... Die große US-Kriegslüge – und mehr
Nov. 17, 2021: Ending the Yemen War is difficult – Fantasies of State Power Cannot Solve Yemen’s War – Education in Yemen – Economy, Yemen’s pressing problem – Pandora papers: The Emirates and secret money flows – The great US war lie – and more
Schwerpunkte / Key aspects
Kursiv: Siehe Teil 2 / In Italics: Look in part 2: https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-771b-yemen-war-mosaic-771b
Klassifizierung / Classification
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
cp2 Allgemein / General
cp2a Allgemein: Saudische Blockade / General: Saudi blockade
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
cp6 Separatisten und Hadi-Regierung im Südjemen / Separatists and Hadi government in Southern Yemen
cp7 UNO und Friedensgespräche / UN and peace talks
cp8 Saudi-Arabien / Saudi Arabia
cp9 USA
cp9a USA-Iran Krise: Spannungen am Golf / US-Iran crisis: Tensions at the Gulf
cp10 Großbritannien / Great Britain
cp11 Deutschland / Germany
cp12 Andere Länder / Other countries
cp12b Sudan
cp12c Libanonkrise / Lebanon crisis
cp13a Waffenhandel / Arms trade
cp13b Kulturerbe / Cultural heritage
cp13c Wirtschaft / Economy
cp14 Terrorismus / Terrorism
cp15 Propaganda
cp16 Saudische Luftangriffe / Saudi air raids
cp17 Kriegsereignisse / Theater of War
cp18 Kampf um Hodeidah / Hodeidah battle
Klassifizierung / Classification
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(Kein Stern / No star)
? = Keine Einschatzung / No rating
A = Aktuell / Current news
B = Hintergrund / Background
C = Chronik / Chronicle
D = Details
E = Wirtschaft / Economy
H = Humanitäre Fragen / Humanitarian questions
K = Krieg / War
P = Politik / Politics
pH = Pro-Houthi
pS = Pro-Saudi
T = Terrorismus / Terrorism
Für wen das Thema ganz neu ist / Who is new to the subject
Ältere einführende Artikel u. Überblicke für alle, die mit den Ereignissen im Jemen noch nicht vertraut sind, hier:
Yemen War: Older introductory articles, overviews, for those who are still unfamiliar with the Yemen war here:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-einfuehrende-artikel-u-ueberblicke
cp1 Am wichtigsten / Most important
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The Shattering of Yemen: Why Ending the War Is More Difficult Than Ever
The war is far more complex than it has often been painted abroad: it is not simply a two-party power struggle between Iranian- and Saudi-backed forces, but fundamentally an internal conflict in which a dizzying array of rival factions are taking part, with outside powers fanning the flames. In order to alleviate the country’s plight, diplomats must set aside their hopes for a quick-fix solution and develop an approach that acknowledges the conflict’s complex, multiparty nature.
Since the war began, Yemen’s politics have been more convoluted and locally driven than any side cares to admit. The internationally recognized government may portray itself as commanding a national army, but in reality the forces opposing the Houthis are a jumble of groups whose principal goal is defending their home turf and preventing a complete Houthi takeover, rather than restoring Hadi to power in Sanaa. Neither Iran, Saudi Arabia, nor the United Arab Emirates guides every move made by their purported Yemeni surrogates, and a Houthi-Hadi deal will go only so far toward ending the fighting.
As the war has dragged on, Yemen’s political fragmentation has accelerated.
The anti-Houthi groups have at times come to blows with one another.
STALLED DIPLOMACY
Despite these changes in the nature of the conflict, the international approach has remained static. The UN has remained resolutely focused on brokering a two-party Houthi-Hadi cease-fire deal, with the support of U.S. Special Envoy Timothy Lenderking. It has sought to prevent a battle for Marib city by addressing core Houthi demands, which include reopening Sanaa International Airport and removing restrictions on shipments to the Hodeidah seaport. Ultimately, the UN hopes to broker an end to the fighting and the formation of an interim unity government made up of members of the Hadi government and the Houthis’ de facto authorities in Sanaa.
There are several problems with this approach. First, it does not take into account the full range of parties involved in the war’s multiple conflicts or the broad spectrum of local actors who can make or break a political settlement. Instead, it provides the Houthis, the Hadi government, and, tacitly, the Saudis with a veto over peacemaking.
Second, the negotiations between the Houthis and the Hadi government seem to be going nowhere. Neither side has been ready to compromise when it believed the military situation was trending in its favor.
Finally, diplomats increasingly believe that neither side is serious about compromise. The two parties seem to be using their disagreement over the terms of a potential deal as an excuse to avoid negotiations entirely.
WASHINGTON’S POLICY DIVIDE
The U.S. policy discussion about Yemen is similarly divorced from reality. Hawkish critics argue that Biden’s reversal of the designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), which was made in the final months of President Donald Trump’s administration, has emboldened the rebel group. Many in this camp would like to see the United States reverse course and increase its military engagement in Yemen to break the back of the Houthi assault in Marib.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, some question whether the Biden administration’s policy pivot went far enough. They frame the ongoing conflict as first and foremost between the Houthis and Saudis and argue that Riyadh has lost. By pressing the Saudis to admit defeat and get out of Yemen, they say, the United States would leave the Houthis to negotiate a victor’s peace with rival Yemeni factions and bring an end to American involvement in yet another Middle Eastern misadventure.
Washington politics largely rules out the first set of arguments.
Even if a deal between Sanaa and Riyadh could be brokered—and it is virtually impossible to imagine the Saudis cutting and running if they do not have a deal to secure their territory from Houthi attacks—it would not mean an end to the war. Local armed groups who have lined up against the Houthis over the past six years, fiercely defending their areas out of fear of falling under the rebels’ hard-line rule, would continue the fight, alone or with funding from other regional patrons. This could very well tip the country into a new, bloodier, and more sectarian phase of the war, as the Houthis extend their geographical reach and their local rivals fight back. Further bloodletting is a far likelier outcome than a wave of peaceful intra-Yemeni dealmaking.
RETHINKING PEACE
In other words, there are no quick wins to be had in Yemen. What can be done, then? The United States and its international partners should work to shift the opposing parties’ incentives away from stonewalling and toward dealmaking. Grundberg’s appointment as the new UN special envoy offers a window of opportunity on this front.
The new envoy should be given the time and space for a much-needed rethink of the international approach to mediating the conflict.
The United States can play an important role in such a rethink. It can help run interference with Riyadh and the Hadi government, which are likely to resist such steps.
Such measures should be accompanied by a renewed focus from the United States and its partners on removing barriers to trade and humanitarian assistance. After years of denying Houthi claims of a blockade on Hodeidah, the Hadi government has since January 2021 mounted a near-total fuel embargo on the port. The Hadi government says it is doing so in response to Houthi violations of UN-brokered revenue-sharing agreements around Hodeidah. But Yemeni and Saudi officials also appear to believe that doing so will slow Houthi advances in Marib. Fuel prices have since shot up in Houthi areas, worsening the humanitarian situation further.
This is a hugely counterproductive effort from the Hadi government. Even if the higher cost of fuel is the result of Houthi profiteering, as the government argues, its embargo is providing the rebels with the cover to do so. As the government readily acknowledges, the Houthis are able to access fuel that is trucked to their areas overland from parts of the country under the government’s nominal control, so they are unlikely to be starved of fuel for their military campaign. In fact, the Hodeidah fuel embargo may be helping the Houthis extract more money from fuel sales, as they sell fuel brought in overland at higher prices, citing shortages caused by the embargo. It may also be causing shortages in areas outside the Houthis’ control, as traders move fuel from government to Houthi areas in pursuit of profits.
The Hadi government says it will not cede authority over Hodeidah. This provides U.S. officials with an opening to make the argument to Hadi and Riyadh that they should unilaterally lift the fuel embargo as soon as possible, if only out of self-interest
There is no magic bullet that can end the war in Yemen. An adjusted international approach is badly needed, but will not represent an algorithm to end the conflict. This is perhaps frustrating news for an American foreign policy establishment that is eager to fast-track a solution to the country’s knotty problems and move on. But continuing with the same diplomatic strategy, based on an outdated understanding of the conflict, is a recipe for disaster. The appointment of the new UN envoy represents an opportunity to build a negotiating framework that incentivizes dealmaking and can potentially lead to a more realistic and sustainable peace. But patience will be needed. Rethought and reinvigorated diplomacy will take time and will face numerous setbacks. Beginning that difficult effort, however, is the only way to halt the war’s grim trajectory – by Michael Wahid Hanna and Peter Salisbury
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Fantasies of State Power Cannot Solve Yemen’s War
It should come as no surprise that the ongoing international efforts at peace-building have yielded so few successes. The international community’s strategy for mediating an end to the complex war in Yemen is fundamentally misguided. It relies on the delusional belief that a single, strong unitary state could somehow be revived to rule a unified Yemen. In reality, power in Yemen is divided between a dizzying array of actors. Some, like the Houthis and the exiled government of the president, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, are pretenders to state power. Others function as hybrid or nonstate actors, some armed and some civilian. Just as all are part of the conflict, all are likely to be part of a future peace. The sooner the international community and its mediators dispense with their Westphalian fantasies of a resuscitated Yemeni state, the sooner they can understand the reality of Yemen’s conflict—and craft a way forward.
The idea that a Yemeni state could emerge from the ashes of the war and establish a monopoly over the use of force within its territory is based on several false assumptions. It fails to grasp the realities on the ground by overlooking the many nonstate armed actors that have evolved over the past six years, and which are now shaping local politics and the overall architecture of the conflict. Most of these groups not only operate entirely outside the control of the Yemeni government, but also compete with it. They have multiple local, sometimes fluid, agendas. Further, many of them operate with heavy influence from regional backers whose goals may not be aligned with the West’s aim of building a sovereign and functional national state in Yemen.
Recognizing and accepting Yemen’s fractured reality is critical for identifying alternative approaches that could support effective interventions to mitigate the war and to develop strategic and long-term policies to address regional security.
This report examines the array of nonstate armed groups that have emerged during the war—groups that are not included in the current UN-led negotiations in Yemen. In particular, the report looks at the main nonstate armed groups that were created by the United Arab Emirates in southern Yemen and on the country’s west coast. The analysis is based on interviews with eighty-two individuals, including twenty-four military and security officers, members of four armed groups, and dozens of local officials, political actors, tribal and community leaders, journalists, civil society leaders, and ordinary citizens. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, most interviews were conducted remotely. The author also consulted previous studies, including reports by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), news articles, and the social media feeds of armed group actors, political leaders, and activists. Most of the interviews cited in this report were conducted between 2019 and April 2021. However, the report also draws on the author’s twenty years of research in Yemen.
