Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 740 - Yemen War Mosaic 740

Yemen Press Reader 740: 11. Mai 2021: Jemen nach sechs Jahren Krieg – Jemen-Rückblick, März-April 2021 – 10 Jahre nach dem Aufstand – Ein Profil von Ahmed Hamid – Psychische Narben des Krieges
Bei diesem Beitrag handelt es sich um ein Blog aus der Freitag-Community

Eingebetteter Medieninhalt

May 11, 2021: Yemen after six years of war – The Yemen Review, March-April 2021 – A decade after the uprising – A profile of Ahmed Hamid – The psychological scars of war – and more

Schwerpunkte / Key aspects

Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2:

Klassifizierung / Classification

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

cp2 Allgemein / General

cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen

cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks

cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia

cp8a Jamal Khashoggi

cp9 USA

cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf

cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain

cp11 Deutschland / Germany

cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries

cp12a Katar-Krise / Qatar crisis

cp12b Sudan

cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade

cp13b Söldner / Mercenaries

cp13c Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage

cp13d Wirtschaft / Economy

cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism

cp15 Propaganda

cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids

cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War

cp17a Kriegsereignisse: Schlacht um Marib / Theater of War: Marib battle

cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle

cp19 Sonstiges / Other

Klassifizierung / Classification




(Kein Stern / No star)

? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating

A = Aktuell / Current news

B = Hintergrund / Background

C = Chronik / Chronicle

D = Details

E = Wirtschaft / Economy

H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions

K = Krieg / War

P = Politik / Politics

pH = Pro-Houthi

pS = Pro-Saudi

T = Terrorismus / Terrorism

Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject

Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:

Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:

(** B H K P)

After six years of war, what is happening in Yemen?

More than 80% of Yemenis live in poverty, yet international donors such as the UK are withdrawing aid

So, why are people dying of hunger?

Yemen’s agriculture has for decades been unable to feed its population, which explains why Yemenis migrated to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – and earlier to the UK, US, South-East Asia and East Africa.

The situation in Yemen worsened significantly in the past three decades due to the water crisis, as well as other aspects of global warming, neo-liberal development policies and rapid population growth. In 1990, when the Republic of Yemen was established, it had 11 million people.

These factors have reduced the country’s self-sufficiency in grains (sorghum, maize, millet and wheat) to, at best 30%, with full self-sufficiency only for poultry, fruit and vegetables. Thus, the country depends on imports for 90% of its food, including staples such as wheat, rice, sugar, or tea.

Prior to the war, almost half of Yemenis were living in poverty, a figure which has now risen to more than 80% as a result of the collapse of the economy since the full-scale war started in 2015.

In 2014, the World Food Programme assessed that more than 40% of the population was food insecure, an 'UN-speak' euphemism for hunger. So given this situation and six years of war, it is little surprise that in 2021, the number rose to 54%.

Shrinking aid

A few hours after his appeal to funders, António Guterres, the UN secretary general, expressed ‘disappointment’ at the low level of pledges, a mere $1.7bn, less than half the $3.8bn called for.

In March 2021, it was announced that the UK had reduced its contribution to Yemen by 60%, leading to widespread outrage at home given the expected impact of the cuts in worsening Yemenis’ living conditions.

The drop in humanitarian assistance has intensified the suffering of the Yemeni population. The amount of food and cash received has fallen, in many cases by half, and the number of beneficiaries has dropped from 14 million in 2019 to nine million in 2020.

These factors weaken people’s resilience and resistance to disease, as well as increasing the rates of malnutrition. In turn, this leads to added demands on medical services, which are the second most severely affected sector by the reduced funding.

Medical staff, who have only very occasionally received their state salaries (which are insufficient for a reasonable living standard at the best of times) for more than five years, had relied on the complementary payments from the humanitarian organisations. Due to lack of funding, these have been mostly stopped, meaning staff are now deserting the 50% of still-functioning medical facilities. These facilities are also running out of supplies, in addition to being under frequent military attacks from the various fighting groups.

Most food and medical supplies arrive through the port of Hodeida on the Red Sea, which has been under effective blockade for years. Fuel ships are also systematically held up by the Saudi-led coalition in agreement with the Internationally Recognised Government (IRG), ensuring a constant fuel crisis in the Huthi-controlled areas.

The humanitarian situation continues to be described as “the world’s worst” by the UN.

Fighting escalates

Since early February, military action has focused on the renewed Huthi offensive threatening the city of Marib, about 170km east of Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.

Marib is the only major city under the full control of the IRG. The Huthis may opt to bypass the city to reach the oil production facilities and take control of the road linking Saudi Arabia with the nearby governorates of Shabwa and Hadhramaut, which would then be within their reach. But taking Marib would increase their strength in any possible future negotiations.

Who are the Huthis?

Ansar Allah’s success is based on a combination of factors. First and foremost, its declared mission of opposing the ‘forces of aggression’ rings true among Yemenis whose attitude to Saudi Arabia is, at best, ambiguous; Yemenis believe in their country’s right to independence and object to Saudi arrogance, something thousands of them have suffered as migrant workers in the Kingdom.

Second is the efficiency of Huthi repression, as they do not hesitate to imprison, torture and impose heavy prison sentences on dissidents or, indeed, anyone who might have assets that they covet. A recent fire in Sana’a’s Immigration detention centre, started by guards firing tear gas canisters at protesters, which killed at least 45 Ethiopians and wounded close to 200, is an example of Huthis disregard for basic human rights.

Their social conservatism is another element that finds echoes among significant proportions of Yemeni men.

Furthermore, the group succeeded in manipulating tribal rivalries and thus enlisting tribal leaders while actively indoctrinating youth for decades.

Finally, the Huthis main ideological position, that sada (people claiming descent from the Prophet) have an innate right to rule, gains them support among this social stratum throughout the country and is not universally opposed by supporters of other groups.

Militarily, while the outside world insists on calling the Huthis ‘Iran-backed’, the unfortunate truth is that their successes are due to the military skills and experience they have gained over the past two decades, while most of their weaponry is ‘acquired’ from the anti-Huthi forces.

Iran’s support for the Huthis is real but limited to supplying, and training in, advanced technology for the newly developed drones and modifications to older missiles. Politically, for Iran, supporting the Huthis is a very cheap and easy mechanism to aggravate its main rival in the region, Saudi Arabia.

Biden-inspired ‘push’ for peace

Although fitting into Biden's overall policy of renewing US participation in international organisations, the Biden administration’s decision to operate within the framework imposed by the UN Security Council presents a major hurdle.

The Security Council’s Resolution 2216 of April 2015 effectively demanded the Huthis surrender and withdraw to their pre-2014 positions. Yet since then, they have taken control of millions of people and large areas of the country, thus totally rejecting this demand.

Calls for the replacement of this resolution with a more realistic one recognising the reality on the ground have for years been widespread in civil society and among observers.

However, the ‘pen holder’ on Yemen at the Security Council is the UK, which prioritises good relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE over the welfare of 30 million Yemenis.

This can be explained by Brexit: the current Boris Johnson government relies on investments from these states to plug the financial and economic abyss expected from the country’s departure from the European Union. Therefore, alienating Gulf leaders at the UN is not considered an option – by Helen Lackner

cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important

(** B H K P)

A Decade After the Uprising – The Yemen Review, March-April 2021

Sanaa Center Editorial: Diplomacy May Pause the Fighting; It Cannot Impose the Peace

International stakeholders to the Yemen conflict have pursued a rush of diplomatic initiatives in recent months that are unprecedented in the war to date. Consensus among regional and international actors to achieve a cease-fire appears closer now than ever before – with the right efforts made to gain buy-in, this could help create a framework for talks among Yemeni parties focused on ending the ongoing war. Simultaneously, events in Yemen itself, specifically the ongoing battle for Marib, threaten to derail prospects for peace for years to come should the armed Houthi movement seize this northern stronghold of the internationally recognized Yemeni government.

Underlying the international moves of late have been the shifting dynamics between Washington, Riyadh and Tehran. Washington’s political and military support for the Saudi-led military coalition intervention in Yemen – during both the Obama and Trump administrations – has been instrumental in sustaining the protracted conflict, now in its seventh year. Also instrumental has been Iranian support for the armed Houthi movement – politically, strategically and militarily, with the latter in direct violation of UN arms sanctions.

It has become among the war’s tragic ironies that today, thanks to Saudi Arabia, the Houthis and Iran have never been closer. Meanwhile, Riyadh has become trapped in a military quagmire and is paying dearly in riches, reputation and clout. It has been clear for some time that the kingdom wants out of Yemen. And Washington, after the Trump administration tore up the Iran nuclear deal, has been left paying the cost of the deal – being a primary backer of an unwinnable war that has unleashed a humanitarian catastrophe – without any of the payoffs the Obama administration had sought.

Among the factors driving the new international dynamics regarding the conflict is the about-turn in the US approach since the Biden administration took office. The new US president has explicitly called for an end to the Yemen war, appointed an envoy to lead this diplomatic charge and halted some US arms sales to Saudi Arabia – importantly, the latter comes after billions upon billions of dollars worth of previous US arms sales have left the kingdom already armed to the teeth. Also important to note is that neither the US, nor any of the other five permanent members of the UN Security Council, have yet brought forward a new framework for negotiations beyond Resolution 2216, which the US and United Kingdom pushed through the security council in 2015 to give international legitimacy to the Saudi-led intervention.

The fate of the Yemen conflict now appears to be increasingly linked with larger efforts toward regional deescalation.

In any conceivable future, the Houthis’ ties with Tehran, with whom the group has exchanged ambassadors, will remain prized – which should worry every stakeholder who cares about peace in Yemen. As international dynamics have been realigning toward peace, Houthi forces on the ground in Yemen have continued to press an assault on Marib city. For the Yemeni government to maintain relevance in the country and in any future peace negotiations, it must not lose this stronghold. The dynamics at play among the various stakeholders inside and outside Yemen would change dramatically if the city falls into Houthi hands, with the prospects for a UN-mediated peace likely to vanish and not return for years. With Marib, the Houthis would consolidate control over northern Yemen, as well as oil and gas fields that could offer an economic base for a new Houthi state; the group’s leaders would feel little compulsion to make concessions. Rather, Houthi demands for ending their military conquest would likely grow astronomically and entail terms that neither Saudi Arabia nor any other Yemenis could stomach.

