten Nationen wegen ihrer Untätigkeit gegen die jahrelangen saudischen Bombenangriffe und die Blockade des Jemen sowie der Streichung von Saudi-Arabien aus der Liste von Kindermördern nicht in der Position, sich über humanitäre Missstände zu äußern.

Meine Bemerkung: Mehr in cp2, cp7.

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

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Adapting with an open ear in the age of COVID-19

Feedback & COVID-19

Since 2005, The Small And Micro Enterprise Promotion Service (SMEPS) has fostered entrepreneurship and financial sustainability in Yemen. We do this by linking development and humanitarian projects together in order to create sustainable jobs that influence social good. As such, we strengthen food supply chains and associated small businesses across the country. SEMPS hopes to see small and medium businesses expand into new areas of the market and introduce new products.

In Yemen, COVID-19 is an evolving disaster that is further challenged by ongoing conflict. The context and needs keep changing, so we have to remain nimble in our response. Even though much of the population lacks reliable access to information, and the changing circumstances of conflict prevent consistent outreach, SMEPS has launched several successful initiatives aimed at keeping people informed and safe.

Our early response to COVID-19 was enabled by our existing good relationships with the communities we serve. Before COVID-19, we were in the field as much as possible and people came to know and trust us. Our Communications Team was responsible for going into the field to connect with people and hear what more we could do to help. We always tell people, “don’t thank us. Share your honest thoughts”, which opens up space for an honest conversation. Over the years, people came to see that we were there to serve and had good intentions, and they began to open up to us. Once I went into the field and there was a farmer who said that though we had supported him, we were late with our support. I took a video of him saying his complaint and we posted it with the hashtag #SEMPSLearning to show that we make mistakes but are receptive to feedback and trying to improve.

These relationships with the community proved paramount in our COVID-19 response.

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7 new cases of coronavirus reported, 1,899 in total

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3 new cases of coronavirus reported, 1,892 in total

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7 new cases of coronavirus reported, 1,889 in total

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Lives Lost: Doctor who battled disease outbreaks in Yemen

For five decades, Yassin Abdel-Wareth was one of a handful of epidemiologists in Yemen, traveling across the impoverished country to hunt for disease outbreaks that are as endemic as armed conflicts in the Middle East’s poorest nation.

He had seen cholera, malaria, Rift Valley fever and, in early June, he was worried about the new coronavirus.

Abdel-Wareth told his brother: “The virus is in every house in Yemen.”

Weeks later, the 72-year-old doctor-turned-epidemiologist was dead from COVID-19. His family said he may have contracted the virus while inspecting a quarantine facility set up outside the capital, Sanaa, by Houthi rebels, who have been concealing the virus’s toll in Yemen.

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Coronavirus im Jemen: „Ich kann meine Kinder nicht schützen“

Radeah lebt mit ihren sieben Kindern in einer überfüllten Notunterkunft. In diesem Lager für vertriebene Familien drängen alle zu den wenigen Wasserentnahmestellen. Die hygienischen Bedingungen sind schlecht. Viele BewohnerInnen müssen sich die sanitären Einrichtungen teilen. Und das alles, während sich im Jemen das Coronavirus ausbreitet.

„Meine Kinder sollten nicht ohne Schutzmasken auf der Straße unterwegs sein. Sie sollten hier bleiben, um Kontakte und damit Ansteckung zu vermeiden“, sagt Radeah. Doch sie hat keine Wahl. Seit ihr Mann verstorben ist, müssen die älteste Tochter Ahlam und der älteste Sohn Mohammed arbeiten, damit die Familie überleben kann. Zur Schule können sie schon länger nicht mehr. „Von den frühen Morgenstunden bis spät in den Abend schuften sie, damit wir was zu essen haben“, sagt Radeah.

Die Familie hat kein sauberes Wasser und auch keine Seife. Wie Radeah und ihren Kindern geht es mehr als 3,6 Millionen Menschen, die wegen des Krieges ihr Zuhause verloren haben und nun in Notlagern ausharren.

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In Yemen, Moms Sew Masks To Protect Their Kids And Their Community

A program created to fight the spread of cholera now pivots to take on COVID-19

At the Al-Shab IDP center in Aden, Yemen, 350 families driven out of their homes by violence in Taiz and Al Hudaydah are living in cramped quarters. Access to clean water, necessary to prevent disease transmission, is limited. UNICEF and partners have been working in the IDP centers for some time, providing health care and water and sanitation services. After a cholera outbreak in 2017, they mobilized groups of mothers to teach their neighbors how to stay safe. The mother-to-mother (M2M) educators went door-to-door sharing health information and distributing hygiene supplies to help families in the community protect themselves from cholera.

Using the money they earned from their peer educator work, mothers bought sewing machines to make clothes and generate some income. Now, with the spread of COVID-19 around the world, the mothers have mobilized again, sewing masks to help their neighbors stop the spread of the virus. They make up to 100 masks a day and distribute them to families while sharing important messaging about social distancing and handwashing.

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13 new cases of coronavirus reported, 1,882 in total

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11 new cases of coronavirus reported, 1,869 in total

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Yemen COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Snapshot - As of 15 August 2020

As of 15 August, the number of reported confirmed COVID-19 cases in Yemen had reached 1,862 with 529 associated deaths and 1,015 recoveries. Men constitute 74 per cent of all reported cases and most COVID-19 cases and deaths are reported among people aged 45 and above. The highest number of confirmed cases continue to be reported in Hadramaut (820 cases, 252 deaths and 362 recoveries), followed by Taizz (300 cases, 80 deaths and 202 recoveries), and Aden (272 cases, 32 deaths and 194 recoveries). The number of cases reported has slowed though indicators suggest that the virus continues to spread and that the number of confirmed cases and deaths fall below actual numbers. The reasons for this include a lack of testing facilities and official reporting, and people delaying seeking treatment because of stigma, difficulty accessing treatment centres and the perceived risks of seeking care.

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Yemen - 2020 AWD / Cholera Response Dashboard - Weeks 1 - 30

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Yemen - Status: affected by circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus 1 (cVDPV1)

Yemen is affected by a circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 1 (cVDPV1). The isolates have 17-24 Nt changes from Sabin 1, suggesting circulation of potentially up to two years.

Cases have been reported from different districts of Saada Governorate, in the north-west of the country, and outbreak response is being implemented.