A detailed catalogue of the armed groups operating just within the Emirates’ sphere of influence in the anti-Houthi camp attests to the complexity of the distribution of power in Yemen. It also shows the difficulty of establishing unified central leadership in the country. An accounting of these groups points to a future in which governance will have to mediate bottom-up factionalism as well as top-down, national-level political competition.
These hybrid groups will continue to have power even if the Emirates reduces its involvement.
Yemen’s South
While the Emirates formed and supported various armed groups in the south and on the west coast, it also supported two Yemeni actors who have become something of a political umbrella for these armed groups. These actors are the STC in the south and Tareq Saleh (the nephew of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh) on the west coast. Although Emirati funding and supervision—along with common goals and enemies—helped establish this order, there remain fundamental differences between these groups. The factions have set these differences aside for the time being, but they will likely resurface when circumstances change. A detailed description of these groups and their aims and origins is essential to understanding the contours of the conflict in Yemen and its possible outcomes.
The Way Forward
The catalogue of armed groups presented above, including the context of their motivations and incentives, reveals the limitations facing the current international approach to ending the conflict in Yemen. This effort remains narrowly focused on fixing national-level politics through power-sharing agreements among the national elite as a foundation for reconstructing a central authority. But this approach neglects the second-order effects of the war, particularly the ascendancy of hybrid groups in Yemen’s politics—groups that have overshadowed a collapsed and increasingly irrelevant state.
The armed groups described in this report will likely continue to wield local power and compete with provincial and national governments, even if the Emirates reduces its involvement in Yemen. The groups’ emergence is the result of a combination of factors, including power struggles between actors at the national and subnational levels, competing perceptions of the social contract and shape of the Yemeni state, long-standing grievances, and a cycle of exclusion that the current UN-led peace negotiations have reinforced. As a result, Yemenis who want to govern will have to find a way to co-opt or win the loyalty of these armed groups—or else will find themselves indefinitely engaged in low-intensity warfare
The current circumstances are not conducive to reinstating a central government that can hold authority over all these armed groups. Attaining peace and building the state in Yemen will not be achieved through a political settlement between the Hadi government and the Houthis. In fact, such a settlement would likely cause more disintegration, as armed actors who feel left out resort to violent ways to assert themselves. The international community needs to think of realistic and practical ways to help Yemen—and be prepared to invest for the long term. To reverse the cycle of fragmentation, the question of hybrid actors must be addressed. If hybrid actors are not supervised, they may become predatory and evolve into a significant security problem.
As part of its support for the peace process, the international community should consider supporting interventions and programs targeting hybrid actors in a way that promotes their role in security provision. At the same time, interventions should develop mechanisms that link hybrid actors to civilian authorities and hold those actors accountable for their actions. This report offers the following suggestions – by Nadwa Dawsari
https://tcf.org/content/report/fantasies-state-power-cannot-solve-yemens-war/?agreed=1
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Education in Yemen: Turning Pens into Bullets
In Yemen, education and conflict are intertwined. This unfortunate state of affairs is not new. In fact, it predates the ongoing war, which erupted in 2014 and has only compounded the problem. Indeed, because the educational sector has since the beginning of the conflict fragmented and descended entirely into partisanship and propaganda, with the warring parties modifying the content and nature of classroom instruction in line with their religiopolitical ideologies, education now serves to perpetuate social division. War has thus engendered a disastrous situation in which the education sector has had to contend with a development even worse than the periodic disruption of the school year and declining levels of student enrollment. Schools across Yemen have for all intents and purposes become centers of indoctrination. Those students who still attend them are often groomed to join the ranks of one or another of the country’s armed factions, albeit not necessarily in combat roles. This phenomenon is especially apparent in areas controlled by Ansar Allah, better known as the Houthi movement.
A LONG-STANDING MISUSE OF THE CLASSROOM
The politicization of education in Yemen was already a problem well before the current conflict erupted. To begin with, religious schools, which predate government-run public schools and enjoy greater popular legitimacy, were neither required to obtain a license nor subject to any kind of oversight. The existence of networks of such schools, with their wholly differing orientations, did not simply result in inconsistent standards. Due to the politicoreligious movements or parties that backed them, they promoted clashing, and increasingly militant, national narratives. Politicoreligious factions even succeeded in influencing the core curriculums of public schools in areas under their sway, all as part of their competition to control the country.
The most widespread and influential network of religious schools in Yemen began when the country was still divided. In the mid-1970s, North Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood established a network of “institutes of knowledge” (maahed ilmiyyah) that were religious in nature and focused on teaching the group’s interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence. Despite their overtly religious orientation, these institutes were allowed to operate as public schools. They proved especially popular among the country’s Sunni population, but also opened in areas dominated by Zaydi Shia, many of whom grew alarmed by this development.
At the same time, a segment of the Zaydi community in the north began to take an interest in organized education. This interest was partly in response to inroads made by both Islah-run and Salafi-run schools in predominantly Zaydi areas, and it was fed by a feeling that existing Zaydi religious schools were not up to the desired standard and not worth the effort of attempting to take over and reorient. Before long, a Zaydi group called Al-Shabab al-Mu’min established unofficial weekend schools, after-hour study sessions on weekdays, and summer camps. This would hold great significance for the future, in large part because Al-Shabab al-Mu’min ended up being subsumed by the growing Houthi movement. Moreover, beginning in 2004, the Houthis engaged in a series of rebellions against the government that culminated in the current war. In increasing numbers, graduates of unofficial schools established by Al-Shabab al-Mu’min have participated in these conflicts.
Finally, other groups, such as Salafis and Sufis, also had their own schools, having taken advantage of the loophole that allowed (purely) religious schools to operate without a license or oversight. The Salafis’ most prominent school was the Saudi-sponsored Hadith Center in Dammaj, whose students fought the Houthis in 2014 in an armed confrontation dubbed the Dammaj War. As for the Sufis, they operated mostly in the governorates of Hadramawt, Hodeidah, and Taiz. The Sufi movements were the exception to the Yemeni rule. Although they, like everyone else, indoctrinated their students, the indoctrination was rarely of the kind that vilified non-adherents. Additionally, the Sufis advocated obedience to the ruler of the day. Sufis thereby ingratiated themselves with Saleh, who had at various times supported virtually all other groups on the scene in a bid to pit them against each other and strengthen his grip on power. But Saleh settled on the Sufis as his most dependable ally after his divide and rule strategy backfired more than once. Beginning in 2000, many Sufi schools opened in urban areas with government backing, offering religious education that was consistent with Saleh’s views and policies.
THE EFFECTS OF THE WAR
The politicization of education in Yemen lent itself to the militarization we see today. Political and religious differences continue to receive expression in clashing national narratives—which, if anything, have intensified—but are now also manifested on the battlefield. If the motives of today’s combatants are examined, one of the most important is the indoctrination they have received in unofficial schools or learning centers. This kind of education inculcates uncompromising ideological convictions in students, who are then ushered into a job market devoid of jobs. Consequently, many of these fresh graduates end up joining the political or armed wing of the party or movement that operated their school. It is a vicious circle.
Moreover, the war has pulverized Yemen’s state education sector. Never robust to begin with, and too often subject to pressures by powerful local actors, Yemen’s state education sector is now in disarray. Owing to airstrikes carried out by the Saudi-led Arab coalition or to Houthi attacks, hundreds of schools have been damaged in whole or in part. According to a report released by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in 2018, more than 2,500 schools are completely out of service, with 27 percent of them having closed down, 66 percent having suffered damage, and 7 percent now used as shelters for displaced persons or commandeered by militias for their own purposes. In areas controlled by government forces, some schools damaged by shelling have undergone renovation at the hands of government bodies amid much fanfare. But many locals view this renovation as more of a publicity stunt than anything else, if not simply because most of these schools continue to suffer from a lack of necessary equipment, much of which was destroyed in the shelling and was never replaced.1 This disaster coincides with the complete cessation of school construction across Yemen since 2011.
The toll the war has exacted on students is very high. Moreover, the trying economic situation has led to a reluctance on the part of parents to send their children to school, as many cannot afford the costs of transportation or even stationery, with some parents even putting their children to work in order for them to provide much-needed additional income for the family. In Houthi-controlled areas, parents must contend with the added burden of tuition costs, as the Houthis have turned public schools into a private enterprise. According to a report released by UNICEF in February 2021, more than 8 million Yemeni children require emergency education support, meaning they need a “set of project activities that allow structured learning to continue in situations of emergency, crisis, or long-term instability.” Two million children have no access to education at all. This figure has jumped by 120 percent since the 2015, when just under 900,000 students did not attend school. Some local studies speak of an even higher figure, one nearing 3 million. Since 70 percent of the country’s population resides in the northern, Houthi-controlled areas, the impact of the tragedy there is greater. According to the Houthis themselves, 400,000 children are added annually to the illiteracy list.
Another chapter in the disaster is what Yemeni teachers are facing. To begin with, teachers have had to contend with intimidation and violence by armed factions—including raids on schools. But the most widespread problem is the irregular payment of salaries, described by UNICEF as “one of the largest challenges” to education in Yemen because it is driving more and more teachers to quit their jobs – by Ahmed Nagi
https://carnegie-mec.org/2021/11/15/education-in-yemen-turning-pens-into-bullets-pub-85777
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Yemen’s most pressing problem isn’t war. It’s the economy
The humanitarian crisis in Yemen is a symptom of an underlying economic conflict. This conflict has contributed significantly to increases in food and fuel prices, and deconflicting among the parties involved needs to be prioritized.
The majority of the Yemenis I spoke to felt strongly that critical economic issues need to be addressed as a matter of urgency, not later as part of a political settlement, regardless of the peace process’s military and political track. I agree. The conflict’s military aspects are limited to specific fronts in the country. But economic conflict is impacting every single person in the country and is driving millions of Yemenis to the edge of famine.
Yet economic mediation has been notably absent from the international, U.N.-led approach. When former special envoy Martin Griffiths was appointed in February 2018, many Yemenis urged him to take an economic leadership role and bridge the gap between the rival central bank administrations, one in Sanaa and the other in Aden. (The internationally recognized government relocated the central bank headquarters to Aden in September 2016 while the Houthi movement rejected the move and continued central bank operations in Sanaa.)
