... Die Provinz Mahrah und Wettbewerb der Golfstaaten in Ostjemen – Sokotra: Riss im Paradies – Hodeidah, 30 Monate nach dem Stockholmer Abkommen – Der Blick aus dem Iran nach Raisis Wahl – Was Frieden im Jemen bedeutet und wie man ihn erreichen kann – Die Altstadt von Sanaa in Gefahr – Die Stimmen von Muhammasheen zu Gehör bringen – Saudi-Arabiens neues Gleichgewicht im Jemen – und mehr
July 23, 2021: A New Platform Tracks Airstrikes in Yemen – Eye on the East: The Yemen Review, June 2021 – Protests at Hadramaut –Mukalla’s Entrepreneurial Resilience – Mahrah province and Gulf Competition in Eastern Yemen – Socotra: A Paradise Divide – Hudaydah, 30 Months on since the Stockholm Agreement – The View from Iran after Raisi’s Election – Redefining What Peace in Yemen Means and How to Achieve it – The Old City of Sana’a Under Threat – Bringing Forth the Voices of Muhammasheen – Saudi Arabia's New Balances in Yemen – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-752b-yemen-war-mosaic-752b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp8a Jamal Khashoggi
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp11 Deutschland / Germany
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp12a Spionagesoftware Pegasus / Pegasus spyware
cp12b Sudan
cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade
cp13b Söldner / Mercenaries
cp13c Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage
cp13d Wirtschaft / Economy
cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism
cp15 Propaganda
cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
cp19 Sonstiges / Other
Klassifizierung / Classification
***
**
*
(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:
Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-einfuehrende-artikel-u-ueberblicke
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
(** B K)
A New Platform Tracks Airstrikes in Yemen
Bellingcat has teamed up with Forensic Architecture, ECCHR and Mnemonic, alongside the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN), to create an interactive map examining airstrikes in Yemen. This is an inaugural project by Investigative Commons, the new Berlin-based hub bringing together open source, legal and investigative experts to examine human rights issues.
The new map can be seen here. It will be a useful resource for researchers and journalists covering Yemen’s humanitarian crisis, which has dragged on for over six years.
In September 2014, an armed rebel group from the northern governorate of Sa’ada known as the Houthis, facilitated by forces loyal to former late President Ali Abdullah Saleh, seized Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. They were facilitated by forces loyal to Yemen’s former president, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh. After Sana’a fell, Saleh’s successor President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi fled towards the southern port city of Aden. On March 25, 2015, Hadi’s government requested the assistance of Saudi Arabia. Riyadh obliged, leading a coalition of nine states in a widespread aerial bombing campaign, as well as a full scale ground offensive, aiming to restore power to the internationally-recognised government. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), by 2021 over 112,000 people are reported to have been killed in the conflict — approximately 8,000 of them by the Saudi-led Coalition (SLC).
Over the course of the war, this coalition has acquired substantial logistical support, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and weapons from the United States, United Kingdom and European Union.
The SLC air campaign in Yemen has only been possible due to the ongoing role which European arms companies and governments have played in supporting and supplying the SLC. These partnerships have continued, despite strong and growing evidence of a clear pattern of breaches of international humanitarian law by the SLC, as evidenced by ECCHR’s submission to the International Criminal Court. For example, in the seven months after the UK resumed issuing arms licences to Saudi Arabia in July 2020, they authorised £1.39bn worth of arms exports.
The map charts airstrikes over space and time, since the start of the SLC’s air campaign. Each incident includes a date, location summary and links to the open sources used to assess it. The map focuses on four categories: airstrikes on hospitals, airstrikes on schools, airstrikes on civilians and civilian objects, and airstrikes on places of cultural significance. It is also possible to filter by whether remnants of munitions were found, whether there were civilian casualties, and whether there were consecutive strikes on the same target, a data point which helps to indicate intent.
Along the timeline below the map we have included not only the strikes themselves, but also the actions and decisions of European governments and arms companies which relate to the war in Yemen. In doing so, the map’s creators hope to show that these decisions were not made in a vacuum, but rather in the midst of a bombing campaign which has demonstrated a clear pattern of targeting hospitals, civilians, and cultural heritage.
This will be an ongoing project, meaning that further data will be added as more strikes are investigated. In the weeks to come Investigative Commons will continue to collaborate on this mapping project, which researchers hope will become a comprehensive guide to airstrikes in Yemen.
You can explore the map here.
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2021/07/20/a-new-platform-tracks-airstrikes-in-yemen/
Map: https://yemen.forensic-architecture.org/
(** B P)
Eye on the East – The Yemen Review, June 2021
The Urgency to Protect Yemen’s Minorities
Through periods of tolerance and persecution, marginalization has remained a constant in the treatment of racial and religious minorities in Yemeni society. During the ongoing conflict, however, violence and subjugation against these marginalized groups has increased dramatically, to the point that it is fundamentally reshaping Yemeni society. For Yemen as we know it to continue to exist it needs to assure the existence of its minorities, as something fundamental to the makeup of a nation dies when its minorities perish.
Yemen’s Jewish community, with a history tracing back millennia, played a foundational role in developing Yemeni culture and commerce, and creating much of the artisanal industries for which the country is known. While the community had already been dwindling in recent decades, persecution at the hands of the armed Houthi movement following its takeover of Sana’a in 2014 has driven almost all the remaining Jewish families into exile, thereby extinguishing a part of Yemen’s soul. Similarly, as a recent Sana’a Center report details, Yemen’s Baha’i community is rapidly being driven out of existence by a systematic Houthi campaign of vilification and erasure.
The Muhammasheen – an ethnic underclass in Yemen literally referred to as Al-Akhdam, meaning ‘the servants’, by many in the country – have proved more useful to the various warring parties. As another Sana’a Center report details, both the Houthis and their rivals have actively sought out Muhammasheen communities at the margins of society to recruit their young men for the frontlines. At the same time, all sides in the conflict routinely deny wounded Muhammasheen access to healthcare and compensation and remove their families from the lists of beneficiaries for international humanitarian aid.
There is a reckoning with intolerance Yemeni society must undergo. No Yemeni – regardless of religion, race, sex, sexual orientation or other difference – should be denied legal rights and social protections. The incredible and liberating acceptance of difference that was alive amongst Yemenis of all backgrounds in the streets and squares during the 2011 revolution is a proof of concept that Yemeni society is capable of so much better.
The war, however, has brought urgency to the plight of marginalized groups in the country. While almost all Yemenis are suffering from this conflict, the struggle of marginalized groups has become an existential threat to these communities. Yemenis and regional and international stakeholders must take assertive steps to protect these vulnerable groups. For a just peace to emerge from any United Nations-led mediation efforts, the new UN special envoy must also seek to integrate protections for Yemen’s marginalized communities into the peace process.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/14617 = https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/14598
Contents
June at a Glance
The Political Arena
Developments in Government-Controlled Territory
Developments in Houthi-Controlled Territory
International Developments
State of the War
Marib: Fighting ramps up but frontlines unchanged
Taiz: Continued clashes within the anti-Houthi coalition
Al-Dhalea, Lahj, Aden, and Shabwa: Gov’t and STC rivalry intensifying
AQAP kidnaps officers, bombs market in Shabwa
Economic Developments
US Department of Treasury lists one of Yemen’s biggest money exchangers
CBY–Sana’a aims to restrict circulation of rial banknotes issued by CBY-Aden
Houthi-run YPC announces introduction of new ‘official’ fuel prices
Houthis Demand Access to Funds Held by Tadhamon Bank
Features
Eye on the East
Protests Simmer as Hadramawt Enter a Long, Hot Summer – By Shaima bin Othman
Expat Returnees and Mukalla’s Entrepreneurial Resilience – By Nabhan Abdullah bin Nabhan
Mukalla’s Arts & Culture Comeback After AQAP – By Shroq Al-Ramadi
Dueling Mahri Scions Reveal Gulf Competition in Eastern Yemen – By Casey Coombs
Socotra: A Paradise Divided. – Photo essay by Quentin Müller
Hudaydah, 30 Months on since the Stockholm Agreement: A Report from the Frontlines – By Salam al-Harbi
Commentaries
The View from Iran after Raisi’s Election – By Adnan Tabatabai
Redefining What Peace in Yemen Means and How to Achieve it – By Osamah al-Rawhani
In Focus
The Old City of Sana’a: A Living History Under Threat – By Wael al-Ahnomi
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/14598
Protests Simmer as Hadramawt Enter a Long, Hot Summer
By Shaima bin Othman
For much of the past three years, periodic protests have rocked Mukalla, a port city and the capital of Yemen’s Hadramawt government. The cause, typically, is Mukalla’s poor electrical grid and frequent outages, although at times politics and Yemen’s broader war have bled into the protests. In turn, the authorities have continued to intensify their response this year in attempting to quash the unrest. In March 2021, for instance, it was university students who took to the streets, frustrated with the declining value of the Yemeni rial (YR) and rising fuel costs. Days after that, security and military forces cracked down hard on yet another protest, firing live and rubber bullets at the demonstrators, killing one and injuring several others.
Faraj al-Bahsani, the governor of Hadramawt, declared a “state of emergency” and said he was forming a committee to investigate the incident. Ibrahim Haidan, the Minster of the Interior, also formed a special committee to investigate. Neither committee has yet to release its results.
While Bahsani’s emergency declaration effectively banned public demonstrations it has done little to change the public’s mood. Electricity coverage is still poor and the rial recently reached an all-time low in southern Yemen, trading at YR1,000 against the US dollar.
Extrajudicial Detention
Along with the protests, concerns about rights and freedoms are intensifying due to the manner in which Al-Bahsani is dealing with citizens.
Media Crackdown
According to the Media Freedoms Observatory in Yemen, Hadramawt recorded 49 cases of violations against members of the press from 2015 until September 2020, including kidnappings, arrests, threats, and torture. Local activists claim that authorities established a “monitoring room” to track journalists’ and activists’ posts on social media.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/14598
Expat Returnees and Mukalla’s Entrepreneurial Resilience
By Nabhan Abdullah bin Nabhan
Remittances from Saudi Arabia to Yemen total billions of dollars annually and are currently the country’s largest source of foreign currency.[2] As expat workers return home and these transfers fall, so too do the incomes of hundreds of thousands of Yemeni households that depend on them. Less foreign currency in Yemen also puts pressure on the Yemeni rial, driving up prices for many basic commodities and other goods.[3] These economic impacts are undeniably devastating on a broad scale. A less discussed consequence of the repatriation of Yemeni workers, however, is that they include a segment of skilled entrepreneurs who are being reintegrated into the Yemeni market, many of whom are keen to build their businesses despite the challenges of operating in Yemen’s conflict-torn economy.
While no statistics regarding the precise number of expatriate returnees is available, it is clear that they are a budding segment of Mukalla’s small- and medium-sized business sector. This article looks at the specific cases of two enterprising young women who overcame multiple barriers to build businesses in niche market segments, and uses their examples to highlight the types of opportunities and challenges facing new entrepreneurs in the city.
Many of the returning expatriates are bold and well-trained, and willing to take the kind of calculated risks essential to succeed in business. All they require is access to capital and business advice to allow them to realize their potential contribution, both to the economy of Mukalla and for the country more broadly.[25]
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/14598
Mukalla’s Arts & Culture Comeback After AQAP
By Shroq Al-Ramadi
When Al-Qaeda entered the city of Mukalla in April 2015, the cultural and artistic movement froze. Artists were intimidated, writers were muzzled, and performances were banned. Cultural visionaries and artists were singled out and targeted by AQAP. Today, five years after Al-Qaeda was forced out of Mukalla, art is slowly making a comeback. “Most of our work was on near-zero budgets to the point where we had to use the same banner 15 times,” says Shaima bin Othman, who co-founded the Meemz Arts Initiative.