With large-scale population movements with other areas of the Horn of Africa, notably Djibouti and northern Somalia, a more thorough Horn of Africa risk assessment to both type 1 and type 2 poliovirus is being conducted.

cp1b Am wichtigsten: Regen und Überschwemmungen / Most important: Rain and flash floods

Siehe / Look at cp13b

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Sana'a civil defense warns of new Zafeer disaster

The Yemeni Sana'a-based civil defense authority on Thursday warned people in al-Tawila town, north Sana'a, of a potential rock slides that would remind of a tragedy experienced by Zafeer village in 2005, when more than 90 people were killed.

Rock blocks overlooking al-Tawila in Mahweet governorate are about to fall down and pose a serious risk to people lives and private and public properties, the authority said in a statement.

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Film: Two people died and another was injured due to landslides caused by heavy rain in Al-Maflahi district in Lahj governorate.

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Six people injured in two houses collapse in Sanaa

Six people were injured on Tuesday in two collapsed houses due to the heavy rains in Bani Hushish district, Sanaa governorate.

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[Sanaa gov.] Civil Defense: 70 people died, 462 homes demolished due to floods

The Civil Defense Department revealed, in a press conference held in Sanaa on Monday, the death of 70 people and the demolition of 462 houses due to the heavy rains and floods that Yemen witnessed during the past days.

The Civil Defense Department explained that 49 deaths were caused by drowning, ten as a result of house collapse, and 11 others as a result of rockslides, in addition to 13 wounded people.

According to the Department, 162 rockslides were recorded, 126 machines sank, one dam collapsed, 36 heads of livestock died, and 56 square kilometers of agricultural land were washed away, while six areas are still vulnerable to collapse.

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cp2 Allgemein / General

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Interactive Map of Yemen War

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UAE and Israel planning joint naval maneuvers in Yemeni waters

UAE base on Socotra island to be used for Zionist forces.

Military sources on Tuesday revealed Emirati and Israeli preparations to carry out a joint naval maneuvers starting from the Yemeni island of Socotra towards the Bab al-Mandab Strait, according to Yemen Press Agency.

The sources confirmed that the UAE has established a joint underground operations room with the Israeli navy in one of the military sites it has created in the Ras Qattainan area, located southwest of Socotra, towards the islands of Samha and Abd al-Kuri and the Horn of Africa.

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We need to reopen Yemen’s airports and sea routes to save lives

As national borders have closed, respective worlds have shrunk. Opportunities, connections and freedoms have disappeared. Birth, deaths and marriages of friends and family on the outside have been missed. 2020 will be defined for many by all that they have had to give up

The pandemic internment is intended to keep people safe and well. Yemen’s is a death sentence.

For four years, seriously ill Yemenis living in the capital and across northern parts of the country have not been able to fly out for lifesaving treatment. Thousands of children, women and men may have died prematurely because they were unable to access hospitals abroad, according to local heath authorities.

Before the first case of Covid-19 reached Yemen in April, the blockade and other import restrictions had left doctors struggling with obsolete equipment, and doubled the cost of many essential medicines. This stranglehold has continued during the pandemic, when obtaining the fuel to run ventilators or getting hold of a bar of soap marks the difference between life and death.

Today, hospitals in Sana’s are running reduced hours because of power cuts—fuel imports are at their lowest ever recorded. A quarter of a million people have had their water cut back or taps run dry because there is no fuel to run the pumps. With coronavirus added to the mix, it’s a toxic cocktail.

A combination of the blockade and restrictions on Yemen’s imports is also crushing what remains of Yemen’s economy. While ships carrying food and fuel wait at sea, small businesses are going under and prices are rocketing, pushing millions more people to depend on aid to survive.

The Human Rights Council believes the closure of Sana’a International Airport, plus the restriction of imports into a defacto naval blockade, violates the laws of war. Warring parties are required to do all they can to protect civilians, not collectively punish them.

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Enablers of Tragedy: How Leaders Are Fueling the Humanitarian Catastrophe in Yemen

As a human rights NGO monitoring attacks on health care in Yemen and advocating for a rights-respecting response to COVID-19 globally, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) has been gravely concerned to see so many parts of the international community give the “all clear” to warring parties that have histories of violently attacking health care. In June, the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, decided to remove the Saudi- and Emirati-led Coalition from the notorious “list of shame” – a report with an annex listing parties to conflicts that are violating children’s rights, including by attacking health facilities. Further boosting Saudi Arabia’s sense of impunity, the UK in July decided to re-authorize arms sales to Saudi Arabia, claiming to not see any risk of British military equipment being used in a serious violation of international humanitarian law. Through these decisions, the UK and the secretary-general’s office have exhibited a clear disregard for fact-based decision-making and stained their supposed commitments to leadership on universal human rights. To make matters worse, the Trump administration has announced that it seeks to bypass an arms control pact to allow for the sale of armed drones to Middle Eastern arms importers such as Saudi Arabia. These developments come just as the State Department inspector general released a report confirming that the agency has failed to take proper consideration of the risk of civilian casualties when selling $8 billion worth of weaponry to certain Middle Eastern countries last year.

The signals of approval afforded to militaries with atrocious track records conducting hostilities have resulted in an immediate uptick in attacks on civilians in Yemen,

Yemen is facing tragedy upon tragedy. With such a clear connection between the active destruction of the health system and the perfect storm posed by the compound threats of COVID-19, famine, cholera, and economic collapse, it is urgent that the international community act now to end the abuses.

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World leaders must act now to save Yemen

When I spoke to the Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at Unversity of Denver, Nader Hashemi, told me that, "Much of this suffering is attributable to the absence of global leadership. Specifically, the refusal of the United States and the United Kingdom to stop Saudi Arabia’s bombing of Yemen which is a key source of this country’s suffering.”

There is indeed a clear lack of global cooperation to save Yemen because the country is not at the top of the agenda for world leaders, and this is one reason why Yemen’s crisis is deepening.

It is shameful that Western governments, who have the means to provide funds, did not. Rather, some of them have sold arms to the Saudi-led coalition, which has committed numerous war crimes in Yemen. This suggests that these governments are prioritising their economic ties with Riyadh over the world's most dire humanitarian need.

This image of what the Yemenis could soon face stresses the need for world leaders to take action. There should be a global effort to deliver humanitarian aid to the country to prevent more people dying from starvation.