Griffiths has always defined his mandate as “focused on the political solution and the end of the conflict bringing peace.” However, his office was eventually forced to play the role of intermediary in the burgeoning economic conflict. In December 2018, Griffiths led negotiations that prevented a battle for the Red Sea port of Hodeida. The accord, named the Stockholm Agreement, included loose language related to joint management of port revenues to pay state salaries. The two parties have met sporadically under U.N. auspices since 2018 to discuss a mechanism but were unable to find a middle ground. They were able to agree to a compromise deal on fuel imports entering Hodeida in November 2019, but that agreement unfortunately collapsed a few months later. A common theme across these efforts was they were reactive and ad hoc, stemming from a fundamental position held by the special envoy that his office should focus on the political solution and brokering a deal to end the conflict.
U.N. humanitarian agencies have also been fixated on responding to the consequences of economic collapse, providing food assistance and emergency relief to the population. This is not to undervalue the critical work humanitarian agencies have been doing to save millions of Yemenis from starvation. But the rival parties’ economic conflict has exacerbated Yemen’s economic collapse, thereby deepening the humanitarian crisis and, in many cases, nullifying the impact of emergency humanitarian assistance.
The new U.N. special envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, started his new position on Sept. 5 after two years as EU ambassador to Yemen. The new envoy will need to make three key decisions.
First, the United Nations—its member states, secretariat, and envoy—should end ambiguity over the envoy’s mandate and empower him to deal with the economic conflict. This doesn’t need to be through a U.N. Security Council statement or resolution, although that would be a welcome step. It can be done by establishing a dedicated senior position—deputy envoy, for example—in the Office of the Special Envoy to primarily deal with its economic portfolio and feed directly into the special envoy. The envoy will also need to recruit sufficient staff with the technical skills and knowhow in economics, finance, and political economy needed to navigate complex challenges, mediate between the parties, and identify technically and politically feasible solutions.
Second, Grundberg and his office will need to orchestrate the establishment of a clear mechanism for international coordination around the peace process’s economic track.
Third, the envoy needs to clearly establish what issues are—and more importantly are not—part of what he can and should deal with. Economic de-escalation issues should be at the top of the agenda. These are urgent economic issues that inflict significant negative impacts on citizens and the economy as well as require negotiations and agreement between the parties closely linked to issues of sovereignty, authority, and legitimacy. These issues include coordination of monetary and fiscal policies, restrictions on key trade and commercial infrastructure and routes, and management of public revenues to ensure payment of public salaries and avoid double taxation.
Establishing an economic negotiation track now will help the envoy, or a successor, prepare for future political negotiations when the war’s economic dimensions are all but certain to be on the agenda. There is significant value to the parties agreeing on how to address some key post-conflict economic issues early on.
Yemenis have suffered enough from almost seven of conflict. Until the war ends, the Yemeni people’s economic suffering should not be relegated to the status of side issue. I have been part of multiple discussions with various international actors in the past few weeks as to whether or not the new special envoy should take leadership on the economic agenda or whether that leadership should sit elsewhere in the international system. Regardless of who takes leadership in this, it is the moral, if not legal, responsibility of the international community to dedicate its full attention to the peace process’s economic track and ensure active leadership in mediating issues between the parties – by Rafat Al-Akhali
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/08/yemen-crisis-war-economy-conflict-humanitarian-response/ = https://www.theigc.org/blog/yemens-most-pressing-problem-isnt-war-its-the-economy/
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Pandora Papers: Middle East
Nearly 40 politicians and public officials from 9 countries in the Middle East were found to have offshore entities in the Pandora Papers. Here are the biggest names — including the current and former leaders of 6 countries and territories.
https://projects.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/power-players/en/region/middle-east
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United Arab Emirates a go-to offshore haven for Africa’s political and business elite, leaked records show
The UAE’s record on illicit finance raises concerns for its relationship with the world’s poorest continent, experts say.
Owning shell companies and bank accounts in the UAE, one of the world’s most secretive financial havens, is a growing trend among African politicians and their business allies.
“The UAE is the center of the world,” Nour El Fath Azali, 37, recently told ICIJ media partner La Gazette des Comores.
The Pandora Papers investigation discovered secretive Emirati financial interests of politicians and powerful business leaders from 17 African countries.
The Pandora Papers, a global media collaboration that exposes the hidden financial deals of the world’s rich and powerful, is based on leaked records from 14 firms that help set up shell companies and bank accounts. Among these so-called offshore providers is SFM Corporate Services, based in the UAE’s financial capital, Dubai.
“The UAE, de facto, tolerates illicit flows and trades that other more reputable international financial centers shun,” said Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, a University of Oxford professor who leads a research project on African countries and major financial centers, including Dubai. “In exchange for its acceptance that dubious players and monies be based in the country, the UAE merely asks wealthy Africans to stay out of local politics and stay within the boundaries of local law,” Soares de Oliveira said.
Those drawn to the UAE praise its light-touch approach to business regulation and its convenient time zone, between those of Europe and Asia. UAE companies often provide generous tax exemptions to foreigners, and owners aren’t required to open an
Financial crime experts and tax and law enforcement officials, however, point to the UAE’s history as a conduit for corrupt proceeds.
The Persian Gulf nation has ignored money laundering for years, according to a 2020 report prepared by a team of international experts for the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force, the main international organization for coordinating global anti-money laundering efforts. The report noted that the UAE is reluctant to share information about the owners of companies created there with authorities in other countries – by Will Fitzgibbon
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Pandora Papers reveal Emirati royal families’ role in secret money flows
From skyscrapers rising in the desert to free-trade zones hawking gold and diamonds, the UAE is open for business. Sometimes that business involves shadowy companies and international crimes.
The Pandora Papers, a trove of secret records obtained by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, reveal that the real owners of these companies include a raft of shady players in the offshore world.
The story of the offshore companies created within Dubai’s corporate enclave casts fresh light on Dubai’s rise as one of the world’s financial capitals— and on the UAE’s role as a nexus for money laundering and other financial crimes.
The UAE is home to a thriving trade in financial secrecy. It offers shell companies that mask their real owners’ identities; dozens of internal free-trade zones that provide even more shadows for them to hide in; and a regulatory system known for what anti-corruption advocates call its “ask-no-questions, see-no-evil approach” to dealing with money tied to gold smuggling, arms trafficking and other crimes.
“The UAE provides secrecy, complexity and control,” Graham Barrow, a money laundering expert and co-host of The Dark Money Files podcast, told ICIJ. “It’s a perfect storm. An invitation to criminals to make the most of it.”
Members of the six royal families that govern the seven emirates have a hand in almost every business activity in the UAE — as landlords of office towers and other properties, as owners of major corporations, as silent partners who take a share of the profits in other enterprises and as public officials overseeing sovereign funds and government-owned businesses. And, in turn, the emirates’ rulers decide who will serve as regulators overseeing businesses that they and their families may profit from.
The more than 11.9 million files in the Pandora Papers include some 190,000 confidential files from SFM Corporate Services, a UAE-based firm that has billed itself as “the World’s #1 Offshore Company Formation Provider.” SFM is one of thousands of firms in the Emirates that help clients incorporate companies, including hard-to-track companies for people living and doing business outside of the UAE. These company formation providers are part of a global web of lawyers, accountants and other operatives who make the offshore financial system possible.
ICIJ’s review identified the owners of at least 2,977 companies in the UAE, the British Virgin Islands and other offshore financial centers that were incorporated with SFM’s help or received other services from SFM – by Maggie Michael and Michael Hudson
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The US makes the rules, and Syria massacre was no exception
It’s fine to be outraged but don’t be shocked: our righteous war-making is not clean, nor humane. It never was
America doesn’t want to know what happens in its wars. It wants to believe each war starts in righteousness. It wants to believe our side is clean, as any force of righteousness must be. And then at some point it wants to forget about it all, absent a few business class upgrades for soldiers flying home next week over Thanksgiving. But what happens when the truth, the overriding truth bigger than a single event, peeks out from under the heavy cover of lies?
So it was kind of surprising to see the New York Times publish an investigation into a more than two-year-old U.S. air attack in Baghuz, Syria, one which killed some 80 women and children, on the front page. Though the entire strike was observed on drone video, a precise death count is unlikely because the weapons dropped — totaling over 2,500 pounds of explosives — would have reduced most of the dead to a fine, pink mist. Hard to count that. The amount of explosives used against these undefended human targets in the open was roughly the equivalent of that carried by a B-25 bomber during WWII. Nothing surgical about that.
The rest of the Times article is a familiar tune: The 2019 Baghuz strike was one of the largest civilian casualty incidents of the war, but was never publicly acknowledged by the United States. A military legal officer flagged the strike as a possible war crime, requiring an investigation. But at nearly every step, the military moved to conceal what happened. The death toll was downplayed. Reports were delayed, sanitized, and of course, made classified. Coalition forces quickly bulldozed the blast site. A whistleblower in contact with Congress lost his job.
The New York Times pieced together what happened, detailed the cover-up, and published the story over the weekend. A CENTCOM spokesperson stated “We abhor the loss of innocent life,” but stood by the airstrike as justified under whatever self-made rules they were following. It is very unlikely anything more will come of all this. The cindered bodies of women and children are simply more ghosts of American war policy.
But the real outrage is the one not acknowledged by the Times. They treat this as if it is all new — the shock of civilian deaths, the cover-up, the whistleblower himself the new target. But we refuse in our new righteousness to acknowledge it is closer to the norm than the exception. After nearly 1,000 air strikes in Syria and Iraq in 2019, using 4,729 bombs and missiles, the official military tally of civilian dead for the year was only a disingenuous 22. As a State Department civilian embedded with the military during Iraq War 2.0 I saw many remains of buildings hit by airstrikes. It was very difficult to maintain the illusion that those buildings — each with four floors and multiple apartments in a regular neighborhood of small dwellings — had only insurgents inside when they were obliterated. But that’s what we told ourselves.
We choose to use the term war crime only when we can pin it on a rogue platoon or a sadistic SEAL. But when it scales up to the use of modern weapons against civilian clusters it turns into some sort of quasi-legal event to be debated and tsk’ed over in the passive voice. Were mistakes made? Can we find a way to reduce it all to some unavoidable error, maybe by some whipping boy who can be punished at little overall cost to the larger body that put him on such fertile ground for atrocity?
We allow the United States to portray its wars as precise and humane because in order to politically sustain war on an Orwellian time frame it is necessary to believe that. We need to believe every report of civilian casualties is investigated and the findings reported publicly, a model of accountability. We believe these things so dearly that we are shocked to read what happened with one airstrike in Syria and rush to the psychological refuge of focusing on the cover-up not the killing.