Meemz was launched in 2018 under the theme “Art Returns” with the objective of promoting arts and artists and re-introducing them to the job market. Since then the organization has held more than 17 events, including workshops to empower artists and teach graphic design, film-making camps, karaoke events, and oud playing.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/14598
Dueling Mahri Scions Reveal Gulf Competition in Eastern Yemen
By Casey Coombs
Abdullah and Mohammed come from different branches of the dynastic Al-Afrar family that ruled the former Sultanate of Qishn and Socotra from the 16th century until the formation of the now-defunct People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1967. Like most dynasties, the house of Al-Afrar has internal divisions, particularly when it comes to political issues. Two distinct branches of the family have existed since at least the 1880s: the Socotra branch, where the last five ruling sultans (including Abdullah’s father) resided, and the Qishn branch, based in and around the coastal town of Qishn on the mainland in Al-Mahra. Mohammed belongs to a minor offshoot of the Qishn branch in the nearby town of Itab, while Abdullah hails from the Socotra branch and remains popular on the island. The two main branches have internal divisions of their own, as much of the Qishn wing still supports Abdullah to this day.
In 2012, when Abdullah was tapped to lead a post-Arab Spring political body called the General Council of the Sons of Al-Mahra and Socotra, both branches of the Al-Afrar family accepted him as their representative. Splitting his time between his then-home in Saudi Arabia and eastern Yemen, Abdullah presented himself as a middleman among the governorates’ competing powers, cultivating the style of popular consensus that underpinned the former sultanate.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/14598
Socotra: A Paradise Divided
Photo essay by Quentin Müller
By 2018, however, the political crises and conflicts of the mainland began landing on the island. The first major incident came when the United Arab Emirates deployed military aircraft and troops to Socotra. Though they subsequently withdrew, a Saudi military presence became a permanent fixture on Socotra. Yemenis displaced from frontline areas on the mainland also began trickling onto the island in search of safety. Then, in an unprecedented escalation of violence for the governorate, clashes between forces loyal to the internationally recognized Yemeni government, and those affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council (STC), broke out in April 2020, involving tanks, artillery and heavy weapons. While the fighting subsided, the STC subsequently seized control of the capital, Hadibo, and has had effective control of the governorate since.
In the following photo essay, journalist Quentin Müller, who visited Socotra in April this year, gives us a glimpse of both the island’s beauty and the ways in which the war has begun to divide its people.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/14598
Hudaydah, 30 Months on since the Stockholm Agreement: A Report from the Frontlines
By Salam al-Harbi
The first thing one notices in Hudaydah is the presence of Houthi slogans. They’re on the fence of the General People’s Congress (GPC) headquarters and plastered on walls throughout the city. Along Sana’a Street, the most important street in the city, the Houthis have changed the name of the Al-Alfi Hospital, which was named after one of the Yemeni army officers who tried to assassinate Imam Ahmad in 1961, to the Center of Martyr Al-Sammad, after former Houthi president Saleh Ali al-Sammad, who was killed near Hudaydah in an Emirati drone strike in 2018. This move is part of the Houthis’ efforts to change the identity of the city. They’ve also replaced imams and preachers with Houthi loyalists.
Loudspeakers in mosques now air the speeches and lectures of the movement’s leader, Abdelmalik al-Houthi, and there are also loudspeakers installed in the main intersections of the city for the same purpose. Employees and young men are pressured to attend special “cultural” courses held by the movement. Hudaydah’s residents are mainly Sunni but the Houthi courses are based on a Shi’a doctrine, which promotes the Hashemite lineage’s exclusive right to governance.
An extreme heat wave, with temperatures rising above 40 degrees Celsius, forced me to stay in my air-conditioned hotel room all day. Outside hotels, however, most of the city’s residents have no escape from the heat. Anyone with an air conditioner in their home has to pay a premium of around YR250 for the state-generated power – which cuts out frequently – and YR350 for the privately-generated power for each hour of operating the AC. The AC consumes an average of one kilowatt of power per hour, so if it’s on for only ten hours per day, the electricity bill for AC alone would be around YR105,000 a month (around $177), which is far greater than the income of a typical family in Hudaydah.
Sometimes, the electricity is on for only an hour during the day and an hour at night. The official excuse is lack of fuel. Most families are not even able to keep water cold in the refrigerators, so they purchase ice cubes from the market.
In 2018, Hudaydah was practically a ghost town due to the intensity of the fighting, which caused many residents to flee. Those who can afford it have largely remained outside Hudaydah, but the poor have no other options. Beggars in the city used to be children and the elderly, but now young women are asking others for help. When only the poor remain, that help is nowhere to be found. Hudaydah used to be a tourist destination for Yemenis, but now hardly anyone risks the trip.
The city’s coastline is mostly closed, save for a small rocky beach between the largest and most beautiful sandy coasts in Al-Kuthaib in the north and Al-Durayhimi in the south. Al-Durayhimi is home to the fresh fish market and Hudaydah University, but the area has been a no-go zone since it became a frontline in 2018. The Al-Nukhaylah area, south of the city, has been closed off for the same reason. Clashes have sputtered on even after the Stockholm Agreement in late 2018 was supposed to have brought them to an end. Roads are closed and the fear of new battles deters most visitors. The most famous cafeteria in the city, near Alshaab Garden, which used to be full of customers and open 24/7, now only has a few employees and no customers at dawn like it used to be.
The sidewalks and streets are lined with Houthi slogans and the photos of the movement’s symbols and deceased fighters face only one competitor: the hundreds of miserable citizens who sleep under these banners at night or lean on the walls they’re pasted on during the day to shield themselves from the burning sun. Even the water is often cut off without prior warning, and many can no longer afford to purchase water.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/14598
The View from Iran after Raisi’s Election
By Adnan Tabatabai
While it is inaccurate to view Iranian-Saudi tension as the sole driver of all armed conflict in the Middle East, peace talks between the two could go a long way toward solving some of the most pressing regional issues such as the war in Yemen, the situations in Syria and Iraq as well as the worsening crisis in Lebanon. All expectations are that meetings will resume on this newly established track shortly after Eid al-Adha in late July.
Observers in the European policy community suggest that Saudi Arabia has a clear interest in entering these talks, as they see the kingdom being stuck in Yemen. These same observers question Iran’s incentives for actually making a deal. But Iran, too, has a lot to gain from these talks.
First, on the Yemen file: Tehran is eyeing two political wins. Iran is increasingly viewed by Saudi Arabia as an important player with a significant role to play in ending the war, at least the geopolitical dimensions of it. For years, Saudi Arabia had rejected any role for Iran. Indeed, Riyadh launched its military intervention in Yemen in 2015 largely out of fear that Tehran might gain a foothold on its southern border. That Saudi perceptions are changing is a win for Iran. Iran would also almost certainly welcome Saudi Arabia’s willingness to grant a share of political power to the Houthis in a reconstituted Yemen. Seeing their allies being elevated from a rebel group to an acknowledged political actor would also be considered a “win” in Tehran. Although Yemen has never been of inherent value to Iran, it is in Yemen that Iran has improved its geopolitical position in the Arabian Peninsula toward Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as vis-à-vis the United States. In the future, Washington will have to worry about a new front from which Iran could threaten its regional allies in times of increasing US-Iran tensions.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/14679 = https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/14598
Redefining What Peace in Yemen Means and How to Achieve it
By Osamah al-Rawhani
The pursuit of peace primarily through the office of the UN special envoy has proven to be a failed approach and has failed to prevent the further deterioration of the situation. In fact, the UN envoy has merely added another layer of complexity to addressing the country’s many conflicts. This is not to belittle the envoy’s efforts, whose mandate in Security Council resolution 2216 is largely restricted to Track 1 negotiations, but to suggest that eyes and efforts should also be directed toward the other approaches that can improve living conditions and contribute to a sustained peace.
With a new UN special envoy soon to take the helm, it is necessary to rethink the approach to achieving peace in Yemen in order to remind people that peace is not only possible but worth struggling for. Perhaps the first step is to recognize that the current approach is not working.
Why Have Peace Efforts Failed?
The warring parties have consistently blamed the UN envoy for the failure of the peace process, at times accusing him of being biased toward the other side. While I have not been a fan of the UN-led peace process and its chaotic approach, I understand that the UN does not have the magical wand. It is merely a mediation tool. The power to end the conflict lies with the warring parties. Unfortunately, both sides profit from continued conflict, and neither has much incentive to work toward achieving peace and all of the unknowns it will usher in.
In many cases, the warring parties have actively undermined peace-related work conducted by other peace tracks. The Houthis, for example, ban all peace-related activities in their areas of control while centralizing power in Sana’a to unprecedented levels using a brutal police state. The internationally recognized government, meanwhile, has struggled to establish a presence in non-Houthi areas. That has allowed non-state actors like the Southern Transitional Council (STC) to gain traction, which has fueled more conflict. In essence, the gun is the only legitimacy the belligerent parties have with the population under their control. That seems to encourage the emergence of more armed groups.
Although it is essential to continue top-down, Track 1 efforts to broker a political deal between the warring parties, this should not be the sole focus. Bottom-up, Track 2 and Track 3 approaches – involving mid-level and grassroots leadership, respectively – could help build the necessary leverage on the main combatants to push Track 1 negotiations toward a political deal. With Track 1 efforts stalled, Yemenis too must invest in Track 2 and Track 3 to push forward peace efforts. At the local level this could help prevent the widening of the conflict and halt further fragmentation by providing greater incentives for stability. These efforts could consist of supporting local peace initiatives and creating platforms for local communities to engage in active dialogue to address the issues they are facing. These efforts could contribute to local and regional peace while the two main warring parties drag their feet on an agreement at the national level.
But these alternative tracks need support. Past efforts have been limited. For example, many Track 2 programs have operated more like workshops, given their lack of structure and consistency. They lack synergies with other tracks, especially Track 1, due to pushback from the warring parties who tend to monopolize power and rob the local level of agency. Paradoxically, expanding direct engagement with local actors might pressure the warring parties to work more in the interests of the populace rather than profiting off of their misery. If anything scares the warring parties, it is stability and local cohesion.
In order to move toward a multi-track peace process, we must redefine what kind of peace Yemen wants. The current approach to peace has focused on what the Americans and the Saudis and the warring parties want. But it has become increasingly clear that peace in any meaningful sense features nowhere on the agendas of the warring parties. And neither the Houthis nor the internationally recognized government have even signaled their desire for a prosperous and united country. They have provided no vision of what the new and better Yemen should like after it emerges from the war – and that is unconscionable.
So is peace for the warring parties to define? Partially, yes. But the peace process goes far beyond that. The peace process in Yemen should be viewed through its various levels of society, from the hyper-local level all the way up to the national political leadership. Thus, a multi-track peace process is the way forward. Working locally is essential. That is where peace should be pursued. It is up to the local leadership and local communities to address the issues they are facing and not to wait for the national or international powers to reach a deal.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/14686 = https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/14598
The Old City of Sana’a: A Living History Under Threat
by Wael Al-Ahnomi
Today, this built heritage, and the human history it evinces, face multiple threats. Heavy rains have recently caused damage to around 1,000 houses, starkly exposing the city’s precarious situation and the extent of the problems in the service sector. These issues present a major challenge to the preservation of the Old City, but they also raise questions about the role of the General Organization for the Preservation of the Historic Cities of Yemen. The GOPHCY is the primary party in charge of preserving Yemen’s historic cities, according to Law No.16 of 2013.