As always, it is Yemenis who tend to pay the heavy price.

None of the warring parties should be exempt from being held responsible for the conditions Yemenis live in today.

Yet world leaders also share responsibility as they turned a blind eye to Yemen’s tragedy when they are capable of playing a positive role. If the governments that sell arms to Saudi Arabia were firm with Riyadh and set boundaries, it is unlikely that the tragedy Yemenis live in, would have reached this extent. Now, as the situation further deteriorates, action is necessary more than at any other time.

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Audio: Zerstörtes Jemen - Said AlDailami

Der Jemen hieß einmal "Arabia felix", glückliches Arabien, sagt Staatswissenschaftler Said AlDailami. Heute ist der Großteil seines Geburtslandes zerstört, seit fünf Jahren tobt dort ein Krieg - weitgehend unbeachtet vom Rest der Welt.

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Cartoon depict the girl who was shot by Houthi sniper in Taiz with monsters licking her trail of blood. Each monster symbolises the following parties:UN, Saudi-led coalition, Hadi’s government, & Houthis. All r responsible for this crime: shooting, betrayal, complicity

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"Marib's desert is devouring your kids. Sadness is breaking my heart for them'

This headline is a plead by Yemeni writer Adel Doshaylah. As his words suggest, he is appealing to the tribes around Sana'a and other northern Yemen tribes to "stop sending your children to the warfront alongside Houthis", warning them that they die in large numbers participating in the Houthi relentless military campaign to press forward on the government-held Marib.

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Houthis: Coalition aircraft left 6 million cluster bombs in Yemen

The Saudi-led airstrikes have left more than 6 million cluster bombs in Yemen, the Houthi group said Tuesday, warning of a real disaster risking the life of civilians across the war-torn country.
This figure is based on an initial survey on the Arab coalition air raids' waste, the Houthi-run National Demining Action (NDA) said in a statement carried by the Sana'a-based Saba.
"Tens of civilians are persistently reported as casualties of cluster bombs in Jawf and Sa'ada governorates and Nihm district," east Sana'a City, it added.
These and other areas "are awash with thousands of cluster bombs that pose a threat to civilians," NDA said.
Four NDA engineers were injured by two US bombs, as they lifted cluster bombs in the nearby of civilian houses in Barran area, Nihm district, according to the statement.

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Infringement to freedom of movement by Houthis security checkpoints continues

The Houthis militants have changed inter-governorates travel between the government-held areas and areas of their control into a hell to male and female travelers.

The Female Relatives Association to the Detainees in Yemen, a local NGO that advocates for rights of the illegal detainees, quoted a testimony by three women travelers who were caught and detained while on their way from Sana'a to Marib, 173 kilometers east of Sana’a.

The women spoke about being stopped and detained by a Houthis-manned checkpoint in Sanaban of Dhamar for eight hours with no access to food or water.

The women said that they were detained along with their three children from 9:00 am to 7:00 pm after being questioned on reasons of their travel from Sana’a to Marib.

The women said that the Houthis officials were never convinced by their answers that they were on a family visit to their relatives in Marib.

My comment: Things like this one do happen at checkpoints of all parties and militia.

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Saudi-led coalition destroyed 200 Yemen factories: report

A new rebel-held ministry report blamed the Saudi-led coalition for exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, where air strikes have destroyed 200 factories.

The Saudi-led coalition has destroyed at least 200 factories and production facilities in Yemen, where much of the country’s infrastructure has already been decimated.

A recent report revealed Yemen’s industries had suffered severe damages due to multiple coalition air strikes, aiding in the deteriorating circumstances across the country, including poverty, chronic unemployment, war and raging conflict.
According to the report issued by the Houthi-controlled ministry of industry and trade, the attacks had completely paralysed the industrial movement, The New Arab’s sister Arabic-news platform Al-Araby Al-Jadeed reported.

By targeting the facilities, the coalition had struck Yemen’s economy and greatly impacted the people’s livelihoods, a rebel source told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed.
In a previous reports, the Yemeni private sector had estimated some two billion dollars in damage to the industrial sector in the country.

The reports lay 55 percent of the blame on direct coalition attacks, shortly followed by indirect strikes at 35 percent, while 10 percent was a result of clashes.
Tamim Al-Saqqaf, director of the Commercial and Industrial Department in the Sana'a Capital Secretariat, confirmed that the private sector has been severely affected, despite its neutrality and lack of links to any of the parties to the conflict.

(* A H K)

Oxfam verurteilt Luftangriffe auf Krankenhäuser, Brunnen und Wassertanks

Seit der Konflikt im Jemen vor mehr als fünf Jahren eskalierte, wurden medizinische Einrichtungen und die Infrastruktur der Wasserversorgung fast 200 Mal durch Luftangriffe getroffen. Zuletzt gab es auch Attacken auf COVID-19-Quarantänezentren, was den Einsatz gegen die Pandemie erschwert. Das zeigt eine aktuelle Analyse von Oxfam. Die Nothilfe- und Entwicklungsorganisation fordert mehr Engagement der internationalen Gemeinschaft, um das Leid im Jemen zu beenden.

Oxfam hat Informationen über Luftangriffe ausgewertet, die vom Yemen Data Project gesammelt wurden. Das Ergebnis: In den vergangenen fünf Jahren gab es fast 200 Attacken auf Krankenhäuser, Krankenwagen, Wassertanks oder Wassertanklaster. Das entspricht einem Angriff alle zehn Tage. Währenddessen verkauften zahlreiche Länder an Saudi-Arabien und seine Koalitionspartner Waffen und Munition im Wert von mehreren Milliarden US-Dollar – obwohl sie wussten, dass diese zum Teil unter Verletzung des humanitären Völkerrechts eingesetzt werden könnten.

Unterdessen verschlimmert die COVID-19-Pandemie die humanitäre Lage im Jemen zusätzlich.

(* A H K)

One air raid every ten days on hospitals, clinics, wells and water tanks throughout Yemen war

Medical and water infrastructure in Yemen has been hit during air raids almost 200 times since the conflict escalated more than five years ago, Oxfam said today, as the country continued to battle its outbreak of COVID-19.

That’s equivalent to one air raid every ten days during the conflict affecting hospitals, clinics, ambulances, water drills, tanks and trucks, according to an Oxfam analysis of information on airstrikes collected by the Yemen Data Project.