Even if the emerging international and domestic dynamics end up bringing the parties to the table, peace will continue to face many challenges. A durable cease-fire and post-conflict environment will depend on finding a stable balance among the domestic forces in Yemen, with regional and international actors providing mechanisms to guarantee the arrangement. The danger here, however, would be if international priorities came to dominate those of Yemenis; we have already seen how the results of such played out in Yemen’s post-2011 failed “transition process” – dubbed the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, aptly reflecting its priorities – that helped bring on current conflict. As well, hardliners within the Houthi movement will almost certainly push to keep an inordinate share of power during negotiations – which would be unacceptable to any other portion of Yemeni society – and seek to usurp any agreement the group’s more moderate and pragmatic negotiators might make. Similarly, divisions within the anti-Houthi coalition could easily undermine its side in the negotiations.

It would be dangerous for international actors to push for an immediate, comprehensive cease-fire prior to the basic prerequisites of a post-conflict state being agreed. Such an arrangement would create an incentive for armed groups that are currently reaping handsome profits from the populations under their control to maintain the status quo by obstructing a power-sharing deal. Rather than giving Yemen the best chance to find a path toward sustainable peace, a more likely scenario would be a relapse into war and a slow and final disintegration of the Yemeni state into warlord-run fiefdoms. Instead, a conditional, limited cease-fire, focused on freezing frontlines in place, should be sought to allow the opportunity for negotiations on the basic prerequisites of a post-conflict arrangement. This should entail identifying basic end goals for political power sharing, social equality and revenue sharing under a unified Republic of Yemen.


March & April at a Glance

Eye on Yemen

The Political Arena

Developments in Government-Controlled Territory

Developments in Houthi-Controlled Territory

International Developments

State of the War

Government Offensive Pressures Houthis in Taiz

Intense Fighting but Few Advances in Marib

Fighting Escalates in Hudaydah; New Government Offensive in Hajjah

Houthis Pepper Saudi Arabia with Cross-Border Attacks

Escalation in AQAP-linked Attacks in Abyan

Government-STC clashes in Abyan Threaten Stability in the South

Economic Developments

Update on Local Exchange Rates

Government Presents Fuel Data in Defense of Reduced Fuel Import Activity at Hudaydah

Saudi Arabia Pledges US$422 million Fuel Grant for Govt Areas

Panel of Experts Revise Analysis of CBY-Aden

Shabwa Local Authority Cancels Agreement for Qana Port Development

Houthis Temporarily Open YPC Fuel Stations in Sana’a

Sana’a Chamber of Commerce and Industry Denounce Houthi Zakat Authority


Reflections on the 2011 Yemeni Uprising a Decade On:

The Day I Wore a Revolution – by Bilqis Lahabi

The Other Side of the Wall – by Salah Ali Salah

The Yemen Uprisings: The View from Turtle Bay – by Casey Coombs

How the Fractious Elite Hijacked the Yemeni Uprising – by Abdulghani al-Iryani

A Decade of Shattered and Betrayed Dreams – by Mohammed Al-Qadhi

Dignity is in Aspirations, Not in a Wall – by Bilqis Lahabi

The Kingpin of Sana’a: A Profile of Ahmed Hamid – by Gregory Johnsen and Sana’a Center Staff

A View From the Frontlines: Taiz – by Khaled Farouq

‘The Battle of All Yemenis Against the Houthi Coup’ – A Q&A with Tareq Saleh


The Corruption is Real: UN Panel Should Not Have Retracted Embezzlement Accusations – by Khaled Monassar

Toward a Wise US Policy in Yemen – by Alexandra Stark

In Focus

Socotra Faces COVID-19’s Rising Tide Unprepared – by Quentin Müller, Socotra

The Kingpin of Sana’a – A Profile of Ahmed Hamid

In early February, Mahdi Al-Mashat, the youthful 35-year-old Houthi president, called a private meeting of senior government officials in Sana’a. Al-Mashat, who became head of the Houthi-run Supreme Political Council in April 2018, wanted to dispel a rumor that had been gaining traction in recent months. Some on social media and in qat chews around the city were suggesting Al-Mashat was little more than a figurehead. “That’s bullshit,” Al-Mashat said, according to a source aware of the proceedings who spoke to the Sana’a Center on condition of anonymity. The president glanced across the room at his 49-year-old office director and the subject of the rumors, Ahmad Hamed. “Ahmad is a dear brother,” Al-Mashat informed the room. “No decision is taken by him until there have been intensive consultations.”

Few in the room believed what Al-Mashat was saying. Al-Mashat is the official head of the Houthi government, the president, or al-ra‘is in Arabic. But in Sana’a, Hamed, a slightly overweight, slightly balding figure, is known as ra‘is al-ra‘is, the president of the president. The most recent report from the UN’s Panel of Experts on Yemen describes him as “possibly the most powerful Houthi civilian leader not bearing the name Al-Houthi.”

Much of Hamed’s power is the result of his long and close relationship to Abdelmalek al-Houthi, the head of the Houthi movement. Like Abdelmalek’s brother and the founder of the Houthi movement, the late Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, Hamed was born in the village of Marran in 1972.

Hamed was one of Hussein’s earliest and most devoted followers, but he also spent significant time with another follower and childhood friend, Hussein’s younger half-brother Abdelmalek. During the first Houthi war, in 2004, Hamed spent weeks besieged in a cave with Abdelmalek in the rugged mountains of Sa’ada. That war ended in September 2004, when Hussein al-Houthi was killed by government fighters.

In January 2018, immediately after Saleh’s death, Abdelmalek installed Hamed as Al-Sammad’s office director. When Al-Sammad was killed in an airstrike a few months later, Hamed stayed on as office director to the new president, Mahdi Al-Mashat. Hamed’s presence as office director provided Abdelmalek with a potential check on the president should he grow too strong, and Hamed has used that authority to increase his own power in Sana’a, even coming into conflict with members of the Al-Houthi family.

The Houthi takeover of governance in the north has proceeded in stages. Initially, the Houthis focused on the heads of government ministries, replacing ministers and top officials with Houthi loyalists, but leaving much of the bureaucracy in place. Later, amid growing concerns over the loyalty of much of the Saleh-era bureaucracy, the Houthis implemented a “supervisor” system, installing trusted Houthi figures in most departments. These mushrifin (supervisors) are not officially part of the government bureaucracy but they determine what a ministry can and cannot do, effectively steering each department. Hamed, along with another top Houthi official, Mohammed al-Houthi, has been instrumental in appointing many of these supervisors and, in the world of Houthi politics where informal relationships matter more than official titles, many of them report back to, and take direction from, Hamed.

But Hamed’s biggest – and most controversial – moves have been on the financial front. Hamed diverted funds from the accounts of both the Youth Welfare Fund, a fund within the Ministry of Youth and Sports, and that of the General Insurance and Pensions Authority, according to a former official with one of the funds and a parliamentary official aware of the transactions. In May 2018, he transferred the Zakat Authority, which collects the alms tax in areas under Houthi control, to his office, according to the same sources. A few months later, he tried to take over the account of the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Guidance, which also brings in significant revenue. Hamed was unable to take direct control of the ministry’s accounts, so the parliamentary source said he eventually created a parallel department – known as the General Authority of Endowments – and then linked the department to the presidential office, giving him backdoor access.

In many ways, Hamed has, through SCMCHA, weaponized food aid in Houthi controlled territory, using it as a tool to reward allies and punish opponents.

Only a few people in Sana’a have attempted to challenge Hamed. At least three Houthi-appointed ministers – health, tourism and water – resigned after public clashes with Hamed since 2018. Another official, who publicly criticized Hamed, had his house seized and a relative detained. Hamed has frozen the bank accounts of other domestic rivals, and the UN Panel believes he heads one of the three competing power bases within the Houthi movement. The other two, according to the UN Panel, are headed by Mohammed al-Houthi, the head of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee, and Abdelkarim al-Houthi, the Minister of the Interior.

Hamed’s influence has only grown since Al-Mashat became president in 2018 – by Gregory Johnsen and Sana’a Center Staff

‘The Battle of All Yemenis Against the Houthi Coup’ – A Q&A with Tareq Saleh

Tareq Saleh: The political office was created as a result of the ongoing political situation in Yemen and the developments that have occurred. We, on the West Coast, need a political entity that represents us in any upcoming negotiations, for it to be another voice that represents the Yemeni people outside of any religious political parties. The GPC is the umbrella that we are all under, but unfortunately, it was fragmented between those inside Yemen and those outside. This major political party was not given the opportunity to play its role in the Yemeni political arena, whether in foreign representation or internally.

Inside Yemen, it is under pressure by the Houthis and the GPC in Sana’a has become very marginalized in its political role. Outside of the country, it is divided into a number of different factions. We hope the GPC can play a very important role. We’re obviously never going to be an alternative to the GPC and the role it has played. But the political office of the National Resistance represents the Joint Forces here on the West Coast, and it also represents the political arm of all of these forces here in the Yemeni political arena.

The Corruption is Real – UN Panel Should Not Have Retracted Embezzlement Accusations Against CBY-Aden, Yemeni Gov and HSA

However, the broader story the panel painted of corrupt practices within the Yemeni government, the CBY-Aden and the private sector were accurate, and the panel only erred further in withdrawing its accusations, rather than issuing the necessary corrections. Those parties that stood accused now publicly claim they are vindicated, and the true story of corruption is lost.

Various critics argued that the panel’s report was outside of its mandate in UNSC Resolution 2140 concerning sanctions related to Yemen. The panel’s mandate is to “report on acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen.” Corruption, profiteering and the war economy are all threats to security, peace and stability, and each directly contributes to prolonging the conflict. By contrast, pressuring the panel to retract its conclusion and for a member of the panel to resign promotes a lack of accountability.

The interests of Yemen and Yemenis must not be confused with the narrow interests of a particular company, businessman or even a particular government. Prioritizing the wealthy and privileged at the expense of the broader interests of society is a dangerous precedent. In the absence of inclusive institutions, the capture of wealth by a limited group of elite Yemeni families is one of the primary reasons for economic inequality and monopolistic policies that contribute to a fragile state – by Khaled Monassar

Toward a Wise US Policy in Yemen

For decades US policy toward Yemen has focused on short-term, narrowly defined solutions ostensibly related to US strategic goals in the broader region, rather than on Yemen itself. But instead of facilitating US strategic interests in the region, this short-termism has harmed them. Both Republicans and Democratic administrations have viewed Yemen primarily as an add-on to other areas of policy – Saudi Arabia, counterterrorism, Iran – rather than as a country deserving of its own policy approach. In practice, this has meant giving security partners in the Gulf, primarily Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, what they want in exchange for their cooperation on other US strategic priorities, rather than focusing on what it would take to help provide Yemenis with the tools to achieve sustainable internal stability.