This article will outline the history of the Old City of Sana’a and the most pressing challenges facing the city, and it will detail the role of the GOPHCY in preserving the city – examining that organization’s current work and its operational challenges.
Difficulties Facing the Old City
Rainfall in August 2020 exposed the extent of the difficulties the Old City faces: of its 6,400 houses, according to UNESCO,[53] 1,000 were damaged severely, moderately or lightly.[54] This most recent acute damage compounds underlying issues in the service sector as a result of long-term degradation, ongoing conflict, and a lack of maintenance and repair.
A 2017-19 study by the GOPHCY, funded by UNESCO and the EU, assessed the condition of Old City infrastructure.[55] It found that important services – water, sanitation, roads, electricity and energy and telecommunications – were completely or partially defunct.[56]
The sewage network has exceeded twice its life expectancy and has not been updated at all since 1982.[57] The water network, which has almost 6,900 connections, equating to some 50,000 residents (with roughly seven people per household) is dilapidated and since 2011 has been effectively unable to provide water.[58]
A project began in 1984 to pave roads in the Old City, with the intent to thereby help preserve its buildings by redirecting rainwater away and preventing it from settling around the buildings’ foundations. However, ruptures and leaks in the water and sewage networks have caused extensive damage to the Old City’s roads. Some 66 percent of the Old City’s main and side streets have sustained moderate to substantial damage.[59]
According to Abu Bakr al-Jamra, a GOPHCY employee and vice president of the committee tasked with assessing buildings damaged by rain, catastrophic water leaks from the underground network are one of the greatest threats facing Old City buildings – greater even than the threat of heavy rainfall accumulation at ground level.[60] Since 2011, given that the main water pressure has remained weak, citizens have dug into the roads to connect their own pipes to the water network to supply their homes with drinking water; this results in leakages, affecting house foundations and road surfaces.[61]
Since the beginning of the war, the public electricity and energy providers have stopped servicing most areas of Yemen; the Old City of Sana’a is no exception. Many citizens have resorted to generators or solar power installations, resulting in a dense web of haphazard power lines that distort the city’s appearance and streetscape.[62]
Over the years, the telecommunications sector has also suffered damage due to neglect, obsolescence, lack of maintenance, and more recently the ongoing conflict and Saudi airstrikes in Sana’a. This has led to intermittent landline telecommunications network service in seven neighborhoods in the Old City.
The GOPHCY’s Role in Preserving Historic Cities
The General Organization for the Preservation of the Historic Cities of Yemen was established over a decade after the Old City of Sana’a was named a World Heritage Site (photos)
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/14598 = https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14892
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Bringing Forth the Voices of Muhammasheen
The Muhammasheen, meaning “the marginalized,” is an ascriptive term designating a group of Yemenis who were traditionally called Al-Akhdam (literally meaning “the servants”). Membership in this ethnic minority is hereditary, associated with certain types of occupations, and in traditional Yemeni social structures its members are considered ‘weak’ and lacking origins, therefore ostensibly under tribal protection. There are strong cultural prohibitions against marriage of Muhammasheen to other social groups and its members are traditionally not allowed to bear arms or to own property. Such individuals are perceived as being of African origin and are highly stigmatized within Yemeni society in ways that are caste-like. The term Muhammasheen, as an alternative to Al-Akhdam, came into common parlance in the early part of the new millennium in development and humanitarian circles and more broadly in Yemeni society.
Estimates of the number of Muhammasheen in Yemen vary radically, most commonly stated from 500,000 to 3.5 million, with significant concentrations in slums surrounding Yemen’s major cities. This study estimates there are between 500,000 to 800,000 Muhammasheen, approximately 1.6 to 2.6 percent of Yemen’s population. There are a variety of theories about the origins of the Muhammasheen. Ultimately, discussions on origins cloud the truth that Muhammasheen are Yemenis and Yemen is their homeland.
During the conflict, Muhammasheen children have faced similar issues as other children in Yemen, as well as additional challenges that emerge from their membership of an ostracized ethnic minority with high levels of poverty and at risk from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Muhammasheen children encounter high levels of discrimination in schools from teachers and administrators, as well as bullying and harassment from their peers. Additionally, many Muhammasheen families need the income that children earn, primarily through begging, to survive. Despite such an environment, Muhammasheen families generally care deeply about education as it is seen as essential to build a better life. The incidence of SGBV against Muhammasheen is perceived to be increasing, including among children, often with impunity for the perpetrators due to a lack of social and state protection of this group.
Young men from the Muhammasheen community have been particularly hard hit by the conflict with shrinking income-earning and educational opportunities and diminishing hopes for marriage and a better future. One of the most significant challenges young Muhammasheen men face is recruitment to fight by parties to the conflict. While families benefit in the short term from the money earned this comes with problems: lack of support for medical treatment if a young man is injured, and little or no compensation if he is not able to work again; no support for mental health issues or trauma suffered as a result of the horror of war; and if a young man is killed while fighting, his family loses his financial contribution with no support to his parents, widow or children. Further, when a man is away fighting his family is more vulnerable to abuse and violence. Muhammasheen men have expressed that they feel used by parties to the conflict who neglected them before the conflict and who they believe will abandon them when the war is over.
One of the most urgent needs of Muhammasheen identified in this research is shelter and housing. The conflict has dramatically deteriorated the situation for all residents of shantytowns, but due to their caste-like status and structural discrimination Muhammasheen residents have been disproportionately negatively impacted. Challenges include severe overcrowding and land ownership issues. The absence of basic services in slums was a major issue before the conflict and since 2015 has only increased in significance.
Poverty among Muhammasheen is intimately tied to structural discrimination and translates into a range of challenges including: educational challenges which limit income-earning potential; weak healthcare services contributing to indebtedness and poor health, impacting the ability to work; denial of humanitarian assistance despite Muhammasheen being among the most vulnerable in displacement; and abuse and trauma which have deep emotional and psychological impacts contributing to depression and constraining income earning.
The social isolation and stigmatization of Muhammasheen magnify vulnerabilities and deny them the support of their fellow Yemenis. Prior to the conflict, Muhammasheen had varying levels of integration into Yemeni society in different parts of the country. Generally, in Aden and Hudaydah, Muhammasheen were more accepted and faced less overt discrimination. However, with the conflict and humanitarian crisis, in some cases isolation has increased, although there are reports of communities of Muhammasheen and non-Muhammasheen coming together in displacement to support one another. In recent decades many Muhammasheen have become distant from tribal systems as a result of urbanization and seeking to escape strangling social stratification in rural areas through migration.
The emergence of Muhammasheen-led CSOs has contributed to the increased visibility of the community at both the national and international levels. Such organizations have sought to positively impact the situation of Muhammasheen through educational and health activities, documenting abuse and discrimination, assessing needs and advocating with local authorities on specific issues. Yemeni civil society has been deeply impacted by the conflict and ensuing humanitarian crisis, and Muhammasheen-led CSOs face similar challenges as their peer organizations, although their marginalized status means their staff face amplified risks of harassment, detention and targeted abuse.
Muhammasheen political engagement has varied during different eras and locations. With the unification of Yemen in May 1990, the possibility of democratization, political parties and electoral politics emerged, but only a few Muhammasheen candidates have entered electoral politics. Apathy or cynicism about national politics is not uncommon among Muhammasheen, who have rarely benefited from the system and have been persecuted, made invisible or manipulated by political elites. Some younger Muhammasheen joined in Yemen’s popular uprising starting in January 2011 seeking political change. However, despite this increased public profile, only one individual from the community, president of the National Union of the Marginalized Noaman al-Hudhaifi, participated in the National Dialogue Conference (NDC). Despite this limited representation, a number of the 1,800 NDC recommendations specifically addressed the situation of Muhammasheen. Following the NDC, the Constitutional Drafting Committee included one article in the new constitution on the situation of Muhammasheen (Article 62), pledging to promote their participation in political, economic and social life.
Women in Yemen face significant social, economic and political challenges. Muhammashat (plural feminine) are the most stigmatized group of Yemeni women, and also the most vulnerable to abuse. Their income-earning activities, commonly begging and street sweeping and vending, bring them into public spaces where there are few other Yemeni women. Additionally, their social isolation and lack of adequate housing expose them to risks and deny them the respect and protection accorded to women from other strata of society. Stereotypes about Muhammashat abound, accusing them of loose morals, lack of honor and lineage and weak religious observance; these stereotypes shape their interactions with other Yemeni men and women. Such prejudiced views have real life consequences for Muhammashat and put them at increased risk of harassment, abuse and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Perpetrators of violence against Muhammashat are rarely prosecuted.
Table 1 summarizes the findings of this study, and presents recommendations to improve the situation of Muhammasheen and address underlying inequalities and structural discrimination in Yemen. (Click here to download a full PDF version of the report.) – by Marta Colburn, Fatimah Saleh, Mohammed Al-Harbi, Sumaya Saleem
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14588
and full report: https://sanaacenter.org/files/Bringing_Forth_the_Voices_of_Muhammasheen_en.pdf
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Saudi Arabia's New Balances in Yemen
Saudi Arabia’s rebalanced alliances within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are producing recalibrated power relations in Yemen, too, as the new United Nations Special Envoy — the Swedish diplomat Hans Grundberg — has been appointed. In fact, three external factors contemporarily affect Yemen’s peace prospects and war dynamics, which could alter the diplomatic stalemate that paralysed negotiations in the last couple of years, though the mediation outlook remains complicated.
First, the new UN Special Envoy — the former European Union Ambassador to Yemen (2019-2021) — can draw upon his previous diplomatic experience to bring in the European consensus on Yemen he contributed to achieve. Doing so, he can also rely on the pro-active stance of the US Special Envoy to Yemen, Timothy Lenderking, appointed in February 2021.
Second, the US’ gradually shifting approach to the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) and Oman’s unusually visible role in the mediation process can help bridge the divide with the Zaydi Shia group with regards to Saudi-Houthi relations, too. Currently, the Sultanate’s pivotal role in Yemen reflects — and also benefits — the Omani-Saudi relationship, whose enhancement is symbolized by Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said’s first-ever state visit abroad (July 11th-12th, 2021)in Saudi Arabia.
Third, rising economic and political disagreements between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia (think about the OPEC’s recent disagreement on oil output quotas) risk, on the contrary, indirectly re-igniting significant rivalry — and clashes — in Aden and other Southern governorates. In fact, the Saudi-supported, internationally recognized government and Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) still have to implement the security annex of the “Riyadh Agreement” (signed in November 2019). In the meantime, protests against lack of services, widespread militarization, and intermittent violence have turned into a constant in Aden.
Yemen’s conflict resolution is still an open-ended process. In this framework, Saudi Arabia is working to regain the political centrality it had lost in the country, leaning on Omani diplomacy to reach out the Houthis containing, at the same time, the broad Emirati leverage in the South. On the other hand, both the Houthis and Iran want to bide their time before diplomatic talks.
International Diplomacy. Towards a New UN and US Approach to Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Management?