No different than Vietnam or Fallujah, dozens of Afghan wedding parties, or when hospitals were targeted and innocents died. It is the conversation America has avoided since the day we proclaimed ourselves the World Police and unilaterally declared our right to be right, simply because it was us doing it, whatever “it” might be. It is a conversation about the difference between combat and killing. We still treat Hiroshima — and Baghuz — as the exception, and not the rule – by Peter van Buren
cp1a Am wichtigsten: Coronavirus und Seuchen / Most important: Coronavirus and epidemics
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Eight new COVID-19 cases reported, 9,944 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of six coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of another.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34078
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Six new COVID-19 cases reported, 9,918 in total
The committee also reported in its statement the recovery of seven coronavirus patients, in addition to the death of two others.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34057
cp2 Allgemein / General
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Interactive Map of Yemen War
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Yemen War Daily Map Updates
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-november-17-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-november-16-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-november-15-2021-map-update/
https://southfront.org/military-situation-in-yemen-on-november-14-2021-map-update/
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US ARMS IN SAUDI'S POOL OF BLOOD: THE YEMENI MASSACRE
Three administrations and five years later, the United States is still fuelling the Saudi-led war on Yemen with weapons that drove the now vulnerable state to become a humanitarian catastrophe.
As some nation officials turned against the war, Raytheon pressured the White House to undo all the efforts made to end the arms sales, which would end the bloodshed in Yemen, according to The New York Times.
Raytheon was a major US defense contractor and industrial corporation with core manufacturing concentrations in weapons and military equipment. However, it was defunct in 2020.
The company spent millions influencing elections and lobbying to encourage more arms sales – fueling the horrific war for the sake of profits.
Western arms in a Yemeni blood bath
The world’s largest arms importer did not only make sales with the United States, but also with other western states such as the UK, France, and Canada.
France was one of the first states to sell arms to Saudi Arabia, with an amount of about €1 billion worth of arms. The state engaged in a partial naval blockade of ports controlled by the Yemeni armed forces that made the humanitarian crisis much worse.
The ongoing war in Yemen is being fuelled with western arms, which violates core norms of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) that came into force in 2014.
ATT has proved to impose a double standard when it comes to the war on Yemen because with all the overwhelming evidence of human rights violations, the practice of arms sales is ongoing and the parties are not being held responsible.
Crime against humanity
For five years, multiple treaties and laws were violated, but no international action was taken. Yemen is now known as the world's largest humanitarian crisis, but officials only had empty statements and imposed double standards.
The Saudi-led coalition that has its hands stained with the blood of children, women, and innocent civilians was not held accountable for the numerous crimes.
Western countries sent their arms, bombs, and munition to the Saudi-led coalition. These countries helped the kingdom create a blood bath in the most vulnerable state in the region. But why were they never held accountable? How can these countries be accountable if they broke their own rules?
https://katehon.com/en/news/us-arms-saudis-pool-blood-yemeni-massacre
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Conflict in Yemen: Continuing Humanitarian Disaster
The international community’s response to protect Yemeni civilians has been dominated by the Saudi-led military intervention, which has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis by blockading aid and resources. This interventionism has only compounded the destruction caused by airstrikes that have killed civilians and destroyed schools and hospitals.
Conflict will persist so long as parties believe violence is the best way of achieving their goals. Consequently, officials engaged in the peace process must understand what both sides are fighting for. Regional political leaders must take any steps possible to deter combative sides from attacking vital civilian infrastructure, such as ports, that give aid access to those in need. The commission of war crimes by all warring factions calls for a stronger commitment from the international community to immediately stop the conflict and help the people of Yemen rebuild their country.
The reality of warfare and conflict is that the consequences extend far beyond the parties involved – ordinary citizens, vulnerable groups, and children are likely to suffer most in a conflict zone. As much of Yemen’s oil and gas resources are based in northern regions of the country, raging conflict in the north has severely damaged Yemen’s export profits, causing the economy to suffer even further. The follow-on effect is that the Yemeni currency loses significant value and the cost of food goes up, making it increasingly difficult for ordinary civilians to feed their families and avoid starvation. These devastating effects have led to approximately 16 million people facing crisis levels of food insecurity in the past year.
https://theowp.org/conflict-in-yemen-continuing-humanitarian-disaster/
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The escalation of war and peace initiatives in Yemen
Dimensions and scenarios
The Houthis’ resumption of attacks on Ma’rib were linked to constant and critical factors that encouraged if not served as the primary motive behind the resumption. One of the most prominent of these were the transformation of Ma’rib into a military, economic and political headquarters for the internationally-recognised government in place of Sana’a, which is now controlled by the Houthis, and the port city of Aden, which is controlled by the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC), although the government is stationed there in compliance with the 2019 Riyadh Agreement.
At the military level, the Supreme Command of the Yemeni Armed Forces is stationed in Ma’rib. Furthermore, the geographic proximity of Ma’rib to Sana’a poses a threat to the Houthis’ political stronghold. This pushed the Houthis to seek control of it
Certainly, the existence of oil and gas fields in Ma’rib, and its control of the road network between Shabwa, Hadramawt and Al-Mahra that leads to Oman and Saudi Arabia, remain a constant and delaying motive for Houthi control of Ma’rib since they seized Sana’a in 2014. This is because control of Ma’rib entails abundant financial resources and returns from commercial activity resulting from population density (about one million people), and what could result from attracting capital to it in the future.
In the context of the pressing factors of escalation, the field progress that the Houthis made in the past 14 months, their seizure of Sana’a and al-Bayda governorates, and their cutting off of vast areas of al-Jawf and Ma’rib governorates is underscored. These factors tempted them to attempt to reach the city of Ma’rib in light of the defence vacuum caused by the withdrawal of the coalition’s strategic air defences from Ma’rib in the face of their missile and unmanned aircraft attacks and the decline of the role of the coalition’s aircraft at the start of 2021.
The Houthis’ ground, ballistic missile and unmanned aircraft attacks on Ma’rib, al-Jawf, Taizz and Hajjah as well as their attacks on the Saudi strategic interests reveal that their military capabilities are better than before and better than those of the internationally-recognised government, especially those facing them at these fronts.
Although the Houthis did not achieve the victory they were expecting from the escalation in Ma’rib, their insistence on appearing as the internally stronger party gave them the ability to influence externally through successive attacks with unmanned aircraft and ballistic missiles on Saudi strategic interests.
The expected scenarios of escalation in Ma’rib, however, are connected to the Houthis’ intentions towards it. The first of these scenarios is based on the concurrence of negotiations and military field progress. The second scenario, which is more likely, depends on waiting in order to rebuild power by exploiting all the fruits gained from any peace process and taking advantage of the critical transformations arising from the internationally-recognised government.
https://www.politics-dz.com/en/the-escalation-of-war-and-peace-initiatives-in-yemen/
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Film: Glad to finally release my filmpoem that was produced in response to the 2021 @UNFCCC Climate Change Conference in Glasgow. It's an invitation to talk abt the threat posed by the floating oil storage, FSO Safer in Yemen. Huge thanks to @arabicartsfest for the invitation&support!
https://twitter.com/Saba_Hamzah/status/1460650549737623563
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Analysis - Ansarullah’s long step to East coast: scenarios of cheaper win
While the eyes in Yemen are on the Ma’arib battle, in recent days new developments have been taking place in the port city of Hudaydah, increasingly changing the battleground circumstances in favor of Sana’a forces.
After a sudden retreat of the UAE-backed forces from Hudaydah in western Yemen, Ansarullah movement took control of major parts of the strategic province, reported Aljazeera news network. Local forces also said that the revolutionary movement took new areas near Hudaydah city and reopened a road linking Hudaydah to Sana’a, the capital in the north.
Meanwhile, hundreds of people in the city of Hudaydah expressed their happiness over the withdrawal of the UAE-aligned “joint forces” and the reopening of the "Kilo 16" road as the city has been under siege for almost 3 years.
Joint forces are a militant structure in the west coast founded in mid-2019 by an Emirati officer called Abu Omar, before he handed over the command to Brigadier General Haithan Qassemm Taher. Recently, Tariq Saleh, the nephew of the slain Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the leader of the National Resistance group, appeared as its operational commander.
Retreat scenario
With the announcement of Ansarullah victory in Hudaydah, the division among the already fallen-apart Saudi-led Arab coalition went even more obvious, with the allies accusing each other of a preplanned “treason.”
The UAE-backed forces who retreated from the west coast in a statement said that they had evacuated the battleground in the province in accordance with the Stockholm agreement, a deal signed in 2019 with Ansarullah to pave the wave for peace. According to Aljazeera report, the group stated that this decision was taken in accordance with the resettlement plan set out in the agreement which the so-called “legitimate government” is committed to implement.
Samir al-Yusefi, the director of a media group associated with National Resistance group, suggesting that what happened in Hudaydah was not a retreat but a relocation, told Aljazeera that the move was in implementation of Stockholm agreement.
The government of fugitive president Arabrabbuh Mansour Hadi fueled the suspicion by stating that it was unaware of the reason for the withdrawal of the forces under the command of Tariq Saleh. The government’s team in the Committee for Coordination of Resettlement, a body founded after Stockholm agreement, in a statement held that what is going on in west coast is without knowledge and coordination of the government.
Abdullah al-Ajam, a commander in Zaraniq Brigades, told Aljazeera about a “large-scale conspiracy” under which the cities and districts of west coast were handed over, adding that the joint forces’ remarks about resettlement was an “obvious lie and deception” of the fighters that led to death and capture of many of them.
According to al-Ajam, Ansarullah took control of Kilo 16 and Al-Darayhami. The regions of Al-Darayhami, Al-Tahtya, Al-Fazah, Al-Jabalya, and Al-Jah fully went under Ansarullah control after the retreat. Al-Ajam insisted that the decision to handover west coast to Ansarullah was UAE’s and that negotiations were underway to hand over Al-Hayth and Al-Khokha to the movement.
Similar Saudi move: what are the motivations?
The retreat by the loyalists of the UAE has a similar example. Anadolu news agency of Turkey, citing a source in the provincial council of Hudaydah, reported that in early November Saudi forces evacuated Ataq airport in Shabwa province in coordination with local officials.
"Saudi forces stationed at Ataq airport were headed for the Al-Wada'a crossing on the Saudi-Yemeni border," the source said without elaborating, noting that "the withdrawal process was coordinated by local officials in the province."
According to the news agency, on 9th of the same month, Saudi forces left Aden in the south onboard a transportation plane landed in Aden airport to transfer facilities and troops.
Meanwhile, there must be three motivations behind there Saudi and Emirati retreats.