British arms have been used by the coalition in the conflict; the fragment of a bomb supplied by the UK was found at the site of an attack on Abs Hospital in Hajjah governorate which killed 19 civilians and injured 24 more in August 2016.

Yemen’s medical facilities have been decimated by more than five years of war, with only half fully functional. The United Nations estimates that 20.5m people – two thirds of the population – need help to get clean water. Oxfam warned last month that thousands of people could be dying from undetected cases of cholera because COVID-19 has overwhelmed the country’s remaining health facilities.

Ruth Tanner, Oxfam’s Head of Humanitarian Campaigns said: “Hospitals, clinics, water tanks and wells are vital to protect people from disease and should never be the targets of military action. And yet, they’ve consistently been in the cross hairs throughout this conflict.

(A P)

Yemeni fishers arrive Hodeida after month in coalition detention: Houthis

21 Yemeni fishers have arrived in the western governorate of Hodeida, the Houthi group said late on Saturday, after one month of detention by the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen.
The 21 fishermen arrived in the port of Salif, 70 kilometers to the northwest of Hodeida city, the Houthi-run Saba reported.
Head of the Houthi authority for Red Sea fisheries accused the Arab coalition of abducting 24 fishermen, the Sana'a-based news agency said.
The fishers were "fishing, westward Thu Thalath Island, mid-July, when they were taken to Forsan jail and then Jizan prison,"

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

(A K P)

Yemeni Official: UN’s Silence Towards Detaining Oil Ships Part of US-Saudi Aggression

Member of the Supreme Political Council, Ahmed Ghaleb Al-Rahwi, confirmed that the United Nations' silent towards the aggression detention of oil derivative ships, despite obtaining entry permits, makes the UN a partner in the aggression and siege on the Yemeni people.

(A K P)

[Sanaa gov.] Prime Minister Calls on International Community to Fulfill Its Responsibilities Over Detained Oil Ships

Prime Minister Dr. Abdulaziz Saleh bin Habtoor renewed his call to the United Nations, the Security Council and the international community to bear legal and moral responsibility towards the arbitrariness practiced by the coalition of the US-Saudi aggression by repeatedly detaining ships of oil derivatives for long periods.

(A K P)

Diesel to run out in next two days in north Yemen, company

The Yemen petroleum company in the Houthi-run Sanaa on Tuesday criticised the United Nations' position on the continued holding of fuel ships by a Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen.
The UN is pleasing the coalition and donors through staying silent over international maritime piracy and blockade, the company said in a press release, a copy of which was obtained by Debriefer.
The UN chose shameful silence and to stand idly by without taking action to save its face amid terrible facts about blocking fuel ships from entering Yemen, the company said, warning that diesel will run out in Houthi-run regions in the next two days.

(A P)

Houthis plan to sue coalition for denying oil tankers access to Hodeida

The Houthis plan to take legal action against the Saudi-led coalition for detaining oil tankers off the Yemeni western ports of Hodeida, the group said Saturday.
"Yemen has not benefited from the global decline in oil prices," the Houthi-appointed oil minister told the Sana'a-based Saba, "due to fines imposed on oil tankers denied access to Hodeida port."
Lengthy detention of tankers "costs nearly US$ 250 million in fines borne by the Yemeni people, exacerbating their living sufferings," Ahmed Daris added.
He said his ministry plans to prosecute the Arab coalition for "making the oil supplies to service sectors halt and the Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) run out of oil stocks, diesel in particular."

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

Siehe / Look at cp9 (USAID)

(*B H)

Film: Impact of War on Development in Yemen: From Data to Practice

The session, which builds on the data presented by Dr. Moyer during his interview of August 10, discussed tangible examples of interventions that help households and communities cope with, and recover from, the multidimensional humanitarian, development and health crises.

Panelists: - Mari Tertsunen, Country Director for Yemen, GIZ - Lamis Al-Iryani , Monitoring and Evaluation Unit Head at Yemen’s Social Fund for Development (SFD). - Auke Lootsma, Resident Representative in Yemen for UNDP since February 2019. - Marina Wes, World Bank Country Director for Egypt, Yemen and Djibouti Presented by UNDP/World Bank

(* B H)

UNFPA Response in Yemen: Monthly Situation Report #07 July 2020

The humanitarian crisis in Yemen continues to worsen; characterized by increasing needs – including hunger and COVID-19 – escalating conflict, and a collapsing economy. An estimated 24 million people – about 80 per cent of the population – is need of humanitarian aid and protection. Millions of Yemenis who depend on aid for survival are now hanging by a thread as humanitarian agencies, including UNFPA, run out of money to fund lifesaving assistance, while humanitarian needs continue to grow.

More than US$3.2 billion is required for the humanitarian response in Yemen in 2020. With only around $650 million of the $1.35 billion pledged received by the end of July, the aid operation in Yemen is teetering on the brink of collapse with grave ramifications for millions of Yemenis who rely on humanitarian assistance for survival.

UNFPA’s appeal for $100.5 million in 2020 received only 53 per cent by end July. If this funding trajectory continues, UNFPA will be forced to suspend operations further, including operations of the rapid response mechanism by August and women’s protection programme by October 2020.

(* B H)

Social protection amidst social upheaval: Examining the impact of a multi-faceted program for ultra-poor households in Yemen

The poorest members of society are often chronically food insecure and lack stable income-generating activities. Under the belief that a short-term big push can help households establish and sustain a stable self-employment activity, social protection programs, often referred to as “graduation” programs, combine short-term relief with a productive asset transfer, training, and ongoing support. Using randomized evaluations in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Honduras, Pakistan, and Peru, this model has been found to generate positive impacts that persisted after two and three years (Banerjee et al. 2015), as well as after four and seven years (Banerjee et al. 2016; Bandiera et al. 2017).

While this approach is adapted to each setting, all sites share several key elements. Each tested program begins by identifying the poorest households within a community.

We find modest positive results four years after the start of the program. Household selected into the program have a higher level of assets and savings, though this increase in wealth is substantially less than the value of the transfers received by the household four years earlier. We do not have precise estimates on per capita consumption or household income, and thus can draw no conclusions for these outcomes.