Regional Diplomacy. Oman’s Visible Mediation Reveals a Strengthened Partnership with Saudi Arabia
Oman has intensified its public diplomatic efforts towards Yemen in the framework of a tightened alliance with Saudi Arabia. The Sultanate’s relations with Riyadh have improved compared to recent years under Qaboos, with an eye to budget security. During his state visit, Sultan Haitham met both King Salman and the crown prince Mohammed bin Salman at NEOM: Yemen was at the top of the regional discussions. Leaders also agreed to establish a Saudi-Omani Coordination Council to deepen multi-thematic cooperation between the two countries.
The mood has changed on the Muscat-Riyadh axis, and this should help limit bilateral tensions around Mahra: in fact, the Sultanate’s increased mediation efforts have been endorsed by Saudi Arabia. Not only do the Omanis have good relations with Ansar Allah, their mediation also indirectly supports Yemen’s recognized yet weak government, which aligns with Saudi interests. In June 2021, a Yemeni delegation headed by the Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak visited Muscat for diplomatic talks. With an unusual ‘visible diplomacy’ choice, an Omani delegation also visited Houthi-held Sanaa to meet top Houthi leaders: Ansar Allah’s spokesman, Mohammed Abdul-Salem, who resides in Muscat, accompanied the delegation.
From OPEC to Aden. The Emirati-Saudi Competition Can Re-Open the Yemeni “Pandora Box” in the South
Growing disagreements around oil and the political economy between the UAE and Saudi Arabia can further ignite Aden and the Southern Yemeni regions: for the first time, influential Saudi commentators are publicly criticising the Emirati role in Yemen, stressing that Abu Dhabi would be obstructing the implementation of the “Riyadh Agreement”. In fact, the Saudi-supported recognized government and the Emirati-backed STC still have to implement the security annex of the deal. Meanwhile, in June, the kingdom hosted talks between Yemeni parties again in an attempt to find common ground. But STC-affiliated armed groups still patrol Aden and control many government buildings as intermittent clashes erupt. Since late May 2021, both parties have dispatched troops and armoured vehicles near the coastal town of Shuqra (Abyan governorate). In June, never-ending political and military rifts worsened the local governance outlook: new protests broke out in Aden due to power outages disrupting water distribution, aid supplies, and medical services. As time goes by, territorial and even district divisions in Southern regions and cities have turned into a de facto reality, narrowing the prospects for a durable reconciliation between pro-Saudi and pro-Emirati Yemeni forces.
The Others: Both the Houthis and Iran Want to Bide Their Time Before Negotiations – by Eleonora Ardemagni
https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/saudi-arabias-new-balances-yemen-31198
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
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Conflict and COVID-19 in Yemen: beyond the humanitarian crisis
Abstract
Background
Yemen has been left in shambles and almost destroyed by its devastating civil war, and is now having to deal with the spread of coronavirus. The Yemeni people have been are left to fend for themselves and faced many problems such as hunger, the ongoing war, infections, diseases and lack of equipment even before the COVID-19 pandemic. All together it is a humanitarian crisis. Only around 50% of the hospitals and healthcare facilities are in full working condition, and even those that are functioning are operating at nowhere near full potential. Healthcare staff and facilities lack necessary essential equipment and money.
Conclusion
This paper presents the accounts of Yemeni emergency physicians who comment on the distinctive challenges that face Yemen’s emergency departments. These challenges include epidemic diseases such cholera, diphtheria, dengue and measles; the geopolitical impact of the ongoing civil war; and daily threats of violence and homicide against emergency healthcare workers. Potential solutions include national and international efforts to properly allocate government funds and to implement universal health insurance plans. Future works and resources should be allocated to addressing these challenges in both short term reactionary measures as well as longer term preventative measures. The solutions to Yemen’s current situation need to be multifaceted, with approaches that target the challenges from multiple angles. Solutions must come from educational and training programs dedicated to filling in the gaps throughout the short and longer-term interventions. Solutions might include community and neighborhood involvement, and invoking assistance from volunteers and activists of all ages to pilot smaller sized improvement projects. Lastly, a systems approach to emergency and disaster management is needed. https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12992-021-00732-1
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Four new cases of COVID-19 reported in Aden, Shabwa
The committee also reported the death of one coronavirus patient in Hadramout. No recoveries have been recorded, said the statement.
923 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33376
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Five new cases of COVID-19 reported in Aden, Lahj
Neither recoveries nor deaths have been recorded today, the committee said in its statement.
419 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33373
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The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Yemeni Women
Claire HaDuong, head of the Médecins Sans Frontières mission in Yemen, described the Yemeni response to the pandemic as a mixture of denial about the spread of the virus, and fear when faced with a case. Such panic was understandable given the country’s near-total lack of capacity to respond.[2]
Yemen has recorded one of the lowest COVID-19 infection rates and related deaths in the Middle East, although official counts by both the armed Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) and the internationally recognized Yemeni government are unreliable due to the lack of testing and access to medical treatment.[3] Moreover, Houthi authorities intimidated health workers, journalists, and even grave diggers to suppress information about the extent of the outbreak in areas they control.[4] Houthi authorities, which control most of the country’s large urban centers, have not provided statistics on the virus since May 2020 when they announced four cases of coronavirus and a single death.[5]
Furthermore, fear and stigma associated with COVID-19 has prevented people from seeking medical care.[6] In Houthi-controlled areas, rumors circulated during the first wave that patients with suspected COVID-19 were being euthanized with so-called “mercy injections”. This fueled fear and discouraged people from going to hospital.[7] In addition, the poor reputation of hospitals pushed some people to stay home rather than seek treatment. During the first wave of the pandemic, the lack of response and prevention capacities prompted large numbers of health workers, at risk of being directly exposed to the virus, to resign and stay at home for fear of infection.[8] Many hospitals shut their doors to patients, including those not suffering COVID-19 symptoms, to limit spread among health workers.[9]
As the terror caused by the first wave subsided, so did people’s caution about the pandemic. A second wave of COVID-19 emerged in February 2021,[10] but according to Dr. Adam al-Juaidi, a doctor at the Shafak Center quarantine facility in Taiz, people became apathetic. Some believed that if they had contracted the virus they were then immune to it, and people were not prepared to stop working and lose their incomes as they had during the first wave, he said.[11]
While few have been spared the impact of this crisis, women and girls in Yemen have experienced the pandemic differently to men and boys. This policy brief explores the impact of COVID-19 on women in Yemen, surveying access to healthcare and how social norms create unequal access to treatment; the perceived rise in gender-based violence related to lost livelihoods and home confinement; and the economic impact of containment measures, like curfews and lockdowns, on Yemeni women.
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14703
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UK to redirect coronavirus vaccine supplies to Yemen
Britain has developed plans to donate coronavirus vaccinations on a “strategic basis” that would allow it to make a specific impact in countries in need, including Yemen and Lebanon.
Sources in the Foreign Office said Dominic Raab's disclosure to parliament that the UK would be using so-called vaccine diplomacy to extend Britain’s soft power influence by donating 20 million doses would specifically include the troubled Middle East states.
It is understood the majority will go to the Middle East and Africa where some countries have had only 1 per cent of their population inoculated.
"The UK could probably quickly deliver jabs but I suspect that the only place that you can have any real influence right now with Covid would be in the capital Sanaa, and Aden," said Michael Stevens, a Middle East expert at the RUSI think tank.
(A H)
Five new cases of COVID-19 reported, 6,992 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the death of one coronavirus patient in Shabwa. No recovery has been recorded.
727 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33370
(A H)
Four new cases of COVID-19 reported, 6,981 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of three coronavirus patients in Hadramout. No death has been recorded.
1,548 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33364
(A H P)
Yemen to get more COVID-19 vaccines by end of month – health ministry
Yemen expects to get a second batch of COVID-19 photographs by the tip of this month by way of the COVAX international vaccine-sharing scheme, the well being ministry stated on Sunday.
Yemen is anticipating to get 151,000 doses of the Johnson & Johnson (JNJ.N) single-shot vaccine, out of an eventual complete of 504,000, a spokesperson stated.
https://infodig.site/yemen-to-get-more-covid-19-vaccines-by-end-of-month-health-ministry/ = https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-yemen-int/yemen-to-get-more-covid-19-vaccines-by-end-of-month-health-ministry-idUSKBN2EO0G5
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Corona Yemen... a black market for the second dose
The second dose of the Corona virus vaccine has turned into a burden in Yemen , due to the lack of sufficient quantities of it to be given on time to people who received the first dose two months ago. A black market has also emerged to sell the vaccine in light of the great rush to obtain it, especially among expatriates and those wishing to perform Hajj or travel abroad.
While the World Health Organization sets the date for the second dose of the vaccine within a period ranging between 8 and 12 weeks after taking the first dose, all Yemeni governorates missed this date due to the non-arrival of the required quantities or some of them being damaged, according to what Al-Araby Al-Jadeed learned from health sources.
A number of Yemenis expressed their fear that the conflict in the dates of taking the vaccines could lead to health problems or a setback in the immune system, especially for those who are close to receiving the second dose.
Many claim that the "broking business" includes primarily the immunization cards for the Corona vaccine that expatriates need and those wishing to travel abroad, noting that the Yemeni Ministry of Health granted those vaccinated with the first dose paper cards, which some countries rejected, which made them issue electronic cards that adhere to the system approved in neighboring countries. The Deputy Director of Information and Education in the Health Directorate in Taiz City, Tayseer Al-Sami'i, denies the accusations of concealing or selling vaccines. He told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed: "From taking the first dose until May 7 last, the second dose was given on time."
(A H)
Five new cases of COVID-19 reported in Hadramout
The committee also reported the recovery of two coronavirus patients in Hadramout and al-Mahra, in addition to the death of two others in Hadramout and Lahj.
1,178 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for the virus were carried out on the same day, the statement added.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33356
cp2 Allgemein / General
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Interactive Map of Yemen War
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Yemen War Daily Map Updates
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-july-22-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-july-21-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-july-20-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-july-19-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-july-18-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-july-17-2021-map-update/
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Yemen Information Center
Why Choose YIC for Research and Media
A myriad of challenges that fuel Yemen's ongoing conflict contributes to a growing sense of pessimism among Yemenis, which leads to narratives and realities associated with hopelessness, skepticism, and lack of faith in any prospects for peace. A primary promoter of this cycle of adversarial rhetoric and negative perceptions is due to misleading research and media covering Yemen, which contributes to the conflict and, as in most cases, benefits from swaying Yemeni perceptions and their outlook for peace.
The overwhelming majority of local and international analysis on Yemen participates in a distorted and inflammatory discourse that diminishes the prospects of positive outcomes. Yemenis deserve a reliable and responsible source of information that provides news and studies that inform Yemeni communities by steering the discourse towards conflict resolution and sustainable peace.
YIC launched with locations throughout Yemen as an independent non-partisan Yemeni center seeking alternative media and scholarly research that answers Yemen's most pressing needs. We believe that peace cannot be realized without enhancing our peoples' awareness and understanding of Yemen's conflict at its roots. To build a solid foundation for permanent peace, Yemeni communities and international stakeholders need to address the systemic root causes of conflict in Yemen.
By centering on the systemic issues causing Yemen's prevalent conflicts, YIC helps bring Yemenis together and closer to reaching sustainable peace. Our center clarifies the distortions to its followers, highlights local and global stakeholders' peacebuilding and humanitarian efforts, and convenes all actionable ideas in various fora and publications.
https://www.yemeninformation.org/
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Biden's Yemen Shift May be Bearing Fruit—and a Lesson for Washington
Without American backing, would Saudi Arabia be more inclined to withdraw?