First motivation: It is related to an agreement with Sana’a to make concessions to Ansarullah in exchange for retreating from the siege of Ma'rib or Taiz. The Ma'rib battle seems to be drawing to a close, and Saudi Arabia is well aware that the Ma'rib capture will be a fatal blow to what remains of the disintegrated Arab coalition in the war and the credibility of the ousted President Mansour Hadi’s government. It is also said that in recent days, Tariq Saleh traveled to the besieged city of Taiz for the first time with a UN representative. This is coming while Aljazeera, meanwhile, confirmed, quoting an official in the coalition, that it had information that Ansarullah was preparing to move to the city of Al-Khokha and then Mocha, both administratively affiliated with Taiz province and home to headquarters of joint forces.
Second motivation: The second motivation, though slim, is the gradual end of war by the aggression countries as they begin to count the political and economic costs of the war.
Third motivation: This motivation can be built on the official comments by the coalition about relocation of forces to fit the new battleground realities and help check the new Ansarullah advances to the central regions of the country.
Withdrawal without agreement: shadow of new war balance on Stockholm agreement
While some see the withdrawal motivations caused by a Sana’a agreement with the Emirates, Ansarullah rejects the claims and talks about defeat of the Arab coalition in the war.
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Yemen: achieving power balance only way to end war, says former top official
Peace in Yemen will be realised only when a power balance is achieved between the warring parties, former prime minister Khaled Bahah told The National on Sunday.
“A balance of power will be able to get people to negotiate, the Houthi rebels are trying to create an imbalance of power which will backfire on them and on the country,” Mr Bahah said on the sidelines of the Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate.
“The international community and regional states must interfere to stop the rebels from advancing in Marib to create a form of a balance of power that would lead to some kind of peace,” he said.
“Peace can only be achieved if there is a form of balance of power to pull people on to the negotiating table.”
If the battle continues and the rebels are determined to seize Marib then “this will drag the country into further instability and destruction,” said the former prime minister.
Mr Bahah believes there is a real opportunity for the war to end seven years after it started but the international community must intervene.
“There is a chance for the Houthis to transform from being a regional agent into a national actor that wants stability for its nation,” he said.
and
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UN sanctions on Houthi leaders not enough to end violnce in Yemen, ex-PM
Former prime minister Khalid Bahah said the UN sanctions on Houthi leaders are not enough to stop the hostilities of the Iran-allied Houthi group or push it to re-engage in the political process.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27765.html
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Film: A Different Side of Yemen (Not seen on Mainstream Media)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3qTyyAIaLw
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According to sources from Taiz residents, there are preparations to open the Hawban road.
https://twitter.com/AhmadAlgohbary/status/1460010283708071938
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Why Marib's liberation will break the Saudis and shake West Asia
If Ansarallah controls Marib, it will control all of Yemen and some of the world's most strategic waterways. No wonder its adversaries are shaken.
In 2019, Ansarallah marched eastward, increasing their defence operations inside Saudi Arabia, and targeting the capital city of Riyadh, airports, and Aramco facilities in retaliation for Saudi airstrikes. The UAE was also threatened when drone activity caused a brief closure of Dubai airport.
The UAE’s very existence depends on the security of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Understanding that they were one ballistic missile away from an existential disaster, the Emiratis withdrew from Marib leaving the Saudis to their own devices, and headed south. The ten-nation coalition had now dwindled to two, neither of whom were fighting alongside the other.
For Sanaa, access to oil is a higher priority than access to ports, hence Ansarallah’s decision to first push eastward, where Marib lies. Although the reverse would have been easier – at 17,000 km², Marib requires a huge military presence, while Hodeidah port and its surrounding areas are less than 1,000 km² – the Yemeni rebels chose the harder, more dangerous fight first.
Today, the complete liberation of Marib is imminent. Of its 14 districts, 13 are now back in Yemeni hands, with only Marib city and the oil fields remaining, alongside one major Saudi military base (Sahen Jin).
Marib’s liberation will be an unprecedented victory for Ansarallah that will place Sanaa back firmly on the world map. Aside from the huge morale boost for the Houthi rebels, Ansarallah will gain control of Yemen’s vital water and oil resources and bring relief for the capital’s civilians. Despite the fact that areas controlled by the group enjoy more financial stability ($1 = 600 Yemeni Rials versus 1,480 Rials in areas outside their control) the war has impoverished Sanaa.
Marib’s liberation will also mean that Ansarallah will govern around 80 percent of the Yemeni population of 30 million, secure its eastern front, and make a move on Hodeidah where remaining coalition forces are based.
After the liberation of Hodeidah and Marib, Saudi Arabia will lose its boots on the ground in Yemen, but will it retreat and accept defeat?
https://thecradle.co/Article/Analysis/3514
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Mediator @HadiGumaan who risks his life everyday evacuating corpses from frontline asks @ICRC_ye for support with basic equipment. I am v surprised ICRC has not capitalized on volunteers like Hadi to help it do its work in #Yemen
https://twitter.com/Ndawsari/status/1459599401333280774
referring to
Film: Local mediators in #Yemen face many difficulties in their humanitarian work, putting their lives at risk. In this video, I was shown, accompanied by a group of volunteers, as we retrieved dozens of corpses from one of the fighting fronts in Al-Ghail District, Al-Jawf Governorate in 2018, where we miraculously escaped from 3 air raids targeting the site.
https://twitter.com/HadiGumaan/status/1457772317510017029
Film: Some ask why we enter the frontlines to retrieve the bodies without coordinating with the coalition. I would like to make it clear to them that there is no available communication channel, and what we are doing is coordinating with the parties controlling the front. We also lack the simplest capabilities, and here I am extending an invitation to the Red Cross in #Yemen @ICRC_ye Provide me with corpse bags
https://twitter.com/HadiGumaan/status/1459449251738574849
cp2a Saudische Blockade / Saudi blockade
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$12 billion indirect losses in Yemen due to coalition’s piracy on fuel ships in 2021
The Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) has estimated the direct losses of the national economy as a result of the difference in the costs of obtaining fuel due to the blockade at more than 600 million dollars since the beginning of 2021, while the indirect losses are estimated at more than 12 billion dollars.
http://en.ypagency.net/243948/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/11/16/yemeni-economy-lost-over-12-billion-dollars-in-2021-due-to-saudi-oil-blockade/
cp3 Humanitäre Lage / Humanitarian situation
Siehe / Look at cp1
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Film: EVENT: A New Narrative on Aid to Yemen: Toward Effective Humanitarian Practice
On November 8, 2021 the Sana'a Center Geneva Association and the MENA Student Initiative hosted a panel discussion on our latest report "When Aid Goes Awry: How the International Humanitarian Response is Failing Yemen". Speakers: Sarah Vuylsteke the author of the report on humanitarian aid in Yemen Farea Al-Muslimi the chairman and co-founder of the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOYZB3Q4jXQ&t=0s
and from this film:
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Film: Farea's Statement in Geneva Event "A New Narrative on Aid to Yemen"
On November 8, 2021 Sana'a Center Chairman Farea Al Muslimi delivered a statement at Geneva on our latest report "When Aid Goes Awry: How the International Humanitarian Response is Failing Yemen".
On November 8, 2021 Sana'a Center Chairman Farea Al Muslimi delivered a statement at Geneva on our latest report "When Aid Goes Awry: How the International Humanitarian Response is Failing Yemen". To watch the full event click here: https://youtu.be/dOYZB3Q4jXQ
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Jemen: Mobile Kliniken machen medizinische Versorgung in der Krise möglich
Die Nichtregierungsorganisation ADRA kümmert sich mit deutscher Unterstützung um grundlegende medizinische Versorgung der Menschen im Jemen.
Die Bundesregierung stellt im Jahr 2021 insgesamt 200 Mio. Euro für den Hilfsplan der Vereinten Nationen bereit. Damit werden Organisationen wie ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency) gefördert. Die Nichtregierungsorganisation ist bereits seit mehr als 25 Jahren vor Ort tätig und verfügt dadurch über ein breites Netzwerk an Kontaktpersonen. Dies ist ein wichtiger Vorteil, vor allem, wenn es um humanitären Zugang geht.
ADRA unterstützt im Norden und Süden des Landes acht Gesundheitseinrichtungen. Dort erhalten Menschen lebenswichtige medizinische Versorgung, wenn sie etwa mit Cholera infiziert sind oder an Unterernährung leiden.
ADRA passt seine Unterstützung immer an die konkreten örtlichen Gegebenheiten an.
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/themen/humanitaere-hilfe/huhi-jemen/2496418
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Yemen: mobile clinics make medical care possible amid the crisis
The non-governmental organisation ADRA is providing basic medical care to the people in Yemen with German support.
In 2021, the Federal Government has earmarked a total of 200 million euro for the United Nations assistance plan. This is used to support organisations such as ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency). The non-governmental organisation has been active on the ground for more than 25 years and can therefore draw on a broad network of contacts. That is a great advantage, particularly when humanitarian access is at stake.
ADRA supports eight healthcare facilities in the north and south of the country, where people can receive vital medical care, for example if they are suffering from cholera or malnutrition.
ADRA always adapts its support to the specific local situation.
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/humanitarianassistance/huas-yemen/2496446
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Jemen: „Nach wie vor eine Tragödie“, sagt Bischof Hinder
Nach sieben Jahren Krieg ist der Jemen ist aus den Schlagzeilen verschwunden, aber die Lage ist dort „nach wie vor eine Tragödie“. Das sagte uns der Apostolische Vikar für Arabien, Bischof Paul Hinder. Wir sprachen mit ihm am Rand eines Interreligiösen Gipfels bei der EXPO in Dubai in den Vereinten Arabischen Emiraten.
https://www.vaticannews.va/de/welt/news/2021-11/jemen-tragoedie-bischof-paul-hinder-arabien.html
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"Ich bin stärker als Bomben und Krieg"
Spenden Sie Kraft für viele kleine Schritte in eine gesunde Zukunft
Eine Bombenexplosion verletzt Achmed Darwesch schwer am Bein. So schwer, dass er es beinahe verliert. Denn im Jemen fehlt es an adäquater medizinischer Versorgung. Aber er hat Glück: Achmed kann in unser Fachkrankenhaus in Amman, Jordanien überwiesen werden. Dort operieren unsere Chirurg*innen den Jungen und retten sein Bein. Mit seiner Physiotherapeutin Rula Marahfeh trainiert er danach täglich und erobert sich Schritt für Schritt sein Leben zurück.
Unser Krankenhaus für rekonstruktive Medizin.