In the current war, for example, the US has maintained its assistance to the Saudi-led coalition for six years not because the intervention was succeeding on its own terms, but because US support has been seen as essential to its relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In addition to maintaining these relationships, US officials initially hoped their support would encourage reciprocity on US security priorities, especially the Iran nuclear agreement – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – and later arms sales. The US also hoped that its involvement could mitigate the worst harms that could come out of the coalition’s intervention.

Yet this short-sighted approach has backfired. Far from achieving US objectives, the intervention of the Saudi-led coalition has seen increased instability in Yemen and the broader region. The spillover effects of the conflict have created conditions that could allow AQAP to present a threat for years to come. The war and the coalition’s intervention opened more space for Iran to build a partnership with a non-state actor that is capable of antagonizing Saudi Arabia on its southern border. A permanently fragmented Yemen would be more likely to succumb to future conflict, creating opportunities for intervention and increased regional instability. At the same time, involvement in the war has damaged the United States’ international reputation. The United States cannot inoculate itself from these problems, which are in part the result of its support for the intervening coalition, nor can it dismiss the moral implications of the ensuing humanitarian disaster.

The US approach to Yemen, under both the Obama and Trump administrations, was driven by US security partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Seeing Yemen and the war through that prism led the US into a number of policy mistakes.

Reframing US Strategic Aims in the Gulf

To contribute to building a sustainable peace in Yemen, the US needs to reframe how it understands its interests in the Gulf. A stable Yemen that provides access to economic opportunity for its citizens and a fairer distribution of government resources would be less likely to succumb to violent conflict in the future, which in turn will prevent external military intervention and the spillover effects of conflict. A sustainable political settlement will also help keep US regional security partners like Saudi Arabia safer. In short, a prosperous, well-governed Yemen would be good for Yemenis, the region, and the US.

To move toward this alternative, longer-term vision for a stable and prosperous Yemen, the United States should use the leverage that it holds with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to end or limit external military intervention. The US can accomplish this by providing security partners with assurance measures. It should also work to get these Gulf states to bring their local partners on the ground to the table for good faith negotiations. Indeed, the appointment of the US special envoy for Yemen, Tim Lenderking, has leant diplomatic heft to mediation efforts, and reported preliminary meetings between Iran and Saudi Arabia on Yemen are promising, even if the parties are still far apart on the key issues. The US should also provide support and resources for a political transition process that invests in transitional justice and addressing underlying causes of conflict. US economic aid to Yemen should focus on investing in sustainable development, in addition to much-needed humanitarian assistance, while working to ensure that such emergency assistance does not inadvertently disrupt local markets. US diplomats should support good governance efforts in Yemen, as well as local conflict resolution strategies to prevent the outbreak of future violence. Rushing this process in order to achieve a short-sighted version of “stability” will only ensure that the underlying issues that led to the conflict will remain unresolved.

The Biden administration’s move to end US support for the Saudi-led coalition is a good start, but Yemen’s wars will not be resolved without painstaking negotiations that require difficult political tradeoffs, a robust transitional justice process, and investments in humanitarian assistance as well as sustainable economic development. All of this will take time and require sustained diplomatic attention from the United States, including helping to ensure that negotiations are truly inclusive and that demobilization processes are effective – by Alexandra Stark

After Reopening to International Travel, Socotra Faces COVID-19’s Rising Tide Unprepared

At the beginning of 2021, Felix Airways restarted direct international flights to Socotra, via Dubai, although this was canceled the next month. In March, Air Arabia established a regular route to the island via Abu Dhabi.

Foreign tourists were requested to present a negative PCR test prior to boarding in the UAE and to take a blood test upon arrival. However, they were not required to quarantine. Nor were masks worn frequently either by locals or tourists to Socotra. Unlike foreign tourists, Yemenis traveling to Socotra from the mainland were not required to present negative PCR tests prior to travel.

For the first few months of 2021, life on the island looked much as it had pre-pandemic, and local guides often told their clients that Socotra was COVID-19 free. The consequences of reopening to international travel, however, have since become apparent. Over the first four days of April, more than 40 Socotris tested COVID-19 positive, according to Dr. Saad al-Qadumi from the Emirati-funded Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan Hospital, which is based in the capital Hadebo and is considered the main hospital in Socotra. “The island is still open for visitors, and citizens who come from Hadramawt and Al-Mahra are not tested,” he said. “They still move freely among the people in the markets and in the streets.”

A Socotri employee of the Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan Hospital, speaking to Sana’a Center on the condition of anonymity, revealed that 19 out of 25 COVID-19 tests conducted on April 1 were positive – a small sample, but a dangerously high positivity rate. “My neighbor, an old lady, died of COVID-19. Cases are increasing every day,” he said. “But no one is wearing a mask.”

Making the matter even more precarious is the fact that there are no quarantine rooms at Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan Hospital, meaning Socotra has minimal resources to deal with a COVID-19 outbreak.

(** B H K)

Victims in the Shadows: The psychological scars of war

“We got up, but my father remained attached to the floor”

In war, there are spaces absent from the humanitarian landscape, in which people are licking their wounds or dying silently in the face of the uncaring media and its audience. The war is like a fire in a forest, in which only the highest trees are seen burning, while everything else, down to the living organisms on the forest floor, die in silence.

Those who look more carefully at the victims of war will find many more tragedies than those most directly obvious from the impact of each incident. Some victims are still writhing from pain [months/years] later, and some have died of the psychological scars and the severe trauma they’ve experienced.

As a human rights activist, every time I go to one of the four coastal districts of Taiz (Al-Mukha, Dhu Bab, Mawza, and Al-Waziyah) to document the human rights violations that occur there, I carefully examine the statements of witnesses and find that there are phrases and sentences tucked deep into their stories, that when explored, reveal that there the victims are not just those who were directly—physically—impacted.

On January 23, 2020 I went to As-Suffai village of Al-Waziyah District to document an incident of an anti-vehicle landmine explosion that had severely wounded and disabled six children. The landmine was left by the Ansar Allah (Houthi) armed group near the village. It exploded when the children found it, tampered with it, and threw stones at it from afar.

As I went to As-Suffai that day to examine the impact of the explosion on the victims and their families, feeling that the explosion would likely leave behind many psychological scars, particularly as the victims were children. Witnesses told me that the brother of one of the victims, 10-year-old Ali Nasser Al-Atoumi, was traumatized and scared because of his brother’s injury. Since the explosion, he has been unable to sleep at night. He wakes up screaming and runs from his bed.

In a separate incident, Saudi/UAE-led Coalition warplanes bombed Al-Zahra’a school in Mawza city on August 8, 2016, causing severe damage to the school. According to the media, no civilians were directly harmed.

Nonetheless, what the journalists who reported on the incident, as well as most residents of the area, do not know is the psychological trauma that the airstrike inflicted on a young girl. Nusseibah Ammar Qassem, who was 15 years old at the time of the attack and lived near the school, suffered from post-traumatic stress, and anxiety, and has become more introverted as a result of the panic and fear she felt during the airstrike. After extensive treatment and care, her condition has now become relatively stable, but the effects of fear still threaten her.

The impact of trauma does not stop at just the psychological, as these are often then lead to physical illness that result in the death of the victim.

60-year-old Muhammad Ali Satta from Al-Kudaiha village of Mokha District was among those who were forcibly displaced by the Ansar Allah group (Houthis) in the summer of 2017. He took his wife and three daughters to Hays city in Hodeidah Governorate, which is more than 80 km north of his village, to temporarily settle in, thinking that he had gone away enough from the threats and fear that had befallen him in Mokha.

But in early February 2018, the UAE-backed joint forces advanced to parts of Hays, where fierce battles took place and left many civilians dead and wounded.

On one of these nights of battle, Muhammad Ali spent the night worried about his daughters. The next morning, he was exhausted from fear and his lack of sleep the night before. He had his breakfast and then left the house to the market to buy some household goods. As soon as he stepped out of his house, he found five dead bodies belonging to one of the parties to the conflict.

For him, this scene was the straw that broke the camel’s back. He turned around and went back into the house and lay on his bed. Soon, he had symptoms of a stroke, and was taken to Aden for treatment. There, he was in clinical death for ten days, before he died.

People in conflict zones have are urgently in need of psychological care. It is clear from the scars caused by this unjust war that the conflict has become the responsibility of everyone. In the shadow of each incident, and behind each direct victim, lies additional pain and death from the psychological impact of this war on its victims – by Ammar Hasan

cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics

Siehe / Look at cp1

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MSF: Aden is another example of global oxygen shortage

More must be done to ensure people with COVID-19 worldwide have access to oxygen, said the international medical humanitarian organization Doctors Without Borders (MSF) today.
“Oxygen is the single most important medicine for severe and critical COVID-19 patients, yet oxygen supply is often insufficient because infrastructure has been neglected in lower- and middle-income countries for decades,” said Dr. Marc Biot, MSF director of operations.
“Before the pandemic, we saw patients suffering from pneumonia, malaria, sepsis, and a variety of other conditions—as well as far too many premature babies—die due to a lack of medical oxygen. COVID-19 has brought this issue into sharp new focus. Unstable oxygen supplies kill.” Dr. Biot added.
“People are being failed twice,” said Dr. Biot. “Not only are they at the end of the inequitable global vaccine line, but they also cannot receive care when they fall ill because they do not have access to the oxygen they need.”
Long-term solutions are needed to secure supply, but, in the meantime, medical oxygen must be urgently made available to health facilities battling COVID-19, particularly when the virus surges. Beyond the current catastrophe in India, the city of Aden, Yemen, is another prime example of the global oxygen shortage.
Beyond COVID-19, access to oxygen therapy is critical for people with pneumonia and other respiratory illnesses, sepsis, severe malaria, epilepsy, trauma, obstetric and neonatal conditions, and those in need of surgical care and anesthesia.