Half a year later, the answer seems to be a qualified "yes." The Saudi government is increasingly eager to exit the conflict, and recent reports indicate Riyadh could be nearing an Oman-mediated exit deal with the Houthis. If that agreement can be accomplished, Yemen may finally receive humanitarian assistance it desperately needs, and eventually, peace.
That is not to say there's a straight line from Biden's announcement and a Saudi-Houthi treaty. We don't even know exactly what Biden changed—some reporting suggests it was far less than he implied.
Finally, even if that diplomacy progresses, the blockade ends and the Saudi-led coalition withdraws, Yemen is unlikely to be immediately at peace. Much as turmoil will continue—or perhaps, for a while, escalate—in Afghanistan after American drawdown, so Yemen's civil war probably will not be resolved when the coalition departs. Foreign military meddling like this can easily prolong civil conflicts, but ending the intervention does not always mean ending the entire war. Post-intervention Yemen will still have internal division that will hopefully be settled diplomatically but may lead to more fighting instead.
For all that uncertainty, there is some hope here, as well as a lesson for U.S. foreign policy. The hope is in reports of diplomatic movement toward ending the blockade and Saudi airstrikes.
The foreign policy lesson is in what Biden's shift has affected—and what it hasn't changed at all. On the positive side, it looks like withdrawal of some American support did push Saudi Arabia toward exiting the war. It's too soon to say, but in retrospect, we may be able to confidently judge that Biden's February move shortened the overall length of Yemen's strife, or at least shortened U.S. participation.
However, the new U.S. posture here was neither magic bullet nor time machine. It did not undo the many harms made possible by Washington's past backing of the coalition. Our meddling added to Yemen's suffering considerably while accomplishing nothing for U.S. security, because the outcome of this civil war in a small, deeply impoverished nation so far from our shores has nothing to do with vital U.S. interests.
The foreign policy lesson is in what Biden's shift has affected—and what it hasn't changed at all. On the positive side, it looks like withdrawal of some American support did push Saudi Arabia toward exiting the war. It's too soon to say, but in retrospect, we may be able to confidently judge that Biden's February move shortened the overall length of Yemen's strife, or at least shortened U.S. participation.
However, the new U.S. posture here was neither magic bullet nor time machine. It did not undo the many harms made possible by Washington's past backing of the coalition. Our meddling added to Yemen's suffering considerably while accomplishing nothing for U.S. security, because the outcome of this civil war in a small, deeply impoverished nation so far from our shores has nothing to do with vital U.S. interests.
https://www.newsweek.com/bidens-yemen-shift-may-bearing-fruit-lesson-washington-opinion-1611481
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Saudi propaganda and misinformation campaign targets Ansarullah powerbase
[Sanaa gov.] Minister of Information, Dhaifullah al-Shami, has no revealed that there is a strategic study and secret plan being carried out by the Saudi-led coalition to dismantle the Yemeni people’s support around resistance movement Ansarullah.
Al-Shami said on Facebook, “The enemy is working hard to break the Yemeni steadfastness and transform the failure of its aggression and its collaboration, to target the Yemeni society.”
Al-Shami pointed out that the most important strategy pursued by the enemy is a highly secretive one under the title “Overthrow Ansarullah from within, in which the study identified five targeted categories: the people, Ansarullah bases, individual citizens, fighters, and the political and military decision-makers.
The Minister mentioned a number of goals that this strategy seeks to achieve, including destroying the Yemeni people’s trust in Ansarullah
“The enemy’s strategy also aims to break Ansarullah’s morale, plant desperation and defeatism among them through various media and activities, and encourage citizens to resist and get rid of the movement, in addition to sowing discontent among the fighters with the goal of making them leavs the front.”
He pointed out that the most prominent propaganda that the media campaign of the enemy will promote is making and spreading the claim that Ansarullah has ties to terrorist groups abroad, and to al-Qaeda and ISIS in Yemen. This despite the fact that al-Qaeda and ISIS have both been backed by Saudi Arabia for years as allies in the war against Ansarullah and the National Salvation Government.
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Jemen: Biden nimmt Wahlkampfversprechen zurück, während die USA die neue saudische Offensive und die Versorgung von AQAP unterstützen
Die USA haben Forderungen abgelehnt, die Bewaffnung Saudi-Arabiens inmitten seines verheerenden Krieges im Jemen einzustellen, und setzen nun verstärkt auf eine militärische Lösung, indem sie auf bewaffnete militante Gruppen zurückgreifen, die sie in Syrien, Libyen, Afghanistan und im Irak mit verheerender Wirkung eingesetzt haben.
Präsident Joe Biden gab vielen Menschen ein Gefühl von vorsichtigem Optimismus, als er sich auf Wahlkampftour begab und versprach, den von den Saudis geführten Krieg gegen den Jemen schnell zu beenden. Die ölreiche Monarchie, die stark von den USA unterstützt wird, führt seit über sechs Jahren die wohl tödlichste Militärkampagne des letzten Jahrzehnts gegen das vergessene Land und fordert einen brutalen humanitären Tribut von der Zivilbevölkerung.
Biden ist es zu verdanken, dass er ein Team von Unterhändlern unter der Leitung von Tim Lenderking entsandt hat, um zu versuchen, eine Versöhnung zwischen den vielen Kriegsparteien des Konflikts zu vermitteln. Aber ohne den politischen Willen, sich gegen die saudische Monarchie und die verschiedenen amerikanischen Interessen, die von ihren Kriegen reichlich profitieren, durchzusetzen, hatte Lenderking wenig Aussicht auf Erfolg. Jetzt scheint es, dass das Königreich – wieder einmal ermutigt, bewaffnet und gedeckt von den Vereinigten Staaten – jeden Anschein von Versöhnung aufgegeben hat und seine brutalen Kriegsanstrengungen verdoppelt hat.
Ein durchbohrender Stern fällt auf die Erde
Letzte Woche begann die von den Saudis angeführte Koalition eine massive Militäroperation, die sie al-Najm al-Thaqib nennt, was aus dem Arabischen mit „Der durchbohrende Stern“ übersetzt werden kann. Die Operation zielt angeblich darauf ab, große Gebiete in der zentraljemenitischen Provinz al-Bayda zurückzuerobern, die von Ansar Allah nach einer Reihe langer und zermürbender Kämpfe mit Kämpfern von al-Qaida auf der Arabischen Halbinsel (AQAP) im letzten Herbst erobert wurde. AQAP hatte sich seit Jahrzehnten in der Provinz verschanzt und trotz konzertierter militärischer Bemühungen sowohl der saudischen Koalition als auch von mindestens vier aufeinanderfolgenden US-Administrationen – einschließlich Barack Obamas berüchtigtem Drohnenkrieg – irgendwie durchgehalten.
In al-Bayda und den umliegenden Provinzen herrschte nach der Operation eine relative Ruhe, da die Bewohner ein Leben ohne das Joch der al-Qaida erlebten, manche zum ersten Mal in ihrem Leben. Jetzt befürchten einige dieser Bewohner, dass Saudi-Arabien, unterstützt von den USA, versucht, diese Gruppen in al-Bayda anzusiedeln, um sich gegen Ansar Allah abzusichern.
Saudische Jets haben in den letzten Wochen zahlreiche Luftangriffe auf al-Bayda geflogen und dabei tonnenweise Bomben abgeworfen, die von den Vereinigten Staaten hergestellt und geliefert wurden, und der AQAP einen potenziellen Weg zur Rückeroberung der Provinz eröffnet, da die Luftangriffe fast ausschließlich Ansar Allah und ihre lokalen Stammesverbündeten zum Ziel hatten.
Nach Angaben des gemeinnützigen Yemeni Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) wurden bei der Offensive Streubomben aus amerikanischer Produktion eingesetzt, die selbst das US-Militär aufgrund ihrer hohen Kollateralschäden nicht verwenden will, darunter die CBU-58, CBU-105, CBU-87, M26 und DPICM M77.
US-Kooperation mit einem Dschihadisten-Rekrutierer
Laut Mitgliedern der Houthi-Verhandlungsdelegation, die mit MintPress unter der Bedingung der Anonymität sprachen, wird die Eskalation in al-Bayda genutzt, um Ansar Allah unter Druck zu setzen, ihren Vormarsch auf die ölreiche Provinz Marib zu stoppen und sie zu zwingen, Bedingungen zu akzeptieren, die Saudi-Arabien und Lenderkings Gesandter der Ansar Allah als Vorbedingung für ein Friedensabkommen auferlegt haben.
Die Houthis ihrerseits haben versprochen, mit der Wiederaufnahme von Drohnen- und ballistischen Raketenangriffen auf saudische Öl- und Militärziele in den südlichen Provinzen des Königreichs Vergeltungsangriffe auszuführen, so Brigadegeneral Abed Al-Thor und General Aziz Rashid, die gegenüber MintPress erklärten, dass der militärische Druck auf das Königreich nach der jüngsten saudischen Eskalation nur noch erhöht werden wird.
Die Angriffe auf al-Bayda erfolgen nach einem Treffen zwischen dem von Saudi-Arabien unterstützten Vizepräsidenten des Jemen, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, und Vizeadmiral Brad Cooper, dem Kommandeur des U.S. Naval Forces Central Command und der U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces.
Düstere Aussichten für den Frieden
Am 1. Juli sagte der Sprecher des US-Außenministeriums, Ned Price, dass die Vereinigten Staaten vom Vormarsch der Houthis in Marib „mehr als genervt“ seien. Er machte die Houthis für die humanitäre Situation im Jemen verantwortlich und behauptete, sie hätten es versäumt, mit den „anderen Parteien …, die aktiv am Frieden arbeiten“, zusammenzuarbeiten – eine Anspielung auf Saudi-Arabien und seine Verbündeten im Land.
Prices Äußerungen und die Kehrtwende der Biden-Administration in Bezug auf den Jemen haben bei Aktivisten, die sich für ein Ende des Krieges einsetzen, Fragen aufgeworfen, zumal die USA Forderungen nach einem Stopp der Bewaffnung Saudi-Arabiens inmitten einer verheerenden Zahl von Toten unter der Zivilbevölkerung weitgehend abgelehnt haben und nun ihr Engagement für eine militärische Lösung des Konflikts zu verdoppeln scheinen, indem sie auf ihre Gewohnheit zurückgreifen, bewaffnete militante Gruppen zu unterstützen, die sie mit verheerender Wirkung in Syrien, Libyen, Afghanistan und dem Irak eingesetzt haben.
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Yemen: Biden Shrugs Off Campaign Promise as US Backs New Saudi Offensive and AQAP Support
The US has refused calls to stop arming Saudi Arabia amid its devastating war in Yemen and is now doubling down on a military solution, falling back on its reliance of armed militant groups that it used to devastating effect in Syria, Libya, Afghanistan and Iraq.
President Joe Biden gave a lot of people a sense of cautious optimism when he took to the campaign trail and promised to bring a swift end to the Saudi-led war on Yemen. The oil-rich monarchy, supported heavily by the United States, has been waging arguably the deadliest military campaign of the past decade on the forgotten country for over six years, exacting a brutal humanitarian toll on its civilian population.
To his credit, Biden sent Tim Lenderking to lead a team of negotiators in an attempt to broker reconciliation between the conflict’s many belligerents. But without the political will to stand up to the Saudi monarchy and the varied American interests that profit handsomely from its wars, Lenderking had little chance of success. Now it seems the Kingdom — once again emboldened, armed, and covered by the United States — has all but abandoned any pretense of reconciliation and doubled down on its brutal war.