(* B H)

COVID-19 exacerbates the effects of water shortages on women in Yemen

The UN estimates that gender-based violence (GBV) has affected 33 percent of women worldwide. In Yemen, GBV has increased by 63 percent since the start of the civil war. As of 2017, roughly 17 percent of women and girls in Yemen were at high risk for GBV. The COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated gender-based violence around the world. However in Yemen, lack of access to water and sanitation is a key contributor to GBV as well as a vector for many other diseases. COVID-19’s spread throughout the country underscores not only the importance of water, but also the disproportionate impact of water scarcity on women.

In June, the UN Children’s Fund published a report revealing the severity of the lack of access to water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance in Yemen, stating that 11.2 million of the 20.4 million Yemenis are in dire need. This deficiency stems from numerous factors: the climate crisis, water mismanagement, migration, and attacks on water systems. Since the start of the civil war, the Pacific Institute has logged 128 attacks to water systems in Yemen. The total renewable water resources per capita per year has continued to shrink, falling to 74.3 cubic meters in 2017. Individuals, mostly women, spend more time and effort obtaining water for their families, exposing them to unsafe areas, unsanitary water, and rendering them more vulnerable to GBV.

COVID-19 has increased the necessity for acquiring safe water so families can frequently wash their hands

(* B H)

World Humanitarian Day 2020

This World Humanitarian Day, Oxfam pays tribute to all humanitarians, like Heba, Asem and Abeer – three extraordinary people, who are working to ensure that their community and their country can one day thrive.

Yet, in the midst of these layers of crisis are the many extraordinary Yemenis who are standing with their communities to help in any way they can. Wherever any crisis hits, local people and communities are on the frontlines of the response, and Yemen is no exception.

Despite the impact that COVID-19 has had on all of their lives – from Asem, who has had to put his medical degree on hold, to Heba, who worries every day that her nine-month-old baby will fall sick with the virus – they continue to help people worse off than themselves. This World Humanitarian Day, Oxfam pays tribute to all humanitarians who, like them, are working to ensure that their country can one day thrive.

Heba works as a Public Health Promotion Officer for Oxfam in her hometown of Aden, southern Yemen. Her job – which involves raising awareness around the importance of good hygiene, and training community health volunteers to deliver hygiene awareness sessions – has put her on the frontlines of the country’s COVID-19 response. Throughout the four years that Heba has worked with Oxfam in Yemen, she has seen the impact of diseases such as cholera, dengue and polio; but the COVID-19 response has been a challenge unlike any other:

(B H)

TWR bringt Hoffnung nach Jemen

Die Menschen seien verzweifelt und hoffnungslos, erzählt TWR-Mitarbeiter Myrtha Smith. TWR möchte ihnen Hoffnung auf eine bessere Zukunft schenken und eine Botschaft des Friedens bringen und die Menschen so ermutigen und ihnen Kraft geben. Mittel dazu sind digitale Plattformen, Online-Radio und Apps.

(B H)

COVID-19 – die große Gefahr für die humanitären Helfer

Die Corona-Pandemie schwächt die Schwachen vor Ort noch mehr und schafft noch mehr Hürden für die Helfer.

In den Diensten der Hilfsorganisation Save the Children steht hier Dr. Khalid Ahmed, der ein COVID-19-Behandlungszentrum in Abs im Jemen leitet. Zusätzlich zu den Problemen bei der Beschaffung von Medikamenten, Röntgengeräten, Schutzausrüstung, Testkits und Sauerstoff überschatten Kämpfe die Hilfsmaßnahmen.

„Wir arbeiten trotz der Kämpfe. Im Behandlungszentrum hören wir den Artilleriebeschuss. Trotz aller Hindernisse, mit denen wir konfrontiert sind, arbeiten die Mitarbeiter des Behandlungszentrums rund um die Uhr, auf freiwilliger Basis, zwei Monate am Stück, ohne sich freizunehmen. Fehlende Schutzausrüstung gefährdet unser Leben. Wir können es uns im Jemen nicht leisten, Gesundheitspersonal zu verlieren“, so Ahmed.

(B H)

WHO Yemen Situation Report, July 2020 - Issue No.7

While humanitarian needs are increasing in Yemen, a significant gap in funding has worsened the situation further. The UN warns that humanitarian operations in Yemen are shutting down.

  • WHO 2020 response requires USD 234M. As of 31 July, 47.8M has been received in response to COVID19 and outbreaks control and containment.
  • However, COVID-19 continues to claim lives in Yemen, the actual figures of cases and deaths are likely to be much higher than being reported by authorities.
  • Conflict keeps raging. As of July, there were 43 active frontlines across the country.
  • WHO continued its support to targeted hospitals to ensure functionality and continuous provision of trauma care services.
  • Amid an ongoing fuel crisis, WHO continues its support to targeted health facilities with fuel provision

(A H)

ICRC medical supplies plane arrives at Sanaa International Airport

(* B H)

The UN warns that humanitarian operations in Yemen are shutting down

Half of all of the UN’s major programmes in Yemen are impacted by the lack of funding. Already, 12 of the UN’s 38 major programmes are shut or drastically reduced. Between August and September, 20 programmes face further reductions or closure.

“World Humanitarian Day should be a day of celebration,” said Ms. Lise Grande, Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen. “This year in Yemen, it’s the opposite.”

“We have no choice,” said Ms. Grande. “We have a moral obligation to warn the world that millions of Yemenis will suffer and could die because we don’t have the funding we need to keep going.”

Humanitarians in Yemen have saved millions of lives. Since the end of 2018, aid agencies have managed one of the fastest and largest scale-ups of assistance in recent history reaching an unprecedented 14 million people every month with life-saving assistance.

“This is an operation with real impact,” said Ms. Grande. “Humanitarians have prevented large-scale famine, rolled back the worst cholera epidemic in modern history, and provided help to millions of displaced people.
No one can say we haven’t made a difference. Yemenis have survived this terrible war because of what humanitarians have done and continue to do every single day.”

The impact of under-funding is dramatic. In April, food rations for more than 8 million people in northern Yemen were halved and humanitarian agencies were forced to stop reproductive health services in 140 facilities.

Health services were cut or reduced in a further 275 specialized centres for treating people with cholera and other infectious diseases. Allowances to nearly 10,000 front-line health workers were stopped and the supplies needed to treat trauma patients, who will almost certainly die without immediate treatment, were halted.