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Top STC official dies from Covid-19

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20 new cases of coronavirus reported, 6,482 in total

The committee also reported the death of one coronavirus patient, in addition to the recovery of 9 others.
964 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

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16 new cases of coronavirus reported, 6,462 in total

The committee also reported the death of one coronavirus patient, in addition to the recovery of 5 others.
1,024 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

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20 new cases of coronavirus reported, 6,446 in total

The committee also reported the death of 4 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 7 others.
1,117 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

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18,555 health workers, elderly people get vaccinated for COVID-19

The number of health workers and elderly people who have received the coronavirus vaccine in the liberated governorates reached more than 18,555 people, Yemen's Health Ministry said in a statement carried by the state news agency Saba on Friday.
7,756 health workers, 6,745 elderly, and 4,000 people with chronic diseases had been immunized in 57 districts in the liberated areas, the statement added.

My comment: It’s just overkill to vaccinate a person who already seems to be infected (look at the photo).

(A H)

12 new cases of coronavirus reported, 6,426 in total

The committee also reported the death of 5 coronavirus patients, in addition to the recovery of 5 others.
1,067 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.

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COVID-19 Movement Restrictions: Yemen Mobility Restriction Dashboard #24 (30 April 2021)

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WHO Yemen Update Situation report - Issue no.3 (March 2021)

COVID19 Response: WHO in partnership with UNICEF, supported the arrival of the first batch of 360,000 doses of AstraZeneca COVID19 vaccines shipped through the Covax facility P 03

Malaria Control & Prevention: As part of their joint Malaria Control & Prevention Project, WHO and KSRelief distributed in March 1200 sprayers for indoor residual & larviciding spray, 1200 valves, and spare parts to support malaria vector control campaigns in targeted governorates in Yemen.

cp2 Allgemein / General

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Interactive Map of Yemen War

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Daily Yemen War map updates (none for May 7)

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Audio: Von Sanaa über Ost-Berlin nach Bayern – Nabil Al Amry

Im Jemen wurde er geboren und wuchs in Ost-Berlin auf. Heute versteht sich Nabil Al Amry sich als Brückenbauer zwischen Menschen aus verschiedenen Kulturen.

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Film: Can Yemen exist as a unified state post-war? Here’s what different forces want

For her final report inside Yemen, special correspondent Jane Ferguson looks at the war to divide this land.

Jane Ferguson: As efforts to end the war in Yemen step up, it's not clear what a postwar Yemen would look like or whether it could even exist as a unified state.

The war offered armed groups an opportunity to rule areas they themselves either came from or took. Now bringing these regions all under one government is a serious challenge.

Elana Delozier: There are sort of enclaves of governance in Yemen, and different ones. So there's some that are controlled by the Houthis, some by the government, some by other forces.

And so the real question is, what happens when the war ends? How do we work that out? And I think part of the answer is probably some sort of federalist system.

Conceptually, there has always been a sense of local politics. You know, all politics is local, and, in Yemen, that has long been the case.

And so I'm not sure that this idea that we are going to have one totally psychologically unified Yemen is necessarily going to be the case.

Jane Ferguson: Driving between territories controlled by different forces and groups is like driving between different Yemens, each less a part of a whole as the years tick by in this war.

The country's fragmentation is coming to feel permanent as each group entrenches. In the capital, Sanaa, where the Houthis enforce tight control, few people want to speak openly about politics. Many have been jailed here for opposition to the group. And we were watched very closely as we worked.

Most Yemenis are trying to keep their heads down and survive not only the war, but also the politics surrounding potential peace. = =

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Sunnis and Shi'a: A Political History

I've read several books on Islam's Sunni-Shia split, with each having provided informative insights on this ancient schism steeped in both theology and politics. The latter is the primary focus through which Laurence Louër's Sunnis and Shi'a: A Political History attempts to explain how this division has manifested throughout the ages and across different landscapes.

Louër, who has previously authored books on Islam, and in particular Shia identity politics, begins by making the point that the conflict between the two sects "was never just a mere quarrel over the Prophet of Islam's successor", but about the very nature of what constitutes legitimate political authority. These doctrinal ideas would develop over time and continue to inform the ways that both Sunnis and Shias express themselves politically.

The book makes an interesting point very early on that such disputes were either "activated" or "deactivated" depending on the political context at the time and place, essentially forming the basis of the book's central argument

I found the chapter on Yemen to be especially interesting and what Louër described as the "Sunnisation" of the Zaydi Shias starting in the eighteenth century. Yet through more recent conflicts preceding the ongoing war, there occurred what could be described as a Zaydi revival and rapprochement with Shi'ism. I have previously discussed the closer alignment with Zaydis and Twelver Shias, although this could have been discussed in more detail. The proliferation of Salafis in the 1990s also helped: "Reactivate what had become a largely latent sectarian division between Zaydis and Sunnis."

A chapter on Saudi and Iranian pragmatism in how they approach the treatment of their respective sectarian minorities was quite revealing.

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[Sanaa gov.] Official: Yemen’s Forces Will Cease Operations Once Saudi-Led Aggression, Siege Stop

While the G7 foreign ministers condemned attacks by Yemeni Armed Forces on Saudi Arabia and the ongoing operation to liberate Yemen’s central city of Ma'rib in a communiqué released after two days of talks in London, they closed their eyes to the Saudi-led aggression, siege and occupation, Mohammad al-Bukhaiti wrote in a post published on his Twitter page Saturday, presstv reported.

He denounced the G7 move as “international hypocrisy”.

“That is why we are continuing our offensives against Saudi Arabia and for the liberation of Yemeni territories,” Bukhaiti pointed out.

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Film: Yemeni-American Women Advocating for Peace in Yemen

Saima Mohsin, Anchor & Correspondent (former CNN, BBC, PBS NewsHour, ITV) leads a discussion of HUNGER WARD and the crisis in Yemen with: - Aisha Jumaan - President, Yemen Relief & Reconstruction Foundation - Shireen Al-Adeimi - Michigan State University - Iman Saleh - Founder, Yemeni Liberation Movement

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In unexpected twist, Saudi forces attack and deport special forces unit of their own mercenaries

Saudi forces on the border with Yemen have on Thursday carried out a crackdown on a military brigade of Hadi loyalist forces, after hours of clashes with them. This was reported by Yemen News Portal, based on military sources .

The clash means that Saudi army forces effectively went to battle against units of the Saudi-backed puppet government of Yemen, in an unexpected case of infighting.

Saudi Army units arrested Brigadier General Adel al-Musabi, commander of a Special Forces brigade deployed on the border, and sentenced him to imprisonment after a lengthy investigation and torture, the sources said.

Saudi forces have also begun withdrawing all the brigade’s weapons and begun deporting its personnel and officers to Aden.

Saudi Arabia has tried to justify the move by saying that military brigade rebelled against Saudi forces and attacked positions in the Saudi hinterland.

The Saudi forces also accused the general of “cooperation with [Sanaa gov.] Yemeni army forces”, but other sources pointed out that differences began between Saudi officers and the brigade leadership because of Saudi looting of the salaries of soldiers and officers, which triggered clashes between the two sides.

Saudi Arabia has already arrested and deported dozens of its own officers for several individuals and officers in the past, but the timing of the deportation of this brigade, which is one of the most prominent military forces under Hadi’s command, may possibly be related to Saudi efforts to remove Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi from the scene entirely.

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Why Yemen will have to keep waiting for an end to its devastating civil war

Every night after they break their dawn-to-dusk fast for the holy month of Ramadan, many Yemenis join in all-night, often heated discussions about how to end the war that has torn their country apart for more than six years. Yemeni journalist Hamdi Albokari led one of those discussions on the Clubhouse social media app this week, and the link between Yemen's crisis and another standoff in the region was a major topic of debate.

"We know that there are negotiations concerning the Iranian nuclear deal happening in Vienna, and any progress happening there will be reflected on the situation here in Yemen," Albokari told CBS News.

The talks in Muscat, the capital of Yemen's neighbor Oman, wrapped up after a week without any tangible progress. Two linked factors may be standing in the way: The war between Iran-backed Houthi rebels and Yemen's Western-allied government is complicated and still raging, and the Houthis' benefactors in Tehran remain locked in a separate, but equally thorny set of negotiations with Washington over their own nuclear program.

The Houthis refused to meet face-to-face with the negotiators in Oman over the last week. A source close to the negotiations told CBS News they had been urged not to talk directly with the U.S. or Saudi delegations. Saudi Arabia, Iran's arch rival, has led the war against the Houthis in Yemen on behalf of the country's beleaguered government.

The source told CBS News that the American delegation had at least gained "a better understanding of the complexities in Yemen" over the last week, and there was a clear sense that "they are determined, this time, to succeed."

"Right now, the Americans are still in a phase of exploring what each party wants," said Albokari, the Yemeni journalist.

[US Senator] Murphy recognized the challenges of trying to negotiate an end to the war in Yemen amid the standoff with Iran, and he said the hardline policy of the previous U.S. administration in dealing with Tehran was, to some degree, still standing in the way.

"So long as we're still sanctioning the hell out of the Iranian economy... it's going to be hard to push the Houthis to a cease-fire," he told The Associated Press this week.

Murphy called the separate talks in Vienna aimed at drawing both Iran and the U.S. back into the 2015 nuclear deal, "very important, perhaps critical to peace in Yemen."

Elisabeth Kendall, a Yemen expert at Oxford University's Pembroke College, told CBS News that the stream of representatives from around the globe passing through Muscat over the last week was in itself a sign of earnest attempts to craft a cease-fire agreement. But she was clear that a political agreement would only be the first step, and just like the politics behind it, the war itself has become incredibly complicated.

"Reaching a deal will be extremely difficult, but not impossible," she said. "The greater challenge will be translating any deal into peace on the ground. That may well be impossible currently."

"It's possible that Yemen could unravel further," warned Kendall. "Whatever the future power balance in Yemen, stability will rely on strong local governance that is representative and un-corrupt."

She said the foreign powers negotiating over the future of the impoverished nation should seize "every opportunity... to use the momentum of ongoing diplomacy" to shore-up local institutions in the country.

"At least then Yemenis will have a chance of getting on with their lives, whether or not the powers that be can settle their differences," she said.

cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade

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UNVIM Operational Snapshot – April 2021

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UNVIM Situation Analysis – April 2021

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Over 116,000 tons of fuel shipments still being held by illegal Saudi blockade

The Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) has announced that the US-supported Saudi forces are still holding several oil ships, including one loaded with diesel.

The company said in a statement that the aggressive Saudi-led coalition continues to detain 4 oil ships loaded with a total of 116,236 tons of petroleum and diesel for varying periods. This year so far, no oil ship has ever been allowed to enter Yemen by the Saudi-led blockade.