A Piercing Star falls to earth
Last week, the Saudi-led Coalition began a massive military operation they’re calling al-Najm al-Thaqib, which translates from Arabic into The Piercing Star. The operation ostensibly aims to recapture large swaths of territory in central Yemen’s al-Bayda province, which was captured by Ansar Allah after a series of long and grueling battles with militants from al-Qaeda on the Arabia Peninsula (AQAP) last fall. AQAP had been entrenched in the province for decades, somehow persevering through concerted military efforts by both the Saudi-led Coalition and at least four consecutive U.S. administrations to dislodge it — including Barack Obama’s infamous drone war.
On August 28, 2020, local tribal partisans backed by Ansar Allah defeated AQAP and myriad extremist allies, including elements of IS, in a week-long operation. This victory came just as AQAP was preparing to sweep the Yemeni provinces of al-Bayda, Dhamar, and Sana’a in an operation that aimed to repeat the scenarios seen in Mosul, Iraq and Raqqa, Syria, where ISIS was able to take and hold a so-called caliphate extending from western Iraq to into eastern Syria.
Al-Bayda and the surrounding provinces saw a state of relative calm in the wake of the operation, as residents experienced life without the yoke of al-Qaeda, some for the first time in their lives. Now, some of those residents fear that Saudi Arabia, backed by the United States, is attempting to resettle those groups in al-Bayda as a hedge against Ansar Allah.
Saudi jets have carried out scores of airstrikes in al-Bayda in recent weeks, flying in from the north to unleash tons of bombs made and supplied by the United States and giving AQAP a potential avenue to retake the province, as the airstrikes have targeted Ansar Allah and their local tribal allies almost exclusively.
According to the nonprofit Yemeni Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC), American-made cluster bombs — which even the U.S. military has pledged not to use, due to their high rate of collateral damage — including the CBU-58, CBU-105, CBU-87, M26, and DPICM M77, have all been used in the offensive.
While there is not yet conclusive evidence of direct coordination between the Saudi Coalition and AQAP in the offensive, AQAP militants began pushing into al-Bayda from the south almost as soon as the Saudi airstrikes began. The southern villages of al-Zaher and al-Sma’h — including the areas of Jumaima, Wafaa, Sharadeh, al-Sous, Shabakat Dhi Madahi, Akrama, Shawkan and others — have already been recaptured by al-Qaeda according to a number of Saudi state-funded media outlets, which celebrated the putsch as a victory for the Saudi-led Coalition.
No “Certain Victory”
However, the celebrations were short-lived, as Ansar Allah has already begun to recapture areas it gained last August in a military operation it has dubbed al-Nasr al-Mubin, an Arabic phrase meaning “Certain Victory.”
US cooperation with a Jihadi recruiter
According to members of the Houthi negotiating delegation, who spoke to MintPress on condition of anonymity, the escalation in al-Bayda is being used to pressure Ansar Allah to halt its advance on the oil-rich Marib province and to force it to accept conditions that Saudi Arabia and Lenderking’s envoy have imposed on Ansar Allah as a precondition for a peace deal.
For their part, the Houthis have promised to retaliate by resuming drone and ballistic missile attacks on Saudi oil and military targets in the Kingdom’s southern provinces, according to Brigadier General Abed Al-Thor and General Aziz Rashid, who told MintPress that military pressure on the Kingdom will only be increased in the wake of the recent Saudi escalation.
The attacks on al-Bayda come in the wake of meetings between the Saudi-backed vice president of Yemen, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces. Cooper pushed for intelligence sharing and support for armed militant groups under the banner of curbing the arming of the Houthis by the Iranian government.
Grim prospects for peace
On July 1, U.S. State Department spokesman Ned Price said that the United States was “beyond fed up” with the Houthis’ advance in Marib and laid the blame for the humanitarian situation in Yemen squarely at the feet of the Houthis, claiming it was they who failed to work with the “other parties … who are actively working towards peace,” a reference to Saudi Arabia and its allies in the country.
Price’s statements and the Biden administration’s about-face on Yemen has raised questions among activists struggling to stop the war, especially as the U.S. has largely refused calls to stop arming Saudi Arabia amid a devastating civilian death toll, and now seems to be doubling down on its commitment to a military solution to the conflict, falling back on its habit of supporting armed militant groups that it used to devastating effect in Syria, Libya, Afghanistan and Iraq.
(A P)
Emirati leader visits Riyadh Monday, Yemen war on agenda
Abu Dhabi crown prince is expected to arrive on Monday in Riyadh, where he and his ministerial delegation will discuss a package of issues.
In his one-day visit, Mohamed Bin Zayed (MBZ) will meet the Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman (MBS), DPA quoted a Gulf source as saying anonymously.
The two sides will discuss developments in Yemen and ways to apply the Riyadh Agreement and to boost relations between GCC states
https://debriefer.net/en/news-26178.html
and
(A P)
UAE’s top prince in Saudi Arabia for talks with crown prince
Abu Dhabi’s powerful crown prince visited Saudi Arabia for a meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on Monday following weeks of speculation about the growing rift between the two leaders. It came as their nations compete for business, regional investments and prominence.
The meeting between Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, 60, and Prince Mohammed bin Salman, 35, also came a day after their energy ministers announced a compromise on oil production quotas that had been preceded by rare public commentary between the OPEC allies.
The state-owned Saudi Press Agency reported few details about the meeting, describing it as a discussion on the “deep-rooted fraternal relations between the two countries” and “the latest regional and international developments.”
https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-business-saudi-arabia-b35f5ebde1284fd02dd7ac5ec9b3cee2
and
(A P)
OPEC, allies reach ‘full agreement’ after production spat
The energy minister of the United Arab Emirates said Sunday that OPEC and allied countries have reached a “full agreement” after an earlier dispute that roiled oil prices.
The comments by Suhail al-Mazrouei to journalists came after an online meeting to reach a deal.
and
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Saudi-UAE: Despite turmoil geopolitical goals remain steadfast
The cause of the current rift between the Gulf heavyweights is more profound than mere economics, analysts say.
The Middle East’s most meaningful alliance between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia is currently being tested by economic aspirations, however, both sides continue to share geopolitical agendas.
The relationship between UAE and Saudi Arabia is based not merely on the friendship of their respective rulers, but also on a long-lasting alliance that has survived various crises over the years. But one constant theme has always remained omnipresent.
Traditionally, Saudi Arabia and the UAE share similar geopolitical and foreign policy interests, Yasmina Abouzzohour, visiting fellow at Brookings Institution, told Al Jazeera.
In recent years, however, the partnership has gradually turned into a competition. The recent oil dispute is just a final symptom of the fracture, said Abouzzohour.
“Riyadh had decided in February of this year to only award state contracts to companies based in the kingdom. This challenged Dubai’s role as the region’s financial hub.
‘Competing for investment’
Disagreements over economic aspirations are likely to continue to play a pivotal role in their respective agendas, said Abouzzohour.
“Given their similar economic goals, Saudi Arabia and the UAE may clash as they attempt to diversify their economies away from hydrocarbons by developing similar sectors [such as tourism, financial services, and technology], thereby competing for expertise and investment.”
These developments mark a significant change, considering Saudi’s de facto ruler Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) and the UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) acted as the Middle East’s new leadership duo.
The cause of the current rift, however, is more profound than mere economics, analysts say.
In the past two years, the liaison between MBS and MBZ has increasingly cracked.
The UAE ceased its fight against the Houthi rebels in the north of Yemen in the summer of 2019 and concentrated only on supporting the separatists in the south. In doing so, Abu Dhabi essentially abandoned Saudi Arabia, whose greatest fear remains a Houthi state on its southern border.
“Although they collaborated closely in many areas such as Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, they were not always fully synchronised. They shared major visions, but when it came to operationalising those ideas, they differed,” Afshin Shahi, senior lecturer in Middle East politics at the University of Bradford, told Al Jazeera.
In Yemen, in particular, one witnessed how quickly their partnership turned into competition when UAE carried out air attacks against government forces in south Yemen to support their southern separatist allies, Shahi said.
Nonetheless, most recently the Saudi-UAE rift was further exacerbated when the kingdom decided it would exclude imports from “free zones”, or those linked to Israel, from a preferential tariff agreement with neighbouring Gulf Arab countries.
Essentially, what the Saudis have done is to alter their laws – given their lack of recognition of Israel and continuing boycott of Israeli goods – to ensure that goods produced by Israeli companies in the Emirates do not benefit from preferential tariff agreements that the kingdom has with the UAE, said Worrall.
The rationale behind it is apparent.
“It would be difficult for Riyadh’s legitimacy at home for it to see a flood of products made by Israeli-owned companies on its shelves,” he said.
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
Siehe / Look at cp1
(B H)
Film: Fantastic to hear these #women in #Mahra (east #Yemen) reflect on their empowerment for #peace-building program last year! Thanks to @MahraYouth's @ameen_asm & team for implementing it & the @BerghofFnd & Political Development Forum's @AliSaifHassan for their vision & support
https://twitter.com/Dr_E_Kendall/status/1418203439046135809
(* B E H)
Yemen currency devalues to historic lows, exacerbating hunger needs, warns IRC
The International Rescue Committee is concerned about the rapidly growing level of humanitarian needs in Yemen, as the exchange rate falls to 1,000 YER per 1 USD in the south of the country for the first time. The devaluation is rendering it impossible for ordinary citizens to afford basic necessities, including food.
Foreign currency shortages are driving rapid food price increases in a country that imports 90% of its food supply. A May 2021 analysis (1) shows “the cost of the minimum food basket was 20% higher than the already significantly above-average levels recorded at the beginning of January 2021”. The purchasing power of ordinary households continues to decline month by month as wages remain stagnant.
Stephanie Puccetti, IRC Yemen Deputy Director of Programs, said:
“The Yemeni economy is not just a victim of this brutal conflict but increasingly a driver of it, as parties compete for control of key resources and institutions at the expense of ordinary citizens. The causes of Yemen’s economic crisis are complex and interconnected, but the effect on communities already suffering after years of war is clear.
The impact of currency devaluation on Yemeni households is extremely worrying. The YER has lost nearly a third of its value against the USD in the past one year. Even people with stable jobs are struggling to afford food as their income can purchase only a fraction of what it could in previous months. Throughout the south of the country, it is not that food is unavailable but that it is completely unaffordable. After six years of conflict and economic crisis, many Yemenis have exhausted their savings and sold off all valuable assets like property or livestock. Families are making decisions no family should have to, such as skipping meals or subsisting on cheap foods like bread. Women and girls have reported being forced to ask to borrow food on credit from shop merchants which exposes them to exploitation and harassment. The rate of forced and early marriage of girls has more than doubled since the war started with as many as two-thirds of Yemeni girls married while they are still children.
With over half the people in Yemen already hungry, and the highest levels of malnutrition ever recorded for children under five years old, we are deeply concerned about the growing levels of humanitarian need in the country where two thirds of the population already depend on humanitarian aid.
(A H P)
Qatar emir directs the allocation of $100 million to support food security in Yemen -agency
Qatar emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani directed the allocation of $100 million to support food security in Yemen, state news agency said on Wednesday.