If funding is not urgently received in the next weeks, 50 percent of water and sanitation services will be cut, medicines and essential supplies for 189 hospitals and 2,500 primary healthcare clinics, representing half of the health facilities in the country, will halt. Thousands of children who are suffering from both malnutrition and disease will probably die and at least 70 percent of schools will likely be shut or only barely able to function when the new school year starts in coming weeks. Tens of thousands of displaced people who have nowhere else to go will be forced to live in inhumane conditions.

Yemen remains the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

(* B H)

Neue IRC-Umfrage: Hunger- und Wirtschaftskrise in Jemen durch COVID-19 dramatisch verschlimmert

Eine aktuelle IRC-Umfrage, zeigt, dass Menschen in Jemen mehr Angst vor Hunger als einer Ansteckung mit dem Coronavirus haben.

- Das Einkommen der Befragten ist seit Beginn der Pandemie um ein Drittel gesunken.

- Mehr als zwei Drittel berichten von Preissteigerungen, vor allem für Lebensmittel. Die meisten von ihnen können ihren Grundbedarf nicht mehr decken.

- Über die Hälfte der Befragten gab an, dass sie sich derzeit am meisten über die gestiegenen Lebensmittelpreise sorgt.

Die Coronavirus-Pandemie verschärft die Hunger- und Wirtschaftskrise in Jemen. Aufgrund enormer Preissteigerung leiden immer mehr Menschen unter Hunger. Im Norden des Landes hat sich die Menge der verfügbaren Nahrungsmittel seit April halbiert. Bei ausbleibender finanzieller Unterstützung haben mehr als fünf Millionen Menschen im Land ab November keinen Zugang zu ausreichend Nahrung.

(* B H)

Children forced to beg or work as hunger eclipses fear of Covid-19 in Yemen

Hikes in food, water and petrol prices adds to ‘triple emergency’, as coronavirus spreads unchecked and humanitarian aid dwindles

Families in Yemen are having to send their children out to work and to beg as concerns mount over rising food, water and petrol prices, a survey has found.

Despite coronavirus spreading undetected across the war-ravaged nation, data collected from more than 150 households in three provinces of southern Yemen found that respondents were more worried about going hungry than contracting Covid-19. The International Rescue Committee (IRC), which led the survey, found nearly two-thirds (62%) of respondents reported being unable to afford food and drinking water. Prices for sugar and vegetable oil have jumped by more than 25% in the past year.

Food insecurity is a major concern in Yemen, where a resurgence in fighting, coupled with decreased humanitarian funding and access, has left millions at risk.

“The nightmare Yemenis are living through continues to get worse with each passing day,” said Tamuna Sabadze, IRC’s Yemen country director.

“With Covid-19 spreading unchecked, dwindling humanitarian funding, and increasing fighting and airstrikes, Yemen is experiencing a triple emergency. This survey brings to life the terrible economic impacts Covid-19 is having on the lives of the world’s most vulnerable.

“In order to feed their families, respondents indicated they have had to take on debts which they can’t afford to repay, reduce the amount of food they are consuming, sell off assets like land or livestock, and some have even had to send their children to work or to beg,” Sabadze said.

Marcus Skinner, senior policy adviser at IRC, said the food price hikes caused by Covid-19 were having a major impact in Yemen because roughly 85% of all food is imported. Families were redirecting funds away from education and healthcare simply in order to eat, he added.

“We’re seeing an increase in child marriage and in child begging as a response to the lack of food, and we know that families are reducing the number of meals they’re eating,” said Skinner.

“Fear of ill-health, including Covid-19, has been usurped by hunger.”

and also

(B H)

Yemen WASH Cluster COVID-19 Bulletin, 11 August 2020

Yemen WASH Cluster - Humanitarian Dashboard (January - July 2020)

(A H)

MONA Relief: Today we distributed 30 food baskets to "Safe Childhood Hospitality". It is a small hospitality center for street children - a center for kids whose parents are not able to look after them. There are currently 50 children residing in the center (photos)

(* B H)

Yemen Cash Working Group (CMWG): Guidance Note - Recommendations for Cash and Vouchers Programming in response to COVID-19, June 2020

Now, Yemen faces the devastating prospect of COVID-19, which has been present and spreading across the country since at least April 2020. Health officials have warned that the combination of extreme vulnerability and low general immunity puts Yemen at exceptional risk. The virus is spreading faster with increased transmission to wider population signifying the need towards scale up of exceptional measures to suppress and address COVID-19. In March 2020, authorities introduced a raft of precautionary measures to prevent the spread of the virus including closure of land borders, curfews, restrictions on movement, social distancing measures, suspension of public offices, bans on gatherings, and closure of educational institutions. As COVID-19 leads to global economic pressures and precautionary measures shrink the domestic economy, the pandemic threatens to exacerbate the humanitarian situation in Yemen. Without urgent innovative humanitarian responses, suffering will worsen in Yemen, jeopardizing lives and livelihoods for years to come.

This paper sets how COVID-19 is affecting the economic and humanitarian situation in Yemen, and makes recommendations for improving cash programming to respond to the impact of the pandemic.

(B BH)

Yemen COVID-19 Joint Market Monitoring Initiative, dates of data collection: 12 July - 16 July 2020

Findings are based on 269 interviews with vendor key informants (KIs), and are to be considered indicative only. Additional methodology can be found in the full JMMI fact sheet. *The primary tool to support a 6-person household for a month with the minimum, culturally adjusted items required for survival. ^July Round 1, 12-16 July 2020

KEY FINDINGS: 12 - 16 JULY 2020

  • There have reportedly been minimal store closures in the two weeks prior to data collection.
  • Nearly 62% of vendors reported facing additional difficulties obtaining petrol. 83% of vendors also reported that diesel was difficult to obtain.
  • Price inflation is still the most commonly reported economic issue when obtaining fuel, WASH items, and water trucking services.
  • Bleach is the only SMEB item that recorded a change in price this round, thus causing a 0.9% increase in the total WASH SMEB.
  • Restocking times for food items were lower than for fuel and WASH items.

(* B H)

In Yemen, one field program officer struggles to move work online

U.N. humanitarian workers in Yemen are accustomed to working in dangerous and unpredictable situations. But COVID-19 is challenging their work in new ways, limiting access to the field and complicating fragile communications with local partners.

“This was the main thing to do — really interesting fieldwork. With COVID-19, we lost this. It was difficult to go out, first internally, because with the U.N. we were asked to work from home,” said Sonia Almassad, a Syrian native now working as a field program officer in Yemen for the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Almassad, the only female OCHA field worker in Yemen, was one of the “real-life heroes” recognized by OCHA in the lead up to World Humanitarian Day on Wednesday.