The company indicated that all the detained ships have completed UN procedures in Djibouti and obtain permits from the United Nations, stressing that the cargo complies with the conditions contained in the concept of verification and inspection mechanism operations. However, despite all this, the Saudi aggressors still have illegally seized the vessels and banned them from bringing their absolutely necessary fuel to Yemen.

The company affirmed the United Nations bodies’ breach of the provisions of the International Convention on Human Rights, the articles of international humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict, and all the applicable laws and customs.

(A H K P)

Kidney Failure Patients First Victims Due to Lack of Fuel, Hodeidah

Private sources from Hodeidah governorate confirmed that the dialysis center and a number of public and private hospitals have stopped due to power cuts due to the lack of fuel.

The Director of Electricity in Hodeidah governorate, Bandar Al-Mahdi, confirmed in a special statement to the YPA: Ras Keteneb electrical station stopped service on Saturday morning, which caused a complete breakdown of the dialysis center and a number of other medical centers and hospitals in the governorate.

Al-Mahdi attributed the reasons for the failure of the electrical station to the total depletion of the amount of fuel, holding the coalition forces, led by Saudi regime, fully responsible for what happens to patients in the dialysis center and the rest of the hospitals.

cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation

Siehe / Look at cp1

(B H)

Yemen Joint Market Monitoring Initiative: April 2021 Situation Overview

information on market systems including price levels and supply chains. The basket of goods to be assessed includes ten non-food items (NFIs), such as fuel, water, and hygiene products, reflecting the programmatic areas of the WASH Cluster. The JMMI tracks all components of the WASH and Food Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) as well as other food and non-food items. In light of the current COVID-19 pandemic, REACH has adapted the JMMI to begin assessing the potential impact of the pandemic on markets and on respondents' businesses.

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Yemen WASH Needs Tracking System (WANTS) in Lahj

(A H)

QRCS provides food, clothing aid to nearly 200,000 beneficiaries

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Arzt Ali Hassan Al-Gamrah aus Ellwangen berichtet über den Krieg in seiner Heimat

Die Situation im Jemen ist „katastrophal.“ Und Corona macht es nur noch schlimmer. Das hat der 71-Jährige bei seiner sechsmonatigen Hilfsreise erlebt (Bezahlschranke),-arzt-ali-hassan-al-gamrah-aus-ellwangen-berichtet-ueber-den-krieg-in-seiner-heimat-_arid,11361766.html

(B H)

Child Protection AoR Achievements in 2020


Mental Health and Psychosocial Support was provided to 452,853 people, including 298,402 children (150,396 boys; 148,006 girls) and 154,451 of the children caregivers (66,868 males; 87,583 females) in 20 governorates through a network of fixed and mobile child friendly spaces to help them overcome the immediate and limit long-term consequences of their exposure to violence.


Through the Critical Services activity, CP AoR supported the referral and provision of critical services to children in 21 Governorates, including facilitating access to life-saving health services for the most vulnerable children. 16,463 children (6,557 girls; 9,906 boys) were received services. These services include victims’ assistance for (169 girls; 381 boys)

Child Protection Case Management Guidance during Covid-19 Yemen

Child Protection AoR Sub - Actor and Services

Child Protection AoR Sub - National Hubs Coordinators

(B H)

Film: Torrential water catching facilities allowing flood stream into Wadi Thua'a #Modia #Abyan. They, completed 2 weeks ago, raised the water level, then drove it into irrigation canals. Waters reached all the valley lands for 1st time in decades.

(B H)

Yemen Humanitarian Fund - Response in four hard-to-reach districts in Ta’iz Governorate, April 2021

The First Standard Allocation for the Yemen Humanitarian Fund was launched at the end of 2020 with the objective to provide immediate funding to assist people in acute humanitarian needs with a view to mitigate the risks of famine and negative consequences of COVID-19 in Yemen. A total of $75.3 million was allocated to 34 partners implementing 58 projects across 10 clusters, including 20 multi-cluster projects, targeting 3,266,358 beneficiaries in 137 districts across 20 governorates. One of the main priorities of the allocation was to cover high priority gaps for people in acute needs in Al-Makha, As Silw, Hayfan and Maqbanah districts of Ta’iz considered as some of the hardest hard to reach areas in Yemen. It is of note that the proposed interventions are planned and may be changed during project implementation if required.

(B H)

Islamic Relief-Yemen with IR US strengthen a Fragile health system teetering on the edge of collapse in Yemen

In a country where the health system is on the brink of collapse, a project funded by IR USA with the amount of US $ 940,458 has accomplished solid results. It is an essential part of the large-scale response of Islamic Relief-Yemen that aims to continue ameliorating access to health and public health services through supporting health service delivery and facilities functionality ensuring people receive the needs in a timely manner.

“Emergency Life-saving health response in Hudaidah, Dhamar, Amran, and Sa'ada has led to greater functionality, facilities that were once dysfunctional are now fixed. Improved operational support has resulted in vast service availability, making sure hundreds of thousands now have healthcare access—now more than ever, more people are seeking healthcare, and delivering the basic health services needed is part of the Yemeni people's "right to health” “. stated Jackson, Nutrition Programme Coordinator, Islamic Relief-Yemen.

(A H)

The 13 year old #Yemeni boy who we reported on twice in recent months as he and his father battled for his life, Murad, lost that fight on Tuesday and died in the hospital in Sanaa. Thank you all for reaching out with offers to help his father. I really don’t have words more...

(B H)

Film by Islamic Relief: Du'a for Yemen

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Thanks to Allah & then to generosity of our Malaysian donors, jazah Allah khair, We distributed 115 #Ramadan food basket IDps families in camp north Sana'a. 3.6 million displaced people left their homes because of the unjust war 4 #help…

(B H)

Yemen: Floods Final Report, DREF operation n° MDRYE009

Since April, Yemen experienced heavy rains which caused flash floods in different governorates of the country requiring immediate assistance. On 21 April, a tropical storm hit the southern coast of Yemen with highest impact in Lahj, Aden,
Taiz, Ad Dali’, Abyan and Hadramawt, affecting at least 150,000 people across 13 governorates, including 64,000 internally displaced people. The floods destroyed roads, bridges, and blocked access to affected areas, which resulted in temporary disruption to humanitarian activates.

Overview of Host National Society Since the onset of the floods, Yemen Red Crescent Society (YRCS) activated its emergency protocol for coordination with those branches in the most affected areas, mobilizing over 20 staff and 80 volunteers in activities including rapid assessment, first aid, evacuation, ambulance services, and psychosocial support.

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Uno warnt vor Verschlimmerung humanitärer Lage im Jemen

Der Jemen ist nach Angaben der Vereinten Nationen (UNO) mit 16 Millionen hungernden Menschen und einem Defizit von 2,5 Milliarden US-Dollar an globalen Hilfsbudgets vom Zusammenbruch bedroht.

Laut der Zeitschrift "National" sagte UN-Sprecher Stéphane Dujarric am Donnerstagabend, mehr als 20 Millionen Jemeniten, darunter 11 Millionen Kinder, stünden kurz vor einer Hungersnot und brauchten Hilfe, und mehr als 16 Millionen Männer, Frauen und Kinder hungerten in diesem Jahr.

Zehntausende Menschen lebten derzeit unter Hungersnot und 5 Millionen Menschen seien nur einen Schritt davon entfernt, fügte Dujarric hinzu.

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Daily Noon Briefing Highlights: Yemen

In Yemen, the humanitarian situation is falling off a cliff and more than 20 million Yemenis need humanitarian assistance.

This includes more than 16 million who are going hungry this year. Tens of thousands of people are already living in famine-like conditions, with 5 million more just one step away.

COVID infections have been surging, with hospitals and health facilities reportedly turning away patients due to lack resources to treat them.

Conflict has been escalating, particularly in Marib, where an offensive by Houthi forces has so far displaced nearly 20,000 people and threatens the safety of millions.

The rainy season is also getting under way, with floods in recent days affecting more than 22,000 people – most of whom were already displaced and living in inadequate shelters.

Aid agencies need US$3.85 billion to hold back a massive famine, respond to the COVID surge and meet other critical needs this year. To date, the response plan is only 34 per cent funded.

(B H)


Die Diakonie Sachsen bittet um Spenden auf das Konto der Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe, Berlin,

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Film by Zahra Trust: YEMEN | Food packs distribution 2021

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Film by Greengate Foundation: YEMEN (Al Hudaidah) CLINIC

As soon as we walked into this clinic a child died right before our eyes my brothers and sisters. Mothers came running out to us and started passing their babies asking us to help save their children. It was so heartbreaking to see because normally the women are very shy here in Yemen but for the sake of their babies they were just passing them over to us asking for help. Every penny we had we distributed and we have again made intention to put our lives on the line and go back to do a “Major Zakat and Sadaqah Distribution” but “WE NEED YOUR SUPPORT AND HELP!”

(B H)

Film Unresolved Rugged Roads' Dilemma is Behind Some Patients' Death in Yemen

Families of the Al-Hija region in Taiz have been suffering for years from the rugged roads that hinder vehicles from ever reaching their homes. They are coerced into walking long distances until they reach a street. Women expressed their suffering in carrying their luggage and belongings on their backs, not to mention that those who are sick may die in their way as ambulances are not able to reach their homes. Therefore, families call upon the local authorities and international organizations to lend a hand in rehabilitating roads that would reach their houses in the mountains

(B H)

Yemen Humanitarian Update - Issue 4 / April 2021

Ramadan in a country on the brink of famine P 02

Hostilities in Ma’rib continue to displace civilians and intensify needs P 03

COVID-19 vaccination campaign launched amidst rising cases in Yemen P 05

Collective action for humanitarian access on the Red Sea coast P 06

(* B E H)

Jemen: Solarenergie als Gefahr für das Grundwasser

Seit Beginn des Krieges haben die Jemeniten den Einsatz von Solarenergie in ihrem Land vervielfacht. Das erscheint erfreulich, birgt aber auch eine Gefahr: Die ständig arbeitenden Pumpen lassen das Grundwasser sinken.

Der Einsatz der umweltschonenden Technik ist eine Folge des Krieges. In dessen Verlauf wurden die Elektrizitätswerke und die angeschlossenen Verteilungsnetze zu großen Teilen zerstört. Das setzte dem ohnehin unter Energieknappheit leidenden und durch den Krieg zusätzlich verarmten Land erheblich zu.