(A H)
Under the slogan (Your sacrifices are a joy for them), About 600 thousand people in all Yemen’s governorates will benefit from the sacrificial meat project
Dr. Abdulwase Alwasea, Secretary General of HUMAN ACCESS, confirmed that ACCESS has completed all arrangements, preparations and equipment to implement the sacrifice project for this year 1442 AH, under the slogan “Your sacrifices are a joy for them” in all governorates of Yemen through coordination and cooperation with a number of organizations, agencies and supporting personalities at home and abroad.
and media report: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkish-sponsors-donate-eid-meat-for-thousands-of-yemenis/2310687
(A H)
Film von Yemen Friends: VIDEO von unserem Hilfsaktionsprojekt im Juli 2021 im Jemen.
Im Juli 2021 konnte Yemen-Friends dank Eurer Spenden und mit Hilfe der Sonderspende und der Zusammenarbeit mit Canvas Bridge, NachdenkSeiten (Jakob Reimann)und Jacob Carstens Stiftung ein weiteres Hilfsprojekt im Jemen durchführen. Wir haben 88 bedürftige Flüchtlingsfamilien in drei verschiedenen Regionen in derHauptstadt Sana'a mit lebensnotwendigen Lebensmitteln versorgt. Grundnahrungsmittel wie 25 kg Weizen, 5 kg Zucker, 5 kg Reis, 3 Liter Speiseöl, 1 kg Milchpulver und 5 kg Linsen, mit denen mindestens 6 Personen einen Monat lang überleben können. Wir haben auch für Eid Al-Edha Kinderkleidung für viele Kinder verteilt.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ANANqhNpfdg
(B H)
TearFund leistet Überlebenshilfe im Katastrophengebiet
Mit dem WASH-Projekt (WASH steht für Wasser, sanitäre Versorgung und Hygiene) erhalten über 3’600 Menschen in der Region Hajjah im Nordwesten des Landes Hilfe. Durch den Bau von Brunnen und Zisternen haben sie Zugang zu sauberem Wasser. Weiter schult das Projektteam die Bevölkerung zum Thema Hygiene und baut Latrinen. So können Kinder, ihre Familien und die ganze Dorfgemeinschaft überleben. Denn Wasser bedeutet Leben.
https://www.kath.ch/medienspiegel/jemen-aktuell-groesste-humanitaere-krise-weltweit/?lost
(* B H)
UNICEF Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report - reporting period: 1 – 31 May 2021
Highlights
UNICEF HAC has been revised in alignment with the 2021 HRP - now at a total of USD 508.8 million (previously at USD 576.9 million). 52% remains unfunded. The lack of funding for emergency WASH interventions continues to undermine the integrated response. UNICEF will be forced to stop its provision of fuel to water pumping stations in September if funding is not urgently mobilized to support this vital activity.
During the period, around 2,100 households have been displaced (14,700 IDPs) with the majority of displacement wavestowards Amanat al Asimah, Hodeidah, Al Bayda, and Ibb, coming from Ma'rib, Hodeidah, Abyan and Al Jawf. The humanitarian and protection situation will likely continue to worsen as heavy rains are expected in the coming weeks. Fighting continues in Ma’rib, with concentration across the northwest, west, and southwest of Ma’rib city, affecting people in Sirwah district the most.
UNICEF Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) reached an additional 2,381 displaced households (16,667 individuals) in May, with RRM kits that included food and essential hygiene items including family basic hygiene kits and female dignity kits.
Situation Overview & Humanitarian Needs
Yemen remains the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.
During the reporting period, the UN Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (UNCTFMR) documented 19 incidents of grave violations against children, of which 95 per cent of the incidents were verified. The majority of verified violations this month pertained to child casualties, including six children killed (33 per cent girls), and 23 children maimed (21 per cent girls) by various parties of the conflict. There was also one attack on a school that took place in Al Dhale’e governorate
(* B E H)
The cost of a minimum food basket is +25% since January across much of Yemen. In Marib, prices are up 44%.
https://twitter.com/WFP/status/1415958785651314691
(A H)
Good day my dear friends, In the last few days, we have delivered a lot of aid to needy in villages. Baby Milk, food bskts, also a quantity of urgent medicines for health center. I will send all details later. Thank u to all our donors. Plz #donate http://Chuffed.org/project/food-at/food-and-medicine-for-yemen…
https://twitter.com/ghalebalsudmy/status/1416498882951983108
(* B H)
Thousands of patients in imminent danger as hospital in Hodeidah in danger of complete shutdown
The head of the Al-Thawra General Hospital Authority in Hodeidah, Dr. Khaled Suhail, warned that some departments of the hospital will completely shut down in the event of a power outage.
Dr. Khaled Suhail pointed out that the obstetrics, pediatrics and burn unit centers, as well as the and the National Blood Center in the hospital are threatened to stop functioning completely if power were to go down.
“Al-Thawra General Hospital in Hodeidah receives approximately 2,000 cases daily, and is the only hospital left in Yemen that works in two shifts,” Dr. Suhail said.
“We have 30 incubators in the center, and if the electricity goes out for only 10 minutes, this will lead to the inevitable death of 30 children,” he said, pointing out that pediatric, general, heart and medium care centers all need electricity around the clock because they contain respirators that are linked to the very lives of patients.
“We are working in Al-Thawra Hospital in a state of concern, because of the aggression’s detention of the ships specialised for supplying power to the city of Hodeidah, which is now barely functioning 6 hours a day,” he expressed with worry.
Currently, the hospital’s generators are already used for back-up power for over 18 hours a day, which causes them to be overloaded. As a result, power is expected to completely halt at any moment.
Doctor Suhail pointed out that UNICEF had withdrawn from supporting the hospital, even ending support to the children’s care unit.
Moreover, Dr. Suhail pointed out that the World Health Organisation’s support for Al-Thawra General Hospital in Hodeidah has been reduced to only 20% of the normal aid.
“We are facing problems in providing medicines, due to the blockade by the US-Saudi aggressors, and there are many medical devices that we cannot import because of this blockade,” he noted.
Furthermore, the head of the hospital explained that there has been a serious increase in disease cases. Dr. Suhail explained that the hospital used to receive two cases of congenital malformation a year, but nowadays such cases are occurring every single week. Dr. Khaled Suhail concluded by stating this fact confirms that the Saudi-led aggressors are using prohibited weapons in their war on Yemen that cause such terrible results.
(A H)
Yemen Women Protection AoR Services, Jan - June 2021
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-women-protection-aor-services-jan-june-2021
Yemen Women Protection AoR Services, June 2021
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-women-protection-aor-services-june-2021
(B H)
Film: Aggressive siege condemns newborns and patients to death... Al-Thawra General Hospital in Hodeidah sounds the alarm 17-07-2021
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IYFuZXzHxvM
(B H)
Film: Yemen Country Presentation Recording - 21 July 2021 - GSC Meeting 2021
Presentation of the activities of the Shelter and NFI cluster in #Yemen
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIf6vcc1vAg
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
(* B H)
IOM Yemen - Marib Response (June 2021)
During the month of June, hostilities in Ma’rib continued to intensify as frontlines remained active, particularly across the west of Ma’rib city. Civilians are bearing the brunt of sustained hostilities, which show little sign of easing. Protection and humanitarian concerns are only increasing and in June, 414 HHs are estimated to have moved from conflict affected areas in Sirwah, Medghal, Raghwan, Bani Dhabyan to Ma’rib City, Marib Al Wadi and Al Jubah. IOM and partner Rapid Response teams estimate that the number of people displaced by the conflict so far this year stands at over 3,353 households (23,471 people). This brings the number of people displaced since the start of hostilities in January 2020 to 22,068 households. In total, local authorities estimate that some 1 million people are currently displaced across the governorate.
Local authorities and humanitarian partners are scaling up response activities to meet the growing needs, but those affected by the crisis in Ma’rib are some of the most vulnerable, repeatedly losing access to basic services and livelihoods. A majority of new IDPs are arriving into already crowded IDP sites and while some 31 new sites have opened in Ma’rib this year, increasing the total number of IDP sites in governorate to 148.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-marib-response-june-2021
(* B H)
Multiple displacements add to the pain of Yemen civilians
Fighting has displaced 40,824 Yemenis in first half of 2021, according to IOM
For Al-Measar, his stay Al Suwaida camp, where he lives since July 2020, is the worst as IDPs experience “real suffering and tragedy”.
“For months, we did not receive any humanitarian response from the local authority, the Executive Unit for managing IDP camps, or human rights organizations. Everyone stood idly,” he said.
Amer al-Huneishi, 32, a father of ten children, is another victim of displacement in Yemen.
Being displaced four times since February 2016 from the Nehm area, northeast of Sanaa, al-Huneishi said whenever he and his family were about to settle in a place, they were forced to keep running away from war zones due to the non-stop Houthi attacks.
In IDP camps, especially in Al Suwaida camp in Marib, where al-Huneishi’s family has been living since August 2020, medical facilities are the worst.
“I have three children suffering from myasthenia gravis and brain atrophy, but I cannot find the right treatment in the camps as they are provided only with first aid facilities,” al-Huneishi said.
The only available option for the treatment of al-Huneishi’s children is hospitals in Marib city or Sayun city, around 436 km far from the camp.
“I cannot afford their treatment given the fact that I have been out of work for years,” he said.
As the fighting continues in Marib, there is still a high possibility for new waves of displacements.
https://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/multiple-displacements-add-to-the-pain-of-yemen-civilians-3576794
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
(A P)
Yemen Condemns Intl. Silence on Crimes of Saudi-Backed Daesh, Al-Qaeda
Head of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council Mahdi Al-Mashat slammed the world community for remaining tight-lipped on the crimes that the Takfiri Daesh (ISIL or ISIS) and Al-Qaeda terror groups have been perpetrating against the Yemenis with backing from the Riyadh-led coalition of aggressors.
In a message marking Eid Al-Adha (feast of sacrifice) on Tuesday, Al-Mashat took the UN and the entire global community to task for refusing to speak out against the “criminal actions” of Daesh and Al-Qaeda in Yemen, which, he said, take place with the support of Riyadh and its allied invaders, presstv reported.
(A P)
Iran-backed Houthis warn barbers of what they called "foreign haircuts" which contradict "their" religious identity and beliefs ,according to this official memo. Otherwise they will face fines and their shops will be closed (document)
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1417167264328175618
(A P)
Houthi militants raise customs by more than 100% tax exacerbating humanitarian crisis in their controlled part of Yemen as part of constant efforts to raise more funds for their unrelenting war. /Multiple websites
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-47935
(A P)
Yemeni religious scholars condemn occupation of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem by agents of imperialism
The Yemen Scholars Association and the Ministry of Guidance and Hajj and Umrah Affairs said that the seizure of the holy places in Mecca, Medina and al-Quds (Jerusalem) by agents of foreign powers, is a western objective aimed to deactivate the noble mission of uniting Muslims.
In a joint statement issued on Monday, the Association and the Ministry affirmed that “the Saudi regime’s decision to ban Muslims from Hajj was a provocation to millions of Muslims, and an unprecedented obstruction from al-Masjid al-Haram throughout history.”
The statement noted that the prohibition of Hajj and its politicisation by the Saudi regime is “clear evidence to the role of this Wahhabi regime in serving the enemies of Muslims.”
(A P)
Public Prosecution Office in Ibb releases 28 prisoners
The Public Prosecution in Ibb province has released 28 poor prisoners.
The General Authority for Zakat and philanthropists paid the poor private rights to others which mounting to 117 Y.R.
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3148451.htm
(A P)
[Hadi gov.] Yemen’s information minister slams Houthis for intimidation tactics against citizens
Yemen’s Information Minister, Muammar al-Eryani, has condemned a Houthi attack against the house of a civilian in the central governorate of Ibb this week.