Neben der Chirurgie gibt es hier ein Labor für Mikrobiologie und eine Physiotherapie. Außerdem stellen wir Prothesen im 3D-Druck-Verfahren her, die individuell auf die Bedürfnisse der Patient*innen angepasst werden. Die 200 Betten sind fast immer belegt, denn unsere Patient*innen kommen aus der ganzen Region – aus dem Irak, Syrien, dem Jemen und den Palästinensischen Autonomiegebieten.
https://www.aerzte-ohne-grenzen.de/spenden/staerker-als-krieg
Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZ3lONG9WH4
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2018 - 2021 SFD built 64,315 water harvesting tanks serving 431,835 people. We measure time to fetch water & period it lasts: Dry seasons, it falls by 63% & lasts 2.1 months. Our new vision explores how to link WASH & Education for bigger impact on school enrolment for girls.
https://twitter.com/Wesamqaid/status/1460869380225609733
Despite clear evidences showing the Yemenis' need to #Cash & #SustainableServices, #SFDYemen has received far less FUNDING than in pre-crisis. This is the time that #Yemen most needs long-term aid not to ensure survival only but also #Resilience #Recovery #HumanCapital protection
https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1458832054678863875
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Yemen Plan to reach 5.1 million people at risk of famine
Urgent life-saving assistance remains critical, while significant investments in economic and infrastructure and institutional rehabilitation are needed to prevent further destitution and help the country recover from seven years of conflict. The economic crisis, an outcome of the protracted conflict, is another key driver of food insecurity. High levels of food insecurity persist as the crisis has devastated livelihoods and the economy and pushed households to exhaust coping strategies.
Yemen is living on the brink of famine. An estimated 16.2 million people, 45 percent of Yemen’s population, are acutely food insecure even with the presence of food assistance. Of those, 11 million people have reached ‘crisis’ levels of food insecurity, classified as Phase 3 in the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC); another 5 million people have reached ‘emergency’ levels (IPC Phase 4); and 47,000 people have reached ‘catastrophe’ or famine-like levels (IPC Phase 5). This is the first return of IPC 5 conditions in Yemen in the last two years. Compared to 2018, the number of districts in IPC Phase 4 conditions tripled, from 49 to 154, out of 333 in Yemen
https://www.wfp.org/publications/country-plans-highlighting-needs-face-famine
(B H)
Rural Female Teachers in Yemen encourage young girls to get an education
The lack of female professionals in many spheres, including education, reduces Yemenis women's opportunities to learn and thrive
Among over two million children out of school today in Yemen, the majority are girls. Basic education remains unavailable for many girls, especially those who live in remote rural areas.
The lack of female professionals in many spheres, including education, reduces Yemenis women's opportunities to learn and thrive. However, this is not the only reason why so many girls remain out of school today.
"I have many friends who stopped studying because the school is too far and most parents do not want their daughters to be taught by male teachers ," says Jawaher, one of Eman's students, " also many girls leave school because they get married."
Adolescent marriages are another reason why many Yemeni girls do not enroll or complete their studies. More than two-thirds of girls in Yemen marry before they turn 18. Girls are being forced into early marriage, where they remain trapped in a cycle of poverty and unfulfilled potential.
That is why the role of a female rural teacher like Eman also includes a lot of persuasion and diplomacy to convince families of the importance of education for girls.
https://www.unicef.org/yemen/stories/rural-female-teachers-yemen-encourage-young-girls-get-education
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Film: A Lifeline For Aseel, A Severely Malnourished 2-Year-Old In Yemen
UNICEF is working with partners to provide lifesaving care for acutely malnourished children in Yemen
It's the silence that visitors to Yemen's therapeutic feeding centers notice first. The beds are full, but the children waiting for treatment are often too weak to make a sound.
At Al-Sabeen Hospital in Sana'a City, Ali Mohammad is worried about his 2-year-old nephew, Aseel, a tiny boy who has suffered from severe acute malnutrition (SAM) since he was 2 months old. Without treatment, SAM can be fatal.
"I've experienced this before, when my kids were ill," says Mohammad. "The first was my daughter. She was suffering from malnutrition. We took her to the malnutrition unit, but she died. She was 5 years old. Then next was her brother. The same happened to him; he was 3." "I hope they can help [Aseel] so that we don't lose him too, like I lost my kids. One after the other and ... they died in front of my eyes."
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pxl-1BcggQQ
(B H)
Injured By A Landmine, 17-Year-Old Ibrahim Can Walk Again In Yemen
UNICEF is working with partners to reach children like Ibrahim, one of more than 2 million children killed or injured since violence escalated in Yemen in 2015.
Ibrahim, 17, was tending his family's flock of sheep when he stepped on a landmine near Ibb City, Yemen.
"My sister was shouting, 'Ibrahim! Ibrahim!' I shouted 'I have no legs!' and she carried me," he recalls. "She took me home and then the people in my village took me to the hospital."
At the hospital in Ibb City, doctors operated. "After the operation, I woke up and I didn't see my legs," says Ibrahim." I was very sad and upset because I couldn't run and play with my friends."
At a UNICEF-supported prostheses and physiotherapy center in Aden, Ibrahim was fitted with artificial limbs. Physiotherapists helped him learn to walk again.
Film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vKo84pGBUMI
(B H K)
Yemen’s ongoing catastrophe sinks to a new low
Hunger is getting worse in Yemen, where 16 million people were already “marching towards starvation” according to the World Food Program (WFP). Today, some 20.7 million Yemenis need immediate help, the United Nations reports.
By September 2021, food prices had risen by as much as 60 percent from the start of the year. This was largely precipitated by the Yemeni rial’s plunge of nearly 40 percent over the same period in southern areas under the control of the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG).
The ever-rising prices have made it substantially harder for ordinary Yemenis to afford their basic needs, as an estimated 80 percent of the total population was already living below the poverty line due to the impact of nearly seven years of war and Covid-19.
“The conflict’s military aspects are limited to specific fronts in the country,” said Rafat Al-Akhali, convener of the Council on State Fragility at Oxford’s International Growth Center. “But economic conflict is impacting every single person in the country and is driving millions of Yemenis to the edge of famine.”
Within this shattered economy, God’s blessing has been evident through an Economic Development program granting small business loans.
https://www.mnnonline.org/news/yemens-ongoing-catastrophe-sinks-to-a-new-low/
(B H)
Film: Solar-Powered Submersible Water Pumps in Yemen
Yemen is one of the world’s most water-stressed countries. Its fragile water system is collapsing amid ongoing conflict. People are forced to use unsafe water sources. But solar-powered water pumps brought a green solution. Our Climate Stories series highlights the World Bank Group's support for investments, solutions and innovations on climate action
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sAlPLG2Ld-E
(B H)
Yemen Women Protection AoR Services, Jan-Oct 2021 / Oct 2021
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-women-protection-aor-services-jan-oct-2021
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-women-protection-aor-services-oct-2021
(* B H)
75% of Yemeni children suffer from acute malnutrition: WHO
WHO says 16.2 million Yemenis are food insecure
Seventy-five percent of Yemeni children suffer from acute malnutrition, the World Health Organization (WHO) said on Monday.
In a Twitter post, the UN body said 16.2 million – representing more than half of the country’s population of 30 million – are food insecure.
Last month, the UN Security Council expressed “grave concern for the dire humanitarian situation (in Yemen), including prolonged starvation and the growing risk of large-scale famine, which is compounded by the dire economic situation.”
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/health/75-of-yemeni-children-suffer-from-acute-malnutrition-who/2421237
(B H)
Film: 15 million Yemenis do not have access to clean water
https://twitter.com/ICRC_ye/status/1459923490874740738
(B H)
#Tamkeen_Program is evolving rapidly reaching today to medium-size projects: building febrile illness dept (2nd floor) @ #Abs Hospital #Hajjah. Such a lifesaving project is selected from district recovery plans reflicting needs of the poor Funded by #ERRY @EUinYemen @UNDPYemen (photos)
https://twitter.com/SFDYemen/status/1459594165143097347
(* B E H)
Film: Fuel and LPG Shortage Leads for Excessive Logging Yemen is facing a huge crisis in fuel availability, including the domestic LPG; therefore, many locals were pushed to use firewood, represented in a random cutting for trees, which threatens the ground cover of vegetation in Yemen. "Approximately 886,000 trees are cut down annually in Yemen to operate bakeries and restaurants in Sana'a only." according to Yemeni Environmental Protection Authority. The use of firewood in many domestic and professional purposes has led to a noticeable increase in its prices, and because citizens are logging in their private lands, this has led to an increase in this phenomenon.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tSWiCgO3Fa8
cp4 Flüchtlinge / Refugees
(* B H K)
Yemen — Rapid Displacement Tracking Update (31 October to 6 November)
During the reporting period, between 31 October and 06 November 2021, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 2,443 households (14,658 individuals) displaced at least once. Conflict was the main reason for displacement, accounting for 99.75 per cent (2,437 HH) of the total, followed by economic reasons, accounting for 0.25 per cent (6 HH). From 01 January 2021 to 6 November 2021, IOM Yemen DTM estimates that 18,066 households (HH) (108,396 Individuals) have experi[1]enced displacement at least once.
Some 747 HH displaced in the previous reporting period (24 – 30 October 2021) in governorates of Marib, Al Maharah, Abyan, Hadramawt and Al Hodeidah were only identified in the current reporting period. This figure has been added to the cumulative displacement total recorded from the beginning of the year.
(A H P)
Yemen has no information about Yemeni refugees in Belarus: Interior Minister
(A H P)
Live Updates: 850 Refugees Arrive at Logistics Centre in Belarus, Others Stay at Polish Border
Some 3,500 migrants have gathered at the closed Kuznica checkpoint on the Polish-Belarusian border, a spokesman for Poland's special services, Stanislaw Zaryn, said on Monday.
(B H)
Jemen: Der Wunsch, zu leben, und die Hoffnung auf eine bessere Zukunft
Meister Ayad und seine Frau leben in einem Camp für intern Vertriebene im Bezirk Al Dhale im Jemen. Das Paar verkörpert ein Stück Hoffnung.
Er hat den uns seine Familie vorgestellt und ihre Geschichte erzählt. Als ihr Dorf im Norden von Al Dhale 2015 zu einem Schlachtfeld wurde, flohen sie vor der eskalierenden Krise aus ihrem Haus. Ayad wurde während der Kämpfe verletzt und verlor ein Bein. Haus und Hof der Familie wurden zerstört, wie die von über 50 anderen geflüchteten Familien. Bis heute kann niemand von ihnen zurückkehren. «Es war schrecklich. Wir haben nichts gemacht, trotzdem haben wir alles verloren. Ich will nicht mehr zurück», sagt ein Bub im Lager.