Um dem Mangel zu begegnen, setzten die Bürger zunächst auf Dieselgeneratoren. Doch durch wirtschaftliche Blockaden wurde die Treibstoffversorgung erschwert, in der Folge stiegen die Dieselpreise. Viele Menschen sahen sich geradezu gezwungen, auf Solarstrom umzusteigen.

Einer Studie des in Berlin ansässigen "Energy Access and Development Program" (EADP) zufolge ist die Solarenergie für viele Jemeniten innerhalb weniger Jahre zur bedeutendsten Energiequelle geworden.

Seitdem hat diese "Solarstrom-Revolution" sogar dazu beigetragen, Leben zu retten - indem sie etwa als verlässliche Energiequelle in Krankenhäusern diente.

Doch gerade der Einsatz der Solarenergie in der Landwirtschaft führt nun offenbar zu massiven Problemen. Eine kürzlich veröffentlichte Studie des britischen "Conflict and Environment Observatory" (CEOBS) kommt zu dem Schluss, dass sich die Energieversorgung im Jemen zwar verbessert habe, es aber sehr bald kaum noch ausreichend Wasser geben könnte. Dies, so die Vermutung, gehe direkt auf die Solarenergie zurück.

Im Jahr 2019 untersuchten die beiden CEOBS-Forscher Leonie Nimmo und Eoghan Darbyshire auf Grundlage von Satellitentechnik die Auswirkungen der Landwirtschaft auf den Grundwasserspiegel im Jemen. Die Satelliten messen Wasserbewegungen und die damit verbundene Kraft der Erdanziehung. Auf dieser Grundlage lässt sich der jeweils aktuelle Wasserspiegel berechnen.

Rasch erkannten die Forscher, dass sich das Grundwasser im westlichen Jemen auf dem niedrigsten Stand seit Beginn der Satellitenaufzeichnungen im Jahr 2002 befand. Verantwortlich dafür ist aus ihrer Sicht die zunehmende Verfügbarkeit von Sonnenenergie.

So setzten viele Jemeniten auf solarbetriebene Wasserpumpen. Diese arbeiten weitgehend störungsfrei, ihre Laufzeit hängt einzig vom Sonnenlicht ab, an dem es im Jemen selten mangelt. Zudem verursachen sie nach der Anschaffung fast keine Betriebskosten mehr. Allerdings tragen sie nach bisherigem Erkenntnisstand durch ihren pausenlosen Einsatz zum Abfall des Grundwasserspiegels bei.

"Das ist das Gegenteil dessen, was man erwarten würde", sagt Eoghan Darbyshire. Der Grund für die Verringerung des Grundwassers, so die Vermutung, liege in der seit 2019 wieder verstärkt betriebenen Landwirtschaft. Dies und der vermehrte Einsatz der Solarenergie führten dazu, dass immer mehr Pumpen immer länger liefen, so Darbyshire. "Alles deutet auf diese Ursachen hin." Um den Befund endgültig zu erhärten, brauche es allerdings weitere Untersuchungen.

Klimawandel und Grundwasser

Die These vom Rückgang des Grundwassers aufgrund vermehrten Einsatzes der Pumpen sei plausibel, sagt auch Hans Hartung, Autor einer 2018 veröffentlichten einschlägigen Studie der Ernährungs- und Landwirtschaftsorganisation der Vereinten Nationen (FAO).

Solarstrom, so Hartung im DW-Gespräch, sei früher oftmals zu teuer gewesen. Erst in den letzten vier oder fünf Jahren sei er in größerem Umfang verfügbar geworden. Zugleich habe aber auch der Klimawandel zu weniger Regen geführt. In der Folge seien immer mehr Menschen gezwungen, Grundwasser aus der Erde zu pumpen.

Grundsätzlich sei der Einsatz von Solarenergie auch für die Wasserförderung im Jemen richtig, urteilen alle von der DW befragten Experten. Es komme allerdings sehr stark darauf an, dies auf verantwortliche Weise zu tun – von Cathrin Schaer

English version (already had been linked earlier):

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Film, Oct. 2019: War in Yemen above the clouds

A remote village high mountainous in the region of Harraz in Yemen has not managed to escape the devastating economic impact of the war.

cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees

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‘I am alive, but I feel like I am dead’: a migrant grieves the drowning of 3 children

Misrah, an undocumented migrant worker, and her family, left their home in Ethiopia hoping for a better life. Instead, her three children are now dead, drowned during a perilous sea crossing across the Gulf of Aden, when the overloaded boat smuggling them into the country capsized.

Overcrowded and travelling in the dead of night, the vessel capsized under the weight of its passengers. Sixteen children, including Misrah’s, and at least 44 migrants and refugees drowned, trapped beneath the sunken vessel. She and her husband Abdul Basit were two of just 14 to survive.

In 2012, Misrah left her home in Derdawah, Ethiopia, to find work. “I wanted to take care of my family, my mother and my siblings,” she explains. “I managed to travel to Djibouti where I worked as a maid. Thanks to the money I earned I was able to afford to travel to Yemen by boat.”

Thousands of migrants from Ethiopia make the same journey through Djibouti to Yemen each year hoping to reach Saudi Arabia, where there are better work opportunities and higher incomes than back home. Others, like Misrah, intend to remain in Yemen where, prior to the conflict and the current pandemic, there were opportunities for migrant workers. Historically, there has always been movement back and forth between Yemen and the Horn of Africa.

Misrah slowly built a new life in the city of Aden, finding work as a cleaner. In 2014 she married Abdul Basit, and they started a family. “I liked my life in Yemen,” Misrah says. When Misrah’s mother fell ill back in Ethiopia, she felt compelled to return and care for her. Her husband was concerned for Misrah’s safety, reluctant for her to travel alone; ultimately, they decided to travel together as a family.

Like most undocumented migrants in the region, they had no formal or official stay documents in Yemen or papers needed to return to Ethiopia, and were forced to pay smugglers USD 400 to travel from Yemen to Djibouti by boat, the first leg on the journey to Ethiopia. Often, this trip can cost a lot more.

(B H)

Yemen - Flow Monitoring Points | Non-Yemeni Migrant Arrivals and Yemeni Returnees in April 2021

From 01 to 30 April 2021, IOM Yemen DTM estimates that 842 migrants arrived in Yemen. The migrant caseload was 88 per cent Ethiopian and 12 per cent Somali, with 100% of those tracked heading for Saudi Arabia. The migrants are predominantly male (76%), with 13 per cent women, seven per cent boys and four per cent girls also among the travelers.

Through April reporting period, 460 migrants arrived from Somalia and were recorded at Eyn Bamabad (320 migrants) and Ber Ali (140 migrants) flow monitoring points in Shabwah governorate. Al Aarah flow monitoring point in Lahj governorate saw the highest number of migrant arrivals, with 382 migrants arriving from Djibouti.

(* B H)

Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, 26 April - 6 May 2021

Since late-April, heavy rains and floods have swept southern Yemen, displacing hundreds of families across several governorates. Five people died after floodwaters washed away houses, cars and livestock, with Tarim district in Hadramaut governorate the most affected. Floods were also recorded in Lahj, Aden, Taizz, and Shabwah governorates. Local authorities have appealed for urgent relief to help those displaced. Last year, similar flash floods killed dozens of people and displaced thousands, with hundreds more succumbing to dengue fever, chikungunya, pneumonia, malaria, and other illnesses after drainage systems, water pipelines and shelters were destroyed. UNHCR has so far conducted rapid needs assessments in 26 IDP hosting sites in Hadramaut, Lahj, Abyan, Aden and Al Dhale’e governorates, and identified 1,300 displaced Yemenis in urgent need of assistance who will receive support to repair their shelters and sanitation facilities.

Continued fighting at the border between Marib and Al-Jawf governorates is aggravating the humanitarian needs of displaced populations in the area.

During the reporting period, UNHCR delivered protection services to more than 350 refugees, including child protection to 12 unaccompanied minors and other at-risk refugee children.

(* B H)

Displaced families in Yemen receive hope in UMCOR packages

UMCOR was originally founded 81 years ago to care for people in multiple countries in Europe and Asia displaced by the conflicts of World War II. Today, UMCOR is well-known for its response to natural disasters, including floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes and wildfires, but humanmade disasters are also part of its mandate.

“The devastation of having to leave your home with only what you can carry to escape violence that threatens your whole family is still very much UMCOR’s concern,” noted Roland Fernandes, general secretary of Global Ministries and UMCOR. “Often the places people end up are unwelcoming and ill-equipped to meet their needs. We work diligently to find partners who can make a difference in the lives of people displaced by violent conflict, especially women and children.”

The IBC-UMCOR distribution included hygiene kits designed to meet the needs of 392 households (about 2,700 individuals) for one month. Contents include cleaning supplies, masks, soap, hand sanitizer and menstrual hygiene supplies. An earlier UMCOR grant in 2019 provided emergency relief in the same area.

For some living in this world, food is like a dream. UMCOR’s purpose is to reach people like Muhammad and Saleh and their families, almost forgotten in wars the world chooses to ignore. A gift to UMCOR Advance #999895 will assist more families with needed emergency relief.

(B H)

Yemen - Flow Monitoring Points | Non-Yemeni Migrant Arrivals and Yemeni Returnees in April 2021

Access constraints limit the ability to collect data at some migrant arrival points.

From 01 to 30 April 2021, IOM Yemen DTM estimates that 842 migrants arrived in Yemen. The migrant caseload was 88 per cent Ethiopian and 12 per cent Somali, with 100% of those tracked heading for Saudi Arabia. The migrants are predominantly male (76%), with 13 per cent women, seven per cent boys and four per cent girls also among the travelers.

Through April reporting period, 460 migrants arrived from Somalia and were recorded at Eyn Bamabad (320 migrants) and Ber Ali (140 migrants) flow monitoring points in Shabwah governorate. Al Aarah flow monitoring point in Lahj governorate saw the highest number of migrant arrivals, with 382 migrants arriving from Djibouti.

(B H)

IOM Yemen | Rapid Displacement Tracking (RDT) - Reporting Period: 25 April to 01 May 2021

From 01 January 2021 to 1 May 2021, IOM Yemen DTM estimates that 5,231 households (HH) (31,386 Individuals) have experienced displacement at least once.

Between 25 April 2021 and 01 May 2021, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 130 households (780 individuals) displaced at least once. The highest number of displacements were seen in:

(B H)

IOM Yemen Rapid Displacement Tracking 2020, Annual Report 2020

RDT methodology has been in use to track internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees between January and December 2020.