In Yemen, intermittent internet access is one logistical complication that the pandemic has worsened, explained Almassad, who serves as a humanitarian access negotiator between the country’s warring parties. Yemen’s five-year civil war between the Houthi rebel group and a Saudi-led coalition has continued unabated over the last several months, despite a U.N. Security Council resolution for a temporary global ceasefire during the pandemic.

“We discussed with local authorities that they need to change with us, but they are not a big fan of online meetings. Some of them even don’t have the skills to do it. We are trying to support them with that,” Almassad said.

“Online meetings are not easy, because some people can hear you and others cannot, or the local partners do not have it. The U.N. can have good internet in their office, but this is not enough. You need everyone to have good internet access,” Almassad continued.

She explained that she now spends more time than ever before communicating with local partners via phone, making her more dependent on this medium to keep up regular communication and maintain relationships.

U.N. field visits to conflict and vulnerable regions across Yemen have become more uncommon during the pandemic because of COVID-19 concerns, creating larger gaps in the awareness of Yemeni people’s specific needs.

“We have somehow a big picture idea about what is going on, but it is different when you have access. It is not the same. We still have data and local partners share information with us. We are trying to get a clear picture of what is going on as much as possible,” Almassad explained.

Almassad expressed hope that travel restrictions will ease next month, but it remains unclear, she said.

“Our movements are still very restricted, and we hope that by the beginning of September things will be better, and more flexible, but we don’t know how much will be open,” Almassad said.

(B H)

Yemen Women Protection Sub Cluster Services, Jan to July 2020

Yemen Women Protection Sub Cluster Services, July 2020

(* B H)

COVID-19 makes Yemen’s hunger and economic nightmare worse each day; the IRC calls repeatedly for an end to the war

A recent survey done by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) found that Yemenis surveyed are more worried about hunger than COVID-19.

Survey respondents noted a 30 percent decrease in income since the start of the pandemic.

More than 68 percent of respondents noted an increase in commodities prices, especially food.

51 percent of respondents cited increases in food prices as one of their most important concerns.

62 percent of respondents report not being able to afford basic household items like food and water.

A recent IPC survey showed that acute food insecurity will increase from the current 25% of the population to 40% by the end of the year in the areas surveyed.

According to UNICEF, almost half of all children under five will be malnourished by the end of the year without immediate support.

(* B H)

From child bride to fearless face mask maker: Yemen’s safe spaces help women reclaim their lives

When the outbreak of COVID-19 led businesses to close their doors, her husband stopped working. Their debts accumulated. Then one day, he simply left.

Salwa had no income and no food.

“I was staying without food for days,” she said. “I wanted anything to eat. Sometimes, some neighbours were giving me some food.”

“Stitching my torn life”

Finally, members of Salwa’s community – part of a “protection committee” – told her about a safe space established by UNFPA and the Yemeni Women’s Union. The space provides counselling, vocational courses, literacy classes and other services for women and girls.

“Signs of fatigue and illness were visible in her features and even in the way she spoke,” said Fawzia, a psychologist who met with Salwa.

Together, they created a plan to help Salwa gain control of her life.

She began receiving regular health and psychosocial services. She attended training courses, learning about marketing and project management. And she discovered a talent for sewing.

“When I stitch, I imagine that I am stitching my torn life,” she said

(* B H)

Feature: Starved displaced family in war-torn Yemen tries to save critically-ill child

In a camp for the displaced by war in Yemen's northwestern province of Hajjah, the father of Mazen faced a painful choice.

Should the use the little money from selling his small land to treat Mazen who had fallen seriously ill and save his life or to buy food and save the lives of his 10-member family?

Six-year-old Mazen suffers from hydrocephalus and acute malnutrition as his stick-like legs are so wasting away that he could not walk any more.

Lying on a wooden bed in his family's hut in the Bani Hassan area of Abs district, Mazen keeps staring down at the sandy floor as if his swollen eyes could dig a hole for him to escape from the severe pain.

"In early 2015, just a few weeks after the war erupted, I took him to hospitals in the neighboring province of Hodeidah and then we travelled to the capital Sanaa, where a hospital charged me 13,000 U.S. dollars for treating my son," Ibrahim Kidysh, father of Mazen, told Xinhua.

"I do not have this large amount of money, so I went back with my son to our village to sell my agricultural land to try to make up the money... but the price was very low," he said.

Not far away from the hut of the family of Mazen, a small hospital provides some health services for the displaced and the residents of the villages.

(B H)

Yemen: Access Constraints as of 16 August 2020

(A H)

Why Millionaire Stock Trader Timothy Sykes Is Donating $500K to Yemen Children

Timothy Sykes, the self-made millionaire and reality TV star, is capturing headlines for altruistic reasons. Sykes has promised to dip into his own pocket and put up half of the $1 million that’s being donated to Yemen children via Karmagawa, the non-profit he founded.

Funds donated by Karmagawa will provide direct aid to Yemeni families. In addition to providing food packs, the initiative will support the building of new schools, something Karmagawa has extensive experience of

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

(B H)

Film: Die Menschen im Jemen brauchen Dich

(* B H)

Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, 20 August 2020

Heavy rains, damage to roads and infrastructure, fuel shortages and an ongoing lack of funding continues to constrict UNHCR’s response to families fleeing natural disasters as a provider of the last resort. In the northern governorates of Sa’ada and Al Jawf, some 3,700 families had their shelters partially damaged or destroyed. UNHCR continues to mobilise partners, first to address the needs of 500 families with basic household items and 300 shelters through Shelter Cluster partner YRC. In Marib, UNHCR through partner SHS distributed basic household items for 100 families. In Hudaydah, UNHCR through partner JAAHD conducted assessments for 700 flood-affected families across the central districts, distributing basic household items for all families and 550 shelters during the reporting period.

The Shelter Cluster led by UNHCR in Hudaydah is suffering from a severe lack of stocks—including emergency contingency stock—compounded by ongoing access constraints.

Cash support to address the socio-economic difficulties arising as an outcome of COVID-19 has been completed for 4,000 refugee families.