Nach ihrer Flucht, war es für die Familie schwierig, einen sicheren Ort zu finden.
Sechs Jahre später leben sie ebenso wie der Rest der Gemeinschaft immer noch in einem Camp. Sie erhalten ein wenig Unterstützung von Organisationen und Einheimischen, doch die Lebensbedingungen bleiben erbärmlich. Sie können weder Landwirtschaft betreiben, noch ihre Kinder zur Schule schicken (Fotos)
(A H)
“Applying proper hygiene practices protects my family from communicable disease,” said a person who was recently displaced in Ma’rib. IOM and @eu_echo provided 150 newly displaced families in with hygiene kits and hygiene awareness sessions last week (photo)
https://twitter.com/IOM_Yemen/status/1460236153844649988
(A H P)
Route Dubai-Minsk: Belavia führt Flugverbot für Afghanen, Iraker, Syrer und Jemeniten ein
Die weißrussische Fluglinie Belavia hat im Zusammenhang mit der Migrationskrise an der EU-Grenze neue Regeln für Bürger Afghanistans, des Irak, des Jemen und Syriens eingeführt: Sie dürfen nicht an Bord von Flügen aus Dubai nach Minsk. Dieser Schritt folgt auf eine entsprechende Entscheidung der Regierung der Vereinten Arabischen Emirate (VAE).
(A H P)
Belavia news
To the attention of citizens of Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan flying from Dubai.
According to the decision of the competent authorities of UAE please note that starting from 14.11.2021 citizens of Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria will not be accepted for boarding on flights from Dubai to Minsk. In this regard, Belavia is strengthening documents verification during check-in for flights from Dubai.
Passengers subject to this ban can refund their tickets at the place of purchase.
https://en.belavia.by/news/4836732/
(A H P)
UAE curbs flights to Belarus amid migrant crisis
The United Arab Emirates has barred Afghan, Syrian, Yemeni and Iraqi citizens from flights to Minsk on Monday that the European Union says were used to fly in migrants by the thousands to engineer a humanitarian crisis on its frontier.
(* A H K)
Fighting near key Yemen port displaces over 6,000: UN
A recent Houthi rebel advance near Yemen's lifeline port of Hodeida has displaced more than 6,000 people, the United Nations has said.
The insurgents on Friday took control of a large area south of Hodeida, a key port where the warring sides agreed a ceasefire in 2018, after loyalist forces withdrew.
"Some 700 families (approximately 4,900 people) were displaced" to Khokha, over 100 kilometres (60 miles) south of Hodeida, "while 184 other families (about 1,300 people) were displaced further south" to the Red Sea coastal town of Mokha, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said, citing Yemeni government sources.
"No displacement has been reported within the areas that came under control of the de facto authorities," it said in a statement Sunday, referring to the Houthis.
Citing aid partners on the ground, it said a 300-tent site for displaced people had been set up in the Khokha district, while the authorities were reportedly looking for another site to cope with the influx.
But the UN also said the Houthi advance could result in "improved movement for civilians" between the provinces of Hodeida and Sanaa, and along roads connecting Hodeida city with other districts.
https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/fighting-near-key-yemen-port-displaces-over-6000-un
and also https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-hodeida-houthi-advance-thousands-displaced
https://www.rfi.fr/en/middle-east/20211115-fighting-near-key-yemen-port-displaces-over-6-000-un
(* A H K)
Yemen Opens 16 New Refugee Camps in Marib
The local authorities in Marib opened 16 new camps in Medina and al-Wadi to accommodate the large numbers of displaced people who fled their regions escaping Houthi militias' attacks.
The local authorities informed the organizations operating in the governorate that the displaced from Rahba, Mahlia, Harib, al-Abdiyya, and al-Juba have been living in miserable humanitarian conditions for the past two months.
The authorities called on the United Nations, its organizations, and all humanitarian partners to carry out their moral and humanitarian duty towards more than 13,500 families, including about 93,387 persons displaced by the Houthi militias.
Local officials and relief organizations said the newly displaced people are in camps that lack basic humanitarian needs and most necessary services.
The camps lack the minimum requirements for a decent life amid limited involvement of international organizations and the absence of humanitarian relief and emergency housing projects in those camps.
Thousands flock to the camps daily, especially since the United Nations has admitted that it does not have any strategic food stocks in the governorate to face such situations, prompting the UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen David Gressly to request $3 million for this purpose.
https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3303531/yemen-opens-16-new-refugee-camps-marib
cp5 Nordjemen und Huthis / Northern Yemen and Houthis
(A P)
Parliament condemns aggression coalition's continual airstrikes on Yemen
https://www.saba.ye/en/news3164314.htm
(B P)
Anti-corruption advocates and spoilers lied from Ahmed Hamed to the youngest official
The presidency of the Civil Status Authority in Sana’a has become an institution for collecting fines without official documentation (and I am responsible for my words) and every employee continues to blackmail the citizen from one week to ten days without completing a transaction for him and keeps visiting the authority from two to three months
There is no transparency, no oversight, no accountability; There is no specific date for completing the transactions, and the offices are full of clients, while the employees are outside their offices, and they come at the end of the day to complete the transactions of the brokers.
The government of interest and war that collects money and harvests lives and does not guarantee the completion of transactions in accordance with the law and order and leaves the employees blackmailing citizens in the way they want and on the pretext that they are without salaries.
https://twitter.com/Naseh_Shaker/status/1460946510238171138
(A P)
Houthi extremists shoots injured two Korean doctors
A Houthi extremist shot injured two Korean doctors in the Shiit militia's stronghold of Saada on Monday, local sources have said.
The militant was shouting the militia's known stronghold of "Death to America" while opening fire on the doctors in the Republican Hospital at the governorate.
The two aid workers are now in the Intensive Care Unit, the sources said.
https://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-52168
(A P)
Parliament condemns coalition’s crime of executing prisoners
http://en.ypagency.net/243926/
(* B P)
Bahais in Yemen | Investigation
The investigation documents the abuse and harassment the Baha'is minority face by Ansar Allah (Houthis) in Yemen. The abuse has resulted in issuing death sentences against their leaders and then forcing them to exile Yemen.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5lU-2t2n0Gk&t=1s
(A P)
Houthi group says wants to be source of peace, not source of threat
Vice minister of foreign affairs in the Houthi government Hussein Al-Ezzi said on Saturday his group wants to be a source of peace not a source of threat to anyone, warning of impromptu thoughts and evil proposals that might destroy the remaining trends of the group towards peace.
The Iran-allied Houthi group ousted the internationally recognised government and seized power in late 2014, sparking a civil war which has caused the largest humanitarian crisis in the world.
For the sake of peace, it is important that the leadership of the Saudi-led coalition and the international community realise the real desire of Sanaa for peace, he said.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27751.html
(A P)
Yemenis have always sought peace, dialogue: Official
A senior member of Yemen’s Supreme Revolutionary Committee said Yemenis have always sought dialogue and peace.
Mohammed Ali al-Houthi said the Yemeni nation prefers peace to war and wants dialogue, al-Ahed News reported.
“We were the ones that after the September 21 Revolution moved toward peace agreement and power sharing,” he added.
He noted that any talks on ending the war will be made based on the conditions that the leader of the Yemeni revolution, Abdul Malik Badreddin al-Houthi specified in a speech marking the birthday of the Holy Prophet (PBUH).
https://en.abna24.com/news//yemenis-have-always-sought-peace-dialogue-official_1198229.html
(A P)
Mohammed al-Houthi: Yemenis’ decision in the capital Sanaa
Mohammad Ali Al-Houthi, member of the Supreme Political Council on Saturday confirmed that the Saudi-led aggression forces realize that the Yemenis’ decision is being made in the capital, Sanaa, and not in any other capital.
During the inauguration of the first training program for preparing and drafting laws and regulations at the Ministry of Legal Affairs, Mohammed Al-Houthi said: We urgently need to reconsider all laws that allow access to public money, indicating that it is not absolutely acceptable obstruction of justice under the heading of compliance with laws and regulations.
https://en.ypagency.net/243739/
(A P)
Houthis deny storming US 'closed' embassy, detaining staffers in Sana'a
Member of the Houthi Supreme Political Council criticized Washington on Sunday after the Department of State accused his Iranian-backed group of storming the mission building in Sana'a City.
The US embassy was evacuated by the Americans," Mohamed Ali al-Houthi tweeted. "Nearly in 2019, they announced stopping the payments for the [embassy's] local staffers in Yemen. And now they claim that a closed embassy was raided and staffers were arrested.
"Pay the salaries of local staff," he added addressing the US. "It's ingratitude to cut wages of those who served you during Yemen's tragic conditions. You abandoned them as the case in Afghanistan."
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27763.html
cp6 Südjemen und Hadi-Regierung / Southern Yemen and Hadi-government
(* B P)
The Future of the «Security Turmoil» in South Yemen
1- The repercussions of Covid-19 pandemic
This pandemic added more complexities to the internal interactions and the settlement patterns. This directly triggered the escalation of the "security unrest". Moreover, the pandemic pushed in the direction of employing the regional actors (such as Israel, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, the KSA, the UAE and Qatar) as well local parties (such as the Houthis, the STC, the Madkhali Salafi fighters in Yemen...etc) to deepen the regional and the international polarities. This necessitates more time to reach consensual solutions and treat its negative effects. For example, the international and regional settlements reduced "the Yemeni issue" into "security\relief perspective regardless to the scale of internal complexities and their entanglement with the international and regional dimensions, as well as ignoring the "elitist division" and the state's failure to manage its internal institutions and external alliances.
2-Reproduce\expansion of the AQAP:
A number of factors contributed in the expansion and survival of the AQAP in Yemen in spite of all blows that hit it since the beginning of the current century given the following points:
- The first factor: There are a number of incentive pillars that boost Yemen's strategic position in the AQAP's mentality
The second factor: is the political employment of the extremist groups and the AQAP elements for serving the local parties’ special interests.
The third factor: is based on the pattern of the alliance relationships that connected the AQAP with other extremist organizations, especially the Muslim Brotherhood
The fourth factor: is related to a state of tension along with political and security instability Yemen has witnessed since the 1990s
- Skirmishes/the Houthi expansion in South Yemen
By the geographical move towards South Yemen, the Houthis attempt to control the Yemeni demographic map and the sources of its Southern resources in order to use redrawing the conflict’s field geography as one of the political negotiation cards in a peaceful settlement process in case of re-submitting it by the fourth UN Envoy.