DTM identified 172,386 individuals (28,731 households) who were displaced, mainly by the conflict, across 13 governorates, 118 districts and over 1,249 locations in Yemen during 2020. As mentioned above, this data only represents displacement events in 2020

cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis

Siehe / Look at cp1

(A P)

Jama'an al-Yashay, frm Khamer, #Yemen's Amran, joined gov forces in al-Jawf yrs ago. After Houthis seized al-Hazm last yr, they reached out 2 'm& assured 'm he can back home safely under what's called "Sayyed's Pardon". When did, they kidnapped& tortured 'm until he lost his mind (photo)

(A P)

Escalation of Houthi violations against Yemeni worshippers

On Sunday, a Houthi armed man stormed a mosque in Hufash, an area of Mahweet province, and shot its imams dead in front of worshippers, while praying.

Local sources told "Alsahwa Net" that the worshippers tried to take the imam to Sana’a to receive treatment, but he passed away before arriving hospital.

and also

(A P)

Yemeni Foreign Ministry condemns Zionist attacks on Al-Aqsa and calls for unity in support of Palestine

(A H)

Film: Farewell Ramadan; welcome Eid. Here is the Gate of Yemen -Old City of Sanaa tonight where Sana'anis take to markets to buy clothes and sweets ahead of Eid Al Fitr.

(B K P)

More than 1,400 Houthi child soldiers died in battles

More than 1,400 10-15 year olds recruited by the Iran-backed rebels have died in battle between 2014 and 2020.
An unknown number of young fighters have been sent home in coffins. More than 6,000 children have died or been maimed in the war, the U.N. children's agency reported.
Recruits are taken first to "culture centers" for nearly a month of religious courses. The children are told they are joining a holy war against Jews and Christians and Arab countries that have succumbed to Western influence.
Next, the recruits are sent to military training camps, and then to war.


(A P)

Original post by a Yemeni woman who was detained and abused by the Houthis, eventually released

Film: There is no forceful prayer. This is what the Yemenis said to the Iranian Houthi militia, who tried to impose mosque sermons on worshipers by force in the occupied capital, Sanaa.

(A P)

Anti-israelische Al-Quds-Demo im Jemen stattgefunden

Wie Al-Mayadeen berichtete, nahmen Hunderttausende Menschen an einer Großdemonstration anlässlich des jährlichen Al-Quds-Tages am letzten Freitag des muslimischen Heiligen Monats Ramadan teil.

Mit Flaggen, Plakaten, Spruchbändern und einer massiven Mobilisierung demonstrierten Jemeniten am heutigen Freitag in den Straßen der Hauptstadt gegen Israel. Die Demonstranten bekundeten ihre Solidarität mit den Palästinensern.

(A P)

Mass rallies held across Yemen to mark International al-Quds Day

The Yemeni capital of Sana’a and a number of Yemeni provinces have on Friday witnessed major mass rallies on the occasion of International al-Quds Day under the slogan “Al-Quds is closer”.

The mass crowds at the rally raised Palestinian flags and slogans, confirming that Palestine is the central cause of the Yemeni people as well as the Arab and Islamic nation (photos)

and also


(A P)

Sana'a Marches on Al-Quds Day, Aspiring to Play Greater Role in Liberating Palestine

The statement of the rallies that took place in the capital, Sana'a and the rest of the governorates, to mark International Al-Quds Day, affirmed that "the Yemeni people aspire to play a greater role in liberating Palestine with the free nation and the axis of resistance, regardless of the size of the aggression that the normalizing regimes implement against Yemen."


Films: =

(A P)

Sayyid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi speaks on Al-Quds Day: Zionism is the worst enemy of the Muslim world

Leader of the Revolution, Sayyid Abdul-Malik Badreddin al-Houthi, has on Thursday affirmed the Yemeni people’s faith stance in supporting the Palestinian people and standing by the Axis of Resistance to liberate the sanctities.

“We affirm our standing by all the peoples of our nation in all their issues and grievances,” Sayyid al-Houthi said in a speech on the eve of the International al-Quds Day.

He urged the Yemeni people to record an honourable presence on the al-Quds Day, which marks the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan, as they did in all past years.

The Leader of the Revolution explained that the timing of the al-Quds Day on the last Friday of the month of Ramadan indicates that “Al-Quds is a responsibility and part of Muslims’ faith obligations.”

“We are concerned with moving against the Israeli danger,” he said. “In addition, we, as an Islamic nation, are in a position of religious responsibility before Allah to move in support of the Palestinian people



(A P)

Sayyed Abdulmalik: Israelis Present "Peace" for Deception

Sayyed Abdulmalik Al-Houthi affirmed that the normalization of the Arab regimes with the Israeli enemy aims to deflect the compass of hostility to the inside under sectarian headings among the Islamic Nation.

Sayyed Abdulmalik said, in a speech, Thursday, on the occasion of International Quds Day, “The Holy Quran speaks the truth about the Israeli hostility to the Islamic Nation, not a research or study centers,” adding that "the Zionists in their plans, curricula and criminal behavior, aggressively attempt to present Muslims (to the world) with a different realty."

He pointed out that some Arab regimes have labeled their normalization, media agenda and educational communications with religion. He exposed the Israeli plan with these Arb regimes to keep hostility inside the Islamic Nation through the active sectarian division


(A P)

Sayyed Abdulmalik Emphasizes Boycotting American, Israeli Products

Sayyed Abdulmalik Al-Houthi revealed, in his speech on the occasion of International Al-Quds Day, an effective and powerful weapon in the real battle with the nation's enemy.

Sayyed Abdulmalik emphasized that boycotting American and Israeli products is an effective instrument that could be deployed in support of the Palestinian cause. “Any observant person should join this campaign”, he added.

(A P)

Film: Houthi leader Moh. al-Bukhaiti ystrdy: the aggression (the Saudi-led coalition) & their mercenaries ( the govt forces) hv become the 1st defensive line 4 the Zionest entity & any progress in any front, prtclrly #Marib front, 4 Axis of Resistance is advancing towards #Jerusalem.

#Marib front is the decisive battle for many reasons, including coz Saudi, British ,American ,perhaps Israeli, officials run all military operations in #Yemen from Marib.

(A P)

Yemen: Politicians affirmed that the commemorating of International Quds Day, on the last Friday of Ramadan, is a message to the world about the adherence of the free Arab and Islamic nation to the Palestinian cause.

(A P)

Houthis invite US official to visit Sana'a

The Houthi group invites the US Democrat Senator, Chris Murphy, to visit the Houthi-held Sana'a City and closely see the "aggressive crimes", member of the group's Supreme Political Council tweeted on Thursday.

"We call on the Congressman to ask aggressive countries for allowance to continue his trip to Yemen and visit its capital in order to closely see the tragic situation resulted from the blockade and the terrorist crimes committed by the aggression throughout six years," Mohamed Ali al-Houthi added.

(A P)

Dozens sign petition for the release of abducted Yemeni model

Dozens of Yemeni activists, politicians and journalists have signed an online petition to force the Iran-backed Houthis to release the abducted Yemeni model Entesar Al-Hammadi and her colleagues.

(A P)

Entisar al-Hammadi, Model Arrested in Yemen, Will Be Forced to Undergo 'Virginity Test,' Lawyer Says

Hammadi was taken more than two months ago, after forces stopped her car and allegedly found cannabis inside. Amnesty claimed she has been "interrogated while blindfolded, physically and verbally abused [and] subjected to racist insults."

Meanwhile, people on social media have taken up Hammadi's cause, sharing her story and pictures.

After her arrest, Hammadi was taken to a police station and detained for 10 days, Amnesty reported. The organization also said that she had been compelled to sign a prewritten statement with her fingerprints while blindfolded, and that it included her supposed confession that admitted to being involved in drug-related offenses.

Amnesty also said her lawyer informed the organization that during her detention, security forces woke her up in the middle of the night and drove her to different houses while asking if she used to work at the residences as a "prostitute."

The security forces reportedly transferred her to the women's section of the central prison in Sana'a after 10 days. Amnesty said that prison authorities prevented her from contacting her family or a lawyer, and that guards verbally abused her and subjected her to sexist and racist remarks.

Amnesty reported her lawyer was told on Tuesday by a member of the prosecution team working against Hammadi that the Houthis planned "to subject her to a 'virginity test' within days."

(A P)

Yemen: Actress arbitrarily detained at risk of forced ‘virginity testing’

Yemen’s Huthi de facto authorities must halt plans to carry out a forced “virginity test” on a Yemeni actress and model who has been arbitrarily detained for more than two months on spurious grounds said Amnesty International, calling for her immediate release. Forced “virginity tests” are a form of sexual violence and amount to torture under international law.

Intisar al-Hammadi was arrested by plainclothes security forces at a checkpoint in Sana’a on 20 February. While detained, she was interrogated while blindfolded, physically and verbally abused, subjected to racist insults and forced to “confess” to several offences, including drug possession and prostitution. Intisar al-Hammadi has regularly appeared in photographs online including in social media posts, without a headscarf defying strict societal norms in Yemen.

“Yemen’s Huthi de facto authorities must immediately halt all plans to subject Intisar al-Hammadi to forced virginity testing. She is being punished by the authorities for challenging the social norms of Yemen’s deeply patriarchal society which entrench discrimination against women,” said Lynn Maalouf, Deputy Director for the Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty International. =

(A P)

The Association of Yemeni Scholars: The closest way to the Al-Aqsa Mosque is the Grand Mosque if it is freed from the domination of the horn of Satan represented by the Saudi regime, which has agreed for itself to be a first line and an advanced rampart to defend the Zionist entity

Houthi senior leader Mohammed al-Bukhaiti: Yemenis (Houthis') aim is not only to liberate #Yemen from foreigners, but also Jerusalem and whole region from Zionest Hegemony.

(B P)

International Observatory of Human Rights: 5 Yemeni journalists have been released from prison. There are still 4 innocent Yemeni journalists on death row.

(A P)

Houthi leader offers to swap Saudi pilots, officers with Hamas operatives

cp6 Südjemen und Hadi-Regierung / Southern Yemen and Hadi-government

Siehe / Look at cp1

(A P)

Ein ungarischer Mann soll im Jemen entführt und zu Tode gefoltert worden sein

Noch im April soll ein 43-jähriger ungarischer Staatsbürger von Milizionären im Südjemen entführt worden sein. Der Mann, bekannt als Kimo, war zum Islam konvertiert und hatte den Namen Abdul Karim Fares angenommen. Die angeblichen Vergewaltiger forderten ein Lösegeld für den Mann, doch als sie es nicht erhielten, folterten sie ihn zu Tode, berichtete der Blog Orientalist unter Berufung auf die Webseite Yemen Akbhar.