(A H)

IOM Yemen | Rapid Displacement Tracking (RDT) - Reporting Period: 09 - 15 Aug 2020

(* B H)

IOM Yemen: Situation Report July 2020

Humanitarian needs continue to be worsened by the spread of COVID-19 across the country while access to basic services, including health care, is becoming more limited for internally displaced people (IDPs), migrants and host communities. Hospitals, already facing equipment, medicine and fuel shortages, are either closing down or turning away suspected COVID-19 cases, and close to 10,000 people have fled areas, mostly in Aden, for fear of contracting the virus. The ongoing conflict adds another layer of challenges, with close to 130,000 households reporting restricted access to health facilities as a direct result of the impact of armed violence1 . At the same time, test kits and protective equipment shortages limit COVID-19 surveillance and response efforts. These challenges, along with the perceived risks of seeking care and delayed hospital treatment, make the full human impact of COVID-19 in Yemen difficult to measure. New Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) analysis for southern governorates warns that there will be an alarming increase in the number of people facing acute food insecurity in the next six months, as a result of the pandemic and economic crisis. Up to 40 per cent of the population in southern governorates will be affected due to a drastic reduction in incomes and purchasing power.

To improve access to health and basic services, camp coordination and camp management (CCCM) teams are urgently scaling up COVID-19 service mapping and infection prevention and control (IPC) activities in displacement sites. =

(* B H)

IOM Yemen Annual Report 2019

In 2019 alone, over 410,000 people were forced to leave their homes, while nearly 138,000 migrants entered the country, predominantly from Ethiopia, mostly intending to travel to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Eastern Corridor migration route is one of the youngest in the world and is fraught with dangers including exploitation, abuse, trafficking and arbitrary detention. This is without mentioning the possibilities of becoming caught up in the conflict. Even with the incredible risks associated with the journey, the Eastern Corridor recorded 28,000 more migrant crossings than the three Mediterranean Sea Routes combined in the past year.

Over the past 25 years, IOM has been supporting communities in need in Yemen. Our work in the country started with helping stranded migrants return home, and later expanded to other areas of humanitarian aid and resilience building. In 2019, we helped over 4 million people meet their basic needs through health care, water, sanitation and hygiene support, displacement camp management, shelter provision and protection support for vulnerable groups, including displaced people and migrants, while also supporting communities recover from conflict. Through community-led initiatives, IOM improves infrastructure in more stable governorates and districts, for example by rebuilding schools, hospitals and water points, and laying the foundation for social and economic development.

To reach more vulnerable communities as needs continue to grow, IOM has enhanced and scaled up its humanitarian response over 2019. We have a nearly 1,000-person strong team (over 95% national) across Yemen’s 22 governorates =

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

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UAE-Israel normalisation agreement was expected, Houthi leader

Leader of the Houthi Group, Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, on Thursday said the UAE-Israel normalisation agreement which was announced by the US president a week ago was expected and that Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Sudanese military chiefs supported it.
The new thing about the agreement was that some Arab regimes are now expanding their relations with Israel and making them official, he said in a televised speech.

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Abductees' mothers in Hodeidah governorate have demanded the Houthi group to release 60 abductees held in the Central Security Camp in Sana'a (photo)

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Teachers’ Syndicate in #Yemen: Houthis turned 90 schools into detention facilities. (Film, in Arabic)


Civilians found the body of an 18-year-old girl hours after the body of her 12-year-old brother was found with signs of torture in Ibb governorate, which is controlled by the Houthi group. Local sources said that the victims were abducted by armed men in unclear circumstances.

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In Mahweet, Houthis forced a young man to pay YR 50K fine for bringing a singer to his wedding. Worth mentioning that, like Taliban did in Afghanistan, Houthis banned singing & r increaingly enforcing sex segregation in areas they control based on their version of Shariah law (document)

My comment: The Houthis are morphing into Wahabists more horrible than the Saudis.

(A P)

UAE proved Israel was behind Yemen war: Houthis

The Iranian-backed Houthi group on Tuesday accused Israel again of having hands in the war on Yemen.
Since the war outbreak in March 2015, the Houthis have accused the United States and Israel of being involved in the "Saudi-Emirati aggression on Yemen".
"We had already said that war on Yemen was as part of arrangements for new alliances between aggression countries and Israel," a Houthi negotiator tweeted. Now, "the Emirati declaration came to prove this.
"We also said that al-Qaeda and Daesh were but military forces used by aggression countries, and you'll believe [in this] only when we're surprised by a declaration of their engagement to the Riyadh Agreement. Then, it will be said a historic, brave decision," Abdul Malik al-Ajri added.

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EXCLUSIVE: The End of Jewish Yemen is Imminent

A precarious existence for country’s last 100 Jews

Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels have ordered at least some of the country’s remaining Jews to leave, according to sources in the Amran Governorate, north of the capital Sanaa, who spoke recently with The Media Line.

According to Ali Qudair, a tribal chief in the governorate, soldiers surrounded a village in mid-July to question members of at least one Jewish family living there about its contacts with people abroad.

“A group of military vehicles arrived in the area, taking up positions at the entrances to the village and establishing checkpoints,” Qudair told The Media Line.

“The soldiers entered the house of a Jewish family in the village and questioned members about their correspondence with the State of Israel, their property in the village and other areas, and whether or not they were in contact with relatives residing in other countries.

Qudair added that some of those questioned were taken to an unknown location and held for 48 hours.

“During the past few years,” he said, “the Jews have been denied many of their rights. They no longer can travel except with prior permission from the Houthi-appointed area supervisor.”

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Al-Houthi to al-Jazeera: No Real Prospect for Peace in Yemen, Coalition’s Advances Illusory

Member of the Supreme Political Council Mohammad Ali Al-Houthi said that the mediation efforts with the countries of aggression reached clashs and their rejection of all the efforts made by Martin Griffiths, they had no intention of negotiating and there is no real prospect for peace.

Al-Houthi’s remarks came in a televised interview with Al-Jazeera TV, pointing out that Sana’a has direct talks with the Saudis but the contacts have not reached the level of negotiations.

"We call for direct dialogue, even with live one, we do not have any agenda to be afraid of. All we have is a national ceiling that we can talk about in front of all people and fear nothing," he said. “We are not agents and we are not traitors to have secret negotiations. If there were real negotiations, we would have announced them."

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp6 – cp19

Vorige / Previous:

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-673 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-673 oder / or

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

09:49 21.08.2020
Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
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Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
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Dietrich Klose