4- The failure to reach a peaceful political settlement with UN and regional efforts:
There have been no talks so far about creating common areas among different parties involved in the Yemeni issue as a prelude for fulfilling the requirements of a “peaceful settlement” which always fails as result of not considering the internal complexities of the Yemeni community or the roots of the local issues as well as the scale of regional and international entanglements.
Thirdly-the future of “security turmoil”:
Given the scale of political, military and strategic developments in South Yemen, there are a number of tracks which would determine the future of “the security turmoil” as follow:
Finally, the triggers of “the security turmoil” in South Yemen are full of several pillars which are diversified between internal and external ones upon which the regional and international competitive policies are built. This is based on the geopolitical importance of South Yemen, and requires a number of moves on the internal, regional and the UN levels to fulfill the requirements of the “political settlement” whose outcomes have direct impact on containing and besieging the security threats in Yemen.
https://south24.net/news/newse.php?nid=2227
(A P)
Shabwa holds huge gathering against Houthi-Brotherhood plots
Hundreds of high-ranking dignitaries, tribal leaders and public figures took part in an extensive consultative meeting held outdoor on Tuesday in Shabwa's Nisab district.
The huge gathering is called for by the tribal chief Awad Ibn A-Wazir Al-Awlaki to discuss means the face the serious consequences of the recent handing over of Bihan's districts to the Iranian-backed rebels and to thwart the joint Houthi-Muslim Brotherhood plot to occupy the territories of the oil-rich province.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34076
(A K P)
Saudi occupation forces hand over positions to UAE-backed separatists in Socotra
The so-called “808th Saudi forces” have withdrawn from the port of the Yemeni Island of Socotra, local sources reported on Monday.
The Saudi forces present in Morey area and Socotra port suddenly transferred their military vehicles and handed them over to the UAE-backed militias (affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council), according to the sources.
The sources stated that the Saudi military vehicles moved from the port to recently established military sites near the airport of Hadibo city, the island’s capital, indicating that they had not left Socotra.
(* A K P)
British forces occupy fishing sites in Mahrah
Local sources in Mahrah Province confirmed, on Monday, that the British occupation forces attacked fishermen in the coastal districts of Qishn and Sayhut in Mahrah and prevented them from practicing their work in the fishing areas.
According to September 26 newspaper of the Ministry of Defense, the Minister of Fisheries, Mohammad Al-Zubayri, said that the battleships in the Arabian Sea expelled the fishermen and prevented them from practicing the fishing profession.
Al-Zubayri added that the British forces occupied the sites of the fishermen in the coasts of Qishn and Sihut in Mahrah, and then took locations and housing for their units and military equipment, noting that these forces dug trenches around those sites with the help of the aggression militias in the governorate.
http://en.ypagency.net/243990/
(A K P)
STC transfers ‘weapons and ammunition’ to Zinjibar district in Abyan
The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) has transported large quantities of weapons and ammunition from Aden to his forces in Abyan province
This was reported by Yemen News Portal, based on testimony of local sources.
The large quantity of equipment was transported on about 30 containers to the village of Sheikh Abdullah in Zinjibar district, the centre of Abyan province, according to the sources.
Some of these weapons were piled up at al-Wahda stadium, while others went to transitional forces positions on the lines of contact with Hadi’s forces in Khanfar district, east of Zanzibar.
http://en.ypagency.net/243993/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/11/16/uae-backed-separatists-transport-large-amounts-of-weaponry-to-abyan-province/
(A K P)
UAE refuses ceding Balhaf facility, pays 90,000 mercenaries monthly: Shabwa governor
The United Arab Emirates refuses to leave the Yemeni gas facility Balhaf in Shabwa governorate, Shabwa governor said on Sunday, accusing Abu Dhabi of creating militias opposing the Yemeni State and paying monthly salaries to 90,000 mercenaries.
Trust in Emirates was lost, they bear nicknames only, Mohamed Bin Edio added in interview with the Sputnik International, as "we don't know their names."
Shabwa local authorities are denied access to Balhaf port, where nearly 100 Emiratis were positioned for security, in addition to fewer numbers of Sudanese and Bahrainis, the Yemeni official said.
The UAE "created militias opposing the State in Yemen and pays monthly salaries to 90,000 mercenaries," he added.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27776.html
(A K P)
Yemeni-Saudi military meeting discusses recent developments on ground
Commander of the Saudi-led coalition, Gen Mutlaq al-Ozaime'i, on Monday met with the Yemeni chief of staff, Gen Sagheer Bin Aziz, in Riyadh, the Saudi Press Agency (SPA) said.
The two generals discussed a number of military arrangements in the light of the recent developments witnessed by different fighting fronts, particularly in the Yemeni northeastern governorate of Marib.
https://debriefer.net/en/news-27779.html
(* A K P)
Saudi Arabia Pulls Brigade Out of Yemen's Strategic Island of Socotra
Yemen's Al-Khabar Al-Yemeni news website, citing informed sources, reported that members of the Saudi 808th Duty Brigade have begun pulling out of the island, where they had been stationed since 2018.
The destination of the Royal Saudi Land Forces brigade has not yet been disclosed, amid speculation it will return to the kingdom, as it was the case with a brigade that recently withdrew from the Southern Yemeni port city of Aden.
https://www.farsnews.ir/en/news/14000825000319/Repr-Sadi-Arabia-Plls-Brigade-O-f-Yemen
(A K P)
Saudi forces hand over Socotra port to UAE
The so-called “808th Saudi forces” have withdrawn from the port of the Yemeni Island of Socotra, local sources reported on Monday.
The Saudi forces present in Morey area and Socotra port suddenly transferred their military vehicles and handed them over to the UAE-backed militias (affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council), according to the sources.
The sources stated that the Saudi military vehicles moved from the port to recently established military sites near the airport of Hadibo city, the island’s capital, indicating that they had not left Socotra.
Saudi Arabia sent its forces to the island of Socotra in 2018, after the UAE forces took control of the island under the humanity banner through the Emirates Red Crescent and the Khalifa Foundation in 2016.
http://en.ypagency.net/243931/
(A P)
UAE expels Socotra residents by imposing lethal dose in fuel prices
UAE has worked to expel residents of Socotra by imposing lethal dose in fuel prices in the island.
According to local sources, the Emirati “ADNOC” station imposed a third dose in the selling prices of oil derivatives since the beginning of last September, from 13 to 24 thousand riyals in the price of a gallon of gasoline with a capacity of 20 liters.
https://en.ypagency.net/243817/
(A P)
Major Emirati businessman buying up large plots of land on occupied Socotra island
The UAE occupation has pushed one of its most prominent businessmen to occupy large tracts of land on the Yemeni island of Socotra, amid reports of a joint Emirati-Israeli investment in the strategic island.
This was reported by Yemen News Portal, base on tesnstomey of well-informed sources.
According to the sources, Emirati businessman Tariq Al-Khaja, brother of Abu Dhabi’s ambassador to the Israeli entity, arrived on Socotra island to buy large and strategic piece of land in the island.
The sources explained that the Office of the Land Authority, which is under the control of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), is forcing the indigenous people to sign land grants to Al Khaja.
Observers said the purchase of land on the vital island is part of an Emirati-Israeli plan to set up joint investment projects meant to increase intelligence and military activity for the occupation.
http://en.ypagency.net/243868/ = https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/11/14/major-emirati-businessman-buying-up-large-plots-of-land-on-occupied-socotra-island/
(A P)
Yemen’s Legitimacy [Hadi gov.] Demands an End to Hezbollah’s Intervention in Yemeni Affairs
The Yemeni legitimate government called on the Lebanese government, the Arab League, and the international community to pressure the Lebanese Hezbollah to stop its interference in Yemeni affairs.
Yemeni Minister of Information, Culture, and Tourism Muammar al-Eryani said that the statements of the Secretary-General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah reveal the involvement of the Tehran regime in Marib battle, as a battle of fate for its expansionist sectarian project, and its significance as a starting point for changing the region and the world.
(A T)
I wish I had died with my wife, says Yemeni journalist who survived car bombing
Mahmoud Al Otmi says he was attacked by Iran-backed Houthi rebels for his views
Yemeni journalist Mahmoud Al Otmi, who survived a car bomb that killed his pregnant wife in Aden last week, lay in hospital with an empty look on his wounded face. Tears rolling down his cheeks were the only expression of his agony.
“I wish I had died with Rasha,” Mr Al Otmi said as he recalled the horror of the past few weeks.
Rasha Al Harazi, 26, who was also a journalist, and her unborn child died when an explosive device planted on the couple’s car exploded. Al Otmi said he had become a target because of his views on repression carried out by the Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen.
(A T)
2 citizens injured in bomb blast in Abyan
At least two civilians were injured on Saturday when an explosive device went off targeting a military vehicle of Islah party in the coastal city of Shoqra in Abyan province, southern Yemen, the sources said.
http://en.ypagency.net/243692/
(A P)
Brotherhood-legitimacy-authorities-raise-fuel-prices-and-the-people-of-hadhramout-denounce
(A P)
Hadramout witnesses angry popular protests against rise in fuel prices
https://en.ypagency.net/243712/
(A P)
Al-Zubaidi heads to Riyadh on official visit
President of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and Supreme Commander of the Southern Armed Forces, Aidroos Qassem al-Zubaidi left Aden on Monday for Riyadh on an official visit in response to the invitation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The visit is within the framework of the continuous communication between the STC leadership and the Saudi-led Arab Coalition.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34070
(A P)
STC president accepts invitation to visit Riyadh
The Southern Transitional Council (STC) welcomed the invitation extended by Riyadh to its president Aidroos Qassem al-Zubaidi to visit the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
http://en.adenpress.news/news/34056
Fortsetzung / Sequel: cp7 – cp19
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-771b-yemen-war-mosaic-771b
Vorige / Previous:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose/jemenkrieg-mosaik-770-yemen-war-mosaic-770
Jemenkrieg-Mosaik 1-770 / Yemen War Mosaic 1-770:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/dklose oder / or http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
Der saudische Luftkrieg im Bild / Saudi aerial war images:
(18 +, Nichts für Sensible!) / (18 +; Graphic!)
http://poorworld.net/YemenWar.htm
http://yemenwarcrimes.blogspot.de/
Liste aller Luftangriffe / and list of all air raids:
http://yemendataproject.org/data/
Untersuchung ausgewählter Luftangriffe durch Bellingcat / Bellingcat investigations of selected air raids:
Untersuchungen von Angriffen, hunderte von Filmen / Investigations of attacks, hundreds of films:
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