(A P)

Hungarian man kidnapped and killed in Yemen
Members of the militia of South Yemen kidnapped a Hungarian citizen back in April.

According to an activist from Yemen, the 43-year-old Hungarian man, whose full name is not known but is nicknamed “Kimo”, decided to convert to Islam and was visiting the country. He even changed his name to Abdul Hakim Faris.

the Hungarian citizen was captured in the city of Aden in the South of the country by soldiers of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is known to be supported by the United Arab Emirates. They wanted to force him to help them get a ransom in exchange for his release. “Kimo”, however, denied to do so, which led to his death, writes

(* A P)

Director of the Office of the President of Yemen: We are ready for direct negotiations with the Houthis

Director of the Office of the President of Yemen, Abdullah Al-Alimi, said during the Yemen Media Call – a media briefing session organized by the Sana’a Center– that Yemen’s internationally recognized government was ready to go into direct negotiations with the armed Houthi movement, adding that it was also in favor of reopening Sana’a airport as well the port of Hudaydah as part of a Houthi ceasefire.

He added that the government was not represented in the recent Muscat meetings, and said that the armed Houthi movement insists on escalating hostilities in Marib and politicizing the humanitarian file.

He also accused the Houthis of thwarting recent negotiations led by UN Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths and US Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking in Oman for reaching a ceasefire, noting that the government had agreed to all suggestions regarding the matter.

On the Riyadh Agreement

According to Al-Alimi, the government gave the political aspects in the Riyadh Agreement precedence over the military provisions, over fear of the deterioration of services in Aden.

He said that the government was attacked by the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is supported by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), noting that the presidency is working with Riyadh to overcome the current situation.

He said that Saudi Arabia had invited both the government and the STC for talks in the Saudi capital regarding the implementation of the remaining articles of the Riyadh Agreement. “We are still waiting on the council to return to Riyadh,” Al-Alimi said.

He said that the Riyadh Agreement did not fail. Rather, he said it needs to be strengthened with its remaining articles implemented.

On the government’s relationship with the UAE

As for Yemeni government’s relationship with the UAE, Al-Alimi said they had their differences but did not elaborate on their nature. He indicated that he was one of the go-to people with regards to the relationship between the Yemeni president and Emirati leaders, and expressed hope that the relationship between the two parties would improve and develop further.

On the battle of Marib

Al-Alimi said that the battles in Marib have killed about 2,400 on the government side, and injured about 5,000 others since last January. He also noted that Houthis launched 93 missiles, 360 shells and 257 bomb and reconnaissance aircraft during that period.

Al-Alimi welcomed any efforts to provide military support to the national army in Marib, noting an offer made by Tareq Saleh, commander of the National Resistance Forces stationed on the West Coast. Saleh’s forces do not fall under the leadership of the Defense Ministry.

The director explained that the government sought for the Riyadh Agreement to include all military factions that currently fall outside the umbrella of the Ministry of Defense, but Saudi Arabia preferred it to focus on resolving the situation in southern Yemen.

On Yemeni President Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi

Al-Alimi did not mention an expected return of President Hadi to Yemen.

(A P)

Yemen’s Parliament condemns Zionist occupation authorities’ crimes against Palestinians

The Yemeni Parliament has strongly condemned the violations and atrocities committed by the Zionist occupation authorities against the Palestinian peoples in the occupied al-Quds, holy shrine of al-Qassa and other Palestinian cities amid worldwide shameful silence and complicity with the Zionist usurper.

In a statement issued today the Parliament called on Arab, Muslim parliaments, the UN and all parliaments around the world to denounce the Zionist arrogance and crimes against the Palestinian peoples.

My comment: This “parliament” did not meet for over a year. It’s just the “speaker” who labels as “parliament”.

(* B P)

Report Revealing Crimes, Violations of the Saudi-Emirati Forces, Mercenaries in Southern Yemen

A report issued by the Media Center for Southern Governorates exposed many practices in secret prisons in the occupied southern Yemeni governorates. These prisons constitute to be the most prominent closed black files and the most important tools of oppression and intimidation practiced by the Saudi-Emirati occupation countries against opponents of occupation criminal practices and destructive policies.

Despite local and international condemnations for the crimes of physical and psychological torture, hundreds of detainees and forcibly disappeared persons were subjected to torture in secret prisons during the past few years.

The scope of secret prisons has expanded throughout the occupied governorates from the western coast to Al-Mahrah and the archipelago of Socotra Island, to reflect the brutality of the Saudi and Emirati regimes and reveal the policy of subjugating society to the authorities with oppression and abuse.

The crimes in secret prisons in the southern governorates, the number of secret prisons criminalized by international humanitarian law increased from 26 secret prisons at the end of 2019 to 42 by the end of last month. Human rights sources in those governorates estimated that the number of detainees in them more than 2500.

Despite the exposure of many of the crimes committed in the secret prisons run by the Emirates and its militias in the southern governorates during the period 2016-2019, the Saudi occupier proceeded with the same approach in establishing many secret prisons. Riyadh gave its militias from the Islah Party in Shabwa and Wadi Hadramout and al-Qaeda in Abyan the green light to establish more prisons.

No secret prison belonging to the UAE has been closed during the past two years, despite Abu Dhabi's announcement of the withdrawal from Yemen and the handing over of the occupation leadership to Saudi Arabia in early October 2019. In addition, all prisons and detention centers that were affiliated with the Ministry of the Interior before the occupation were transformed into prisons belonging to the armed militias of the occupation countries.

The militias of the occupation forces have established illegal detention centers in the camps' headquarters of the occupation militias in the various southern governorates.

According to information obtained by the Media Center for the Southern Governorates, Aden Governorate is still the main headquarters of the Emirati secret prisons that are managed under cover by the Saudi occupation forces that took over the leadership of the occupation headquarters from the Emirati in early October 2019.

There are three secret prisons in Bir Ahmed, west of Aden, one of which is a group prison, the second is a solitary prison that has been established, and the third is a secret prison dedicated to the forcibly disappeared.

In addition to the support forces, the security belt, and the special forces camp in the city, individual and group prisons, and the transformation of the Intelligence, Political and National Security Prison in Aden into secret prisons belonging to the militias of the Southern Transitional Council affiliated to the Emirates, with the exception of the Central Prison in Aden, which is still subject to the Public Prosecution in Aden.

The report emphasized that the aforementioned prisons are not subject to the Public Prosecution or pro-Saudi government, and it refuses to present the detainees to the Specialized Criminal Court or other courts in the city and has not dealt with any orders or directives issued by the pro-Saudi government.

The report indicated that the International Committee of the Red Cross and other human rights organizations were prevented from visiting these prisons

(A T)

UAE-backed separatist commander wounded in explosion in Aden

(A P)

Yemeni prisoner tortured to death by Saudi mercenaries in Ma’rib

A Yemeni prisoner was martyred in the prisons of Saudi-led mercenaries in Ma’rib province due to torture, the National Committee for Prisoners’ Affairs said in a statement issued on Saturday.

According to the statement, in the last week the mercenaries brutally tortured Hamid Hammoud Abu Halfa until his death inside one of their prisons in the province.


(A P)

Rights Group Condemns Murder of Prisoner after Being Torture in Marib

Eye of Humanity Center (Ain al-Insiyah Center) for Human Rights and Development condemned the torture of the captive Hamid Hammoud Abu Halfa by the mercenaries of the US-Saudi aggression, leading to his death.

The Center said that those in charge of the prisoner exchange deals in the National Committee for Prisoners Affairs were surprised by his arrival as a lifeless body during the prisoner exchange process at the end of last week.

(A P)

Protests in Mukalla Condemning Deteriorating Living Conditions

(A K P)

Saudi Arabia sends modern military reinforcements to Yemen's Abyan

Saudi Arabia sent on Saturday modern military vehicles to Saudi-backed exiled Hadi government forces in Abyan province, in southern Yemen.
Local sources suggested that the Saudi support came in the context of the military tension escalated with the leaders of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council and pushing or the return of new armed confrontations between the two parties.

(A P)

Al-Zubaidi: STC remains the voice of the people's aspirations

Al-Zubaidi made it clear that the STC successfully managed to make the southern issue a cornerstone of any future solutions, adding that the STC will always remain the voice of the people's aspirations.
Al-Zubaidi affirmed the STC's adherence to the Riyadh Agreement and all the signed agreements, voicing the STC's readiness to contribute in improving the situation in Aden and the southern regions in accordance with the resources available.

(A P)

Tribal armed clashes break out in Shabwa

Armed clashes erupted in Shabwa province on Friday, following a tribal conflict between Amrasas and Lashram, local sources reported.
At least one person of Lashram was injured

(A T)

Two people killed by unknown gunmen in Wadi Hadramout

and also

(A P)


(A P)

UAE 'running Socotra tours without Yemen's permission', ministerial aide says

The United Arab Emirates has been accused of operating trips and direct flights for tourist groups from Abu Dhabi to Socotra island, without the permission of Yemeni authorities.

Mukhtar al-Rahbi, advisor to Yemen's Minister of Information, said on Friday that the island had "become violated by the UAE, which has planned to control it for years."

“Today (the UAE) has become the primary controller in Socotra. Even the tourist delegations take permission to enter Socotra from the UAE,” al-Rahbi tweeted.

"The UAE is marching in groups of foreign tourists in clear encroachment on Yemeni sovereignty," he added, without adding any further details.

and also

If this tweet is true, the #UAE seems to be organizing trips to #Socotra island completely bypassing #Yemeni government's officials authority. The #Riyadh agreement stipulates cooperation b/w UAE-sponsored STC & Hadi government but bypassing government doesn't signal goodwill.

(A T)

Southern Soldier [separatist militiaman] Assassinated in Wadi Hadramout

Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp7 – cp19

Vorige / Previous:

Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-739 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-739: oder / or

Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:

(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)

Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:

Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:

Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:

07:00 11.05.2021
Dieser Beitrag gibt die Meinung des Autors wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die der Redaktion des Freitag.
Geschrieben von

Dietrich Klose

Vielfältig interessiert am aktuellen Geschehen, zur Zeit besonders: Ukraine, Russland, Jemen, Rolle der USA, Neoliberalismus, Ausbeutung der 3. Welt
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Dietrich Klose