The mob, led by senior militant Badar Al-Assal, damaged part of the house and intimidated its occupants Mohammed Aldaas and his family – mouthing racial slurs, Yemen state news agency Saba reported.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1896571/middle-east
(A P)
Houthi extremist kill his parents in north Yemen after labeling them as 'astray'
A Houthi extremist is reported to have killed his two Sunni parents in the northern Yemen governorate of Mahweet on Sunday after labeling them as being "astray" from the beliefs of Shiit spiritual leader Abdulmalik Al-Houthi to which he has switched loyalty, local sources have said.
Mohammed Ali al-Harazi, 30, reportedly shot dead his father (in his 60s) and his mother Fatimah Kawkabah (in her 50s) as they were preparing to have a sunset meal at the end of an optional fasting day as per mainstream Sunni beliefs sending a wave of panic in his village of Bayt Dhiyab within Mahweet's Hofash district.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-47934
and also https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1416904203281252352
https://republicanyemen.net/archives/28566
(A P)
Houthi authorities refer 83 to court in connection with huge ponzi scheme
They included 26 prisoners, 53 people released on bail and 3 fugitives, the Sanaa-based Saba news agency said, elaborating that they defrauded 100.000 persons through claiming that they were running speculative trading bringing in quarterly and annual profits.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-26167.html
(A P)
Houthi public employee replacements a massacre on sectarian criteria, parliament presidency says
In a statement, the [pro-Hadi gov.] parliament's presidency said the militia's ongoing process to replace 160 thousand public employees with loyalists to the theocratic sectarian militia will exacerbate the social divisions and make the wretched living conditions of the Yemeni people even worse given that the Yemeni people are already suffering due to the militia's confiscation of public salaries, imposition of many and exorbitant outlawed taxes and other forms of robbing.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-47896
(A P)
Presidential term of Mahdi al-Mashat officially extended
The Supreme Political Council of Yemen has approved, in its extraordinary meeting on Saturday, the extension of the presidency of its current President, Mahdi Al-Mashat, for three presidential terms according to the internal regulations of the Council.
The Council valued the role of President Mahdi Al-Mashat and his ability to lead the country
https://hodhodyemennews.net/2021/07/17/presidential-term-of-mahdi-al-mashat-officially-extended/
and also https://debriefer.net/en/news-26156.html
(A P)
Yemeni Prime Minister meets with Iranian ambassador
https://hodhodyemennews.net/2021/07/17/yemeni-prime-minister-meets-with-iranian-ambassador/
and
(A P)
PM Saleh bin Habtoor praises Iran’s position toward Yemen
https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/463267/PM-Saleh-bin-Habtoor-praises-Iran-s-position-toward-Yemen
and
(A P)
Envoy: Iran, Yemen Key Allies of Resistance Front
https://www.farsnews.ir/en/news/14000428000843/Envy-Iran-Yemen-Key-Allies-f-Resisance-Frn
(A P)
Houthis have forced the disappearance of 34 tribal Sheikhs from Sana'a, Dhamar, Hajjah and Amran governorates in the first two weeks of July/Multiple websites.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-47899
and
(A P)
A week ago Iran-backed Houthis detained sheik Mohammad Amran, a senior GPC and tribal leader in Ans tribe and Dhamar governorate. Yesterday, his tribe called for a gathering today ,Sunday, to protest against "his arbitrary detention" and hold a sit-in until he gets released.
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1416572256034168838
(B P)
Prison Time in Sanaa: I highly recommend this short, well-written, easy-to-read new book on Yemen. It explains the country's many troubles through the personal story of Dr. Abdulkader al-Guneid during his imprisonment in 2015-16 after being kidnapped by Ansarullah gunmen.
https://twitter.com/DaySWTweet/status/1418260204165255168
cp6 Südjemen und Hadi-Regierung / Southern Yemen and Hadi-government
Siehe / Look at cp1, cp12a
(A P)
Authority-of-brotherhood-insists-on-controlling-shabwa-imposing-taxes-and-depriving-it-of-services
My comment: By the separatist STC. Tge problem is, this claimed “brotherhood authority” is the governor of the province.
(A P)
Yemen: The WFTU stands by the side of Aden power plant workers
The World Federation of Trade Unions, on behalf of its 105 million members who work and struggle in 133 countries around the globe, extends its solidarity to Aden power plant workers in Yemen, who have been protesting demanding the payment of their salaries of the last months.
We urge the responsible authorities to urgently pay the workers of Aden power plant their accrued salaries.
http://www.wftucentral.org/yemen-the-wftu-stands-by-the-side-of-aden-power-plant-workers/
(A P)
The Yemeni government has sent a memo to the International Criminal Court to demand the arrest and prosecution of the Aden-based Salafi cleric and vice chair of the [UAE-aligned] STC militia over his repeatedly announced legal opinions calling for the murder of government soldiers. /Almashehad Alyemeni
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-47935
(A K P)
Saudi troops arrive in Aden
Two planes of the Saudi-led coalition landed at Aden Airport on Monday carrying tens of Saudi troops and 30 armoured vehicles, navigation sources said.
The Saudi troops and vehicles headed to the Presidential Palace, Al-Maashiq, to secure it as a prelude to the return of the members of the internationally recognised government.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-26185.html
and also https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210722-saudi-arabia-sends-reinforcements-to-aden/
and
(A K P)
2 C-130 aircraft reportedly landed at #Aden int'l Airport 3 hours ago, where new troops headed to Presidential palace of Maashiq accompanied by several #Saudi armored vehicles.
https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1416952228594737156
(A P)
Mothers of abducted Yemenis protest against UAE-backed mercenaries
A protest rally was staged on Sunday by the Mothers of Abductees’ Association in Aden city, in order to demand the release of their children who are detained in Southern Transitional Council prisons.
At the rally, the protesters held the STC militia fully responsible for the lives of 40 arbitrarily detained sons and 43 abducted others.
They affirmed that the prisons of the Security Belt of the STC are still operating under tragic conditions, lack minimum health services, and experience frequent electricity blackouts in light of a severe heat wave sweeping the city of Aden, in addition to the spread of skin diseases and the Covid-19 pandemic.
(A P)
Yemen's ambassador to Jordan says the STC militia and its backers [the UAE] is responsible for failing the liberation of Sana'a, not only Alzaher or Beidha governorate./Crater Sky
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-47899
(A P)
Yemen: How the anti-government militias helped one another fail army's rare gains in Beidha
He said that STC units "led by Mokhtar Al-Noobi and Saleh Asayed kept "seizing" shipments of ammunition bound for the Al-Homeiqan front "without justifications" besides the arrest and "detention" of reinforcement personnel.
He said that "after the resistance force had their cannon ammunition depleted, the Houthi militia mounted a counter attack with heavy weapons and managed to evict the resistance from Al-Zaher and the regions around [the provincial capital] Beidha " and drove the resistance force back "to the starting point in Yafe'a."
Several Yemeni journalist and social media activists saw the UAE-backed militia's help to the Iran-backed Houthi militia to reverse a rare governmental victory in Beidha as only the latest in many and bigger evidences of an existing alliance between the UAE and Iran in Yemen in spite of the prevailing belief that the UAE supports the Yemeni legitimate government.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-47898
(A P)
Yemen’s Embassy required to submit “Notification of Termination” of Binmubarak as Ambassador to US, says Department of State
US Department of State has requested Yemen’s Embassy in Washington D.C to submit a “Notification of Termination” of Ahmed Binmubark’s status as Yemen’s Ambassador to the United States.
It added that the submission has to be made “via eGov no later than June 30, 2021”, as it requested the Embassy to submit a “Notification of Change” in eGov.
The circulated letter has sparked outrage and dismay with the poor diplomatic performance of the Yemeni government, whose most cabinet members perform their duties from outside the country.
https://republicanyemen.net/archives/28545
and
(A P)
Albukhaiti lashes out at Yemen’s Minister of Foreign Affairs
Yemeni political commentator Ali Albukhaiti criticized Yemen’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Bin Mubarak for remaining in his post as Ambassador to the US even after being appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in December 2020, describing it as a “disaster”.
Bin Mubarak hired a Moroccan lady as his secretary to run Yemen’s Embassy in Washington D.C who has access to all private correspondence of the embassy, Mr. Albukhaiti said on Twitter.
Albukhaiti accused Bin Mubark of destroying what is left of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, referring to Bin Mubarak’s persistence to hold on to his post as an ambassador despite the fact that he is currently serving as Yemen’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.
“Ahmed Bin Mubark has been like this since the National Dialogue Conference in 2013. He always wants to have control over everything. He sought to be nominated as the Prime Minister and because of him being a control freak, we lost everything, including the state’s institutions,” Albukhaiti said, referring to the infamous coup staged by Houthi rebels in 2014.
https://republicanyemen.net/archives/28561
(A K P)
At least three injured in armed clashes in Taiz
https://hodhodyemennews.net/2021/07/17/at-least-three-injured-in-armed-clashes-in-taiz/
(A P)
Protest against Brotherhood's policies held in Abyan
Dozens of angry protesters took to the streets of al-Mahfed district of Abyan governorate on Saturday, to express their rejection of the policy of starvation applied by the Yemeni arm of Muslim Brotherhood organization within Yemen's legitimacy in the province.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33358
This is by a pro-sepratist news site. And by a pro-Houthi news site: https://hodhodyemennews.net/2021/07/17/mass-protests-against-economic-misery-hit-abyan/
(A P T)
[Separatist] Security raids terrorist hideout, seizes explosives in Yafa'
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33359
(A P)
Shatara: Golden Arrow represents starting point for Southerners' project
"Golden Arrow is not only a title for the defeat of Iran's project in the South and the liberation of Aden, but it is also a key starting point for addressing the southern issue and achieving the southern project." the member of the Presidency of Southern Transitional Council (STC ), Vice-President of the National Assembly for Control and Inspection, Lufti Shatara said in a tweet on Saturday.
On the sixth anniversary of the liberation of the southern port city of Aden, Shatara affirmed that "the Golden Arrow will always be a symbol of a privileged relationship between the Southerners and the Arab Coalition Forces led by Saudi Arabia."
http://en.adenpress.news/news/33351
(A P)
Al-jaadi-explains-the-reason-for-the-fighting-between-the-parties-to-the-legitimacy-in-shabwa
(A T)
Unidentified gunmen assassinate Yemeni religious leader in Aden
Unknown armed men assassinated a Yemeni religious leader on Thursday in the southern port city of Aden.
The gunmen shot dead Sheikh Soroor Ali Abdullah al-Yafiei on his way back home after Fajr (dawn) Prayers
https://debriefer.net/en/news-26138.html
(A K P)
STC puts forces on alert in Yemen's Shabwa
The Southern Transitional Council on Thursday put its forces on alert in Yemen's southeastern province of Shabwa.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-26132.html
(A P)
PM rules out return of government to Aden soon
Yemen's prime minister Maeen Abdulmalik on Friday ruled out that the government would return to the interim capital Aden soon if the southern transitional council continues to control the city.
The return of the government requires arrangements that the Saudi brothers are now working on, he said in a TV interview, without giving details.
The Riyadh agreement guaranteed the participation of all factions in the government and that means all should shoulder responsibilities not divide control of geography or power, he said.
Partnership must not be a justification for taking over public institutions or normalisation of such abuses, he said, stressing that the government should control the state, protect accomplishments and prevent chaos.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-26145.html
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp7 – cp19
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-752b-yemen-war-mosaic-752b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-751-yemen-war-mosaic-751
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-751 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-751:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
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